

Leaving the Party: Power Asymmetries and Membership Discontinuity within International Organizations

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Abstract: Why do some states exit international organizations (IOs)? We build a theoretical model to capture the tension that both sides face when calculating the costs and benefits of continued membership. IOs seek to provide efficiency gains within a specified issue area due to coordinating the behavior of their members. In addition to these efficiency gains, the utility that member states derive is also a function of their ability to influence how those gains are distributed. While policy similarity makes coordination easier, significant variation in the power capabilities of their members undermines the benefits, as the more powerful states seek a less equitable distribution of benefits. Our model indicates that, all else equal, IOs with greater power asymmetries among their membership have greater contestation and are more likely to have members exit the organization, while policy convergence exerts a non-linear relationship with the likelihood of member discontinuity. We test the model's predictions on a newly construct dataset on the degree of power inequality and policy similarity across IOs and find support for each hypothesis.

Key words: International organizations, Power inequality, Membership discontinuity


Introduction

Why do some states exit international organizations (IOs)? States sometimes choose to leave an organization of their own accord, such as when South Africa withdrew from UNESCO in 1956, Venezuela left the IMF in 2007, or Great Britain's invocation of Article 50 to exit the European Union in 2017. Others act in a way that violate an IO's rules and are suspended, such as when the British Commonwealth of Nations suspended Zimbabwe in 2002 for electoral irregularities, or when Mercosur suspended Venezuela in 2017 for human rights and electoral irregularities. Yet, violations of an IO's formal rules seldom result in a state relinquishing membership or facing suspension (von Boryskowski and Vabulas 2018). Scholars have suggested many relevant factors to explain when IOs are most likely to face membership discontinuities, but have generally overlooked the role of power asymmetry and policy similarity among member states. Rather than focusing on the formal institutional makeup of an IO or the characteristics of its individual member states, we seek to understand how the degree of power asymmetry and policy divergence among an IO's member states influence the likelihood of membership discontinuities from the IO.

While the relative probability of any particular member state exiting an IO is relatively low, membership discontinuities are not rare occurrences. We identify 398 cases of an IO experiencing at least one discontinuity in its membership—resulting in 846 individual member state discontinuities—from 1965 to 2005. Discontinuities have occurred with regularity throughout the post-1965 period, with increases in the mid-1990s and a high in 2000.¹ The

¹ Countries do not tend to leave multiple IOs in the same year, nor is exiting an IO limited certain types of states. Only Yugoslavia/Serbia (1992 - 11), Vietnam (1974 - 8), and Benin (2005 - 6) left more than 5 IOs in one year. The countries with the most discontinuities in their membership are Yugoslavia/Serbia (26), the United Kingdom (19), Brazil (17), Vietnam (16), and the United States (16).

Figure 1. Number of IO Membership Discontinuities by Year.



annual number of discontinuities across all IOs is displayed in Figure 1. A table listing all discontinuities is available in the Appendix.

That membership discontinuities are so common is especially impressive given the number of zombie organizations—effectively defunct, but formally present—that exist within the international system (Gray 2018). In many of these cases, the IO either provides no benefits or has become sufficiently ineffective that some members formed a new IO with a similar mandate. Under what conditions then, would a state or IO decide that it is necessary for a member to exit the organization?

In this paper, we explore the conditions under which membership discontinuities are most likely. We argue that while IO membership generates benefits through increased coordination and efficiency, it also confers opportunity costs to member states. We suggest that the opportunity costs facing member states increase when member preferences are splintered or when internal power relations among member states are asymmetrical. Policy dissimilarity

results in ineffective organizations that fail to provide members with efficiency gains, undermining a key purpose of membership. Power imbalances within IOs result in different levels of influence over the actions taken by IO and in how benefits are distributed. Under either condition, members may find it rational to reconsider their membership, barring a reconfiguration on the part of the organization.

From the organization's perspective, policy dissimilarity and power asymmetries are also problematic in that they prevent the organization best from pursuing its mandate. When members have similar policy goals, it is easier to coordinate their behavior. Likewise, when member states are roughly equal in terms of material strength, IOs are likely to offer all parties equal influence over policy outcomes. Members with higher degrees of power are more likely to shape policies that are in their own interests, at the expense of the preferences of weaker members (Thompson 2006; Stone 2011). Yet, organization rules may limit or even stymie powerful states from an unfettered pursuit their goals (Ikenberry 2000). The result is an organizational middle ground that leaves both powerful and weak members dissatisfied, with the former upset that their goals and benefits are too often ignored and the latter upset that it has to compromise too often.

We build a theoretical model to capture the cost-benefit calculus that member states and IOs face when their joint interests fail to perfectly align. Member states must assess whether the benefits of membership outweigh the costs imposed, or whether to issue an ultimatum to adjust its terms of membership. In response, the IO must determine whether to acquiesce to the ultimatum and reconfigure the distribution of benefits among its members, or reject the ultimatum and lose a member.

The model enables us to identify those conditions under which rising opportunity costs can result in membership discontinuities. We expect that when the distribution of value-added

benefits of membership is incongruent with distribution of power among the member states—i.e. where the opportunity costs are greatest—IO member dynamics are less cooperative and more conflictual than if the benefits outweigh the costs. While policy similarity should enhance efficiency and help to offset any distributional costs, the model helps us recognize conditions where efficiency gains affect membership discontinuities in a variety of ways. Counter-intuitively, the model shows that efficiency gains exert a non-linear relationship with membership discontinuities; increases in efficiency initially increase membership discontinuities, until reaching a critical threshold after which further gains reduce the risk of discontinuities.

Our theoretical model defines either member-state withdrawal or suspension as a membership discontinuity. We contend that both withdrawal and suspension follow the same underlying process. In each case a member state has decided that the benefits of IO membership, as currently configured, fail to justify the incurred costs, and (explicitly or implicitly) issues an ultimatum. In the case of withdrawal, a state makes this calculation and ultimately opts to leave the IO. In the case of suspension, a state knowingly violates an IO's rules, having determined that the risk of suspension is necessary to bring the membership benefits in line with the costs. Thus, both suspension and withdrawal are two sides of the same coin. Moreover, in many cases, states that withdraw from an IO also faced the threat of suspension. In 1964, for example, post-revolution Cuba refused to repay loans, fees, and adhere to the balance-of-payment and exchange rate policies of the IMF and, as a result, faced possible expulsion. Prior to the meeting where the suspension was to be officially discussed, however, Cuba pre-emptively withdrew from the organization (Feinberg 2011, 66-67). Cuba, in other words, knew that its actions were likely to result in expulsion, chose to act anyways, and withdrew its membership to head off the IMF's move to suspend. Similarly, in 2009 the Organization of American States (OAS)

suspended Honduras following a military coup, but Honduras had already announced it was leaving the organization. Likewise, in 2018 the US requested that the OAS suspend Venezuela for human rights violations, but Venezuela had already begun the withdraw process.

We empirically evaluate the model by analyzing the behavior of states within IOs using an original dataset of power asymmetry and policy preference similarity among an IO's member states. The results demonstrate that the degree of power asymmetry within an IO has a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of member discontinuity from IOs, even after accounting for several other factors. We also demonstrate that factors that increase an IO's efficiency—e.g., policy congruency—counteract this risk, at least to a point. Using a variety of different estimation techniques and operationalization of membership discontinuities, we find evidence of a robust positive relationship between an IO's degree of power asymmetry and membership discontinuity, as well as the expected non-linear relationship between an IO's efficiency and membership discontinuity.

IO Membership

Most research on IOs focuses on either why states join organizations or how organizational features affect cooperation and conflict among their members. Beginning with the former, IOs address the coordination problem faced by states by providing a focal point for addressing problems or coordinating policies (Schelling 1960; North 1990). IOs reduce communication costs and allow for greater access to information among states (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Botcheva and Martin 2001). Lower costs of communication motivates members to cooperate with each other, which reduces distrust among participating states (Oye 1985; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). The creation of a forum in which member states can participate and

air grievances lends credibility in the resulting policies, and helps direct the interactions among members (Simmons 2000; Russett and Oneal 2001). Finally, enforcement of agreements is easier in institutional settings as the costs of compelling compliance or implementing sanctions can be spread out among members (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990; Martin 1993). Each of these mechanisms focuses on ways that reduce members' costs to achieve joint action towards a shared policy goal.

Research on member cooperation typically focus on an IO's structure. Institutional differences in formal rules and the procedures through which policies are implemented are used to explain variation in member cohesion in pursuit of a shared policy goal (Botcheva and Martin 2001; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). Others argue that cooperation is limited due to low organization capabilities or high enforcement costs (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004). Relatedly, institutional features have also been shown to reduce conflict due to credible commitments and offering dispute settlement mechanisms (Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Pevehouse and Russett 2006; Mitchell and Hensel 2007; Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke 2010).

Another explanation for the efficacy of IO membership relates to the domestic characteristics of member states, such as the level of democracy or type of legal institutions (Smith 2000; Russett and Oneal 2001). Since IOs are typically formed with some democratic attitudes—i.e. each member will have a certain amount of influence on the formation of policies implemented or that each state has the ability to publicly address grievances or veto policies—domestic politics affect the degree to which cooperation can be sustained in IOs. States that afford their domestic citizenry basic property rights, for example, tend to be more cooperative and compliant within international agreements than those who deny their citizens' property

rights (Simmons 2000). IOs whose members are more likely to adhere to liberal principles and value the rule of law domestically have been found to have higher levels of cooperation and compliance with organization rules (Dixon 1993; Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi 2008). Democratic regimes tend to be more compliant and willing to sustain cooperation over time than non-democratic regimes (Leeds 1999; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel 2009).² This could be because both the domestic citizenry and political elites in liberal democracies are accustomed to stringent constitutional controls and come to revere the benefits of “keeping commitments” (Fisher and Goldman 1981; McDonald 2009). Moreover, institutional pressures can strengthen domestic groups and encourage democratization, creating a virtuous circle (Pevenhouse 2005).

Lastly, IOs may actively change the preferences of their members. IOs develop their own internal bureaucratic logics and pathologies, acting as autonomous agents that influence their member states over time (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Chwieroth 2008). The result of IOs acting on their members and socialization which occurs through repeated interaction is that members’ interests and policies often converge (Bearce and Bondanella 2007). This is especially true within economic IOs, as evidenced in the issue areas of market regulation (Simmons 2001; Cao 2009), rule of law (Chyzh 2016), tax rates (Plümper, Troeger, and Winner 2009), and welfare policies (Hays 2009). As interests among member converge, the costs of continued membership in an IO and the level of conflict between the organization and its members should decrease.

² There is also significant variation in compliance with international agreements among autocratic regimes (Chyzh 2014).

Discontinuity of IO Membership

While the literature identifies factors that reduce the costs of IO membership, it offers few explanations for why states exit an IO. One of the few studies that does investigate this topic is von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2018). They explore why IOs with democratic requirements suspend some states that backslide politically, but not others. They find that geopolitics and institutional rules explain this variation. We build on this research to look at membership discontinuities across all types of IOs. In addition, we focus on the interactions *between* member states and the IO itself. We contend that IOs serve not only to reduce transaction costs and enhance coordination, but also to restrict state behavior.

That IOs can impose restrictions on state behavior is most evident in highly institutionalized IOs, such as the EU, which requires members to adhere to strict budgetary constraints and implement reforms to deepen commitments to democracy and the rule of law, the latter of which can be quite politically costly for regimes relying on redistributing economic rents to supporters to remain in power. Even relatively innocuous IOs, however, such as the British Commonwealth of Nations, also frequently impose political and legal restrictions on their members. Thus, IOs serve to impose some constraints on their members, reducing the range of available actions that they can take in pursuit of their national interests.

In addition, the presence of powerful states within an IO greatly reduces the level of autonomy of the organization (Thompson 2006; Stone 2011; von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2018). Great powers are much more capable of interfering with the operations of or ignoring the dictates of an institution. Further, their capability to dissolve or restructure the organization is not a power shared by smaller states (Abbott and Snidal 1998). While many IOs are formed with a democratic intent as discussed above—that all members are able to influence and vote on

policies before they are implemented—this does not mean that power that is shared equally. The presence of power asymmetries within an organization is likely to lead to imbalances in the amount of influence each member has.

The US, for example, exerts a disproportionate level of influence in the IMF than its voting share would delineate. Despite holding only a 17% share of the Fund's voting bloc, the US is able to effectively act as a veto player, actually directs resources and determines penalties to a significantly higher degree than other members of the G-5 (Stone 2011). Moreover, Sahin (2012) finds that IMF country forecasts include high degrees of politically motivated bias, reflecting US commitments rather than economic fundamentals.

The role of constraints and a lack of influence for some members serves to impose opportunity costs on member states by (a) restricting their actions and (b) preventing them from adjusting an IO to accommodate their policy goals. The results is that member states are left with a choice to either remain within an IO or take steps that can result in a membership discontinuity.

There are two related ways in which state actions result in membership discontinuation, i.e. a member either withdraws from, or is suspended by, an IO. First, a state may seek to unilaterally achieve its goals without moderating its policy to accommodate other member states' interests. That is, states seek to reduce the opportunity costs imposed by the IO. France, for example, left NATO in 1966 in order to pursue a more independent foreign policy and engage the Soviet bloc, fearing that the US dominated the organization and restricted French autonomy. Similarly, Ecuador withdrew its membership from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries as the organization refused to raise Ecuador's oil quota (New York Times 1992).

Second, a state may directly violate the terms of membership in an IO. In such cases, member states are effectively issuing a challenge to the IO to call them out for their implicit

demand to receive special accommodation outside the bounds of the agreement. For example, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League in 1979 for initiating a peace treaty with Israel, which ran against the preferences of the League's other members as well as the formal rules of the organization.

In the first set of cases, a state determined that it could receive greater benefits outside of the IO than within it. In the latter case, a state acted in a manner that put its membership at risk because it determined that its expected benefits from ignoring the constraints of membership within the IO outweighed the benefits of continued membership. All of these states effectively issued demands to their IO—concede greater autonomy in the French and Ecuadorian cases, respond to violations of the terms of agreement in the Egyptian case—and challenged the IO to respond to these demands.

For their part, the degree to which IOs are able to pursue the interests that they were created is inversely related to the risk of membership discontinuity. IOs are generally formed with a specific goal in mind. For instance, the WTO seeks to reduce tariffs and encourage trade among members. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) liberalizes banking and investment regulations across the region. The International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV) promotes and coordinate the scientific and technical aspects of viticulture and wine making. The Community of Portuguese Language Countries seeks to protect, enhance, and expand the Portuguese language and culture. Member states that ignore or violate the regulations and standards of an IO, however, serve to work against the goal of increased efficiency. In addition, conceding to the demands of one member state may encourage demands from additional members in the future, either because other member's now must reevaluate their own memberships in light of the new allocation of benefits and costs, or because the organization


develops a reputation for acquiescence. Therefore, when confronted with a member state's demands, an IO must weigh whether the contributions of a member state outweigh the deadweight efficiency losses and potential future demands from other member states.

In the next section, we develop a simple model to reflect a rationalist account of membership discontinuity. The model emphasizes the tension between the opportunity costs for the member state against the common goals and efficiency of the IO. The model helps clarify the mechanisms and derive predictions related to membership discontinuities, as well as to identify scope conditions and the appropriate level of analysis for subsequent empirical tests.

A Rational Theory of IO Membership Discontinuity

IOs enhance coordination and international cooperation by reducing transaction costs, but also impose constraints on the actions of member states. We argue that each member state of an IO compares the degree to which an IO provides benefits and the opportunity costs of participating in the IO. In the event that the opportunity costs are deemed too high, member states may seek to re-negotiate the terms of their membership or threaten to leave the organization. IOs, on the other hand, seek to enhance the benefits of membership. Frequently adjusting terms of membership, of course, reduces the efficiency of an IO by creating deadweight losses. In addition, once one member receives concessions, other members may also seek similar adjustments, further reducing efficiency. The interaction between member states and an IO can be treated as a two player, non-cooperative game, where member state/IO interactions result in three outcomes: no changes in membership terms (either due to a lack of demands or to being deterred), IO reconfiguration (where the terms of membership for at least one member is

Figure 2. Interaction between Member and IO.



renegotiated), or IO membership discontinuity (at least one member state withdraws or is suspended from the IO).

We model the game as one with complete information between two rational actors, a *member* and the *IO*. The *member* moves first. The *member* can choose between two actions: issue a demand (d) or not ($\neg d$). Once the member selects their strategy, the *IO* chooses to either respond with a punitive action (r) or not ($\neg r$). There are three possible outcomes: if *member* selects $\neg d$, the game ends with *no change*. If *member* selects d and *IO* chooses $\neg r$, the member's demands are accommodated by the IO, implying that the *IO reconfigures* its rules to account for the member's new privileges. Finally, if *member* selects d and *IO* chooses r , the member's demands are rejected by the IO, resulting in a *discontinuity* with the member either withdrawing or the IO suspending membership. The game is displayed in extensive form with payoffs in Figure 2.

The *member's* payoff for *no change* is $B - k$. B represents the benefits of being a part of the specific IO where $B > 0$, and k represents the opportunity costs of IO membership, where $k > 0$. The *member's* payoff for *IO reconfigure* is $\delta_L B$, where δ_L represents the new (lower) level of efficiency that the actor derives from B . Note, however, that the *member* does not pay any opportunity costs for IO membership. Lastly, *member's* payoff for *discontinuity* is 0. In this

outcome, the *member* no longer pays the opportunity costs of IO membership, but also no longer receives benefits.

The IO's payoff for *IO reconfiguration* is $\delta_L(R_G)$ and its payoff for *Discontinuity* is $\delta_O(R_G - R_J)$, where δ_O is the IO's efficiency in achieving policy goals when allocating its efforts towards the organization's stated objectives, R_G represents the summation of resources that IO receives with full membership, and R_J are the resources that the *member* contributes to the IO. As above, δ_L represents the lower level of efficiency that is associated with reconfiguring the organizational rules to one accommodate the unhappy *member*. Consistent with this, we assume that the initial, pre-demand level of efficiency is strictly greater than the level of efficiency following an IO reconfiguration, $0 < \delta_L < \delta_O < 1$, which accounts for deadweight losses.³

Since the game is sequential and played with complete information, it is solved using backwards induction. The top of Table 1 reports player strategies and the conditions for each action, while the bottom of Table 1 displays the equilibrium outcomes. The game yields three equilibria. First, if either one of two conditions holds; that (1) $\frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J} > \delta_O > \delta_L + \frac{k}{B}$ or (2) that both $\delta_O > \frac{k}{B}$ and $\delta_O > \frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J}$, then *member* always selects $\neg d$. Condition 1 occurs when the *member* chooses $\neg r$ and condition 2 occurs when the *member* chooses r . More substantively, condition 1 takes place if the IO is willing to reconfigure, but the loss of efficiency is sufficiently large that the member state does not want to issue a demand. Condition 2 takes place if the efficiency of the IO is greater than the loss of resources provided by a member, yet the member state gains more from the IO than the costs. We refer to this equilibrium as *Member Deterred*.

³ We assume that the rate of change for the two parameters are equal, $\partial\delta_O = \partial\delta_L$, until $\partial\delta_L$ reaches the lower limit.

Table 1. Summary of Results

Actor	Action	Condition
IO	r	$\delta_O > \frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J}$
	$\neg r$	$\delta_O < \frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J}$
Member	d r	$k > \delta_O B$
	$\neg d r$	$k < \delta_O B$
	d $\neg r$	$k > B(1 - \delta_R)$
	$\neg d \neg r$	$k < B(1 - \delta_R)$
Equilibria (path)		Conditions
Member Deterred ($\neg dr$; $\neg d\neg r$)		$\frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J} > \delta_O > \delta_L + \frac{k}{B}$ or $\delta_O > \frac{k}{B}$, $\delta_O > \frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J}$
Always Reconfigure ($\neg dr$)		$\delta_L + \frac{k}{B} > \frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J} > \delta_O$
Discontinuity (dr)		$\frac{k}{B} > \delta_O > \frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J}$

Second, when $\delta_L + \frac{k}{B} > \frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J} > \delta_O$ then we observe the *Always Reconfigure* equilibrium. Since the resources provided to the IO by the member state are sufficiently large, the IO would prefer to acquiesce to the member state if a demand is issued. The member state, meanwhile, finds the currently level of benefits lacking and, knowing that the IO will acquiesce, issue a demand. Finally, if $\frac{k}{B} > \delta_O > \frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J}$, then the *Discontinuity* equilibrium is observed. The IO prefers maintaining its current level of efficiency to the resources provided by the member state, while the member state finds the costs of membership to be greater than the derived benefits.

Empirical Implications

The game yields several predictions. We focus on the predictions that are most readily testable given observable data and most directly relate to our outcome of interest. Specifically, we examine the effects of changes in k , the opportunity costs faced by the member state, and δ_O , the efficiency of the IO regarding the benefits of membership, on the probability of a

discontinuity in an IO's membership. In addition to the formal derivations, we discuss how we conceptualize opportunity costs and efficiency in order to specify testable hypotheses.

Beginning with k , Table 1 makes it is clear that increases in k make the decision to issue a demand more attractive to the *member*, holding all else constant. This is true regardless of the action of the *IO*. As such, the *member* choosing d is a necessary condition for observing the *Discontinuity* outcome; thus k has a monotonically increasing relationship with the probability of observing a discontinuity in IO membership. This leads to the first proposition:

Proposition 1: Increased opportunity costs are associated with increases in membership discontinuity.

We conceptualize opportunity costs as the level of power inequality within an IO. This conceptualization captures the fact that, as the degree of power inequality within an IO increases, all of its members are more likely to feel that their interests and derived benefits do not match their contribution. In contrast, IOs with greater power parity have a more clear expectation between member contribution and influence, with each member giving and receiving roughly the same.

We expect that power asymmetries within an IO make each of these negative evaluations more likely. IOs whose members have roughly similar power distributions are more likely to hold similar interests and face similar challenges. Members of the UN Security Council and the Group of Seven, for example, share a common interest in managing global conflict and jointly regulating international economic and monetary policies, respectively. While they may not always agree on policy, each member has a roughly equal voice, reflecting their material capabilities, and thus has little reason to act in a way that imperils its standing within the

organization. Likewise, IOs primarily made up of relatively weak states are also likely to have similar expectations.

In contrast, IOs with significant power inequality are more likely to experience membership discontinuities. The more powerful member states, who tend to contribute the greatest resources to IOs, also expect to derive benefits from it reflecting this contribution. If such states try to push their agenda and use the IO as an extension of their own power, however, at least some other members are likely to resist. Albania's withdraw from the Warsaw Pact in 1968 over policy disputes stemming from the Sino-Soviet split is an example (Vickers and Pettifer 2000). The constraints that the regulations of the IO impose, combined with the need to act in a restrained way in order to appease smaller member states, serve to create opportunity costs on materially powerful states.

Similarly, materially weaker states also face opportunity costs for participating in unequal IOs. While weaker member states likely contribute less in net resources, they may yet pay a larger share relative to their GDP than the more wealthy members. They may also view their contribution as generating negative marginal returns, because the more powerful members exert significant influence on policy outcomes and other benefits. In such cases, weak states may actually view their contribution to the IO as a subsidy for the more powerful, with the weaker state receiving little to no benefit. The result is resistance from some IO members, again resulting in membership discontinuity if they refuse to contribute. Recall Cuba's 1964 withdraw from the IMF: Cuba viewed the IMF as an extension of a power capitalist core that demanded significant domestic policy concessions from the periphery while offering them few direct benefits (Feinberg 2011). In light of Proposition 1, our first hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 1: The greater the level of power inequality among an IO's members, the greater the hazard of membership discontinuity within the IO.

In contrast to k , the impact of δ_O is less straight forward. Looking at Table 1, it is evident that the *Always Reconfigure* outcome is observed only when δ_O is low relative to other parameters. For instance, if $\frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J} > \delta_O$ then the *Discontinuity* is never observed. As δ_O increases, there exists a parameter space where $\delta_O > \frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J}$, but $\frac{k}{B} > \delta_O$. At these intermediate values of δ_O , the *Discontinuity* outcome is observed. As δ_O continues to increase, however, it eventually is greater than both $\frac{\delta_L R_G}{R_G - R_J}$ and $\frac{k}{B}$. At this point, δ_O leaves the parameter space where *Discontinuity* is possible. This means that, all else equal, δ_O should have a non-linear relationship with the probability of observing discontinuities in IO membership; increases in δ_O are initially positively related to the probability of a discontinuity, until a critical value is reached in which further increases in δ_O are negatively related to the probability of a discontinuity. The results in the second proposition:

Proposition 2: Increases in efficiency are initially associated with increases in membership discontinuity, but after a critical threshold is reached further increases are associated with a decrease in membership discontinuity.

We conceptualize the idea of efficiency as the degree that member states share similar policy preferences, as states with similar policy goals have greater incentive to coordinate and thus derive greater benefits from membership. In other words, an organization is more likely to be efficient if its members agree on the organization's goals.

As discussed previously, organizations are formed with specific goals in mind. Aside from how the pie should be divided, there may be disagreement related to what type of pie should be made or how the ingredients should be constructed and assembled. This is true even

after all relevant parties have agreed that they want to bake a pie. Likewise, once an organization is formed to address an agreed upon issue, the desired outcome and means to achieve that outcome must still be sorted out. IOs whose member states are comprised of similar policy goals should be more agreeable on the desired outcome. This does not imply, of course, that shared goals always produce the desired outcomes; members may disagree with the most appropriate means to achieve a goal. Yet, organizations with member states with shared policy goals are in a better position to work towards those goals than organizations with member states with incongruent goals. In relative terms, the latter organization is less likely to efficiently address and take steps to resolve an issue than the former organization.

The previous discussion links how shared policy preferences are expected to increase an IO's efficiency. Proposition 2, however, states that increases in efficiency produces a non-linear effect on membership discontinuity, with efficiency gains initially increasing the probability of a discontinuity with further gains reducing the probability of a discontinuity. The logic is that initial gains produce a small good to be fought over, whereas continued gains become large enough that no member is willing to give them up. While a small gain may produce an increased focus on relative gains, as each member seeks to divide the pie in their favor, continued gains eventually can become large enough in absolute terms that no member can rationally leave the organization. This process is similar to empirical findings of how responders playing the ultimatum game are more likely to accept any distribution of offers as the stakes increase—even those offers that disproportionately favor the proposer (Slonim and Roth 1998; Cameron 1999). In light of Proposition 2, this leads to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Increases in the variation among IO members' policy preferences has a non-linear effect association with the hazard of membership discontinuity with the IO, with the effect initially increasing before declining.

Research Design

Our empirical analyses use pooled time-series cross-sectional data at the IO-year level of analysis covering the period 1965-2005. The IO-year is the appropriate level of analysis as our theory focuses on IO-level characteristics and our hypotheses are derived at the IO-level. By focusing on membership discontinuities, the data possess several characteristics that we must account for in the empirical analyses: measuring discontinuity, accounting for duration dependence, and modeling the overdispersion of non-events (i.e. no membership discontinuities are observed).

To address the first issue, we membership discontinuities in two different ways: (a) whether an IO experienced any membership discontinuities in a given year; and (b) as a count of the number of membership discontinuities experienced by an IO in a given year. We estimate models for both data types. Second, we account for how an IO's history affects the likelihood of membership discontinuity by including a series of cubic polynomials since the most recent discontinuity (Carter and Signorino 2010). Finally, we address the overdispersion of non-events in the data by employing a variety of methodological techniques. For the analyses examining cases with a binary dependent variable, we use random-effects logit, rare event logit (King and Zeng 2001), and zero-inflated logit models (Xiang 2010).⁴ When the dependent variable is a

⁴ Zero-inflated models are a type of mixture model that allows us to estimate two distinct population of cases: one where membership discontinuity is extremely unlikely (zero-inflated equation) and another where membership discontinuity follows a random process. See Bagozzi et al (2015) and Bagozzi (2016) for more on zero-inflated models, and Xiang (2010) for more on models with partial observability.

count, we estimate zero-inflated Poisson and zero-inflated negative binomial models. By examining both binary and count operationalization of the dependent variables and estimating several models assuming various functional forms, we are better able to assess the robustness of our results.

Lastly, we address the issue of potential endogeneity between states joining and exiting an IO. Previous work has illustrated that selection into IOs, the level of cooperation, and likelihood of enforcement for violations are inextricably linked (e.g., Fearon 1998). More recently, there is evidence that more conflict-prone states are screened out of joining IOs (Donno, Metzger, and Russett 2015).

We contend endogeneity might not be problematic for our empirical analysis for two reasons. First, given the short tenures in office of most state leaders (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009), the lack of policy continuity between consecutive leaders (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004; Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel 2009), and the degree of left censoring in the data (many IOs exist before the first year of our analysis), a state's membership in an IO can be thought of as weakly exogenous (Chyzh 2016, 10-11). Therefore, from a practical perspective, endogeneity can be ruled out. Second, any issues related to endogeneity poses would actually makes for a *more difficult* empirical test of our hypotheses: rational states are unlikely to pay the requisite costs to join an IO that they are planning on leaving, especially if they place a non-zero value on their shadow of the future. Likewise, if IOs screen potential members, then only those members that are expected to improve the organization's ability to pursue its mandate are likely to be admitted. In other words, states are likely to only join IOs that they intend to remain in, and IOs are likely to admit only those states they intend to retain. Thus, any support for our hypothesis is *understated* in the presence of endogeneity.

Data

Our dependent variable is the number of member state *Discontinuities* in an IO in a specific year. The variable is constructed using data from the International Organizations Dataset Version 2.1 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). This dataset contains annual state membership in international governmental organization for 463 IOs during the period of 1965-2005.⁵ We create two dependent variables based on this information. The first dependent variable is measured as a binary variable, where 1 indicates that an IO experienced *any* discontinuities, *Discontinuities (binary)*, in their membership in a given year; the second dependent variable is the *total number* of discontinuities, *Discontinuities (count)* in their membership in a given year.

Our primary independent variable captures the level of opportunity costs of IO membership, which we operationalize as the degree of power symmetry among IO member states, *IO Gini Index (IOGI)*. We measure the degree of power asymmetry by using the Gini score of the power distribution within an IO. The Gini index is a widely used measure of inequality (Morgan 1962). If power is evenly distributed among an IO's members, the *IOGI* score is close to zero. If power is concentrated in one, or only a small number, of an IO's members, then the *IOGI* score is close to 1. We measure member state's power with the composite Index of National Capability (CINC) index, which is widely utilized to measure the material capacity of a state (Singer 1987).⁶ We identify IO memberships using the International Organizations Dataset described above. The distribution of members' power is displayed in

⁵ The International Organizations dataset contains state-membership data at five-year intervals prior to 1965.

⁶ CINC is based on total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of states.

Figure 3. Histogram of IO Gini Index




Figure 3. As evidenced in the figure, it is clear that the majority of IOs are not equally distributed.

We measure the efficiency within an IO as the variation in ideal points among members within IOs, *Ideal Point Stdv*. IOs whose members share similar preferences are more likely to have a common conception of the goals and objectives of the IO, and thus are expected to experience fewer membership discontinuities. Our measure of preference similarity is based on voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). We calculate *Ideal Point Stdv* as the standard deviation of an IO's member state's ideal points. The greater the standard deviation of the ideal points within an IO, the more dissimilar its member's preferences. We include a squared term to account for the expected non-linearity.

We also control for a number of other factors. We control for the *Average Democracy Level*, of an IO's members. IOs with members consisting of more democratic states may experience less discontinuities, as member states seek to solve the problems or issues among

members through democratic decision making systems. Moreover, democratic states tend to have more veto players than autocratic states (Andrews and Montinola 2004) and are less likely to experience sudden changes in their foreign policies, including their IO memberships. We calculate the *Average Democracy Level* by taking the mean democratic score of member states within an IO using the 21-point Polity scale (-10 to 10) (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016).

Along with the average level of democracy of members within IOs, we calculate the standard deviation of member states' Polity score with an IO. *Democracy Stdv* accounts for the idea that similar regimes tend to be more cooperative and less conflictual (Leeds 1999; Lai and Reiter 2000). That is, IOs made of states of similar regime types and less likely to experience membership discontinuities.⁷ In addition, we consider the economic capacity of an IO's membership, *Average Economic Level*.⁸ We measure an IO's economic strength as the average GDP among its members. After taking the average of its members' GDP, we log the variable in order to avoid extreme variation and control for skewedness. The reason why we control this variable is that members of IOs sometimes want to join or stay in IOs to gain economic benefit from other members (Anderson and Reichert 1995). Therefore, they might want to stay more if the average economic levels of members are higher.

We control for how long an IO has existed to account for an IO's level of institutionalization. We measure this as the IO's *Longevity*. Older IOs are expected to be more stable than younger IOs. *Longevity* is a reasonable proxy that allows us keep all IOs in our analysis.⁹

⁷ The correlation between *Average Democracy Level* and *Democracy Stdv* is $r = -0.29$.

⁸ We considered an economic CINC measure as well, but its correlation to *IOGI* was relatively high ($r = 0.52$).

⁹ We use *Longevity* to measure the degree of institutionalization rather than Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom's (2004) *institutionalization* variable owing to the greater spatial and temporal availability of the former compared to the latter.


Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
<i>Discontinuities (binary)</i>	10773	0.037	0.189	0	1
<i>Discontinuities (count)</i>	10773	0.079	0.721	0	27
<i>IOGI</i>	10773	0.589	0.178	0	0.884
<i>Ideal Point Stdv</i>	10773	0.574	0.359	0	2.081
<i>Average Democracy Level</i>	10773	2.315	5.489	-10	10
<i>Democracy Stdv</i>	10773	4.645	2.704	0	12.021
<i>Average Economic Level</i>	10773	8.089	1.300	4.558	11.143
<i>Longevity</i>	10773	28.614	24.723	1	191
<i>Economic Mandate</i>	10773	0.369	0.483	0	1
<i>Security Mandate</i>	10773	0.049	0.215	0	1
<i>Regional IOs</i>	10773	0.635	0.481	0	1

We include two dummy variables related to an IO's mandate. The dummy variable indicates whether an IO is intended to address economic or security issues. The reference category for the two dummy variables are multi-issue IOs. The original data are from Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004), but we extend the data to IOs not covered by their dataset. Lastly, we include a dummy variable for *Regional IOs*. Regional organizations might have a higher level of cooperation among members since they are well tied to each other in terms of regional interests (Mansfield and Milner 1997).

Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of each of these variables. As shown, the standard deviations of *Discontinuities (binary)* and *Discontinuities (count)* are much higher than the means of two variables, indicating that these counts exhibit very high dispersion with many zeros. As was noted in the methods section, we address this using a combination of random effects, rare event, and zero-inflated techniques.

Figure 4. Number of IO Membership Discontinuity and IO Gini Index



Empirical Results

We first explore the bivariate relationship between power asymmetry within an IO—using the IO’s Gini score—and the number of IO membership discontinuities in Figure 4. It is clear from the figure that greater power imbalances, i.e. greater values on the IO Gini index, are associated with more membership discontinuities. Comparing Figure 3 to Figure 4, we can see that there is a shift to the right, as the number of membership discontinuities are more likely at higher values than lower values than would be expected by random chance. For example, there are 22 discontinuities out of 1645 observations in IOs with an IO Gini index below .4. In contrast, there are 266 discontinuities out of 2750 observations in IOs with a Gini index above .75. The rate of discontinuities is more than 12 times greater for the latter than the former.

We report the results of more systematic analyses for the binary and count measures of the dependent variable in Tables 3 and 4. We use a variety of estimation techniques to demonstrate the robustness of the results. In Table 3, random-effects logit, rare event logit, and

zero-inflated logit are used. In these models, the dependent variable is *Discontinuities (binary)*, a binary variable which shows whether the discontinuity of membership within IOs occur in a given year. Table 3 shows the empirical results with the dependent variable of *Discontinuities (count)*, by using zero-inflated Poisson and negative binomial models.¹⁰

We begin by evaluated the first hypothesis, which relates to opportunity costs.¹¹ Beginning with Table 3, where membership discontinuity is measured as a binary outcome, it is clear that for all models, the coefficient on power asymmetry, *IOGI*, is positive. *IOGI* is statistically significant in 5 of the six models. Looking to Table 4, where membership discontinuity is measured as a count variable, we against find that *IOGI* is positive and statistically significant in all models. The results imply that members are more likely to discontinue their membership within IOs where the level of power is asymmetric.¹²

Turning to the second hypothesis, which focused efficiency, we find some evidence of a non-linear relationship between the variations among an IO members' policy preferences. Starting with Table 3, the coefficient on *Ideal Point Stdv* is positive and statistically significant across all models. Moreover, *Ideal Point Stdv Squared* is negative and statistically significant in all models. These results are consistent with the theorized non-linear relationship. Turning to the count models in Table 4, *Ideal Point Stdv* is again positive and statistically significant. *Ideal Point Stdv Squared* is only statistically significant in one model, though the coefficient is in the expected direction.

¹⁰ We use a series of Vuong and likelihood ratio tests to compare the zero-inflated negative binomial with an ordinary negative binomial model. The results show that the zero-inflated models are preferred.

¹¹ Recall that Proposition 1 expected a positive, monotonic relationship between opportunity costs and discontinuity.

¹² We conduct additional analyses examining the *change in IOGI* and *change in Ideal Point Stdv*, respectively. These *change* variables are not consistently statistically significant across models. Our primary independent variables of *IOGI* and *Ideal Point Stdv* are robust to these additional model specifications.

Table 3. Membership Discontinuity within IOs from 1965 to 2005

	Random Effects		Rare Events		Zero-inflated	
<i>IOGI</i>	1.090*	0.908+	0.800*	0.603+	0.710+	0.520
	(0.625)	(0.617)	(0.416)	(0.410)	(0.482)	(0.483)
<i>Ideal Point Stdv</i>	1.976**	1.566*	2.083***	1.635***	2.035***	1.665**
	(0.863)	(0.865)	(0.618)	(0.627)	(0.729)	(0.739)
<i>Ideal Point Stdv Squared</i>	-0.927*	-0.828+	-1.017***	-0.880**	-1.016**	-0.940**
	(0.520)	(0.519)	(0.359)	(0.366)	(0.431)	(0.436)
<i>Avg Democracy Level</i>	-0.058***	-0.058***	-0.050***	-0.049***	-0.048***	-0.047***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
<i>Democracy Stdv</i>	0.108***	0.087**	0.109***	0.086***	0.107***	0.088**
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.036)
<i>Avg Economic Level</i>	0.189**	0.174**	0.281***	0.250***	0.342***	0.303***
	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.076)
<i>Longevity</i>	0.002	-0.001	0.003*	0.001	-0.007**	-0.009**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)
<i>Economic Mandate</i>		0.122		0.107		0.124
		(0.184)		(0.116)		(0.118)
<i>Security Mandate</i>		-0.822+		-0.673*		-0.807**
		(0.515)		(0.365)		(0.371)
<i>Regional IO</i>		-0.766***		-0.627***		-0.581***
		(0.204)		(0.124)		(0.139)
<i>Time</i>	0.004	0.009	-0.106***	-0.091**	-0.122***	-0.107***
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)
<i>Time Squared</i>	-0.214	-0.234	0.142	0.0816	0.108	0.0489
	(0.288)	(0.288)	(0.280)	(0.280)	(0.285)	(0.286)
<i>Time Cubed</i>	0.483	0.508	0.021	0.102	0.184	0.263
	(0.570)	(0.570)	(0.557)	(0.558)	(0.563)	(0.565)
<i>Constant</i>	-7.168***	-6.123***	-6.673***	-5.659***	-6.345***	-5.348***
	(0.716)	(0.752)	(0.563)	(0.573)	(0.672)	(0.705)
<i>Ln(α)</i>	0.0929	0.0118				
	(0.217)	(0.225)				
<hr/>						
<i>Inflate</i>						
<i>Avg Economic Level</i>					0.236	0.194
					(0.189)	(0.189)
<i>Longevity</i>					-0.180***	-0.176***
					(0.0548)	(0.0546)
<i>Constant</i>					-0.332	-0.0470
					(1.567)	(1.563)
<hr/>						
Log-Likelihood	-1508.0	-1498.8	-1523.9	-1503.9	-1535.3	-1521.8
N	10773	10773	10773	10773	10773	10773

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed, + p<0.1, one-tailed.

Table 4. Count of Membership Discontinuity within IOs from 1965 to 2005.

	Zero-inflated Poisson		Zero-inflated Negative Binomial	
<i>IOGI</i>	2.023*** (0.445)	1.639*** (0.453)	1.103* (0.577)	0.850+ (0.573)
<i>Ideal Point Stdv</i>	1.761*** (0.649)	1.571** (0.670)	1.824** (0.878)	1.567* (0.869)
<i>Ideal Point Stdv Squared</i>	-0.490+ (0.362)	-0.425 (0.368)	-0.479 (0.550)	-0.524 (0.539)
<i>Avg Democracy Level</i>	-0.035*** (0.013)	-0.034** (0.014)	-0.063*** (0.018)	-0.061*** (0.018)
<i>Democracy Stdv</i>	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.036 (0.036)	0.077* (0.041)	0.052 (0.041)
<i>Avg Economic Level</i>	0.457*** (0.068)	0.421*** (0.069)	0.452*** (0.097)	0.393*** (0.097)
<i>Longevity</i>	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.004)	-0.019*** (0.004)
<i>Economic Mandate</i>	-0.060** (0.027)	-0.059** (0.027)	-0.149*** (0.043)	-0.133*** (0.044)
<i>Security Mandate</i>	0.324+ (0.224)	0.325+ (0.227)	0.459+ (0.303)	0.364 (0.307)
<i>Regional IO</i>	-0.568 (0.465)	-0.550 (0.472)	-0.493 (0.580)	-0.324 (0.584)
<i>Time</i>		0.096 (0.085)		0.077 (0.140)
<i>Time Squared</i>		0.963*** (0.243)		0.003 (0.309)
<i>Time Cubed</i>		-0.449*** (0.133)		-0.699*** (0.170)
<i>Constant</i>	-4.919*** (0.637)	-4.102*** (0.674)	-6.575*** (0.771)	-5.318*** (0.832)
<i>Ln(α)</i>			2.697*** (0.153)	2.676*** (0.146)
Inflate				
<i>Avg Economic Level</i>	0.219*** (0.061)	0.222*** (0.062)	0.287* (0.169)	0.235+ (0.171)
<i>Longevity</i>	-0.0145*** (0.003)	-0.0143*** (0.003)	-0.114** (0.047)	-0.120** (0.048)
<i>Constant</i>	1.253** (0.513)	1.200** (0.516)	-1.119 (1.450)	-0.695 (1.455)
Log-Likelihood	-2096.0	-2087.3	-2396.3	-2382.9
N	10773	10773	10773	10773


Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed, + p<0.1, one-tailed.

In addition to the main model, in the cases of the zero-modified estimators (model 5 and 6 in Table 3; all models in Table 4), we included *Longevity* and *Average Economic Level* to explain excessive number of zeros of membership discontinuity (inflate equation), as these two factors can induce members to stay in IOs despite some policy complaints due to either inertia or the strength of the organization.¹³ In the case of the former, new IOs lack the path dependency and sunk costs associated with IOs with a longer history. In the case of the latter, members are more likely to find that the economic benefits outweigh their other concerns. The empirical results, however, are mixed. In the zero-inflated logit models in Table 3, *Average Economic Level* is statistically insignificant in the inflate equation, whereas *Longevity* is negative and statistically significant. That is, the longer an IO has gone without a discontinuity, the more likely it is to enter the at-risk sample. The zero-modified count models in Table 4 report somewhat different results. *Longevity* again has a negative coefficient in the zero-inflation equation (i.e. makes entering the at-risk sample more likely), *Average economic level* is now positive and statistically significant. That is, when looking at the count of discontinuities, *Average economic level* is associated with zero inflation (i.e. less likely to enter the at risk sample).

We also highlight the substantive effects of both *IOGI* and *Ideal Point Stdv*. In order to show the substantive effects of inequality of members within IOs, we construct two graphs from two different models. Figure 5 shows the predicted probability of membership discontinuity for IOs, varying only the level of *IOGI*, using Model 2 from Table 3. Figure 6 shows the expected count of membership discontinuities for IOs, varying only the level of *IOGI*, using Model 1 in Table 4. The two figures demonstrate how increases in power asymmetries among IO members


¹³ 11,311 out of 11,730 number of IO-year observations are coded as zeros.

Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Membership Discontinuity Varying *IOGI*




Note: Estimates based on random-effects probit model, Model 2 in Table 3. All variables held at mean.

Figure 6. Expected Count of Membership Discontinuity Varying *IOGI*



Note: Estimates based on zero-inflated Poisson regression, Model 1 in Table 4. All variables held at mean.

Figure 7. Predicted Probability of Membership Discontinuity Varying *Ideal Point SD*




Note: Estimates based on random-effects probit model, Model 3 in Table 2. All variables held at mean.

substantively increase the probability of membership discontinuity. In each case, an increase from complete power equity to the maximum level of power asymmetry produces approximately a three-fold increase in the likelihood of member discontinuity.

We report the substantive effects of increasing the deviation in the ideal scores in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 shows the predicted probability of membership discontinuity for IOs, varying only the *Ideal Point Stdv*, using Model 2 from Table 3. Figure 8 shows the expected count of membership discontinuity, varying only the *Ideal Point Stdv*, using Model 1 from Table 4. Each figure shows the non-linear relationship between increases in efficiency and membership discontinuities. At low levels of *Ideal Point Stdv* (high efficiency), the likelihood of a membership discontinuities is low. As the *Ideal Point Stdv* increases (efficiency decreases) the likelihood of a membership discontinuities increases, until reaching an inflection point where, at high levels of *Ideal Point Stdv* (low efficiency), the likelihood of a membership discontinuities once again decreases.

Figure 8. Expected Count of Membership Discontinuity Varying *Ideal Point SD*



Note: Estimates based on zero-inflated Poisson regression, Model 1 in Table 4. All variables held at mean.

Conclusion

We examine how differences and similarities in IO membership composition affects conflict between IOs and member states. We expect that asymmetries in power increase the risk of membership discontinuity, and that increases in the variation of ideal points has a non-linear relationship with the risk of membership discontinuity. We develop a formal model and test the derived predictions using a variety of methodological techniques to demonstrate that key differences among the IO's member states affect discontinuities in IO memberships. Using a newly constructed dataset, our empirical analyses show that unequal material power markedly increases the risk of IO membership discontinuity. In addition, greater similarity in member preferences among members within an IO is initially associated with an increasing risk of membership discontinuity, until reaching a critical threshold where further increases similarity results in a decreasing risk of membership discontinuity.

Our results provide a framework for evaluating the likelihood of membership discontinuity from an IO, and also has important policy implications for the construction and membership structure of future IOs. IO success is not only a function of rational design and agenda setting, but must reflect and account for power asymmetries. Expansion of an IO's membership without accounting for how this action will affect preference similarity and power asymmetries—which directly affect the distribution of benefits (and costs) that members expect to receive (or pay)—can reduce the efficiency and efficacy of the organization as a whole, affecting the level of conflict between the broader IO and its original members. An example of this can be seen in the EU, where the rapid expansion into Eastern Europe produced new strains among members, as the preferences and needs of the new members diverged from those of the older members, and the distribution of power within the IO changed substantially. The wealthier, older members perceived that their influence had been diluted and benefits decreased, while the newer members scoffed at the lack of influence in formulating policies affecting their domestic situations. The net result has been a rise of Euroskeptic parties in both new and old member states (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz 2012). The rise of Euroskeptic parties directly increases the risk of states either withdrawing from the organization or governments that form including such parties acting in ways that cause the EU to withhold funding or even suspending membership.

Future research may focus on how other connections made between states can increase cooperation and reduce conflict within an IO. States may, for example, be able to avoid the negative effects of extreme power imbalances by using side-payments or linking other issues to continued membership or through affiliated IOs. Another avenue would be to look at lower

levels of conflict between IOs and member states, such as boycotting meetings or withholding funds.

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Appendix – IO Member-state Discontinuities

Country	International Organization	Year
Afghanistan	Council for Mutual Economic Aid	1985
Algeria	African Postal Union	1976
Algeria	Euro & Med Plant Protect Org	1990
Algeria	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1976
Algeria	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1972
Algeria	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1988
Angola	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Argentina	Ibero-Am Office of Education	1980
Argentina	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1986
Argentina	Int'l Copper Study Grp.	2000
Argentina	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1987
Argentina	Intl Olive Oil Council	1974
Argentina	Latin American Energy Org.	1996
Argentina	Non-Aligned Movement	1994
Argentina	International Organization of Vine and Wine	2004
Armenia	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Australia	Assoc. Tin Producing Countries	1999
Australia	Asian Vegetable Res. & Dev. Center	2000
Australia	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Australia	Int'l Bauxite Assoc.	1994
Australia	Intgvt Council of Copper Exp. Countries	1990
Australia	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1980
Australia	Intl Coffee Org	1980
Australia	Intl Coffee Org	1990
Australia	Int'l Jute Organization	1997
Australia	Int'l Natural Rubber Org.	1990
Australia	Intl Org for Migration	1973
Australia	Intl Rubber Study Group	1995
Australia	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Australia	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1983
Australia	World Tourism Org.	1992
Austria	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Austria	Euro Free Trade Assn	1994
Austria	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1992
Austria	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1981
Austria	Intl Coffee Org	1996
Austria	Intl Grains Council	1994
Austria	Int'l Jute Organization	1992
Austria	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1998
Austria	Intl Rubber Study Group	1979

Austria	Intl Tin Council	1976
Austria	Intl Tin Council	1983
Austria	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Azerbaijan	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Bahamas	World Tourism Org.	1983
Bahrain	Food & Ag Org	1972
Bahrain	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
Bahrain	World Tourism Org.	1986
Bangladesh	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Bangladesh	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
Barbados	Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau	1976
Belarus	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Belgium	Intl Comm of Ag Industries	1976
Belgium	Int'l Commm. for SE Atlantic Fisheries	1981
Belgium	Intl Grains Council	1994
Belgium	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Belgium	World Tourism Org.	1998
Belize	CAB International	2003
Belize	Intl Whaling Comm	1988
Benin	ACP/EU Joint Assembly	2005
Benin	Agency for Safety of Aerial Nav. in Afr. & Madagas.	2005
Benin	West African Economic Community	1973
Benin	Intl Af Migratory Locust Org	1973
Benin	Int'l Cocoa Org.	2003
Benin	Intl Coffee Org	1995
Benin	International Institute for Water and Environment Engineering	2005
Benin	Inter-St Org. for Advanced Technicians of Hydraulics...	2004
Benin	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Benin	Inter-State School for Hydraulic & Rural Engin...	1996
Benin	Minist Conf of West & Cent African States on Maritime	2005
Benin	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1989
Benin	Org. Islamic Conference	2005
Benin	World Tourism Org.	2005
Bolivia	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Bolivia	Intl Exhib Bureau	1989
Bolivia	Intl Tin Council	1983
Bolivia	Latin American Energy Org.	1987
Bolivia	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1989
Bolivia	International Organization of Vine and Wine	2004
Botswana	Assoc. of African Tax Administrators	1994
Botswana	Intl Labour Org	1967
Botswana	Intl Org Legal Metrology	1977

Botswana	Intl Red Locust Control Service	1999
Botswana	Southern African Regional Tourism Council	1983
Brazil	Hague Conf on Private Intl Law	1978
Brazil	Ibero-Am Office of Education	1984
Brazil	Inter-Am Conf on Social Security	1974
Brazil	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Brazil	Intergov. Bureau for Infomatics	1985
Brazil	Interim Comm. for Coord. Investigations of the Lower Mek	1993
Brazil	Intl Exhib Bureau	1980
Brazil	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1993
Brazil	Int'l Natural Rubber Org.	1990
Brazil	Intl Criminal Police Comm	1980
Brazil	Intl Org for Migration	1979
Brazil	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Brazil	Intl Rubber Study Group	1991
Brazil	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Brazil	Intl Whaling Comm	1966
Brazil	International Organization of Vine and Wine	2004
Brazil	Intl Instit for Unification of Private Law	1970
Bulgaria	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Bulgaria	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2003
Bulgaria	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1993
Bulgaria	Intl Tin Council	1983
Burkina Faso	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1987
Burkina Faso	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Burundi	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1987
Burundi	Intl Red Locust Control Service	1977
Cambodia	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1980
Cambodia	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Cambodia	Intl Rubber Study Group	1974
Cambodia	Intl Rubber Study Group	1996
Cambodia	Non-Aligned Movement	1979
Cameroon	Assoc. of African Central Banks	1988
Cameroon	Afr. Cultural Institute	1974
Cameroon	Afro-Malagasy Postal and Telecomm Union	1976
Cameroon	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Cameroon	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
Cameroon	Intl Coffee Org	1995
Cameroon	Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Org	1974
Canada	British Commonwealth Scientific Comm	1999
Canada	Council for Tech Coop in S & SE Asia	1991
Canada	Inter-Am Tropical Tuna Comm	1984
Canada	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1973

Canada	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1981
Canada	Intl Coffee Org	1992
Canada	Int'l Jute Organization	1992
Canada	Int'l Natural Rubber Org.	1990
Canada	Intl Rubber Study Group	1992
Canada	Intl Whaling Comm	1982
Canada	L/A Civil Aviation Comm.	1995
Canada	Pan Am Instit of Geog & Hist	1999
Canada	World Road Assn	1972
Canada	World Tourism Org.	1995
Central African Republic	Assoc. of African Tax Administrators	1994
Central African Republic	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1989
Central African Republic	Intl Coffee Org	1996
Chad	Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Org	1974
Chad	World Road Assn	1973
Chad	Central African Customs & Economic Union	1968
Chile	Andean Pact	1975
Chile	Inter-Am Conf on Social Security	1988
Chile	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1973
Chile	Intl Exhib Bureau	1988
Chile	Intl Olive Oil Council	1977
Chile	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Chile	Non-Aligned Movement	1973
Chile	International Organization of Vine and Wine	2004
China	Asian Industrial Develop. Council	1969
China	Asian-Oceanic Postal Union	1969
China	Asian-Oceanic Postal Union	1973
China	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1972
China	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
China	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
China	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1972
Colombia	Caribbean Fin. Action Task Force	1998
Colombia	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1986
Colombia	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1986
Colombia	Intl Hydrographic Org	1978
Colombia	Latin Union	1990
Colombia	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1989
Comoros	Afr. Cultural Institute	1984
Comoros	Conference interafricaine des marches d'assurances	2004
Congo-Brazzaville	Afr. Cultural Institute	1974
Congo-Brazzaville	Intl Coffee Org	1993
Congo-Brazzaville	Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Org	1974
Congo-Brazzaville	World Road Assn	1972

Congo-Brazzaville	World Road Assn	1996
Costa Rica	Intl Olive Oil Council	1979
Costa Rica	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Costa Rica	World Tourism Org.	1989
Croatia	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Cuba	Central American Research Institute for Industry	1966
Cuba	Food & Ag Org	1976
Cuba	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1975
Cuba	Intl Wool Study Group	1973
Cuba	Pan Am Instit of Geog & Hist	1968
Cuba	Pan Am Instit of Geog & Hist	1980
Cuba	Pan Am Instit of Geog & Hist	1999
Cuba	South Investment, Trade & Tech. Data Exchg. Center	2003
Cyprus	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Cyprus	Intl Coffee Org	1983
Czech Republic	Central Europe FTA	2004
Czech Republic	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Czech Republic	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Czech Republic	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1999
Czech Republic	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1995
Czechoslovakia	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1987
Czechoslovakia	Intl Tin Council	1983
Denmark	European Central Bank	1999
Denmark	Euro Free Trade Assn	1972
Denmark	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
Denmark	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1995
Denmark	Intl Comm for NW Atlantic Fisheries	1977
Denmark	Intl Grains Council	1994
Denmark	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1995
Denmark	Intl Rubber Study Group	1993
Denmark	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Denmark	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1993
Djibouti	Assoc. of African Central Banks	2000
Djibouti	African Intellectual Property Organization	1999
Djibouti	World Tourism Org.	1997
Dominican Republic	Int'l Bauxite Assoc.	1989
Dominican Republic	Intl Coffee Org	1995
Dominican Republic	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
Dominican Republic	Intl Org Legal Metrology	1977
Dominican Republic	Intl Olive Oil Council	1979
Dominican Republic	Int'l Seabed Authority	1995
Dominican Republic	Union of Banana Exporting Countries	1994
Dominica	Commonwealth Air Transport Council	1983

Dominica	Group of L/A & Carib. Sugar Exp. Countries	1983
Dominica	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1986
Dominica	Intl Whaling Comm	1983
Ecuador	Intl Center Study Preserv & Restor Cultural Prop	2001
Ecuador	Intl Grains Council	2004
Ecuador	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Ecuador	Intl Whaling Comm	1994
Ecuador	Org of Petroleum Exporting Countries	1992
Ecuador	South Investment, Trade & Tech. Data Exchg. Center	2003
Ecuador	Tropical Ag. Research & Higher Educ. Center	2000
Egypt	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1989
Egypt	Arab Bank for Econ. Dev. in Africa	1977
Egypt	Arab Fund for Social/Economic Development	1979
Egypt	Arab Monetary Fund	1979
Egypt	Arab Org for Ag. & Develop.	1979
Egypt	Arab Postal Union	1977
Egypt	Interim Comm. for Coord. Investigations of the Lower Mek	1993
Egypt	Int'l Cocoa Org.	2003
Egypt	Int'l Jute Organization	1998
Egypt	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Egypt	Intl Whaling Comm	1989
Egypt	League of Arab States	1979
Egypt	World Tourism Org.	1996
El Salvador	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1986
El Salvador	Intl Exhib Bureau	1988
El Salvador	Intl Criminal Police Comm	1984
El Salvador	World Tourism Org.	1983
Equatorial Guinea	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Equatorial Guinea	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1989
Equatorial Guinea	Org. of Coord. for Control of Endemic Diseases in Cent. Afr.	1992
Estonia	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Estonia	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Ethiopia	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1989
Fiji	CAB International	2001
Fiji	Commonwealth Air Transport Council	1988
Fiji	Commonwealth Secretariat	1987
Fiji	Intl Coffee Org	1993
Finland	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Finland	Euro Free Trade Assn	1994
Finland	Intl Grains Council	1994
Finland	Intl Rubber Study Group	1993
Finland	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
France	Asian Vegetable Res. & Dev. Center	2000

France	Intl Comm for NW Atlantic Fisheries	1977
France	Intl Grains Council	1994
France	Intl Org for Migration	1966
France	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
France	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1989
Gabon	Afro-Malagasy Postal and Telecomm Union	1984
Gabon	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1980
Gabon	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2004
Gabon	Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Org	1984
Gabon	Org of Petroleum Exporting Countries	1996
Gambia	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Gambia	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
Gambia	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Georgia	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Georgia	Int'l Mobile Satellite Org.	1994
Georgia	International Organization of Vine and Wine	2004
Germany	Asian Vegetable Res. & Dev. Center	2000
Germany	Intl Grains Council	1994
Ghana	Commonwealth Advis. Aero. Research Council	1989
Ghana	Intl Coffee Org	1996
Ghana	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
Ghana	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1977
Greece	European Central Bank	1999
Greece	Intl Grains Council	1994
Greece	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Greece	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	2000
Grenada	Inter-Am Conf on Social Security	1997
Grenada	Inter-Am Instit of Ag Science	1977
Grenada	Int'l Cocoa Org.	2003
Guatemala	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1997
Guatemala	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1994
Guatemala	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1985
Guatemala	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1977
Guatemala	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Guinea	Intl Af Migratory Locust Org	1966
Guinea	Intl Org Legal Metrology	1992
Guinea Bissau	Afr. Cultural Institute	1984
Guyana	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Guyana	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Guyana	L/A Fisheries Devel. Org.	2001
Haiti	Int'l Bauxite Assoc.	1989
Haiti	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1993
Haiti	Latin Am Center for Physics	1977

Honduras	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1995
Honduras	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1975
Honduras	Intl Coffee Org	1996
Honduras	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Honduras	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1988
Honduras	Latin Am Center for Physics	1977
Honduras	World Tourism Org.	1991
Hungary	CAB International	2001
Hungary	Central Europe FTA	2004
Hungary	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Hungary	Intl Bank Economic Coop	1992
Hungary	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1995
Hungary	Intl Comm of Ag Industries	1986
Hungary	Intl Coffee Org	1983
Hungary	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1993
Hungary	Intl Rubber Study Group	1979
Hungary	Intl Tin Council	1983
Iceland	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Iceland	Intl Whaling Comm	1992
India	Int'l Bauxite Assoc.	1994
India	Interim Comm. for Coord. Investigations of the Lower Mek	1993
India	Intl Rubber Study Group	1999
India	Intl Tin Council	1976
India	Int'l Tea Promotion Assoc.	1984
India	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Indonesia	Food & Ag Org	1966
Indonesia	Intgovt Council of Copper Exp. Countries	1990
Indonesia	Interim Comm. for Coord. Investigations of the Lower Mek	1993
Indonesia	Intl Monetary Fund	1965
Indonesia	Intl Org Legal Metrology	1970
Indonesia	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Iran	Asian Reinsurance Corp.	1984
Iran	Intergov. Bureau for Infomatics	1980
Iran	Intl Comm of Ag Industries	1986
Iran	Interim Comm. for Coord. Investigations of the Lower Mek	1987
Iran	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1985
Iran	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1997
Iran	Intl Org Legal Metrology	1980
Iran	S. Asia Coop. Environment Prog.	2003
Iraq	Arab Gulf Prog. for UN Dev. Org.	2001
Iraq	Arab Gulf Prog. for UN Dev. Org.	2004
Iraq	Arab Monetary Fund	1993
Iraq	Gulf Org. for Industrial Consulting	1993

Iraq	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	1994
Iraq	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2001
Iraq	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
Iraq	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1986
Iraq	Int'l Natural Rubber Org.	1990
Ireland	Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau	1980
Ireland	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Ireland	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Ireland	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
Ireland	Intl Grains Council	1994
Ireland	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1988
Ireland	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Ireland	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1989
Israel	Intergov. Bureau for Infomatics	1980
Israel	Intl Coffee Org	1983
Israel	Intl Exhib Bureau	1989
Israel	Intl Grains Council	2002
Israel	Intl Tin Council	1973
Italy	Intl Council for Exploration of Sea	1978
Italy	Intl Comm for NW Atlantic Fisheries	1977
Italy	Intl Grains Council	1994
Italy	Intl Tin Council	1976
Italy	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Italy	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1993
Ivory Coast	African & Malagasy Coffee Org.	2004
Ivory Coast	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	1986
Ivory Coast	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1981
Ivory Coast	Int'l Natural Rubber Org.	1990
Ivory Coast	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Ivory Coast	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Ivory Coast	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1996
Jamaica	Int'l Cocoa Org.	2003
Jamaica	Intl Whaling Comm	1984
Jamaica	Latin American Institute of Communication	1970
Japan	Asian Vegetable Res. & Dev. Center	2000
Japan	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Japan	Int'l Cocoa Org.	2003
Japan	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1993
Kazakhstan	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Kazakhstan	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Kenya	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1989
Kenya	Intl Af Migratory Locust Org	1972
Kenya	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002

Kiribati	Intl Criminal Police Comm	1999
Kuwait	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Kuwait	World Tourism Org.	1998
Kyrgyzstan	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Laos	Intl Comm of Ag Industries	1986
Laos	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1980
Laos	World Road Assn	1972
Latvia	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Lebanon	Intl Org Legal Metrology	1996
Lebanon	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Lebanon	International Organization of Vine and Wine	2004
Lebanon	World Road Assn	1972
Lesotho	Commonwealth Air Transport Council	1986
Lesotho	Intl Labour Org	1971
Lesotho	Intl Red Locust Control Service	1989
Lesotho	Souoth African Regional Tourism Council	1977
Lesotho	Souoth African Regional Tourism Council	1983
Liberia	Intl Coffee Org	1993
Liberia	Intl Rubber Study Group	1989
Liberia	Islamic Dev. Bank	1992
Libya	African Postal Union	1994
Libya	Arab Industrial Devel. & Mining Org.	1998
Libya	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
Libya	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
Libya	Intl Olive Oil Council	1986
Libya	Islamic Dev. Bank	1986
Lithuania	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Lithuania	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Lithuania	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
Luxembourg	Intl Grains Council	1994
Luxembourg	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Luxembourg	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Luxembourg	Intl Instit for Unification of Private Law	1968
Madagascar	Afr. Cultural Institute	1974
Madagascar	African Intellectual Property Organization	1993
Madagascar	Afro-Malagasy Postal and Telecomm Union	1976
Madagascar	Afro-Malagasy Postal and Telecomm Union	1984
Madagascar	African Timber Org.	1989
Madagascar	Intl Comm of Ag Industries	1986
Madagascar	Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Org	1974
Malawi	Intl Coffee Org	1983
Malaysia	Asian-Oceanic Postal Union	1980
Malaysia	Commonwealth Advis. Aero. Research Council	1989

Malaysia	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Malaysia	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Malaysia	World Tourism Org.	1977
Malaysia	World Tourism Org.	1988
Maldives	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Mali	Assoc. of African Central Banks	1988
Mali	Intl Center Study Preserv & Restor Cultural Prop	1998
Malta	British Commonwealth Scientific Comm	1972
Malta	Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau	1970
Malta	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2003
Malta	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1980
Malta	Intl Org for Migration	1981
Malta	Int'l Seabed Authority	1995
Mauritania	Arab Labor Org.	1997
Mauritania	Economic Community of West African States	2002
Mauritania	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	1989
Mauritania	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2003
Mauritania	Intgvt Council of Copper Exp. Countries	1980
Mauritania	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Mauritania	Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Org	1965
Mauritania	West African Monetary Union	1973
Mauritania	West African Health Organization	2002
Mauritius	Afr. Regional Industrial Property Org.	1980
Mauritius	Intl Whaling Comm	1988
Mauritius	Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Org	1983
Mauritius	Souoth African Regional Tourism Council	1980
Mexico	Caribbean Fin. Action Task Force	1998
Mexico	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2003
Mexico	Inter-Am Tropical Tuna Comm	1978
Mexico	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1996
Mexico	Intl Comm of Ag Industries	1986
Mexico	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1994
Mexico	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1991
Mexico	Intl Exhib Bureau	1994
Mexico	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1988
Mexico	Int'l Natural Rubber Org.	1990
Mexico	Intl Rubber Study Group	1987
Mexico	Intl Tin Council	1973
Mexico	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1996
Moldova	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Monaco	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
Morocco	African Postal Union	1976
Morocco	African Union	2002

Morocco	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Morocco	Intl Patent Institute	1970
Morocco	Mideast & Medit. Travel & Tourism Assoc.	2001
Morocco	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1989
Morocco	Org for African Unity	1984
Myanmar	Intl Civil Aviation Org	1985
Myanmar	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1985
Myanmar	Intl Rubber Study Group	1997
Myanmar	Non-Aligned Movement	1979
Namibia	Comm Market for East/South Africa	2003
Nepal	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Nepal	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	2003
Nepal	World Tourism Org.	1977
Netherlands	Asia Pacific Fisheries Comm	1974
Netherlands	Euro Company Chem Process Irrad Fuels	1977
Netherlands	Intl Grains Council	1994
Netherlands	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1996
Netherlands	Intl Whaling Comm	1970
Netherlands	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1993
Netherlands	International Organization of Vine and Wine	2004
New Zealand	Commonwealth Advis. Aero. Research Council	1989
New Zealand	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
New Zealand	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1981
New Zealand	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1972
New Zealand	Intl Coffee Org	1980
New Zealand	Intl Coffee Org	1988
New Zealand	Intl Exhib Bureau	1980
New Zealand	Intl Org for Migration	1967
New Zealand	Intl Whaling Comm	1969
New Zealand	World Road Assn	1972
Nicaragua	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1997
Nicaragua	Intl Coffee Org	1996
Nicaragua	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Nicaragua	World Tourism Org.	1983
Niger	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1989
Nigeria	Afr. Exp/Import Bank	2000
Nigeria	British Commonwealth Scientific Comm	1999
Nigeria	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Nigeria	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
Nigeria	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1995
Nigeria	Int'l Natural Rubber Org.	1990
Nigeria	Int'l Telecomm. Satellite Org.	1995
Nigeria	Intl Rubber Study Group	2003

Nigeria	World Road Assn	1972
Norway	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	1986
Norway	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1995
Norway	Int'l Cocoa Org.	2003
Oman	United Arab Shipping Co.	1988
Pakistan	British Commonwealth Scientific Comm	1972
Pakistan	British Commonwealth Scientific Comm	2000
Pakistan	Commonwealth Advis. Aero. Research Council	1976
Pakistan	Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau	1972
Pakistan	Commonwealth Secretariat	1972
Pakistan	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Pakistan	Interim Comm. for Coord. Investigations of the Lower Mek	1993
Pakistan	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1998
Pakistan	World Tourism Org.	1977
Panama	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Panama	Intl Coffee Org	1996
Panama	Intl Exhib Bureau	1989
Panama	Intl Olive Oil Council	1980
Panama	Intl Whaling Comm	1980
Panama	Latin Am Center for Physics	1977
Panama	Latin Union	1987
Panama	Rio Group	1989
Panama	World Tourism Org.	1996
Papua New Guinea	Int'govt Council of Copper Exp. Countries	1993
Papua New Guinea	Int'l Natural Rubber Org.	1990
Paraguay	Ibero-Am Office of Education	1984
Peru	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1995
Peru	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1981
Peru	Intl Coffee Org	1995
Peru	Int'l Natural Rubber Org.	1990
Peru	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Peru	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1983
Philippines	Asian Vegetable Res. & Dev. Center	2000
Philippines	Interim Comm. for Coord. Investigations of the Lower Mek	1993
Philippines	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1980
Philippines	Intl Coffee Org	1996
Philippines	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
Philippines	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1996
Philippines	Intl Whaling Comm	1988
Philippines	World Tourism Org.	1977
Philippines	World Tourism Org.	1991
Poland	Central Europe FTA	2004
Poland	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000

Poland	Intl Comm of Ag Industries	1986
Poland	Intl Comm for NW Atlantic Fisheries	1977
Poland	Intl Rubber Study Group	1980
Poland	Intl Tin Council	1986
Poland	Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Comm	2004
Portugal	Euro Free Trade Assn	1985
Portugal	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1986
Portugal	Intl Comm for NW Atlantic Fisheries	1977
Portugal	Intl Grains Council	1994
Portugal	Int'l Jute Organization	1993
Portugal	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Portugal	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1991
Portugal	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1998
Portugal	NW Atlantic Fish Org	1986
Qatar	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1994
Qatar	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
Qatar	World Tourism Org.	1991
Romania	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Romania	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Romania	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
Romania	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1976
Romania	Intl Tin Council	1976
Romania	Intl Tin Council	1983
Romania	NW Atlantic Fish Org	2002
Russia	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Russia	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1993
Russia	Intl Tin Council	1983
Russia	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Russia	World Road Assn	1993
Rwanda	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1989
Rwanda	Afro-Malagasy Industrial Property Office	1973
Rwanda	Afro-Malagasy Postal and Telecomm Union	1989
Rwanda	Intl Red Locust Control Service	1977
Rwanda	Reg. Afr. Satellite Comm. Org.	2001
San Marino	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1996
Sao Tome	Banque Inter'l d'Info. sur les Estats Francophone	1992
Sao Tome	Int'l Cocoa Org.	2003
Sao Tome	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Saudi Arabia	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Senegal	Assoc. of African Tax Administrators	1994
Senegal	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1989
Senegal	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	2003
Senegal	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000

Senegal	Intl Instit for Unification of Private Law	1997
Seychelles	Intl Whaling Comm	1995
Seychelles	Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Org	1984
Sierra Leone	Int'l Cocoa Org.	2003
Sierra Leone	Intl Coffee Org	1995
Sierra Leone	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1989
Sierra Leone	World Road Assn	1972
Singapore	Asian/Pacific Coconut Comm.	1980
Singapore	British Commonwealth Scientific Comm	1984
Singapore	Intl Coffee Org	1996
Singapore	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1989
Singapore	World Tourism Org.	1977
Slovakia	Central Europe FTA	2004
Slovakia	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1997
Slovenia	Central Europe FTA	2004
Slovenia	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Slovenia	World Road Assn	1998
Slovenia	World Tourism Org.	1996
Soafrica	Food & Ag Org	1966
South Africa	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
South Africa	Intl Labour Org	1966
South Africa	Intl Org for Migration	1980
South Africa	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
South Africa	Intl Red Locust Control Service	1972
South Africa	World Road Assn	1972
South Korea	Asian Vegetable Res. & Dev. Center	2000
South Korea	Intl Tin Council	1976
South Vietnam	Intl Civil Aviation Org	1974
South Yemen	Council for Mutual Economic Aid	1985
Somalia	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	2001
Somalia	Arab Fund for Social/Economic Development	1993
Somalia	Arab Labor Org.	1997
Somalia	Arab Monetary Fund	1993
Somalia	Afr. Regional Industrial Property Org.	1980
Somalia	Reg. Afr. Satellite Comm. Org.	2002
Spain	Intl Comm of Ag Industries	1986
Spain	Intl Comm for NW Atlantic Fisheries	1977
Spain	Intl Grains Council	1994
Spain	Intl Org for Migration	1976
Spain	Intl Tin Council	1976
Spain	Intl Tin Council	1983
Spain	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Spain	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1993

Spain	NW Atlantic Fish Org	1986
Sri Lanka	Commonwealth Advis. Aero. Research Council	1976
Sri Lanka	Interim Comm. for Coord. Investigations of the Lower Mek	1993
Sri Lanka	Intl Coffee Org	1996
Sri Lanka	Int'l Tea Promotion Assoc.	1982
Sri Lanka	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1989
Sri Lanka	World Tourism Org.	1977
St Kitts	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
St Kitts	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1989
St Lucia	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1980
St Vincent	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1981
St Vincent	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Sudan	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	2000
Sudan	Arab Monetary Fund	1993
Sudan	Arab Postal Union	1977
Sudan	Intl Af Migratory Locust Org	1973
Swaziland	Assoc. of African Tax Administrators	1994
Swaziland	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1990
Swaziland	Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau	1974
Swaziland	Intl Red Locust Control Service	1970
Sweden	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Sweden	European Central Bank	1999
Sweden	Euro Free Trade Assn	1994
Sweden	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1995
Sweden	Intl Grains Council	1994
Sweden	Intl Rubber Study Group	1995
Sweden	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Sweden	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1993
Switzerland	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Switzerland	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Switzerland	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1993
Syria	Arab Postal Union	1974
Syria	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Syria	World Tourism Org.	1977
Taiwan	Asian Industrial Develop. Council	1972
Taiwan	Asian-Oceanic Postal Union	1971
Taiwan	Asian-Oceanic Postal Union	1976
Taiwan	Asian Vegetable Res. & Dev. Center	2000
Taiwan	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1991
Taiwan	Intl Criminal Police Comm	1984
Taiwan	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1976
Taiwan	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1983
Tanzania	African Timber Org.	1989

Tanzania	Intl Af Migratory Locust Org	1976
Tanzania	Intl Exhib Bureau	1977
Tanzania	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
Thailand	Assoc. Tin Producing Countries	1999
Thailand	Asian Vegetable Res. & Dev. Center	2000
Thailand	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Thailand	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1976
Thailand	World Tourism Org.	1977
Thailand	World Tourism Org.	1991
Togo	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1996
Tonga	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Trinidad	Intl Coffee Org	1999
Trinidad	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Trinidad	Latin American Institute of Communication	1970
Trinidad	World Tourism Org.	1983
Tunisia	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1990
Tunisia	Intl Comm of Ag Industries	1986
Tunisia	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1998
Tunisia	Mideast & Medit. Travel & Tourism Assoc.	2001
Tunisia	Org. Arab Petroleum Export. Countries	1986
Tunisia	International Organization of Vine and Wine	2004
Tunisia	South Investment, Trade & Tech. Data Exchg. Center	2003
Turkey	Int'l Jute Organization	1992
Turkey	Int'l Natural Rubber Org.	1988
Turkey	Intl Olive Oil Council	1998
Turkey	Intl Tin Council	1973
Turkey	Intl Tin Council	1983
Turkey	International Organization of Vine and Wine	2004
Turkey	Reg Commonwealth in the Field of Comm	2003
Turkmenistan	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Tuvalu	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
UAE	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
UAE	Intl Office Epizootics	1987
UAE	World Tourism Org.	1998
UK	Council for Tech Coop in S & SE Asia	1991
UK	Dev. Bank of Great Lake States	1980
UK	European Central Bank	1999
UK	Euro Free Trade Assn	1972
UK	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	1987
UK	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
UK	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
UK	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1968
UK	Intl Comm for NW Atlantic Fisheries	1977

UK	Int'l Copper Study Grp.	2000
UK	Intl Grains Council	1994
UK	Intl Org for Migration	1968
UK	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
UK	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1968
UK	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1996
UK	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1993
UK	International Organization of Vine and Wine	2004
UK	South Pacific Comm	1996
UK	UN Education, Scientific, & Cultural Org	1985
USA	Asian Vegetable Res. & Dev. Center	2000
USA	Commonwealth Secretariat	1968
USA	Inter-Am Conf on Social Security	1966
USA	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
USA	Interim Comm. for Coord. Investigations of the Lower Mek	1993
USA	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1968
USA	Intl Comm for NW Atlantic Fisheries	1977
USA	Intl Coffee Org	1995
USA	Intl Exhib Bureau	2002
USA	Int'l Jute Organization	1995
USA	Intl Labour Org	1977
USA	Intl Tin Council	1983
USA	Intl Vine & Wine Office	2001
USA	World Road Assn	1980
USA	UN Education, Scientific, & Cultural Org	1984
USA	World Tourism Org.	1998
Uganda	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1989
Uganda	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	2001
Uganda	Afr. Regional Industrial Property Org.	1980
Uganda	Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau	1980
Ukraine	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Uruguay	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Uruguay	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
Uruguay	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1983
Uruguay	Intl Whaling Comm	1991
Uruguay	World Road Assn	1972
Uzbekistan	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	2000
Uzbekistan	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
Uzbekistan	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Venezuela	Food & Ag Org	1994
Venezuela	Group of 24	2003
Venezuela	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Venezuela	Intl Civil Aviation Org	1985

Venezuela	Intl Instit of Refrigeration	1997
Venezuela	Intl Org Legal Metrology	1996
Venezuela	Intl Org for Migration	1967
Venezuela	Intl Whaling Comm	1999
Venezuela	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1989
Venezuela	South Investment, Trade & Tech. Data Exchg. Center	2000
Vietnam	Assoc. Tin Producing Countries	1999
Vietnam	Food & Ag Org	1980
Vietnam	Intl Atomic Energy Agency	1974
Vietnam	Intl Civil Aviation Org	1972
Vietnam	Intl Center Study Preserv & Restor Cultural Prop	1974
Vietnam	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1980
Vietnam	Intl Coffee Org	1996
Vietnam	Intl Telecom Union	1974
Vietnam	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1973
Vietnam	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1995
Vietnam	Interoceanmetall	1990
Vietnam	UN Education, Scientific, & Cultural Org	1974
Vietnam	UN Industrial Development Org	1974
Vietnam	Universal Postal Union	1974
Vietnam	World Health Org	1974
Vietnam	World Meteorological Org	1974
West Germany	Intl Comm for NW Atlantic Fisheries	1977
Yemen	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2000
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Bank for International Settlements	1992
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Central European Initiative	1991
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Euro Conf Postal Telecom Admin	1992
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Group of 15	1990
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Group of 24	1998
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intl Cotton Adv Comte	1992
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intl Civil Aviation Org	1992
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intgvt Council of Copper Exp. Countries	1992
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1994
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intl Comte of Military Medicine & Pharmacy	1994
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intl Coffee Org	1990
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Int'l Jute Organization	1992
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1995
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Int'l Mobile Satellite Org.	1992
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intl Criminal Police Comm	1993
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intl Office Epizootics	1993
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Int'l Oil Pollution Compens. Funds	2002
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intl Tin Council	1985
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intl Telecom Union	1992

Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intl Union Publication of Customs Tariffs	1995
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1998
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Non-Aligned Movement	1992
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Org. Security Cooperation Europe	1992
Yugoslavia/Serbia	World Road Assn	1994
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Intl Instit for Unification of Private Law	1991
Yugoslavia/Serbia	Universal Postal Union	1992
Zaire	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1996
Zaire	Afr. Cultural Institute	1974
Zaire	African Groundnut Council	1973
Zaire	African Union	2002
Zaire	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2002
Zaire	Int'l Assoc. of Supreme Admin. Jurisdictions	2004
Zaire	Int'l Cocoa Org.	1980
Zaire	Intl Coffee Org	1995
Zaire	Intl Red Locust Control Service	1977
Zaire	Intl Tin Council	1976
Zaire	Int'l Tropical Timber Org	1994
Zaire	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1989
Zaire	Org for African Unity	1984
Zaire	Common Afro-Malagasy Economic Org	1974
Zaire	World Road Assn	1998
Zambia	Assoc. of African Central Banks	1988
Zambia	Assoc. of Afr. Trade Promotion Orgs.	1989
Zambia	Intl Af Migratory Locust Org	1976
Zambia	Intl Coffee Org	1995
Zambia	Intl Lead & Zinc Study Group	1988
Zimbabwe	Commonwealth Telecom Board	2003
Zimbabwe	Commonwealth Secretariat	2003
Zimbabwe	Intl Coffee Org	1995
Zimbabwe	Intl Red Locust Control Service	1972
Zimbabwe	World Road Assn	1984
Zimbabwe	South African Regional Tourism Council	1983
