Taking Our Country Back: The New Left, Deaniacs, and the Production of Contemporary American Politics

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Abstract
This paper examines the evolution of ideas about participatory democracy and expressive politics and their articulation alongside new media with an eye towards revealing the historical antecedents of the 2003-2004 Howard Dean campaign. Through a comprehensive survey of documents produced by social movements, media artists, computer hobbyists, and the Dean campaign this paper presents the uptake of participatory theory and performative politics through networked tools and demonstrates how 1960s social and technical movements shaped the cultural meaning and practices of the Dean campaign. As the Internet and computing technology more generally became a repository for hopes of a renewal of democracy, the campaign was able to bring together a network of actors whose professional careers were located in the fields of politics and technology, and who in turn spawned a number of influential consulting firms and conferences which served as the mechanisms of diffusion for a particular form of electoral politics across the political field.

Introduction
Outside of a $500-a-plate fundraiser in 1968 in San Francisco for Democratic presidential candidate Robert Kennedy, Jerry Rubin and a group of self-described “freaks” greeted the entering guests with shouts of “Have a free bologna sandwich! Why pay $500 for bologna inside when you can get free bologna right here?” (Rubin 1970, 138). Nearly forty years later in July 2003 in the midst of a closely contested Democratic presidential primary Howard Dean’s campaign staff posted a picture of Dean eating a turkey sandwich on the DeanForAmerica Web-site to coincide with a $2,000-a-plate fundraiser hosted by Dick Cheney. The response from citizens across the country making small donations was enormous. Dean’s event out-raised Cheney’s by nearly $200,000, bringing in $508,000, and the episode took its place in popular lore as a harbinger of the many changes to come as the Internet began to revolutionize politics.

These two episodes frame a period in American history during which participatory and expressive forms of democratic practice came to the forefront of politics through a deep engagement with communications media. In 1970, Rubin (108) celebrated the idea that “you can’t be a revolutionary today without a television set -- it’s as important as the gun!” For the Yippies and other stylistic social movement groups of the era including the Black Panther Party, television served as a theatre of the revolution, a medium with the power to make the heroes that could instantaneously penetrate into the homes and therefore the psyches of individuals across
America. Symbolic and expressive political actions orchestrated by Rubin and Abbie Hoffman including the famous, and failed, attempt to levitate the Pentagon in 1967 were performed for broadcast television journalists as part of a strategy to, as Hoffman's biographer described it, "detonate brain cells and create a revolution in consciousness" (Raskin 1996, 108). Yet, these performances were derided by other organizations of the New Left as celebrity stunts, revealing how oppositional political movements were fractured by cultural, ideological, and tactical differences. For example, the leaders of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) vehemently argued that Yippie-style politics detracted from efforts to win greater citizen participation in economic, political, and social institutions, ends that were pursued through more established tactics of disciplined political protest and organization building.

This paper demonstrates that these two broad approaches to politics, symbolized in the participatory democratic theory of the SDS and the expressive performances of the Yippies, came together through the Web-based political practices of the Dean campaign. Through the appropriation of Silicon Valley rhetoric casting technology as an inherently revolutionary force in social and economic life and the uptake of new tools, the Dean campaign’s principle figures re-framed a set of commercial practices as the model for a new kind of participatory and expressive politics. In part through the cultural work of Joe Trippi, Dean’s campaign manager, a number of individuals with professional backgrounds in the technology field joined the campaign and used their professional skills to build a set of Internet-based, social networking applications designed to foster greater participation in electoral politics. Echoing the political practice of the SDS and Yippies more than forty years earlier, Trippi and these technologists posited the Internet as both a participatory tool of democracy and a stage for the authentic expression of self, practices of what I call "creative citizenship," an expressive and aesthetic form of political engagement. After the Democratic primary the relationship between the Dean campaign and Silicon Valley was brought full circle. Just as Trippi borrowed the rhetoric, tools and practices of the technology industry and the language of popular forms of social networking theory to situate an insurgent candidacy, the luminaries interpreting and creating the next generation of
Web 2.0 companies pointed to the Dean campaign as a powerful legitimation of their social vision, technology, and business plans.

While the general consensus among political scientists and theorists of “commons-based peer production” (Benkler 2006; Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006) is to view networked technologies primarily as tools that lend themselves instrumentally to the accomplishment of specific tasks, I suggest here that we read technologies culturally as they are adopted as a way of orienting individuals, movements, and organizations toward the values they materially instantiate. Extending the work on “computerization movements” by Iacono and Kling (2001), I explore the discursive context within which the Dean campaign was embedded, the meanings articulated alongside technology in Silicon Valley and ported into the political field by Trippi and others, and how the local context of the Dean campaign in turn shaped a then-emergent discourse of Web 2.0. Historically situated technological frames (Bijker 1997) shaped both the uptake of specific tools in the Dean campaign and the organizational practices crafted around them, in addition to mobilizing individuals with specific biographies into the campaign. At the same time, as Iacono and Kling (2001) note, local practices are not always in accordance with these frames. As recent scholarship makes apparent, innovations in social networking theory and technology pioneered in the political field by the campaign (Wiese and Gronbeck 2005) structured citizen participation in some very traditional ways, primarily serving the ends of fundraising and mobilization (Stromer-Galley and Baker 2006; Haas 2006).

For Trippi and other members of the Dean campaign the Internet held the promise of renewing American democracy in its unique ability to realize citizen participation and, in the process, unlock the latent creativity of alienated individuals. It was, as the ubiquitous campaign slogan went, enabling citizens to "take their country back." This paper explores this vision of the Internet, American democracy, and political practice through an interpretative analysis of primary documents and secondary sources relating to the campaign and its antecedents among the various social movements of the 1960s. To analyze the public framing and practices of the Dean campaign I rely on a number of open-ended interviews with key participants along with
primary documents, including campaign manager Joe Trippi’s (2004) influential autobiographical account of the primary *The Revolution Will Not be Televised*, Streeter and Teachout’s (2007) edited collection of first-hand accounts of the campaign by members and volunteers, more than 600 blog posts and public documents including official campaign Web-pages, Federal Elections Commission filings, professional press articles, and the proceedings of conferences relating to technology and democracy that were spawned in the wake of the Dean campaign. I also consider primary archival documents along with the secondary literature on 1960s social movements and groups conducting early experiments with communications technology in democratic practice.

**Silicon Vermont and the Open Source Campaign**

In a break with the rhetoric of the political field, in 2003 Joe Trippi began publicly framing (Benford and Snow 2000) the Dean campaign as an “open source” and “decentralized” effort (Cone 2003) that was leveraging the power of new communications technologies to revitalize American democracy. In a now-famous blog post from May 17, 2003, Trippi (2003) explicitly compared the Dean effort with Linux, the collaboratively-built operating platform, and criticized previous political campaigns and those of Dean’s opponents for being predicated on a “top-down military structure.” Trippi’s claim, if not always the practice, was that the Dean campaign embraced the networked technologies that enabled citizens to “self-organize”; for the campaign “the important thing is to provide the tools and some of the direction…and get the hell out of the way when a big wave is building on its own” (Ibid.). In adopting the mythic language of prominent technologists found on the pages of digital lifestyle magazines such as *Wired* during the dot.com boom that heralded the new social and economic forms coming into being through networked technologies (Mosco 2004) along with these culturally-valued material tools, Trippi (2004, 82) created a vision of a revolutionary new form of mediated, participatory politics that was premised on the model of Internet start-up companies including “Amazon.com, eBay, and all the online travel agencies.” In turn, the decentralized communication made possible by
the Internet empowered individuals to act as creative agents in democracy, pursuing expressive and novel forms of engagement, in contrast to the alienating broadcast model (Trippi 2004, 40) of communication and organization in American politics.

Trippi’s framing of the campaign in the rhetoric of Silicon Valley technologists adapted to the political realm and its uptake of networked tools marks the historical moment within which the campaign occurred. In generating an effective frame for the Dean campaign Trippi served as what organizational theorists refer to as a “cultural entrepreneur” (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001; Johnson 2007), an individual who performs the cultural work necessary to create and legitimate new ventures within a distinct discursive context. Through the use of metaphors including the "open source" campaign, a term used to denote collaborative, technical labor, Trippi drew from a discourse rooted in Silicon Valley that not only had wide cultural purchase, but was associated with a host of revolutionary countercultural claims of new world-making through communications technology (Turner 2006). In adapting it to politics through hundreds of press interviews and writings on the Dean For America blog and Web-site and the deployment of the technology itself, Trippi (2004, 209-210) situated his insurgent candidate as standing at the forefront of a technological revolution that would reshape the democratic process, support a new kind of political campaign, and enable individuals to become citizens again through the participation that the Internet inherently affords.

These technological frames shaped understandings of the campaign for journalists and, by extension, potential volunteers and voters. Journalists widely adopted Trippi’s language of the "decentralized" and "open source" campaign organization in their articles, in turn disseminating this frame to a wider audience, including the readerships of Fast Company (Tischler 2003) and Wired (Wolf 2004), the business and technology magazines of Silicon Valley, and technology-oriented blogs including Slashdot.com. The perceived cultural affinity between the Dean campaign and the Valley, both rhetorically and through a shared set of technologies, in turn facilitated a number of information technology professionals joining the campaign as both staff and volunteers. As Streeter and Teachout (2007, 28) note “part of what
made the campaign what it was, what attracted a slew of young Internet enthusiasts and created
an iconoclastic sense of openness, an enthusiasm for experimentation, and a new sense of hope,
was the way it became associated with the vision of new technology and a widespread
fascination with the future.” At the same time a set of conditions existed that supported
crossovers between these then-distinct organizational fields (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). While
the riches of the dot.com boom afforded the movement of individuals into the political field, for
example MoveOn.org was founded in 1998 by Wes Boyd and Joan Blades after they made their
fortunes in the technology industry and were inspired by Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2000)
to invent a new form of Internet-enabled civic association, an advertising and investment
slowdown in the post-crash era left a number of writers and technologists out of work and
searching for new professional opportunities (O’Reilly 2005; Allen 2008), including those in the
political domain (Franke-Ruta 2003).

Trippi and these "young Internet enthusiasts" (Streeter and Teachout 2007, 28) along
with the seasoned Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and IT workers who joined the campaign brought
with them both a set of cultural understandings of networked technologies and strategies for
implementing them in practice that were drawn from their personal and professional
backgrounds. A number of scholars argue that involvement in social movements as well as
innovations in rhetoric, organizational practice, and tactics can be a function of what Jasper
(1997, 54) calls “biography,” or “the processes by which certain elements of a broader culture
are selected for use in an individual’s mental and emotional arsenal” and which are shaped
through an individual's experience in myriad social and cultural contexts. For example, Gusfield
(1981, 324) theorizes the role of “carry-overs” between movements, where individuals bring
knowledge, meanings, and practices from their prior experiences into new settings, and in
analyses of formal social movement organizations a number of scholars document how
professionals routinize their functions along the lines of what they encounter and create in other
managerial contexts (Staggenborg 1988; Taylor 1989; for a review see Clemens and Minkoff
2004).
As Dean's campaign manager with a lengthy resume in both professional political consulting and technology start-ups, Trippi himself was the most prominent member of a bridging group that crossed fields. As Trippi (2004) recounts in many press articles and The Revolution Will Not be Televised, he attended San Jose State University in the 1970s where he began to get involved in politics and had his first experience with ARPANET, sparking an enduring fascination with technology. After two decades of professional political consulting, often for outsider Democratic Party candidates, during the 1990s Trippi (2004, 54) consulted for what he referred to as “a few brash young companies” including Wave Systems, Smartpaper Networks, and Progeny Linux Systems. He describes at length how his understanding of the Internet’s potential application to the democratic process was shaped by this work experience, which taught him how individuals are empowered through networked commerce that was inherently, given the nature of the technology, reestablishing community bonds while distributing power away from hierarchical institutions. While Trippi straddled both of these fields, a number of individuals with technology expertise entered the political field for the first time through the Dean campaign and carried with them a shared set of cultural understandings of networked technologies in addition to their professional knowledge. For example, Bobby Clark (2007, 77), a former technology entrepreneur working on start-ups in Colorado and California, served as the first web strategist for the campaign and recruited his former colleague, Dave Kochbeck, to serve as the campaign’s first IT director. In Clark’s (2007, 77) words Kochbeck, who would later go on to become the Head of Technology for Friendster and Senior Vice President of Interactive Technology for Live Nation, essentially “served as our campaign’s chief technology officer (CTO), as he had for our San Francisco start-up….A CTO also becomes a bridge between the technology and business operations for the organization, translating business
needs to the IT department, and explaining the IT implications of decisions to other managers” (Clark 2007, 77).

Under Trippi’s guidance, these technology industry professionals deployed the material tools that were culturally valued through the frames articulated around networked technologies by entrepreneurs, journalists, and popular network theorists including Rheingold (2002) and Weinberger (2002). The uptake of these tools in turn shaped the organizational form and practices that instantiated, or at least gave the appearance of being consistent with, these frames. To that end these professionals brought their knowledge of the industry and technology to bear on the political process, driving what political scientists Wiese and Gronbeck (2005, 220) describe as the six developments in on-line campaigning that emerged during the course of the 2004 electoral cycle: the application of network software and theory to Internet politics; the expansion of political databases for campaign communications; the widespread facilitation of what Foot and Schneider (2002, 222) call “coproduction”; the increased use of Web video and advertising; the institutionalization of campaign Web-sites as a genre of communication; and, the emergence of a political blogosphere and its interactions with the campaigns. Dean’s IT staff and volunteers with technical backgrounds developed a suite of new applications for the campaign including DeanLink, a social networking supporter Web-site modeled after Friendster (Teachout 2007, 69), and Generation Dean, a virtual community for young supporters (Michel 2007, 155). These were not only innovations in the political field, but were both inspired by and stood alongside the early commercial social networking Web-sites that began to achieve significant visibility during this period with the success of companies including LiveJournal and Friendster, the forerunners of what would be popularly characterized as Web 2.0 by late 2004. The most widely used commercial tool in the initial stages of the campaign however was MeetUp.com, which the campaign utilized to enable volunteers to network amongst themselves for mobilization and fundraising purposes. Meetup.com would eventually be supplemented by Deanspace, an open source toolkit based on Drupal for supporters to set up their own Web-sites and plan events co-developed by volunteers Zack Rosen, Josh Koening, and Aldon Hynes (2007,
86-99), the latter of which was a professional systems analyst who was drawn to the campaign by Dean's authenticity and subsequently joined Ned Lamont’s campaign for Senate in 2006. The development and adoption of these in-house and commercial technologies with their attendant set of cultural understandings mark their first deployment in the political field.

The Dean campaign also leveraged the burgeoning political blogosphere that emerged during the late 1990s but only came to widespread public attention during the 2003-2004 electoral cycle, culminating in both major parties offering press passes to bloggers for their nominating conventions. The Dean campaign organization informally and formally collaborated with the political blogosphere through practices such as hyperlinking and "agenda-setting" (McCombs et al. 1995) through the campaign blog and Web-site (Gross 2007, 107). Trippi also hired bloggers as staff and consultants, including Matt Gross of MyDD.com as the campaign's founding blogger. In addition, in January 2003 Trippi hired Jerome Armstrong, also of MyDD.com, and Markos Moulitsas of DailyKos.com as consultants for the campaign; Armstrong and Moulitsas began a business partnership, since ended, in 2002 and both continue to be among the most prominent progressive bloggers today. Taken as a whole, collaboration with the political blogosphere and the utilization of social networking applications are an example of the "coproduction" (Foot and Schneider 2002, 229) of the campaign, or the processes by which disparate actors, “including citizens, candidates, journalists, advocacy and civic groups, and for-profit Internet entrepreneurs,” collaboratively produce political communication.

These technological applications were not just tools, they were also deployed rhetorically by campaign advisors and staff to reinforce Trippi's framing of the campaign and served as metaphors for new forms of participatory and creative political practice. The network theory that was articulated alongside these technologies provided a language for the campaign's self-understanding and shaped its practice while situating and legitimating innovations in organizational form for the press and public in the context of the larger social and economic changes being wrought by the widespread adoption of networked communications technology. Theorist, columnist, marketing consultant, and Senior Internet Advisor for the campaign David
Weinberger (2002), whose *Small Pieces Loosely Joined* was required reading for the Internet staff (Teachout 2007, 62), along with Howard Rheingold and Lawrence Lessig were oft-quoted sources in articles relating to the campaign. These individuals cited these technologies in the context of network theory to explain Dean's early successes in fundraising and on-line visibility while making larger claims for the transformative effects the Internet was having on democratic practice. For example, Rheingold described the campaign's use of Meetup.com in an article in *The Weekly Standard* as “a perfect example of a smart mob” (Skinner 2004) while in a piece in *Wired* Lessig (2003) argued that in contrast to broadcast media the campaign's use of the political blogosphere “allows for a million ideas to form, in the froth of engagement that is the stuff of blogs.”

The campaign’s technology advisors were, and remain, among the most prominent individuals interpreting the social, economic, and political effects of networked technologies, often with a strong technologically deterministic cast. Weinberger, Rheingold, and Lessig were all members of Dean's "Net Advisory Net" (NAN), which was created by Trippi in September 2003 to serve as “a modular, virtual, board of policy advisors tasked with formulating Dean’s Internet policy” (Froomkin 2003). Their involvement with the Dean campaign is a striking example of the host of technologists, IT professionals, and new media forecasters that Trippi was able to draw into the institutionalized political field through his framing of the campaign, deployment of technologies, and professional connections. Other NAN members included Joichi Ito, prominent blogger, entrepreneur, and the founder and CEO of Neoteny, a venture capital firm; Richard Rowe, the CEO of Rowe Communications and Director of the Internet and Information Services Department of Dean for America; David Reed, formulator of “Reed’s Law,” adjunct faculty member at MIT Media Laboratory and fellow at Hewlett-Packard Laboratories; Bob Lucky, a technological forecaster and engineer who began his career at Bell Labs; and Hal Abelson, founding director of the Free Software Foundation, consultant to Hewlett-Packard Laboratories and co-head of the MIT Council on Educational Technology. While the NAN’s work was abbreviated by the collapse of the Dean campaign in early 2004, the
policy arguments advanced by this group reflect a libertarian approach to networked communications technologies where “the Internet's value as a marketplace of innovation and a public square for ideas” (Lessig 2004) was best ensured through the absence of governmental regulation except to ensure equal ‘end-to-end’ network equality, "network neutrality" in the parlance of current policy debates. The fact that many of these individuals had financial stakes in companies that would be subject to Dean administration regulations should he have become president was never addressed given that this policy approach was legitimated by a discourse that scholars (Turner 2006; Barbrook 1998; Barbrook and Cameron 1998) note entangles commercial computing, deregulation, and social change.

Despite the frames articulated around these new technologies and many of the claims made for the campaign with respect to an emergent new form of participatory politics, a view echoed by contemporary network theorists (Jenkins 2006, Benkler 2006, Jett 2006), in many respects the Dean campaign extended organizational and technological practices already institutionalized in the field of politics. In this sense, individuals may deploy particular frames rhetorically “despite the material reality of divergent practices” (Iacono and Kling 2001). For example, as much as members of the NAN heralded the openness of the Internet as a space for participatory communication in its official policy statements (Howard Dean for America 2003) this group was not democratic, representative of a broad range of interests, open to members of the larger community of Dean supporters, or transparent in its deliberations. Instead, the NAN functioned much as a traditional body of campaign advisors, just as recent scholarship has pointed to the limits of interactivity in the Dean campaign (Stromer-Galley and Baker 2006) and the fact that citizens had few opportunities to contribute to the substantive policy or allocative decisions of the campaign (Haas 2006). Outside of an on-line vote that the campaign hosted in November 2003 about whether to participate in the public financing system, there are no other examples of the candidate reconsidering or taking a new public position on a matter of policy as a result of citizen input. In a largely complementary article in Wired, Gary Wolf (2004) noted this explicitly: “But since none of the grassroots groups are officially tied to the campaign, there
is no guarantee of influence over policy. Dean is free to ignore the political wishes of any of these groups, and he often does. In many conversations with Dean supporters, I find them arguing against his positions on guns, on the death penalty, on trade.”

A formal, hierarchical organization was responsible for advising the candidate, managing the activities of the campaign, and complying with Federal Election Commission regulations, many of the staffers for which were campaign or social movement professionals who move across social movement organizations (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1976; Staggenborg 1988) or between campaigns as consultants (Johnson 2007; Howard 2006; Farrell et al. 2001; Thurber and Nelson 2000; Mancini 1999; Sabato 1981; Nimmo 1970). The professional biographies of the managerial consultants who sat at the top of the Dean organizational hierarchy in operations outside of its Internet division and the consulting companies they hired to facilitate campaign functions make clear the organizational complexity of the campaign and its reliance on many individuals, organizations, and tactics from the political field. Larry Biddle, the deputy finance director of the Dean campaign, received his start in political fundraising through a training offered by EMILY’s List, a non-profit progressive women’s organization, and worked on two Senate campaigns before joining Dean. Biddle (2007, 170) lists the political consulting and other companies that were hired by the campaign, including Direct Line Politics to coordinate its direct mail operations, the Share Group as a telemarketing firm, and, before developing DeanSpace, Convio’s TeamRaiser (Clark 2007, 78-79), a constituent relations management platform that provided one central database for on-line donations, Web-hosting, and e-mail that was also used by the Kerry campaign. Biddle and Bobby Clark also cite the importance of MoveOn.org. Zach Exley, the Organizing Director of MoveOn.org, was at Howard Dean headquarters for two weeks to advise the campaign on organizing strategy at Trippi’s request. As a corrective to long prevalent assumptions of emergent collective action on-line, recent scholarship has revealed MoveOn.org to be an example of “organizational hybridity” that combines the “mobilization strategies typically associated with parties, interest groups and new social movements” (Chadwick 2005, 14). Thus, its structure as a “family of organizations”
(MoveOn) that includes both a federal 501c(4) organization and a political action committee, relies on board of directors and a full-time professional staff, and contracts with a network of consultants to facilitate its operations.

As first-hand accounts suggest, the management of the campaign was fraught with tensions, in part centering on conflicts between Trippi and the Internet division he stewarded and the professional political consultants and long-time advisers who were part of the governor’s inner circle. As campaign manager, Trippi contended over strategy and resources with a number of other senior campaign staff. While Trippi only hints at these conflicts in *The Revolution Will Not Be Televised*, and thus they have received scant attention in academic and more popular accounts of the campaign, Zephyr Teachout (2007, 65-67), who served as Dean’s Director of Online Organizing, suggests that he utilized the Internet division of the campaign in order to leverage more power within the formal organization. As the Internet was a highly visible means through which the campaign conducted its fundraising and voter mobilization, these numbers offered a clear set of metrics, in many respects the most important, through which to ground claims for organizational power. At the same time this was an effective tactic internally given that on-line support raised Dean’s external profile considerably as journalists emphasized a radically new tool in the “money primary” (Adkins and Dowdle 2002), a media strategy that Trippi and others deliberately pursued. Indeed, honed through years of experience running campaigns Trippi demonstrated a keen understanding of political journalism, staging highly symbolic Internet fundraising and mobilization actions that both attracted media coverage (see Armstrong 2007, 50) and supported his framing of the campaign.

All of which translates into a strikingly different, and more complex, model of organization than Trippi’s autobiography and statements to the press suggest and that some theorists have posited, where the campaign was a place for emergent collaboration following
Ito’s (Trippi 2004, 210) maxim that conveners of on-line communities need to realize that “you’re not a leader, you’re a place. You’re like a park or a garden. If it’s comfortable and cool, people are attracted.” That the professionalized practices of a formal organizational hierarchy underlay, channeled, and coordinated citizen participation in select domains is evident, even as the campaign was innovative, inspiring, and participatory in many other respects. These same tensions have long been at the core of participatory and expressive political practices, as macro-discourses articulated alongside technologies become embedded in fields and organizations and individuals orient themselves towards technological frames in strikingly disparate local contexts.

**The New Left to the Deaniacs, participatory and expressive politics in the information age**

For Trippi and many of his associates on the Dean campaign the Internet offered the promise of restoring the participatory ideal of democracy through the affordances that replaced the "broadcast model" of one-way communication with, as the NAN's *Statement of Internet Principles* held, “conversation” (Howard Dean for America 2003). Premised on a radical freeing of communication and information, the decentralization of the Dean campaign was simultaneously a metaphor for and symptomatic of the larger shifts in power away from bureaucratic, hierarchical institutions that technological enthusiasts and popular network theorists argued were taking place across society as participatory media allowed individuals to commune, and consume, directly with one another. Re-framing Silicon Valley commercial practices as the model for a new form of politics through the utilization of new tools, Trippi and the prominent figures of the NAN argued that the Internet was empowering individuals through novel opportunities to participate in democracy and, in the process, enabling them to become citizens that as creative agents were not simply recipients of information. In an article published in *Fast Company* (Tischler 2003), “Trippi’s TIPS For Building a Better Campaign – or Company,” Trippi argued that the campaign manager or business leader needed to: “Encourage ways for ideas to bubble up from the field. Understand that the more brainpower that is applied to a problem, the better the solution. Unleash the power of the people to be creative.” This creativity related to new forms of instrumental politics along with aesthetic and cultural
expression, novel citizenship practices that scholars have seen the potential for (Coleman 2007), located in (Foot and Schneider 2002), and advocated for (Jenkins 2006), the political web.

While some scholars situate the Dean campaign as part of a natural evolution in Internet-based political campaigning (Wiese and Gronbeck 2005), this twin focus on participatory and expressive politics had its origins in two distinct orientations toward political practice that came to the fore among the various social movements of the 1960s. Forty years prior to the Dean campaign Tom Hayden and the SDS along with the Yippies crafted their respective political practices in response to the perceived psychological alienation in modern society, and each group to varying degrees posited communication and media as central to the process of overcoming what the Port Huron Statement described as “the partial and fragmentary bonds of function that bind men only as worker to worker, employer to employee, teacher to student, American to Russian” (Miller 1987, 332). These organizations are representative of the broader political and cultural movements of the 1960s, many of which had ties to the Civil Rights Movement (McAdam 1988), and as such are cases that mark shifting contemporary practices of politics.

Despite a common critique of modern society and shared emphasis on communication, the SDS and Yippies pursued radically different tactics of oppositional politics, which marked larger cultural distinctions between them. The Port Huron Statement of the SDS and the theory of "participatory democracy" it elaborated called for refashioning American political, social, and economic institutions and, in accordance with communicative theories in the tradition of Dewey, providing citizens with “the media for their common participation” (Miller 1987, 333) in democracy.iii SDS pursued these aims through a “repertoire” (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998; Auyero 2004) of collective action that included building a political organization that sought to realize the ideals of democratic participation and relying on protest tactics common among the oppositional political movements of the era, especially those of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and other organizations of the Civil Rights Movement (McAdam 1988). In contrast, hailing from a different cultural and intellectual lineage the Yippies were among the most visible adopters of expressive and performative political tactics directed toward the ends of overcoming
individual alienation, entering into new forms of fellowship, and in the process changing the
consciousness of individuals living in what the Yippies widely referred to as "Amerikan" society.
As Rubin (1970, 56) described it: "The Be-in: a new medium of human relations...We could see
one another, touch one another and realize that we were not alone. All of our rebellion was
reaffirmed. It was a new consciousness." For the Yippies the television offered a performative
stage to express the self, engage in a creative form of politics, and in the process change the
consciousness of psyches across the nation. The 1968 Democratic National Convention provides
the charged moment when adherents of these two divergent approaches to political practice met
and clashed, in the process leaving a lasting split among the actors involved.

The Port Huron Statement of 1962 set forth a political theory of "participatory
democracy" in response to the perceived psychological alienation engendered by a technocratic,
mass society. As prominent theorists note (Pateman 1970; Mansbridge 1999), there is a long
tradition of participatory democratic theories stemming from Rousseau (1968), Mill (2004) and
de Toqueville (2003), and scholars have located similar ideas in the early American leftist groups
that influenced the student movements of the 1960s (Flacks 1967; Westby 1976; Isserman 1987).
Yet, the intellectual origins of its early 1960s New Left version makes clear a distinctive focus
on the psyche. The specific phrase "participatory democracy" was first used by Michigan
philosopher Arnold Kaufman (1960, 272) in an essay where he argued that “its main justifying
function is and always has been, not the extent to which it protects or stabilizes a community, but
the contribution it can make to the development of human powers of thought, feeling and
action.” Kaufman (ibid.) explicitly critiques representative democracy’s concern for “human
rights and social order,” in the process drawing a contrast with rights-based political movements
and philosophy. While at Michigan Kaufman taught Tom Hayden, SDS president from 1962-
1963, and he served as a “free-floating guru” (Miller 1987, 111) at the Port Huron conference.

In addition to the work of Kaufman, SDS members were steeped in 1950s critiques of
“mass” and “technocentric” society set forth by social theorists C. Wright Mills and Erich
Fromm among others (Miller 1987, 93-94) along with the communicative and educational
theories of pragmatist John Dewey. SDS's predecessor organization, the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID), was known as the “John Dewey Discussion Club” at Columbia and Yale (Sale 1973, 15) and Hayden encountered *The Public and its Problems* (1927) through the SDS recommended reading list (Miller 1987, 78). During the 1940s Dewey served as president of the parent organization of SLID, the League for Industrial Democracy, a research and pamphlet organization that was loosely associated with American socialism (Johnpoll and Yerburgh, 1980, 1371). In *The Public and Its Problems* and other writings, Dewey (1927; 1916) argued that the complexity of modern life and technology alienates individuals from their communities and from their own interests as members of the social body, thus the emphasis he placed on communication which he saw as part of an educational process that leads individuals to consider the interests and experiences of others.

Pulling together these varied intellectual sources, the Port Huron statement, drafted by Hayden, argued that renewed participation in political, economic, and social life would help men realize their “potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity,” in turn enabling new forms of “decentralized” community based on “personal links between man and man” (Miller 1987, 332). This democratic ideal was entwined with thinking about technology and communications media. The activists who met in 1962 at Port Huron believed that “supertechnology” in the hands of bureaucratic elites was dehumanizing men and fragmenting communities as it created "mass" society, "monster cities," and "mass labor" (Port Huron Statement 1962). The way forward for the SDS was through citizen engagement in political, social, and economic affairs using "the media for their common participation" and "by experiments in decentralization, based on the vision of man as master of his machines and his society"; a society that should be "broken into smaller communities…arranged according to community decision" (ibid). It was a vision that called for a humanized form of technology that would enable men to understand machines and integrate them into the conditions necessary for
the development of the community and the whole person: "technology, which could be a blessing to society, becomes more and more a sinister threat to humanistic and rational enterprise” (ibid).

These calls for greater participation in democracy and society by the highly visible SDS activists were influential for a generation of oppositional social movements and political theorists, leading Mansbridge (1999, 312-313) to argue that the Port Huron Statement “served as the philosophical inspiration for the entire New Left in the United States.” During this time period on through to the Dean campaign the concept of "participatory democracy" became what Snow and Benford (1988; McAdam 1994) refer to as a "master protest frame,” a shared ideational and strategic language that was appropriated by various oppositional movement organizations in differing political contexts and time periods. While a movement repertoire that included participatory forms of organization in accordance with an underlying theory of democracy did not originate with the SDS, as McAdam (1988) notes it was common among organizations of the Civil Rights Movement, SDS activists helped diffuse this frame and its associated practices across the political field. As Gitlin (1987, 422) notes, during the 1960s and after the collapse of the student movement figures associated with SDS spread across the field of oppositional politics joining feminist, anti-war, and environmental organizations along with becoming involved in Democratic party politics. Meanwhile, there is a robust literature on the valuing of “participatory democracy” (Martin 1990) among the collectivist feminist (Rothschild-Whitt 1979; Ferree 1987; Ferree and Hess 1985) and economic cooperative organizations (Rothschild-Whitt 1986) of the 1970s and early 1980s.

At the same time, ‘participation’ was a malleable and ill-defined concept that was applied towards the end of social stability in a time of domestic insurgency. As Light (2003) demonstrates in the context of late 1960s and early 1970s debates over cable technologies, a parallel discourse of participation with a different intellectual lineage was articulated during this time period by “defense intellectuals” at the urban planning divisions of think tanks including RAND and universities with ties to national security research. Applying the conceptual models
of cybernetics and systems theory to problems of domestic unrest given an underlying assessment of psychological alienation among urban residents, intellectuals including the MIT-based political theorist and psychologist Ithiel de Sola Pool saw expanded participation through media as a path towards social stability. Cities were conceived as “communications systems” whose functioning was impaired by the “alienation of individuals in mass society,” the remedy for which was “to reconsider the consequences of rational, hierarchical, closed-door decision strategies in favor of processes that invited public participation” (Light 2003, 170-172).

Through the efforts of oppositional social movement groups and professional communities of defense intellectuals, participatory democratic narratives were articulated around new communications technologies, elaborating a discourse that structured their meaning across contexts. For example, bolstered by government and foundation funding and supported through a network of conferences, defense intellectuals carried out the prototypical experiments in participatory, communicative democracy using cable and computing technology that served as the foundation for the later theorizing and practice of on-line politics. Amitai Etzioni’s 1972 proposal for the MINERVA, a pilot “McLuhanesque” video and telephony “electronic town hall” system that was funded by the National Science Foundation, contrasts this system with broadcast technology’s reliance on “unidirectional communication” that increases the “alienation of the citizen from political and social processes” resulting in “the making of decisions that are unresponsive to the real wishes or needs of the people and, as such, widely resisted.” Shorn of their historical context, the MINERVA along with other projects such as the QUBE system that were justified through participatory democratic arguments (Estabrooks 1995, 89; Dahlberg 2001) were cited by a later generation of scholars, reformers, and practitioners, forming the basis for early thinking about utilizing the Internet to strengthen democracy. Barber’s (1984, 274) influential Strong Democracy argued that QUBE could serve as a model for the expanded and non-market use of broadcast and networked cable and computing technologies in the service of democratic ends. Barber’s text in turn was important for what Howard (2006, 148-150) characterizes as the “ideologue elites” of the early e-politics community, a group of individuals
that carried “epistemological authority because their statements about the future of democracy are what inspire the imagination of investors (sic), clients, and employees alike.” Drawing from Barber and other participatory theorists including Mansbridge (1983), in adopting these culturally-valued tools these professionals imagined their work in terms of ushering in a new communitarian democracy through technologies of communicative participation. That this was a shared text more generally for individuals thinking about the application of information technology to politics is evident in Barber’s own recollection of the first time he went to Burlington, Vermont to meet with Dean and Trippi before becoming a foreign policy advisor for the campaign: “Strong Democracy was sitting on Trippi’s desk and they said that a number of people in the campaign had been aware of that book” (Logos 2004).

This form of participatory politics, marked by a shared set of political and technological frames, was situated alongside and at times intersected with a more expressive, cultural practice of politics geared towards changing consciousness as an expressly political activity. While Turner (2006) identifies the New Communalists, a 1960s social movement that turned to consciousness and small-scale technologies in an effort to create utopian social forms, they were by and large disengaged from expressly political activities in their orientation towards networked computing technologies at sites including the WELL and later Wired magazine. In contrast, the Diggers, a 1960s collective and politically-oriented participatory performance group, and the Yippies espoused individual self-expression as a means of changing consciousness, but did so primarily through what can be described as psychological interventions in the realm of institutionalized politics and protest. In short, instead of heading to communes the Yippies ended up at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

The New Communalists and the Diggers, while having some divergent cultural and intellectual lineages, also overlapped at key sites. Unlike the New Communalists, who were influenced by the cybernetic and systems theories of Norbert Weiner and Gregory Bateson (Turner 2006), the Diggers traced their aesthetic and intellectual lineage to the French playwright and dramaturgical theorist Antonin Artaud ([1938] 1970) and Malina and Beck’s “The Living
Theatre” in New York City (Tytell 1995). Yet, the art formation Fluxus, with its emphasis on process, chance, do-it-yourself materials, and media, was also important for the Diggers. Fluxus artists such as Cage, Maciunas, Higgins, and Nam June Paik constituted what Tuner (2006, 45-51, 47) describes as the “Cybernetic Art Worlds” of the 1950s and early 1960s where “the making of art had become the building of systems of pattern and randomness, and thus, in Claude Shannon’s sense, of information.” For example, inspired by and borrowing the language of the Happenings Movement and Fluxus (Sandler 1998), in conjunction with the San Francisco-based Artists Liberation Front, a broad collective organized in opposition to the arts establishment in the city, the Diggers hosted an immersive happening called the “Invisible Circus” at Glide Memorial Church from February 24-26, 1967. At the event, Richard Brautigan created and ran what he referred to as “The John Dillinger Computer Complex,” a “populist anti-media media” using mimeograph machines to report on the proceedings of the Invisible Circus (Abbott 2006; Martin 2004, 118).vi

The Diggers espoused a hybrid form of practice that stands between the systems and information theory derived “consciousness” work of the New Communalists and the established protest politics of the SDS and other organizations of the New Left. In addition to 1950s and 1960s arts movements, the Diggers were influenced by and often shared members with early 1960s politically radical performance troupes including the Art Workers Coalition, Bread & Puppet and the San Francisco Mime Troupe, whose members started the Diggers (Martin 2004, 12). As such, the Diggers emphasized highly symbolic, performative actions to change the consciousness of their audiences and effect revolutionary political change, including the establishment of communal living, free stores, and personal liberation. At the same time, these practices differed from the tactics of other oppositional organizations. As Martin (2004, 88) argues, the Diggers motto of “do your thing” and “public, participatory events” marked a stark contrast with the New Left even though it was articulated within a broad framework of radical
politics: “Whereas the New Left formulated ideological platforms and made demands in the style of an orthodox political organization, the Diggers repudiated the notion of demands, opting for often playfully theatrical community-based innovations that attempted to provide a framework for the utopian life they imagined.” Yet, far from turning from the political, the Diggers engaged in a process of “ politicizing the counterculture” not only through performance, but community service for the young hippies streaming into Haight-Ashbury in 1967, before they left for rural communes (Martin 2004, 122-124).

Abbie Hoffman borrowed much of the Diggers’ repertoire and thus copied the performance group’s orientation toward symbolic, performative politics. Looking to the San Francisco Diggers along with television coverage of Bread and Puppet’s anti-Vietnam war theatre, Hoffman and his circle began referring to themselves as the New York Diggers in 1967 and emulating their expressive politics, including opening a Free Store on the Lower East Side, dropping money on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange, and creating other theatrical, participatory actions as forms of political protest (Doyle 2002, 85-89). Yet, while the Diggers eschewed celebrity, insisting on anonymity in the news media, Hoffman crafted his expressive politics with McLuhan in mind. As his biographer notes, McLuhan’s approach to myth, symbol, and “hot” media resonated with Hoffman, leading to actions such as 1968’s “Festival of Life,” a precursor to the 1968 Chicago Democratic convention, being “made for TV”: “There’s a kind of symbolic violence that comes from our side…Psychic violence. You know, just the vision of a TV screen with kids running through the streets yelling and screaming” (Hoffman quoted in Raskin 1998, 143). McLuhan’s idea of a mediated “ participation mystique” (Thrall 2001, 118), a term adapted from ‘ primitive’ anthropology to describe the melding of identity between subject and object, enthralled Hoffman (Raskin 1998, 129). This orientation towards the media was, in part, responsible for a split between the San Francisco Diggers and its counterpart in New York, leading to the formation of the Yippies! in 1967 (Doyle 2002, 88-89).

The 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago further reveals the cultural and
tactical gradations among the disparate groups that made up the New Left and clearly distinguishes between two broad orientations toward participatory and expressive politics. In a contemporaneous account of “The Underground Revolution,” Feigelson (1970, 172) argues that the practices of guerrilla theater sought to realize participation by making the audience “part of the play.” Yet despite a shared orientation towards participatory forms of practice, the performative and consciousness-changing emphasis of the Yippies stood far from the SDS organizational and tactical model, causing conflicts between them, including the 1967 SDS conference in Denton, Michigan that Hoffman and the New York Diggers disrupted through a symbolic protest (Raskin 1998, 143). This was a prelude to the events in Chicago in 1968. In keeping with the idea that self-expression could provoke a change in consciousness and viewing the television was a tool of the revolution in its power to publicize psychological and cultural protest to change the consciousness of viewers, Feigelson (1970, 177) argues that at the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention the SDS were there “to talk to the McCarthy kids,” while the Yippies wanted “to show them how they lived….,” demonstrating the twin influences of media and performance theory, Chicago was seen by the Yippies as “a case for applying McLuhan and Artaud to politics” (Feigelson 1970, 186). While organizations of the Civil Rights Movement and other oppositional social movement groups began to self-consciously utilize broadcast media as part of their protest tactics during this time period (Torres 2003), the Yippies’ tactics were expressly directed towards utilizing the television as a performative stage for psychological liberation (Bodroghkozy 2001; Farber 1988), and they stylistically dressed the part through the psychedelic costumes of the Hippie aesthetic. As Gitlin (1980, 176) remarks, Rubin saw “The revolutionary mass [as] just that: a mass to be ‘turned on’ by media buttons.”

While by the mid-1970s the Yippies exited the televisual stage and with them disappeared the most flamboyant aspects of their mediated, expressivist politics, changing consciousness as political practice was also espoused by other oppositional groupings associated with the New Left along with later movements including the Black Panther Party (Kreiss 2008), the cultural organizations of “Black Power” (Van DeBurg 1992), the “second wave” of the
women's movement (Mansbridge 2001, 8), gay rights (D’Emilio 1983), and AIDS activism (Gamson 1999). While not a new practice (Denning 1996; 2004), groups like these performed cultural work as a part of their political practice to create and sustain what Mansbridge (2001, 1) refers to as “oppositional consciousness.” In essence, psychological liberation through an expressivist politics was directed as performing the cultural and identity work necessary to break institutionalized routines. Yet, unlike the Yippies, this emphasis on consciousness was largely turned inward, sustaining group identity as a precursor to mobilization.

In contrast, similar to the New Communalists (Turner 2006), 1960s and 1970s communities of artists and technologists influenced by cybernetic and systems theory saw the self as part of a larger information system that through new technologies could link with other minds. For example, Paul Ryan (1971; 1975), co-founder of the video collective Raindance, anti-war activist, and a student of McLuhan’s, described early participatory video projects of the late 1960s as “cybernetic guerilla warfare.” In the first issue of Radical Software, a periodical that served as the voice of “the alternate television movement,” Ryan argued that video equipment “can accelerate perception and understanding, and therefore accelerate action” in a process of “self-cybernation” that would enable individuals to be their own “information composer.” Yet, for Ryan and Michael Shamberg, co-founder of Raindance, author of Guerilla Television (1971, PROCESS NOTES) and later Hollywood film producer, their work with video extended beyond the self, embodying a “post-political solution to cultural problems which are radical in their discontinuity with the past.” Shamberg (1971, 9, 12) applies his understanding of cybernetics to an analysis of the "information structures" of American democracy, arguing that the contemporary media environment is a failed information system: "lack of feedback is exactly the opposite of democracy as de Tocqueville saw it: decentralized, self-governing units of people who could see that their decisions were being carried out." Taken as a whole, in its concrete engagement with information theory and participatory media Guerilla Television reads like a McLuhanesque version of the Port Huron statement, an extended discussion of "the media for their common participation" (Port Huron Statement 1962) with a cybernetic cast.
Discussions of cybernetics and systems theory are juxtaposed with more conventionally political essays on the need for democratic access to technologies for community participation and empowerment throughout early technological communities of the 1970s. The Community Memory Project (1974), a peer-to-peer public computerized bulletin board system founded by former student activist Lee Felsenstein and piloted in Berkeley from 1972-1974, contains a similar blending of cybernetic understandings of media, an emphasis on consciousness-changing and political participation. Meanwhile, published papers of the West Coast Computer Faires, an early and influential series of computer conferences that took place during the late 1970s and early 1980s, called for the decentralization of organizational power to smaller collections of individuals, increased access to information for citizens and thus democratized expertise, and the exploration of the new creative and productive potentialities of computing, particularly in childhood education, as contrasted with one-way, broadcast media. One striking example of the mixed rhetoric at the Faires is Carl Townsend’s essay “Changing Paradigms and the Computer” from the Third West Coast Computer Faire in 1978. Townsend (1978, 35) argued that computing was transforming “industrial reductionism” to allow for “holistic” individuals, “fluid, changing, dynamic, and short-lived” organizational forms, “participating-control of the future” to be “determined by the whole acting as an organism,” and the maximization of “individual creativity.” Townsend’s (ibid.) explicit notion of “participatory democracy” is counter-posed to the “computerized educational tools used to develop behaviorally conditioned responses to existing Industrial Age paradigm.”

By the mid-1980s the failure of computing to revitalize democracy was bitterly felt as these promises of a participatory and expressive democracy were overtaken by commercialism in the view of some interpreters. In 1987 David Bunnell (Pfaffenberger 1988), former New Left activist, vice president of marketing for MITS during the introduction of the Altair, computer magazine publishing mogul, and later authority on technology during the dot.com boom called for a return to the Hacker ethic to reclaim the idea of the “participatory PC.” Bunnell (1987) writes of discovering in the early 1970s the “kindred spirits” of the People’s Computer
Company, Lee Felsenstein, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Jim Warren, all of whom were linked to the networks involved in the Whole Earth catalogs (Turner 2006), and the hackers: “the vision arose among all of us almost simultaneously. The PC was the tool we were looking for that would help make our society more democratic.” Bunnell’s dreams would later be reborn in the early 1990s with the widespread adoption of the Internet to the political process by the e-politics community (Howard 2006), who, in line with SDS, took their cues from the participatory, communitarian and communicative theorists cited above. Thus, computing was closely associated with political participation through direct democratic mechanisms including electronic town halls and increased linkages between representatives and citizens, the limits of which was noted by a few scholars (Margolis and Resnick 2000). At the same time, the consciousness approach to computing and the associated “playful, self-sufficient, and psychologically whole” networked individuals it would make possible (Turner 2006, 1) faded somewhat from oppositional and institutionalized politics, but it was articulated alongside networked communications technologies in the discourse elaborated by the New Communalist social networks that flowed through sites including the WELL and later, Wired.

Trippi’s adoption of these networked communications tools and framing of the campaign reflect these two broad orientations towards political practice. Porting these Silicon Valley-derived understandings of networked communications technologies articulated in conjunction with commercial practice into the political field, Trippi posited both a participatory and expressive form of citizenship as the normative model for Web-based, mediated politics. This is not to suggest that these forms of on-line political practice originated with the Dean campaign; elements of expressive and participatory citizenship practices were present since the early days of the World Wide Web (Stolle and Micheletti 2005; Carty 2002; Bennett 2004; Deibert 2000; Ayres 1999). However, the Dean campaign served as an influential site for the gathering of these disparate orientations and their diffusion across the political field in a way that influenced the subsequent framing of mediated politics, legitimated new sets of actors, and guided the development and adaptation of political technologies.
The Dean Campaign, Web 2.0 and the Political Field

On Thursday October 7, 2004 at the first O'Reilly Web 2.0 conference, and later in an op-ed published in the San Francisco Chronicle, Mitch Kapor (2004), founder of the Lotus Development Corporation, argued that the Dean campaign and MoveOn.org "represent a first generation of powerful net-based communities in which the collective power of a mass of people makes a difference.” Kapor portrayed the campaign as taking the first steps in applying the principles of open-source technical and knowledge labor to the political process. While the campaign ultimately failed to make Dean the Democratic presidential nominee, Kapor argued that "we need to understand more about the conditions under which decentralized coordination and decision-making takes place successfully in order to bring those lessons to the political arena...the success of open source software proves it’s possible to undertake large, complex projects without strong centralization. Tom Paine would be writing "Common Sense" on his Linux box today" (ibid.).

Kapor's talk underscores both the extraordinary visibility of the Dean campaign and its cultural fit with the technology industry of Silicon Valley, particularly its accordance with the then-emergent language of what is now widely referred to as "Web 2.0," a loose designation popularized by O’Reilly to refer to the “new participatory architectures of the Web” including on-line "social networking" applications (Scholz 2008). At the same time, Kapor's talk brings the Dean campaign's relationship with Silicon Valley full circle. Trippi leveraged the rhetoric, technologies, and professionals of Silicon Valley to fashion what he described as a new kind of politics, and Silicon Valley luminaries in turn pointed to the Dean campaign as a prototypical example of the revolutionary applications of Web 2.0 in what was self-evidently a non-commercial domain. While outside of Kapor the Dean case was not prevalently cited at the first Web 2.0 conference, many technology companies more explicitly positioned themselves with regard to the political field after the Dean campaign, in essence trading on the legitimacy of the Dean effort to strengthen their own claims with respect to the public good. At the same time, campaign alumni launched a number of political consulting firms, accepted high-level positions
in extant organizations, worked on new campaigns, and joined a speaking circuit that included a number of new conferences, all ventures with an emphasis on the application of networked technology to electoral politics. These professional activities in turn helped to create a “cultural circuit” (2001) that spread the rhetoric, technologies and organizational innovations of the campaign across the political field as well as institutionalized many of its practices.

The Dean campaign had a lasting effect on the political field through its cultural legitimation of a group of professional actors that were and are creating a new generation of technologies and organizations to mediate the relationship between citizens and the state. The campaign’s utilization of new technologies and framing as a radical break with past political practice not only eased the entry of technologists into the political field, but rhetorically swept aside the established professional community that Howard (2006) documents, allowing Dean's principle actors to supplant these individuals professionally on the basis of their experience with the new socially networked forms of on-line democratic practice that were adopted from commercial Internet ventures. This is evident in the number of Dean alumni who after the Democratic primary became prominent campaign consultants and leading figures in organizations that are developing new technologies for use in the political process, often for progressive political ends. Jascha Franklin Hodge, Clay Johnson, Ben Self and Joe Rospars, all former members of Dean’s Internet staff and, with the exception of Rospars, all of whom came from the commercial technology industry, went on to found Blue State Digital, a leading Internet consulting firm for progressive causes. Rospars also served as Barack Obama’s New Media Director during the 2008 presidential cycle. Matthew Gross, the campaign’s founding blogger whose previous experience was blogging at MYDD.com went on to work as a technology consultant and later for the Edwards campaign. Nicco Mele, Howard Dean’s Webmaster with prior experience in information technology work for a variety of progressive organizations, co-founded and became CEO of the political Web consulting firm EchoDitto after the primary and worked for John McCain’s campaign during the 2007-2008 electoral cycle. Mele’s colleague Michael Silberman, Dean’s National MeetUp Director, served as co-founder and president of
EchoDitto. Zachary Rosen, who dropped out of college and co-founded Deanspace, the toolkit for Dean supporters to set up their own Websites based on the open source program Drupal, after the campaign launched CivicSpace, a Web-based organizing non-profit organization based on the content management technology he developed for Dean. Along with Dean alum Josh Koening, Rosen later founded Chapter Three, a web-development and political organizing firm. David Salie, Director of House Party Fundraising for the Dean campaign, later became the co-founder of Party2Win.com, an online event management program for political campaigns, advocacy groups, and firms interested in viral marketing. Aaron Welch, a Web-designer for arts organizations who designed the Web-site for Dean’s Iowa Campaign, later went on to found Advomatic (Advocacy Automated), a web-design firm for progressive organizations and served as the Internet Technology Director for the Dodd campaign.

Lower-level staff and those outside of the formal campaign organization also spread throughout the political field after the primary. Bill Mauk and Daniel Lopez worked on constituency outreach for the Dean campaign and afterward founded VivaDemocracy.com, an online platform for voter outreach and mobilization. In addition, the unofficial Dean Nation blog served as a “farm team” (Armstrong 2007, 44) for a host of bloggers who are now among the most prominent voices in progressive on-line politics including Matt Yglesias, who currently writes for the Atlantic Monthly’s Web-site, and Ezra Klein, who is a writing fellow for The American Prospect. After the election, Howard Dean brought staff and relationships from the campaign with him to the Democratic National Committee (DNC), where he was elected chairman in 2005. For example, he contracted with Blue State Digital to revamp the DNC's Web-site, a collaboration that produced "PartyBuilder," a social-networking suite "of people-powered tools for civic action" that allows individuals to blog, host events, and fundraise on behalf of the DNC (Democratic Party 2008).

Some explicitly commercial ventures were transformed into tools of democracy through their association with the Dean campaign, both reflecting and made possible by a decades-long cultural process whereby entrepreneurship, especially in relation to the Internet, came to be seen
as an alternative way of practicing politics (Turner 2006). For example, Meetup.com went from being a site that facilitated “a local gathering of a group of people brought together by a common interest” (Salisbury and Hanstad 2003) to both a model and a tool for bringing about a new society in the rhetoric of Trippi and its CEO Scott Heiferman. An essential part of Dean’s fundraising and mobilization efforts, in his book and in his statements to the press Meetup.com served as Trippi’s primary evidence for the open source, decentralized campaign and polity that the Internet made possible, in the process eliding the fact that there were tensions within the campaign between this “structurally independent” (Silberman 2007, 125) volunteer program and the formal campaign field offices. Heiferman both actively sought out and embraced this legitimation in the political register and, based on his company’s close association with the campaign, became a credible spokesperson for how on-line democratic politics was and should be practiced. During his keynote address at the 2004 Personal Democracy Forum (PDF), an organization for which he also served as an advisory board member, Heiferman argued that in the future politics would be practiced along the lines of Rheingold’s (2002) “smart mobs” in what he called the “Napsterization of organization” (Sifry 2004). Micah Sifry, co-founder of PDF and an editor and writer for The Nation whose brother, Dave Sifry, was the founder of one of the most prominent blog search engines, Technorati.com, provides an account of Heiferman’s speech, which echoes both Trippi’s rhetoric regarding the campaign and 1960s oppositional political movements’ embrace of participatory forms of democracy:

We need a "Constitution-wizard," he said, in other words tools that help people create such new kinds of powerful federations....This is about not just changing the world, he said, but saving the world – from big business, big government, big money, etc. People are watching Big Brother, two..."Net-based collective action and group power has hardly begun," he admitted, but predicted huge and subtle changes around the corner. "Bet on that which gives citizens control," he added, quoting Jeff Jarvis.

Personal Democracy Forum, sponsored in 2004 and subsequent years by Google, is one example of the conferences that were spawned in the wake of the Dean campaign and, similar to earlier e-politics conferences (Howard 2006), that served to bring together sets of actors from heterogeneous fields to institutionalize the meanings of mediated democracy as well as how new technologies should be applied and for what ends in the electoral and policy-making process.
PDF held its inaugural conference at the end of May 2004, less than four months after Dean’s highly publicized disappointing third place finish in Iowa, which effectively ended his hopes of becoming the Democratic nominee for president. Co-founded by Andrew Raisej, a nightlife and technology entrepreneur who was involved in New York state politics (Scheier 2000) and served as the Chairman of the Howard Dean Technology Advisory Council, PDF brought together many of the key players from the Dean campaign along with elected officials, professional political consultants, journalists, non-profit representatives and technology entrepreneurs to assess how “the Internet is becoming a force to reckon with in politics” (PDF 2004). Among the speakers in 2004 were Trippi, Nicco Mele, Ralph Reed, the Southeast Regional Chairman for Bush-Cheney ’04, Ron Wyden, Democratic Senator from Oregon, Eric Alterman, columnist for The Nation and blogger at MSNBC.com, Mark Halperin, then political director of ABC News, Scott Heiferman, Jeff Jarvis, media commentator and prominent blogger at Buzzmachine.com, Joe Klein, columnist for Time Magazine, Eli Pariser, National Campaigns Director of Moveon.org, Simon Rosenberg, President and Founder of New Democrat Network, New York Congressman Anthony Weiner, and David Weinberger. PDF served as a site for these speakers to collaboratively become the interpreters of an emergent new world of mediated, socially-networked democracy and in the process lay the symbolic and material groundwork necessary to further bring it into being. The Web-site of the conference reflects this dual role, simultaneously casting technology in terms of an autonomous force spreading throughout the polity while celebrating these individuals as ushering in its widespread application to politics:

Watch as the world of politics meets the world of information technology and listen to how individuals are defining their involvement in the political life of their country on their own terms. Find out what other forms of democracy will develop as technology takes root in society. Meet the politicians, the technologists, and the movers and shakers of the personal democracy movement. (PDF 2004a)

As the phrase "personal democracy" suggests, a dominant theme running throughout PDF is the personalization of politics, a broad concept encompassing the socially-networked publics based on affinity that are selected by individual choice. As noted above, the Dean campaign introduced social networking theory to the field through the information technology
professionals on staff and popular network theorists that served as advisors to the campaign, along with the uptake of commercial tools and homegrown innovations including DeanTV and DeanSpace. In the years since the inaugural conference, PDF reflects the changing commercial tools that were being incorporated into the political field, featuring workshops on video-sharing technologies including YouTube and social networking sites such as FaceBook and MySpace. Together these social networking tools are rhetorically a part of Web 2.0, the social and participatory applications that in turn give rise to what Benkler (2006, 10) describes as the "networked public sphere." Benkler himself presented on this topic at the 2007 PDF in New York City, describing how the Internet constitutes a multiplicity of publics built around networks of individual affiliation. Extrapolating to the theme of the conference, a "personal" democracy is constituted through voluntary social associations. At the same time, "personal democracy" is about the participatory, interactive technologies that empower individuals to creatively engage in politics. The technologies utilized by Dean and those developed since the campaign are personalized in the sense that individuals have access to information and content on demand, and they in turn are able to become the unique creators of political information. As Jenkins (2004) argues, the new, on-line citizen engages in "photoshop for democracy."

As scholars (Allen 2008) have noted, Web 2.0 was framed in explicitly democratic terms in relation to participatory production and consumption, a discourse made possible by cultural understandings of the countercultural and oppositional nature of the Internet. Scholars such as Jenkins (2006) argue through analogy that cases as diverse as "Survivor" chat groups and the Dean campaign are all a part of the same phenomenon of individual empowerment and creative expression made possible by the participatory and democratizing nature of networked technology; Jenkins goes so far as to argue that participation in these commercial contexts are the training grounds for democratic citizenship. Indeed, after the Dean campaign, many companies including Google, Ebay, and Yahoo sought to position themselves more explicitly with respect to the institutionalized political field, including sponsoring and sending speakers to conferences like PDF. In the process this strengthened the public understandings of these
companies as the facilitators of a new kind of participatory and creative politics in much the same way that Meetup.com was cast into this role during the Dean campaign. This in turn led to the increased prominence of these companies with respect to the political field. For example, during the 2007-2008 presidential election cycle, Google’s YouTube sponsored a Democratic and Republican debate, where through Web-video ordinary citizens had the opportunity to ask questions directly of the candidates in a manner that was "creative" (Seelye 2007) in the words of host Anderson Cooper. Google now also runs CitizenTube, a video-sharing Web-site for election related materials. Also during the 2007-2008 election cycle, Facebook co-hosted a debate with ABC News as part of a broader partnership that brought journalists and content to the social networking site. Innovations like these are tracked by the influential TechPresident.com group blog that was spun off from PDF and founded by Raisej and Sifry in 2007 to chronicle the Internet activities of the campaigns.

As noted above, these notions of "personal democracy" and participatory, creative politics more generally echo a 1960s turn towards "personal liberation" among the social movements that posited cultural and life choices as deeply political and that carried through the 1970s on to the present day in the form of what scholars (Laraña et al. 2004) have described as "new social movements," those identity-based organizations that connect to and mobilize around life-style issues. At times, the rhetorical and cultural links to the 1960s were more explicit. For example, in February of 2004 the “O’Reilly Emerging Technology Conference,” one of the consummate industry gatherings, sponsored a co-located “O’Reilly Digital Democracy Teach-In,” adopting the protest language of 1960s student movements to symbolize the revolutionary nature of the new, social-networking technologies that were being developed commercially and could be implemented in the domain of politics. The conference brought together many of the key players from the Dean campaign and other enthusiasts to discuss how “Internet technologies are putting power back into the hands of people,” including Trippi, Wes Boyd, the founder of MoveOn, Britt Blaser, senior advisor for Internet strategy for the Dean campaign, Scott Heiferman, Joi Ito, and Doc Searls, Weinberger’s collaborator on The Cluetrain Manifesto,
Wired author during the late 1990s and early 2000s, and senior editor of *Linux Journal*. The O'Reilly conference, which received extensive coverage in the professional press and blogosphere, included sessions on the Dean campaign, citizen involvement, effective blogging, and “emergent democracy worldwide,” which was focused on how to bridge material and cultural divides while “building great new tools to build communities.” The "O'Reilly Digital Democracy Teach-In" clearly posited the democratic possibilities of the new, commercial technologies that were being built by individuals next door at the emerging technology conference, framing these tools in the terms marked out forty years prior within the various social movements of the 1960s. The Dean campaign offered a powerful site for the reinvigoration of the democratic dreams of the 1960s, a promise that was threaded through narratives around the rise of social media and Web 2.0.

**Conclusion**

While the specific technologies used during the 2007-2008 primary and general election campaigns changed, their orientation towards social networking and the claims for their impact mark the legacy of the Dean campaign. Indeed, this is due to the networks of Dean alumni who contributed to a discourse of Web 2.0 as they spread across the political field and carried with them enduring promises of new technologies revitalizing the democratic process along with a set of attendant practices. Trippi went on to become a senior campaign advisor for John Edwards’s campaign, joining his former colleague Matt Gross. After Edwards dropped out, Trippi became the consummate source on what journalists heralded as Obama’s revolutionary use of new technologies to run a “bottom-up campaign,” situating Obama’s efforts in the context of Dean (Dickinson 2008). As noted above, the link was not simply rhetorical. Joe Rospars, a Dean alum, served as Obama’s Director of New Media, just as other high-profile Dean campaign members joined the new media staffs of other candidates including McCain and Dodd.

At the same time, a new group of private, for-profit companies stepped to the fore during the 2007-2008 cycle and situated their businesses as extending the practices of the Dean
campaign. For example, Isaac Garcia (2008), co-founder of Central Desktop, a "Complete Business Collaboration platform" technology employed by the Obama campaign, argues that "in similar ways that Howard Dean leveraged Meetup.com to grow his grassroots efforts, the Barack Obama campaign leveraged Central Desktop to organize and collaborate with more than 6,000 precincts in California.” Garcia goes on to state that Obama's campaign is evidence of the "long tail," a marketing term coined in 2004 by Chris Anderson at Wired, of average voters that through technology have the opportunity to get involved with political campaigns at low cost to themselves. This ostensibly public good dimension to commercial technologies is echoed in Rospars’s comments about MyBarackObama.com, a social networking tool developed for the campaign by one of the founders of FaceBook: "We put these tools online as a public utility…We said to our supporters, ‘Have at it’” (Dickinson 2008).

Garcia's article, similar to Trippi and Kapor’s public discursive work before him, continues to intertwine the language of the Silicon Valley technology industry with that of the realm of politics, in the process equating the two. Companies like Central Desktop provide the tools that from the perspective of network theorists realize on-line participatory democracy in the distinctive cast of Web 2.0. At the same time, the expressivist vein of political practice is alive and well in the creative citizenship practices that spread ideas through "viral networks,” a concept that was originally developed in the domain of Internet marketing (Rayport 1996). As Micah Sifry (2008) argued comparing the Obama campaign to Clinton's, "they know how to use the medium to spread messages….One campaign benefits from voter-generated organic online support...and one hires professionals to make online videos that, at least in this case, reek of inauthenticity." The rhetoric of "authenticity" and "organic" self-expression hearkens back to the Diggers’ credo of just "do your thing" along with Hoffman and Rubin’s performances of the late 1960s. Expressing an authentic, inner self is a central component of the creative citizenship practices realized through networked technologies.

The cultural work that Trippi and other members of the Dean campaign performed in 2003-2004 traded off of the rhetoric and practices of the New Communalists and the technology
industry to frame a new kind of political practice, one that also had a marked cultural fit with the activities of the disparate social movements during 1960s. While SDS activists believed that “super-technology” in the hands of bureaucratic elites created “mass” society, one way to revitalize democracy was through communicative dialogue using “the media for their common participation” (Port Huron Statement). Meanwhile, for the Yippies communications media supported new ways of practicing politics that was based on changing consciousness as the television became the stage for a revolution in the psyches of Americans. Forty years later, Dean's run for the presidency posited a "people-powered Howard" movement on-line against the broadcast model of American politics, marking similar hopes for a renewal of democracy through new communications technology. Trippi’s (2004) autobiographical account of the campaign is dedicated “To the six hundred thousand people of Dean for America who relit the flame of participatory democracy.” Through the participation that the Internet made possible, and that was even inevitable in social, economic, and political life, citizens could discover themselves and enter into new forms of fellowship, utilizing communication technologies to draw together into small-scale, networked units based on affinity and interest, while at the same time allowing for the fuller expression of the authentic self. It was a democratic vision that the SDS and the Yippies would have recognized and applauded, although the language was adopted from technologists and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley. Yet, we are also brought full circle. Just as Trippi borrowed the cultural understandings and commercial practices of the technology industry and ported them into them into the political field to revitalize democracy, the theorists and commercial interests of Web 2.0 turned to Dean to legitimate the participatory Web.

**Bibliography**


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i For a list of participants and biographies see Rein (2003)
ii For the individuals staffing the formal Dean For America campaign organization see “Howard Dean-Campaign Organization” available on-line at: http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/dean/deanorg.html. This chain of command was ultimately responsible for Trippi’s ouster after Dean’s loss in New Hampshire (Lizza 2004).
iii Alan Haber, the first President of SDS, argued "the challenge ahead is to appraise and evolve radical alternatives to the inadequate society of today, and to develop an institutionalized communication system that will give perspective to our immediate actions" (Sale 1973, 25). Indeed, as an organization SDS was conceived by Haber and Hayden to be "a national communications network" for the decentralized activists of the student movement (Miller 1987, 72).
iv This critique of “mass society” suggests the “reflexivity” (Gusfield 1994) of the activists constituting the SDS. Contemporary scholars of social movements (McAdam 1999) note that during this time and until the late 1970s the paradigmatic theories of social unrest posited psychological strain and alienation brought on by rapid social and economic change as the causal agent for collective action. Born of studies of fascism, Nazism, and McCarthyism, social movements were seen under the rubric of abnormal psychology, an expression of fundamental coping mechanisms in response to social processes that atomized and alienated individuals from their communities. In addition, theories of underlying psychological alienation were not confined to any one specific field or even to the academy, but had wide purchase in popular books such as “The Organization Man” (Whyte 2002 [1956]), and later, texts including Alvin Toffler’s (1970) Future Shock. While this psychological perspective in the study of social movements was supplanted by a new research paradigm espoused by a younger group of scholars sympathetic to and often involved in 1960s and 1970s movements, this shift is often treated as a matter of intellectual history detailing the passage from one dominant analytical and theoretical perspective to another. Thus, few students of social movements have noted how theories of “mass society” and its psychological effects shaped the beliefs, rhetoric, and action of some social movements in the post-World War II era, although for different underlying reasons than the psychological paradigm postulated. With instrumental strategic and political aims, leaders of the SDS including Hayden during the early 1960s developed critiques of the psychological...
alienation caused by technocracy to provide a set of overarching goals, compelling narratives, and a collective identity that mobilized individuals around achieving participatory democracy. That an academic critique of alienation was turned to is not surprising; in contrast to the indigenous organizations involved in the early Civil Rights Movement, 1960s student movements originated in the academy, in part given the historic rates of college attendance among the baby boom generation. Thus, activists in social movements did not take collective action as a result of their own underlying psychological alienation, as these older theories posited, rather their beliefs about society, politics, and the individual were shaped by a broader cultural turn toward theories of the mind that in turn guided the goals, activities, and perception of the ends posited for collective action.

The Port Huron Statement echoes psychologist Erich Fromm’s (1955, 342) call for a reinvigoration of “the principle of the Town Meeting into modern industrialized society.” Fromm diagnosed individual alienation in American society, which was part of what he called the “pathology of normalcy,” and in the political realm called for the reintroduction of small face-to-face discussion groups voting on political issues which would then be communicated via “the technical devices we have today” to the central government.

Brautigan’s poem, “All Watched Over By Machines of Love and Grace” was printed in the 1968 edition of The Realist, which was created entirely by the Diggers as a collection of their best broadsides and featured pieces by Antonin Artaud, Peter Berg, William Burroughs, Neil Cassidy, Fidel Castro, Don Cochran, Allen Ginsberg, Emmett Grogan, Norman Mailer, Malcolm X, and Huey Newton (The Realist).


Cohn (2007) argues that Rosen and Koening along with other members of Hack4Dean who later developed DeanSpace helped diffuse Drupal more widely in the United States. As Cohn (ibid.) argues, Rosen’s CivicSpace was “the first company with full time employees that was developing and distributing Drupal technology,” meanwhile Dean alums Mele’s EchoDitto and Welch’s Advomatic used Drupal in their on-line consulting and it was the platform upon which Dean volunteer Chris Messina launched the Spread Firefox campaign.