A Human Security Perspective on Migration: A Compass in the Perfect Storm

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‘We deserve a life we can live, not just exist’.¹ These words by an asylum-seeker in Belfast make an important distinction between living and existing, thriving and surviving, flourishing and gradually diminishing. A life under constant fear and anxiety of physical violence, risk of poverty, exclusion, discrimination, abuse, and harassment is not living, in the fuller sense; it is simply existing. And similarly, for a life full of fear of ‘unknown strangers’ with different languages, beliefs, and skin colour. Countless philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, and artists underline that life under fear is not a full life. It is reductive and restrictive, and makes an individual susceptible to hate, distrust, paranoia, and suspicion.

Today, many individuals, whether European citizens or migrants into Europe, live under fear and anxiety. The conditions that migrants and European citizens experience are different. Even within these groups, it is impossible to make sweeping generalisations about why they experience fear. I certainly will not compare and contrast the insecurities of individuals and decide whose suffering is worthier of focus than others’. However, it is not morally acceptable to equalise the violence that a migrant endures in the Sahara during her migration towards the borders of Europe and the anxiety of an EU citizen regarding how these borders are secured. These two types of insecurity are different, albeit inherently connected. Both involve living under fear. The existing political structures dichotomise these two lives—these two insecurities—and also perpetuate them.

This is why Europe has found itself in what we can characterise as ‘a perfect storm’²: accelerated instability and more human mobility outside its borders, and rising xenophobia and racism along with economic problems inside. It is trying to sail through this storm without a compass, only

¹ http://www.righttoremain.org.uk/blog/asylum-seekers-in-belfast-demand-dignity/
² According to Collins English Dictionary the concept refers to a combination of events which are individually manageable but 'occurring together produce a disastrous outcome'. Available at https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/perfect-storm
adopting measures to save the immediate day and/or that make the existing situation worse. The compass Europe needs is, I suggest, human security for both migrants and European citizens, so they can live together, not just exist.

In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published a Human Development Report that defined human security. Since then, there have been several renditions and elaborations of the concept. In my understanding, which matches that adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2012, human security broadly refers to an individual’s freedom from fear (threats such as physical and direct violence), from want (meaning unemployment, poverty, sickness), and from indignity (exclusion, exploitation, and discrimination) (Tadjbakhsh 2014: 44). Human security shifts political and analytical attention from states to individuals, as the subjects whose security must be prioritised. It imagines political communities in which political, economic and social systems do not inflict physical and structural violence on individuals.

Since its inception, there has been contention about human security in academic and political circles. It is unlikely that there will ever be full consensus on what human security means. For this reason, I would like to briefly explain what human security means to me as a scholar of International Relations. My academic journey has been shaped by a combination of the Frankfurt School Critical Theory tradition, neo-Gramscian International Relations, post colonialism and feminism. Human security analysis is about explicitly problematising power relations that inflict violence on individuals and communities. Unlike cosmopolitanism and traditional humanitarianism, human security thinking appropriately takes into account all the dimensions that mark our identities, such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, legal status, and class.. Neoliberal capitalism, racism, patriarchy, neo-colonialism, West-centrism and obsession with sovereignty in politics render some individuals more insecure than others in different spaces and times. Being conscious of power relations, human security analysis reveals that the security of those who are disadvantaged and marginalised and the security of those who are more privileged in different power relations are, in fact, inherently connected.
Today, political and economic structures in the European political community, meaning the European Union and its member states, dichotomise the human security of citizens versus that of migrants from the global South, operating as if one group would be, or feel, secure when the other one faces insecurities. The human security paradigm operates instead on the political and moral principle that the lives and well-being of all individuals in a shared system are connected. In my case I want to examine the Euro-Mediterranean migration system. As challenging as it is, human security analysis aims to destabilise the status quo by asking novel questions and encouraging us to answer these questions in unorthodox ways. Adopting a human security perspective is an invitation to imagine a different present and future.

In this lecture, my main objective is to make a case for human security as an analytical perspective and a practical policy approach to rethink European political community and human mobility. I will start with identifying ‘the perfect storm’ that Europe is in regarding migration and with unpacking how Europe has been responding to the challenges of human mobility. I will then move to discuss the main consequences of Europe’s migration management system and I will call them the three dialectics: of ‘criminalisation’, of distrust, and of insecurity. ‘If the status quo is violent and does not work, then why is it so persistent?’ is the question I will ask next. Based on that critical discussion of Europe’s migration system, I will explain why and how a human security approach can address the challenges of contemporary human mobility more effectively than the existing system. In the concluding section, I will raise some questions and political possibilities that I will pursue during my term as Prince Claus Chair in cooperation with scholars and practitioners in various countries.

Before starting this challenging journey, please allow me to underline that human security is not a final objective that we can fully achieve; it is not an end point. Rather, it is a way of thinking about how we can live differently as a global community, of how we can thrive together instead of just existing. A world where all humans feel completely secure is of course a utopia, but we do need some intellectual utopias. Eduardo Galeano, a Uruguayan novelist who went into exile in Argentina following the military coup in 1973, once wrote:
‘No matter how much I walk, I’ll never reach her./
What good is utopia? That’s what: it is good for walking.’

A human security framework helps us walk farther and imagine a different world together, because the status quo is neither politically nor morally sustainable. Since I chose as my MA thesis subject migration in Europe in 2005, I have been conducting research on why humans migrate, why they come to Europe, how Europe responds to the movements of some of the most vulnerable people in the world, and why the response to migration is often violent and discriminatory, not only in Europe but also in North Africa and the wider Middle East, as well as in Australia, Asia, and America. My research on migration has produced a PhD thesis, a book, several academic articles, dozens of blogs, conference presentations, and public lectures. I have been conducting my research on migration as myself a migrant in Europe, from the global South, which gives me insights that feed my academic research. I am one of the privileged migrants because I am married to a European Union citizen, which allows me to travel, reside, and work in the EU. In addition, my job as an academic shelters me from the worst assaults that migrants face in Europe, although, like all migrants, I have faced institutional discrimination and racist remarks in my daily life. However, my personal experience also allows me to see what Europe can do better, its potential. I’d like to thank to The Curatorium of the Prince Claus Chair in Development and Equity for allowing me to take my research further to explore Europe’s potential to do better, so that migrants who make Europe their home and EU citizens can live together rewardingly, not simply exist.

**Europe in the Perfect Storm**

In the first month of 2018, 343 migrants were recorded as killed on their way to Europe. The real figure is likely to be considerably higher. These numbers are the latest episode in the ongoing situation in the Mediterranean Sea since 2011. This situation is often identified as a ‘crisis’ by different actors. However, what they mean by ‘crisis’ is not always the same.
For some, this is Europe’s border crisis. In other words, the crisis is seen in terms of the inflow of migrants that Europe has faced in recent years. According to EU figures, there were around 1.5 million detected illegal border crossings in 2015 and 2016 in total (EU 2017a: 10). In this time, over 2 million first asylum claims were made in the EU, of which around half were granted (EU 2017a: 10, 25). Note that many asylum claims result in only temporary leave to remain, not a permanent right to residency, and often not even a right to work.

For others, it is a humanitarian crisis. It refers to the suffering and death that many migrants endure on their way to Europe. In 2016, 5143 migrants are recorded as dying during the passage to Europe in the Mediterranean (IOM 2017a: 100). In 2017, the number was 3119 (IOM 2017b). The recorded figures are likely to be a major underestimate. Further, these figures do not include those who died or were killed in the Sahara. According to Richard Danziger, the International Organization for Migration Director for West and Central Africa, this number “has to be at least double those who die in the Mediterranean”.3

These numbers are revealing, because they suggest that what’s happening on the borders of Europe and beyond is indeed unprecedented. However, what we witness today is not simply a border crisis. Similarly, it is not only a humanitarian crisis, because humans have been dying on the way to Europe for a long time. In 2006, the total number of dead bodies discovered on the shores of EU states was 2088, but this number was not considered high enough to call this a humanitarian disaster back then.4 Like those deaths in the Sahara today: hidden from the headlines and from Europe’s gaze…

Instead, what has become impossible to conceal today is that Europe as a political community is in crisis (de Genova 2017). Although many Europeans are shocked when they begin to comprehend how much suffering migrants endure, many wonder how the fortress they think they exist in

3 https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-sahara/migrant-deaths-in-the-sahara-likely-twice-mediterranean-toll-u-n-idUKKBN1CH22D
crumbles so easily when it faces migrant groups. According to a Eurobarometer survey back in 2005, migration was the fifth concern of EU citizens, at 14%.\(^5\) Eurobarometer 2017 shows that 86% of EU citizens are concerned with EU’s external borders.\(^6\) Moreover, in several European capitals, words and slogans promising white supremacy and violence, which we thought were relics of history, are back; they are cried out in defiance to liberal and multicultural Europe. We observe a rise of xenophobic and racist social forces in several EU countries. Hate crimes have been on the rise. In 2016, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights categorised ‘racist incidents such as demonstrations, online hate speech or hate crime’ as one of the five fundamental problems needing urgent policy response.\(^7\)

Mark Twain reputedly said: ‘History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme’. The rhyming between contemporary European politics and those in the 1930s is alarming. How Europe responds to human mobility in the 21\(^{st}\) century is not solely about migrants, but is also deeply and essentially about what kind of Europe there will be (Bilgic and Pace 2017).

So, I suggest that more fundamental than a ‘migration crisis’ or ‘border crisis’ is the crisis of Europe. How did Europe come to this point and find itself in the midst of the storm? There are external and internal reasons for this, and their combination has created the conditions for the perfect storm.

### Reasons for the Storm

Externally, instability in the EU’s neighbourhood is unusually high and accelerates human mobility in the region. Migration to Europe from Asia, the Middle East, and sub Saharan Africa has been increasing since the early 1990s, and the origin countries of migrants have started to diversify. These new migrants are joined by the regular, circular migrants coming to Europe from North

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Africa and West Africa. What has changed since 2011 is that many of the relatively stable and authoritarian regimes in North Africa, which used to be Europe's long-time collaborators in migration control, have now collapsed or been blasted away. Instability has not only uprooted the citizens of these countries, but has also provoked migrants from sub-Saharan Africa or Asia to carry on their movement towards Europe.8

Another external reason is that contemporary migration cannot be easily categorised as voluntary or forced. The reasons for migration cannot also be easily determined as political, economic or social; instead they are often intertwined. Structural violence, such as poverty, social exclusion, unemployment and discrimination, can force individuals to choose migration as a way of living not just existing. Mobility can be an individual's human security strategy. The 1951 Refugee Convention, which is concerned with the persecution of an individual because of her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is too narrow to reflect the contemporary realities of human mobility escaping from structural violence. Words of a migrant from Cote d'Ivoire are indicative of this reality:

> It was not because of the war that I left the country, but because of poverty. My father sold our radio and television and almost all our personal possessions so that I could leave…My father wept when he heard that I’d been arrested. He said that our luck had run out and asked me not to be discouraged, but to try again. I know that I’ll be sent back to Senegal but I am going to work there for a while to get some money and then I’m going to come back to Nuoadhibou to give it [migration] another try. I know that without me, my family is finished. I am their only hope.9

The inability or unwillingness to acknowledge this complexity has led to the formulation of terms such as ‘bogus asylum seeker’, ‘economic migrants’, or the pervasive narrative that ‘they are here to abuse our welfare systems’. In turn, these simplifications feed into anti-migrant, racist and


xenophobic ideologies, which put the very existence of liberal, democratic, and multicultural Europe into question.

Let’s turn to the internal reasons behind the perfect storm. Several of these are related to the ways in which Europe has responded to contemporary human mobility. The primary action of the European Union and its member states has been the gradual restriction or removal of legal migration channels. This has rendered long-term migration to Europe more difficult, especially for those who are from low-income classes. The reduction of legal migration routes, combined with continuing high demand for many types of labour from abroad, has led to higher irregular migration and to the flourishing of the smuggling business (Jansen et al 2015; de Vries et al 2016; Guild et al 2016). This is why the European Commission has called for opening ‘more safe, legal ways into the EU’ in the ‘EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020)’.10

I should clarify a point. Restrictive border management and the reduction of legal migration channels do not mean that the European political community is against all migration or that it is at war with all migrants. In fact, Europe wants and needs high-skilled migrants, and many at medium skill levels (as in care work, for example); plus EU documents underline that Europe’s doors will irrevocably remain open to migrants who need international protection, provided that they can make it to Europe. Consequently, the European border regime constructs and reconstructs a dichotomy between good migrants (those that Europe wants, needs and accepts) and ‘bad migrants’. The latter category includes ‘bogus asylum-seekers’, most ‘economic migrants’, irregular border-crossers, visa overstayers, and those who refuse to stay in the hotspots of Europe. This dichotomy is deeply problematic, because it is a Euro-centric conception of migrants: the complexities of human mobility are reduced to legal and political categories that are defined by Europe and in the interests of Europe.

The approach in migration studies that is called ‘autonomy of migration’ (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2007; de Genova 2017) teaches us that migrants’ reasons for migration, and their

practices during the process of migration, often defy the legal categories of states. A migrant will very often not find the protection she seeks in North African countries, because of insufficient economic opportunities, exclusion, and discrimination. Additionally, she does not feel she must settle in Greece or Italy because they are first countries of asylum according to Dublin regulations. This is because she may be able to live in dignity in the community with her family, maybe in Germany, France or Sweden. If a migrant refuses to play Europe’s border management game, she is ‘illegalised’ and accused of not complying. This, in turn, extends restrictive and punitive measures. Unless the European political community develops a new language, new politics, and corresponding institutional mechanisms that try to understand human mobility also from the perspective of migrants—where migration is not simply understood in terms of ‘flows’, ‘waves’, and ‘influx’, as represented by the arrows in Frontex risk analysis maps—then the crisis of Europe will continue to render both its citizens and migrants insecure. The human security perspective, as I will explain soon, can help Europe develop new, more resilient and sustainable politics.

Reasons for opposing migration are related to European economic structures. Youth unemployment hit record levels in 2014 (23.8%), and overall unemployment was recorded as 12%. In 2015, 17.3% of the EU-28 population lived facing the risk of poverty. In 2016, one in every four EU citizens lived at the risk of poverty and social exclusion: 23.4% of the population of the biggest trading bloc in the world. Living standards have decreased; for example: ‘9.5% of the EU population reported that they could not afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish or a vegetarian equivalent every second day’ in 2014.11 Although establishing a causal link between poverty and anti-migrant attitudes can be problematic, and an economistic approach can overlook historical and political reasons for this type of attitude, we have good evidence that there is a correlation between economic insecurities and anti-immigrant attitudes in contemporary European societies (Mayda 2006; Freeman and Mirilovic 2016).

In the same time frame, border security was elevated to the level of high security by being articulated as a counter-terrorism measure (d’Appollonia 2012). In a context where security

concerns and neoliberal market orientation intersect, the management of migration has been privatised in many EU states and at the EU level. Visa processing, border guards, carrier sanctions, and surveillance technology have been the main areas where private companies have begun to formulate and practice border management (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2015).

If we consider these external and internal factors, we face an impossible situation: on the one hand, human mobility has become complex and complicated; but on the other hand, partly because of this complexity, Europe has been looking for simplified solutions such as militarisation of the borders or punishing irregular migrants or asylum-seekers by violating their right to work, or privatising border controls to reduce the cost of border management. However, this perfect storm defies simplifications like ‘good migrant’ vs. ‘bad migrant’, refugee vs. economic migrant’ and quick but very expensive solutions such as funding, say, Senegalese police forces or Libyan coastguards or building up walls in Melilla (one of the Spanish enclaves in Africa). These responses have rendered both European citizens and migrants insecure; and have not stopped either irregular border crossings or humanitarian tragedies.

**Europe’s Migration Management: The Regime of ‘Super-Frontex’**

The contemporary migration management and control system, which was constructed in the last four decades in ‘Europe’ (first the European Economic Community Area, now the EU, or the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice) can be identified as ‘the Super-Frontex regime’. As a regime, it involves ideas, norms, principles, institutions, material capabilities, and policies. It is a biopolitical regime in the Foucauldian sense, which manages, regulates, and registers life with the objective of creating/preserving good life by gradually phasing out, terminating, or incarcerating ‘the bad life’. As such, it is productive of subjectivities, bodies, space, and time in order to build up ‘governable populations’ (Bigo 2002; Vaughan-Williams 2015; Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017).

The regime of ‘super-Frontex’ was designed and put into practice gradually and in a complex context, with the member states’ practices and reactions to the creation of the Schengen area and
human migration within and towards the new ‘Schengenland’ (Walters 2002). In this complex context, ‘securing' EU citizens, who can enjoy freedom and justice where internal borders have been removed, is one of the main ideological, political and normative drivers of the regime (Carrera and Balzacq 2013). This ideological driver has resulted in multiple practices, such as multiplication of borders in- and outside of EU’s geopolitical borders, which reflect the fluid, ever-changing, and mobile ‘borderscapes’ (Brambilla 2015). An EU commissioner called this outside-bordering projection ‘building up defence lines’; they are fluid and mobile, but nevertheless highly ‘militarised’ ‘fronts’ (Bialasiewicz 2011; Bilgic 2013). Other practices involve outsourcing migration control to the EU’s neighbouring and/or third countries via the European Neighbourhood Policy or Mobility Partnership agreements of Frontex (Del Sarto, 2016; Bialasiewicz 2012), or via the introduction of border technologies (such as Smart Border Initiative) that create multiple and cross-cutting databases (such as the Schengen Information System, EURODOC).

However, since its inception, the EU border regime has had another political-normative dimension: a humanitarian logic (Walters 2011). The early demonstrations of this logic can be seen in the Tampere Programme (1999), which highlights that the migration management system should protect migrants from smuggling and trafficking networks, and underlines that migrants have the right to enjoy ‘freedom, security and justice’. Although the humanitarian logic of the regime lost its prominence in favour of the securitarian one after the terrorist attacks in USA and Europe (Carrera and Balzacq 2013), it has never disappeared, and made a strong come-back during ‘the migration crisis’ following the Arab uprisings in 2011.

An important document with powerful humanitarian and human security underpinnings is the EU Commission’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (2011). In the document, the Commission laid the foundation for a migration management system that prioritises saving the lives of migrants as much as securing Europe from the risks of non-managed and irregular migration. The document clearly and unapologetically declares that, in essence, ‘migration governance is not about ‘flows’, ‘stocks’ and ‘routes’; it is about people and the EU's approach to migration should ‘empower vulnerable migrants’ (6). Most of the document outlines and reaffirms the aforementioned migration
management policies, although not at the expense of the ‘migrant-centred’ approach that promotes and protects ‘human rights of migrants’. Similarly, in 2015 the Commission and the Council jointly published an Action Plan (2015), whose ‘humanitarian logic’ is as follows: the situation in the Mediterranean is ‘dire’ and migrants should be saved from smugglers. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that in order to hinder the efforts of smuggling networks, ‘it is important to open more safe, legal ways into the EU’ (2). Another joint statement by the Commission and the Council was released in 2017, whose opening statement articulating the deaths in the Mediterranean ended with ‘The human suffering and cost of this is intolerable’ (EU 2017b: 2). The statement continues with member states’ collective efforts to render ‘European presence in the sea’ possible, in order to rapidly respond to ‘emergencies’, and praises Operation Triton (see below) and the ‘EU Naval Force - Mediterranean’ for their work saving vulnerable migrants. Furthermore, the statement does not call them ‘illegal’, but ‘irregular’.

A first look at this 2017 reintroduction of a humanitarian logic and discourse to the EU’s migration management gives the impression that the EU has, at last, acknowledged the human suffering inflicted by the exclusionary and violent securitarian approach, giving way to a humanitarian one. The dichotomist approach to ‘security’ versus ‘humanitarianism’ has been identified and criticised in academic and NGO circles alike (Mezzadre and Neilson 2013; Panebianco 2016; de Vries et al. 2016; Human Rights Watch 2015). However, following Vaughan-Williams (2015; see also Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017), I will argue that the securitarian and humanitarian logics are not contradictory, but complementary dimensions of a single biopolitical logic of border governance. The super-Frontex regime cannot be understood as the triumph of the securitarian logic over the humanitarian one, but as a performative blend of two logics that (re)construct European ‘borderscapes’ (Brambilla, 2015). Next, I will discuss the gradual construction of the regime through the institution of Frontex, followed by an analysis of how and why humanitarianism fails to address the ‘crisis’.

The militarisation of the Mediterranean is a result of the EU- and member state-level policy of fighting against ‘illegal migration’, which has been articulated as a major security threat to Europe.
The war rhetoric that targets irregular migration invokes concepts that present Europe as a territory under attack and, as such, in need of defence. In 2005, EU Commissioner Franco Frattini worded this as ‘three defence lines’ to protect Europe against the attack of ‘illegal migration’: firstly, equip EU borders with the latest technology; secondly, obtain the cooperation of the North African countries to maintain control of the EU borders; thirdly, establish bilateral agreements with the countries of origin. Meanwhile, a fourth defence line was in the making, of the space that lies in between: the Mediterranean Sea (Bilgic 2013: 111–117).

The maritime cooperation among EU member states started at the end of the 1990s under the leadership of Italy and Spain, in order to meet the challenge of ‘illegal’ crossings in the Mediterranean Sea. This practice gave birth to maritime cooperation between southern and northern Mediterranean states in the area of immigration control. For example, Italy began to subsidise Tunisian maritime capabilities to control immigration as early as 1998. In 2003, Operation Ulysses was launched as a joint naval initiative between France, the UK, Spain, Portugal and Italy. In the same year, the Spain–Morocco and Italy–Libya agreements were announced with regard to joint naval patrols in the Mediterranean Sea. Since 2004, Moroccan–Spanish joint naval patrols have conducted off-shore operations both in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Atlantic Ocean. It was in this bellicose climate of ‘defending Europe’ that Frontex was brought to life.

In 2004, the EU Council issued a regulation for the establishment of a border agency, which would coordinate member state cooperation and conduct risk analysis in the area of immigration control. Risk analysis reports were presented to the European Commission and Council, whereas the European Parliament was excluded from the process. Therefore, the risk analysis, which is the basis of joint naval operations, suffers from very poor democratic accountability, transparency, and legal scrutiny (Carrera 2007). One foundational change was that the institution whose main objective was to conduct ‘risk analysis’ was tasked to coordinate the coast guard operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the eastern coast of the Atlantic Ocean, responding to the migrants’
routes. The first operation conducted in the territorial waters of third states under the coordination of Frontex was HERA II, in 2006.

As Frontex became an operational unit whose objective was to coordinate efforts to ‘defend’ Europe, instead of solely an institution conducting ‘risk analysis’, the humanitarian discourse was watered down in parallel with the reactions of member states in the post-9/11 period. In this period, it was documented that Frontex was involved in ‘push-back’ operations (Carrera 2007). In 2011, amidst increasing criticism, particularly by the EP’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee, Frontex was forced to halt explicit push-back operations and adopted the rhetoric of search and rescue (SAR). It is important to note that 2011 was the year of publication of the Commission’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, and also of the first waves of migration (and death toll in the Mediterranean) due to the Arab uprisings.

Two changes increased the capacity of Frontex and simultaneously limited its practices, in 2014 and 2016. In the 2014 regulation, Frontex was officially banned from practising push-back in the high seas, but the practice was still possible in the territorial waters of the member states. Then, in Regulation 2016/1624, Frontex was transformed into a ‘European Border and Coast Guard Agency’ with new powers. In addition to risk analysis and coordination of border operations, Frontex now has a rapid reaction force of 1500 border guards, which can be deployed in any member state without its invitation and can play a role in the return of ‘illegal’ migrants.

On the one hand, Frontex’s capacity and competence has increased in order to secure Europe to an unprecedented level. The ‘hotspots’ approach of the EU, in which the places with the highest number of ‘illegal’ arrivals would be used for ‘processing’ and, if necessary for returns, involves Frontex along with the EU naval force, Europol, and the European Asylum Support Office. Frontex’s role is to monitor and interrogate asylum-seekers and decide who can be passed to EASO and who should be returned. In addition to its accelerated role in return operations, it has developed a new technology of fingerprinting for asylum-seekers. On the other hand, as the competence of the institution is expanded, it is increasingly bound by the rulings of the European
Court of Human Rights, such as in the Hirsi vs. Italy case. The 2016 regulation extended the areas where Frontex has to observe European and international law, including relations with third countries.

The replacement of ‘push-back’ with Search And Rescue and increased prominence of fundamental human rights in Frontex is reflective of the 2017 joint statement mentioned above. The ‘super-Frontex’ regime is a securitarian/humanitarian biopolitical border management system where life is valued; therefore, it is registered, regulated, and saved. The question of how humanitarianism can be so intimately enmeshed with the securitarian approach is an intriguing one. This leads to another question: can humanitarianism be an effective way to destabilise, or even transform, violent bordering practices such as push-back, detention, and confinement, where the migrant is produced as the subject of a biopolitical ‘super-Frontex’ regime?

Critical literature is advancing on the historical roots of humanitarianism (Fassin 2012; Fassin and Pandolfi 2010) in relation to migration control (Ticktin 2011; Kinnvall 2016) and on contemporary humanitarian practices in the context of bordering practices (Debrix 1998; Fassin 2011; Ticktin 2005 and 2011; Walters 2002 and 2011; Vaughan-Williams 2015; Cuttitta 2017; Pallister-Wilkins, 2017). The discussion below benefits from this literature, but its specific aim is to explore why and how humanitarianism can be easily blended and become cooperative with the violent, exclusionary and militarised security notions and practices. Whereas it is derived from some exemplary works on the security/humanitarianism nexus (Aradau 2004; Vaughan-Williams, 2015 and Little and Vaughan-Williams, 2017; Andersson, 2017), it aims to go beyond them. The discussion paves the way for a human security approach that can cope with humanitarianism’s complacency towards violent bordering ‘security’ practices within the super-Frontex regime.

Deriving from Deleuze and Guattari’s (e.g. 2013) concepts of ‘straited’ and ‘smooth’ space, Debrix (1998) argues that humanitarianism claims neutrality, which supposedly enables its operation on the ‘smooth’ borderless universe of humanity. Therefore, it challenges the ‘straited’ space of states and territories of sovereign bodies, and thus deterritorialises the space. However, Debrix
continues, it reterritorialises the space at the same time by drawing the borders of humanitarian action. That is why he calls this ‘transversal space’, where deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation do not work against each other, but concomitantly: ‘occupying and charting new territories while escaping the spatial confines in which one was previously located’ (Debrix 1998: 832).

Multiple and conflated de/reterritorialisation processes have been studied, in refugee camps, medical clinics and ‘hotspots’ of the EU borderscapes (Agier 2011, Pallister-Wilkins, 2017). These studies demonstrate the fluidity and mobility of humanitarian ‘territories’, always interacting with human im/mobility and the bordering practices of the sovereign. In some ways, it is possible to argue that humanitarian ‘territories’ mediate between the two. Humanitarianism (and humanitarian actors) has the privilege of defining what constitutes a ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’. As humanitarianism is onto-territorial, which means creative of territories (Debrix 1998: 833), it engages with ‘temporal processing of distinct mobilities’: it determines who falls under which category of ‘migrant’ temporally (de Genova, 2017: 9). Migrants are categorised into those who need temporary ‘saving’ (and also those who do not) when the situation is identified as humanitarian ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’. The identification of humanitarian ‘crisis’ is accompanied with the dissemination of ‘sensationalistic images’ (and stories) of identified ‘victims’ via the media. Those victims are ‘confined to a specific humanitarian space’ (Debrix 1998: 839) and a humanitarian ‘time’ of crisis. In other words, humanitarian actors specify which time is an ‘emergency’, which, in turn, necessitates and reinforces humanitarian practices. Like space, time is striated by humanitarianism.

Both the EU and NGOs have been engaging with onto-territorial and onto-temporal humanitarianism. As has now been discussed in the literature, the former’s humanitarianism is a bordering technology that strengthens and multiplies militarised borders while waging ‘war’ against the smugglers (Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017; Andersson 2017). The appropriation or co-option of humanitarianism as a border security tool is best described by the EU (2017b: 5) itself with the title ‘Reducing the Number of Crossings, Saving the Lives’. Under this title, the EU promised to work with the Libyan authorities by releasing additional EUR 1 million to the coast guard as part of Seahorse Operation and EUR 2.2 million to the Libyan Ministry of Interior under
the Regional Development and Protection Programme in North Africa (EU 2017b: 7). The EU’s humanitarian partner, the Libyan coast guard, shot at humanitarian missions, according to NGOs. Hence, several had to halt their missions due to the accelerating Libyan threat. NGO humanitarianism is an alternative and a challenge to these activities. That is why, in the super-Frontex regime, the sovereign body tries to eliminate this challenge. Italy (with the strong support of Frontex) recently asked all NGOs that are conducting rescue operations in the Mediterranean to sign a ‘a code of conduct’ that ‘forces them to allow police officers on board and return immediately to port, rather than transferring migrants to other ships’.12

Although NGO humanitarianism is a challenge to the super-Frontex border regime, humanitarian actions also have a more subtle impact. Spatiality and temporality of humanitarianism inevitably bring up two related questions. First, the question of who defines the recipients of humanitarian practice in a certain space and time and, second, how this temporal and spatial identification produces subjectivities. The onto-territoriality and onto-temporality of humanitarianism lead to three points. Firstly, humanitarianism (and self-identified humanitarian actors) constructs a temporal and transversal ‘space of global victimhood’ (Debrix 1998: 837). In this temporal space, humanitarianism ‘creates and privileges non-rights-bearing, apolitical, non-agentive victims’ (Ticktin 2005: 350). The victim identity is circulated and reinforced through ‘sensationalistic images’. Secondly, Cuttita (2017) shows that in the Mediterranean ‘savings’, while humanitarianism can be more inclusive than ‘what human rights might require’, this inclusion is not a rights-based one: it is presented as an act of ‘grace’. The ‘gesture of rescuing’ is a performative border practice. As an act of grace, humanitarian actors (both state and non-state) keep the discretion (and power) of determining who should be ‘saved’ and when this grace is withdrawn. Thirdly, humanitarianism does not ‘blame’ irregular migrants, but considers them ‘victimised’ by smugglers/criminals. This is most visible in the EU documents such as the Commission’s joint communication entitled ‘Migration on the Central Mediterranean route Managing flows, saving lives’.

As a result, humanitarian border practices, which the super-Frontex regime is actively pursuing, produce three subject and object positions: the criminal smuggler, passive/victimised migrants, and humanitarian actors (particularly of the EU) fighting the criminals and saving the victims. These subjectivities are produced in the temporal and transversal spaces of ‘humanitarianism’, resulting in the following political processes.

The notion of ‘Illegal migration’ and the associated war rhetoric have political functions that justify and normalise securitarian and violent border practices, such as push-back, detention, and forced return. Primarily, humanitarianism as ‘an act of grace’ to save ‘victims’ and punish ‘smugglers’ conceals the aforementioned history of ‘illegalisation’ and, therefore, ‘criminalisation’ of migration to Europe by the EU and its member states. Furthermore, the criminalisation of migration to Europe unsurprisingly coincided with the period of neoliberalisation of European economies, which resulted in the decline of the welfare state and reduction of public expenses. ‘Scapegoating’ migrants as ‘bogus asylum-seekers’ and ‘criminals’ is a politically convenient way for several political actors to face citizens whose life standards have been in decline, or who compete for limited blue collar or low-skilled jobs. Although often neglected, push-back is justified as an economic ‘defence’, as much as a political and legal one, in order to allegedly ‘save’ European jobs and welfare for European citizens in neoliberal Europe. Humanitarianism erases this history by claiming neutrality and, therefore, an apolitical stance.

Furthermore, through temporally and spatially separating the ‘good migrant’ from the ‘bad migrant’, humanitarianism reinforces the securitarian logic of biopolitical border management. The good migrants are those who are identified as ‘victims’, who become temporarily the object of humanitarian ‘grace’. If they use their agency and continue their movements further, they leave the humanitarian space. As non-rights-bearers, ‘victim’ migrants are expected to be monitored, registered, and ‘made known’ by the authorities. It must be noted that humanitarian NGOs often challenge the intervention of sovereign bodies into their ‘humanitarian, smooth, apolitical space’, and migrants in turn are not passive recipients of humanitarian grace. Their decisions and
practices of mobility constantly shape and challenge both humanitarian and securitarian border practices (de Genova 2017).

Lastly, for some, humanitarianism was a constituent of a colonial governance regime. Since the normalisation and legitimisation of colonialism as ‘the white man’s burden’ to work for the well-being of the colonised, humanitarianism as the betterment and saving of the ‘lower life’ has been an ideological undercurrent of the humanitarianism of the West (Ticktin 2011; Fassin 2012). This humanitarianism has been reproduced by humanitarian interventions, humanitarian aid, and multiple renditions of human security that kept underlining the responsibility of the West towards fellow human beings that share a common humanity (Fassin and Pandolfi 2010). In the neo-colonial version of the super-Frontex regime, the images of racialised non-white bodies dying on the borders of ‘Europe’, waiting to be rescued, are in circulation. As these images are circulated repeatedly, the racialised bodies are produced as objects of compassion by ‘Europe,’ which is produced as the subject that has power to withdraw this compassion (Bilgic, forthcoming). The images of ‘rescue operations’ are often used by racist, xenophobic, and anti-migrant media as a ‘show’ of the white man’s ‘generosity’. For example, the UK’s Daily Mail as a direct representative of this type of media outlet praises the ‘British’ sailors who saved 15,000 ‘migrants’ and added the words of a ‘rescued migrant’ to the images: ‘I was granted a new life. I thank them with all my heart and I thank Britain for providing me with everything I need in life’13.

In conclusion, humanitarianism is not a challenge to the super-Frontex biopolitical border regime; it is a constitutive practice of the regime. Therefore, we face the question of how the regime can be changed. A human security approach can perform this task, by politicising the security/humanitarianism nexus.

Three Dialectics of the Super-Frontex Regime

Regarding the consequences of how the European political community reacts to human mobility, we can observe three dialectical relationships.

The first one is the dialectic between restrictive border management and the criminalisation of human mobility. From 1974 onwards, during the recession following the oil crisis and rising unemployment, European states, starting from Germany, ended and phased out the guest worker schemes. The succeeding decades were marked by a process where legal, permanent migration channels to Europe were reduced to asylum-seeking, family unification, and increasingly expensive and digitalised visa systems. These channels could only appeal to high-skilled migrants with substantial financial resources. Lack of accessible legal migration possibilities, plus continuing demand in Europe for many types of immigrant labour, inevitably led many migrants to use asylum or family unification routes, which eventually resulted in the European discourse of ‘bogus asylum-seekers’ and ‘white’ or ‘sham’ marriages. However, instead of opening new legal migration routes to respect the diverse economic and social needs and demands, the EU and member states have developed new systems that further restrict claiming asylum and family unification. Consequently, more and more migrants have resorted to clandestine migration paths, which have boosted smuggling and human trafficking.

In migration studies, this process is called ‘criminalisation’, ‘irregularisation’, or ‘illegalisation’ of migration in Europe. ‘Irregular migrants’ are produced as the ultimate ‘bad migrants’: unrecorded, unobserved, violating the sovereign borders, feeding the black economy, abusing the system. EU citizens live in fear and anxiety about ‘irregular migrants’. In 2015, ‘around nine Europeans in ten say that additional measures should be taken to fight the illegal immigration of people from outside the EU (89%)’ (Eurobarometer 2015: 28). The condition of ‘illegality’ creates insecurities also for migrants, from exploitation to exclusion and discrimination. The consequence of illegality is human insecurity, which at the extreme often claims lives as in the Mediterranean, and in general leads to economic exploitation and poverty (Di Giorgi 2010) and prevents living in dignity.
The second dialectic is related to the first and consists of the cycle of distrust between migrants and the European political community. The European border management system operates based on distrust towards nearly all migrants, including especially but not only asylum seekers. The starting assumption of the community when encountering a migrant, especially from the global South, is that the ‘migrant is here to abuse the system’. Therefore, the burden of proof is on the migrant (including asylum-seekers) to show that she is not trying to abuse the system. For example, even a minor inconsistency in an asylum-seeker’s story could easily result in rejection of an asylum application and in deportation. For example, the UK Home Office rejected an asylum-seeker’s application for the following reason:

It is noted that you have been inconsistent … as you initially state that you took sheep and goats to graze and then you stated that you took the sheep. This is a minor inconsistency, however it has been noted.14

However absurd, this is a manifestation of deep distrust towards migrants, and indeed of hostility. A potential visitor or migrant to Europe must prove to the authorities, including visa officials and border police, despite their deep distrust, that she has every intention to go back to her country, or ample financial resources to maintain herself, or that she genuinely needs protection. Anthropological research demonstrates that such distrust by Europe towards migrants feeds into distrust from migrants to Europe (Scheel 2017; Stierl 2017; Picozza 2017). They sometimes forge documents, overstay their visas, and show no intention to declare themselves to the authorities, whose main objective, in their opinion, is to deport them. Some also isolate themselves from wider society because of fear of being caught, abused by the police or harassed in the community. In a political context where xenophobia and racism are on the rise, migrant anxieties and fears are not unfounded. A migrant from Afghanistan told Amnesty International in Hungary that:

I have spent 38 days in the camp, I will get to cross the border in 12 days. […] Yesterday I went to Horgoš, the shopkeeper said I have no permission to be there. The

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hairdresser refused to cut my hair. The police and people look me down as if we were not human.\textsuperscript{15}

In June 2015, public bus drivers in Milan made it to the news when they refused to take dark-skin migrants on the bus and the company defended this act as ‘not racism but a sanitary measure’.\textsuperscript{16}

So, the second dialectic is that migrants often do not trust Europe because European societies frequently violate migrants’ right to freedom from indignity.

The third dialectic concerns mutual human insecurities, and is founded upon the previous two. The condition of ‘illegality’, which has been constructed and reproduced for reasons I stated beforehand, is a source of human insecurity for both migrants and European citizens. More generally, each group’s attempts to secure itself cause insecurity for the other. The border regime, which aims to secure European citizens, can sometimes be violent towards migrants, as in the case of Greek coast guards who pushed migrant boats back to Turkish territorial waters. Further, it indirectly encourages them to employ clandestine migration channels. Facing such a regime, migrants often choose to remain invisible. This choice, however, deepens anxiety and fear among EU citizens, who are often manipulated by certain political actors and media.

The three dialectics highlight that the existing regime is not working satisfactorily and instead produces insecurities for humans in Europe and beyond. Then why are we stuck in this box?

**Persistence of The Violent Status Quo**

There are ideological, political, and economic reasons that can explain the persistence of our status quo.


Europe has never faced its colonial past. Thus, when people are on the move towards Europe, they are rapidly racialised and presented as threats to the European political community. This is not the first migration crisis in Europe. Since the Industrial Revolution, many European countries have needed a migrant workforce and attracted migrants from both the periphery of Europe and the colonies. Historical and sociological research shows that the integration of these migrants was not unproblematic, and many integration problems and violent encounters between racialised migrant communities and host communities have been recorded (Sassen 2014; d’Appollonia 2012: 19-48). The racism and xenophobia of the previous decades was however swept under the carpet, to be forgotten.

In the post-war reconstruction era, Europe again needed a migrant labour force with the expectation that migrants would return to their countries when their job was considered done. However, as the autonomy of migration approach teaches us, human mobility rarely respects legalistic state policies. Since then, in addition to the external reasons I mentioned earlier, there has been a tension between migration control policies and the autonomy of migration. The former is working on the assumption that Europe has a fixed identity with its liberal democracy, market capitalism, and (in recent years) multiculturalism. It imagines a political community whose development is finished and now needs to be protected. As a result, migration is constructed as a threat to this imagined community. Because Europe has not dealt with its violent past, but has instead assumed that racism and xenophobia are things that it has left behind, when migrants from the global South are on the move towards Europe, historical narratives marked by racism and xenophobia are easily invoked, with little self-consciousness or guilt (Kinnvall 2016; Buckel 2012).

Another reason why the existing regime is persistent is the economy revolving around ‘illegality’. There are two dimensions of this economy. The first one is the ongoing demand for ‘illegal’ cheap labour. Welfare states in Europe, which have been in decline, have increasingly excluded migrants from benefits and social welfare in favour of citizens, many of whose living standards have also been in decline. Welfare systems in the age of neoliberalism have a boundary-producing effect on who is in and who is out. While the EU’s ‘border spectacle’ so-called ‘catches’ the ‘criminals’ (i.e.
illegalised migrants), most of the border work constructs the conditions of ‘deportability’ for migrants (illegalised or not). Beyond the spotlight of ‘border spectacle’, deportability as a neoliberal economic practice produces ‘a subordinate reserve army of deportable “foreign” labour, -already within the space of the nation state, readily available for deployment as the inevitably over-employed poor’ (de Genova, 2013: 1190; see also de Giorgi 2010: 153). Therefore, neoliberal capitalism situates a deportable ‘foreign’ labour against the ‘citizen’ low-paid labour, who is subjected to ‘nativist’ ideology (de Genova 2010) and perceives the foreigner as a ‘threat’ economically and also ‘racially’. Race ideas and neoliberalism productively interact to construct racialised and precarious labour forces (Karakayali 2015: 33).

The second dimension of the economy revolving around ‘illegality’ concerns the emergence of prevention of illegal migration as itself a lucrative business. The management of migration has been privatised in many EU states and at the EU level in line with neoliberal economic restructuring. In particular, the European border security industry’s turnover was estimated at €15 billion in 2015, and is predicted to rise to more than €29 billion annually by 2022. The budget of Frontex increased between 2005 and 2016 from €6.3m to €238.7m. Anthropologist Ruben Andersson (2014) calls the complex political economy revolving around ‘illegal migration’ and the ‘business of securing Europe’ as the ‘illegality industry’, where multiple actors -- from border guards in Spain, police in West Africa, multinational corporations, European and non-European political institutions, to private security actors -- interact. Through this industry, migrants’ ‘illegality’ is produced, or we can say that mobile humans are produced as ‘illegals’, so that certain sectors make financial gains. For instance, in December 2017, Amnesty International released a detailed report on how Libyan law enforcement forces and smugglers work together to exploit ‘illegal’ migrants financially by inflicting horrific violence on them.17 This is Libya: the country the EU promised to work with by releasing financial aid amounting to EUR 1 billion to the coast guard and EUR 2.2 billion to the Libyan Ministry of Interior in order to ‘save lives’.18

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EU’s partner, the Libyan coast guard, shot at humanitarian missions. Several missions had to be halted due to the accelerating Libyan threat.\(^\text{19}\)

The ‘illegality industry’ is part of what Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sorensen (2013) called ‘the migration industry’. This involves networks that facilitate migration and others who control it. The control side of the industry and the illegality industry revolve around the fear and anxiety of Western states and societies. A report published by a globally-known credit accreditation company in 2015 opens as follows:

Border management is one of the great challenges of our times. In an increasingly globalized world, how do governments maintain the security they need, while encouraging the trade they want? Economic prosperity relies on the free movement of goods and people, but if those flows are not monitored and controlled the result can be smuggling, trafficking and illegal migration; and with these come organised crime and terrorism. How can governments hope to reconcile these contradictions? PricewaterhouseCoopers has many years’ experience in supporting governments to establish effective border management systems and processes and we have close relationships with customs and border control agencies, immigration services, law enforcement and security agencies, as well as private bodies in many different countries. We also have our own Global Government Security Network, which has over 250 members in more than 50 countries.\(^\text{20}\)

Today, a credit accreditation company can become a securitising actor by discursively constructing irregular migration as a threat to the West. Anxieties and fears in North America, Europe, and Australia stemming from so-called ‘illegal’ migration flourish alongside business opportunities to address these fears and anxieties. Allow me to put this bluntly: for this industry, EU citizens should be encouraged to feel insecure so that the business of border control can flourish. As anthropologist Ruben Andersson (2014: 8) puts it, ‘The more specter-like the threat at the border, the higher the potential gains from this phantom menace’.

\(^{19}\) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/14/three-ngos-halt-mediterranean-migrant-rescues-after-libyan-hostility

The business of addressing ‘illegal migration’ stretches beyond Europe. Several multinational companies have been active in supporting Libya’s migration control systems, for example. Recently, a private security company used to be called ‘Blackwater’ (currently renamed as ‘Academi’), which is known for atrocities during the invasion of Iraq, raised its interest in border control in Libya.21 Here I am talking about an industry whose ‘digital’ dimension only (i.e. digitalisation of border security) is anticipated to increase to 56 billion dollars by 2022.22

Finally, today Europe lacks sufficient political vision and leadership to bring forth a different European political community. The European Commission and European Parliament do develop important ideas, which I draw on to frame my own human security vision on migration. However, without political leadership, their ideas are lost in translation.

The status quo is too violent and unsustainable for both European citizens and migrants. We do not have the luxury of not imagining an alternative. However, the human security perspective that I will present now will offer no miraculous solutions and faces strong challenges.

A Human Security Perspective on Migration

Constructing a case for ‘human security’ is not straightforward, analytically or politically. From an analytical point of view, human security is not a theory, but ‘a paradigm and a concept that allows recognition of threats and vulnerabilities’ (Tadjbakhsh 2014: 45; see also Gasper and Sinatti 2016). Although ‘human’ is conceptualised as the ‘referent of security’ within this paradigm, what constitutes ‘human’, how to approach it, what threats target the amorphous ‘human’, and what means would be necessary are widely debated. It can be argued that there is a broad spectrum of answers to these questions, largely depending on whose ‘human security’ is studied. In other words, the scholar’s choice of subject and how to study it shapes, and is shaped by, the definition of what kind of human security approach is adopted. For example, the approaches that associate

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human security with human development focus on the effects of neoliberal economic policies on populations (Thomas 2000 and 2001), with focus on groups that have vulnerabilities during economic development, including in economic downturns but not only then (Mine 2007; Sen 2014). While there are human security approaches that prioritise survival and the physiological needs of individuals (Roberts 2010; King and Murray 2001), others understand human security more broadly as entailing freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity (Tadjbakhsh 2014). Furthermore, it is possible to differentiate top-down and bottom-up approaches to human security (den Boer and de Wilde 2008).

Regardless of their differences, three commonalities among these approaches, albeit with nuances, can be highlighted: first, opening up the concept of security to include actors beyond states and issues beyond militarised, exclusionary, and violent security understandings; second, conceptualising and justifying human security through various renditions of human rights of ‘vulnerable’ populations; third, problematising local and transnational structures both as a source and as a potential solution to insecurities of vulnerable populations (Gasper 2014). The human security approaches, in general, adopt an explicitly normative position to rethinking security ideas and practices in favour of humans in their own contexts.

However, criticisms towards the concept cannot be omitted. Aside from the ‘conventional’ criticism that promotes a return to traditional state-centric and militarist security understandings (Paris 2001; Thomas and Tow 2002), more important and insightful criticisms originate from critical security studies. Some scholars essentialise human security as a neoliberal biopolitical governance technique that reproduces human bodies and subjectivities as its objects (Chandler 2008; Chandler and Hynek 2010). As human security has been operationalised mainly in cases from and in relation to the Global South (see for exceptions Tripp, Ferree and Ewig 2013; Ozolina 2013; Remacle 2008: Heinbecker 2000), the concept is in danger of being reduced to a tool of liberal interventionism with its underpinning neo-colonial ideology (Duffield 2010). Furthermore, the
universalised ‘human’ can conceal gendered identities and power relations (Wibben 2015; Boyd 2014; Hudson 2005).23

In order to counter the criticisms, the human security approach has been subjected to revisions and conceptual enrichments. Regarding the ‘liberal interventionist’ criticisms, Richmond proposes a human security-based post-conflict reconstruction where liberal values and practices are always interrogated and negotiated by local actors, which results in the production of a post-colonial hybrid subject (Richmond 2007 and 2010). Chandler (2012) takes a different path by introducing the concept of ‘resilience’ to the approach and arguing that the construction of resilient communities lies at the heart of human security (UNDP 2003). Feminist security scholars offer alternative ways of thinking human security that are bottom-up, empowering, pluralist, and conducive to problematising gendered identities and power relations (Hoogensen and Stovoy 2006; Robinson 2011; Tripp et al 2013).

Contrary to some who consider human security framing as a ‘lost cause’ that can hardly challenge the systemic status quo in world politics (Christie 2010), the aforementioned studies make a case for human security that is nuanced and refined. Firstly, human security ‘as a paradigm’ is not accepted at face value, but is regarded as a way of rethinking about security for humans only when the concept is supported by a theory or an approach, which offers an alternative, more pluralist, inclusionary, politics that opens space for different ways of being and doing. This is sometimes gender theory, sometimes postcolonialism, sometimes resilience. The human security concept is not a theory of security and there is nothing invariable, apart from articulating ‘humans’ as the referent of security, that cements together approaches that have used the label ‘human security’—even in this case, who is ‘human’ should be a question. This fluidity and generality can potentially pave the way for articulating more destabilising human security thinking.

23 Works that illustrate the frequent legitimacy and accuracy of these criticisms include Dunne and Wheeler (2004) and Thomas and Tow (2002).
Secondly, the operationalisation of human security cannot be one-size-fits-all, but should be crafted around the contextual, historical and political dynamics in relation to the case (Jolly and Basu Ray 2007; Gomez et al 2016). In this process of rethinking security, the bottom-up approach is prioritised over top-down approaches, but what bottom-up human security means in theory and practice is open for debate: who decides who should be included and how? This is a political question. Finally, problematising structures and reforming existing ones through bottom-up practices underpin the human security approaches. However, this is not an exclusively structuralist approach, but a ‘person-centered’ one that explores how structures are understood, experienced, produced and challenged by individuals (Gasper and Sinatti 2016: 14).

While there is potential for human security analysis as a critique and an alternative in rethinking ‘the super-Frontex’ migration management regime, this is a challenging task. In what follows, I will discuss why and how.

*Why Human Security?*

The critical literature on the EU’s migration regime is vast. Most of this literature extensively shows the processes of securitisation by European actors, multiplication of borders to secure ‘Europe’, privatisation and outsourcing border control, technologisation and militarisation of borders, and political consequences of the securitarian logic behind the super-Frontex regime (among others, see Carrera and Balzacq 2013; Huysmans 2006; Neal 2009; Lazaridos and Wadia 2015; Vaughan-Williams 2015). Notwithstanding the immense contributions of this literature, I have elsewhere argued that the critical security studies literature on the topic is limited by, firstly, state-centrism (association of security with territoriality, and overwhelming preoccupation with the sovereign logic of mainly, albeit not only, states); and, secondly, security professionalism (exclusively focusing on ‘professionals’ who are ‘entitled’ to do and talk about security) (Bilgic 2013: 6–8). As a result, the academic space for thinking about alternative imaginations and practices of security has shrunk.
To reiterate, in the absence of alternative security notions, humanitarianism is articulated as the alternative practical policy to the securitarian policies (Mezzadre and Neilson 2013; Panebianco 2016; de Vries et al 2016; Human Rights Watch 2015). However, this is problematic. As seen above, it is an onto-territorial and onto-temporal practice that produces certain bodies and subjectivities as hapless victims waiting for protection. When saving lives, the subjectivity produced is a disempowered one, which has been reappropriated to reconstruct a ‘white, saviour Europe’ identity. As an ‘act of grace’, it categorises migrants into those who are ‘deserving’ and others who are ‘non-deserving’. Furthermore, humanitarianism is now integrated into the super-Frontex regime. ‘Saving lives’ has become ‘securing EU borders’, by keeping some migrants outside the borders and castrated in the borderscapes, and by turning them - at best - into rightless recipients of Europe’s compassion. Racialised and gendered power in this power relation remains largely outside the scope of analysis.

There is, in addition, a deeper running problem characteristically embedded in most humanitarianism: its ‘apolitical’, ‘urgency-focused’, and ‘universal’ approach takes analytical and political attention away from the politics that has been feeding into the criminalisation of migration in Europe. ‘Smugglers’, ‘third country states that are not complying with international conventions’, ‘untrained coast guards’, or Frontex have been articulated as the bodies responsible for humanitarian emergencies, but this overshadows asking the question of how humanitarian emergencies have become common, a ‘new normal’. In this way, humanitarianism reproduces the sovereign politics of bordering, exclusion, othering, and control.

*How Human Security?*

One common criticism against a human security understanding, and potentially seriously damaging, concerns its possible liberal and Western undercurrent. Human security is often rendered as close to humanitarianism, which opens it to the same disadvantages discussed above. The adaptation of the concept by some Western states in their foreign policies, such as Canada up to 2006, sometimes reinforced this problem, while some human security proponents
from non-Western contexts have similarly adopted a liberal and sometimes economy-centric standpoint (for example, Tehranian 1999). Some continuing efforts to think human security only in relation to conflict or post-conflict situations strongly associate the concept with ‘failed states’ and the developing world (Thomas 2001; Poku et al 2007; Hove et al 2013; Cilliers 2004), while peoples of the developing world are reproduced as the recipients and agents of human security.

The consequence is that much human security thinking has been too often derived from West-centric liberal politics. Much like humanitarianism, this reproduces racial, economic, colonial, and gendered power hierarchies (Duffield 2010). To challenge this, Jenny Peterson (2013) argues for an ‘agonistic’ human security understanding, as opposed to the liberal one, by re-articulating the concept through radical democratic criticisms to liberal democracy. ‘Agonistic human security’, on the contrary, opens the political space: introducing ideas, practices, and identities that differ from a liberal, bourgeois, and Western outlook. ‘It involves an open confrontation of dissent and the allowance for the creation of something new from such confrontations’ (2013: 325). Inclusion into the conversation is not a matter of ‘right and wrong’, predefined by a liberal human security understanding, but a question of ‘does engagement with their positions create opportunities for better forms of human security?’ (326).

Peterson’s contribution is invaluable in the sense that it demonstrates how human security can be re-thought in order to make the concept more innovative, pluralist and democratic. However, it falls short of transforming the concept substantially because the politics that underline the ‘agonistic’ human security are not problematised. Without this problematisation, any human security paradigm can reproduce the status quo, which has rendered individuals insecure in the first place.

Security is derived from politics (Booth 2007: 150) and security notions and practices reinforce the politics that underlie them in the first place. Politics is not solely about ‘who gets what, when and how’. There is another, and more fundamental, question that causes contestations and disagreements as well as alliances and agreements: What types of communities do we want to live in and be part of? And this entails more questions: where do the boundaries of our community start
and end? Who would be included and who would be excluded? This is where the concepts of security and insecurity become central. Burgess (2011: 133) argues:

security and insecurity are implicitly connected to what we value, an expression of a value constellation that expresses a certain perspective on life, of individual and collective anxieties and aspirations, of expectations about what to sacrifice and what is worth preserving . . . It involves people who value things and who need certain things as a means to survive.

‘Individual and collective anxieties and aspirations’ are in a mutually constitutive relation. When they clash, individuals seek alternative collective formations in/through which their ‘anxieties and aspirations’ are addressed. We all make assumptions about individual and collective security (and insecurity) based on our own imaginations of what community we would like to be part of. It is not that a particular community already exists, but we imagine that it exists, we take actions to protect it (by defining ‘risks’ and ‘threats’), and call them security policies. As we are trying to secure that ‘imagined community’, we also construct and try to stabilise it. Politics concerns the contestation of ‘imagined communities’ where individuals feel secure. This is the productive relation between security and politics. Therefore, thinking security differently means thinking politics differently and vice versa.

If human security thinking is politicised, it is not any more just about assumptions, presumptions, and blueprints about how humans should be secured. Each blueprint of security inevitably favours one type of community over another, which is against a political view on security, and often results in the reproduction of Western agency to ‘secure’ humans globally. According to political human security, humans and social groups are main actors and agents of security but not in a liberal individualist sense. Humans imagine communities, small or big, local or global, identity-based or class-based, in which they feel secure politically, economically, and socially. The problem of liberal human security is not its focus on humans but the imposition of a Western, liberal, capitalist community model as the only model that must be adopted by global human society for human security. Politicised approaches transform the conception of human security to a pluralist platform.
of different imaginations of community where humans feel secure. The politicised human security paradigm democratises the politics of security by opening the space for different subject positions and subjectivities, even if they fall into the category of ‘wrong’ according to the liberal security notions. The main practice of a political human security researcher is to make conflicting imaginations of community and security talk to each other and through these discussions, explore new practices of human security.

The human security perspective on migration that I offer is an invitation to rethink our political communities and how humans in and outside these communities can be secured or can feel secure. It does not present simple action remedies that are universal and generalisable. Rather, it calls for a research agenda that is dynamic (meaning, always responsive to change), critical (always being conscious of power relations), and interdisciplinary (acknowledging the complexities of the social world). This agenda is responsive to human mobility and why and how host countries and societies respond to new potential members. A human security paradigm enables us to rethink our political communities. European political community is not a fixed entity, it is not a fortress, but is always community in the making. Policies to fix and reify this political community, some of the reasons for which I elaborated above, make both European citizens and migrants more insecure.

Humans and social groups are the main actors and agents of security, but not in a liberal-individualist sense. Humans imagine communities, small or big, local or global, identity-based or class-based, in which they feel secure politically, economically, and socially. The question and challenge here is thinking about different imaginations of the community (or communities) where humans feel secure; where they do not only exist, but live: ‘survival plus’. That said, the human security paradigm does not offer the blueprint of a community, let alone a single blueprint, since what violates human security varies over time and space.

Therefore, I’d like to suggest the parameters of a research agenda on migration from a human security perspective. I know that this agenda, which I will pursue together with distinguished scholars from different disciplines of social sciences can be unorthodox and out-of-the-box.
Thinking out of the box of conventional frames doesn't mean being unrealistic. Human security questions and policy proposals should be derived from existing structures and relations. What I would like to propose today is a set of questions and possible areas of interdisciplinary and policy-relevant research that seek to address the vicious cycles of migration mismanagement. They aim to provoke reflection and experimentation, so that the dialectic of human insecurity between European citizens and noncitizens can be dismantled gradually.

Let us consider three questions that a human security research on migration in Europe should ask.

**Human Security Questions and Possibilities: A Way Forward**

No doubt the image of the three-year-old Aylan Kurdi’s lifeless body on a Turkish shore is still vivid in our minds. It provoked protests all over Europe in 2015 and 2016 and gave birth to the ‘#Refugeeswelcome’ campaign. Sadly, Aylan was not the first or last child migrant who died on the way to Europe. There’s something systemic and structural that repeatedly violates the human security of both migrants and EU citizens.

Paolo Cuttita from the University of Amsterdam (2017) argues regarding the Mediterranean ‘savings’ of lives, that while humanitarianism can be inclusive this inclusion is not a rights-based one: it is presented as an act of ‘grace’. As an act of grace, humanitarian actors (state and non-state) keep the discretion (and power) of determining who should be ‘saved’ and when this grace should be withdrawn. As a result, humanitarian border practices produce three subject and object positions: the criminal smuggler, passive/victimised migrants, and humanitarian actors (particularly the EU) fighting the criminals and saving the victims. Viewing humanitarianism as ‘an act of grace’ erases the political and economic history of the criminalisation of human mobility in Europe. Unlike this humanitarianism that refuses to ask structural political questions and focuses only on ‘crises’, the human security paradigm accepts ‘crises’ as the spatial and temporal consequences and symptoms of political structures and relations. Therefore, the first question in my research area is:
How does the interaction between economic and political structures produce violence, fear and anxiety for individuals?

As I discussed above, one of the most important elements of the perfect storm is the economic insecurities of European citizens, which form a fertile ground for racist and xenophobic ideologies to grow. Their economic insecurities are easily racialised. The three dialectics partly result from Europe’s political and economic choices in the last five decades. These choices also involve Europe’s external relations. This leads to my second question:

How do European external relations produce or obscure human security?

Another area that human security researchers should explore is EU relations with its North African and Middle Eastern neighbours; a field I have been studying in the last ten years. In the last 30 years, Europe has developed the policy of containing migrants in the EU's neighbourhood by transforming the neighbouring states into ‘Europe’s border guards’. We call this process ‘externalisation’ of migration management. It is now documented that political, economic, and social problems in the neighbouring states actually encourage many migrants to continue their journeys to Europe, from countries which had previously been their intended destinations, usually for a short-to-medium term stay before rotating back to their country of origin (Amnesty International 2017).

This focus on Europe’s external relations leads to the last, and most fundamental, question of the research agenda:

How can the human security of migrants, EU citizens and citizens of neighbouring regions be addressed together, and not opposed to each other?
Human security of one social group cannot – sustainably and successfully – be pursued at the expense of another group. This idea is known as the principle of common human security. It can be traced back at least to the foundation of the United Nations. The current migration management regime divides groups. The human security paradigm does not prioritise only one group’s security. This is not to argue that European authorities are not responsible for the security of EU citizens. On the contrary, it encourages and calls European sovereign authorities to take the human insecurities of EU citizens seriously by acknowledging that their security depends on the human security of non-EU citizens in the Euro-Mediterranean migration system.

Against the backdrop of these three questions, I will now share with you two of the relevant policy possibilities that I formulated in my book *Rethinking Security in the Age of Migration* (2013) regarding migration to Europe from a human security perspective.

**Human Security Policy Possibilities**

*Possibility 1: to explore the concept of ‘protection seeker’*

As discussed above, Europe’s current migration management regime is not responsive to the realities of contemporary migration. Refugees, those fleeing political persecution or violence are considered as ‘good migrants’, whereas migrants who have escaped from economic and social insecurities easily become ‘unwanted’, ‘undesirable’ migrants, ‘bogus asylum seekers’, ‘illegals’. Making the situation worse, media and policy circles use the concepts of refugee, asylum seeker, economic migrant, and illegal migrant interchangeably. These conceptual confusions play into the hands of anti-migrant, racist, and xenophobic politics. The only way for these migrants to get sympathy from Europe is to become an object of Europe’s humanitarianism as non-agentive, rightless victims – pathetic small bodies on a beach. All these concepts reflect a Euro-centric point of view on human mobility and do not effectively articulate why individuals become migrants: what are they seeking outside their own communities?
Yet new migrants very often leave their countries because of structural reasons such as ongoing conflicts, political crises, and systems of bad governance, poverty, and exclusion that partly reflect the ways that these countries have been incorporated into global power systems. The combination of structural factors and individual initiatives to migrate problematises the distinction between forced and voluntary migration.

The human security perspective can help us think about a new concept, that has emerged in recent years, to reflect contemporary realities and interconnections.

‘Protection-seeker’ refers to an individual who is forced to choose to leave the community in which s/he lives due to political, social and economic structures and power relations, climate change and other environmental processes that violate an individual’s right to life, well-being, and dignity or those of her family. The term ‘protection-seeker’ covers, but is not limited to, refugees. It also refers to groups such as migrants from countries where political and economic problems are chronically entangled, and all those people who do not meet the 1951 Refugee Convention political criterion, but have had to leave their countries nonetheless.

The EU Commission often underlines the necessity of developing ‘a migrant-centered approach’ that protects and promotes the human rights of migrants. How is it possible to develop a migrant-centred approach when migrants are labelled legally (legal/illegal) and politically (good/bad) by a Euro-centric perspective? One of the most fundamental problems of the European border management regime is that it converts migrants into objects of the regime, mere arrows in Frontex risk analysis maps, or numbers that cross the borders ‘illegally’. Consequently, the regime expects migrants to act in accordance with its legal categories and regulations; however, the ‘autonomy of migration’ suggests otherwise. A protection-seeker will very often not find the protection she seeks in North African countries, because of insufficient economic opportunities, exclusion, and discrimination. Additionally, she does not have to settle in Greece or Italy just because they are first countries of asylum according to Dublin regulations. This is because she may be able to live in dignity in the community with her family or friends, maybe in Germany, France or Sweden. If a
protection-seeker refuses to play Europe's border management game, she is ‘illegalised’ and accused of not complying.

I propose that we should investigate measures by which instead the European political community can send a message to a protection-seeker that ‘you can trust us’. These could be steps also towards securing EU citizens.

**Possibility 2: An EU-level Regularisation Mechanism?**

The introduction of the concept of protection seeker is an initial step. It is not enough in itself. The phenomenon of irregularised migration of protection-seekers should be addressed by creating institutional mechanisms that can help to render migrating illegally unnecessary. So far, Europe's reaction to irregular migration is twofold. It is punitive not only for those who facilitate irregular migration, but also for those who use irregular channels despite legal channels of migration to Europe being drastically limited. The second reaction was announced in 2015: the creation of hotspots where asylum claims of some irregular protection-seekers are processed. However, according to a European Parliament report in 2016, ‘there are obvious fundamental right challenges in the pressured environments of the hotspots’. Furthermore, protection is offered based not on individual circumstances, but on nationality in the hotspots. For example, West African nationals are broadly excluded (de Vries et al. 2016: 5).

I propose to explore possibilities of a European-level regularisation mechanism (Bilgic 2013). The policy of regularisation is not unfamiliar to European states. However, in the last three decades the practice was abandoned because it was argued that regularisation might become a pull factor for irregular migrants. There is no scientific research that confirms this. Instead, this may be one of the myths Europe has been holding on to unnecessarily. Furthermore, the policy is in line with the

United Nations' Sutherland Report (named after the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Migration during 2006 to 2017, Peter Sutherland),

What might such a regulation mechanism look like?

a. Regularisation with opportunities for legal migration: Regularisation with tighter border controls does not produce solutions. A report prepared by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) notes how border control without legal opportunities for migration is a contributory factor to irregular migration. Irregular migration can be effectively addressed via regularisation and legal immigration opportunities.

b. Regularisation as an individual-oriented process: Case-by-case regularisation enables protection-seekers to make their case about why they came to Europe and why they chose irregular ways of travelling and living. Individual regularisation can also ease public fears about the perverse effects of regularisation. The EU Commission itself argued for case-by-case regulation in 2008.

c. A regularisation mechanism, not a one-off programme: Mechanisms are ongoing processes of integration that depend on cooperation between the authorities and the irregularised migrant. They are more formal and principled, unlike programmes, which are massive and one-off.

d. Regularisation for protection reasons: In 2004, The Commission called for “protection regularizations aimed at granting a right of residence to specific categories of persons who are

not eligible to claim international protection." Irregularised protection-seekers will be the target group of this European policy, which can be a corrective mechanism of the failed protection-oriented migration policies.

The concept of protection-seeker and the EU-level regularisation mechanism aim to address the three dialectics of migration mismanagement by taking into account both of two realities: the autonomy of migration and EU citizens’ fear and anxieties about migration. We must, of course, consider that ideological and economic structures, particularly the interests of the economic ‘business of securing Europe’, will be important obstacles to imagining and constructing an alternative European political community. Framing alternative policy proposals as human security policies is relevant. Firstly, human security is not a utopian vision, but a deeply examined and well-practised policy philosophy that underlies the conception of the United Nations. Secondly, various EU documents already use human security ideas. One that had significant influence is the report ‘A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities’ commissioned by the then EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, in 2004. The advisory report presented the rationale for:

A human security approach for the European Union [meaning one] that … should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the defence of the Union’s borders, as was the security approach of nation-states.28

One of the reasons is ‘enlightened self-interest’. I quote: ‘the whole point of a human security approach is that Europeans cannot be secure while others in the world live in severe insecurity.’29 This means that to secure EU citizens, the EU should, ironically, abandon a Euro-centric perspective on human mobility. A related report, entitled ‘From Hybrid Peace to Human Security: Rethinking EU Strategy towards Conflict’ was presented to High Representative Federica

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29 Ibid., p. 9.
Mogherini in 2016. One specific contribution was to argue for rethinking the EU’s migration policies from the perspective of human security and replacing the ‘frontline’ security approach.³⁰

Human security is not alien to the action plans and policies of European security and external relations. However, when the issue at stake is migration and borders, the concept has unfortunately faded from view. Taking advantage of the EU’s continuing interest in human security and building upon the expertise that has developed, it is now time to innovatively rethink Europe and migration, and by extension, what kind of European political community can be imagined. I hope my period as a Prince Claus Chairholder can contribute towards this, in partnership with other scholars and practitioners, and as a basis for subsequent ongoing cooperative work.

Europe is in the eye of ‘the perfect storm’ and human security can offer a compass that leads Europe through the storm. This will be a long journey, but the objective is promising for both EU citizens and migrants: a life with freedom from fear, want and indignity, instead of just existing. An individual life in a flourishing community…

I would like to conclude with a few lines by Nazim Hikmet, the famous Turkish poet who was a migrant, who died in exile in 1963. These lines capture what human security means and promises: ‘To live! Like a tree[,] alone and free / and like a forest[,] in solidarity.’

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References


