

Measurement and Belief: Determinates of Federal Funding for Public Diplomacy  
Programs

Ariel Scheirer

Columbia University, New York, NY

December 22, 2009

### Abstract

This paper explores the extent to which principled beliefs affect decision makers' funding of public diplomacy programs in the context of domestic constructivism. By utilizing Kaufmann and Pape's (1999) conception of principled beliefs that develop primarily at the domestic (unitary) level, rather than Wendt's (1999) argument for an international (systemic) development, it is possible to explain the decision-makers' actions for supporting international public diplomacy programs that yield limited immediate material gains. An analysis of different groups' funding patterns of public diplomacy programs suggests that a belief in international social interaction as a means to achieve mutual understanding contributes to sustained support despite changes in the international and domestic environments. However, decision-makers' appropriations do not appear affected by epistemic communities support.

Measurement and Belief: Determinates of Federal Funding for Public Diplomacy Programs

International relations theory has focused much of its analysis on case studies of historical events that emphasize power dynamics between states. The two dominant strands of international relations theory, realism/neorealism, and liberalism/neoliberalism, tend to analyze the international arena in a deterministic framework, where state actors are large constrained by the international setting and predisposition of the state. A more recent strand of international relations theory, constructivism, presents an alternative view of state action, whereby interaction presents an opportunity for changes in the state disposition. A difficulty for international relations theorists has been to demonstrate empirically a basis for state action that encompasses both the domestic and international spheres. Case studies tend to support a particular theory that rests in either the domestic or the international area: either domestic action – which occurs at the level of local politics and economy – or international action – which occurs at the level of the state-system – is necessarily disregarded in order to isolate the determining factor of a particular strand of theory.

The domestic funding of programs that are essentially international in nature, therefore, provides a fruitful middle-ground for international relations theorizing. The United States government and private sectors cooperatively fund several programs that provide informal interaction between professionals across borders. In order to explain this funding action, theory must provide an avenue to evaluate international and domestic state action, as well as an empirical means to assess this action. This paper considers the funding of a set of international professional and academic exchange programs in order to

understand the motivations for state actors. In particular, the international relations theory constructivism provides a means to understand international action that occurs simultaneously at the domestic level.

### Literature Review

#### *International Relations Theory: The problem of uncertainty*

The tacit agreement between the mainstream international relations theories of neorealism and neoliberalism – that the unpredictability of the international arena results in equally unpredictable State action – has provided a rich literature exploring the themes of anarchy and uncertainty in the field of international relations. An international arena without a regulatory power necessitates that States rely on their ability to understand and predict other States actions and intentions to achieve their interests. Although disagreeing on particulars and implications, neoliberals and neorealists base much of their theorizing on the shared assumptions of the anarchic international arena and the belief that states will pursue self-interest (Milner, 1993; Mearsheimer, 2001; Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1954).

Cooperative action provides an example of the central themes of anarchy and self-interest: state A desires a long-term goal of X, as do states B, D, and C. If all states agree to work together, they will all achieve X, but each State must set aside achieving certain short-term interests in the meantime. The problem for achieving a cooperative goal is that the anarchic arena ensures that each State lacks certainty that the others will cooperate, as there is no outside regulatory force to ensure that no State decides to back-out. Rather, it is possible that one of the states will decide at any moment to advance its

interests outside of the long-term agreement. Consequently, although the incentive to cooperate in order to obtain X is high, the uncertainty that other States will uphold their end of the mutual bargain is also high. Self-interest in an anarchic environment means each State fears that others will eschew cooperation for achieving national interests in favor of “self-help” strategies. The central problematic for neorealist and neoliberal theories is the inherent uncertainty in international relations, due to the difficulty of interpreting and predicting other States’ actions. In light of the dilemma of the triple-entente of international relations theory – anarchy, self-interest, and uncertainty – it seems that cooperation would remain largely elusive.

Constructivism posits a different scenario, where interests and anarchy are socially constructed (Finnemore, 1996, Haas, 1992, Wendt, 1992, 1999), rather than materially given, thus differentiating itself as a unique form of international relations theory. Although a diffuse arena for theorizing, constructivists share a focus on the role of intersubjective norms, beliefs, and values as an ideational structure that shapes actors’ behavior (Copeland, 2000, Wendt, 1999, Finnemore, 1996). Constructivism considers ideas as causal, while neorealist and neoliberal theories, consider power and international institutions to be causal forces (regardless of self-interest and identity) (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993, Jervis, 1997, Milner, 1993, Waltz, 1954, 1979). Constructivists contend that because actors construct their identity and interests through interaction, the ideational structure is constitutive. And because ideational structures exist through the interaction of actors, these structures are mutable. Thus, ideational structures and actors co-constitute one another in the constructivist framework. Without the bedrock assumptions

of anarchy and self-interest (as both are now dependent upon social interaction and ideas), the possibility of cooperation in the international arena emerges.

Because of the central role of ideational structures in constructivism, cooperation is possible to the extent that actors through acts of social will can determine new practices (Wendt, 1992). By claiming that discourse shapes actors' and states' conceptions of themselves and the international arena, the conception of security in an anarchic self-help system is turned on its head. In the constructivist framework, states only resort to "self-help" strategies to achieve their own interests (thus rejecting cooperation) in the event that they construct anarchy. For example, Constructivism is able to explain the development of the European Union (EU), a socially-constructed cooperative international environment (Wendt, 1999). Whereas the causal variable in explaining the EU's formation for neorealists and neoliberals is the pursuit of material self-interests (at the state and institution level, respectively) (Jervis, 1997, 1999, Waltz, 1979), for constructivists, intersubjective norms or principled ideas, which shape beliefs, socialization, norms, and identity, are the impetus for the EU. It is through social interaction, that ideas and identities are shaped and generated. Principled ideas emerge through social interaction, and enable actors to construct a new environment. Because a state's self-interests are mediated by the socially constructed environment, principled beliefs are the aegis for actors to identify cooperation as being in their self-interests. With principled beliefs as the driving force, self-interest can be transformed, and uncertainty is effectively removed as the impasse to international cooperation.

Perhaps the most notable difference between constructivism and other international relations theories is not that diplomacy is ineffectual in building

cooperation. Rather, the difference is whether diplomatic interaction merely *mitigates* the anarchic arena's effects, or whether it *mediates* actors' entire conception of that arena (Glaser, 1999, Jervis, 1999, Mearsheimer, 2001, Waltz, 1979). Here the discussion of communication at the domestic and international levels takes particular relevance. As Haas notes in discussing international policy coordination, "How states identify their interests and recognize the latitude of actions deemed appropriate in specific issue-areas of policymaking are functions of the manner in which the problems are understood by the policymakers or are represented by those to whom they turn for advice under conditions of uncertainty" (pp. 1-2).

Nevertheless, Constructivism faces an impasse not dissimilar to other international relations theories. The international decision-making process for state actors, if open to change, is one that is dependent upon accuracy and representation of actors' knowledge. The mutability of the international arena where ideational structures and actors co-constitute and co-determine each other, guarantees that uncertainty persists in remaining high. Just as actors can change to cooperation through acts of social will, so they can change to self-help or aggressive solutions, particularly because they still face the same constraints of accurate knowledge and interpretation of that knowledge in other international relations theorizing. Actor-interaction, of state-system interaction is still subject to temporal uncertainties of the present intention of the other and, more critical, the future intention of the other (Copeland, 2000, p. 199). Even if present intentions are known, and actions accurately interpreted, the possibility that intentions may change in the future – often due to domestic changes – still exists because an act of social will has the potential to work as a two-edge sword. Constructivism considers the resolution of

uncertainty to be transformation of the socially-constructed anarchic arena and state interests. In fact, the central problematic for constructivism is the same as that of neorealism and neoliberalism. If these “givens” are mutable and their change can be either positive or negative for other state actors, then the question remains: how to determine actors’ intentions and action in the face of uncertainty.

*Constructivism: social action and principled beliefs*

Constructivist scholars thus face an imperative of articulating and empirically demonstrating a system of meaning and social value that enables transmission of knowledge that is both accurate and well-represented. Clear examples of socially constructed values, however, are difficult to identify. Past examples have included the ideas generated during the Cold War (Tannewald, 2005), Britain’s campaign against the Atlantic slave trade (Kaufmann and Pape, 1999) and policy cooperation (Haas, 1992). Haas, rather than focusing on identity, turns his focus to the means by which principled ideas – those beliefs that determine action because of how they shape actors’ perception of identity and discourse – are transmitted. A focus on social interaction provides an explanation for decision-makers’ behaviors that are seemingly motivated by non-material interest (Haas, 1992, Finnemore, 1996).

What is perhaps most notable about the choice of focusing on principled beliefs is that it requires a *unitary* (single/domestic state action), rather than *systemic* (interstate/system interaction), analytic approach. This approach stands in contrast not only to neorealism (Waltz, 1979), but also to systemic constructivism, which brackets off domestic process to focus on interaction between states (Wendt, 1999, p. 224-233). A state’s identity – and action driven through costly international moral action – has been

clearly demonstrated to develop from purely domestic processes in Kaufmann and Pape's analysis of domestic processes in Britain in the mid-1800's. Not only do they find that Britain suffered relative and absolute economic losses and that efforts to suppress the slave trade met with suspicion from other major maritime powers and jeopardized its security position (in opposition to realist theories), but that "[t]ransnational efforts at persuasion and political assistance played virtually no role, whereas domestic coalition politics. . . played a decisive role at several points" (p. 632-633). Consequently, systemic constructivism, focusing on interstate interactions, neglects the dense processes of the domestic level, which are often the very means of one state understanding the others' actions. A structural approach fails to address how states can emancipate themselves from uncertainty when multiple interpretations are possible, and misinterpretation can be fatal (1999, pp. 330, 360).

The notion of principled ideas provides a fruitful tool for explanation of both interstate and domestic actions, because they tie together several of the difficulties identified above. First, it is possible to utilize this concept at both the "dense" domestic level, as well as the broader interstate structure level; second, it enables a discussion of state identity (similar to systemic constructivism); and, finally, it can explain state actions, regardless of whether they are perceived as being motivated by structure, self-interest, or mutual gains.

Principled ideas are transmitted via transnational networks of epistemic communities. Haas defines an epistemic community, as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (p. 5). Main characteristics

of epistemic communities include (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, (2) shared causal beliefs, (3) shared notions of validity (intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge); and (4) a common policy to which their professional competence is directed, typically out of a conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. Similar to Khun's (1962) broader sociological definition of a paradigm, which is "an entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community" (p. 16), what binds an epistemic community together is their shared belief in the verity and the applicability of particular forms of knowledge or specific truths – thus largely coinciding with the constructivist notion of a socially-constructed international environment.

An epistemic community's impact, typically involves the transmission of ideas via direct and indirect channels. An example of a direct channel is the 124th Bergedorf Round Table on "Contours of a New World Order", which met in Berlin in June 2002, and brought together politicians, academic experts and publicists from the U.S. and European nations to discuss the impact of September 11th on transatlantic relationships (Korber-Stiftung, 2003). An indirect channel concerns the transmission of ideas prior to an individual rising to the level of a decision-maker, such as Margaret Thatcher's participation in the U.S.-sponsored International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) (Scott-Smith, 2004). The IVLP provides an example of citizen-to-citizen social interaction. Funded by both non-profit organizations and the U.S. Department of State, program administration is carried out via a network of approximately 90 non-profit and volunteer organizations. Because participation in international exchange fits within the conceit that ideas and beliefs are communicated through diffuse networks of social

interaction, it is possible to surmise that Thatcher's participation in such an international exchange during the formative years of her career had an impact on later policy decisions (Scott-Smith, 2004). Participation in an international exchange such as the IVLP is not necessarily predictive of future policy decisions. Because of this lack of predictability, there is no clear material incentive for such a U.S.-sponsored program. If a unitary analytic methodology is employed, neoliberal and neorealist theories fail to explain a state's funding of such a program. The constructivist framework has explanatory power for such action, as it credits ideational, rather than materialist interests for the funding of programs with apparently no direct material impact.

Exchange programs provide an opportunity for empirically demonstrating a system of socially-constructed principled beliefs. In particular, public diplomacy programs – those programs that emphasize citizen-to-citizen interaction across borders to engage in discussion of on a structured topic enables explication of the causality of ideational structure. By isolating actions associated with principled beliefs, it is possible to test the extent to which principled beliefs determine decision-makers' action. The central problem of misperception is clearly addressed, as the focus of public diplomacy programs is the advancement of communication through informal discussions. Finally, the diverse administrative and funding structure provides ample opportunity to investigate the concomitant relationships of state and non-state actors at the domestic level. A discussion of the development of public diplomacy will assist in understanding how it may serve as a useful explanatory tool in the field of international relations theory.

*Public Diplomacy: State and Non-state Actor Explanations*

Public diplomacy was created as a phrase to cover a constellation of activities undertaken by the United States Information Agency in the 1960's that went beyond education, information, or culture (Arndt, 2004, Tuch, 1990). The term effectively avoided the negative connotations of propaganda (Arndt, 2004, Roberts, 2006).<sup>1</sup> There is a general consensus (Arndt, 2004, Gregory, 2008, Mueller, 2006, Scott-Smith 2004, Tuch, 1990) that public diplomacy's ascendancy as part of governmental work began with the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hayes Act). The Fulbright-Hayes Act established the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) within the Department of State. Fulbright-Hays also established programs including the Fulbright Scholarship Program, the International Visitor Leadership Program<sup>2</sup>, the Hubert H. Humphrey Program, the American Studies Program, American Cultural Centers and libraries, as well as described the administration of cooperative contracts with non-profit organizations for program administration.

Public diplomacy as a concept, however, had existed some time prior to Fulbright-Hayes. In 1938 the Division of Cultural Relations, precursor to ECA, in the Department of State was created. The European crisis of 1930 is typically credited as the impetus of the Division's creation (Arndt, 2004), but other events served as stimulus, including the efforts of French and British diplomacy – which included cultural diplomacy, such as arts exchange – as well as the notion that public diplomacy could

---

<sup>1</sup> In distinguishing public diplomacy from propaganda, the suggestion is that the former always deals with "the known facts," whereas "propaganda" is typically based on some combination of falsehoods and untruths mixed in with facts. United States Information Agency Alumni Association, "What Is Public Diplomacy?" Washington, D.C., updated September 1, 2002. Online at <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm> (as of August 6, 2004).

<sup>2</sup> At the time, call the International Visitor Program. The addition of "Leadership" was added in 2004.

combat the growth of Fascism (Tuch, 1990). Prior to the formalization of IVLP, international visitors (primarily journalists) were brought to the U.S. for six-week professional tours, starting in 1940, and international exchanges of the Fulbright Scholarship Program began in 1948.

The difficulty of defining public diplomacy, due to the multiplicity of constituent actors, as well as the different terms used in the U.S. government for programs and offices, may in part explain its lack of traction in developing into an area of analysis for international relations theory. Because public diplomacy is inherently co-constituted by administrators and participants, definitions of public diplomacy – particular the International Visitor Leadership Program – are dominated by two views of those involved. In the first view, public diplomacy is often defined in terms of governmental action (Arndt, 2004, Tuch, 1990). Chronicles of public diplomacy tend to follow bureaucratic structure and negotiation, rather than the full range of actors involved in the formulation of programs.

Tuch (1990) defines public diplomacy as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies” (p. 3). He differentiates public diplomacy from traditional diplomacy in that it is not conducted through government foreign ministries and that the process is open. Similarly, the Stanton Panel on Information and Cultural Relations<sup>3</sup> began its seminal 1974 report with the statement, “Public Diplomacy is a central part of American foreign policy simply because the freedom to know is such an important part of America”

---

<sup>3</sup> Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations, established in 1973, headed by Dr. Frank Stanton, former president of CBS.

(“Stanton Panel Reports, 1974, p. 5-8). Both the Stanton Panel and Tuch suggest that public diplomacy is about the transmission of ideas and ideals that are *sui generis* to a peculiar U.S. identity. This description of public diplomacy involves the cast of actors most commonly found in the framework of neoliberalism: states, decision-makers and institutions.

From the second viewpoint, public diplomacy is defined in terms of actors whose identity and interests are constructed through social interaction. Constructivism’s story differs from neoliberalism because of the introduction of two new actors: the epistemic community (transnational academic/participant/non-governmental organization) and principled ideas (the notions that shape perception and belief). The transnational academic community that participated in exchanges (including the network of citizen-interlocutors that volunteer and non-profit organizations arrange to speak with program participants) is united in a common approach to international education, and thus espouses cooperation across borders.

Both Tuch’s and Arndt’s neoliberal descriptions lacks explanatory power for the formation and funding of public diplomacy programs, because they fail to account for the values and beliefs that caused state and non-state actors to move outside of an anarchic conception of the international sphere. The strength of most international exchange programs draws in large part from the networks of participants (Arndt, 2004, Mueller, 2006), rather than particular states or institutions, as would be argued from the neoliberal standpoint. By accounting for the diffusion of new ideas and information via transnational networks, the constructivist viewpoint creates a cause-and-effect relationship with the how decision-makers choose to define their interests.

The principled belief that interaction across borders will have an impact on participants across all sectors and countries is tied to an identity that rejects direct governmental control of the program as indicated by the creation of cooperative agreements with the private sector. The entire development of a non-governmental administrative network, including the creation of Fulbright binational commissions,<sup>4</sup> suggests that credibility for public diplomacy rests – as mentioned earlier – on the lack of direct governmental action.

Broadly defined, public diplomacy cannot be confined simply to the arena of particular governmental programs, in part because the main actors are not simply governmental agencies, but the participants' themselves. The participants of sponsored programs make up the international exchange programs community. The IVLP transnational epistemic exists to discuss particular topics directly to promote mutual understanding. If the state is not the main actor in public diplomacy exchanges, then we must ask: who is? Mueller's conception of public diplomacy coincides with the notion of epistemic communities – that the community is defined less by a state agency, than by a shared value of international exchange for the promotion of public good.

For the purposes of this paper, I will define public diplomacy as the cooperative efforts of state and non-state actors to communicate with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture. This definition modifies Tuch's in that it includes the role of non-state actors and excludes the notion of national goals and current state policies. Furthermore, this

---

<sup>4</sup> There are currently 50 Fulbright Commissions, that administer the Fulbright Program. Commissions were a key component of the program's development, as they make the decision of who will be awarded a scholarship. Today, foreign government funding accounts for approximately 30 percent of Fulbright program costs (Arndt, p. 231).

definition enables differentiation between reactionary public diplomacy (those programs that are created in reaction to international events) and sustained public diplomacy (those programs that have maintained continued funding despite changes in international environment). Finally, this definition enables a new level of analysis for the cooperative, or non-state actor definition of public diplomacy – the actualization of principled beliefs in international cooperation through funding at the state and private level.

*Measuring Principled Beliefs: PART*

Continued funding of public diplomacy programs, such as IVLP, suggests decision-makers' belief in the utility of such programs. In spite of domestic and international changes (such as economic down-turns or U.S. participation in a war), funding has remained constant for public diplomacy programs. The introduction of performance-based budgeting through the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 marked a new mode of conceptualizing what program and projects would be funded by U.S. tax payer dollars. In order to better implement the new form of budgeting, the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) was introduced in 2000 in order to review programs' utility. The distinguishing mechanism of PART was that that negative consequences would follow poor performance (President's Management Agenda, 2002). From 2002-2008, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) performed a review of all programs in the U.S. Federal Budget, including public diplomacy programs. A brief overview of GPRA and PART is useful prior to reviewing the potential impact on funding for public diplomacy programs.

GPRA requires federal agencies, to set goals and objectives, measure performance, and report their accomplishments in order to move toward a performance-

based environment (Government Performance and Results Act, 1993). Beginning in 2000, agency heads were responsible for submission of a performance report to the President. In the event that an agency finds it unfeasible to express performance goals for a particular program activity in an objective quantifiable and measurable form, there is an alternative of utilizing a descriptive statement of a minimally effective and successful program. However, this alternative measure has not been used for public diplomacy programs funded through the Department of State.

OMB developed PART as a diagnostic tool meant to provide a consistent approach to evaluating federal programs and applied it in formulating the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request. PART covers four broad topics for all "programs"<sup>5</sup> selected for review: (1) program purpose and design, (2) strategic planning, (3) program management, and (4) program results (i.e., whether a program is meeting its long-term and annual goals) as well as additional questions that are specific to one of seven mechanisms or approaches used to deliver the program. A Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) report which analyzed the success of PART, noted that "There is no standard definition for the term "program." For purposes of PART, OMB described the unit of analysis (program) as (1) an activity or set of activities clearly recognized as a program by the public, OMB, or Congress; (2) having a discrete level of funding clearly associated with it; and (3) corresponding to the level at which budget decisions are made" ("Performance Budgeting," 2004) .

Public diplomacy programs, such as those legislated through the Fulbright-Hayes Act present an interesting area for measurement and evaluation. To the extent that the measurement of individuals' diverse international cultural, professional, and academic

exchange programs is a measure of personal growth and change in perception, public diplomacy resists measurement. The Department of State, however, has achieved satisfactory measures of its programs according to recent PART scorecards. A variety of case-studies of different programs and cohorts are conducted on an on-going basis, to attempt to qualify and quantify the work of public diplomacy programs, and it that sufficient steps are taken to justify funding of these programs.

Case studies and surveys notwithstanding, the effectiveness of public diplomacy is questionable – not because it does not or cannot accomplish what it sets out to do – but because measuring the impact of human interaction across borders is simply very difficult. The pool of participants in public diplomacy is in part self-selected, and in part merit-based: some participants apply for programs, such as the Fulbright Scholarship to study outside of the U.S., and are then evaluated by an outside panel; other participants are invited to participate, and then accept, as is the case with the International Visitor Leadership Program. Because each individual's program is often tailored to participants' academic or professional interests there are difficulties for comparison. Yet, despite the fact that public diplomacy remains a somewhat inscrutable area for evaluation, funding has remained fairly constant since its inception. How do we explain the continued funding of something which some often fails to show a material return on investment, and particularly defies standardized measurement?

One explanation draws upon the notion that the epistemic community of international exchanges promotes the principled idea of mutual understanding – a means of overcoming uncertainty in the international arena. Government funding represents a tacit belief on the part of private and public actors that building the epistemic community

of exchange participants will promote mutual understanding. Federal and private funding patterns for public diplomacy programs provide a fruitful area to explore the role of transnational action in the creation of beliefs. Because funding represents a material investment toward a particular goal, changes in the amount “invested” may be construed to represent confidence in the ability of the program to achieve a given outcome. It is thus possible to test the strength of a principled belief in promoting the exchanges epistemic community if funding is not altered with changes in international or domestic events.

This paper considers the relationship between funding of exchange programs and the external and domestic factors highlighted in international relations theory. This serves as a test of the constructivist argument that despite domestic and international changes, principled belief in the benefit of building an epistemic community to benefit mutual understanding will ensure sustained domestic funding. The constructivist contention that beliefs and identity play the main role in articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems such as international public opinion, helping states identify their interests, as well as propose specific policies, suggests that funding should remain constant on all three funding levels in spite of changes in the international and domestic arena. An analysis of funding over time enables observation of material action motivated by principled beliefs. Longitudinal analysis of federal and state funded programs is common, but no analysis has been done on the funding of public diplomacy programs. Similarly, no analysis has been conducted that shows relative funding patterns at the three main levels for public diplomacy. Finally, by evaluating trends in funding, the decision-making process and formation of U.S. policy goals are clarified.

## Research

In order to evaluate the extent to which principled beliefs in international cooperation motivate the funding of public diplomacy programs I analyze longitudinal federal and private funding of public diplomacy, in particular Professional and Cultural Exchanges (PCE). The primary program in the PCE public diplomacy programs in the International Visitor Leadership Program, which provides a history of funding that matches the formalization of public diplomacy, resulting in deep pool of budget data that spans multiple U.S. administrations, changes in international and domestic environments, as well as legislative and bureaucratic changes. Professional and Cultural Exchange appropriations enable analysis of domestic U.S. funding sources through non-profit organizations in the National Council for International Visitors network. Although this may appear to be a “homegrown” phenomenon, similar to Kaufmann and Pape’s discussion of the British anti-slave movement, the introduction of international participants as key actors of a transnational epistemic community enable some extrapolation to the system level of analysis.

### *Research Questions*

My research questions include

1. To what extent does the role of private citizens’ contributions determine federal funding of public diplomacy programs?
2. To what degree does the role of private citizen’s determine funding patterns of professional exchanges beyond the incremental changes to budgets that are predicted for the majority of programs?
3. What impact does the introduction of performance based budgeting and PART have on U.S. federal funding levels of public diplomacy programs (IVLP)?

## Data

I used appropriation data drawn from Conference Reports (1980-2009). Because of the pattern of strategic congressional behavior relating to under appropriations and supplemental appropriations (Wlezein, 1996, Wladavsky, 1994), when possible, I used actual appropriations, obtained through the Government Printing Office and the Federal Reserve Archive for Economic Research (FRASER). In the event that actual appropriations were not available, I used the expected appropriations for that fiscal year. I calculated real dollar values of appropriations by dividing current dollar values into the gross national product implicit price deflator (2008 = 123), drawn from The National Income and Product Accounts.

Community Impact Summaries from the National Council of International Visitors (NCIV) network to assess private citizens' believe in the value of public diplomacy 1980-2009. NCIV collects and analyzes the value of donated time and resources that are used in the administration of public diplomacy, specifically IVLP. The Summaries provide a dollar figure for number of volunteers, program administration, services, and locally generated support (such as fund-raising). I calculated real dollar values of Summaries by dividing current dollar values into the gross national product implicit price deflator (2008 = 123), drawn from The National Income and Product Accounts.

### *Measures*

*Dependent variable.* To assess changes in funding of public diplomacy programs, I utilized the line item "Professional and Cultural Exchanges" from Conference Reports. Professional and Cultural Exchanges includes short-term international visitor programs

for emerging foreign leaders and professionals in the United States including both officially invited, and non-sponsored visitors; a variety of professionals and cultural cooperative exchange programs with non-governmental organizations, such as the Citizen Exchange Program, Arts America Exchanges and the Congress-Bundestag Exchange program; and exchange programs of special Congressional interest, such as the Mike Mansfield Fellowship Program and support for the Paralympic Games (*Government Printing Office*, 2003).

Because of the difficulty of tracking specific appropriations data at the program line-item, the Professional and Cultural Exchanges data serves as a proxy measure for funding for International Visitor Leadership Program, as well as other programs that focus on “leaders and professionals” across a variety of disciplines, rather than Academic Exchanges, such as the Fulbright. Programs within Professional and Cultural Exchanges share the same characteristic of participants being nominated or invited to participate (with the exception of Congress-Bundestag, which is partly funded by the German government).

*Funding measures.* To test the impact of a domestic volunteer network on federal funding of public diplomacy programs, I use Community Impact Summaries from the National Council of International Visitors (NCIV) network to assess private citizens’ believe in the value of public diplomacy (1980-2009). NCIV collects and analyzes the value of donated time and resources that are used in the administration of public diplomacy, specifically IVLP. The Summaries provide a dollar figure for number of volunteers, program administration, services, and locally generated support (such as fund-raising). The NCIV measure is a proxy for the total donated resources to the

program. The National Programming Agencies (NPAs), through their cooperative agreements with the Department of State include a cost-share for the program, of either in-kind donations (such as unpaid staff time or donated meeting space), or a monetary contribution. Because the NCIV network is largely volunteer, the majority of citizen donated time and services – of particular interest to this study – comes from NCIV donated resources.

The Summaries are compiled from Annual Reports submitted by Councils for International Visitors (CIVs) – community-based member organizations of NCIV. There are between 90 and 103 CIVs throughout the U.S. during the period of 1980-2009. Each is an independent nonprofit organization governed by a Board of Directors. Each is dependent on a dedicated corps of volunteers – citizen diplomats – to achieve its mission. The Summaries consider CIV personnel (paid vs. volunteer – includes host families, individuals who served as professional resources, and other supporters); Aggregate Number of Visits Organized by CIVs (Visits for participants in the U.S. Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Program vs. other exchange programs); Community Based Programs Provided by CIVs (programs for participants in the International Visitor Leadership Program vs. other exchange programs); Services Provided to International Visitors and the Community by CIVs (Professional meetings/appointments, professional internships, home hospitality, overnight homestay nights, classroom presentations, cultural events, hotel room nights used); Support Generated Locally for CIV Programs (Individual and corporate memberships and donations, foundation/local/county/state awards and grants, other income).

It is expected that the amount appropriated for any given fiscal year for Professional and Cultural Exchanges will be dependent upon the previous year's appropriation amount. I consider appropriations for in a given fiscal year  $t$ , in thousands of 2008 dollars, as a measure of political actors' belief in the value of public diplomacy. Appropriations are analyzed by appropriation number, as well as line-item/program (Department of State, Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, Academic Exchanges, Professional and Cultural Exchanges, International Visitor Leadership Program, Program and Performance).

*External Factors.* The full model of federal funding determinates reflects connections to discretionary factors – namely, transitions from Republican to Democratic presidents, shifts in the partisan composition of Congress. The model also reflects connection to unanticipated deficiencies in regular appropriations, including the effects of budgetary growth, unemployment, and inflation. I include three political measures, including a dummy-coded measure of political affiliation of the president in office President (1 = Republican, 0 = Democrat), and dummy-coded for majority of Democrats in House and Senate (1 = majority, 0 = minority), during the regular appropriations cycle. Although there is generally bi-partisan support of public diplomacy programs, changes in political the introduction of a new political make-up is often considered a means for change for domestic constructivists. I consider inflation (the annualized percentage change in the Consumer Price Index during the last 6 months of fiscal year) and unemployment (the difference between the average rate of unemployment during fiscal year  $t$  and the average rate during fiscal year  $t - 1$ ) as two domestic influencers of policy-makers' funding decisions. A dummy-codes measure for U.S. participation in a major

armed conflict is considered as an influencer of funding decisions (1 = U.S. participation in War, 0 = No participation). A dummy-coded measure was included to control for the one-time change of all administrative and programmatic activities from the U.S. Information Agency to the U.S. Department of State (lagged for one year).

*Performance Assessment.* The need for an empirical test of support of public diplomacy programs is fulfilled through the introduction of the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) in 2001 – passed in 2002 – which enables analysis of how program evaluation and measurement affects funding patterns.

#### Analytical Approach

As suggested by English, Kauffman and Pape, Mueller, and Scott-Smith, the domestic sector plays a crucial role in the creation of policy. Likewise, the transmission of principled ideas occurs through the framework of the domestic sector because of its concomitant role in the formation of epistemic communities according to neoliberal and domestic constructivist theorists. In order to determine to what extent the role of private citizens' contributions determine the level of federal funding of public diplomacy programs, I develop a model of budgetary behavior that treats appropriations decision-making as a discursive process in which beliefs are communicated between private and public actors. At the heart of the model is the conjecture that the stability of funding for public diplomacy programs, such as IVLP, is largely dependent on the contributions of the private domestic sector.

Similar to Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky (1966) and Wleziem (1996), I use time-series data to select the equation which best seems to describe the role of principled

beliefs in the federal appropriations process. Appropriations for international education, particularly the IVLP, are modeled using multiple linear regressions in a hierarchical framework as a function of citizens' donated resources, economic variables, external events (domestic and international) and measures of presidential and congressional party affiliation. I first consider three models of predictors for federal funding levels to discuss the theoretical assumptions undergirding the different perspectives. I then develop a model that best explicates funding patterns for public diplomacy. For all models I employ multiple linear regressions, with regular appropriations as the dependent variable in each. Each model is constructed in a hierarchical framework. Each subsequent step included all variables in the previous step. All the political and economic variables are measured in the period during which regular appropriations are requested and made – namely, the previous fiscal year. I expect these models to be linear, stable over periods of time, and stochastic.

I also analyze the impact of performance based budgeting and PART on U.S. federal funding levels of public diplomacy programs, such as IVLP. As previously noted, assessments of public diplomacy programs suffer in concrete analyses, such as those conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), but also in a larger philosophical framework. Public diplomacy, as suggested in the definitions I included earlier, hopes for individualized impact in order to achieve the goal of increasing mutual understanding and peace. The introduction of measurement standards for funding in the 1990's and 2000's, should have heralded a decrease in federal funding, based upon the inability of IVLP and other public diplomacy programs to meet performance requirements. However, if principled beliefs are the motive for funding programs such as

the IVLP, U.S. federal funding level would remain constant relative to U.S. Department of State and U.S. Information Agency budgets, holding other external factors (wartime, economic, domestic political effects, etc.) constant.


To test for the possibility that principled beliefs enable stable funding levels (that is, funding levels stable with inflation), I treat the introduction of PART as a policy “treatment” by comparing differential effects of the policy for two different types of public diplomacy programs (Academic Exchanges, which tend to be subject to a “reactionary” funding basis, and Professional and Cultural Exchanges, which tends to have a “proactive” funding basis). My main concern is in avoiding the potential pitfall in policy-effect analysis that my units of observation (that is, the budget numbers of public diplomacy programs), are not randomly assigned. The benefit of comparing two similar programs through a panel data framework is that I can ensure that any variables that remain constant over time (but are unobserved) that are correlated with the outcome variable will not bias the estimated effect. **HAUSMAN TEST**

### Findings

An initial review of funding patterns is useful before considering the association between principled beliefs and funding of exchange programs. From the view of constructivists, it is the strong funding from domestic community groups that provides an interesting counterpoint to changes in Federal funding. The community donated resources represent a tangible expression of support in the exchanges epistemic community – as well as interaction at the citizen-to-citizen level. The domestic epistemic community does not seem to have increased, but support has remained constant and has

buttressed the IVLP program to represent nearly all of the Professional and Cultural Exchanges appropriations.

Although funding for exchange patterns has risen and fallen in parallel, the most notable difference between the programs occurs in 1998, where Academic and Cultural



Exchange Programs outpace Professional and Cultural Exchanges by nearly \$10,000,000 more in appropriations. From 1994 to present, academic exchange programs consistently receive more funding, where before academic professional exchanges received the same amount of funding. The factors that cause the difference in funding between the two types of exchange programs, as well as the relationship between donated resources and Professional exchange funding provides insight into the argument that principled beliefs change state actors' perspectives to a degree that causes them to continue to commit material resources in the absence of clear material benefit.

*Models: Decision-maker and Community Contributions to Public Diplomacy*

Model 1 presents the current year's regular appropriations (RA) as dependent on the previous year's appropriation ( $RA_{t-1}$ ). This model presents the state-centric view presented by Arndt and Tuch, where the federal government is the principle player in public diplomacy. It also suggests that the budget may develop incrementally, that is, that each year is primarily dependent upon the previous year's appropriation (True, 2000).

Model 2 includes the measure of donated resources, represented through the NCIV network (NCIV). The nature of the cooperative contract epitomizes the conceit of the discursive democratic process, and also suggests that the role of private citizens is crucial to the implementation of programs. Thus, the amount appropriated in any given year is a function of the total aggregate of resources from the previous year. Although we would not anticipate for model 2 to have noticeably more explanatory power, we would expect for the relationship between citizen donated resources to be positively correlated and statistically significant.

Model 3 includes an interaction between donated resources and regular appropriations (both lagged one year) to consider whether the effect of one of regular appropriations differs depending on the level of donated resources. Based upon transmission of principled beliefs, we would anticipate that the interaction term will have a positive and significant relationship on regular allocations, thus mediating the effects of the previous year's allocation. The amount that Congress appropriates for a given Federal program may be a function of that program's long-standing place in the budget. Any increase in funding for a given program may be attributable to time, or that the program is simply a function of itself. Because the professional exchanges and community (PCE) programs benefit from considerable citizen involvement (of both time and resources), these contributions are also taken into account. Table 1 introduces these fundamental assumptions in the absence of other possible determinates.

A system-level analysis of public diplomacy would suggest that citizen contributions would have a marginal, if any, effect on decision-makers' actions for appropriations. Likewise, allocations for particular programs by decision-makers in a given state would be a function of itself (Wenz, 1999), and only mitigated by large-scale international actions, such as participation in a war. Domestic-level constructivists would argue that decision-makers' actions are often due in large part to active citizen involvement (Tannenwald, 2005).

Table 1. Relationship of NCIV Donated Resources and of Federal Funding for Professional Exchange Programs 1980-2009 in thousands of 2008 Dollars ( $N = 29$ )

	Model 1 <sup>1</sup>	Model 2	Model 3
Professional Exchanges <sub>t</sub>	.281 (.184)	.558 (.438)	.501 (.402)
NCIV Donated Resources <sub>t</sub>		-1.112 (1.598)	-.157 (1.519)
Prof Exchanges*NCIV Donated Resources			-.001* (.000)
Constant	2,305.0** (623.0)	2,473.00~ (674.0)	2,335.0 (620.0)
R <sup>2</sup>	.086	.104	.280~

~p < .10, \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, \*\*\*p < .001

<sup>1</sup>Unstandardized coefficients

What is initially surprising is that the previous year's congressional appropriation bears no relationship to the current year's appropriation. The expectation is that the previous year's appropriation would have a strong, positive relationship with the current year's appropriation, reflecting typical Congressional action. Even without taking into account other political and economic factors, a relationship should exist (Wlezien, 1996). When appropriations are adjusted for inflation, Model 1 indicates no such relationship. Likewise, Model 1 demonstrates the conception of the state/bureaucratic interpretation of public diplomacy (Arndt, 2004, Tuch, 1990) – one which down-plays the active role of the citizenry and participants in impacting programs' success (in this case, financial success year-to-year). From this we can conclude that a PCE appropriation is not simply a function of itself.

The second step is to include citizen donated resources. Model 2 represents the constructivist view that the active role of participants' and citizens is constitutive to the efficacy of public diplomacy (Mueller, 2006, Scott-Smith, 2004). The expectation is that the inclusion of both the previous year's Congressional appropriation and the previous year's donated resources would provide significant explanatory power for the current year's appropriations, because the best way to explain governmental action is due to ideas. In the case of donated resources, the NCIV network provides a strong

representation of principled beliefs in the efficacy of public diplomacy. Again, there appears to be no such effect. Theory suggests that community donated services will have a strong positive relationship with current PCE appropriations. However, in Model 2, the relationship is negative, and appears to bear no relationship with the current year's appropriations ( $p > .05$ ). As in Model 1, previous year appropriations do not predict current year appropriations. This suggests that the relationship between previous appropriation amounts and community donated resources with current appropriations but must be interpreted in light of other factors.

Nevertheless, prior to proceeding to the consideration of other factors that influence the environment in which citizens and decision-makers act, Model 3 articulates the possible interaction of these two determinates of current appropriations. In one sense, the constructivist theory implies that PCE appropriations and community donated resources are dependent upon one another. The amount Congress appropriates in a given year is dependent upon community participation. Likewise, NCIV donated resources may well vary according to how much Congress appropriates.

The only caveat to this anticipated interplay is that these interactions are arbitrated via the structure of the cooperative agreements, whereby public diplomacy programs are administered by both the public and private sectors. A constructivist view, while taking this into account, contends that it is primarily the private domestic and international sector which mediates the effect of decision-makers actions (Haas, 1992, Kaufmann and Pape, 1999, Tannenwald, 2005). Specifically, the ideational framework connects the actions of private citizens who form an epistemic community as not only influencing the outcome of decisions, but also potentially mediating the decision-process itself. Model 3

has marginally more explanatory power beyond the first two models ( $p < .10$ ). Although the interaction of the citizen donated resources and PCE appropriations is significant ( $p < .001$ ), its effect appears rather small. As in the previous two models, the two main determinates of federal funding for public diplomacy appropriations appear to have no relationship. Thus, the initial models suggest that that any relationship must be considered in the framework of larger domestic and international political, economic, and bureaucratic factors.

*Bureaucratic, Domestic and International Contexts for Public Diplomacy Appropriations*

Domestic constructivism suggests several aspects to the international arena that provide the framework for transmission of principled beliefs. These include (1) the bureaucratic context, where internal processes affect policy outcomes by contributing to the implementation of specific policies, (2) the domestic context, which accounts for the characteristics of decision-makers, as well as the economic environment, and the (3) the international context, where interaction between states which interacts with the domestic context in the transmission of ideas and perception of policy. As previously discussed, public diplomacy programs such as the International Visitor Leadership Program, provide an opportunity to observe decisions in each of these contexts.

My subsequent models include other determinants which affect the decision-making process. Other determinates include economic variables (inflation and unemployment rates), external events (U.S. participation in a war) and measures of presidential and congressional party affiliation (whether the President is Republican, and Democrats in the House under Republican Presidents). I also include two dummy-measures to control for the change in agency administrator of IVLP (1978 and 2000

change from Department of State to the United States Information Agency and back, both lagged by 1 year). I also control in 1991 for the dissolution of the USSR and the establishment of the Independent Republics.

In Model 1 appropriations for Academic Exchanges and the transfer of PCE public diplomacy programs from the U.S. Information Agency to the U.S. Department of State are included to account for bureaucratic changes. For those who focus on the bureaucratic context, the agency transfer of 2000 was considered detrimental to the work of the program (Arndt 2004, Tuch 1990). This suggests that agency change will be negatively associated with PCE appropriations. A focus on epistemic communities suggests that an agency transfer will have a negligible – if any – effect on appropriations. However, appropriations for other programs may be either positively or negatively related. Cultural public diplomacy (such as short-term artist/athlete exchanges) is sometimes used as a response to soften or counteract perception of U.S. policies abroad (Hyde, 200, 2Arndt, 2004, Tuch, 1990). Thus, an increase in this area of public diplomacy, may suggest that decision-makers are attempting to use cultural exchanges as a near-term direct tool, rather than espousing a long-term belief in the increase of mutual understanding. On the other hand, if citizen networks – an epistemic community that influences decision-makers – are efficacious, then increases to academic and cultural exchanges should have a minimal impact on the long-standing programs in PCE appropriations.

In Model 1 we note that the 2000 agency change is related to PCE appropriations ( $p < .01$ ). However, though negligible, relationship is positive. This differs from both the bureaucratic focus (that agency change is related to PCE appropriations, but

negatively), and from the focus on epistemic communities (that agency change should not be related). Appropriations for Academic and Cultural are unrelated to PCE appropriations ( $p > .05$ ). As in the prior analysis, previous year PCE appropriations and community donated resources remain unrelated to the predictor. In light of the lack of relationship of either community donated resources and academic exchanges, it is not possible to evaluate the constructivist viewpoint of how principled beliefs effect decision-makers. Thus, analysis at the bureaucratic level alone appears to be insufficient to explain what determines the level of funding for professional public diplomacy programs.

Model 2 includes political variables, which are commonly associated with analysis at the domestic level. Generally, a Democrat President and Congress, *ceteris paribas*, would be associated with an increase in appropriations (Wlezien, 1996). Model 2 fits with this general conception, although the party of the President bears no relationship to current appropriations. Most notable, is that by accounting for political characteristics of decision-makers, previous year appropriations and community donated resources become significant predictors of current year PCE appropriations. As anticipated, previous year appropriations are positively related to current appropriations ( $p < .05$ ). Unexpectedly, however, is the negative relationship between community donated resources and PCE appropriations. For every \$1,000 increase in NCIV community donated resources there is a corresponding \$3,000 decrease in the amount that Congress appropriates for Professional and Cultural Exchanges ( $p < .05$ ).

Although the relationship speaks to the fact that community donated resources are important for understanding the amount decision-makers appropriate for professional public diplomacy programs, the negative association fails to contribute credibility to the

belief that citizen networks are enhancing decision-makers' belief in long-term public diplomacy. Because the NCIV community donated resources are primarily a result of volunteer activities, any increase suggests that the network is growing. In one sense, constructivist theory posits that as the strength of a network grows, so should the influence of the networks principled belief on decision-makers. A principled belief in the utility of public diplomacy for increasing mutual understanding, should gain strength and cause an increase in the amount decision-makers appropriate for professional public diplomacy programs.<sup>5</sup>

In the event that economic factors influence decision-makers and community donated resources, Model 3 includes measures of inflation and unemployment. The relationship between previous appropriations and donated resources persists when economic factors are accounted for. In fact, accounting for economic variables, community donated resources has a stronger negative relationship with appropriations.

It is possible that Congress is “banking” on the private sector to support professional public diplomacy programs. That is, following the theory of strategic appropriations behavior (Wlezein, 1996, Wladavsky, 1994), Congress deliberately underappropriates monies for public diplomacy, knowing that community donated resources are likely to increase. This theory does not fully explain the observed relationships. Model 3 indicates that for every \$1,000 increase in donated resources, Congress appropriates approximately \$4,000 less each year. This seeming discrepancy in funding may be accounted for by recalling that the NCIV measure is a conservative estimate of donated resources, and likely represents a larger contribution. It is possible,

---

<sup>5</sup> I assessed whether the amount Congress appropriates affects the citizen network, by leading the NCIV community resources measure by a year. There was no relationship ( $p > .05$ ).

therefore, that Congress is accurately anticipating a response for the private sector – thus accounting for the seeming \$3,000 discrepancy. Even assuming that there is a strategic relationship, however, this does not account for the disjuncture with the constructivist theory that principled beliefs should be communicated to decision-makers through a growing network, and those principled beliefs would increase the funds Congress contributes to long-term public diplomacy programs which would enhance mutual understanding and mitigate the problems of misperception in an anarchic arena.

A structural constructivist approach largely ignores the bureaucratic and domestic effects on decision-making. Public diplomacy, by operating at both the domestic and international arenas, demonstrates the utility of the domestic constructivist approach by accounting for primarily domestic means for mitigating misperception in the international arena. In Model 4 an international measure – one taken into account by structural constructivism – is included, as well as the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) – a domestic policy change in budgeting.<sup>6</sup> By accounting for GPRA and participation in war, the relationship between previous year appropriations and current appropriations become stronger. Whereas in Model 3, a \$1,000 appropriation from the previous year predicted a \$1,800 increase for the current year, in Model 4 it predicts a \$2,600 increase for every \$1,000 of the previous year ( $p < .01$ ). The negative relationship between NCIV persists, and in fact has nearly double the impact that it had in Model 2 ( $p < .001$ ).

Both participation in a war and GPRA are negatively associated with current year appropriations. Because war may cause increased desire to change the perception of

---

<sup>6</sup> The GPRA legislation primarily acted as a new budgeting mechanism, and would have been implemented that year. Consequently, I did not include a lag on the measure.

U.S., we would anticipate a positive relationship between war and PCE appropriations. In fact, there is no relationship. Notably, in the international context (state-to-state interaction), appropriations for Academic and Cultural Exchanges (ACE) becomes a significant predictor of current year PCE appropriations. It is possible that monies are channeled to some of the short-term cultural exchange programs in the ACE appropriation. A thousand-dollar increase in the ACE appropriation is associated with a seven-hundred decrease in the PCE appropriation ( $p < .01$ ). Accounting for the presence of war also enables us to see that the political make-up of Congress is a good predictor of PCE appropriations. Generally, a Democrat-controlled Congress will appropriate approximately \$3,000 more than a Republican-controlled Congress (regardless of the President's political affiliation).

Thus, although U.S. participation in a war does not have a direct bearing on how much is appropriated for PCE, accounting for the war, clarifies the relationship of domestic political/economic factors, as well as the dense bureaucratic context. By assessing these factors' on appropriations for professional public diplomacy programs such as the International Visitor Leadership Program in concert, the utility of public diplomacy for international relations theorizing is apparent.

Model 5 enables a better understanding of the impact of the change in agency in 2000. Change in the agency that administers professional public diplomacy programs did not have a unitary effect on PCE appropriations. In fact, the positive effect of program administration change from USIA to Department of State ultimately resulted in a loss of funding. Overall, the new administrative framework appears to have had a negative impact on PCE appropriations, corresponding to the focus on the bureaucratic context

(Arndt, 2004, Tuch, ). No other measure had this effect on PCE appropriations. Both domestic constructivist theory and the nature of the cooperative contract that administers professional public diplomacy programs would suggest that PCE appropriations and community donated resources would be dependent upon one another, but this was not the case. This suggests that beliefs of citizen epistemic communities and legislation is not as important as domestic constructivists might suggest.

Table 2. Determinates of Federal Funding for Professional Exchange Programs 1980-2009 in thousands of 2008 Dollars ( $N = 29$ )

	Model 1 <sup>1</sup>	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Professional Exchanges <sub>-1</sub>	.486 (.553)	1.50* (.625)	1.82** (.476)	.63*** (.562)	2.63*** (.562)
NCIV Donated Resources <sub>-1</sub>	-2.15 (1.48)	-3.62* (1.48)	-4.36** (1.13)	-5.27*** (1.11)	-5.27*** (1.11)
Academic Exchanges <sub>-1</sub>	.213 (.225)	-.304 (.278)	-.377~ (.212)	.761** (.256)	-.761** (.256)
2000 Agency Change <sup>2</sup>	3322.59** (1437.09)	3090.11* (1350.04)	4630.89** (1202.87)	4665.92** (1129.42)	--
President (Democrat)		-143.11 (584.70)	-444.37 (458.66)	-682.64 (491.06)	-682.64 (491.06)
Congress (Democrat)		2019.52* (795.38)	2223.06** (609.26)	3241.87*** (709.54)	3241.87*** (709.54)
Inflation (%) <sub>-1</sub> <sup>3</sup>			4.28~ (2.03)	3.66~ (1.92)	3.66 (1.92)
Unemployment (%) <sub>-1</sub> <sup>4</sup>			72.8 (175.06)	69.4 (169.25)	69.4 (169.25)
War <sup>5</sup>				-169.24 (443.42)	-169.24 (443.42)
GPRA 1993				-2798.64* (1208.59)	-2798.64~ (1208.59)
Prof Exchange*2000 Agency Change					-4.42** (1.07)
Constant	2550.2** (663.4)	2322.00* (823.88)	1840.12 (1316.00)	1851.54 (1224.38)	1851.54 (1224.38)
R <sup>2</sup>	.338~	.516~	.749**	.815**	0.815**

~p < .10, \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, \*\*\*p < .001

<sup>1</sup>Unstandardized coefficients

<sup>2</sup>Transfer of programs and funding from United States Information Agency to United States Department of State. Agency transfer showed no appreciable difference in effects before/after the 2000 transfer.

<sup>3</sup>The average rate of unemployment during the last 6 months of the fiscal year<sub>t-1</sub>

<sup>4</sup>The annualized percentage change in the Consumer Price Index during the last 6 months of the fiscal year<sub>t-1</sub>

<sup>5</sup>US participation in high profile wars (includes Bosnian conflict and Iraq).

### *Modeling Decision-Making: PART as a test of idea*

If the previous models provided an analysis of the context in which decisions are made, the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) provides an opportunity to demonstrate the effect of measurement on difficult-to-measure concepts. As earlier mentioned, the ability to measure human-interaction across borders, let alone the utility

of a particular public diplomacy program, is quite difficult. To follow the constructivist approach in international relations analysis, and attempt to isolate beliefs as causal – or at least crucial – to a particular outcome, including some “test” is fruitful. As in previous studies, where decision-makers’ principled beliefs caused them to act in such a way as to somehow challenge the status quo, the effect of principled beliefs’ on decision-makers actions may be assessed with the help of PART.

The implementation of PART may not appear to have any effect on the amount that is appropriated for professional public diplomacy programs. In fact, the inclusion of PART in the previous models indicated that there was no relationship between PART and the amount appropriated ( $p > .05$ ). This suggests that despite public diplomacy’s challenge to provide a clear material outcome for its’ programs, the belief in these programs is strong enough for both the domestic epistemic community and decision-makers’ principled beliefs to continue to contribute resources. But is this enough to conclude that principled beliefs have carried the day?

Another method of analysis is to compare federal programs similar to public diplomacy, and consider the extent to which funding varies by program after the implementation of PART. If appropriations remain the same for all programs, then it would be difficult to consider principled beliefs as key to funding. In other words, a better “test” of principled ideas’ role in appropriations for public diplomacy is to see how they fair in comparison to programs where principled beliefs are not considered as crucial for funding. An approximation of this test is possible by differentiating between Academic and Cultural Exchange programs and Professional and Cultural Exchange programs. Academic and Cultural Exchange programs tend to gain much of their funding

due to the “reactive” nature of public diplomacy – short-term programs that respond to perception problems in the international arena. Consequently, principled beliefs should not be as crucial for congressional funding, as additional monies are frequently appropriated for “last-minute” programs to address a domestic or international situation.

In Table 3, I consider appropriation levels for these two sets of programs with and without the inclusion of PART. Model 1 includes measures for citizen donated resources, bureaucratic change, political and economic, as well as international factors. The data indicate that domestic factors play the largest role in explaining program appropriations. The inclusion of PART in Model 2, however, demonstrates that the implementation of PART had a positive effect for public diplomacy programs. On average, appropriations after the implementation of PART were higher for programs, such as the IVLP than before the implementation of PART. Political factors continue to have a strong association with public diplomacy appropriations, but now a Democrat President or Congress, *ceteris paribus*, is associated with a decrease in funding, rather than increase ( $p < .05$ ).

The inclusion of PART in Model 2 provides more explanatory power for the difference in funding between Academic and Professional exchange programs, and also is strongly associated with program funding ( $p < .001$ ). NCIV community donated resources bear no relationship to different levels of funding between the exchange programs. Similarly, by accounting for PART, inflation no longer is related to program appropriations. A Democrat president appears to be related to a decrease in funding of professional exchanges ( $p < .05$ ). PART however, has a positive effect on funding ( $p < .001$ ), which may mean that measurement of a program matters – even for difficult to

measure programs, such as IVLP. Although this may initially appear that belief in long-standing professional programs is growing, the interpretation is, in fact, ambiguous. The measurement of a program such as IVLP should not necessarily result in any funding action – positive or negative. A pessimist may view this as justification to say that principled beliefs are not the impetus for funding at all. An optimist may interpret this as a growing trend of belief in the exchanges epistemic community throughout the domestic U.S. political sector, culminating in an expression of approval for these programs.

Table 3. Effect of the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) on Appropriation Levels for Academic and Cultural Exchanges and for Professional and Cultural Exchanges in thousands of dollars. ( $N = 54$ )

	Model 1 <sup>1</sup>	Model 2
NCIV Donated Resources <sub>-1</sub>	-.850 (1.76)	-1.53 (1.36)
2000 Agency Change <sup>2</sup>	-25,400 (32,700)	-9,940 (25,200)
President (Democrat)	14,600* (22,500)	-51,700* (20,900)
Congress (Democrat)	20,200 (15,600)	-31,500* (15,100)
Inflation (%) <sub>-1</sub> <sup>3</sup>	-9,787* 4,556	-4,765 (3,611)
Unemployment (%) <sub>-1</sub> <sup>4</sup>	-10,900 (6,435)	-5,088 (5,047)
War <sup>5</sup>	20,100 (19,500)	-4,765 (3,611)
GPRA 1993	-8,161 (42,000)	-46,900 (32,900)
PART <sub>-1</sub> <sup>6</sup>		97,600*** (17,400)
Constant	140,000** (45,100)	162,000*** (34,900)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.3606**	0.6315***

~p < .10, \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, \*\*\*p < .001

<sup>1</sup>Unstandardized coefficients

### Conclusion

There is a clear connection between private citizens' contributions and the funding of public diplomacy programs such as the IVLP. Although public sector state actors' funding decisions are not dependent upon the private sector contributions, the impact of the private sector is apparent. Despite changes in the international and

domestic arenas, funding from both the citizen community groups and decision-makers remains relatively stable.

As suggested by domestic constructivism, private citizens' contributions play a key role in determining federal funding of public diplomacy programs. The data implies that appropriations alone do not account for the amount of funding public diplomacy programs receive each year. Citizen contributions are crucial for understanding funding pattern. Regardless of political, economic, and international factors, appropriations are best understood in concert with citizen contributions. Surprisingly, current year citizen contributions have a negative effect on next year appropriations. This may be explained by the concept of strategic underappropriations (Wlezein, 1996, Wladavsky, 1994). Congress deliberately appropriates less monies for the following fiscal year, anticipating that the citizen network throughout the United States will make up the difference. This would explain the trend that NCIV citizen contributions mirror federal appropriations.

However, unlike the dependent relationship that constructivism posits exists between decision-makers and other domestic and international networks which transmit principled beliefs, federal funding of public diplomacy programs is not dependent upon citizen contributions. Both domestic constructivist theory and the nature of the cooperative contract that administers professional public diplomacy programs would suggest that PCE appropriations and community donated resources would be dependent upon one another, but this was not the case. This suggests that belief in citizen epistemic communities and legislation is not as important as domestic constructivists might suggest.

Two scenarios would explain this disjuncture between model funding behavior and theory. It is possible, that NCIV funding is an insufficient measure to explain

funding patterns. By excluding measure, such as the size of public diplomacy participant networks, a key component of funding may be missing. This scenario seems unlikely, in that the NCIV contribution represents citizen volunteer contributions. Volunteering time and contributing resources generally is a hallmark of principled belief. Decision-makers have limited interaction with the international epistemic network, and the size and growth of the participant network has not been utilized as a primary method of appeal for further funding.

The second scenario is that principled beliefs are not transmitted in the context that the models were set up to depict. It is possible that decision-makers have already adopted a belief that interaction across borders is beneficial for mutual understanding. Thus, the presence of citizen contributions is a reinforcing, rather than persuasive, factor in the amount Congress appropriates. Assuming that social interaction and perception are mutable – the double-edged sword of constructivism -- it is possible that Congress could be persuaded otherwise. The international, system-level constructivist perspective is controlled for, largely by the nature of public diplomacy itself, and thus does not pose a difficulty in considering the impact of principled beliefs. Thus, to determine whether principled beliefs are adopted “once and for all”, or are dependent upon social interaction to be maintained, a longer time-series of data is required.

Principled beliefs appear to play a role in the amount appropriated for public diplomacy programs, because funding remains stable despite the introduction of performance based measurement of federal programs (i.e., PART). The introduction of PART would be anticipated in a neoliberal context as a policy intervention which would decrease funding. As previously mentioned, a negative interpretation that PART and

performance based budgeting have no effect on either citizen contributions, nor appropriations, is that principled beliefs play no role at all. Rather, appropriations are determined through incremental changes. The positive interpretation is that decision-makers have fully adopted the principled belief in the usefulness of an international epistemic community that promotes mutual understanding.

A closer analysis shows that PART did not have the same effect on all public diplomacy programs. Programs which are more “reactionary” (i.e., tend to receive additional appropriations to counteract negative perception of the United States abroad), tend to benefit from PART, more than “stable” programs. Stable programs, such as IVLP, tend to receive \$100,000 less/year than reactionary programs. Thus, it appears that PART did, indeed, have some effect on public diplomacy programs. Because PART had a differential effect on appropriations, it appears that decision-makers distinguish between types of programs. This distinguishing suggests that the stable funding for programs such as IVLP, may be dependent citizen contributions.

Although a dependent relationship was not represented between the two funding streams, the notion of strategic underappropriations, suggests both an awareness by decision-makers of the ability of domestic networks to fill the funding gap, and a predictable funding pattern. Perhaps professional exchange programs are not subject to the vagaries of the international and political arena. Further analysis, which includes the growth of the IVLP participant network may assist in understanding funding levels. Despite the difference between these types of programs, it is clear that domestic constructivism may be used to analyze principled beliefs. Likewise, the domestic funding of programs that are essentially international in nature provides a fruitful middle-

ground for international relations theorizing. Further exploration of public diplomacy programs would provide empirical evidence for constructivist contention that social interaction is mutable and that beliefs may play either a beneficial, or deleterious role in the promotion of mutual understanding across borders.

## References

- Arndt, R. (2004). *The First Resort of Kings*. Washington DC: Potomac Books, Inc.
- Axelrod, Robert, and Keohane, Robert O. (1993) Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. In D. Baldwin (Ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Executive Branch Management Scorecard, Fiscal Year 2008, 4th Quarter. (2008). Retrieved November 21, 2008 [www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/FY08Q4-SCORECARD.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/FY08Q4-SCORECARD.pdf).
- Executive Branch Management Scorecard: 2001 Baseline Evaluation. (2001). Retrieved [http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/original\\_scorecard.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/original_scorecard.pdf) November 21, 2008.
- Finnemore, M. (1996). *National Interests in International Society*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- Glaser, Charles L. (1994). "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security*, 19:3, pp.50-90.
- Gregory, B. (2008). "Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field", *The Annals of the American Academy of Social Science* March 2008.
- Haas, P. M. (1992). "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 1.
- Hyde, H. J. (2002). Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, "Speaking to Our Silent Allies: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy", *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Retrieved November 21, 2008 <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4hyde.htm>).
- Kaufmann, Chaim, D. and Pape, Robert A. (1999). "Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade" *International Organization* 46:2, 631-668.
- Kuhn, T. (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Jervis, Robert. (1999). "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security*, 24:1, 42-63).

- Jervis, Robert. (1997). *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mearsheimer, J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Press.
- Milner, H. (1993) The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique. In D. Baldwin (Ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Mueller, S. L. (2006). Professional Exchanges, Citizen Diplomacy, and Credibility. In W. P. Keihl, *America's Dialogue with the World*. Public Diplomacy Council: Washington, DC.
- The President's Management Agenda, Fiscal Year 2002 (2002). *Executive Office of the President Office of Management and Budget*. Retrieved November 21, 2008 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf>.
- Roberts, W. R. (2006). The Evolution of Diplomacy, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 17 (3); 55-64.
- Scott-Smith, G. (2003). "Her Rather Ambitious Washington Program': Margaret Thatcher's International Visitor Program Visit to the United States in 1967," *British Contemporary History* 17.4.
- Tannenwald, Nina. (2005). "Ideas and Explanations: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 7, Spring, 13-42.
- True, James L. (2000). "Avalanches and Incrementalism: Making Policy and Budgets in the United States", *ARPA*, March.
- Tuch, Hans M. (1990). *Communicating With the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*. Washington: Georgetown University.
- U.S. Advisory Commission on Information (1974). "Stanton Panel Reports," 27th Report, July 1974, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- U.S. Department of State, Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. (2000). *Field Survey of Public Diplomacy Programs* Washington D.C.: GPO.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office (2004). "Performance Budgeting: OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool Presents Opportunities and Challenges For Budget and Performance Integration." GAO-04-439T .

- United States Information Agency Alumni Association (2002). "What Is Public Diplomacy?" Retrieved November 20, 2008 [www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm](http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm).
- U.S. Department of State. (1987). *Dictionary of International Relations Terms*, Washington, D.C.
- Von Trott zu Soz, Levin, et al. (2003). *Contours of a "New World Order"?: American and European Perspectives*, Korber-Stiftung: Hamburg.
- Van der Knaap, P. "Performance Management and Policy Evaluation in the Netherlands: Towards an Integrated Approach," Ministry of Finance, The Hague.
- Wendt, A. (1992) "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics" *International Organization* 46:2.
- Wendt, A. (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wildavsky, Aaron. (1984). *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Wleizien, Christopher. (1996). "The President, Congress, and Appropriation, 1951 – 1985", *American Politics Quarterly*, 24:1, 42-67.