Anton Wilhelm Amo, an 18th Century African slave who lived, studied and taught philosophy in Germany, formulated a considerable critique of Descartes’ mind/body distinction. The history of philosophy has neglected to a fault Amo and his role in-and-for the history of philosophy. I strive,

1 I have personally read most of this edition and it is going to be great for the history of philosophy. It will be a must buy!
2 Supposed image of Amo.
here, to remove this omission and to present a clear explication of Amo – the philosopher, the African, the unnoticed.

Quick Outline

I. Biographical Sketch
II. Why Amo?
III. Timeline
IV. English Translation

Biographical Sketch

From the Modern Period until the end of the Nineteenth Century, two-thirds of the slaves that left Africa were taken from Amo’s home, i.e., Guinea, known then as the ‘Gold Coast’.

Anton Wilhelm Amo born circa 1700 in present-day Ghana was akin to the Akan people, meaning he was part of the Nzema clan, one of the eight clans of the Akan people. Slaving was a norming

---

4 Moll, Herman. "NEGROLAND and GUINEA.”
norm for Amo and the Akan people. Taken at a young age, he was purchased in Amsterdam in 1707 and presented to the Duke of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, Anton Ulrich.

Duke Ulrich gave Amo to his son, August Wilhelm, and one of August’s sisters - the princess of Brunswick - presumably occupied herself with educating Amo. Most scholars are of the opinion that Duke Ulrich and his family decided to educate Amo (1) because they wanted to obtain favor with the Russian Empire and (2) they wanted to display to Peter the Great, I, that he was not the

---

5 According to the Akan people, “a clan is like a flowering shrub, it blossoms in clusters. (...) [and] “the family tree is not clipped”. (Abraham., 455)
7 Portraits by Christoph Bernhard Francke. Francke was court paint for Duke Rudolph Augustus. Duke Rudolph’s daughter, Duchess Christine Sophia, married her cousin August Wilhelm.
8 Duke Ulrich had multiple daughters. Thus, Amo could have been educated by any one of the princesses.
9 I haven’t found evidence to back-up this claim but this seems highly plausibly because Amo knew Greek and Hebrew but he did not study theology. Common to the 18th Century, women were not given a form education, but they were allowed to study the Bible. Thus, wealthy women, like Duke Ulrich’s daughters, would have tutors teach them Greek and Hebrew. Thus, they could better understand God and His word. Amo was a natural philosophy, and most natural philosophers did not know Hebrew and only some truly known Greek, most only had an elementary understanding of Greek. Therefore, Amo knowing Greek and Hebrew seems indicative of a wealthy women’s education in early modern Europe.
only one with an enlightened Moor.\(^\text{11}\) Peter the Great’s slave Abram Petrovich Gannibal was legally adopted\(^\text{12}\) by the tsar’s family and raised alongside his only surviving son, Alexei Petrovich.\(^\text{13}\)

Abram became a military officer and engineer, married into nobility, and even held positions at court. Both Amo and Abram’s lives were saturated with anomalous opportunities, which were contingent on their proprietors. I want to stress that their opportunities were contingent on their proprietors. Abram was made part of the family\(^\text{15}\) while Amo was never given such opportunities, which reveals the stark difference in their life-experiences and historical impact.

In 1727, Amo began his collegiate studies at the University of Halle.

\(^{12}\) Of course not in the way adoption is understand today.
\(^{13}\) Alexei was Peter the Great’s only son to survive to adulthood. He lost 7 sons and 4 daughters. This is why I believe Peter the Great adopted Abram.
\(^{14}\) Paul Delaroche completed Peter’s portrait. Delaroche was a famous French painter of the 19th Century and is known for *The Execution Of Lady Jane Grey*. Alexei’s portrait painted by Johann Paul Luedden (also known as Ludden) is displayed in Moscow’s *Museum of History*. Hugh Barnes, author of *Gannibal: The Moor of Petersburg*, has defined Abram’s supposed portrait as contingent. More research is needed regarding his portrait.
\(^{15}\) Defined as valuable by Peter the Great. To be valued by Western history people like Amo and Abram often times have to be “valued” by someone in the European world that can legitimizes their value.
Two years later, he defended his first thesis: *DE IURE MAURORUM IN EUROPA* (On the Right of Moors in Europe - 1729).

---


17 Amo, P5.
Following his defense, he moved to the University of Wittenberg in 1729, where he obtained a MA in Philosophy and Liberal Arts within a year of arriving on campus.

Four years later, he defended his dissertation: *DE HUMANAE MENTIS APATHEIA (On the Impassivity of the Human Mind - 1734)*; and on the 16th of April 1734, Amo was awarded a doctorial degree in philosophy.  

---

18 Amo, P7.
That following May, Amo’s student, John Theodosius Meiner, defended his and Amo’s thesis, which was published, a continuation of Amo’s dissertation: IDEAURUM DISTINCTAM EORUM QUAE COMPETUNT VEL MENTI VEL CORPORI NOSTRO VIVO ET ORGANICO (A Philosophical Disputation Containing a Distinct Idea of Those Things That Belong Either to Our Mind or to Our Living and Organic Body - 1734). Amo then taught at the University of Halle and the University of Jena, and during this time he published his only book: TRACTATUS DE ARTE SOBRIE ET ACCURATE PHILOSOPHANDI (Treatise on the Art of Soberly and Accurately Philosophizing – 1738). In roughly 1748, Amo left Germany due to the death of one of his major benefactors and rising racial tension. After returning to Ghana, Amo lived as a hermit and died soon thereafter in his motherland.

Why study Amo?

Amo should be celebrated in philosophy because: (1) he was the first African Ph.D. and teacher of philosophy at a European university, (2) accomplishing such a task was especially difficult for an African slave in early modern Europe, (3) he thoroughly contributed to the philosophical dialogues of his era, (4) the next person of the African diaspora to follow in Amo’s footstep came in the 20th century, over 150 years after Amo. Furthermore, Amo stands at the juxtaposition of diverging interpretations of race: race as inherently tethered to physical difference, and race as inherited essential difference. The former interpretation of race is present before and during the majority of Amo’s life. On this theory physical differences (i.e., deviations) occur in one of three ways: through geography by change in climate and environment (as we see in A Natural History, General and Particular, containing the History and Theory of the Earth, &c., 8 vols. by Buffon), through

---

19 Amo, P33 & P51.
20 Rector Ludwig, 1743.
21 Johann Phillpi’s satirical piece mocking a Moor’s, Amo’s, love for a Germany girl.
culture by way of morals and practices (as in *Anthropometamorphosis: Man Transform’d, or, The Artificial Changeling* by John Bulwer), and through hybridism (e.g., *Orang-outang* by Edward Tyson and *apish-language* by Thomas Herbert). The latter interpretation of race is present towards the end of Amo’s time in Europe and soon thereafter. Here, human difference and the absence of reason became intertwined, whether through logical fallacies or scientific racism. Race and racism acquires scientific substructure. Thus, human difference, i.e., the early modern interpretation of race, and Amo scholarship are interrelated.
Timeline

c.1700  Amo’s Birth
1707  Arrived at the Court of Duke Anton Ulrich
07.29.1707  Baptized at Wolfenbüttel [i.e., the Salzthal Chapel]
1708 – 10  The Leibniz-Stahl Controversy
03.27.1714  Duke Ulrich dies
1716 – 21  Amo’s involvement with Wolfenbüttel’s finances
05.10.1723  Christian Wolff expelled from the University of Halle
06.09.1727  Matriculated into the University of Halle
11.28.1729  Defend His Disputation [i.e., \textit{DE IURE MAURORUM IN EUROPA}]
09.02.1730  Transferred into the University of Wittenberg
10.17.1730  Received degree of Magister of Philosophy and Liberal Arts
03.23.1731  Duke August Wilhelm dies
05.10.1733  Amo leads parade at the University of Wittenberg
04.1734  Inaugural Dissertation [i.e., \textit{DE HUMANAE MENTIS APATHEIA}]
04.16.1734  Admitted as Magister Legens at the University of Wittenberg
1734  Meiner-Amo Dissertation [i.e., \textit{IDEARUM DISTINCTAM EORUM QUAE COMPETUNT VEL MENTI VEL CORPORI NOSTRO VIVO ET ORGANICO}]
07.21.1736  Admitted as Dozent at the University of Halle
1736  Amo critique of J.C. Petsche Disputation
1737  Amo composes poem for Abraham Wolff
1738  Amo publishes only book [i.e., \textit{TRACTATUS DE ARTE SOBRIE ET ACCURATE PHILOSOPHANDI}]
06.27.1739  Applied for nostrification at the University of Jena
06.29.1739  Friedrich Andreas Hallbauer addresses faculty on Amo’s behalf
07.08.1739  Amo’s nostrificated at the University of Jena

03.10.1742  Jacobus Elisa Johannes Capitein’s, Ghanaian slave, dissertation [i.e. DE SERVITUDE, LIBERTATI CHRISTIANAE NON CONTRARIA], which has a Christian defense against slavery

08.07.1743  Johann Peter von Ludewig dies [i.e., Amo’s mentor]

10.1747  Johann Ernst Philippi’s Poem about Amo [i.e., Sections 3 & 4] · Wöchentliche Hallische Anzeigen

1748  Amo returns to Africa

1752  David-Henri Gallandat meets Amo in Africa, which is known because his report was published in the journal of the Dutch Scientific Society [c. 1782]

c. 1753  Amo dies

1808  Abbé Henri Grégoire Book [i.e., De la littérature des Nègres], which talks about Amo

Translation

This translation is meant to be a resource until Justin E. H. Smith & Stephen Menn Critical Edition of Amo’s first two works is published in the next year or two.

There are three major problems with the following translation: (1) it has multiple translation errors, (2) words were unnecessarily left untranslated, and (3) this translation was produced by nonnative English speakers. Thus, the importance and need for the Smith-Menn Translation.

Written by:

Antonius Guilielmus Amo fil.
Phil. et art. liberal. Magister legent
& jura. cand.

MAY GOD TURN THIS TO GOOD
INAUGURAL PHILOSOPHICAL DISSERTATION
ON
THE AΠΑΘΕΙΑ OF THE HUMAN MIND
OR
THE ABSENCE OF SENSATION AND
THE FACULTY OF SENSE IN THE
HUMAN MIND
AND
THEIR PRESENCE IN OUR ORGANIC
AND LIVING BODY
WHICH WAS
PRESIDED OVER BY
DOCTOR MARTIN GOTTHELF LOESCHER [1]
PUBLIC PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE AND PHYSIOLOGY
AND ALSO PRIVATE TUTOR TO THE MOST SERENE
DUKE OF SACHSEN-WEIMAR
DEFENDED IN PUBLIC
BY THE AUTHOR

ANTHONY WILLIAM AMO,
A WEST AFRICAN, MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY AND
THE LIBERAL ARTS, AND JURUM UNIVERSALIUM
CULTOR
IN THE GREATER ASSEMBLY HALL
1734 IN THE MONTH OF APRIL
AT WITTENBERG FROM THE OFFICINA SCHLOMACHINA
ON THE AΠAΘΕΙΑ OF THE HUMAN MIND
AN OUTLINE OF THE EXPOSITION OF IDEAS
CONCERNING THE SUBJECT AS WELL AS THE
PREDICATE OF THE THESIS

THE SUBJECT
II. What is the human mind in particular? ibid. § 3.

THE PREDICATE
I. What is the opposite of the predicate? namely
(a) what is sensation?
(b) what is the faculty of sensing? ch. I, div. II.
II. What is the predicate itself or Ἀπάθεια; ibid. div. III.
III. What, finally, is the proposition itself, i.e. the Ἀπάθεια of the human mind itself?
With these things explained at the outset, there follows a statement of the question, and
the theses.
I. Negative Thesis: The human mind does not sense material objects; necessary proofs
supplied.
II. Second Negative Thesis: The faculty of sense does not belong to mind.
III. Third Affirmative Thesis: But rather, it pertains to our organic and living body. Nece-
sary proofs again supplied.
CHAPTER I
CONTAINING AN EXPOSITION OF THE IDEAS
EMBRACED IN THE THESIS
Preface to the Title of this Disputation

By the dísege of the human mind we understand the absence of sensation and of the
faculty of sensing in the human mind. On the things said here, see ch. II, div. I, § 1 etc.

DIVISION I
Containing an Exposition of the Ideas of the
Subject, that is, Concerning the General Nature and
the Specific Nature of the Human Mind

Note to the title of this division: since the human mind is the subject of the inquiry or
the thesis, the method of the work demands that we should make plain whatever it is that
we understand by the same terms (a constant meaning for the same terms) to the end that
clear and distinct ideas having been laid down, the subject may proceed more happily.

§ 1.
WHAT IS SPIRIT IN ITS GENERAL NATURE?
The human mind is spirit in its general nature, therefore a declaration is quite necessary,
what we understand by the expression or designation "spirit." Well then, spirit is to us
whatever substance is purely active, immaterial, always gains understanding through it-
self (i.e. directly), and acts from self-motion and with intention, in regard of an end and
goal of which it is conscious to itself.

NOTE I. To understand and to be conscious to oneself of something are synonymous.

NOTE II. By intention we understand that operation of the spirit, whereby it makes
something known to itself, which made effective, the end results.

NOTE III. The end is that in whose attainment and presence the spirit, ceasing from its
former operation, finds rest.

EXPOSITIONS OF THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDING
DESCRIPTION OF SPIRIT

EXPOSITION I. I call spirit a substance which is purely active; the same as if you
should say spirit admits of no passivity in itself.

Proof of this Exposition

If spirit should be said to feel, that is, admit passivity in itself, this could only
happen either through communication, or through penetration, or finally through contact.

NOTE I. By communication I understand the following: when the parts, properties, and
effects of one being through the agency of some act become present in another being which
is suitable and comparable.

EXAMPLE: Thus if fire should give its heat to a glowing object, what is this but that
we see it to communicate itself?

NOTE II. By penetration, I understand the passage of one being through the parts of
another object through the agency of some act.

NOTE III. What contact is, immediate sensation itself reveals to us; but lest we seem
to speak words without ideas here, by contact we understand the following: when two sur-
faces touch each other at some physical or sensible point.

APPLICATIONS

STATEMENT I. All spirit lies wholly outside passivity.

PROOF I. No parts, properties, or effects of a second object can become present in
spirit through the agency of any act; otherwise, spirit would contain in its essence and sub-
stance something other than it should contain. Likewise, to contain and to be contained
are material conceptions, and cannot with truth be predicated of spirit. The spirit there-
fore does not feel through communication, i.e. in the way in which the parts, properties
and effects of an object are material, in the same way they ought to be when present in
another object through the agency of some act.

PROOF II. No spirit either by itself or by accident receives material and sensible parts,
properties, and effects, for it is opposed in a contrary way to a sensible being and among
contrary opposites no communication is possible.

NOTE to this proof: Those things are opposed in a contrary way, which are so related
that the absence of one occasions the presence of the second and the presence of the second
means the absence of the first, i.e. if something is immaterial, it follows that it cannot be
material: for these are contrarily opposed, for the predicate of immateriality excludes the
predicate of materiality since the presence of immateriality is the absence of materiality.
Likewise where spirituality is present, there materiality is absent, and vice versa.

I have said that spirit does not feel or have passivity through communication

I say secondly that no spirit feels or becomes passive through the mode of penetration,
since penetration is the passage of one object through the parts of another object, but no
spirit enjoys constituent parts. Therefore spirit wholly lies outside passion to the extent that passivity takes place in the mode of penetration, i.e. by the passage of one object through the parts of another.

I say thirdly that it neither senses nor is affected through contact; for whatever touches and is touched is body. See the learned Descartes in his Letters, part III, letter 14, paragraph 12, where you have the following words: “I said to you in the first place, etc.” [2]. Again, there is contact when two surfaces touch each other at some physical point. But neither a sensible point nor a surface can be predicated of spirit; therefore neither can passivity to the extent that it can happen through contact.

EXPOSITION II. All spirit always thinks per se, i.e. is conscious of itself to itself, of its own operations, and also of other things.

NOTE. Although I am ignorant of that way whereby God and other unincarnate spirits know themselves, their own operations, and other things, I nevertheless do not think it likely that they have knowledge of these things through ideas, considering that an idea is defined in the following way: the instantaneous action of our mind, by which it represents to itself things perceived before through the senses and sensory organs, or causes them to be present. But God and other spirits placed outside matter are entirely destitute of sensation, sensory organs, and an organic living body. Likewise, in God, representation is impossible, for otherwise there would occur in God a representation of future, past, and in general of absent things, whereas in God there is no such knowledge as that of the past or the future, or in general of absent things. Rather, all things are directly present in his knowledge, and hence there cannot be any representation in him, since representation presupposes the absence of what must be represented. From all this it therefore emerges that God and the other spirits have knowledge of themselves, their actions, and other things entirely without any idea, or ideas and resought sensation, but our own mind knows and operates through ideas on account of the closest link with the body and its intercourse with it, regarding which see the illustrious Dr. Berger [3] in his Physiology, book I, chapter I, pages 1 and 5, Dr. Descartes or Cartesius in his Correspondence, part III, epist. 115, part I, epist. 29 and 36 [4].

EXPOSITION III. All spirit operates spontaneously, i.e. it determines its operations within itself towards the end to be achieved, and it is certainly not compelled from some other source into acting.

PROOF. If spirit were forced from elsewhere, this would be possible either by the agency of some other thinking spirit or matter. If it is compelled by some other spirit, then in both cases spontaneity or freedom of action remains preserved, as does also the faculty of response. If spirit were however compelled by matter, this of course could not happen, since spirit is by definition purely active, but matter is always passive, and receives unto itself all the action of an agent in itself active.

EXPOSITION IV. Spirit acts with intention from recognition of the object which ought to happen and of the end which it intends to achieve by its operation.

PROOF. For in this consists the nature of activity, that a being operates rationally and from knowledge.

CONSEQUENCE I. Every efficient cause ought to have knowledge of itself, its own acts and of what ought to happen.

CONSEQUENCE II. Every active object in which is present knowledge of itself, of its own acts and of other things, is that object which is spirit.

EXPOSITION V. Spirit is immaterial, i.e. neither in its essence nor in its properties does it include anything material.

PROOF. Of contrary opposites one cannot contain and include the other, since contrary opposites mutually exclude each other in genus, species, and identity of designation.

§ 2.

So far concerning spirit, we have at least settled these topics which serve our purpose. Next in order is:

§ 3.

DESCRIPTION OF THE HUMAN MIND AS REGARDS ITS SPECIES

The human mind is a substance which is purely active and immaterial; by its intercourse with the organic living body in which it exists, it thinks, and acts from intention towards a determined end of which it is conscious to itself.

NOTE I. The association of body and mind consists in the following: (1) that it employs the body in which it inheres as a subject; (2) and also as an instrument of its own acts and as a medium.

NOTE II. Instrument and medium differ in this respect that instrument is actively applied to the goal by a practical exercise, and medium is used for the goal to be achieved as a theoretical conception.

NOTE III. There are two essential parts of a man, mind and body. We have already spoken about mind. As for the body, it is an extremely elegant substance first skillfully fashioned by the Creator from diverse living and animal organs, and thence multiplied by procreation. These are the words of D. Christian Vater in his Physiology, section VIII, chapter III about the human body, thesis 1. [5]
§ 4.

CONTAINING VARIOUS DESIGNATIONS OF SPIRITS

Under the name of spirits come (1) matter, (2) spirit properly so called. Material spirits are the natural spirits, vital spirits and animal spirits of antiquity concerning which see SEVERITUS in Natural Science, bk. VIII, ch. 11; on the human body, p. 671 [6]. Spirit properly so called is all reality, immaterial, thinking and acting with intention in regard of a determined end of which it has knowledge. Concerning this, see what has gone before, and also Johannes CLERICUS in the Pneumatology, sect. III, ch. 3 § 14, and others [7]. They thrive under various names, and are for example called intelligences, minds, souls and intelligent spirits in the more general expression.

NOTE I. Intelligences and minds differ in their accidents, not in their essence. Spirits are said to be souls when they are still spirits of men in their bodies, or when having been separated they survive the body, e.g. the souls of the blessed and the damned. These are also called apparitions and shades. On these, I refer you to PROPERTIUS, bk. IV: "There are shades, death does not end everything" [8]. See MIZALDUS in the appendices to the Memorable Centuries, aphorism 290 [9].

NOTE II. There is no lack of those who understand by the name of soul some third essential part of man, and invent for themselves something which we do not make our contention. See S. C. TRUVER [10] in his balanced pronouncement on the theological question whether there are three essential parts of man. The above concerns the subject of the thesis.

DIVISION II

Containing Declarations of the Ideas from the Point of View of the Predicate and as regards the Species

ON THE OPPOSITES OF THE PREDICATE, SENSATION AND THE FACULTY OF SENSING

Caution: Every proposition as is known in the Philosophy schools is either affirmative or negative. It is affirmative when presence, negative when absence, of the predicate is judged in the subject. In either case, it is simple or upon some reason. Something is simply affirmed when the presence of the whole predicate without limitation or exception is judged in the subject, e.g. all spirit thinks. An affirmation is upon some reason when we judge the predicate to be in the subject only to the extent of a certain part, e.g. man is mortal, surely as touching the body, but certainly not in respect of the soul. I refer you to Matthew X, 28. The same account is true of negation. A negation is simple when we remove the whole of the predicate with its parts from the subject; negation is partial or secondary when we remove a part at least of the predicate from the subject. In this thesis of ours, we remove the whole bimembered predicate from the whole of the subject; that is to say, we remove both sense and the faculty of sensation. But since we have been talking of something being removed from another thing, it is necessary to explain that which is removed from another as though the subject had no room for it; i.e. what is sensation, what the faculty of sensing?

§ 1.

SENSATION EXPLAINED

Sensation is in general as follows: the result of the sensory organs obstructing the sensible properties of material objects immediately present.

NOTE I. Sensation is considered to be either logical or physical. When logical, all sensation is either mediate or immediate. People call that an idea, and it will be clarified in what follows soon. Meanwhile, when physical, all sensation is either pleasant or unpleasant, and in either case is internal or external. These subjects are treated in my logic disquisitions.

NOTE II. Internal sensation is an affection or feeling of the soul. For this see DESCARTES in his treatise on The Passions of the Soul [11].

NOTE III. Sensation, feeling, sensing are for me synonymous.

§ 2.

THE FACULTY OF SENSATION EXPLAINED

With what has been said before in mind, the faculty of sense is easily described, as regards what it really is. It is such a disposition of our organic and living body as by whose mediation all animal being is affected by material and sensible objects which are immediately present.

NOTE. The ancients called this faculty of feeling the sensitive soul. This was different and distinct from the rational soul and the vegetable soul. About the rational soul see SEVERITUS [12] in the Epitome of Natural Science, bk. VI ch. 1. On the vegetable soul see bk. VI ch. 2 and again the Essay on Nature, first part, ch. VIII on the sensations, p. 103 [13]. Animals are therefore composed of body and a sensitive soul which is their form, but with men this sensitive soul is subordinated to the immortal soul. And being a substance intermediate between body and this immortal soul, it perfectly unites them, etc.
DIVISION III.
Contains the Description of ἀνάθημα or the Predicate of the Thesis

§ 1.
We are considering ἀνάθημα (first) in respect of the faculty of sensation and (second) in respect of sensation itself. The former must be treated now, and the latter afterwards, § 3.

NOTE. The predicate of this thesis is twofold since it contains a twofold idea, viz. the faculty of sensation and sensation itself, and their absence from a subject in fact not appropriate.

§ 2.
Ἀνάθημα in terms of the faculty of sensing. Ἀνάθημα in terms of the faculty of sensing is the absence of such a disposition in an inappropriate subject as by whose means an animal should be affected by material objects immediately present.

Special exposition. A subject has no capacity or is not apposite if it is an entity which does not admit in itself the parts, properties, and effects of another entity, and cannot partake in them. Such a subject is either spirit or matter. Concerning spirit, it has been said that it is incapable of sensation in part I, ch. 1, together with these appropriate expositions and their applications.

Because of the nature of matter, a distinction ought to be made between the living body and body deprived of life; the former certainly, the latter by no means because of its own disposition, is affected by sensation.

§ 3.
Ἀνάθημα in terms of sensation. The next thing in order is what ἀνάθημα is in terms of sensation: the absence of any sensation whatever in an inapposite (non-sentient) subject, for example, spirit, stone, etc.

§ 4.
What is the ἀνάθημα of the Human Mind?
With all these explanations, the question at last is what is the thesis itself; namely, what we understand by the ἀνάθημα of the human mind. Surely this is the absence of the faculty of sense and of immediate sensation in the human mind.

CHAPTER II
CONTAINS APPLICATIONS OF OUR GENERAL CONCLUSIONS WHICH WE HAVE BROUGHT OUT AT LENGTH IN WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE

The State of the Argument

Man has sensation of material objects not as regards his mind but as regards his organic and living body. These statements are here asserted and are defended against Descartes and his expressed opinion in his Correspondence, part I, letter XXIX, where the passage reads: "For since there are two factors in the human soul on which depends the whole cognition which we can have concerning its nature, of which one is the part that thinks and the other that which united to the body moves it and feels with it." [14]

To this statement we give the following warning and dissent: that the mind acts with the body with which it is in mutual union, we concede; but that it suffers with the body, we deny.

NOTE. Among living things, to suffer and to feel are synonymous. But among things destitute of life, to feel is to admit in oneself changes coming from elsewhere as far as quantity and quality are concerned. In other words it is for them to be modified and determined from outside.

First Caution. But he openly contradicts himself, loc. cit. part I, Epistola 99, in the preceding programmatic investigation where he lays it down that the nature of the soul consists solely in the faculty of thinking [15]; and yet thinking is an activity of the mind, not a passion.

Against Severinus in his Natural Science bk. VIII ch. 1 on the subject of the rational soul [16] where he writes: "Even if indeed the human soul is strengthened by means of the faculties which we have so far attributed to it regarding the vegetable and the sensitive soul notwithstanding the two, etc." Again bk. VII ch. 1 p. 562 [17] on the sensitive soul: "For to feel is the work of the soul."

Second Caution. But he stands in contradiction to himself p. 563 [18] with the words: "To receive sensible forms is the function of an organ. To judge it when received is the function of the soul." To receive the sensible forms is to feel; but this is appropriate to organs, and in consequence to body, for organs are appropriate not to mind but to body. Again he himself distinguishes between feeling and judging, attributing the former to organs and the latter to minds.
Also contrary to what Johannes Clericus has in the fourth book on the Physiology of Plants and Animals ch. X on sensible and mobile animals § 2 [19].

Third Caution. He contradicts himself further § 3 subsequently [20] where he says that three things are to be distinguished: (1) the action of an object on an organ, (2) the passion of the organ, (3) says he: "When an organ is affected, the mind is upset, and the mind feels the sensation of its body being affected." Now if the mind should really have this feeling he should have expressed it in this way: "and the mind feels its body to be affected, it feels, or rather it understands itself not to have been affected." But he confuses the act of understanding with the business of feeling: it is the same as if he should have said: "and the mind understands its body to have been affected."


The Aristotelians agree with us. In bk. II of "de generatione et corruptione" ch. 9 p. 49 [22]: "It is the characteristic of matter to suffer and be moved, etc." Contrary to John Frederick Teichmeyer in his "Elements of Natural and Experimental Philosophy," ch. III on the principles of physics p. 18 [23], where he has these words: "We understand by sensation, etc."

Also John Christopher Sturm in the "Hypothes of Physics," bk. I or the General Part, section I, chapter II in the 5th Epilogue [24]. Again p. III. 232 and what follows thereafter [25].

SPECIAL PART

1st Negative Thesis

EXPOSITION. The thesis means the same as if you said: The human mind is not affected by sensible things however much they are immediately present to the body in which the mind is. But it has knowledge of the sensations arising in the body and employs them when possessed in its operations. See the Essay on Physics chapter VIII, p. 107 [26].

NOTE. When man is considered logically, mind, operation of mind, idea and immediate sensation must not be confused; mind and its operation are immaterial. For as it is the nature of a substance so is the nature of the property of the substance, and yet that mind is immaterial, has been shown in what we have already said in ch. I, div. I, § 1., etc., and therefore its property too is immaterial. Idea is a composite entity; for there is an idea when the mind makes present to itself a sensation pre-existing in the body, and thereby brings the feeling before the mind. For what immediate sensation is, see ch. I, part 2., section I. together with the footnotes.

First Proof of Thesis. Whatever feels, lives; whatever lives, depends on nourishment; whatever lives and depends on nourishment grows; whatever is of this nature is in the end resolved into its basic principles; whatever comes to be resolved into its basic principles is a complex; every complex has its constituent parts; whatever this is true of is a divisible body. If therefore the human mind feels, it follows that it is a divisible body.

Second Proof of Thesis. No spirit has sensation of material objects. Since the human mind is spirit, it has no sensation of material objects.

The major premise has been proved in ch. I div. I § 1., under the first exposition with notes and applications supplied. The minor premise is incapable of contradiction.

NOTE I. To live and to have sensation are two inseparable predicates. The proof is in the following inversion: everything which lives necessarily feels; and everything which feels necessarily lives. The result is that the presence of one feature imports of necessity the presence of the other.

NOTE II. To live and to exist are not synonyms. Whatever lives exists, but not everything that exists lives, for both spirit and stones exist, but can hardly be said to live. For spirit exists and operates with knowledge; matter exists and suffers the action of another agent. On the other hand both men and animals exist, act, live and feel.

Third Proof of Thesis. "Fear not," our Saviour says, "those who killing the body yet cannot kill the soul." Matthew X 28. From that we gather that whatever is killed can be killed, necessarily lives. (For to be killed is to be deprived of life by violence from some other quarter.) If therefore the body is slain or can be slain, it follows that it lives; and if it lives; feels; and if it feels, it follows that it enjoys the faculty of sensation. For living and feeling are always and right from the beginning conjoined in the same subject.

NOTE. There is agreement between us and the whole assembly of medical men and others whose opinion is that sensation occurs in fluid of the kind in the nerves, and this nervous fluid was by the ancients called animal spirits. See the illustrious de Rerum in his Physiology, bk. I. On human nature, ch. XXI on secretion and motion of the nervous fluid, p. 277 [27]. See also the most distinguished Dean, my own Chairman, in his compendious second edition of the Experimental Physics. C.V.O. XXV [28]. Essays on Nature part one, ch. VIII, Of Sensations § 5, p. 102 [29]; Senocrates in his Epitome of Natural Science, bk. XV ch. 5 p. 674 [30].

EXEMPLE. Exceptionally appropriate here is the solemn pronouncement of Frederick the Wise, Elector, of the most glorious memory, most beneficent founder of our University which flourishes here, Wittenberg. In his last breath of life he was asked how he felt. He answered that his body was in mortal pain but his mind was at peace: "who on his death-bed was asked how he felt, and made answer: The spirit is restful, but the body is in great pain." —See Brucker in "The Hall of Fame" on the life of Frederick the Wise, . . . [31]
§ 2.

THEISI. And there is no faculty of sensation in the mind.

PROOF. Anything to which circulation of blood is appropriate is that also to which the principle of life is. Whatever the latter pertains to, that also does the faculty of sense. Yet circulation of the blood, and the principle of life pertain to the body. See the illustrious DE BERGHER ch. 5 to the end of p. 112. In the same book also p. 56 [32]. Let me refer you in addition to my worthy President in the work mentioned, to Christian VATER C.V.Q. XII [33] in Physiologus, s. IV ch. II, on life and nutrition, thesis I towards the end [34]. Likewise the Bible clearly marks the distinction between the soul and the breath, Job XII, v. 10 where the seventy men say: "If in his hands are the souls of all living things and the breath of all men." DR. LUTHER too renders it similarly: "that in his hand is the soul of all things which have life and the spirit of everything that has flesh." The expression θαυμάζω indicates the principle of life of animals, Genesis I verse 24, also ch. IX verse 4. "Flesh in the blood, which is the life thereof, shall ye not eat." "Except meat" etc. "Eat not of flesh which yet lives in its blood," and in the same place DR. LUTHER rendered τὸ ψύξα as the life of man [35]. Likewise Proverbs 4 [36]. "Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it proceeds life." But the heart with its cycle of blood means the body. Further turn to Leviticus ch. XVII [37]: "For all life is the blood." But blood here is traced back to body. Add the Essays on Nature, part I, chapter VIII on sensations pp. 102, 103 [38]. Since these things are so, it follows that the principle of life with the faculty of sense is not appropriate to mind. Rather, they belong to the body.

§ 3.

THEISII. Hence sensation and the faculty of sense belong to body.

PROOF. Sensation and the faculty of sense belong either to the mind or to the body, not both. They do not pertain to the mind has been shown by our broad conclusions. Therefore, they belong to the body. I refer you to the proofs of Theses I and II.

FINAL NOTE. To conclude this dissertation: for the refutation of contrary opinions to my position see chapter 2 on the form of the question. In the same way we must not confuse the things which belong to the mind and the body respectively. Whatever consists in the pure operation of the mind belongs to mind alone, and whatever is subject to sensation and the faculty of sensation and involves the concept of matter is entirely to be attributed to body. THAT IS ALL.

THE RECTOR

and

PUBLIC ASSEMBLY OF WITTENBERG UNIVERSITY

to the Kind Reader render Public Greeting

Great once was the dignity of Africa, whether one considers natural talents of mind or the study of letters, or the very institutions for safeguarding religion. For she has given birth to several men of the greatest pre-eminence by whose talents and efforts the whole of human knowledge, no less than divine knowledge, has been built up. No one in former time and no one in our own age has been judged to be either more prudent in civic life or more elegant than TERENCE, the Carthaginian. Moreover, Plato, in the Socratic disquisitions of APOLLONIOUS the Madalassian, seemed to come to life again, and with such great applause of former ages, that scholars broke asunder, and the Apuleian School [30] flourished, the school which dared to rival the Ciceronians [40] for first place in eloquence. In Christian teaching too how great are the men who have come out of Africa. Of the more distinguished it is enough to mention TERTULLIAN, CYRILL [41], ASENORIOUS [42], OPTATUS MILITIANUS [43], AUGUSTINE, all of whose sanctity of soul rivals the learning of every race. And finally with what great faith and steadfastness for soundness in sacred matters the African doctors continued their memorials and their deeds, their martyrdom, their councils declare. Those who say that the African Church has always merely been a receiver of instruction, do her immeasurable wrong. While admitting that with the spread of Arab power into Africa, great changes have indeed taken place, nevertheless all the light of their genius and learning has been far from extinguished by Arab absolutism. By an old established custom of this race to whom learning seems to have migrated, liberal science was cultivated, and when the Moors crossed from Africa into Spain their ancient writers brought with them at the same time much help to the cultivation of letters from the darkness which had taken hold of it. Such was the position of learning that it brought pleasure to the Africa of ancient days. But though in our own times indeed that part of the world is reported to be more prolific in other things than in learning, nevertheless that it is by no means exhausted of genius.

ANTHONY WILLIAM AMO,

here, that most distinguished Master of Science and the Liberal Arts—would teach by his example. Born in a very distant recess of Africa where it faces the east, he came to Europe as a very little child. He was initiated into sacred rites in the Halls of Julius [54], and so enjoyed the kindness of their most serene Highnesses and Dukes of Brunswick-Wolfenbättel, of AUGUST WILHELM [45] and of LUDWIG RUDOLPH [46], which was so great that in the matter of his education no bounty of paternal love was wanting.
By reason of his proven greatness of spirit he visited the Saxon town of Halle, and already learned in various doctrines, he came to us, and by continuing the curriculum with diligence, he won the affection of the Order of Scholars to such an extent that by the unanimous vote of the Fathers, he was decorated with the laurels of philosophy. The honour won by desert of his ability, of his outstanding uprightness, industry, erudition, which he has shown by public and private exercise, he increased with praise. By such behaviour, with the best and most learned, he won great influence; among his equals he easily shone out. Therefore trained and stimulated by the study of these, he handed over his knowledge of philosophy to several at home. Having examined the opinions of the ancients as well as those of the moderns, he garnered all that was best, and what he picked out he interpreted with precision and with lucidity. This work has proved that his intellectual ability is as great as his powers of teaching, nor has this ability proved itself unequal to the office of teaching, which by some natural instinct he is at length being drawn to administer in the university. Therefore, since he has completely justified our expectation, there is no reason whatever why we should deny him our public judgement and attest to which he has a right. Indeed, we hope for all the best things from him and we adjudge him worthy of that Princely favour which he has dutifully respected, and which he publicises in every address. And now for blessing in order that he may be able to enjoy for a long time this good fortune and attain to the most renowned fruition of his hope for the well-being of the good and great Prince, LUDWIG RUDOLPH,

for the preservation of the whole House of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, celebrated for so many great services to all Germany, let us all address God in prayer.

JOHN GODFREY KRAUS [47], DOCTOR, Rector of the University

THE CHAIRMAN TO THE MOST DISTINGUISHED AUTHOR ETC. OF THIS DISSERTATION RENDERS PUBLIC GREETING

We proclaim Africa and its region of Guinea, planted at a very great distance from us, formerly the Golden Coast, so called by Europeans on account of its abundant and copious yield of gold, but known by us as your fatherland, in which you first saw the light of day, the mother not only of many good things and the treasures of nature but also of the most successful minds; we proclaim her quite deservedly. Among these auspicious minds, your genius particularly stands out, most noble and most distinguished Sir, seeing that you have excellently proved the felicity and superiority of your mind, the solidity and refinement of your learning and teaching, in countless instances up to now even in this our University with great honour in all good deeds, and also in your present dissertation. Still complete and wholly unchanged I return to you this which you have by your own efforts worked out with refinement of scholarship in order that the power of your intellect may shine forth all the more strongly from now on. It only remains now for me to congratulate you wholeheartedly on this singular example of your more refined learning; and with a more abundant feeling of heart than with words I pray for all good fortune and commend you to the Divine Grace and also to the Highest and Best Prince LUDWIG RUDOLPH,

for whose greater health and safety I shall never tire of worshipping the Divine Majesty. You too I commend with equal devotion and humility.

I write this at Wittenberg in Saxony.