

LIVING HIGH
AND LETTING DIE

Our Illusion of Innocence

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LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: A PUZZLE ABOUT BEHAVIOR TOWARD PEOPLE IN GREAT NEED

Let's explore a puzzle about our behavior toward people in great need. Centrally, it concerns our untutored reactions to two cases, the two *puzzle cases*. For the cases to pose a puzzle, they must be similar in many ways even while they differ in many others. For the puzzle to pack a punch, the cases should be pretty simple and realistic. And, there should be a strong contrast between our intuitive responses to the cases. Now, one of our two puzzle cases will be the Envelope. For a case to pair with it, there should be an example that, though similar to the Shallow Pond in many respects, goes well beyond it in a few. For instance, in the Shallow Pond there's *very little cost* to you, the case's agent; so, in a newly instructive contrast case, there'll be *very considerable cost* to you.

1. A Puzzle about Behavior toward People in Great Need

With those thoughts in mind, this is the first of our cases:

The Vintage Sedan. Not truly rich, your one luxury in life is a vintage Mercedes sedan that, with much time, attention and

money, you've restored to mint condition. In particular, you're pleased by the auto's fine leather seating. One day, you stop at the intersection of two small country roads, both lightly travelled. Hearing a voice screaming for help, you get out and see a man who's wounded and covered with a lot of his blood. Assuring you that his wound's confined to one of his legs, the man also informs you that he was a medical student for two full years. And, despite his expulsion for cheating on his second year final exams, which explains his indigent status since, he's knowledgeable tied his shirt near the wound so as to stop the flow. So, there's no urgent danger of losing his life, you're informed, but there's great danger of losing his limb. This can be prevented, however, if you drive him to a rural hospital fifty miles away. "How did the wound occur?" you ask. An avid bird-watcher, he admits that he trespassed on a nearby field and, in carelessly leaving, cut himself on rusty barbed wire. Now, if you'd aid this trespasser, you must lay him across your fine back seat. But, then, your fine upholstery will be soaked through with blood, and restoring the car will cost over five thousand dollars. So, you drive away. Picked up the next day by another driver, he survives but loses the wounded leg.

Except for your behavior, the example's as realistic as it's simple.

Even including the specification of your behavior, our other case is pretty realistic and extremely simple; for convenience, I'll again display it:

The Envelope. In your mailbox, there's something from (the U.S. Committee for) UNICEF. After reading it through, you correctly believe that, unless you soon send in a check for \$100, then, instead of each living many more years, over thirty more children will die soon. But, you throw the material in your trash basket, including the convenient return envelope provided, you send nothing, and, instead of living many years, over thirty more children soon die than would have had you sent in the requested \$100.

Taken together, these contrast cases will promote the chapter's primary puzzle.

Toward having the puzzle be instructive, I'll make two stipulations for understanding the examples. The first is this: Beyond what's explicitly stated in each case's presentation, or what's clearly implied by it, there aren't ever any bad consequences of your conduct for anyone

and, what's more, there's nothing else that's morally objectionable about it.¹ In effect, this means we're to understand a proposed scenario so that it is as boring as possible. Easily applied by all, in short the stipulation is: *Be boring!*

Also easily effected, the other stipulation concerns an agent's motivation, and its relation to her behavior: As much as can make sense, the agent's motivation in one contrast case, and its relation to her conduct there, is like that in the other. Not chasing perfection, here it's easy to assume a motivational parallel that's strong enough to prove instructive: Far from being moved by any malice toward the needy, in both our puzzle cases, your main motivation is simply your concern to maintain your nice asset position. So, even as it's just this that, in the Envelope, mainly moves you to donate nothing; it's also just this that, in the Sedan, similarly moves you to offer no aid.

Better than ever, we can ask these two key questions: What's our intuitive moral assessment of your conduct in the Vintage Sedan? And, what's our untutored moral judgment of your behavior in the Envelope? As we react, in the Sedan your behavior was very seriously wrong. And, we respond, in the Envelope your conduct wasn't even mildly wrong. This wide divergence presents a puzzle: Between the cases, is there a difference that adequately grounds these divergent intuitive assessments?

Since at least five obvious factors favor the proposition that the Envelope's conduct was *worse* than the Sedan's, at the outset the prospects look bleak: First, even just financially, in the Vintage Sedan the cost to the agent is *over fifty times* that in the Envelope; and, with *nonfinancial* cost also considered, the difference is greater still. Second, in the Sedan, the reasonably expected consequences of your conduct, and also the actual consequences, were that *only one* person suffered a serious loss; but, in the Envelope, they were that *over thirty* people suffered seriously. Third, in the Sedan the *greatest loss suffered*

1. To understand our cases according to this usefully simplifying stipulation, we should have a good idea of what's to count as clearly implied by the statement of an example. Toward that end, perhaps even just a few words may prove very helpful. First, some fairly general words: To be clearly implied by such a statement, a proposition needn't be logically entailed by the statement. Nor need it be entailed even by a conjunction of the statement and a group of logical, mathematical, analytical or purely conceptual truths. Rather, it's enough that the proposition be entailed by a conjunction of the statement with others that are each commonly known to be true. Second, some more specific words: With both our puzzle cases, it's only in a *very boringly balanced* way that we're to think of the case's relevantly vulnerable people. Thus, even as we're not to think of anyone who might be saved as someone who'll go on to discover an effective cure for AIDS, we're also not to think of anyone as a future despot who'll go on to produce much serious suffering.

by anybody was the loss of a *leg*; but, in the Envelope the *least loss* suffered was *far greater* than that.² Fourth, because he was a mature and well-educated individual, the Sedan's serious loser was *largely responsible* for his own serious situation; but, being just little children, none of the Envelope's serious losers was *at all responsible* for her bad situation. And, fifth, the Sedan's man suffered his loss owing to his objectionable trespassing behavior; but, nothing like that's in the Envelope.

Now, I don't say these five are the only factors bearing on the morality of your conduct in the two cases. Still, with the differential flowing from them as tremendous as what we've just seen, it seems they're almost bound to prevail. So, for Preservationists seeking sense for both a lenient judgment of the Envelope's conduct and a harsh one of the Sedan's, there's a mighty long row to hoe.³

2. An Overview of the Chapter: Distinguishing the Primary from the Secondary Basic Moral Values

In the next section, we'll start the hard work of investigating the "apparently promising" differences between the puzzle cases. Here, I'll provide an overview of how it will proceed and where it may lead.

There are enormously many differences, of course, between the two examples: Only one of them involves a Mercedes automobile. On the other side, only the Envelope involves the postal system. But, as is evident, very nearly all of these enormously many differences haven't any chance of helping to ground a stricter judgment for the Sedan's behavior than the Envelope's. So, the job at hand may well be manage-

2. Among other reasons, this accommodates the friends of John Taurek's wildly incorrect paper, but highly stimulating essay, "Should the Numbers Count?" *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1977. But, as even some of the earliest replies to it show, no accommodation is really necessary; flawed only by some minor errors, a reasonably successful reply is Derek Parfit's "Innumerate Ethics," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1978. So, my making this accommodation is an act of philosophical supererogation.

3. For the moment, suppose that, as the five factors indicate, your conduct in the Envelope was at least as bad as in the Sedan. From a purely logical point of view, there's naught to choose between the two salient ways of adjusting our moral thinking: (1) *The Negative Response*. While continuing to hold that your conduct in the Envelope *wasn't* wrong, we may hold that, despite initial appearances, your conduct in the Sedan *wasn't* wrong. (2) *The Libertarianist Response*. While continuing to hold that your conduct in the Sedan *was wrong*, we may hold that, despite initial appearances, your conduct in the Envelope *also was wrong*. But, since we're more than just logic to go on, we can see the Libertarianist Response is far superior. So, unless there's a sound way to hoe that mighty long row, we should conclude, with Libertarianism, that the Envelope's conduct was very seriously wrong.

able. First, we'll try to look at genuine differences one by one. But, sometimes we'll confront thoughts that, though they might first appear to locate differential factors, really don't find any. With some of these thoughts, the fault's that the idea doesn't really fasten on any factor at all. With others, the fault's that the factor's really present in both puzzle cases, not just the one where it's obvious.

Going beyond all such confusions, we'll note some factors that do differentiate between our puzzle cases. Each time that happens, we'll ask: Does this difference do much to favor a harsh judgment only for the Sedan's conduct, and not for the Envelope's? In trying to answer, each time we'll consult our two main guides. On the one hand, we'll note our *moral intuitions on particular cases*. On the other, we'll note the deliverance of what I'll call our *general moral common sense*, since this second sensibility is directed at matters at least somewhat more general than the first's proper objects. Pitched at a level somewhere between the extremely general considerations dominating the tenets of traditional moral theories, on one hand, and the quite fine-grained ones often dominating the particular cases philosophers present, on the other, it's at this moderately general level of discursive thought, I commonsensibly surmise, that we'll most often respond in ways reflecting our Values and, less directly, morality itself. Not yet having much confirmation, that's now just a sensible working hypothesis. At all events, after seeing what both these guides say about each of nine notable differences, we'll ask: Does any combination of the differences ground a harsh judgment just for the Sedan?

Increasingly, we'll see that, for the most part, the deliverance from our two guides will agree. Occasionally, however, we'll see disagreement. What will explain that discrepancy? Though we won't arrive at a fully complete answer, we'll see a partial explanation full enough to be instructive: Even while the imperilled folks peopling certain cases have absolutely vital needs to be met, since their dire needs *aren't conspicuous* to you, the examples' agent, our intuitive response has your conduct as quite all right. Rather than anything with much moral weight, it's this that largely promotes the lenient response to the Envelope's behavior. Correspondingly, our harsh response to the Sedan's conduct is largely promoted by a serious need that's so salient.⁴

To avoid many confusions, a few remarks should suffice: Generally, what's most conspicuous to you is what most fully attracts, and what most fully holds, your attention. Often, what's very conspicuous

4. As I'll use the term "salience" in this book, it will mean the same as the more colloquial but more laborious term, "conspicuousness". So, on my use of it, "salience" *won't* mean the same as "*deserved* conspicuousness."

to you is distinct from what you perceive clearly and fully. Thus, while we may clearly and fully perceive them, the needs of a shabby person lying in one of New York City's gloomiest streets *aren't* very conspicuous to us. But, when someone's nicely groomed and dressed, and he's in a setting where no such troubles are expected, then, generally, his serious need is conspicuous.

As matters progress, these points about salience will become increasingly clear: When it's present in spades, as with the Vintage Sedan, then, generally, we'll judge harshly our agent's unhelpful behavior; when it's wholly absent, as with the Envelope, then, generally, we'll judge the agent's conduct leniently.

When the intuitive moral responses to cases are so largely determined by such sheer salience to the examples' agent(s), do they accurately reflect our Values? Straightforwardly, Preservationism's answer is that they do. By contrast, the best Libertarianist answer isn't straightforward. Briefly, I'll explain.

At times, some people's great needs may be highly salient to you and, partly for that reason, it's then *obvious* to you that (without doing anything the least bit morally suspect) you can save the folks from suffering serious loss. Then, to you, it may be *obvious* that your letting them suffer *conflicts very sharply* with your Basic Moral Values (and, so, with the very heart of morality). To highlight this, let's say that, for you then, there's an Obvious Sharp Conflict. Now, since you're actually a quite decent person, when there's such an Obvious Sharp Conflict, generally it will be *hard* for you, psychologically, *not* to help meet people's great needs, even if you must incur a cost that's quite considerable. So, then, usually you won't behave in the way stipulated in the Vintage Sedan; rather, you'll behave helpfully.

In sharp contrast with that, there's this: When you let there be more folks who suffer serious loss by failing to contribute to the likes of UNICEF, then, even to you yourself, it's *far* from obvious that your conduct conflicts sharply with your Values, and with much of morality; indeed, as it usually appears, there *isn't* any such conflict. To highlight this contrasting situation, let's say that, for you *then*, there's No Apparent Conflict. Now, even though you're a decent person, when there's No Apparent Conflict, generally it will be *all too easy* for you, psychologically, not to help meet people's great needs. So, then, as with most decent folks, you'll behave in the unhelpful way stipulated for the Envelope.

With the difference between there being an Obvious Sharp Conflict and there being No Apparent Conflict, we've noted a contrast between the Envelope and the Sedan that *isn't* always morally irrel-

vant. Indeed, perhaps particularly when thinking whether to praise or to damn some conduct, *sometimes* it's appropriate to give this difference *great* weight. But, until the last chapter, in most of this book's pages, even the mere mention of the difference would be misplaced. For, here the aim is to become clearer about what really are the Basic Moral Values and, perhaps less directly, what's really morally most significant. And, since that's our aim, it's useful to *abstract away from* questions of what psychological difficulty there may be for us, in one case or another, to behave in a morally acceptable manner. Thus, until the book's last chapter, I'll set contexts where, as is there perfectly proper, no weight at all will be given to such considerations.

For a good perspective on this methodological proposal, it's useful to compare the Liberatorist's thoughts about the Envelope's behavior to a reasonably probing abolitionist's thoughts, addressed to an ordinary "good Southerner" some years before the Civil War. No Jefferson he, our Southerner thinks that, especially as it's practiced by so many nice enough folks all around him, slaveholding isn't so much as wrong. Now, without seeking to dole out blame, our abolitionist may compare a typical white slaveholder's conduct with respect to his black slaves and, say, the conduct of a white person who, without any good reason for assaulting anyone, punches another white hard on the jaw; rendering his hapless victim unconscious for a few minutes. (Perhaps, because he abstained from alcoholic beverages, and said as much, the victim refused to drink, say, to the puncher's favorite Virginian county.) As the abolitionist might painstakingly point out, first focusing on one contrast between the two behaviors, then another, and another, and another, in the morally most important respects, that bad assaulting behavior *wasn't as bad* as the much more common slaveholding behavior.

Paralleling the difference in psychological difficulty noted for the Envelope and the Sedan, there's a difference in the slaveholding conduct and the assaulting behavior. For the ordinary Old Southerner, there's No Apparent Conflict between common slaveholding conduct and the Basic Moral Values, whereas, even for them, there's an Obvious Sharp Conflict between the gratuitous punching conduct and the Values; and so on, and so forth. For both parties to the discussion, *that's* common knowledge right from the outset. Indeed, attempting to focus the discussion on any *such* difference is, really, just a move to opt out of any serious discussion of the moral status of the slaveholding. Now, what that abolitionist was doing with such controlling conduct as was then widespread, this Liberatorist author is doing, or is going to try to do, with such unhelpful conduct as the Envelope's currently

common behavior. So, as decently sensible readers will see, it's inappropriate to focus on the thought that there's an Obvious Sharp Conflict only with the Sedan, and not with the Envelope; for, that will be just a move to opt out of seriously discussing the moral status of such vitally unhelpful conduct that, with No Apparent Conflict, is now so commonly exemplified. Not perfect, the parallel between the abolitionist and the Liberatorist is plenty strong enough for seeing the sense in my modest proposal.

By now, I've made all the section's main points. So, it's with hesitation that, in what remains, I try to say something of interest to readers who enjoy, as I do, making philosophical distinctions, and enjoy exploring what utility may derive therefrom. Hesitantly, I'll offer a distinction between our *Primary* and our *Secondary* Basic Moral Values, a contrast that may have only heuristic value.

I'll begin with some remarks about the Primary Values: Among them is, plainly, a value to the effect that (like any well-behaved person) you not contribute to the serious suffering of an innocent other, neither its initiation nor its continuation. In the Envelope, your conduct *didn't* conflict, apparently, with this obviously important Value; so vast is the sea of suffering in the world and so resolutely efficient are UNICEF's health-promoting programs that, even if you'd made as large a donation as you could possibly afford, there *still wouldn't* have been *anyone*, apparently, whose serious suffering *you'd* have averted, or even lessened much. Concerning an equally "ground level" moral matter, is there some *other* Primary Value the Envelope's conduct *did* contravene? Well, there's none that's obvious.

But, as Liberatorists may suggest, perhaps the Envelope's conduct conflicts with an *unobvious* Value, near enough, a Primary Value to the effect that, about as much as you possibly can manage, you *lessen the number of (the world's) innocent others who suffer seriously*. Though it encompasses, apparently, your relations with many millions of needy people, this unobvious Value might be *just as central* to your Values as the obvious one so prominent in the previous paragraph.

As I'll trust, that's a useful start toward indicating the domain of the Primary Values. Perhaps a helpful indication of this domain can be given, briefly and roughly, along these more general lines: Knowing everything you ought about what's really the case morally, and knowing all that's relevant to your situation, it's in the domain of the Primary Values that you look when, being as morally well motivated as anyone could wish, you deliberate about what you morally ought to do. So, motivation needn't be a stranger to the Primary Values' domain: When someone has his conduct conflict with what morally *obvi-*

ously requires and, so, with what even a *modestly* cognizant moral agent *knows* it requires, then, (at least) for being motivated so poorly, the person's behavior does badly by his good Primary Values.

Well, then, what's in the domain of the Secondary Values? Here's a step toward an answer: As has long been recognized, part of morality concerns our *epistemic* responsibilities. Here, morality concerns what we *ought* to know about the *nonmoral facts* of our situation. A simple example: In an area frequented by little kids, when you park your car quickly, without taking care to know the space is free of kids, then, even if you cause no harm, there's *something morally wrong* with your behavior. Now, another step: Far less well recognized, another part of morality concerns what we ought to know about our *Values* and, perhaps less directly, about what's really *morally* the case. Again, suppose it's true that central to the Primary Values is a Value to the effect that, roughly, you have the number of innocents seriously suffering be as small as you can manage. Then, even though it may be hard to do, it may be that you ought to know that. And, should you fail to know it, you've failed your Secondary Values.

Further, our Secondary Values concern how our conduct *ought to be moved* by our knowing what's really the case morally. Generally, in an area of conduct, one must first do well by the epistemic aspect of these Values, just introduced, before one's in a position to do well by their motivational aspect, now introduced: In the area of slaveholding conduct, during their mature years Washington and Jefferson did well, apparently, by the epistemic aspect of the Secondary Values. This put them in at least some sort of position to do well, in this area, by the motivational aspect of these Values (and, so, to do well by the Primary Values). But, they did badly by this other aspect; and, so, they contravened the Primary Values.

In the area of the Envelope's conduct, the Libertarianist suggests, we do badly even by the epistemic aspect of the Secondary Values. So, we're far from doing even modestly well by their motivational aspect (and, so, by the Primary Values). By abstracting away from questions of how well we may do by our Secondary Values, we can learn about our Primary Values. So, until the last chapter, I'll set contexts where weight's rightly given only to how well an agent does by the Primary Values. At that late stage, it will turn out, I'll do well to give the Secondary Values pride of place.

Both the Primary and the Secondary Values are concerned with motivational matters. What the Secondary Values alone concern is, I'll say, the *unobvious* things someone ought to know about her Values and *those* motivational matters most closely connected with *those*

things. Now, this notion of the Secondary Values may harbor, irremediably, much arbitrariness: (1) Through causing doubts as to what's really the case in certain moral matters, a person's social setting may make it hard for her to know much about the matters and, so, she may know far less than what, at bottom, she ought to know. (2) Insofar as she knows what's what morally about the matter, the setting may make it hard for her to be moved much by what she does know and, so, she may be moved far less than what, at bottom, she ought to be moved. For both reasons, (1) and (2), someone may fail to behave decently. Of a particular failure, we may ask: Did it derive (mainly) from a failure of awareness; or did it derive (mainly) from a failure of will? Often, it may be arbitrary to *favor either* factor, (1) *or* (2), and *also* arbitrary to say they're *equally* responsible. So, with the offered contrast, I don't pretend to mark a deep difference.

Recall this leading question: When they reflect little more than the sheer conspicuousness, to this or that agent, of folks' great needs, how well do our case-specific responses reflect our Basic Moral Values? In terms of my heuristic distinction, the Libertarianist answers: When that's what they do, then, properly placing aside Secondary matters, our intuitions on the cases promote a badly distorted conception of our *Primary* Values. In line with that useful answer, the chapter's inquiry will lead to this Libertarianist solution of its central puzzle: According to the Primary Values, the Envelope's behavior is at least as badly wrong as the Sedan's. But, first, the Preservationist gets a good run for the money.

3. Physical Proximity, Social Proximity, Informative Directness and Experiential Impact

What might ground judging negatively only the Sedan's behavior, and not the Envelope's? Four of the most easily noted differences cut no moral mustard.

Easily noted is the difference in *physical distance*. In the Vintage Sedan, the wounded student was only a few feet away; in the Envelope, even the nearest child was many miles from you. But, unlike many physical forces, the strength of a moral force doesn't diminish with distance. Surely, our moral common sense tells us that much. What do our intuitions on cases urge?

As with other differential factors, with physical distance *two* sorts of example are most relevant: Being greatly like the Envelope in many respects, in one sort there'll be a *small* distance between those in need

and whoever might aid them. Being greatly like the Sedan, in the other there'll be a far greater distance. To be terribly thorough, for each factor I'd have an apt example of *both* its most relevant sorts. Mercifully, with most factors, I won't have both, but just one. But, to show what could be done with each, with physical distance I'll go both ways. First, I'll present this "Envelopey" case:

The Bungalow Compound. Not being truly rich, you own only a one-twelfth share in a small bungalow that's part of a beach resort compound in an exotic but poor country, say, Haiti. Long since there's been much strife in the land, right now it's your month to enjoy the bungalow, and you're there on your annual vacation. In your mailbox, there's an envelope from UNICEF asking for money to help save children's lives in the town nearest you, whichever one that is. In your very typical case, quite a few such needy kids are all within a few blocks and, just over the compound wall, some are only a few feet away. As the appeal makes clear, your \$100 will mean the difference between long life and early death for nearby children. But, of course, each month such appeals are sent to many bungalows in many Haitian resort compounds. You contribute nothing and, so, more nearby children die soon than if you'd sent \$100.

As most respond to this case, your behavior isn't so much as wrong at all.⁵ Next, a "Sedanish" example:

The CB Radios. Instead of coming upon the erstwhile student at a crossroads, you hear from him on the CB radio that's in your fine sedan. Along with the rest of his story, the trespasser informs you, by talking into his own much cheaper CB radio, that he's stranded there with an old jalopy, which can't even be started and which, to

5. Throughout this work, my statements about how "most respond" are to be understood like this: Informally and intermittently, I've asked many students, colleagues and friends for their intuitive moral assessments of the agent's behavior in a case I've had them just encounter. Even as this has been unsystematic, so, at any given point, I'll use reports about how "most respond" to a certain case mainly as a guide for proceeding in what then appears a fruitful direction. Without ever placing great weight on any one of the reports, it may be surprisingly impressive to feel the weight of them all taken together.

Trying to be more systematic, I asked a research psychologist at my home university to read an early draft of the book, with an eye to designing some telling experiments. Good enough to start with that, he asked graduate students to take on the project, and his onerous chores, as a doctoral dissertation; but, he found no takers. Having limited energy, I've left the matter there.

boot, is out of gas. Citing landmarks to each other, he truthfully says you're just ten miles from where he's stranded. He asks you to pick him up and take him to a hospital, where his leg can be saved. Thinking about an upholstery bill for over \$5000, you drive in another direction. As a foreseen result of that, he loses his leg, though not his life.

As most react to this other case, your behavior was seriously wrong. In the Bungalow Compound, you were only a short distance from the needy children; in the CB Radios, you were ten miles from the needy trespasser. Thus, our responses to relevant cases jibe with the deliverance from our more general moral common sense. So much for physical proximity.

Often, physical distance correlates with what we might call *social distance*. Following the instruction to be boring, we've thus supposed that the Sedan's trespasser was your compatriot and, so, he was socially somewhat close. As we've also supposed, the Envelopey's children are all foreigners, all socially more distant. Can that difference matter much? Since all those children become dead little kids, our common sense says, "Certainly not." What do we get from examples?

As usual from now on, I'll hit the issue from just one side. Here, we'll confront a Sedanish example:

The Long Drive. Rather than going for a short drive, you're spending the whole summer driving from your home, in the United States, to the far tip of South America and back. So, it's somewhere in Bolivia, say, that you stop where two country roads cross. There you confront an erstwhile Bolivian medical student who tells you of his situation, in Spanish, a language you know well. As you soon learn, he wants you to drive him to a hospital, where his leg can be saved. Thinking also of your upholstery, you drive elsewhere and, as a result, he loses a leg.

To the Long Drive, almost all respond that your behavior was abominable.

Perhaps it's only within certain limits that social proximity's morally irrelevant. But, insofar as they're plausible, such limits will leave so very much leeway as to be entirely irrelevant to our puzzle: Where those in need are socially *very* close to you, like your closest family members, there may be a very strong moral reason for you to meet *their* dire needs. But, in the Sedan, it wasn't your father, or your sister, or your son whose leg was at stake. Indeed, as we've been boringly