

Anishnawbe World View by Ahmoo Angeconeb.
Private collection of J. Douglas Rabb.

Indian from the Inside

Native American Philosophy and Cultural Renewal

SECOND EDITION

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Foreword by Jace Weaver

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into annually rotated quarters — to permit the recovery of populations of game animals" has been cited as "evidence of conservation among *aboriginal* northern woodland hunter-gathering peoples" (Callicott 1989, 207, italics in the original). He rejects this evidence because current research suggests that such family hunting territory "was a post-contact development" and hence it is at least possible "that conservation was expressly taught to the Indians by whites" (Callicott 1989, 208). Although others have made similar claims (e.g., Bishop 1970), here we suggest that Callicott is being just a little bit too cautious. He is granting too much to the other side, to the skeptic. After all way back in 1992 we celebrated the five hundredth anniversary of contact between Europeans and the aboriginal peoples of the Americas. Just how long does a way of life have to be followed before it becomes a tradition? If a Native person has lived all his life in the family hunting territory where his father lived and his grandfather before him, is this not part of Native American Indian tradition? Whether or not they learned this form of rotation from whites, the fact that they readily accepted it, and have maintained it for generations, suggests that such practices were at least compatible with traditional Native ways.

We do, however, agree with Callicott that the concept of "conservation" does not adequately capture the Native attitude. Native people are not really interested in calculating the optimum sustained yield of natural resources. Doing so would hardly show the appropriate respect for these "other-than-human persons." As Callicott discovered teaching Ojibwa students with fellow philosopher Tom Overholt at the University of Wisconsin: "Animals, plants, and minerals are not ... rightless resources, as is the case in Western economic assumptions.... Human beings must assume appropriate attitudes toward the non-human members of their polymorphous community.... Above all non-human beings must be respected" (Overholt and Callicott 1982, 154–155).

Learning Respect

In order to explore more deeply this important notion of respect, including respect for the other-than-human, we like to compare one well known analysis of the acquisition of respect offered by modern mainstream philosophy with a Native American account of the same thing. Here, we believe the differences, and, interestingly enough, some similarities become most apparent. The non–Native account we use in our comparison was first

articulated by the very influential German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). He was just analyzing a commonly accepted underlying attitude in Western moral thinking and did not suggest that he was proposing anything new or radical, except perhaps in the philosophical terminology he used to describe it, which is, itself, quite revealing. Kant claims that the concept of person applies only to human beings who can act on universal moral principles that they rationally accept and impose upon themselves. Each person thus becomes, according to Kant, "a law-making member in a universal kingdom of ends" by "always choosing his maxims from the point of view of himself— and also of every other rational being — as a maker of law" and, Kant adds, "this is why they are called persons" (Kant 1964a, 106). In this way, says Kant, human persons (the only kind of persons there are on earth) acquire a "dignity ... above all mere things of nature" (Kant 1964a, 105). This is, of course, very different from the Native American notion of a deep respect, perhaps even a religious respect, for a nature which consists for the most part of other-than-human persons, perhaps even more-than-human persons. Kant has his own reasons for wanting to draw such a sharp distinction between nature and humanity. By his day science had advanced far enough that it was obvious to him that a scientific explanation, i.e., a causal explanation, could ultimately be given for every natural event including the behavior of human beings. But problems arise concerning ascriptions of moral responsibility if causal explanations can be given for moral behavior. After all, how can we blame or praise someone for something if the action in question was caused by prior events completely beyond the agent's control? Science has attempted to show that all human action is subject to this sort of causal explanation. Kant himself thought he had justified the application of causal explanation to everything in what he called the phenomenal world, the world we discover through sense perception. Human beings are, of course, part of this phenomenal world, "*homo phenomenon.*" As such human beings are thus subject to causal laws.

In what sense, then, is our behavior free, as opposed to being causally determined? In what sense can we be held morally responsible for what we do? Kant attempts to answer such questions by speaking of a noumenal world, a world other than the phenomenal. Such a world is so extra-ordinary that Kant argues that it is impossible to describe using our ordinary concepts of reality — thing, substance, causality, etc. This means, of course, that it is very difficult to say anything meaningful about it at all. We discover this noumenal world, not through scientific reason, but through what Kant calls, practical reason, through our moral action. When we act on universal moral

principles which we make and impose upon ourselves then, for the first time, we are acting with freedom, with autonomy. Through acting on principle, as opposed simply to giving in to desires, we achieve autonomy and become genuine persons with intrinsic worth, with dignity. We become, in Kant's terms, "*homo noumenon*" as opposed to "*homo phenomenon.*" It is, Kant thinks, this ability to rise above our phenomenal nature, which sets us apart from the other animals and indeed apart from the rest of nature. Insofar as our phenomenal natures are concerned, even though we are rational animals, we are really no better than, have no more moral worth than, the lower animals: "Man in the system of nature (*homo phenomenon, animal rationale*) is a being of slight importance and shares with the rest of the animals, as offspring of the earth, a common value (*pretium vulgare*)" (Kant 1964b, 99). The concept "vulgar," which Kant uses here in its Latin form, originally just meant common, but due to the disdainful attitude Kant is expressing here both the terms "vulgar" and "common" have taken on a negative connotation. He contrasts the common vulgar animals with morally responsible persons. "But man regarded as a person — that is, as the subject of morally practical reason — is exalted above any price; for as such (*homo noumenon*) he is not to be valued as a mere means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself" (99). Such persons, Kant argues, have "*dignity,*" which he defines as "an absolute inner worth," and therefore a person can and should "extract *respect* for himself from all other rational beings in the world: he can measure himself with every other being of this kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them" (Kant 1964b, 99, italics in the original).

One of the things Kant is doing here is making explicit an implicit and widespread very non–Native, Euro-Western, attitude toward nature. It seems to be one of complete alienation from the earth. The offspring of the earth have only a common value (*pretium vulgare*), whereas man alone (by which Kant means the human or rational animal) has dignity, an intrinsic value worthy of respect. For Kant, it is of course our rational side, not our animal side, that confers upon us intrinsic value or dignity. It is not difficult to see why Callicott, for example, would prefer the Native American worldview as a foundation for an environmental ethics, a land ethic. In spite of this obvious difference, however, a closer examination of Kant's notion of respect will show that it is not all that far removed from what we may call the Native view, though, who or what is thought worthy of respect differs widely. A comparison of the two applications of the concept of respect will provide a deeper understanding of both worldviews.

Kant's concept of respect seems to be closely bound up with his notion of autonomy, with the self as free (*homo noumenon*). The self is free only in so far as it is self-disciplined, i.e., only in so far as it acts for the sake of moral principle instead of giving in to desire. This is the true Western meaning of "autonomy" which comes from the Greek "autos" meaning self, and "nomos" meaning law (think of "astronomy" which is the study of the laws of the heavens). Just as an autos-mobile (automobile) is something that is self-moving, so an autonomous being is one that imposes its own law upon itself. If laws regulate our behavior, then, by imposing such laws upon ourselves, we become self-regulating (autos-nomos), autonomous. We therefore have freedom, provided, of course, that the laws are ones that we freely accept or are of our own making. If the laws that regulate our behavior are imposed on us by someone else, someone other than ourselves, then we have not achieved autonomy. We then have, or rather are under, what Kant insists on calling "heteronomy" (from "heteros" the Greek word for "other," as in heterosexual, being attracted to "the other" sex, for example). Instead of using our own will power, we have submitted ourselves to the will of another, whether that other is society, God, or another person. According to Kant "*Autonomy* is .... the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature" (Kant 1964a, 103, italics in the original). We are, however, always in danger of losing our autonomy in one of two ways: (1) by giving in to a desire instead of exercising our own will power and acting on principle, on the moral law, in which case we become merely part of the causal order (*homo phenomenon*); or (2) by submitting to a law imposed by another, in which case though our behavior is law-governed, it is not autonomous since the law is not self-imposed. Still, it is important to learn to govern our behavior according to laws or moral principles. As children we are governed by rules imposed by parents, teachers, and so on — by adults. As we achieve adulthood ourselves, having already learned law-like behavior, we continue to impose upon ourselves such laws as we still accept. In short, heteronomy is considered the first step toward autonomy. As John Watson (1847–1939), a famous Kant scholar, puts it: "At first everyone is under apparent bondage to his superiors in the family relation, but in reality this is the means by which a measure of freedom is attained. It is true that he must render implicit obedience to those in authority over him, but in so doing he learns to free himself from an undue accentuation of his own individual desires, and to seek his freedom where alone it can be found — in the subordination of his own will to the good of others" (Watson 1988, 37–38).

Would many Native American Indians agree with Watson on this?

Would any? Certainly beings with freedom deserve respect. Certainly the good of others is at least as important as, and usually more important than, the satisfaction of my individual desires. But could anyone *really* expect to achieve freedom by giving it up? When we put it like that it sounds completely contradictory. Heteronomy may well be an implicit part of the Western philosophical tradition stemming from ancient Greece. However, it most certainly is *not* a concept native to North America. A great deal of research has been done on the education of Native children. One point on which all researchers seem to agree is that Native children are given much more freedom than their non–Native counterparts.

This point, which is crucial to our argument, is well documented in a major book-length study, titled *Native Literacy and Life Skills Curriculum Guidelines* and produced by a special committee of the British Columbia Ministry of Education. The committee (made up of both Native and non–Native members) was charged with "the task of developing guidelines to provide, in addition to basic literacy materials, materials directed toward the teaching of pre-employment skills and life skills, computational skills, and Native cultural awareness" (1989, v). The report contains a sympathetic and well documented discussion of Native culture, particularly as it relates to education. The members of the committee indicate that they are very much aware that "any discussion of cultural learning styles is fraught with danger because of the tendency toward stereotyping" (13). Nevertheless, they do provide a useful comparison of "Indian and non–Indian characteristics that may impinge upon the classroom" (13). Insofar as the different attitudes toward children are concerned, they suggest that "at the age of mobility" the Native Indian child is "considered a person" and is "free to explore his own environment" whereas the non–Indian "is watched and controlled by parents throughout childhood." The word "autonomous" is used to describe the Native American Indian child whereas his or her non–Native counterpart is said to be "dependent." In comparing learning styles, once again the Native American Indian child is said to be "independent and autonomous" while the non–Native child is "dependent and controlled." The "flexible and often non-existent" routines of the Native American Indian child are said to be "child-determined," for example, "meals served on demand, bedtimes vary with sleepiness and family activity." The non–Native child is raised with more rigid routines dominated or controlled by adults. In the extended family of Native American Indian society "rarely is a child punished in a systematic way" whereas the non–Native child can expect "punishment for failure to comply with adult expectations" (14–15). The comparisons between Native American Indians and non–Natives made here by the *Native Literacy and Life Skills Curriculum Guidelines* draw heavily on quite a large number of other classic studies, including: *A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of Canada,* ed. H. B. Hawthorne (Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1967); R. Barnhardt, *Culture, Community, and the Curriculum* (Fairbanks: University of Alaska, 1981); F. Erickson and G. Mohatt' "Cultural Organization of Participation Structures in Two Classrooms of Indian Students" (1980), an unpublished study cited often in *Native Literacy and Life Skills Curriculum Guidelines*; and S. Philips, "Participation Structures & Communicative Competence: Warm Springs Children in Community and Classroom," in *Functions of Language in the Classroom,* ed. D. Hymes (New York: Teachers' College Press, 1972).

Obviously all these comparisons between Native American Indians and non–Natives contain rather general observations and we would invite readers to agree or disagree on the basis of their own experience. However, we do suggest that the general tendency is clear and is probably in accordance with the experience of most Native American Indians. As *The Native Literacy and Life Skills Curriculum Guidelines* conclude; for the Native American Indian child, his "autonomy allows him his own decisions" (15). It seems to be clear that in the Native American Indian tradition young people do not have to endure a period of heteronomy in order to gain autonomy as is the case in the Western philosophical tradition explained by Watson and Kant.

We have discussed in some detail how, in the Kantian tradition, the individual first acquires autonomy and respect for other persons through "the subordination of his own will to the good of others," through heteronomous relationships with family, teachers, and other adults. How does this occur in the North American Indian tradition(s) where autonomy seems to be granted "at the age of mobility?" How does such an individual learn respect for other persons? Here we cannot turn to, and draw upon, a full philosophical analysis of the problem by a Kant or a Watson. No such philosophical analysis of Native American Indian tradition(s) has been attempted as yet. Indeed, a full analysis lies far beyond even the scope of this study. The best we can do here is suggest what sorts of things ought to be included in the analysis, and hence in the answer to our question about respect for other persons. Certainly the examples set, and the stories told, by elders are of vital importance. As Native elder Ron Geyshick puts it, "In my stories, I try teach young people respect for everything: other people, trees, water and the spirits" (Geyshick and Doyle 1989, 31). Indeed, the entire narrative tradition plays an important role in helping the individual formulate a view

of the world and thus decide what sorts of things deserve the respect accorded to "persons." Fortunately the Native American Indian narrative tradition, at least that of the Ojibwa people, has been subjected to a preliminary philosophical analysis in Thomas W. Overholt and J. Baird Callicott's *Clothed-in-Fur and Other Tales: An Introduction to an Ojibwa World View.* This, we believe, makes it a little more accessible to those not raised in the Native tradition. As Callicott has often observed: "Ojibwa narratives consistently represent the natural world as a world of other-than-human persons organized into congeries of societies ... [where] animals give their skins and flesh to human beings, who in return give the animals tobacco" (Callicott 1989, 214–215). It is not difficult to see how children raised on such narratives would gain a natural respect for those other-than-human persons who give themselves willingly to the hunter. They would also learn, from the example of the hunter himself, to share what they had with others: "The fact of the matter is that the more meat a forager distributes the higher his social status" (Driben and Auger 1989, 20).

Finally, we suggest that the vision quest plays an essential role in at least re-enforcing traditional values. In the previous chapter on the phenomenology of the vision quest we noted that one of the things discovered during the vision quest is that we are not really *apart from* the earth and other people. We are rather a *part of* the earth and other people. As Douglas Cardinal put it: "The elders say, 'You ask all the living beings for strength because they are at one with the creator and you are part of creation' ... It seemed like I was part of everything, and I felt very, very powerful" (cf. Chapter Three, R8). With this realization comes the knowledge that willing the good of others is not in any sense a form of self-sacrifice given the enlarged sense of self acquired in the journey into non-ordinary reality. The expression "enlarged sense of self" which we have used here may be a little misleading. This notion may convey a sense of arrogant individualism which is not intended and is certainly not present. After saying, in the passage cited above, "I felt very, very powerful," Cardinal adds, "I just wasn't there." In our phenomenological analysis of the vision quest we suggested that with this mysterious expression Cardinal is attempting to put into words his felt experience that there is just no distinction between the individual and the rest of the community, indeed, the rest of the universe. Even this analysis is still misleading since it is quite wrong to suggest that the individual self dissolves into the greater whole. The exact relationship of the individual and the community, and the greater whole, requires further analysis. As a special instance of this, the relationship, or rather the inter-relationship,

between the vision quest itself and the narrative and other traditions also requires further analysis. We noted in the previous chapter that Cardinal did not accept as authentic all the visions that came to him during his fast: "All the sounds at night made you hallucinate. You had all these demons you had to deal with that were just part of your imagination. You couldn't deviate for one second from holding the sacred pipe and always asking for strength. If you let yourself go and let your mind go, you'd be confronted with some nightmare monster in your own head" (cf. Chapter Three). What implicit criteria are being used here to distinguish the nightmare monsters, the hallucinations of one's own imagination, from the authentic visions, from the truly "magical experiences" as Cardinal calls them? Obviously the sacred pipe is an important link to the tradition. Certainly the teachings of the elders play an equally important role: "The elders say, 'You gotta watch because now the forces will turn on you. The bad forces will start sweet-talking you'.... They were trying to sweet-talk me out of my commitment. I just held on, kept that pipe."

In a great many ways, then, which are in need of much more analysis than we can attempt here, the tradition feeds into and to some extent governs the vision quest, just as the vision quest in its turn feeds into and re-enforces the narrative and other traditions. We can, however, say something more about the *result* of this mutual interaction. It results in individual persons who, in active ways, will the good of other persons, both human and other-than-human, in their mutually shared community. Further, these individuals in turn expect each individual in the community to do the same. "When a gift is made a return is expected, but the type of return and the time when it should take place vary with the particular individuals involved" (cf. Driben and Auger 1989, 12; Rogers 1962, C7).

We have been attempting to explain how Native American Indian children arrive at the notion of respect for persons and responsible, morally appropriate behavior without having to endure the heteronomous domination of adults throughout their childhood. The *result* of traditional Native Indian upbringing, through what we might call noninterference, the example of elders, the narrative tradition, the vision quest, and so on, seems not unlike Kant's universal kingdom of ends, though without the emphasis on moral laws. Kant sums up his position in the following words: "[R]ational beings all stand under the *law* that each of them should treat himself and all others, *never merely as a means,* but always *at the same time as an end in himself.* But by so doing there arises a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws — that is a kingdom. Since these laws are

directed precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends and means, this kingdom can be called a kingdom of ends (which admittedly is only an ideal)" (Kant 1964a, 101). Kant, of course, has a much more limited notion of person than the Native American concept which includes other-than-human persons. In fact in this passage Kant limits persons, those who deserve respect, to "rational beings." These persons are all law-making members of this kingdom of ends. No one is under the laws of another. They all have autonomy. Since the laws are universal, "common objective laws," it is *as if* each legislates for all. What are these laws of morality all about? They are about treating persons as ends in themselves, as each having their own dignity and intrinsic value. Even though they can be treated as means, according to Kant, persons must never be treated *merely* as means. The laws of morality, for Kant, "are directed precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends and means." Such persons cannot be treated *only* as means for they must be treated with respect. In other words, if you are always accepting favors and gifts from people and never do anything for them in return, then you are treating them only as a means to your own happiness, satisfaction, or whatever. Comparatively, the Driben-Auger report, which we discussed above, found, of the members of the Whitesands Indian Band who live in the town of Armstrong, that "if they gave ... gifts to the foragers without receiving gifts of food in return, they would shame not only the foragers but also themselves" (Driben and Auger 1989, 31). The two worldviews share in common a respect for the autonomy, the dignity, of persons. However, as we have seen, they reach this common view by very different paths. The one seems to require heteronomy in order to develop autonomy whereas the other makes no use of heteronomy in any way. It is important to realize that what we have been discussing here is not merely how respect for persons is cultivated, but how the person himself or herself is developed within the particular culture.

There is one interpretation of our position here which is a little misleading. Addressing it will help to clarify our comparison of Native and non-Native worldviews. The interpretation appears in the posthumously published book *How It Is: The Native American Philosophy of V. F. Cordova.* Viola Cordova discusses our paper, "Some Thoughts on Articulating a Native Philosophy," which we presented at the American Philosophical Association (APA) Pacific Division meeting in Seattle in 1996 (McPherson and Rabb 1997, 11–30). Cordova was also presenting in the same session so that we were able to discuss each other's presentations at the time.

As we understand it, although the occasional paper on aboriginal issues

had been presented to the APA in the past, this was the first full concurrent session devoted entirely to Native American philosophy ever presented at the APA annual meetings. We are pleased that Dr. Cordova (Apache), the first Native American ever to earn a Ph.D. in philosophy (University of New Mexico, 1992), was able to receive at least this level of recognition from the APA before her untimely death in 2002.

As part of our presentation we did indeed compare Kant with Native American philosophy and child-rearing practices, though not in the detail we have attempted here. Cordova, in her essay "What Is It to Be Human in a Native American Worldview?" which appears in *How It Is,* makes it quite clear that it is our interpretation she is addressing. To be clear, this is not the paper she presented at the APA and does not reflect the discussion that went on there. She begins her argument here by noting that "J. Douglas Rabb and Dennis McPherson, Canadian professors in Native American philosophy at Lakehead University, have written on the method of creating autonomous actors within a Native American society" (Cordova 2007, 148). She then references the published version of our APA paper cited above. She is not attacking our position. She seems largely in agreement with us. She acknowledges that we are more than familiar with Native American child rearing practices, citing, with approval, some of the studies we have also referred to above. She does say that we "make a claim, that on the surface, seems incredible to those who are not familiar with child-raising techniques among Native Americans" (148). That seemingly incredible claim, our claim as detailed in Cordova's book, is "that the methods that eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant proposed for making adults into autonomous thinkers and ethical agents are the same methods used in raising Native children, with one very important difference"(148). Now, this is the misleading statement. This is not our position, though we can see how even our presentation above, in which we were trying to be exceedingly careful, might be possibly read as such. Cordova, as might be expected, singles out Kant's use of "heteronomy" as the "one very important difference." As Cordova herself puts it: "According to Kant it is necessary for an individual to go through a period of *heteronomy*—of dependency wherein one is guided by external rules and authorities—before one can become truly autonomous" (148). We agree that this is one important difference. However, Kant's use of heteronomy is not the only important difference. As we made clear above, it is the *result* of traditional American Indian upbringing, noninterference, that we are saying is not unlike Kant's universal kingdom of ends, though without his emphasis on moral laws. It

is not, as Cordova seems to suggest, Kant's *methods* for making adults into autonomous thinkers and ethical agents that are the same as those traditionally used in raising Native American children. The *results* may well be similar but what we actually consider incredible is that the *methods* used to achieve said results differ, and differ radically. Certainly the use or non-use of heteronomy is one important difference. But there are other equally important differences as well. There is no place in Kant for the vision quest, for example. In fact he would be against any kind of experiential learning of this kind in moral thinking. As we noted above he argues that ethical thinking involves moral laws, principles laid down by pure practical reason, quite independent of (not polluted by) sensory experience. Kant is a principlist in ethics. There is no place in Kant for the stories told by elders or for modeling behavior based on their example.

Native Ethics as Narrative Ethics

Given the emphasis on story and the narrative tradition we are tempted to say that a narrative ethics, rather than a Kantian or principlist ethics, would be more compatible with a Native American approach. This, we contend, is confirmed by such studies as Keith H. Basso's *Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language Among the Western Apache*, and David B. Morris's "Narrative Ethics and Pain: Thinking with Stories." In arguing for his rather anti-Kantian thesis that "[t]he emotion implicit in narrative provides a valuable resource ... in the formation of moral knowledge and ethical action" Morris actually cites Basso's study of Apache narratives to lend support to his thesis (Morris 1996, 207). Morris admits that he draws on the Apache tradition in order "to put us in contact with valuable resources for moral thought and action" (Morris 1996, 197). Now, the principal purpose of Basso's study, as the subtitle makes perfectly clear, is to show how story and place, language and landscape, are so interrelated that the "Apache people in the U. S. Southwest live today in a local world richly endowed with narrative meaning—where the reference to specific places (such as Line-of-White-Rocks or Red-Ridge-with-Alder-Trees) instantly evokes tales of what happened there" (Morris 1996, 197; Basso 1996, 80). We discuss the relation between traditional narrative and specific place in more detail in the following chapter. Here we want to concentrate on the role of narrative in ethics, specifically the transformative impact of story. J. T. Banks, in his study of narrative ethics "The Story Inside," observes, "Narrative inevitably

expresses and transforms who we are at every level of our being: the organic, the symbolic, the social, and the spiritual" (219). This ties narrative to the transformative nature of ceremonies like the vision quest discussed above, confirming, we contend, how very un-Kantian the Native American narrative traditions really are. Basso notes how in the Western Apache tradition one would never directly criticize another person, regardless of age. That would be considered rude. We should point out that it follows that a Kantian use of heteronomy would also be considered rude. As Morris explains referring to the narrative tradition examined in Basso's study: "In a culture that avoids direct rebuke, these narratives, as Basso demonstrates, provide unobtrusive and gentle but steady moral guidance" (197). Basso cites Apache people explaining how stories can "work on you," "get under your skin," "make you want to change," or "make you want to replace yourself" (Basso 1996, 59). This notion of "replacing yourself" in the face of moral misconduct is obviously transformative. It is a recognition that radical change is required. But these conclusions are arrived at on your own after hearing, and reflecting on, specific stories. No one has told you that you need to change, or even that you have done anything wrong, much less that you have violated one of Kant's moral laws or ethical principles. This is an indirect manner of instruction which is a manifestation of what we might call an ethic of interventive-noninterference, the very opposite of a Kantian ethic. Native elders, for example, are not known for offering advice, at least not directly. In actual fact they have the reputation of never giving a straight answer. You will often be told a story which seems to have nothing whatsoever to do with whatever question you asked or problem you raised. You are given the autonomy, the complete freedom, to discover the relevance of the reply, and hence to work the problem out for yourself. This is a sign of respect. It is also a method of instruction which fosters self-reliance and independent thinking. Further, it is consistent with a narrative ethic, not a Kantian one based on moral principles. As Morris explains: "In contrast to principle alone, narrative in its detailed, emotion-rich representation of experience can help us recognize implicit values and negotiate conflicts of moral action" (213).

One of the first philosophical studies of Native ethics was published by the late Mohawk psychiatrist Clare Brant in the *Canadian Journal of Psychiatry* (Brant 1990, 535–539). The title of his classic paper, "Native Ethics and Rules of Behaviour," is somewhat unfortunate in that it seems to suggest that a Native ethics would be one based on rules or moral principles making it seem closer to a Kantian ethics than it is in fact. This certainly is not