

## **Do Shared IO Memberships Increase Amounts of Foreign Aid?**

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**Abstract:** Do shared international organization (IO) memberships affect foreign aid allocations? We argue that shared IO memberships promote increased foreign aid allocations provided by a donor to a recipient. Shared IO memberships offer donors a way to assess the risk that recipients will allocate funds in a manner inconsistent with the strategic or ideological goals of the donor. As donors interact with recipients in the same IOs, they are able to understand (and influence) recipients' underlying policies. In addition, IOs provide technical assistance to recipients, which allows donors a way to improve the efficiency with which aid is used. We analyze the amount of foreign aid provided by the US, the UK, France, Germany, and Japan to 151 recipients in the period 1965-2005 and find empirical support for our expectations.

**Key words:** International Organizations, Foreign Aid, Donors

## **Introduction**

Foreign aid is generally distributed by donor states to either address humanitarian needs or as a foreign policy tool to influence the behavior of recipient states (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000). These goals are not always unrelated. For instance, Japan's foreign assistance goals stipulate that they promote "human security," which it treats as threats emanating from both poverty and conflict (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). In addition, Japan officially promotes poverty reduction through the promotion of rule of law and environmental sustainability. In other words, Japan seeks to reduce poverty, and it has specific means in mind for how best to achieve this goal. Thus, to fulfill a humanitarian goal, Japan advocates for specific policy tools that align with its broader political goals.

Regardless of the motivation, donors seek to ensure that foreign aid allocations are used in pursuit of the intended end. That is, donors want recipients to apply aid in a way that either (a) addresses the humanitarian issue, (b) promotes the donor's normative or strategic interests, or (c) does both. Donors do not want aid to be applied towards some other alternative end, such as financial assistance being distributed only to a governing regime's family, or used in other ways that undermine the donor's own interests. Thus, donors seek ways to overcome the time inconsistency problem associated with aid—i.e. how to make sure aid is used as intended by the recipient once it is dispersed by the donor. Moreover, donors prefer that aid be applied in an efficient manner to pursue their initial motivation for providing assistance, rather than inefficiently lost through corruption, redundant application, or poor management.

One way that donors ensure that aid is used in a manner consistent with the donor's agenda is by interacting with recipient states through a variety of international organizations (IOs). IOs encourage greater aid allocations because of a numerous advantages that they offer

donor countries, both directly and indirectly, to reduce the probability that aid is used in a manner inconsistent the donor's goals. These advantages can be broken down into two primary mechanisms.

First, the number of overlapping IO memberships among donor and recipient states provides an *ex ante* measure of their policy similarity. The greater the degree of underlying policy similarities, of course, decreases the likelihood that an aid recipient will allocate aid in a manner inconsistent with donor interests, making it a safer investment from the donor's perspective. Second, IOs provide technical assistance to implement policies. Returning to the primary education example, the World Bank helps states set training standards for teachers, student testing criteria for each grade level, etc.

We hypothesize that increases in the number of shared IO memberships are associated with increases in foreign aid allocations provided from a donor to a recipient. We analyze the amount of foreign aid provided by the five largest donor states—the US, UK, France, Germany, and Japan—to 151 recipient states during the period 1965-2005.<sup>1</sup> As these states are the source of the majority of aid allocations within our sample, the identification of their determinants of aid is an important substantive matter. We estimate a variety of statistical models and find robust empirical support for our expectations.

We outline why states provide foreign aid in the next section, highlighting its role as a foreign policy instrument. We then discuss how IOs are used to assist donor states as a means to overcome the time inconsistency problem associated with aid. The final sections describe our research design and presents the empirical tests of our argument.

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<sup>1</sup> The US, UK, France, Germany, and Japan are the five largest donors of official development assistance in absolute terms. In any given year, the 5<sup>th</sup> largest donor provided more than twice as much aid as the 6<sup>th</sup> largest donor, making the top five donors a natural break-point.

## **Strategic Interests, International Organizations, and Foreign Aid**

Great powers often seek to expand their influence for either explicit strategic concerns or normative, ideological causes (Wolfers 1984; Lake 2009; Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012). The USSR, for example, subsidized trade both with its satellites and among other Warsaw Pact allies in effort to validate their economic model (Marrese and Vanous 1983; Rodrik 1992, 1994; Rosati 1994). The US tied foreign aid to a recipient government's anti-communism efforts during the Cold War (Poe and Meernik 1995; Blanton 2000).

Strategic concerns, such as access to markets, and especially resources such as oil, provide additional incentives to great powers to intervene and direct the policies of minor powers. China, for instance, has provided African states with loans including favorable, back-loaded payment plans that do not include the structural reforms required by the US-dominated IMF and World Bank. In addition, many great powers maintain close ties and continued interests in their former colonies. France, for example, maintains involvement in many of its former colonies, especially in Africa (Stone 2004). Many former British colonies, moreover, have joined the Commonwealth of Nations, accepting restrictions on their domestic political and legal regimes. The UK, in return, provides funds to support and monitor these initiatives.

Great powers may also promote their own normative interests. Which norms are broadly adopted by minor powers are determined, in part, by which norms are promoted or punished by great powers (Wendt 1999; Mitchell 2002; Lake, 2009). Fordham and Asal (2007), for example, argue that the prestige of major powers helps define what is normatively acceptable, and find that prestige is linked with the diffusion of formal political equality to women and improvements in human rights practices. Great powers can promote their preferred norms by rewarding minor powers with economic packages, such as foreign aid, loans or debt forgiveness, technical assistance, easing travel restrictions, or security

guarantees and arms contracts. States that adjust their policy in response to these rewards may bureaucratize and internalize the promoted policies, making them part of the recipient state's day-to-day practices (Wendt and Friedheim 1995). The degree to which states "buy in", or accept the legitimacy of a great power's policies, has a direct effect on a minor power's observed foreign policy behavior (Lake 2009; Johnson 2015; Nieman 2016b).

### *Foreign Aid as a Policy Tool*

Great powers, because of their larger capacity to act, are better equipped to promote changes from the status quo (Chiba, Martinez Machain, and Reed 2014). Foreign aid is one among several policy options that a state holds to yield influence (Palmer, Wohlander, and Morgan 2002; Palmer and Morgan 2006). Foreign aid is seldom just a blank check, but instead often contains various conditionalities (Pevehouse 2005; Stone 2002, 2004). While foreign aid may be given to combat humanitarian crises, or to encourage economic and political development (Knack 2004; McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Lai 2003), aid may also be considered a foreign policy tool to entice recipients and encourage particular policy or behavioral outcomes (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; Bearce and Tirone 2010; Fleck and Kilby 2010; Licht 2010). Countries were more likely to receive US foreign aid, for example, if they offered support for the 2003 US intervention in Iraq (Gibler and Miller 2012).

Foreign aid is an enticing policy tool for many great powers because, while it generates influence and provides a costly signal of support to recipients, it is often a cheaper substitute than forming alliances, deploying non-combat troops, or initiating a militarized conflict. Moreover, foreign aid is considered an effective tool to induce changes in recipient behavior, especially as it pertains to granting resource access or supporting geopolitical

concerns (Palmer, Wohlander, and Morgan 2002; Palmer and Morgan 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009).<sup>2</sup>

### *How International Organizations Influence Aid Allocation and Application*

Aid recipient states may face contrasting incentives that create internal strains regarding the need or desire for aid, and weighing this against other key interests (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Licht 2010). An autocratic leader receiving aid from Western states, for example, must measure the benefits of aid that is contingent on improvements in human rights conditions versus the desire to maintain stability for their own rule. Another example is two states that identify one another as rivals must evaluate how much they value their relationship with a mutual third-party donor compared to the degree of distrust they have towards one another (Nieman 2016b). More concretely, despite several ongoing territorial disputes and numerous interstate rivalries among Latin American states, the close ties that many state maintain with the US is thought to have contributed to a lack of militarized conflict in the region (Thies 2008). The continued issuance of US support and foreign aid, in other words, may generate greater utility each member of a hostile dyad than the utility they would derive from taking militarized actions to resolve an outstanding dispute.

At the same time, donor states are confronted with the time inconsistency problem as it pertains to foreign aid—once aid is dispersed, donor states have little control over how aid is used. On account of contrasting incentives to meet the previously agreed to conditions for foreign aid, recipient states may not allocate funds in the way that the donor intended.

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<sup>2</sup> This does not necessarily mean that great powers are generally revisionist at the global level, only that they are more likely to be both willing and able to revise specific policies in minor powers, such as Japan's interest in improving ties in Central Asia, and France's promotion of the Franc Zone among its former colonies in Africa.

Consider, for example, that throughout the Cold War the US often shipped weapons to governments throughout the third world as part of its foreign policy mission to contain communism (Kinsella and Tillema 1995). In spite of the explicit intent of the military aid, arms transfers were often associated with domestic repression of both communist and non-communist groups alike, at least until the end of the Cold War (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Blanton 2005). This danger of foreign aid being applied by the recipient for purposes beyond the intend of the donor is increased among recipients that are most policy relevant to the donor, as these recipient states may expect that they will be given access to future loans and aid, even if they fail to meet the terms of previous arrangements (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Stone 2002, 2004).

Shared IO memberships offer donor states a path towards reducing the risk that recipients allocate funds in a manner inconsistent with the strategic or ideological goals of the donor. First, shared IO memberships provide an *ex ante* measure of a recipient state's underlying policy similarity. Shared IOs provide a signal of a state's policy preferences and significant overlap in memberships suggests increased policy similarity. Second, IOs can be used by donor states as a means to "teach" recipient states how to use aid. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006: 798), for example, argue that IOs provide a platform for organized pedagogy, while (Lazer 2005: 57) adds that IOs are especially valuable in terms of overseeing the transmission of technical regulatory policies. Together, these mechanisms provide donor states a manner to weigh the extent that they expect foreign aid to be used and a means to exert some control over how to increase the efficiency of aid once it is dispersed. We discuss each of these mechanisms in turn.

Shared interests, either because of material considerations (Lai and Reiter 2000; Boehmer and Nordstrom 2008), legalistic norms (Mitchell and Kadera 2005; Nieman 2016a),

or asymmetric major-minor power relations (Lake 2009; Nieman 2016b), may manifest in shared IO memberships. Shared material interests, or homophily, leads similar types of states to self-select into similar treatments (Hays, Kachi, and Franzese 2010; Steglich, Snijders, and Perason 2010). Legalistic norms may cause states to create, join, and institutionalize international bodies to coordinate and regulate behavior in a consistent manner, as a manifestation of their shared underlying normative preferences (Bearce and Bondanella 2007, Mousseau 2000, 2003). Such institutions may even arise specifically in effort to regularize and resolve contentious issues (Gibler 1996; Tir and Ackerman 2009). Finally, minor powers often surrender policy autonomy to major powers in return for ideological and material benefits (Wendt and Friedheim 1995; Thies 2013). Major powers that form IOs often “encourage” minor powers under their sway to join as well. Hence, a large degree of overlap in a minor power’s IO membership embeddedness may represent policy dependence on the major power, in much the same way as alliance embeddedness (Gibler and Rider 2004; Lake 2009).

Regardless of the specific cause, sharing many IOs serves as a signal of closely aligned interests between states. Recipient states with many shared IO memberships with a donor are seemingly more aligned with them on a number of policy dimensions, making it easier to find common ground and create issue linkages among members. In particular, membership in non-binding IOs demonstrate shared interests, as joining such as institution serves *only* to coordinate the interests of like-minded states (Bearce and Bondanella 2007). Legal action on the part of a state is necessary to create or join an IO, so the choice to join (and be admitted) provides a signal of their foreign policy interests. While membership by a state in any individual IO may not provide much information about a state’s foreign policy, joint memberships across many IOs does signal similarity in foreign policy interests.



Thus, the latent degree of policy similarity manifests itself in the observable indicator of joint IO memberships and, more specifically, the degree of overlap in these memberships. These overlaps, moreover, create well-known reference groups, that both members and outsiders can identify and use to calculate a recipient state's expected behavior (Cao 2009; Chyzh 2017; Elkins and Simmons 2004). In other words, shared IO memberships can be used to calculate the degree of *ex ante* risk that recipient states represent.

In addition to functioning as an indicator of risk, IOs also offer donor states a means to exert some control over how aid is used, once it has been dispersed. IOs can assist aid recipients in best practices regarding aid allocation and implementing policies that help more efficiently use aid.<sup>3</sup> Donor states are more likely to provide foreign aid when they are confident that it will be used efficiently towards policies to which they approve. IOs promote efficient policy implementation in a number of ways. Economic IOs, for instance, promote policies by creating and sponsoring exchange programs (Chyzh 2017: 35). These programs can exist for both educational programs (student exchanges) and more technical policy experts. Education programs based in US, for instance, have been shown to increase the likelihood of both democratization (Gift and Krcmaric 2017) and economic liberalization (Weymouth and MacPherson 2012). In fact, aid is sometimes dispersed directly to IOs as donors employ 'bypass' tactics in poorly governed recipient states (Dietrich 2016).

Regulatory policy, on the other hand, has been aided by the exchange of experts that assist in technical aspects of policy implementation (Breul 1996; Stone 2002; Lazor 2005).

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<sup>3</sup> IOs may also increase the amount of foreign aid provided by donors by reducing the risk of aid misallocation (Dietrich 2016). Similar to nongovernment organizations (NGOs), IOs can provide additional sources of information of state behavior by taking information gathered 'on the ground' and bringing it to the attention of both the donor and recipient states (Bell, Clay, and Murdie 2012; Kim 2017). Information regarding inefficiencies or highlighting of successful strategies, in turn, can affect aid contributions (Dietrich and Murdie 2015; Murdie and Davis 2012).

Knack (2004) argues that technical assistance in implementing electoral processes and reforms has assisted in democratization efforts. Finally, IOs sometimes coordinate and work with NGOs to distribute foreign aid (Cooley and Ron 2002; Edwards 1999; Murdie 2014). The Education Sector of the World Bank, for example, works closely with education-focused NGOs to operate as stakeholders and implement policy on the ground in the countries it operates. Prior to the 1980s, USAid often designed programs in-house and sent their own agents to implement programs; similarly, Agence Française de Développement of France has an extensive field presence to implement recommended programs (Dietrich 2016). Such NGOs can provide on-the-ground assistance and information to both IOs and aid donors.

Previous empirical work provides support for our contention that IOs provide a source of policy diffusion and technical assistance. Simmons (2000), for instance, shows that regional memberships offers an easy point of reference for state comparison. Chyzh (2017) demonstrates that IOs, in particular economic IOs, provide a point of reference beyond geography for outsiders to compare and evaluate the effectiveness of specific domestic policies. Cao (2009), Elkins and Simmons (2004), and Thies, Chyzh, and Nieman (2016) provide evidence that IOs encourage policy diffusion among their members on account of learning and shared affinity in the issue areas of economic policies and government tax capacity. The net effect of improved technical assistance is that IOs reduce risk associated with ensuring that the pay-for-policy is adhered to once foreign aid is dispersed.

In sum, we argue that shared IO memberships promote increases in the amount of foreign aid provided by a donor to a recipient. Shared IO memberships offer donor states tools in which to evaluate recipient states. First, donors can gain insights into foreign policy alignment by examining the number of shared IO membership. Second, shared IO memberships allow donors additional avenues to provide technical expertise to aid recipients.

Combined, signals of policy similarity and provisions of technical assistance, IOs help to ensure that recipients use aid in both a manner consistent with donor interests, and in to more efficiently to these ends. These insights lead to our primary hypothesis:

*Research Hypothesis: Recipient countries that share more IO memberships with a donor are more likely to receive a greater amount of foreign aid from the donor.*

## **Methods**

Our dataset consists of 151 recipient states for each of the five primary donors--the US, UK, France, Germany, and Japan--from 1965-2005.<sup>4</sup> By focusing on the five largest donors, we can account for possible heterogeneity in their behavior.<sup>5</sup> We use fixed- and random-effects models to account for the non-independence of observations in the time-series cross-sectional data. We also estimate models that including regional dummies to control the impact of country's region context on foreign aid. In addition to these two baseline models, we also employ a Tobit model with fixed effects to account of potential selection effects related to the non-random distribution of foreign aid. The foreign aid literature identifies that donors may have two steps to determine the amount of foreign aid (Neumayer 2003; Gibler 2008). The first stage is whether they provide foreign aid, and the second stage is about how much they want to provide to recipient countries. A Tobit model permits addressing this two-stage process regarding the determinants of foreign aid (McGillivray 2003). This is because, as Sigelman and Zeng (1999: fn 11) note, a Tobit model

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<sup>4</sup> Due to the limitation of our main independent variable, shared IO memberships, our dataset cannot cover the most recent years. The dataset of IO only covers up to 2005.

<sup>5</sup> The US, UK, France, Germany, and Japan provide significantly more aid, in an absolute sense, than other countries. As noted previously, the fifth largest donor offers more than twice as much aid as the sixth largest donor. By focusing on the donors that provide the greatest sums of aid, we are able to isolate the most significant factors of aid allocation. These factors may be obscured in a pooled analysis of all donors.

is a special case of the Heckman selection model, where the variables in the selection and regression equations are the same.

### *Variables*

We measure our dependent variable of foreign aid allocation as the logged amount of official development assistance (ODA) from a donor to a recipient countries. The data are from *OECD Statistics* covering years from 1965-2005. We follow convention by logging foreign aid, measured in constant 2012 USD, to avoid extreme dispersion in values. Before logging the amount, we have some negative values of foreign aid because of repayment of the previous period's loans paid by recipients. As this is not directly related to the intention of donors, we change a negative amount of foreign aid zero, following the how the literature traditionally treats negative foreign aid (e.g., McGillivray 2003).

We obtain our main independent variable—shared IO memberships—from the Correlates of War (COW) intergovernmental organizations data set (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). These data provides information about whether countries share membership of international organizations in a given year from 1815-2005 for 496 intergovernmental organizations. Given the availability of control variables, we focus on the period of 1965-2005. We use these data to determine whether donors and recipients have the same membership in a specific IO in a given year. We code 1 if two countries share a membership in the same international organizations, and 0 otherwise. We then sum the number of membership that each donor and its recipient countries share. For example, the United States share 42 membership with Haiti in 2005, and Germany shares 35 membership with Cambodia in 2005.

Figure 1. Histogram of Shared IO Memberships with US, UK, France, Germany, and Japan.




Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our main dependent and independent variables, while Figure 1 shows histograms of the total number of shared IO memberships between the US, UK, France, Germany, and Japan and recipient states in a given year. The average number of shared IO memberships with the US, UK, France, Germany, and Japan is 29.4, 33.1, 34.4, 36.8, and 31, respectively.

We also include several control variables based on the existing foreign aid literature. Beginning with economic factors, we control for *Logged GDP per capita*, which has previously been identified as a determinant of foreign aid offered by donors. The expectation is that poorer states receive greater amount of aid from donors (Alesina and Dollar 2000). We include *Logged Population* as the size of the population may influence the absolute amount of foreign aid received. Recipient states with larger populations are expected to receive more aid. We also include *Life Expectancy* in order to reflect the socio-economic situation of

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable		Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations	
Logged US Aid	overall	9.90	8.46	0.00	23.27	N=6232	6232
	between		5.98	0.00	18.84	n=152	152
	within		6.01	-8.17	28.22	T=41	41
Logged UK Aid	overall	10.40	7.12	0.00	21.55	N=6232	6232
	between		5.14	0.00	19.65	n=152	152
	within		4.95	-6.68	26.24	T=41	41
Logged France Aid	overall	9.70	8.01	0.00	21.25	N=6232	6232
	between		5.09	0.00	19.34	n=152	152
	within		6.19	-7.89	25.58	T=41	41
Logged Germany Aid	overall	11.86	7.20	0.00	21.54	N=6232	6232
	between		5.38	0.00	18.93	n=152	152
	within		4.81	-5.82	29.32	T=41	41
Logged Japan Aid	overall	10.96	7.47	0.00	22.21	N=6232	6232
	between		4.48	0.00	20.13	n=152	152
	within		5.99	-9.17	25.57	T=41	41
Shared IO Memberships with the US	overall	26.21	10.74	0.00	58.00	N=5202	5202
	between		8.88	6.58	48.27	n=151	151
	within		6.19	0.18	44.82	T=34.45	34.45
Shared IO Memberships with the UK	overall	27.85	10.52	0.00	64.00	N=5202	5202
	between		8.00	8.42	52.34	n=151	151
	within		7.07	-2.32	53.07	T=34.45	34.45
Shared IO Memberships with France	overall	28.76	11.38	0.00	68.00	N=5202	5202
	between		8.71	8.50	55.76	n=151	151
	within		7.65	1.33	54.56	T=34.45	34.45
Shared IO Memberships with Germany	overall	30.72	9.78	0.00	61.00	N=2350	2350
	between		9.27	6.75	59.38	n=151	151
	within		3.87	5.65	45.93	T=15.56	15.56
Shared IO Memberships with Japan	overall	27.80	10.83	0.00	67.00	N=5202	5202
	between		8.53	7.42	52.63	n=151	151
	within		6.98	-3.71	51.07	T=34.45	34.45

recipient countries. Trade openness is also considered as an important factor that can influence the amount of foreign aid since donors might be more interested in promoting open trade in recipient countries (Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp 2004). Hence, we include *Trade*, and measure it as trade as a percentage of GDP. Each of these variables are obtained from the World Development Indicators.

In addition to economic factors, we include several additional control variables to account for the political environment, as well as other domestic factors. We include a control variable for the *Cold War*. According to Fleck and Kilby (2010), different periods of time have influenced the amount of foreign aid provided by the United States. To account for the possibility that aid is given to states with whom donors share an ideological affinity, we include *UN Ideal Point*. *UN Ideal Point* is an estimate of ideal points that account for a state's position towards the US-led liberal order obtained from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017).<sup>6</sup> We measure this as the absolute distance between a donor and recipient state.

In order to measure the level of democracy of recipient countries, the *Polity IV* score is used. While the causal mechanism between democracy and foreign aid is not clearly studied, democracy is ordinarily controlled for (Knack 2004). *Alliances* is an ordinal variable that provides the type of alliance (none, entente, neutrality/non-aggression, or defensive pact) using the Correlates of War Alliances Version 4.1 data set (Gibler 2009). In addition to these, we include *Former Colony*, which shows whether recipient countries had been a colony of donor states. This variable is important especially for France and the UK, since these donors consider the colonial ties as one of the most important aspect of foreign aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). We obtain colonial data comes from the ICOW colonial history data set. Finally, we include regional dummies, *America*, *Europe*, *Africa*, *Middle East*, *Asia*, are included with the reference of Oceania to control regional features of aid recipients.

Finally, to account for the possibility that aid is given to states with whom they share an ideological affinity, we include *UN Ideal Point Distance*. *UN Ideal Point* is an estimate of

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<sup>6</sup> UN Ideal point voting may differ from the *ex ante* risk mechanism we posit in that UN votes are relatively low cost signals of a state's preferences, while joining an IO involves a costly action (e.g., membership dues, staff).

ideal points that account for a state's position towards the US-led liberal order obtained from the work of Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017). In order to measure how much donors and recipients are different in terms of ideal points, we calculate the absolute value of ideal point difference between donors and recipients. By controlling this, we attempt to minimize the possibility that our empirical results are just an artefacts of similarity of preferences leading to great aid flow from donors to recipients, rather than the *signal* provided by shared IO memberships. More specifically, UN voting may differ from the *ex ante* risk mechanism we posit is represented by shared IO memberships in that UN votes are relatively low cost signals of a state's preferences, while joining an IO involves a costly action (e.g., membership dues, staff).

## **Empirical Results**

Our results are reported in several tables below. Table 2 looks at the US aid using several different estimation strategies and specifications. Table 3 reports US aid allocations for a number of different types of IO, in order to assess whether the affects attributed to IOs are conditional of IO structure. Table 4 reports the results of aid allocations for the four other major donors, the UK, France, Germany, and Japan. Finally, Table 5 displays the results of aid for all five major donors using a Tobit model in order to account for possible selection effects. The empirical results provide robust support for our hypothesis regarding the relationship between foreign aid and shared membership between donors and recipients.

Table 2 reports the results from several models estimating the relationship between aid allocation and shared IO memberships for the US. Models 1 and 2 are estimated with fixed country- effects, while Model 3-5 are estimated with random country-effects. All models in Table 2 show that *shared IO membership* is a significant and positive predictor



Table 2. Logged Amount of Foreign Aid by the US, 1965-2005.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Shared IO Memberships	0.051*** (0.013)	0.173*** (0.032)	0.053*** (0.012)	0.203*** (0.028)	0.200*** (0.029)
Ln GDP per capita		-2.915*** (0.395)		-3.145*** (0.276)	-3.168*** (0.298)
Ln Population		3.076*** (0.811)		-0.408 (0.261)	-0.381 (0.283)
Life Expectancy		-0.097*** (0.032)		-0.048* (0.026)	-0.045 (0.028)
Trade		-0.005 (0.005)		0.000 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Polity		0.048** (0.024)		0.050** (0.023)	0.050** (0.023)
Cold War		0.821** (0.329)		0.122 (0.284)	0.113 (0.286)
Ideal Point Distance		-1.589*** (0.220)		-1.192*** (0.185)	-1.201*** (0.189)
US Ally		-0.195 (0.422)		-0.389 (0.263)	-0.453 (0.348)
Former US Colony				-0.425 (2.827)	-0.343 (2.850)
America					1.915 (2.654)
Europe					1.513 (2.649)
Africa					1.689 (2.428)
Middle East					1.633 (2.559)
Asia					1.117 (2.558)
Constant	10.436*** (0.341)	-9.576 (12.389)	10.405*** (0.562)	42.696*** (4.575)	40.818*** (5.231)
N	5,202	3,725	5,202	3,725	3,725

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 use fixed effects. Models 3-5 use random effects. Coefficients for country fixed effects are not reported.

logged US aid.<sup>7</sup> The findings demonstrate that the US tends to provide a higher amount of foreign aid to recipients who share more IO memberships with the US. This provides initial support for our argument that shared IOs facilitate greater aid dispersions.

Turning to the control variables, we find that *GDP per capita*, *life expectancy* (in models 2 and 4, but not model 5), and *ideal point distance* are negatively related with the allocation of foreign aid. Recipient countries with a higher GDP per capita and life expectancy tend to receive a lower amount of foreign aid. This is aligned with the traditional findings of foreign aid literature (e.g., Alesian and Dollar 2000). As expected, when the US has a greater difference with recipients in terms of ideal point, it seems to provide the less amount of foreign aid to them. *Polity score* has a positive and significant relationship with the amount of foreign aid. Interestingly, *US ally* and *former US colony* do not pass the conventional significance in this empirical tests. This non-finding may be related to these variables having high correlations with *shared IO memberships*. Of course, a high degree of collinearity should have made it more difficult to find an effect for *shared IO memberships* as well, suggesting that our results for our primary independent variable are strong.

While we find a positive relationship between aid allocation and shared IO membership, we also investigate whether there is heterogeneity among different IO types. To do so, we construct a variable for the number of shared economic, security, and multi-purposed IO memberships. We also construct a count of shared regional IO membership.<sup>8</sup> We repeat the earlier analyses for each set of IOs. Table 3 shows the empirical results of random-effects models with each type of shared IO membership. It is clear that all IO types

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<sup>7</sup> Our results are robust to using the natural log of shared IOs (plus a constant, since the natural log of zero is undefined), rather than the count of shared IOs.

<sup>8</sup> The correlations of shared IO membership with shared economic, security, multi-purposed and regional IO membership are 0.91, 0.77, 0.98, and 0.79, respectively.

Table 3. Logged US Foreign Aid, 1965-2005 Across IO Type.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Shared Economic IO Membership	0.323*** (0.070)			
Shared Security IO Membership		0.987*** (0.341)		
Shared Multi-purposed IO Membership			0.271*** (0.041)	
Shared Regional IO Membership				0.593*** (0.102)
Ln GDP per capita	-2.900*** (0.294)	-2.707*** (0.289)	-3.091*** (0.296)	-2.811*** (0.288)
Ln Population	0.082 (0.270)	0.387 (0.256)	-0.264 (0.279)	0.088 (0.261)
Life Expectancy	-0.026 (0.028)	0.006 (0.027)	-0.035 (0.028)	-0.025 (0.028)
Trade	0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Polity	0.050** (0.023)	0.060*** (0.023)	0.056** (0.023)	0.047** (0.023)
Cold War	-0.040 (0.297)	-0.622** (0.264)	-0.160 (0.273)	0.222 (0.305)
Ideal Point Distance	-1.106*** (0.191)	-0.831*** (0.185)	-1.136*** (0.188)	-1.052*** (0.186)
US Ally	-0.255 (0.348)	-0.101 (0.345)	-0.344 (0.346)	-0.561 (0.356)
Former US Colony	-0.127 (2.870)	-0.690 (2.855)	-0.908 (2.866)	0.379 (2.854)
America	2.733 (2.677)	1.058 (2.671)	1.350 (2.670)	0.387 (2.662)
Europe	1.716 (2.674)	-0.885 (2.684)	1.129 (2.662)	1.394 (2.646)
Africa	1.972 (2.441)	1.789 (2.432)	1.590 (2.443)	2.929 (2.431)
Middle East	1.932 (2.588)	0.098 (2.560)	0.859 (2.569)	2.628 (2.578)
Asia	0.633 (2.572)	-0.594 (2.555)	0.851 (2.571)	0.734 (2.553)
Constant	33.093*** (5.044)	26.841*** (4.734)	38.376*** (5.136)	32.051*** (4.823)
N	3,725	3,725	3,725	3,725

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. All models with random effects. All models use random effects.

exert a positive and significant effect on US foreign aid, though it appears that security and regional IOs have the largest effect.

Next, we move beyond the US and look at the other major donors. Table 4 shows the results with the logged amount of foreign aid provided by the UK, France, Germany, and Japan, using random effects models.<sup>9</sup> Similar to the results for the US, our hypothesis is supported across each model. The coefficient associated with *shared IO membership* is statistically significant and positively related with foreign aid between donors and recipients for all five major donors. In other words, the UK, France, Germany, and Japan are each more likely to provide a higher amount of foreign aid to recipients when they share IO membership with recipients.

Consistent with the results for the US, logged *GDP per capita* has a negative impact on the provision of foreign aid by the UK, France, Germany, and Japan. In contrast to the results for the US, these four donors provide a higher amount of foreign aid to recipients during the Cold War. The UK and France also tend to provide a higher amount of foreign aid to their former colonies, which is consistent with a conventional understanding of their foreign aid behaviors. Conversely, while the UK tends to provide the less amount of foreign aid to recipients with a greater ideal point distance, France provides the higher amount of foreign aid to recipients with a greater ideal point distance. This result may be because that France provides more foreign aid to its former colonies whose ideal points are different from France.

We demonstrate the substantive effects of shared IO memberships on foreign aid in Figure 2. The figure shows that as the number of shared IO memberships with the US increases from the minimum to the maximum value in the data, the amount of foreign aid that

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<sup>9</sup> Alliance of Japan and colonies of Germany are omitted because of collinearity.

Table 4. Logged Foreign Aid by the UK, France, Germany and Japan, 1965-2005.


	UK	France	Germany	Japan
Shared IO Memberships	0.083*** (0.019)	0.276*** (0.021)	0.124*** (0.026)	0.346*** (0.023)
Ln GDP per capita	-2.345*** (0.244)	-1.491*** (0.262)	-2.453*** (0.318)	-2.517*** (0.257)
Ln Population	0.233 (0.240)	-0.075 (0.246)	0.010 (0.262)	-0.336 (0.239)
Life Expectancy	0.006 (0.021)	0.106*** (0.025)	-0.036 (0.038)	0.128*** (0.024)
Trade	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.011*** (0.004)
Polity	0.058*** (0.018)	0.068*** (0.021)	-0.011 (0.030)	0.016 (0.020)
Cold War	0.755*** (0.233)	2.088*** (0.262)	0.952** (0.371)	2.761*** (0.263)
Ideal Point Distance	-0.841*** (0.179)	2.861*** (0.188)	0.671* (0.367)	0.264 (0.207)
Ally	0.500 (0.362)	1.170*** (0.285)	-1.158 (1.241)	
Former Colony	2.356*** (0.735)	3.589*** (0.825)		-17.494*** (3.409)
America	5.077** (2.175)	-0.463 (2.104)	2.953 (2.227)	-2.039 (1.974)
Europe	3.015 (2.301)	0.576 (2.234)	-1.225 (2.347)	-4.652** (2.106)
Africa	4.263** (2.088)	2.389 (2.069)	-0.691 (2.176)	-2.555 (1.924)
Middle East	3.150 (2.200)	-1.455 (2.175)	-0.093 (2.335)	-3.627* (2.031)
Asia	4.670** (2.209)	-0.414 (2.162)	0.353 (2.276)	-0.989 (2.027)
Constant	19.173*** (4.348)	2.052 (4.559)	28.792*** (5.197)	18.768*** (4.433)
N	3,725	3,725	1,724	3,725

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. All models with random effects.

a recipient receives increases as well. An increase of one standard deviation (approximately 13 shared IOs) from the mean (approximately 29 shared IOs) increases the logged US foreign aid a recipient state receives from the US from 13 to over 15. This translates into a change from roughly \$440,000 to \$3.38 million in aid.

Finally, we estimate an additional set of models to account for possible selection effects. Table 5 shows the empirical results with Tobit models with fixed effects by including

Figure 2. Marginal Effects of US Foreign Aid by Number of Shared IO Memberships.



all five major donors. The Tobit model with fixed effects accounts for the possible two-stage process of foreign aid distribution, and reflects the characteristics of panel dataset. The results are similar to those from Tables 2-4, demonstrating that the findings are robust even after accounting for possible selection effects in the distribution of foreign aid.

The strong and consistent relationship that we find between shared IO memberships and aid allocation across models provides robust support for our hypothesis. We believe that these results are best understood in terms of the two mechanisms outlined above for how IOs function for donors. Donors want recipients to allocate aid in line with the donor's interests. IOs provide two complementary means for donors to ensure that their aid is used as intended. First, the number of shared IOs provide an *ex ante* measure of shared interests between a donor and recipient. Second, sharing IOs provides an additional means in which technical expertise can be provided to implement policies sought by the donor. Each of these mechanisms makes donors more willing to provide a higher amount of foreign aid.

Table 5. Logged Amount of Foreign Aid by the US, UK, France, Germany and Japan from 1965 to 2005, using a Tobit model with Fixed Effects.

	US	UK	France	Germany	Japan
Shared IO Memberships	0.222*** (0.049)	0.137*** (0.034)	0.310*** (0.036)	0.247*** (0.056)	0.379*** (0.039)
Ln GDP per capita	-3.470*** (0.531)	-2.506*** (0.421)	-0.735 (0.490)	-2.346*** (0.802)	-2.476*** (0.534)
Ln Population	3.266*** (1.084)	-2.238** (0.885)	3.110*** (1.063)	-10.244*** (1.603)	3.314*** (0.949)
Life Expectancy	-0.110*** (0.036)	0.053* (0.028)	0.071** (0.034)	0.081** (0.040)	0.060 (0.036)
Trade	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.010* (0.006)	0.011* (0.006)
Polity	0.055* (0.030)	0.068*** (0.021)	0.103*** (0.030)	0.019 (0.038)	0.028 (0.025)
Cold War	0.710* (0.429)	0.551* (0.296)	3.471*** (0.332)	0.373 (0.388)	4.318*** (0.335)
Ideal Point Distance	-1.952*** (0.330)	-0.831*** (0.263)	3.371*** (0.318)	0.658 (0.478)	-0.097 (0.309)
Ally	-0.419 (0.582)	0.458 (0.441)	1.805*** (0.195)	3.013*** (1.101)	
Former Colony	-21.863*** (3.320)	-0.400 (2.882)	5.977** (2.762)		-24.742*** (3.883)
Constant	4.337 (14.381)	55.289*** (13.969)	-62.489*** (16.636)	182.401*** (25.328)	-41.190*** (15.152)
Sigma	6.536*** (0.132)	4.902*** (0.108)	5.772*** (0.108)	3.503*** (0.149)	5.297*** (0.122)
Log-likelihood	-10,194.75	-9,917.27	-10,167.27	-4,242.79	-10,500.58
N	3,725	3,725	3,725	1,724	3,725

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients for country fixed effects are not reported.

## Conclusion

Considering the large volume of foreign aid literature, it is surprising that the relationship between shared IO memberships and foreign aid has not been systematically studied. We address this gap in the literature, paying special attention to how the interaction among members within IOs can influence the relationship between donors and recipients. Donors want to make sure that they share the policy preferences with recipients before they provide foreign aid. In addition, they do not want to waste their money. Shared membership within IOs can provide a tool for donors to understand the preferences of recipients and to

improve the efficiency in which foreign aid is applied. Our empirical results support our theoretical understanding of the relationship between donors and recipients who share IO memberships. As donors and recipients share more IO memberships, there is a higher amount of foreign aid delivered from donors to recipients.

While this study is an important first step into understanding how shared IO memberships, there are some limitations to this research. Fortunately, these limitations provide agendas for future research. First, we are able to deal with only five major donors. Even though we decide to focus on these five major donors, considering their amount of foreign aid, there are other donors at OECD. Of specific interest is that of non-conventional donors, such as China, Brazil, and India, which may have different incentives and goals for their aid and behave in ways that differ from the OECD donors. South-South cooperation, in particular, may be promoted and facilitated through IOs.

Second, future work could address other kinds of foreign aid, such as military, humanitarian, or disaster aid. We expect that the relationship between aid and IO memberships function in a similar way, though the effect sizes may differ. In particular, these more fine-grained foreign aid types may be facilitated through only specific types of IOs. It may be the case, for example, that donors provide more military aid to recipients who share membership with donors in military or security IOs.

Finally, the general argument that shared IO memberships are associated with specific mechanisms to facilitate cooperation contributes to the broader literature on state interactions. For example, empirical work associated with the liberal peace thesis has demonstrated that shared IOs are less likely to engage in conflict (Russett and Oneal 2001). Explanations for this have focused on information flows and signaling between states as part of the bargaining process (e.g., Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Shannon, Morey,



and Boehmke 2010), while others have focused on addressing commitment problems through adjudication (e.g., Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi 2008). We introduce two additional ways in which IOs affect state interactions: as an *ex ante* measure of risk, which states can utilize to behave strategically, as well as a means of influencing states directly via diffusion and technical assistance. While the former mechanism fits well within the traditional bargaining framework, the latter mechanism offers a method for states to help alter preferences and improve efficiencies related to their interactions. While our focus in the current paper is on foreign aid, the mechanisms themselves can be applied more broadly as a means through which IOs contribute to state interactions.

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