

similar U.S. military strategies in relation to local officials, the courts, legislative committees, and the president.

Durant observes patterns in the U.S. military's resistance to institutional change that organizational theory would predict. Examples include "demobilization" (here, of political enemies); "delegitimation" (here, of nongovernmental entities seeking redress in the courts for the military's environmental violations); "deinstitutionalization" (here, of nonmilitary governmental entities, such as the Undersecretary of Defense, or the Environmental Protection Agency); and disinformation (for example, by manipulating data to make a base clean up look more impressive than it was).

Despite Clinton's tendency to endorse and withdraw support for environmental initiatives based on political considerations, Durant concludes the Clinton era saw "halting, halfway, and patchwork" progress toward an environmental ethic in the military. In the current Bush administration, however, Durant concludes that both the U.S. military and the President's administration have returned to a "zero sum contest among readiness, weapons modernization, and environmental protection . . . with a vengeance" (p. 227). Bush's administration has sought wholesale environmental statutory exemptions for the U.S. military, and has attempted to create a "national security impact statement"—similar to National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)'s environmental impact statement and would likely override it—for federal projects. One U.S. military official even suggested that America's enemies were friendly to environmental statutes. Durant concludes that, in sixteen years, nothing fundamental has changed in the U.S. military's culture with regard to the environment, recalling what Richard Cheney—then Secretary of Defense—declared in 1989: the country could no longer choose between national security and important environmental issues.

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Note

1. William Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, act III, scene 2.

Gilroy, C., & Williams, C., eds. (2007). *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

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Since the end of the Cold War, there has been general agreement among Western and Westernizing countries that the security environment has changed and their military establishments must change accordingly. Although much of the focus in

military transformation has been on technology, Curtis Gilroy and Cindy Williams point out that the heart of any military organization is personnel. Military transformation cannot take place without transformation of personnel systems. Not all states agree, however, on how to respond to new security challenges, and the high costs involved in personnel reform warrant a cautious and studied approach. Gilroy and Williams argue that countries can and ought to learn from one another's experiences, and have therefore brought together a number of experts to answer two questions: how are military organizations in advanced industrialized countries trying to change their personnel policies? And, what factors affect these attempts at reform?

The book's primary purpose is to broaden the perspectives of those involved in the planning and implementation of military transformation. This should help them to identify potential problems and solutions and consider the conditions which make certain solutions more feasible than others. It is also aimed at academics, identifying a large number of issues important to military sociology and political science, including the economic and social status of military personnel, the psychology and economics of recruiting and retention, the role of the military in social and political identity, potential points of international cooperation and/or friction enabled by the transformation process, and the role of popular understandings of "security." The book provides a rich source of ideas to explore and a good basis for designing data collection.

The content is divided into four loosely grouped segments: The Changing Environment, The Choice of Personnel Model, The Transition to All-Volunteer Forces, and Transforming Reserve Policies. These are brought together by the editor-authored introduction and conclusion. Most chapters are country studies or descriptively statistical, and each section except the first includes one "theoretical" chapter clarifying concepts central to the empirical discussion. These include the costs and benefits associated with volunteer vs. conscript models, cash vs. in-kind compensation, and different types of reserve models. Both large and small traditional Western states as well as emerging post-communist states are covered.

The first section outlines the main issues of defense "supply" and "demand." One chapter addresses the challenges of dwindling youth demographics, and two chapters discuss the evolution of military missions and capability in Europe. The central claim is that security in the new environment will require armed forces which are small and agile, but high-quality in terms of both equipment and personnel. In addition, quality personnel will grow ever more expensive as the traditional supply dwindles and new, potentially socially disruptive sources of manpower may need to be sought. This has implications for personnel models, because personnel models affect average service tenure, training/skills levels, personnel quality, and personnel cost.

The editors and most of the authors adopt the premise that an all-volunteer force (AVF) is a superior organizational concept for the needs of the current security environment. The second section thus begins with an argument that AVFs are nearly

always more economical than conscript forces, except in a situation where the defense need is large numbers (relative to the young male population) of minimally trained people. Although both authors and editors state that AVF models are not suitable to every polity at every time, the implication is that they are generally appropriate except where the state chooses not to engage the “new” security environment. The other chapters in this section are therefore somewhat defensive justifications from countries which have not moved to an AVF model.

The main message of the third section is that recruiting during the initial stages of transformation to an AVF is often more difficult than expected, and the transition is usually more expensive than projected. The final section deals specifically with the issue of reserves, primarily in terms of their importance, function, and organization and training.

That countries should learn from one another’s experiences is the central premise of the book, and while the volume is indispensable as a first cut, it fails in some ways to take its own advice seriously. It is striking that all of the “theoretical” chapters are written by either Americans or Britons. This makes practical sense, as they have the largest volume of data and long-term studies on their own militaries. However, the result is that a significant amount of the supposedly general discussion of variables is actually heavily influenced by American and British perspectives, which are in many ways militarily, socially, and economically distinct from the rest of Europe.

John Warner and Sebastian Negrusa’s modeling of conscription and the host economy, for example, is very much predicated on the U.S./UK model. This model did indeed resemble coercion, expected conscripts to be “operationally useful,” and assumed that national economies were relatively deregulated. Not all forms of conscription follow this model, however, and variations on these dimensions will affect the economic viability of conscription. The country studies make it very clear that the move to an all-volunteer force is the beginning rather than the end of a state’s planning problems. The editors and authors acknowledge this but do not explore it deeply. Careful readings of the country analyses indicate that the factors influencing (e.g.,) turnover, training, and the quality of recruits are not necessarily conscription or voluntarism as such, but rather terms of contract, promotion and retirement systems, national perception of service obligations, the variance in alternative (i.e., civilian) compensation for a given level of personnel quality, and several other issues that can vary substantially without regard to whether conscription is employed or not. This is not to say that conscription is the superior option, but to point out that “conscription or volunteer” may not be the most important question. It would be interesting to try to isolate conscription and voluntarism as variables independent of the personnel structures employed, but if the hope is to produce information regarding the factors which affect personnel cost, quality, and management, it would be best to look beyond conscription.

Deborah Clay-Mendez notes in her chapter that the level and types of government benefits available to all citizens ought to affect the attractiveness of different kinds

of compensation for military personnel. It is also important to consider the structure of compensation and career paths in society at large, which varies greatly even among advanced industrialized states. Chris Donnelly argues there is a need for radical rethinking of reserves' roles; However, he assumes their roles must include being involved in overseas operations (p. 399), as is common for the United States and UK (and Finland), but not generally for other countries. None of these chapters is wrong—indeed, they advance our understanding of very important issues—rather the arguments are perhaps not as widely generalizable as their language would indicate. An important next step would be to expand the models and insights presented here to include greater variation on certain dimensions.

The book certainly accomplishes one of its core missions, which is to build awareness of how other countries manage their military organizations. One comes away with a clearer view of the factors that influence what works and what does not. This not only raises important questions about “common wisdom” and “lessons learned,” but also introduces truly innovative ideas into what are often relatively predictable conversations about transformation and reform. The volume's overall lesson is: question your assumptions.

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Avant, D. D. (2005). *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Percy, S. (2007). *Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

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The reemergence of private military actors has received increasing attention over the past years. Ranging from the changing nature of warfare due to new threats from warlords and international terrorists to the outsourcing of military services to private contractors in Iraq, it seems indicative of a major transformation in the contemporary security environment. However, so far, there have been few attempts to conceptualize and explain these developments through international relations theory. It is within this context that Deborah Avant's *The Market for Force* and Sarah Percy's *Mercenaries* stand out as the first monographs that seek to address the lack of theoretical research on one aspect of this transformation, namely, the recent proliferation of private military and security contractors. Together, they make a major theoretical contribution toward explaining why private military forces have and should be viewed with concern.

Published already in 2005, Avant's outstanding book analyzes the implications of the rise of the private military and security service industry for the state control over