Accommodationists versus Hardliners in Slovakia: Correlates of Public Opinion on Selected Foreign Policy Topics 2004—2010

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes public opinion on selected foreign policy topics in Slovakia during the 2004—2010 period. It applies the concept of a hard—soft continuum and attempts to analyze which personal level characteristics are good predictors of whether people become more hardline or more accommodationist in their opinions on foreign policy. The models include the perception of the importance of NATO, the concern over the threat of terrorism and the preference of economic to military power as the dependent variables, with the independent variables being age, education, gender, time factors, and interactive terms. Using independently pooled cross-sectional data and OLS regressions with clustered standard errors, the research shows that public opinion on foreign policy in Slovakia can be estimated to varying extents from given independent variables. It also shows significant differences in the pre-2006 and post-2007 trends and indicates that as years pass, the Slovak population is on average becoming more favorable of military power, less concerned with terrorism and more inclined to think of NATO as still being essential for Slovakia's security.
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1. Introduction

Although public opinion on foreign policy has long been one of the main focuses of foreign policy analysis in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in Western European political science, this topic has been rather under-researched in countries where the study of political science has been suppressed for decades due to the non-democratic nature of their governments. At the same time, with these countries recently gaining access to key international organizations such as the EU and NATO, knowledge and analysis of their foreign policies, including domestic sources of foreign policy, such as, but not limited to, public opinion, is if not more important than ever before, then much needed at the very least. There are surveys which attempt to capture public opinion on foreign policy in these countries; the body of secondary sources analyzing these survey data is nevertheless quite limited. This is certainly the case in the Slovak Republic, which started to form its independent foreign policy as late as 1993, after the “Velvet Divorce”, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.

The proposed research therefore aims to bridge this gap by focusing on the factors that may be linked to individual attitudes toward foreign policy issues in the Slovak public, especially to individuals’ positions on a so-called hard-soft continuum. It will examine how and whether public opinion on topics such as the importance of NATO, the preference of economic to military power and the awareness of the threat of terrorism are a function of certain individual-level characteristics such as education and age and how this relationship has varied over recent years.

I will first present some essential background on the development of Slovak foreign policy from 1993 until 2011, together with ideas on how different periods of Slovak foreign policy making may resonate with the public. I will subsequently discuss a theoretical basis for the research, that is, the literature on the relationship between individual-level characteristics and foreign policy attitudes, and will then proceed to methodology and data analysis. In the end, I will discuss the findings and limitations of this research.

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1 See Chapter 3.
2. Slovak Foreign Policy from the Velvet Divorce to the Government Collapse over Greek Bailout

Slovak foreign policy can be essentially divided into four main periods. The first of these would be the early years (1993—1994) right after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, followed by the period of international isolation under the third government of Vladimir Mečiar (1994—1998). Post-1998, Slovak foreign policy was defined by a zealous effort to become a member of the EU and NATO (1998—2004) under two governments of Mikuláš Dzurinda (1998—2002 and 2002—2006). After becoming a member of both international organizations in 2004, post-integration Slovak foreign policy was a product of the first government led by Robert Fico (2006—2010), a short period of government led by Iveta Radičová (2010—2012) and by the second Robert Fico government (2012—present). In the following pages, I will introduce Slovak foreign policy from 1993 to 2011, together with the implications of the analysis of foreign policy attitudes of the Slovak public.

2.1 1993—1998: The Early Years and the Isolation under Vladimír Mečiar’s Government

After more than a half-century of coexistence, the Czech and Slovak Republics separated from each other in 1993. This “Velvet Divorce” followed the Velvet Revolution in 1989 which marked the end of communist rule of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and the so-called Hyphen War in 1990 which resulted in the name of the country being changed to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic².

Since then, the two countries have been forming their policies independently. During 1993 and 1994, after becoming a distinct legal entity, the Slovak Republic started to

²The Hyphen War in the spring of 1990 was "the issue that best demonstrated the symbolic content of the Slovak Question [...]. With the collapse of the socialist system, the name of the Federation, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, had to be changed to reflect the new political circumstances. Slovak members of the Federal Parliament protested against Havel’s first suggestion to merely omit the word 'Socialist'. Instead, they supported the name the Czech-Slovak Republic: a name that would underline the equal status of the two constituent republics. Czecho-Slovak was unacceptable to many Czechs, however, as the hyphenated name had been the name of post-Munich Czechoslovakia (the 1938-39 Second Republic). A temporary solution, with the name written without a hyphen in Czech and with one but without a capital’s in Slovak (thus the Czecho-slovak Federal Republic), only inflamed popular passions in both republics. The dispute was solved only after a two-month long and bitter struggle with the adoption of a new compromise name: The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic." (Hilde 1999: 654)
form its foreign policy, as well as institutional framework thereof and the bilateral ties with other countries. In this period of massive structural changes, its foreign service came into existence, basic treaties were signed, and embassies were established. In the midst of the political turmoil – the country was dealing with an enormous agenda that resulted from the separation of the former federation, such as the division of the federation's assets and the beginnings of the transition to a democratic system$^3$ and a market-based economy – there was a need to define foreign policy priorities as well as decide on the overarching orientation of the new state.

At the same time, Western analysts were offering their takes on what needed to be done in order to make the new European architecture stable. In 1991, Charles Gati identified the removal of trade barriers, encouragement of private businesses to explore new opportunities in the region, “aggressive promotion of democratic values by diplomatic means” and encouragement of regional cooperation among the main tasks for the Western governments, including the U.S. government in order to make “east-central Europe [...] increasingly prosperous and increasingly democratic.” (Gati 1991: 143—145)

Back in Slovakia, the priorities were mostly defined in terms of full integration to the European Union as well as membership and overall strategic anchorage in international security structures, mainly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Obviously, smooth, equal and mutually profitable relationships with the neighboring countries were also high on the list.

Slovakia had six ministers of foreign affairs between 1990 and 1994. Milan Kňažko from the movement Public against Violence who held the office from 1990 to 1991 was followed by Ján Čarnogurský from the Christian Democratic Movement (in office for two months in 1991). Pavol Demeš, unaffiliated with any political party, served as a minister of foreign affairs in 1991—1992, followed again by Milan Kňažko who by then had joined the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. Despite the fact that the foreign policy leadership was unstable at that time, all these ministers, as well as Jozef Moravčík (MDS, in office 1993—1994), Eduard Kukan (Democratic Union of Slovakia, March—December 1994) and Juraj

$^3$ For analyses of various aspects of democratic transition of Slovakia, see for example Szomolányi, Gould 1997; Harris 2010: 186—194; Wolchik 2011. For analyses of Slovak politics, see Kopeček 2006; Kopeček 2007; Hloušek, Kopeček 2010.

This early period of Slovak foreign policy-making immediately after the dissolution of the federation was therefore unique in the degree to which foreign policy issues were subsumed by other topics of enormous importance. An overarching pro-Western orientation was nevertheless set and even though public opinion on foreign policy in this period is not the focus of this analysis, it was undoubtedly an important era that, at least to some extent, laid down a basis for later public support of Slovakia’s membership in the EU and the NATO⁴.

However, the government of Vladimír Mečiar (MDS, Prime Minister from 1994 to 1998) stirred much criticism towards Slovakia from abroad as the foreign policy started to shift away from Euro-Atlantic orientation towards Russia (see for example Candole 1994) and doubts concerning the democratic nature of the country emerged. The opposition’s lack of representation in the important controlling bodies, threats to media independence, deficiencies in minority rights, together with a problematic privatization and overall instability of the political environment, led to a weakening of the ties between Slovakia and the West and eventually to Slovak isolation in 1997. A number of scandals—such as the abduction of the then-president Michal Kováč’s son, Michal Kováč Junior, to Austria, presumably organized by the Slovak Information Service (the Slovak intelligence agency), or the murder of Róbert Remiáš, a 26-year-old former policeman who played a key role in the investigation of the above, only highlighted the seriousness of the situation⁵. To sum up, despite the fact that “the third Mečiar government declared in 1994 that joining the EU was its foremost foreign policy task⁶, it practiced “formal compliance,” promising but not

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⁴ This may be true to varying extent for different groups of society – I would expect there to be a cleavage especially between the strong supporters of the former regime and the rest. The former group would be probably more likely to oppose the membership in those organizations as well as the pro-Western orientation of the country and vice versa, the opponents of the pre-1989 regime may have been significantly more supportive of the ties between Slovakia and the West. This is just a speculation though as there is no data, as far as I am aware, available to subject these ideas to further testing.

⁵ For a detailed treatise on the SIS scandals and related developments see Lesná 1998 and Lesná 2001. For a treatise on the figure of Vladimír Mečiar see Leško 1996.

⁶ More precisely, the Government Declaration of the Slovak Republic from December 13, 1994 states that “in a foreign policy domain, the government of the Slovak Republic will unambiguously maintain the continuity of its orientation. We want to draw upon the existing policy of rapprochement to the European and transatlantic
delivering improvements [...]. It also practiced “selective compliance”, tasking government agencies to adopt large tracts of the acquis, all the while violating basic democratic standards. [...] In the case of Slovakia, the EU restorted to the “demarche” – a formal diplomatic note criticizing actions taken by the government – as a tool for active leverage. The demarches were unsuccessful in compelling the Mečiar government to end chauvinist and corrupt practices [...]” (Vachudova 2005: 156).

Failure to meet democratic standards and the troublesome process of a transition from a centrally planned to a market-driven economy through wild privatization and a coupon privatization also led to a failure to convince foreign investors to enter the market and to an increased connectedness between the government and the private sector. As a result, Slovakia found itself in isolation by 1997, with bilateral relations being maintained on only a very basic level.

Unsurprisingly, these developments influenced the process of accession to NATO as well. At the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997, the backwardness of Slovakia was confirmed as the General Secretary of NATO Javier Solana announced that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland should be invited to NATO, while Slovakia was not invited to start the accession talks until 2002. The fact that Slovakia was unable to keep up with the rest of the Visegrad Four in the process of NATO accession is undoubtedly attributable to political, security and economic structures as well as to intensify this policy and to emphasize our determination to become a full member of these organizations.” (Government Office of the Slovak Republic 1994)

The term ‘acquis’ refers to acquis communautaire, “the rights and obligations that EU countries share. The ‘acquis’ includes all the EU’s treaties and laws, declarations and resolutions, international agreements on EU affairs and the judgments given by the Court of Justice. It also includes action that EU governments take together in the area of ‘justice and home affairs’ and on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. ‘Accepting the acquis’ therefore means taking the EU as you find it. Candidate countries have to accept the ‘acquis’ before they can join the EU, and make EU law part of their own national legislation.” (EU 2012)

For a more thorough analysis of privatization and economic transition in Slovakia see for example Fisher 2006.

9 For a chronology of the Slovak accession to NATO, see NATO 2004. For a “definitive account of the ideas, politics and diplomacy that went into the historic decision to expand NATO to Central and Eastern Europe” written by a “high-level insider”, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, see the book by Ronald Asmus (Asmus 2002), who was also “one of the earliest advocates and intellectual architects of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe”. For various analyses of Slovak accession to NATO see Ješko, Palacka 1997; Bútora, Šebej 1998; and Bílčík, Bútorová, Gyarfášová et al. 2005.

10 The Visegrad Four (V4 or The Visegrad Group) is an international organization of a regional scope that comprises the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. It “reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central European region to work together in a number of fields of common interest within the all-European integration. [...] The Visegrad Group wishes to contribute towards building the European security architecture
the “behavior of the Slovak decision-making institutions in the years before, their reflection of Slovakia’s security position and of the security constellation in Europe” (Samson 1999: 2). This failure is, I believe, also a critical moment in this analysis, in spite of the fact that it happened beyond the range of data analyzed in this paper. It can be said that this development resonated with the public as well, since public support for NATO membership was declining in a given period. In April 1996, as little as 37.8 percent of Slovaks supported Slovakia’s joining NATO, as opposed to 42.5 percent in December 1995 and at the same time, 25.3 percent opposed NATO entry, in comparison to 19.2 percent in June 1995 (Simon 2003: 165).

Similarly, Slovakia also failed to keep up with the EU enlargement process in 1997 when the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997 decided to launch the opening negotiations with the first group of candidate countries, the so-called “Luxembourg countries” – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus – on March 31, 1998 (European Commission 2011). This additional proof of Slovakia’s backwardness during Vladimír Mečiar’s government highlighted the degree to which the country had established itself as suffering from more serious problems than just a rocky path toward contemporary democracy.

By 1998, Mečiar’s role became even stronger. During the period, Slovak foreign policy suffered from the fact that twenty-eight ambassadors were renounced while at the same time key embassies—such as in Germany and in neighboring Ukraine—remained unstaffed; in Kyiv, there has been no Slovak ambassador since June 1996 (Balmaceda 2001: 99).11 Needless to say, vacant ambassador post in a neighboring country for such a prolonged period of time is hardly in line with a pursuit of a successful bilateral relationship and bilateral relationships between Slovakia and the neighboring countries were just as problematic as the country’s relationship with the countries further West.

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To sum up, by October 1998, Slovakia found itself in the least favorable foreign policy situation in its post-1993 history, with virtually no real partners abroad, no international security anchorage, difficult economic situation, failing or rather not even attempting to truly reach the milestones of a democratization process and just as far from the European Union, the NATO, and even its immediate neighbors as pre-1989, if not further. The 1998 elections were therefore crucial in determining whether this trend would continue, or whether would it be reversed.

2.2 1998—2006: Two Governments of Mikuláš Dzurinda – EU and NATO Member in the Making

The 1998 elections\textsuperscript{12} brought change in government together with a change in the overarching orientation of Slovak foreign policy. After Mikuláš Dzurinda (from then-Christian Democratic Movement, which was part of the election coalition called Slovak Democratic Coalition) became the Prime Minister and Eduard Kukan (then-DUS, part of the SDC as well) became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the government made a significant effort to catch up on the accession processes to both the EU and NATO, and to overcome the negative image of Slovakia caused by the preceding government (see for example BBC 1998). The effort was in general appreciated abroad even though there was a strong emphasis on the need for the changes to be of a more permanent nature.

The new orientation of Slovak foreign policy was emphasized by the country’s official stance towards the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, when the Slovak government granted unlimited access by NATO aircraft to Slovakia’s air space\textsuperscript{13}, despite this decision not being unequivocally supported by the entire coalition nor it being popular with the public. Even though this period was not entirely successful and the country did not manage to meet all of its foreign policy goals – for example, it failed to become a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for 2000—2001 – Slovakia managed to join the OECD in 2000. This partial foreign policy success was a definite preview of the eventual accession to the EU and the NATO.

\textsuperscript{12} For analyses of Slovak 1998 elections, see Mesežnikov 1998; Bútora, Bútorová, Mesežnikov 1999; and Bútora, Bútorová, Fisher, Mesežnikov 1999.

\textsuperscript{13} For more details on Slovak attitude towards Kosovo crisis, see for example Samson in Bebler 2010: 45—48.
The continuity of this trend was nevertheless dependent on the outcome of the 2002 elections which stirred much interest in Slovakia as well as among the international community. Charles Gati expressed his concerns about the outcome of the election in the Summer 2002 issue of The National Interest: „[In Slovakia] more than half a dozen parties make up a proWestern [sic] but highly fragmented coalition [...]. The government, led by Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, has worked hard to meet NATO’s expectations, and it has also done a remarkably effective job getting the country ready to enter the European Union. Yet with elections scheduled for September 2002, two months before NATO’s Prague summit, this unwieldy coalition will almost surely unravel because the necessary reforms it has carried out have eroded its political base. The worst possibility is that Vladimir Mečiar, the authoritarian former prime minister whose Movement for a Democratic Slovakia continues to lead in the polls, will return to power. (Washington, to its credit, made it clear earlier this year that a Slovakia with Mečiar at the helm will not be invited to join NATO.)“ (Gati 2002: 79-88)

However, the concerns of Gati and others did not materialize and the results of the parliamentary election in 2002 allowed for the trend of rapprochement between Slovakia and the EU as well as NATO to continue – even though the party led by Mikuláš Dzurinda, The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union, came in second with 15.1% of eligible votes after MDS led by the 1994 – 1998 Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar with 19.5%. Mečiar was nonetheless unable to form a coalition and therefore Mikuláš Dzurinda continued to hold the office of the Prime Minister in the period of 1998 – 2002 after forming a “relatively homogenous coalition government with three small right-wing and center-wing parties“ (Balík, Kopeček 2002).

Another important development in the 2002 election was the participation of the newly formed party Smer (Direction) led by Robert Fico. The party, originally presented as “a subject attempting to de-ideologize Slovak politics, cease the political vengeance, establish order and a rule of experts“ (Balík, Kopeček 2002) came in third with 13.5% of votes. Paradoxically, Smer attempted to be viewed as a new non-ideological subject and a chance for new personalities while at the same time it was led by Robert Fico, former vice
chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left (ibid.)\textsuperscript{14}, which was a successor of the Communist Party of Slovakia, of which Robert Fico was also a member in 1987 – 1990. Aside from Robert Fico, the leading personalities of Smer included Dušan Čaplovič (member of the Communist Party of Slovakia until 1990, later member of PDL), Milan Murgaš (member of the Communist Party of Slovakia until 1990), Boris Zala (leader of Social Democratic Party of Slovakia in 1990—1992 and later one of the founders of the platform called The Revival of Social Democracy which was inclined to cooperation with Mečiar’s MDS) and Monika Beňová, also formerly closely linked to MDS. Smer was formally oriented towards modern European leftism. The statement was nevertheless rather formal as the populist rhetoric towards the public prevailed. (ibid.)

Shortly after the elections, the EAPC\textsuperscript{15} summit in November 2002 took place in Prague. Slovakia was, together with six other countries, invited to start the NATO accession talks with the view of joining the Alliance during the NATO Summit. (NATO 2004) However, public support for NATO still remained relatively weak – in early 2000, 39.5% supported membership with 49.3% opposed. (Simon 2003: 211) At the same time, of the 52.15% of eligible Slovaks who participated in the referendum on the EU membership, fully 92.46% supported the idea in May 2003, resulting in congratulatory letters from major international political figures (BBC 2003). The second Dzurinda’s government finally capped both the EU and NATO accession processes and Slovakia became a member of NATO on March 29, 2004 and shortly thereafter joined the EU on May 1, 2004.

\textsuperscript{14} For an analysis of the Party of the Democratic Left, see Kopeček 2002.
\textsuperscript{15} The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is a “multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues among Allies and Partner countries. It provides the overall political framework for NATO’s cooperation with Partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, and for the bilateral relationships developed between NATO and individual Partner countries under the Partnership for Peace programme. EAPC members regularly exchange views on current political and security-related issues, including the evolving security situations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, where peacekeepers from Allied and Partner countries are deployed together. Established in 1997, the EAPC succeeded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was set up in 1991 just after the end of the Cold War. This decision reflected NATO’s desire to build a security forum better suited for a more enhanced and operational partnership, matching the increasingly sophisticated relationships being developed with Partner countries.” (NATO 2012) In addition to NATO Member countries, EAPC consists of the following partner countries: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Malta, The Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. (ibid.)
Post-2004, the government of Mikuláš Dzurinda continued the trend of intensifying the relationships between Slovakia and the international economic and security structures and also succeeded in fulfilling the obligations resulting from those memberships. Aside from the obvious economic and security benefits, the integration into these structures also provided Slovakia with a basis for redefining its interests towards countries that were not NATO or EU members. The discussion about the post-2004 priorities started around 2002 (Najšlová 2011: 107) and they were soon defined mostly in terms of spreading the democratic values further to the East and South of Slovakia, with special focus on assisting Ukraine in the process of democratic transition and contributing to the stabilization of the Western Balkans\textsuperscript{16} as well as playing an active part in the execution of EU and NATO policies towards these countries. (Kovačovská 2008a)

The post-2004 period is therefore marked by a boost in the normative, value-based dimension of Slovak foreign policy; both in terms of its goals abroad and internally in terms of increased participation of non-governmental actors in the process of foreign policy making. For example, the Slovak Foreign Policy Association organized, as a key foreign policy think-tank, a number of conferences and hearings with representatives of Slovak ministries, including international events that involved joint brainstorming by think-tankers – these debates provided opportunities for brainstorming in regard to the prioritization of geographical regions of operation as well as their thematic focus (Najšlová 2011: 107)\textsuperscript{17}. As for public opinion during the period, I would expect the perception of the importance of NATO for Slovak security and overall support of NATO operations to be relatively higher in comparison to pre-1998 levels; in other aspects, I would expect the Slovaks to be more inclined toward softer, more cooperative foreign policy attitudes, mainly due to the contrast of the successful integration in the international community in this period relative to the pre-1998 isolation\textsuperscript{18}.

\textsuperscript{16} See annual document Orientation of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic for the year 2005. (MFA 2004)
\textsuperscript{17} These developments may seem obvious, the participation of non-governmental organizations in a country with non-existent civil society before 1989 is however a significant step in the process of democratic transition.
\textsuperscript{18} However, the public opinion on foreign policy in Slovakia has been annually captured since 2004 thanks to Transatlantic Trends Survey and subsequent analyses (see for example Gyárňsova 2004 for an analysis of the 2004 survey data) so the hypotheses are informed to the extent of having information about the topline
2.3 2006—2010: Post-Accession Foreign Policy under Robert Fico

The parliamentary election in 2006\(^\text{19}\) nevertheless brought another change of government, with Robert Fico’s SMER-SD winning with 29.1% of the popular vote and forming a coalition with an extreme right-wing Slovak Nationalist Party (SNP) and the People’s Party – Movement for Democratic Slovakia (MDS) of the former Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. The union with extreme nationalists resulted in SMER being temporarily suspended from the Party of European Socialists (PES). According to PES, the resolution referred specifically to the Declaration For a Modern, Pluralist and Tolerant Europe adopted by PES Congress in 2001 in Berlin which states “all PES parties adhere to the following principles [...] to refrain from any form of political alliance or co-operation at all levels with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred” (PES 2006).

On the basic level, the new government essentially maintained the foreign policy orientation started by two Dzurinda’s governments. Slovakia joined the Schengen Area in 2007 and the Eurozone in 2009. There were nevertheless many disruptions in the previous trends – the bilateral relationships with Hungary became tense, mainly because of the anti-Hungarian rhetoric of the coalition member the Slovak Nationalist Party; the ties with NATO became marked by Robert Fico’s strong orientation on Russia and the normative, value-based dimension of the Slovak foreign policy suffered due to the prime minister’s lack of explicit support for democratic values, most blatantly demonstrated by frequent official visits to countries such as Libya and Cuba, and bloopers such as “raising a mojito to the anniversary of Fidel Castro’s revolution at Havana’s embassy in Bratislava” (The Economist 2011), while the United States has long been neglected (Kovačovská 2008b).

Another topic that resonated in the Slovak foreign policy discourse during the 2006—2010 period was the question of Kosovo’s independence. Slovak Minister of Foreign

\(^{19}\) For analyses of 2006 parliamentary election, see Gyarfášová, Kollár, Mesežníkov 2006 and Kollár, Mesežníkov 2006.
Affairs Ján Kubiš was originally performing a balancing act between respect for Kosovo’s route to independence and a governmental stance of rejecting the idea of independent Kosovo without Serbia’s approval; he nevertheless at the end expressed a disapproval of the independent Kosovo. With the Western Balkans being high on the list of Slovak foreign policy priorities, the warm relationship between Slovakia and Serbia, the extreme-right Slovak Nationalist Party being a coalition member and, most importantly, independent Kosovo being seen as a possible threat to Slovakia in terms of it creating a precedent for Hungarian irredentism, it did not come as a surprise that the topic of an independent Kosovo stirred a vivid discussion. It also highlighted discrepancies between the stances advocated by Prime Minister Fico and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kubiš, who originally vacillated between supporting Kosovo’s independence and disapproving it. (Kovačovská 2008b)

Intensification of the relations with Russia was, at least on a rhetorical level, one of the important aspects of Slovak foreign policy in the period of 2006—2010. Annual document Orientation of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic for the year 2010 emphasized the importance of Russia as a “key partner” of Slovakia, without mentioning the need for democratization of the country or any other stress on the value-based aspects of the relationship, partly due to the government’s advocation of a pragmatic stance and focusing on Slovakia’s dependence on Russian gas supplies. Slovak diplomacy therefore faced the challenge of making the country more rooted in the still fresh strategic partnerships with the EU and NATO while at the same time “explaining the Prime Minister’s blunders” (The Economist 2011).

The impact of the 2006—2010 government on the public’s foreign policy attitudes is difficult to hypothesize due to an inherent ambiguity in the foreign policy making process. However, I would expect the support for the EU to go down in comparison to the previous period due to the weakened transatlantic dimension of foreign policy under Robert Fico. At

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20 The exact same words were used to describe bilateral relations with the USA.
21 Natural gas is the single most important energy resource for Slovakia. The share of imports in consumption is 98%, and the entire volume of imported gas is supplied from Russia. (Kovačovská 2011: 53) The absence of gas supply diversification became palpable during the 2009 Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute, when Russia temporarily suspended its supplies to the region due to a bilateral dispute with Ukraine as a key transit country. Slovakia was hit substantially together with several other countries in the region.
the same time, I would expect public opinion to become a little more inclined to support hardline attitudes due to less emphasis on international cooperation. Either way, the 2010 elections represented another significant milestone, crucial to defining the country’s foreign policy orientation, albeit within the boundaries set by membership in the EU and the NATO.

2.4 Post-2010: Cumbersome Present, Unpredictable Future?

The 2010 elections\textsuperscript{22} resulted in a new government led by Iveta Radičová, an Oxford-educated sociology professor. It aroused optimism among the supporters of a pro-Western foreign policy orientation, especially so in terms of a renewed support for democratization processes around the world, human rights, and once again an overall boost of the normative, value-based framework of foreign policy making.

Indeed, the document Civic Responsibility and Co-Operation (MFA 2010) mentions “value-based foreign policy” first, and it commits to “restrict the official contacts with countries committing gross and flagrant violations of human rights and freedoms on their own citizens” and to “step up support for and intensify relations with their civil societies and human rights activists” (ibid.). Well in line with this document, Iveta Radičová presented an award to a Cuban opposition group Damas de Blanco and brokered a declaration of the Visegrad states, Germany and Austria demanding immediate release of the political prisoners in Belarus (The Economist 2011). With Mikuláš Dzurinda as the minister of foreign affairs, a short period of Iveta Radičová’s government showed a strong inclination to the support of democracy as well as to the restoration of a value-based framework of Slovak foreign policy to pre-2006 levels. However, the government did not manage to make it through a strong disagreement over the Eurozone’s bail-out fund within the much fragmented coalition and eventually fell apart in October 2011. The 2012 parliamentary elections\textsuperscript{23} brought a definite victory of Robert Fico’s SMER-SD, gaining 44.4\%. From the standpoint of foreign policy, continuity with the 2006—2010 period can be expected, as Robert Fico was able to form a government without a coalition partner. It is nevertheless

\textsuperscript{22} For analyses of the 2010 parliamentary election, see for example Gyarfášová 2011; Deegan-Krause, Houghton 2012.

\textsuperscript{23} For a commentary on 2012 elections, see for example Mesežníkov 2012.
difficult to anticipate for the time being just how similar policy-making in these two periods will be, or how such policymaking will be received by the public.
3. Foreign Policy and Public Opinion

The previous discussion on the foreign policy developments in Slovakia demonstrates the shift from it being part of the Eastern Bloc before 1989 to integration into NATO and the EU in 2004 alongside the post-1989 oscillation, and varying degrees of adherence to and identification with the ‘Western’ democratic, economic and security standards. There is no doubt that this development resonated with the Slovak public, however the extent to which it has been so, and the magnitudes and directions of those relationships, remain relatively unknown.

A limited body of literature devotes some space to discussing public opinion on a few foreign policy topics in Slovakia. With regards to the attitudes of the Slovak public toward the EU and NATO, Bugajski and Teleki (2006: 170) emphasize that among the CEE states, the EU has been supported by public opinion in Slovakia, whereas public support for NATO has been among the lowest. They point out that the United States only generates lukewarm feelings among the Slovak population. Slovaks positively link the EU to “economic development (high standard of living, low unemployment, social security, prosperity, wealth, welfare protection, trade, satisfaction, jobs, good pay) and democracy (freedom, tolerance, independence, progress, respect for human rights).” As for the attitudes toward the United States, it is widely viewed more negatively as arrogant and dominant. Images in the Slovak media have been largely unflattering for America and negative perceptions have been accentuated by the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal and the cost and difficulty of obtaining US visas. (ibid.)

As I said earlier, however, the literature analyzing foreign policy attitudes among the Slovak public is extremely limited. Although not much has been published about public opinion on foreign policy topics in Slovakia, a substantial body of literature exists on the

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24 See for example Pekník 2005 for outcomes of the foreign-policy related polls and Bútorová 2009; Bútorová, Gyárňášová, Haberlová, Hartl 2005; and Bútorová, Gyárňášová 2005 for short reports on particular foreign policy-related attitudes.

25 This is in line with Transatlantic Trends Survey 2011 which reports 78 % of Slovaks having very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion on the European Union and only 18 % having somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion. (Transatlantic Trends 2011)

26 However, recent survey shows that this is no longer true. According to Transatlantic Trends Survey from 2011, 10 % of Slovaks have very favorable opinion of the United States, while 51 % reporting a somewhat favorable stance, 26 % saying their opinion of the US is somewhat unfavorable and 7 % very unfavorable opinion. (Transatlantic Trends 2011)
relationship between the two in other countries\textsuperscript{27}, particularly so in the United States. Similarly, the domestic sources of foreign policy, which include public opinion, have been one of the focal points of the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and as such are examined quite thoroughly. Finally, the links between selected personal characteristics and foreign policy attitudes are also being examined across the world. In the following section, I would like to outline some of the thoughts on the above that are relevant in the context of the analysis of the role of personal characteristics on the Slovak public opinion and foreign policy that will, together with the preceding portion of the text, lead to a discussion of the hypothesized directions of the relationships in the analysis presented in this paper\textsuperscript{28}.

Before elaborating on the determinants of public attitudes on foreign policy, it is important to clarify that one of the distinct features of public opinion on foreign policy is undoubtedly its ignorance\textsuperscript{29}, which has been demonstrated especially thoroughly in the United States\textsuperscript{30}. This phenomenon is important in that the extent to which people care, or, on the contrary, do not care about foreign policy, may interfere with the analysis of what influences their opinions in this domain.

\textsuperscript{27} For application of such analytical framework in an analysis of German public opinion, see Schoen 2007. For analysis of foreign policy attitudes broken down by certain personal characteristics such as age and gender in Japan, see Mendel 1961.

\textsuperscript{28} This is admittedly a simplified framework used just for the purposes of this analysis. It can be argued that foreign policy is influenced by individual stances that form public opinion; at the same time, public opinion itself is influenced by foreign policy as well as by international politics and developments. However, the analysis of the complexity of the relationships between foreign policy, individual attitudes, public opinion and the various intersections between them is not a primary focus of this thesis; I am therefore only focusing on selected phenomena that are more explicitly outlined in Chapter 3.5.

\textsuperscript{29} It is generally believed that the public usually cares little or not at all about foreign policy. In Transatlantic Trends survey (2011), only 12\% of Slovaks reported that they follow news about world affairs very closely, and another 38\% reported to follow such news fairly closely. However, the survey did not include questions that would test actual level of knowledge of world affairs, so there may be a discrepancy between the self-reported interest and the depth of the actual knowledge.

\textsuperscript{30} As Kegley and Wittkopf (1996, pp. 265—266) point out, the levels of ignorance of foreign policy issues in American public are rather startling, giving examples such as “in 1985, 28\% of those surveyed thought that the Soviet Union and the United States fought each other in World War II. [...] In 1964 [...] almost two-fifths [of the American public] believed that Soviet Union was a member [of NATO]. [...] In 1994, 46\% of the electorate believed that foreign aid, which accounts for less than 1\% of the federal budget, was one of its two biggest items [...]. In 1985, only 63\% of the public knew that the United States supported South Vietnam in the Vietnam War, which cost fifty-eight thousand American lives.”
The relative ignorance towards foreign policy among the public\(^{31}\) has made scholars wonder about the reasons for such levels of misinformation. Almond (1960: 5) attributed it to tortuoseness and withdrawnness of the foreign policy agenda to the public, saying that “there are inherent limitations in modern society on the capacity of the public to understand its issues and grasp the significance of the most important problems of public policy. This is particularly the case with foreign policy where the issues are especially complex and remote”. The fact that the public may not tend to view the impact of foreign policy on its lives as immediate leads, according to Almond (1960: 71), to a situation, where “foreign policy […] has to shout loudly to be heard even a little”. This lack of interest in foreign policy on the individual level probably contributed to public opinion. Political attitudes and personality are traditionally seen by IR scholars as the “exotic factors” that may have influence on the country's foreign policy, but they nevertheless had not been paid attention to until as late as the 1960s (McClosky 1967).

A shift towards increased sensitivity to the so-called domestic sources of foreign policy finally occurred in the 60s. In 1967, a prominent IR scholar James N. Rosenau wrote: “Domestic sources of foreign policy are no less crucial to its content and conduct than are the international situations towards which it is directed […] the dilemma is that the links between the domestic sources and the resulting behavior – foreign policy – are not easily observed and are thus especially resistant to coherent analysis,” (Rosenau 1967: 2), thus acknowledging both the necessity of analyzing these sources and the challenging nature of doing so. Aside from the relationship between individual-level characteristics and public opinion (see for example McClosky 1967; Galtung 1967), the analyses of the domestic sources of foreign policy also include the discussion of the role of media (Cohen 1967; Ajibola 1978; Nacos, Shapiro, Isernia 2000), the overlap between voting behavior and foreign policy (Miller 1967) and also studies on the role of interest groups and lobbying in foreign policymaking (Milbrath 1967).\(^{32}\) As Merritt (1975: 2) points out, numerous interest groups, such as

\(^{31}\) This view can be and has been challenged, however in the context of analyzing Slovak public opinion in this paper, I would adhere to this view rather than to the one that attributes a significant degree of rationality to public opinion on foreign policy saying that “the public possesses structured foreign policy opinions and responds reasonably to foreign policy events” (Schoen 2007: 408; Graham 1988; Shapiro, Page 1988; Jentleson 1992; Isernia, Juhász, Rattinger 2002).

\(^{32}\) For the analysis of the domestic sources of Czech foreign policy, see for example Kořan 2007.
representatives of business, labor, ethnic association, civic bodies, and media are making demands upon the decision system. Moreover, "public at large can have a direct impact upon the foreign policymaking process as well as, through its elected representatives and other mediators, a more indirect influence". (Merritt 1975: 2) Recently, the analysis of this domain has been brought to a new level by its linkage to the examinations of the processes of globalization, including the global media landscape. The interconnectedness between the mass media, public opinion and foreign policymaking has attracted some attention from political science and IR scholars (see for example Nacos, Shapiro, Isernia 2000). On top of this range of topics belonging under the umbrella of the domestic sources of foreign policy, a by-now traditional analytical outlook on politics in general, the one resulting from the concept of the conflict between the reality and the perception and misperception thereof (see Jervis 1976), can be applied to the analysis of public opinion and foreign policy as well (see for example Kull, Ramsay 2000: 95).

It was probably the sad state of misinformation on foreign policy topics among the American public that made Almond (1960) conclude that attitudes towards foreign policy are conditioned by culturally imposed qualities of character (p. 29) and are also subject to a mood (29—69)33, which is difficult to analytically capture. He therefore sought the answers to what drives American public opinion on foreign policy by examining what can be best labeled as American character. He turned to Alexis de Tocqueville (1945: 234) who, in relation to the American public, identified two overarching tendencies of people that, according to Almond, may also influence foreign policy attitudes – namely, the emphasis on material welfare and religious enthusiasm (Tocqueville 1945:234). Almond pointed that the “American success imperative", i.e., the emotional force of propulsion towards success, is strongly compulsive since the stake involved is the individual's fundamental sense of self-esteem and worthiness, and that the criterion of achievement is not located in the self but

33 More precisely, he says that “the orientation of most Americans toward foreign policy is one of mood, and mood is essentially an unstable phenomenon”. According to Almond, American moods are affected by two variables. First consists of the changes in the domestic and foreign political-economic situation involving the presence or absence of threat in varying degrees; while the second lies in the characterological predispositions of the population that are linked to the potential movements of opinion along the lines of withdrawal and intervention, mood and simplification, optimism and pessimism, tolerance and intolerance, idealism and cynicism, and finally superiority and inferiority. (Almond 1960: 29—68)
in the responses of others (Almond 1960: 41—42). Even though this aspect of Almond’s work may not be directly translatable to a country other than the United States and is by now rather outdated even in the US, it is interesting in terms of how he proceeded to interpret the lack of consistency in public opinion on foreign policy, which may also maintain in Slovakia.

He proceeded with the analysis by drawing upon the work of Margaret Mead (1943), who concluded that the sense of achievement and the peculiar attitudes toward authority in the American public are to be attributed to its immigrant origins. Moreover, according to Mead, the Americans are optimists by virtue of their faith in good will and effort and are therefore prone to reject sober reflection and calculation. Lastly, Almond points out the rather positive attitude towards aggression and violence as another feature of American culture (Almond 1960; Mead 1943). Regardless of how far-fetched these deliberations may seem to be today (see for example Kegley, Wittkopf 1996: 267), Almond makes a valid point by drawing a connection between individual characteristics and opinions of these individuals and simultaneously relaxing the link between the political developments and the public opinion by questioning the extent to which the latter is a mere reaction to the former. In the following parts of the text, I would like to look at the hypothesized determinants of foreign policy attitudes more closely in order to derive hypothesized relationship that will subsequently be tested in the Slovak conditions.

3.1 Role of Age, Cohort and Generation

One of the first possible determinants of the foreign policy attitudes is a group of features that include age, cohort and generation34. Almond (1960) elaborates on the relationship between an individual’s age and his/her foreign policy attitudes, making a link between a higher age and an experience with the failures in international political development that may lead to increased skepticism. More precisely, he says that “one might expect among the older age groups a greater measure of skepticism about the effectiveness of international organization”. Also, back in the time Almond wrote this book, he concluded

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34 These characteristics are central to the Age Period Cohort Analysis (see for example O’Brien 2000); the analysis in this paper will however not be using this framework as it is not suitable mainly due to short time span of the data.
that older people would “vividly recall the failure of the League of Nations” which may lead to their greater skepticism as well (ibid.). This is interesting and relevant for the purposes of the analysis of public opinion on Slovak foreign policy in that I would, in line with an idea that older people share some sort of a formative experience, expect older age groups who experienced WWII, and the 1968 occupation of Czechoslovakia to be more on the hardline end of the spectrum in their foreign policy attitudes than those who, throughout their lives, enjoyed the benefits of Slovakia being increasingly democratic, open and anchored in the Western international order.

Furthermore, Almond assumes that even without such a key formative experience, “age itself often tends to sober idealism and inhibit transports of hope”. On the contrary, younger groups are, according to Almond “likely to set a greater priority on international affairs than on domestic”, “likely to be more informed on the organizational aspects of international relations”, “they are more likely to be optimistic about the prospects of international organization and less likely to favor unilateral security actions”. (p. 118) Increasing age would therefore act as a prerequisite to rather pessimistic and hardline opinions in two ways – in itself and by the experience that the older age groups have been through35.

As Schoen (2007: 409) points out, there is a controversy about the magnitude of the impact of age as compared to generation; in this paper, I am nonetheless only focusing on age and I will overall hypothesize increasing age to lead to the “harder” foreign policy attitudes; although taking into account a possible shared formative experience of the older age groups as well.

3.2 Role of Gender

Another variable whose relationship with foreign policy attitudes will be examined is gender. Generally speaking, men and women are believed to differ in attitudes toward foreign and security policy issues, with women being more risk averse and less inclined to

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35 However, these assumptions may stem from the Western-centric view of public opinion and foreign policy intrinsic to Almond’s work. The exact opposite may be true for non-Western societies; interest in foreign policy may be typical for rather young people but they may at the same time consider international relations to be a zero-sum game and prefer hard unilateral attitudes and solutions of international conflicts.
support the use of military force (Schoen 2007; Fite, Genest, Wilcox 1990; Sapiro, Conover 1993; Nincic, Nincic 2002; Eichenberg 2003). At the same time, men were previously thought of as being more politically active than women (Berelson, Steiner 1963; Lipset, Linz 1956; Galtung 1967; Galtung 1964), but this is probably no longer true, as female participation in politics has increased over the last decades (Shapiro, Mahajan 1986).

In an analysis of Slovak public opinion, I am only focusing on the relationship between gender and an individual’s position on the hard-soft continuum. Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) point to “compelling differences” between men and women as reported by Smith (1984) in opinions on matters concerned with force and violence: “[...] men were more likely than women to support violent options in 87 percent of his readings, and the average gender difference was more than 9 percentage points, with individual differences ranging up to 30 percent” (Shapiro, Mahajan 1986).

The causal reasoning behind the relationship between gender and the questions of force and violence is twofold – either related to the biological differences between the two genders saying that men are naturally more aggressive than women, or that women are more fearful than men (Sapiro, Conover 1993: 1079; Burris 1992). This view is however being rejected by some, mainly by feminist theorists (eg. Miller 1976) and there is an inclination towards a theory that “early differential socialization and experiences, among other things, render women more pacifist than men” (Sapiro, Conover 1993: 1079).

In Slovak conditions, I would expect gender to have, on the conceptual level, the exact same impact as hypothesized in the United States, rendering females more prone to advocate softer foreign policy attitudes, —being closer, therefore, to the accommodationist end of the spectrum—and males to support harder stances.

3.3 Socio-Economic Characteristics

Finally, the last group of factors that will be dealt with and that are traditionally being thought of as possibly related to individual’s stances on foreign policy topics are

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36 The biologically deterministic stance is also advocated by some radical feminist, who nevertheless unlike the public opinion theorists interpret the differences in terms of women’s innate moral superiority. (Sapiro, Conover 1993: 1079)
those that can be put under a heading called socio-economic status, such as income, social class, or education.

Almond expects lower income groups to be more prone to resignation, whereas middle-income and the wealthy according to him tend to be moderately optimistic (Almond 1960: 124). At the same time, he identifies an overlap between what he refers to as “professional persons”, therefore working professionals, and the upper class. The professional persons, he says, are “the most informed sector of the American population, the most interested in foreign affairs, the least pessimistic about the prospects for peace, and the most optimistic with regard to the capacity of the United States to develop policies which may prevent war” (ibid.). One may assume the causal mechanism behind this thinking to lie in the fact that income and social class both tend to be closely correlated with education, however Almond blames the frustration of an individual who belongs to a lower class as a factor that “produces resentment and hostility reactions which may bias some members of the lower classes in the direction of hard nationalism” (p. 126).

As for the relationship between education and foreign policy attitudes, Wittkopf (1990) assumes education to be affecting one’s level of attention to foreign affairs37, which in turn affects the position of an individual on the hard-soft continuum: “The more educated people were, the more likely they were to support internationalist policies […]. […] those with college educations support the tenets of cooperative internationalism more strongly than they support the tenets of militant internationalism. They differ from the two other educational groups that are best characterized either as hardliners or as isolationists.” (Wittkopf 1990: 37; see also Kegley, Wittkopf 1987: 290—303; Holsti, Rosenau 1990) It can be expected that the impact of education and the social class as proxied by income levels would be similar due to generally strong correlation between the two; however, as Almond points out, the contrast between college education and elementary school education is much sharper than the ones observed among the upper- and lower-income groups (Almond 1960:

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37 This is nevertheless probably not exclusive to the attentiveness to foreign affairs, but also includes attentiveness to politics in general. Socio-economic background has for example been linked to voting behavior – the higher a person’s socio-economic and educational level, the higher is his political interest, participation and voting turnaround (Berelson, Steiner 1963; Lipset, Linz 1956, Galtung 1967; Galtung 1964).
126—127). It can be nevertheless summed up that on a general level, education makes citizens more inclined to support international cooperation (Schoen 2007).

Wittkopf’s (1990) focus on the relationship between the socio-economic and other characteristics on one’s position on the hard-soft continuum is crucial for this analysis of public opinion on foreign policy in Slovakia, although I will only focus on education as one of the independent variables. I would assume the direction of the relationships to be similar in Slovakia as in the US, with certain exceptions to or rather adjustments of this relationship due to certain specific conditions.

3.4 Conclusion

All in all, it can be concluded that young people, women, upper income groups, and the college-educated tend to be more inclined to foreign policy idealism, optimism, and internationalism. On the contrary, older people, males, lower-income groups, those with elementary education and the rural population tend to be more inclined to pessimism, isolationism and nationalism. (Almond 1960)

Translated into an individual’s position on a continuum other than optimism—pessimism or internationalism—isolationism38, the distinction between the hardliners and the accommodationists is, to some extent, related to the distinction between hard power and soft power, as described by, among others, Christopher Hill: “Hard power is that which is targeted, coercive, often immediate and physical. Soft power is that which is indirect, long-term and works more through persuasion than force.” (Hill 2003: 135) Even though Hill refers to policy instruments rather than to an opinion on foreign policy, I believe this

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38 Although this continuum is often used, its application in the non-US conditions is nonetheless cumbersome at the very least; there may, however, be a strong correlation between supporting isolationist policies and what in this analysis is referred to as hardline attitudes. The isolationism versus non-isolationism relationship is nevertheless more complex (see for example McClosky 1967: 52—53 and Wittkopf 1990). It can further be broken down along the lines of aggressive and non-aggressive orientations – non-isolationists are then expected to be more participant, more informed, more mobile, closer to the articulate mainstream, more worldly, less parochial due to the fact that this orientation supposedly requires a greater element of sophistication and cosmopolitanism in the intellectual and cultural sense than the isolationist orientation. Analogically, isolationism is more likely to signify a tendency towards international belligerency as opposed to international pacifism and therefore has more to do with hostility against foreign nations and disavowal of responsibility for the well-being of others than with the considered assessment of the risks arising from international entanglements. (McClosky 1967: 59—60)
understanding of the soft versus hard distinction is applicable to individual-level attitudes toward foreign policy as well.

To summarize, the relationship between various personal characteristics and political behavior and opinions has been in the academic community’s center of attention, with socio-economic factors, gender and age being among the most often used independent variables in the studies. Having said that, subtle nuances of this relationship could benefit from further analysis, especially so in the countries where attention to this topic has traditionally been low. It can be hypothesized that the impacts of personal characteristics would be similar in an international comparison, though one must nonetheless take local context into account. In the analysis of public opinion on foreign policy in Slovakia, I am therefore applying the framework derived from existing research that was outlined in the preceding chapter in order to analyze the relationship between personal characteristics and foreign policy attitudes in terms of a position on a hard—soft continuum; the hypothesized directions of relationships will nonetheless account for what I believe is specific to the Slovak post-1993 experience.

3.5 Implications for the Analysis – Operational Variables and the Hypothesized Relationships

On a conceptual level, the independent variable in this analysis is personal characteristics, with the dependent variable being a position on a hard—soft continuum in terms of foreign policy attitudes. Given the nature of Slovak foreign policy over the last two decades and the priorities it has been pursuing, I consider the views on security-related questions as the most important to analyze at this point, since they are among the most intimately linked to the very basic foreign policy orientation of the country. At the same time, people’s attitudes toward foreign policy in terms of their position on a hard—soft continuum can be very well proxied as answers to the security-related questions.

39 Given the optimism—pessimism continuum to be somewhat outdated and the internationalism— isolationism continuum to be more closely related to the features intrinsic to the American politics, I consider the hard—soft continuum as described in the previous pages to be most useful for this analysis as the conceptual dependent variable.
On an operational level, I will work with three independent variables – age, gender and education⁴⁰. As for the dependent variables, I am interested to see the relationship with the perception of the importance of economic power as opposed to military power; to the level of perceiving terrorism as a threat; and to the importance of NATO for Slovakia’s security. I will elaborate on their relationship with the conceptual dependent variable and on the hypothesized directions of this relationship in the following paragraphs.

The perceived importance of economic power in comparison to the military power is a rather traditional dependent variable in an analysis of gender, education and age differences in foreign policy attitudes. The tendency to view economic power as more important than the military power is associated with “soft” or “accommodationist” attitudes, with the opposite being labeled as “hardline”. I hypothesize, in line with the above discussion on the relationship between support for the use of force and personal characteristics, that older people, males, and less educated groups would be more hardline in their opinions in that they would view military power as more important than economic power. I expect this relationship to be in the same direction in Slovakia that it is usually hypothesized to be in the United States.

The next dependent variable is the perception of terrorism as a threat. This is more cumbersome, because it cannot be directly said whether hardline attitudes translate into perceiving terrorism as more of a threat than accommodationist attitudes would; it is however more plausible than the opposite hypothesis. I therefore hypothesize that perceiving terrorism as a threat is more hardline and therefore more typical for males. But in the case of education I would expect more educated people to be more likely to see terrorism as a threat as opposed to less educated people. The reason is Slovakia-specific –

⁴⁰It would be interesting to include other variables such as especially income, social class and party identification, I nevertheless consider the eventual use of these to be cumbersome mainly due to specific development in the post-communist area. Post-1993 income levels in Slovakia were heavily influenced by the pre-1989 development and as such would require a more complex analysis, I believe, than what can be offered in this study. Social class identification is also very specific in the post-communist area and may not be suitable for this analysis even though the emergence of the social class system in a contemporary sense is undoubtedly a valid phenomenon to be analyzed in relation to the public opinion on politics-related topics. Finally, party identification is virtually impossible to be included as an independent variable in a study that analyzes data from the 2004—2010 period, because the political system is comprised of too many parties and given the sample size there would be too few observations in each party identification category, not to mention the frequency with which new parties are formed and old parties disestablished even in such a short time span.
as the country has not been subject to more attention-capturing terrorist attacks, the awareness of the threat of terrorism and especially the awareness of the possibility of this threat to actually affect Slovakia would be, I assume, typical for people who follow news, are more attentive to international politics, and therefore more educated. I therefore hypothesize that as education goes up, so does the perception of terrorism as a threat. Finally, as terrorism in its current meaning is a relatively new phenomenon in the Central European context, I hypothesize older age groups to be less aware of this threat and therefore less prone to consider it being an important threat, their otherwise presumably hardline attitudes notwithstanding.

The last operational dependent variable in this analysis is the perception of NATO as being essential for the security of Slovakia. Similarly to the perception of terrorism, it may not be evident how NATO’s perceived importance relates to the hard—soft continuum, as the organization is undoubtedly a product of international cooperation which would be pointing toward the soft end of the continuum, yet at the same time its agenda is primarily focused on security and military cooperation. I consider this aspect to be more important and therefore on a conceptual level, I would expect higher support of NATO to be typical for more hardline attitudes. I nevertheless believe that in this particular case, the context of Slovak politics needs to be taken into account. I would expect the older people, in line with their presumably more hardline attitudes, to see NATO as essential for Slovakia’s security rather than not. The causal reasoning behind this hypothesis is nevertheless not necessarily linked to the soft—hard distinction, but rather to the shared experience of older people in Slovakia. Those who still recall the Second World War and definitely very vividly recall the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia led by the Soviet Union in 1968, would hypothetically be more prone to consider NATO as essential for Slovakia’s security. I therefore hypothesize older people to think that NATO is essential, rather than not. In line with the traditional thinking about the relationship between gender and the hard—soft attitudes, I would expect males to be more inclined to consider NATO essential as opposed to females; however, given the context of Slovak politics, I would expect this difference to be relatively small and the support of NATO to be driven primarily by factors other than gender. Finally, I would expect more educated groups to think of NATO as being essential
for Slovakia’s security, despite the fact that they would normally be hypothesized to be rather “soft” in their opinions. I believe this to be a similar case to the perception of terrorism – the awareness of the importance of NATO is probably higher among the more educated and is a necessary condition to considering NATO essential.

Finally, as the analysis spans two governments, the relationship between each of the given time periods and the dependent variable should be hypothesized about as well. As for 2004—2006, the years in my analysis that correspond to the second Dzurinda government (2002—2006), I expect people to be more soft in their opinions and more prone to consider economic power as more important than military power, mainly due to Slovakia’s successful accession to the EU and NATO in 2004 and also due to the government’s emphasis on international cooperation. I would nevertheless expect the perception of terrorism as a threat to be stronger in this period in comparison to the 2006—2010 period, as I would assume the levels of awareness of terrorism to be influenced by the 9/11 attacks and the 2004 attacks in Madrid and would expect this awareness to gradually fade over the years. The threat of terrorism is not a topic that would resonate much in Slovak political discourse, and I would therefore not attempt to draw a link between a government per se and public opinion on terrorism. As for the 2006—2010 period, I would expect the trends to be in an opposite direction, i.e., a weaker emphasis on international cooperation causing leading to the perception of the importance of economic power to go down in comparison to the previous period, the perception of terrorism as a threat to go down as well and the perception of the necessity of NATO for Slovakia’s security to decrease.

The hypothesized relationships are summarized in Table 3.5.1. All dependent variables were coded so that higher values stand for soft attitudes (economic power being more important than military power; terrorism not being a threat; and NATO not being essential for Slovakia’s security). Both education and age are categorical variables with higher values standing for older people and higher educational levels. Gender was recoded so that the higher value (1) stands for male while the lower value (0) stands for females\textsuperscript{41}.

\textsuperscript{41} For a detailed description of the variables, see Chapter 4.2.
### Table 3.5.1: Hypothesized Relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economic power being more important than military power (econpower)</th>
<th>Terrorism not being an important threat (terrorism)</th>
<th>NATO not being essential for Slovakia’s security (natoess)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (age)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (gender)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (educ)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time period 2004—2006</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time period 2006—2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All dependent variables (econpower, terrorism, natoess) are recoded so that higher values stand for accommodationist, or soft attitudes. Therefore, higher values of econpower variable mean economic power being perceived as more important than military power; higher values of terrorism variable mean the opinion that terrorism is not an important threat; and the higher values of natoess variable stand for an opinion that NATO is not essential for Slovakia’s security. Age and education are coded so that higher categories stand for higher age and higher education. Gender variable is coded so that zero stands for female and one stands for male. For a detailed description of the variables, see Chapter 4.2.
4. Data Description

4.1 Source of Data

The analysis is conducted using the Transatlantic Trends Survey from the years 2004 until 2010. The time period has been chosen due to data availability. The fact that there has been a change of government in 2006 which also marked a change in Slovak foreign policy is in line with the overall research design that attempts to analyze the trends with respect to this turning point in Slovak politics.

The Transatlantic Trends Survey is a "comprehensive annual survey of American and European public opinion". (TT 2011) In 2010, polling was conducted by TNS Opinion – Brussels at the request of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The survey included Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (TT 2010). The basic sample design applied in all states was multi-stage and random. Up to five call-backs for telephone interviews and four visits in total for face-to-face interviews were attempted before dropping a potential respondent. The face-to-face interview was used in Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey due to the low telephone penetration rate in these five countries. (TT 2010)

This analysis uses Transatlantic Trends surveys from the years 2004—2010, as 2004 was the first year Slovakia was included in the survey. The datasets were obtained separately for each year and subsequently merged into one dataset as independently pooled cross-sectional data in order to make an analysis of trends across the years possible. The sample sizes for Slovakia for each year are summarized in the table below.

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42 Other data sources, particularly the Eurobarometer and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems were also considered; the questions in Eurobarometer nevertheless change from one survey to another, and therefore are not useful for this kind of analysis; and the CSES survey contains hardly any foreign policy-related variables.

43 The survey methodology did not change substantially from one year to another; I therefore only describe the methodology in the last year used, that is, in 2010. For a description of the features of each of the datasets, refer to the supporting documents for a given year.
### Table 4.1.1: Transatlantic Trends Survey, Sample Sizes for Slovakia, 2004—2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.2 Variables and Question Wordings

The Transatlantic Trends surveys contain a certain portion of the same variables from one year to another and a certain portion of variables that are unique for a given year. Moreover, some of the same variables have different categories in some of the years the surveys were conducted and they may also be named differently. This section is thus intended to clarify which variables exactly were used, how they were originally coded and recoded for the purposes of this analysis and how can they be traced back to the original dataset in order to check the validity of the findings presented in this analysis.
4.2.1 Independent Variables

Independent variables include age, gender and education. Their names across the years and their recode for the purposes of this analysis are summarized in table 4.2.1.1. For question wordings for each year, please refer to Appendix.

| Table 4.2.1.1: Names of the Independent Variables across Years and Their Recodes |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| **Age (age)**                   | 2004  | 2005  | 2006  | 2007  | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  |
| Age (age)                       | VAR004| VAR005| VAR004| VAR004| AGE   | AGE   | AGE, CAT |
| Range: 18—24 (coded as 0), 25—34 (coded as 1), 35—44 (coded as 2), 45—54 (coded as 3), 55—64 (coded as 4), 65+ (coded as 5), don’t know/no answer (coded as missing). |
| **Education (educ)**            | VAR005| VAR006| VAR005| VAR005| EDUC  | EDUC  | EDUC  |
| Education (educ)                | Range: elementary or less (coded as 0), some high school (coded 1), high school graduate (coded 2), college graduate (coded 3), professional or advanced degree beyond college is (coded 4), everything else coded as missing. |
| **Gender (gender)**             | VAR003| VAR004| VAR003| VAR003| GENDER| GENDER| GENDER |
| Gender (gender)                 | Range: Female (coded as 0); male (coded as 1). |

Note: In addition to these independent variables, the relationships of time periods and the dependent variables are also examined; they are however addressed using splines and/or separate regressions and are therefore not listed in this table. Also, the year variable used in the later analysis to denote the year the question was asked was not part of any of the original datasets, as these originally came from one year each and the dataset used for this analysis was created by the author by pooling the datasets from individual years.
4.2.2 Dependent Variables

The dependent variables include the perception of the importance of economic power as opposed to military power; whether one sees terrorism as a threat; and whether one considers NATO as still being essential for Slovakia’s security. The names of the variables used from datasets from each year and their recodings are summarized in table 4.2.2.1. For exact question wordings for each year refer to Appendix.

| Table 4.2.2.1: Names of the Dependent Variables across Years and Their Recodes |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Economic power being more important than military power (econpower) | VAR100 | VAR120 | VAR076 | v65 | Q26_1 | Q29_1 | Q33_1 |
| Range: disagree strongly (coded 0), disagree somewhat (coded 1), agree somewhat (coded 2), agree strongly (coded 3), everything else treated as missing. |
| Terrorism not being an important threat (terrorism) | VAR017 | VAR031 | VAR037 | v26 | Q15_1 | Not asked | Not asked |
| Range: extremely important threat (coded 0), important threat (coded 1), not important threat (coded 2), don't know/no answer coded as missing. |
| NATO not being essential for Slovakia’s security (natoess) | VAR044 | VAR082 | VAR021 | v46 | Q11 | Q11 | Q11 |
| Range: essential (coded as 0), no longer essential (coded as 1). |

4.3 Basic Descriptives

As a preliminary step before the actual data analysis, I will briefly report the descriptive statistics on each of the variables included in the analysis. This step is necessary for better understanding of the data that are used.

Age is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 5 (0 stands for 18—24 years old; 1 for 25—34; 2 for 35—44; 3 for 45—54; 4 for 55—64; and 5 for more than 65 years old). For all years combined, it consists of 7058 observations. For descriptive statistics of the age variable, refer to Table 4.3.1. For visual representation of the relative frequencies of the age variable, see Figure 4.3.2.
Table 4.3.1: Mean, Standard Deviation, and Range for the Age Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>7058</td>
<td>2.332389</td>
<td>1.534092</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.3.2: Histogram of Relative Frequencies for Age

Gender is a binary variable ranging from 0 to 1. There are 7073 observations of this variable; 0 stands for female and 1 stands for male. The sample contains 43.5% males and 56.5% females (Table 4.3.3).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3996</td>
<td>56.50</td>
<td>56.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3077</td>
<td>43.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7073</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education (educ) is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 4. There are 7073 observations of this variable; ranging from 0 to 4, where 0 stands for elementary education or less; 1 stands for some high school; 2 stands for high school graduate; 3 stands for college graduate; and 4 stands for a professional or advanced degree beyond college. For descriptive statistics of the education variable, refer to Table 4.3.4. For a visual representation of the relative frequencies for education, see Figure 4.3.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educ</td>
<td>7073</td>
<td>1.614732</td>
<td>.8950234</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The importance of economic power as opposed to military power (econpower) is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 3. The lowest category, 0, stands for strong disagreement that economic power is more important than military power; 1 stands for disagree somewhat, 2 stands for agree somewhat and 3 for agree strongly.

There are 6831 observations of this variable. For descriptive statistics of the econpower variable, refer to Table 4.3.6. For a visual representation of the relative frequencies for econpower, see Figure 4.3.7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.3.6: Mean, Standard Deviation and Range for the Econpower Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econpower</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The perception of terrorism as not being a threat (terrorism) is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 2. It is recoded to be consistent with other variables so that low values stand for hardline attitudes and high values stand for soft or accommodationist attitudes. Therefore, 0 stands for terrorism being an extremely important threat; 1 stands for it being an important threat; and 2 for a perception of terrorism as not being an important threat. There are 4353 observations of this variable in the years 2004—2008 (as there are no observations for 2009 or 2010). For descriptive statistics of the terrorism variable, refer to Table 4.3.8. For a visual representation of the relative frequencies for terrorism variable, see Figure 4.3.9.

| Table 4.3.8: Mean, Standard Deviation and Range for the Terrorism Variable |
|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Variable              | Number of Observations | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
| Terrorism             | 4353              | .7999081 | .8047881           | 0       | 2       |

Figure 4.3.7: Histogram of Relative Frequencies for the Econpower Variable
The perception of NATO as being no longer important for Slovakia’s security (natoess) is a binary variable ranging from 0 to 1. Again, the coding has been done in a way that would make low values represent the hardline attitudes and high values represent the soft, or accommodationist, attitudes. Therefore, 0 stands for NATO still being essential for Slovakia’s security, whereas 1 stands for it no longer being essential. There are 5230 observations of this variable. For descriptive statistics of the terrorism variable, refer to Table 4.3.10. For a visual representation of the relative frequencies for terrorism variable, see Figure 4.3.11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natoess</td>
<td>5230</td>
<td>0.3627151</td>
<td>0.4808296</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.3.11: Histogram of Relative Frequencies for the Natoess Variable

NATO No Longer Being Essential for Slovakia's Security
5. **Bivariate Data Analysis**

In the first part of data analysis, I will look at the relationships between each of the independent variables and each dependent variable. More precisely, I will report the strength of the correlation and the frequency distributions of a dependent variable by values of the independent variable. I will also report on how the means of the dependent variables vary for different values of the independent variable and use line approximations (fitted lines) to depict expected trends and line graphs to see actual trends alongside with histograms. Finally, I will run simple OLS models\(^{44}\) for each combination of the dependent and independent variables to analyze the relationship using simple regression function, without controlling for the year variable, as this will be addressed in Chapter 6.

5.1 **Age and Foreign Policy Attitudes**

5.1.1 **Age and the Importance of Economic Power**

The first of the examined relationships is between age and whether or not the respondent thinks that economic power is more important than military power (econpower). The correlation falls between -1 and +1 and for this particular case, it is 0.0483, meaning that the straight-line association between the two variables is not particularly strong (see table 5.1.1.1; table 5.1.1.2 shows a cross-classification of respondents’ perception of economic power being more important than military power (econpower) and their age; the table indicates that more people tend to consider economic power as more important since there are more observations in the higher categories of the econpower variable, and also that most observations fall into the 45—54 and 35—44 age groups and strong agreement with the statement that economic power is more important than military power (807 and 801 observations respectively). The line Graph 5.1.1.3 depicts the relationship between the two variables by connecting the means of econpower for each age group. Finally, the Graph 5.1.1.4 depicts a linear approximation of the relationship with a 95% confidence interval. All in all, age is not very strongly correlated

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\(^{44}\) Logit model may be used to obtain predicted values of the importance of NATO (natoess) as this is essentially a dummy variable. However, as the OLS (in form of a Linear Probability Model in this case) produces comparable results, it is being used for NATO question as well. This makes a comparison of R-squared for different models possible.
with the econpower variable; the correlation is nevertheless positive, meaning that older age is associated with higher support of economic power as opposed to military power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1.1.1: Correlation Between Age and Econpower</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N=6817) Age Econpower</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econpower 0.0483 1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1.1.2: Cross-Classification of Perception of Economic Power Being More Important Than Military Power and Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approximate Age Economic Power Being More Important than Military Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree somewhat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree somewhat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 5.1.1.3: Line Graph of the Econpower Mean Values, by Age
5.1.2 Age and the Perception of a Terrorist Threat

The second examined relationship is between age and whether people think terrorism is or is not an important threat (with higher values in the terrorism variable meaning that they do not consider terrorism an important threat). The correlation (table 5.1.2.1) is positive, meaning that older people tend not to consider terrorism as being an important threat. The relationship is nevertheless very weak. The cross-classification of the two variables indicates that the most numerous categories are age groups 25—34 and 35—44 who think that terrorism is an extremely important threat (with 406 observation falling in each of these two categories). The fact that people consider terrorism as being an important threat and that the mean response only slightly varies for different age groups is shown on the line graph (Graph 5.1.2.3). The approximation by a fitted line (Graph 5.1.2.4) shows that as age goes up, the perception of terrorism as being an important threat goes down (because the mean value of the terrorism variable goes up); however, as the mean
only moves from ~.75 to ~.85 from the lowest to the highest age group, the difference is not very big.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1.2.1: Correlation Between Age and Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N=4339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1.2.2: Cross-Classification of Perception of Terrorism as Not Being an Important Threat and Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approximate Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 5.1.2.3: Line Graph of the Terrorism Mean Values, by Age
5.1.3 Age and the Importance of NATO

The relationship between age and the perception of NATO as being or not being essential for Slovakia’s security shows the strongest correlation among the three relationships between the age and each of the dependent variables. The correlation is positive, which means that as age goes up, people are more prone to consider NATO being no longer essential for Slovakia’s security; the relationship is nevertheless still weak. The cross-classification indicates that most observations (733) fall into the second age group (35—44) and the view of NATO as being essential for Slovakia’s security (0). Graph 5.1.3.3 indicates that people younger than 54 years have, on average, relatively similar views on how essential NATO is for Slovakia’s security, whereas people who are aged 55 years and older tend to be different in their opinions. The relationship is nonetheless again rather weak.
Table 5.1.3.1: Correlation Between Age and Natoess
(N= 5218)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Natoess</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natoess</td>
<td>0.0690</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1.3.2: Cross-Classification of Perception of NATO as Not Being Essential for Slovakia’s Security and Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natoess</th>
<th>18—24</th>
<th>25—34</th>
<th>35—44</th>
<th>45—54</th>
<th>55—64</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essential</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>3324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No longer essential</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>1026</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>1072</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>5218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 5.1.3.3: Line Graph of the Natoess Mean Values, by Age
5.1.4 Summary

Finally, I ran an OLS regression in order to see the predicted values of the dependent variables (econpower, terrorism and natoess) based on the values of the independent variable, in this case, age. The data from all years are pooled together, therefore these models do not control for year; they nevertheless allow for the analysis of the bivariate relationships. Table 5.1.4.1 shows that each of these relationships is statistically significant, meaning that in all three cases I can reject the null hypothesis that change in the independent variable makes no difference in the dependent variable. As people on average move from a lower age group to one age group up, their view of economic power being more important than military goes up by .023, on a scale of 0 to 3, ceteris paribus. Also, as people move one age group up, their perception of terrorism not being an important threat goes up by .017, on a scale of 0 to 2, meaning that they become more “accommodationist” in their opinions. In other words, their perception of terrorism as an important threat goes down with increase in age, ceteris paribus. Finally, for each step up to an older age category
from a younger one, people are 2.17% more likely to consider NATO as no longer essential for Slovakia’s security. The low R-squared in each model nevertheless indicates that a very small portion of the variance of the dependent variable can be attributed to the independent variable (.22% of the change in econpower can be attributed to age; .1% of the change in terrorism, and .48% of the change in natoess).

In relation to the hypotheses outlined in chapter 3.5, this means that the relationship between age and the perception of terrorism as a threat is the only one that is in line with the expectations – older people indeed tend to perceive terrorism as less of a threat, possibly because the latest iteration of international terrorism has not become a focal point of Central European life as it has in some Western countries. As the older cohorts were probably not worried about terrorism all their lives, they are not worried now, even if the threat of terrorism is more immediate than ever before.

The relationship between the age and whether one sees economic power as being important is in the opposite direction of the hypothesis, meaning that as people in Slovakia get older they tend to view economic power as more important than military power. This is in conflict with the theory that people are becoming more "hardline" in their opinions as they get older. One of the possible explanation may be that due to the experience of living in a centrally planned economy under the communist regime, older people now tend to prioritize economic welfare and economic security in general.

The last relationship, between age and the perception of NATO as being essential for Slovakia’s security, indicates that as Slovak people get older, they consider NATO as less essential for Slovakia’s security. I originally hypothesized that their shared experience of WWII and the Soviet Occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 would make them more supportive of NATO; this is, however, not the case. The opposite can be explained by the fact that with Slovakia joining NATO only recently, in 2004, these older cohorts were used to Slovakia not being a member all their lives, which may in turn make them think that NATO is not essential for the country’s security.
5.2 Gender and Foreign Policy Attitudes

5.2.1 Gender and the Importance of Economic Power

The relationship between gender and the perception of economic power as being more important than military power is the first one to be examined in this section. Table 5.2.1.1 shows a negative correlation between the two, meaning that higher values in the gender variable (that stand for males) are associated with lower values in the econpower variable, therefore with an opinion that military power is more important than the economic power. This is also indicated by a cross-classification (table 5.2.1.2) – it is evident that more females fall into the highest categories of the econpower variable than males. This suggests that on average, men may be slightly more inclined to view military power as more important than the economic power. The graphical depiction of the means of econpower variable by gender (graph 5.2.1.3) supports this claim. Finally, the relationship is approximated in a linear form in graph 5.2.1.4. As gender is a binary variable, a line graph is not included because it would look just like the fitted line graph.

### Table 5.2.1.1: Correlation Between Gender and Econpower

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(N= 6831)</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Econpower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econpower</td>
<td>-0.0255</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5.2.1.2: Cross-Classification of Perception of Economic Power Being More Important Than Military Power and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Power Being More Important than Military Power</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree strongly</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree somewhat</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree somewhat</td>
<td>1259</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>2249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
<td>2246</td>
<td>1696</td>
<td>3942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3841</td>
<td>2990</td>
<td>6831</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Graph 5.2.1.3: Mean of Econpower Variable, by Gender**

![Graph showing the mean of Econpower variable by gender](image-url)
Graph 5.2.1.4: Fitted Line Graph for the Econpower Variable, by Gender

5.2.2 Gender and the Perception of a Terrorist Threat

The relationship between gender and the perception of terrorism as not being an important threat shows a weak, positive correlation. This indicates that as gender goes up, the values of the terrorism variable also go up, meaning that being a male is associated with not seeing terrorism as an important threat. This is also evident from the cross-classification of the two variables (table 5.2.2.1) which shows that the most numerous category for females is the one that corresponds to a view of terrorism being an extremely important threat (1132). Graph 5.2.2.3 also shows that the mean of the terrorism variable is slightly higher for males than for females. The linear approximation is depicted in graph 5.2.2.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.2.2.1: Correlation Between Gender and Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N=4353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2.2.2: Cross-Classification of Perception of Terrorism as Not Being an Important Threat and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important threat</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important threat</td>
<td>798</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>1360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important threat</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>1061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2510</td>
<td>1843</td>
<td>4353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 5.2.2.3: Mean of the Terrorism Variable, by Gender
5.2.3 Gender and the Importance of NATO

Finally, gender is negatively associated with the view that NATO is no longer essential for Slovakia’s security. This indicates that being a male is associated with perceiving NATO as essential for Slovakia’s security. The correlation is nevertheless very weak. Graph 5.2.3.3 depicts that the mean of natoess variable is slightly lower for males; the linear approximation (graph 5.2.3.4) also shows that higher values of the gender variable are associated with with lower values in the natoess variable. Being a female is therefore associated with a lower perception of NATO as still essential for Slovakia's security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.2.3.1: Correlation Between Gender and Natoess</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natoess</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2.3.2: Cross-Classification of Perception of NATO as Not Being Essential for Slovakia’s Security and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natoess</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essential</td>
<td></td>
<td>1751</td>
<td>1582</td>
<td>3333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No longer essential</td>
<td></td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>1897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2776</td>
<td>2454</td>
<td>5230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 5.2.3.3: Mean of the Natoess Variable, by Gender
5.2.4 Summary

To sum up, being a male is associated with a .037 decrease in belief that economic power is more essential than military power on a scale 0 to 3, all else being equal. The relationship is statistically significant, the variance of the attitude towards the importance of the economic power that is attributable to gender is nevertheless very low (as R-squared equals .0007). Being a male also leads to a .047 increase in not considering terrorism as an important threat, on a scale of 0 to 2, all else being equal. Men are therefore more "accommodationist" in their attitudes towards terrorism and women are more "hardline". The relationship is bordering on statistically significant, though the R-squared is nevertheless again low. Finally, men are 1.39% more likely to perceive NATO as still being essential for Slovakia’s security, ceteris paribus. This relationship is nevertheless not statistically significant (see table 5.2.4.1). These models again use data from all years combined, and they do not control for year.
In relation to the hypothesized relationships, the one between gender and the perception of economic power as important is in line with the original hypothesis, that is, that women are more accommodationist in their opinions and therefore more prone to favor economic to military solutions, with the opposite being true for men. The hypothesis derived from the mostly-American scholarly literature therefore in this case turns out to be valid in Slovak conditions as well.

The relationship between gender and a perception of a terrorist threat is nevertheless in the opposite direction than hypothesized, meaning that Slovak women are more concerned about terrorism than Slovak men. One possible explanation is that the concern about terrorism does not really proxy the hard—soft continuum, but rather it proxies whether one generally gets more worried about security issues or not. In such case, women may be more concerned about security in general and more susceptible to security threats, which would make them perceive terrorism as more of a threat than men do.

Finally, while the relationship between the perception of how important NATO is for Slovakia’s security may only be marginally statistically significant, it is however in line with the hypothesized direction and may be of substantive significance. It indicates that women tend to see NATO as less essential for Slovakia’s security than men do; this may be, as I mentioned in the section on hypothesized relationships, attributable to the fact that NATO is a military alliance and therefore less appealing to women who tend to be more prone to support economic cooperation and economic power in general.

| Table 5.2.4.1: Gender and Foreign Policy Attitudes (OLS Regression) |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                             | Model 1 Econpower | Model 2 Terrorism | Model 3 Natoess (LPM) |
| Gender                     | -.0371237         | .046833           | -.0138981                |
| Std. Err.                  | .0176078          | .0246801          | .0133227                |
| T                          | -2.11             | 1.90              | -1.04                   |
| P>|t|                       | 0.035             | 0.058             | 0.297                   |
| R-sq.                      | 0.0007            | 0.0008            | 0.0002                  |
5.3 Education and Foreign Policy Attitudes

5.3.1 Education and the Importance of Economic Power

The next examined relationship is the one between education and the perception of economic power as being more important than the military power. The positive correlation equal to .01 indicates a weak positive association between the two variables; higher education is therefore associated with higher levels of preference of economic power to military power. The linear approximation also indicates a slight increase in an average value of econpower variable with education going up; the slope is however almost flat, in line with a very low correlation indicated in table 5.3.1.1. The line graph 5.3.1.3 shows higher mean values of the econpower variable for people who are college-educated (3), although as the difference between highest and the lowest mean values of the econpower variable is very small, this does not mean much in substantive terms.

| Table 5.3.1.1: Correlation Between Education and Econpower |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| (N= 6831)                       | Education       | Econpower      |
| Education                       | 1.0000          |                |
| Econpower                       | 0.0100          | 1.0000         |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.3.1.2: Cross-Classification of Perception of Economic Power Being More Important Than Military Power and Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Power Being More Important than Military Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree somewhat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree somewhat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree strongly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Graph 5.3.1.3: Line Graph of the Econpower Mean Values, by Education
5.3.2 Education and the Perception of a Terrorist Threat

The relationship between education and the perception of terrorism as not being an important threat is positive; the association is nevertheless weak. However, higher education is associated with higher levels of perceiving terrorism as not being an important threat. The lower mean of the terrorism variable, especially for those with a professional or advanced degree beyond college, indicates that very educated people are more prone to believe that terrorism is an important threat. This is evident from the line graph 5.3.2.3. Graph 5.3.2.4 with a linear approximation depicts an upward slope meaning that higher education is associated with higher values of the terrorism variable; the slope is nevertheless essentially almost flat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.3.2.1: Correlation Between Education and Terrorism (N= 4353)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.3.2.2: Cross-Classification of Perception of Terrorism as Not Being an Important Threat and Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Elementary or less</th>
<th>Some high school</th>
<th>High school graduate</th>
<th>College graduate</th>
<th>Professional or advanced degree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important threat</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important threat</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important threat</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>1321</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>4353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 5.3.2.3: Line Graph of the Terrorism Mean Values, by Education
Graph 5.3.2.4: Fitted Line Graph of the Relationship between the Terrorism Variable and Education

5.3.3 Education and the Importance of NATO

Finally, the relationship between the level of education and the perception of NATO as not being essential for Slovakia’s security shows a correlation of -.04, meaning that higher values of education are associated with lower values of the natoess variable. Therefore, on average, as people get more educated, they tend to think that NATO is still essential for Slovakia’s security. However, line graph 5.3.3.3 shows that the belief that NATO is still essential for Slovakia’s security is highest for people with a college degree and then it goes down again for people who possess a professional and or an advanced degree beyond college. The fitted line graph (5.3.3.4), however, has a linear approximation, indicating that generally, higher education means higher perception of NATO as still being essential for Slovakia’s security.
Table 5.3.3.1: Correlation Between Education and Natoess

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(N=5230)</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Natoess</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natoess</td>
<td>-0.0432</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3.3.2: Cross-Classification of Perception of NATO as Not Being Essential for Slovakia’s Security and Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Essential or less</th>
<th>Some high school</th>
<th>High school graduate</th>
<th>College graduate</th>
<th>Professional or advanced degree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essential</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>1478</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No longer essential</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>1624</td>
<td>2286</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Graph 5.3.3.3: Line Graph of the Natoess Mean Values, by Education
Graph 5.3.3.4: Fitted Line Graph of the Relationship between the Natoess Variable and Education

5.3.4 Summary

To sum up the relationship between education and the individual dependent variables, it can be said that it is not a good predictor for any of the outcome variables except for the opinions on the importance of NATO. The t-scores for Model 1 and Model 2 are too low, indicating that the relationship between the perception of economic power and education is not statistically significant and neither is the relationship between the perception of terrorism as a threat and education. As for the third model, it indicates that for every one-category increase in education, people are 2.3% more likely to think that NATO is still essential for Slovakia’s security, all else being equal. This relationship is statistically significant as the absolute value of t-score is large, however, the low R-squared indicates that as little as .19% of the changes in the perception of the importance of NATO can be attributed to a given independent variable, in this case, to education.

Regarding the hypothesized relationships, the one between education and the perception of the importance of economic power is in line with the hypothesis that as...
people get more educated, they tend to prefer economic power to military power. Even though it is not significant, it may be interesting in substantive terms, indicating that public opinion in Slovakia is in this respect in line with the hypothesized directions of relationships in other countries, particularly the USA.

The relationship between education and the perception of the threat of terrorism is even less statistically significant and is not in line with the originally hypothesized direction.

Lastly, the relationship between education and the view of NATO as being or not being essential for Slovakia’s security is a statistically significant one and in line with the hypothesized direction. As Slovak people get more educated, they tend to think of NATO as being more essential for Slovakia’s security. This can be as hypothesized earlier attributed to educated people being more aware of international politics and also having a more thorough understanding of Slovakia’s history.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.3.4.1: Education and Foreign Policy Attitudes (OLS Regression)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Std. Err.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**P&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R-sq.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Across the Years

The last independent variable that is used in this analysis is year. As it is, in various ways, included in each of the final models (see Chapter 6), I will here only show basic trends of the values of each dependent variable across the years. The three line graphs (5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 5.4.3) depict the trend in the responses about the importance of economic power by year, the perception of terrorism as a threat by year and the importance of NATO for Slovakia’s security by year.

The perception of importance of economic power as opposed to military power was, in relative terms, high during the 2005—2006 period, after which there was a downward trend until 2007, followed by an upward trend until 2008, which nevertheless did not
achieve the pre-2006 levels. Another drop occurred in 2009, followed by another upward change in 2010. All in all, the slope in the 2006—2010 period is on average downward. This trend is interesting in that it seems that there were essentially two different trends – before and after 2006. In the final models, I will examine this phenomenon in more detail.

Graph 5.4.1: Line Graph – Importance of Economic Power, by Year

The perception of terrorism as not being a threat was, in relative terms, rather low in the 2004—2006 period, after which it went up steeply. This means that the opinion that terrorism is an extremely important threat (coded 0) was more common in the 2004—2006 period, whereas in 2006—2008 (as 2008 is the last year the data for this variable is available) there were relatively more people thinking that it is not an important threat. The interpretation of this trend with regards to the change of government in 2006 is, as I said earlier, cumbersome. Rather than a radical change in 2006, I would expect a steady year-on-year decline in the level of perception of terrorism as a threat, as the memories of 9/11 and the 2004 Madrid bombings fade over the years. The graph indicates this decline, however, the change in 2006 seems rather substantial. Even if this does not mean that it
can be attributed to the change of government, it requires further analysis in order to elaborate on the possible causes of this change.

**Graph 5.4.2: Line Graph – Terrorism Not Being an Important Threat, by Year**

Lastly, the perception of NATO as no longer being essential for Slovakia’s security showed a downward trend between 2004 and 2005, after which it reached the 2004 level in 2006. Since 2006, there has been a steady decline in the values of the natoess variable, reaching .25 point in 2010. This trend indicates that since 2006, people have become on average more supportive of the idea that NATO is still essential for Slovakia’s security, whereas in 2004 and 2006, the average opinion that NATO is no longer essential for Slovakia’s security was at its highest level during the analyzed years. The trend in the 2004—2006 period is not easy to interpret, especially due to a decline in 2005.
Graph 5.4.3: Line Graph – NATO Not Being Essential for Slovakia's security, by Year
6. **Multivariate Analysis**

In the following pages, I will present the models for each of the dependent variables and various combinations of the independent variables, with each model controlling for year. The relationships are modeled using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression\(^{45}\), therefore the estimates of the regression equation coefficients are obtained in a way that makes the sum of the squares of the vertical distances of the data points from the line as small as possible (Moore, McCabe 2003: 140; Knoke, Bohrnstedt, Mee 2002: 174; Lewis-Beck 1980). All OLS regressions in this chapter use standard errors clustered on the year variable\(^{46}\) in order to avoid the t-scores from being too high due to not accounting for the fact that some observations come from the same year.

6.1 **Modeling the Opinions on the Importance of Economic Power**

The first of the dependent variables analyzed in this part is the opinion on the importance of economic power. The first model only includes year as a linear trend as an independent variable and econpow as the dependent variable. The t-score of the year variable indicates that this relationship is statistically significant. With each year that passes, the perception of economic power as being more important than the military power goes down by .02, on a scale of 0 to 3, all else being equal. Therefore it can be said that the Slovak population is becoming more supportive of military power from one year to another. The magnitude of the relationship is nonetheless relatively small. Similarly, low R-squared indicates that a very small portion of variance of the opinions on the importance of economic power as opposed to military power is attributable to the year from which the observation comes.

Model 2 examines the same relationship, but this time it uses the year dummy variables. The advantage of this approach is that it shows the coefficient for each individual year (summarized in Table 6.1.1). The fact that the coefficients are positive (although not significant) for years 2005 and 2006 and are negative (and mostly significant) from year

---

\(^{45}\) Other types of models, especially logit, were also considered. However, given the fact that their use in most cases reduced the t-scores of the independent variables included in the models relative to OLS, indicated that the use of OLS may be more appropriate.

\(^{46}\) Except for the models with year dummy variables, in which case robust standard errors are used.
2007 until 2010 indicates that creating a spline may be a useful way to model the relationship between the time variable and the econpower variable (Model 3), because the pre-2006 and post-2006 trends may differ substantially.

Model 3 with splines shows that the second spline is bordering on being statistically significant, meaning that in the 2007—2010 period, public opinion on the importance of economic power shows a relatively steady trend. In the 2007—2010 period, it is therefore safer to conclude that the preference for economic power is declining over time. The slope of decline is also marginally steeper than the slope of the line estimated from year as a linear trend (Model 1), indicating that people’s support of military power rose faster during the 2007—2010 period than the average year-on-year increase in the 2004—2010 period.

Models 4 through 6 each include time as a linear trend and one more of the independent variables. They indicate that age is a relatively good predictor of whether people think that economic power is more important than military power, controlling for year; as age goes up by one category (i.e., as people get older) their perception of economic power being more important than military power goes up by .025, ceteris paribus. The R-squared is higher for this model as opposed to model 1 with only the year variable, which indicates that including both year and age as predictors increase the variance of the econpower variable explained by the model. This is in line with the outcome of the bivariate analysis of the relationship between age and the perception of economic power that did not control for year and that is examined in Chapter 5. Both these models are in conflict with the original hypothesis that as people get older, they are becoming more hardline in their opinions, and point to the contrary in Slovak conditions.

Models 5 and 6 show that neither education nor gender are good predictors of public opinion on the importance of economic power, controlling for year; this is also indicated by a lower R-squared, in comparison to model 4, that penalizes the model for including variables that do not increase its predictive power. However, the t-score on gender in model 6 indicates that the relationship is bordering on statistically significant and as such it is worth further analysis. Furthermore, in substantive terms, the relationship is in the hypothesized direction, with being a male leading to .036 decrease in the opinion that economic power is more important than military power, controlling for year, ceteris
paribus. This evidence is again in line with the model in Chapter 5 that did not control for year and both models therefore support the theory that females are more accommodationist in their attitudes and more prone to consider economic power as being more important than the military power, whereas males are more hardline in their opinions and more prone to see military power as more important, in Slovak conditions. However, the fact that the relationship is not unambiguously statistically significant should lead to caution in this interpretation.

Model 7 examines a possible interaction between education and year, although a low t-score on the interactive term indicates that the slopes of the econpower variable across years are not significantly different for different educational levels. Model 8 then includes all the predictors and the interactive term.

As the t-scores on education and on the interactive term are not even marginally statistically significant, the final model 9 includes year as a linear trend, age and gender as the predictors of public opinion on whether economic power is more important than military power. Among the predictors that are examined in this analysis, these are the most appropriate independent variables for estimation of the values of the dependent variable. This is also indicated by a higher R-squared, relative to the other models, and by relatively high t-scores.

All in all, it can be said that the opinion on whether the economic power is more important than the military power can be modeled as a function of the year the data come from, age, and gender. Gender is in line with a hypothesized direction, suggesting that women are more prone to view economic power as more important than military power; and the opposite is true for men, controlling for year and age and all else being equal. Age is, nonetheless, in the opposite direction than hypothesized, suggesting that older people see economic power as more important, as opposed to younger people, controlling for year and gender, ceteris paribus. That age is in conflict with the hypothesis derived from the review of mainly US scholarly literature, while gender is in line with that hypothesis, may be due to older cohorts having a shared, Slovak- or Central Europe-specific formative experience as opposed to younger cohorts, whereas being a male or female in Slovakia and being a male or female in the USA is not a different enough experience to cause different opinions on the
importance of economic power with respect to gender. In other words, females in Slovakia are more like females in the USA than older people in Slovakia are like older people in the USA, when it comes to their perception of the importance of economic power. The downward trend across years at the same time suggests that the population as a whole is becoming more hardline in their opinion and more prone to view military power as more important than economic power. This phenomenon would benefit from further clarification; it is undoubtedly worth addressing more thoroughly.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1.1: Modeling the Opinions on the Importance of Economic Power (OLS Regressions with Standard Errors Clustered on Year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year (linear trend)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year (dummy variables)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time period 2004—2006 (spline)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time period 2007—2010 (spline)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education*year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1.2: Model 2, OLS with Individual Dummy Variables for Each Year (Robust Standard Errors)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Econpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iyear 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iyear 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iyear 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iyear 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iyear 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iyear 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared=0.0082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2 Modeling the Opinions on the Threat of Terrorism

The second examined relationship is the one between people’s opinion on whether or not terrorism is an important threat (with higher values of the terrorism variable being associated with not perceiving terrorism as a threat) and various combinations of the independent variables, while each model controls for year.

Model 1 uses year variable as a linear trend to predict the values of terrorism. It indicates that with each year that passes, people get .262 less concerned with the threat of terrorism, on a scale of 0 to 2, all else being equal. The population is therefore getting less concerned with terrorism over the years, which is in line with an idea that as the memories of 9/11 attacks and 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid fade, Slovak people get less concerned about terrorism. The relationship is statistically significant and the magnitude is also relatively large, as the terrorism variable only ranges from 0 to 2. Very high R-squared also suggests that as much as 23.41% of the variance of the terrorism variable can be attributed to the changes in year.

The use of year dummy variables (model 2) shows that the coefficients on 2007 and 2008 are statistically very significant, which may again indicate that a creation of splines could be beneficial to the model (years 2009 and 2010 are omitted because there are no observations from these years). Therefore, in the model 3, the years are divided between two time periods, 2004—2006 and 2007—2008. The high t-score on the second spline indicates that during the 2007—2008 period, people went up in their perception of terrorism no longer being a threat by .396 from one year to another, all else being equal; the slope was therefore steeper than the slope of the linear approximation across all the years (model 1). In other words, in 2007—2008, the concern over terrorism in Slovakia was decreasing at a faster pace than in 2004—2006.

Models 4 through 6 then each combine year as a linear trend and one more independent variable. They indicate that neither age nor education (models 4 and 5, respectively) are good predictors of the perception of the threat of terrorism, controlling for year, as the t-scores are very low (-.52 for age and .08 for education). The R-squared in both models is equal to or lower than the R-squared for Model 1, indicating that none of these two variables increase explanatory power of the model. Model 6, however, indicates
that gender is a good predictor of the attitudes toward terrorism in terms of it being a threat; being a male leads to .065 increase in the terrorism variable, that is, closer to an opinion that terrorism is not an important threat, controlling for year and all else being equal. This is in line with the bivariate model in Chapter 5 that did not control for year and both these models are in conflict with the hypothesized direction that being a female would lead to a higher level in an opinion that terrorism is not an important threat. One of the possible explanations, as I said earlier, is that in fact, the perception of terrorism as a threat or not may have less to do with one being accommodationist or hardliner in his/her foreign policy attitudes than it does with how worried about one's safety one gets. It can be hypothesized that women are more likely to be worried about their safety and the safety of their families, which makes them more susceptible to security threats, which in turn may lead to them seeing terrorism on average as more of a threat, compared to males' perception of the phenomenon.

Model 7 includes an interactive term for education and year, which is bordering on statistically significant. It indicates that the linear approximation of the relationship between year and people's perception of terrorism as a threat has a different slope for different educational levels. Graph 6.2.3 shows that indeed, for people with master's and professional degrees, the slope is less steep than for other (lower) levels of education; this means that even if people with master’s degrees also become more inclined to think that terrorism is not an important threat as years pass, they become less so than people with lower education, all else being equal. This is in line with a theory that it can be a fading memory of 9/11 and the Madrid attacks that make Slovak people care about terrorism less and less over the years; it would be plausible to conclude that this trend is more evident for people with lower education, because attentiveness to international politics, higher levels of which are presumably correlated with high educational attainment, makes people with master's degrees become relatively less unaware of the terrorist threat.

Finally, model 8 includes all the independent variables and indicates that if put together into one model, all of them except for age are at least bordering on being statistically significant. This leads to a final model 9, which includes year as a linear trend together with education, an interactive term between the two, and gender. This model has
the highest R-squared of all models (except for 2 and 3, but R-squared's of these models are driven by the fact that the year variable is not treated in a linear form), indicating that those predictors, if included in one model, predict the perception of a terrorist threat fairly well. In other words, 23.58% of variance in the terrorism variable can be attributed to year, education, and gender.

Table 6.2.1: Modeling the Opinions on the Threat of Terrorism (OLS Regressions with Standard Errors Clustered on Year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Year (linear trend)</th>
<th>Year (dummy variables)</th>
<th>Time period 2004—2006 (spline)</th>
<th>Time period 2007—2008 (spline)</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Education* year</th>
<th>R-sq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.2624447 (.0499805)</td>
<td>See table 6.2.2</td>
<td>.128754 (.1431599)</td>
<td>.3969734 (.144834)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.2620611 (.0498634)</td>
<td>t=5.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.2624388 (.0499697)</td>
<td>t=5.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.2629478 (.0499606)</td>
<td>t=5.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.271329 (.0531555)</td>
<td>t=5.10</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<td>t=5.15</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>.2706745 (.0527874)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.2699608 (.0523993)</td>
<td>t=5.15</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>.2706745 (.0527874)</td>
<td>t=5.13</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.2358</td>
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Table 6.2.2: Model 2, OLS with Individual Dummy Variables for Each Year (Robust Standard Errors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Robust Standard Error</th>
<th>t</th>
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<tr>
<td>_Iyear_2005</td>
<td>.018425</td>
<td>.0272599</td>
<td>0.68</td>
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<tr>
<td>_Iyear_2006</td>
<td>-0.037197</td>
<td>.0329215</td>
<td>-1.13</td>
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<td>_Iyear_2007</td>
<td>.9608911</td>
<td>.0305135</td>
<td>31.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_Iyear_2008</td>
<td>.839544</td>
<td>.0315761</td>
<td>26.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_Iyear_2009 omitted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_Iyear_2010 omitted</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

R-squared=0.3106
6.3 Modeling the Opinions on the Importance of NATO

The last examined relationship is between various combinations of the independent variables and the perception of NATO as being (0) versus not being (1) essential for Slovakia’s security, controlling for year. The first model with year as a linear trend indicates that with each year that passes, Slovak people are 2.1% more likely to think that NATO is still essential for Slovakia’s security, all else being equal. The t-score indicates the statistical significance of this relationship, the low R-squared nonetheless shows that a very small portion of the variance of Slovak public opinion on the importance of NATO can be attributed to a year when the survey was conducted.

Model 2 and table 6.3.1 show that there is nevertheless a difference between the pre-2006 and post-2007 period, as the post-2007 and especially post-2008 periods yield very high t-scores. This indicates that from 2007 onwards, the trend may be different than the trend in 2004—2006. Model 3 with splines shows that indeed, in the 2007—2010
period, with each year that passed people were 3.4% more likely to think that NATO is still essential for Slovakia’s security, all else being equal. Therefore, the slope was steeper during the 2007—2010 period, with people becoming inclined to think that NATO is still essential for Slovakia’s security at a faster pace than pre-2006.

Models 4 through 6 each combine year as a linear trend with another independent variable. They indicate that age and education are relatively good predictors of public opinion on the importance of NATO in Slovakia, controlling for year, whereas gender is not, as the t-score for gender is not even bordering on statistical significance. Model 7 includes year, education and the interaction between the two. However, it yields a low t-score on the interactive term as well as a low t-score on education, meaning that the interactive term should not be part of the final model.

Finally, model 9 includes all the significant predictors of public opinion on NATO importance in Slovakia that are examined in this analysis – year as a linear trend, age, and education. It indicates that as people move up from one age category to another, they are 2.3% more likely to think that NATO is no longer essential for Slovakia’s security, all else being equal, controlling for year and education. The relationship is statistically significant. This is in line with a bivariate model in Chapter 5 that did not control for year and both are in conflict with the hypothesized direction—contrary to it, older people tend to be more inclined to think that NATO is no longer essential for Slovakia’s security. The original idea—that older people who have similar formative experiences of WWII and the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 would be more inclined to think NATO is essential for Slovakia’s security—therefore has to be rejected. Instead, we may theorize that those older cohorts used to live for most of their lives without their country being a member of NATO, which may lead them to think that it is not that important for Slovakia’s security; as opposed to younger cohorts that may have been aware of Slovakia’s effort to join the alliance for most of their lives and therefore may perceive it as something rather important.

Regarding education, model 9 indicates that as it goes up by one category, people become 1.7% more likely to think that NATO is still essential for Slovakia’s security, controlling for year and age, all else being equal. The relationship is statistically significant at t=-2.32, and is in line with the hypothesized direction and with the bivariate model in
Chapter 5. This indicates that more educated people are more inclined to think that NATO is still essential for Slovakia’s security. As mentioned above, I would attribute this direction to more educated people being supposedly more aware of international politics, more attentive to international affairs, more educated about Slovakia’s history and therefore also more inclined to view NATO as being essential in this respect. The model’s R-squared of .0154 indicates that even if the model is rather weak, it is the best of all the models presented here (aside from 2 and 3).

| Table 6.3.1: Modeling the Opinions on the Importance of NATO  
(O LS Regressions with Standard Errors Clustered on Year) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year (linear trend)</td>
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<td>Year (dummy variables)</td>
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<td>Time period 2004—2006 (spline)</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<td>Education*y ear</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-sq.</td>
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| Table 6.3.2: Model 2, OLS with Individual Dummy Variables for Each Year  
(R obust Standard Errors) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Natoess Coefficient</td>
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<tr>
<td>_Iyear_2005</td>
</tr>
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<td>_Iyear_2006</td>
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<td>_Iyear_2007</td>
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<td>_Iyear_2008</td>
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<td>_Iyear_2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_Iyear_2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared=0.0165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Conclusion

To sum up, it can be concluded that the personal characteristics as well as the time factor are in general useful predictors of public opinion on selected foreign policy topics in Slovakia, although to varying extents.

Not controlling for time and all else being equal, older people in Slovakia tend to see economic power as more important than military power; they also tend to see terrorism as less of a threat; and finally they see NATO as no longer essential for Slovakia’s security. All these relationships are statistically significant, pointing to a conclusion that age is in general a good predictor for opinions on foreign policy issues in Slovakia. Also, if we do not control for time, males are more inclined to prefer military power to economic power, as opposed to females; they are also less concerned with terrorism as a threat, ceteris paribus. Both relationships are statistically significant, however there is not a statistically significant relationship between gender and the perception of the importance of NATO for Slovakia’s security. Finally, not controlling for year, education is a good predictor for none of the dependent variables except the view on the importance of NATO, all else being equal, suggesting that more educated people in Slovakia tend to think of NATO as being more essential to Slovakia’s security.

Looking at these relationship from a different perspective, public opinion on the importance of economic power as opposed to military power can be modeled using year as a linear trend in a model together with age and gender. Such a model indicates that the Slovak population is becoming on average more hardline in its attitudes year-on-year and the trend is steeper in the 2007—2010 period; it also indicates that older people and females tend to prefer economic power to military power, controlling for the remaining variables in the model.

Public opinion on terrorism as being versus not being a threat can be modeled using year as a linear trend, education, gender, and the interactive term between education and year. Such a model indicates that as years pass, the Slovak population is becoming less and less worried about terrorism, all else being equal. The decline is again steeper in the 2007—2008 period, for no obvious reason, even though the overall decline may be attributed to fading memories of 9/11 and the Madrid attacks. Other than that, higher
education makes people less worried about terrorism and so does being a male, all else being equal and controlling for the remaining variables in the model.

Finally, the perception of NATO as being versus not being essential for Slovakia’s security can be modeled using year as a linear trend, age, and education. Such a model indicates that as years go by, the Slovak population tend to see NATO as being more and more essential for Slovakia’s security; with the slope being again steeper in the 2007—2010 period. Older people are, however, more inclined to think NATO is not essential for Slovakia’s security, whereas more educated people are more inclined to think the opposite is true, all else being equal and controlling for other variables included in the model.

Out of three sets of multivariate models, the model of perception of a terrorist threat yields an extremely high R-squared, which is mostly driven by the time variable. This indicates that time is an extremely good predictor of how people in Slovakia perceive the threat of terrorism.

Lastly, an interesting feature of all three models is that creating splines for the 2004—2006 and 2007—2010 periods yielded statistically significant coefficients in the 2007—2010 period in two cases, in the perception of the importance of NATO and in the perception of a threat of terrorism, while a 2007—2010 spline was marginally significant for the modeling of the opinion on the importance of economic power as opposed to military power. Given a change of government in 2006, this may indicate that there is a relationship between change of government and changes in public opinion on foreign policy in Slovakia.

These are just some of the possible explanations and as a non-exhaustive account they admittedly do not capture the entire range of processes and possible reasons behind the results. For example, a perception of NATO as not being essential for Slovakia’s security may in fact be driven by a disapproving stance toward the US role in the world affairs, but it may as well be driven by one’s adherence to the ideas of multiculturalism and globalization that would make one reluctant to think that organizations such as NATO are still relevant. From this perspective, NATO can be opposed by fundamentally different groups of people, such as educated, worldly liberals and conservative leftists, such as communists. At the
same time, it can be supported by authoritarian rightists such as former members of anti-communist movements just as well as it can be supported by liberal rightists.

Similarly, in case of a concern over terrorism, it can be said that another intervening variable may be the extent to which one adheres to the American interpretation of the clash of civilizations and the war against terrorism, therefore one’s identification with Americanist versus anti-Americanist attitudes may drive his/her attitudes towards terrorism as well. For example, if people do not see terrorism as a threat it may mean that they are opposing American politics and US supremacy in world affairs, thinking that the US response to 9/11 is inadequate, and are upset by the limited extent of US adherence to international legal standards. In this view, Americanist opinions would be supported by young rightists, old anti-communists, but also rightist authoritarians, while anti-Americanist opinions would presumably find support among young leftist liberals, cosmopolitan economic liberals, but also communists. Moreover, general disillusion resulting from the failures of the war on terrorism and American blunders in this domain may again contribute to a declining concern over terrorism.

As for the importance of economic power, an inclination to think it is more important than military power may stem from one’s preference for international trade as opposed to military solutions; but it may also mean that people identify economic interconnectedness as a new way of occupation, thinking that as opposed to German occupation during WWII and Soviet occupation in the second half of the 20th century, today it is German companies and Russian energy business that hold Central European countries captive, thus making military power obsolete in the Central European context. All in all, application of a more complex framework, such as the left-right continuum together with the authoritarian-liberal continuum and party identification may provide some more thorough explanations of the phenomena addressed in this thesis.
8. Discussion

There are many limitations to this research. First of all, it would be better to have data from more years than just from those included in the analysis. That would increase the sample size for bivariate analyses and would also make the trend analysis more complex. Moreover, longitudinal data would make more sophisticated research designs possible, such as difference-in-difference designs, that may provide more insight into public opinion on foreign policy in Slovakia. Of course, higher response rates would increase the quality of the used datasets.

Next, the exact same wording of the questions across the years would be beneficial, in that it would ensure an analysis of the exact same variables, while even slight differences in question wordings lead to a situation when one question is a proxy for another question which is a methodologically cumbersome situation.

In relation to the analysis of the conceptual relationship, the chosen variables may not be the best proxies for the hard—soft continuum, I however still believe that such an analytical outlook is generally beneficial to the interpretation of the results in substantive terms.

As for next steps, the fact that including splines in the models with a cut-off in year 2006 when there was a change in the government yielded statistically significant post-2007 trends should be addressed in further research. It is more plausible to theorize that government influences public opinion on foreign policy than vice versa, as foreign policy is on average not high on the list of the priorities of Slovak voters. Either way though, if there is such a strong indication that something in public opinion changes when the government changes, it would be beneficial to address it in further research.

Finally, the extremely high R-squared for the models predicting the concern with terrorism suggest that in Slovakia, year predicts the concern levels very well. Since there were no major terrorist attacks in Europe or in the USA that would significantly resonate with the Slovak public during the 2004—2010 period, it is difficult to hypothesize to what extent the Slovak public reacts to the terrorist attacks by being more concerned about terrorism. It is nevertheless still interesting that the concern over terrorism showed a steady decline over time during a period when "nothing was happening". In case of an
occurrence of major events in this area, it would be beneficial to capture the reaction of Slovak public opinion.

These are just some of the limitations of this research and suggestions for future analyses. Alongside the more obvious improvements, such as including more and or better data, more independent variables such as income, party identification, or a position on a left—right continuum, or more independent variables to model public opinion on foreign policy in Slovakia more thoroughly, I see these as the main prospects for future research.
9. List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Movement (Slovak: Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie, KDH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUS</td>
<td>Democratic Union of Slovakia (Slovak: Demokratická únia Slovenska, DEÚS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPM</td>
<td>Linear Probability Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDS</td>
<td>Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Slovak: Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko, HZDS)</td>
</tr>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordinary Least Squares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAV</td>
<td>Public Against Violence (Slovak: Verejnosť proti násiliu, VPN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDL</td>
<td>Party of the Democratic Left (Slovak: Strana demokratickej ľavice, SDL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PES</td>
<td>Party of European Socialists</td>
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<td>SDC</td>
<td>Slovak Democratic Coalition (Slovak: Slovenská demokratická koalícia, SDK)</td>
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<td>SDCU</td>
<td>Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (Slovak: Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia, SDKÚ)</td>
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<td>Slovak Information Service (Slovak: Slovenská informačná služba, SIS)</td>
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<td>SNP</td>
<td>Slovak Nationalist Party (Slovak: Slovenská národná strana, SNS)</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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</table>
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Table 6.3.1: Modeling the Opinions on the Importance of NATO

Table 6.3.2: Model 2, OLS with Individual Dummy Variables for Each Year
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Datasets

Transatlantic Trends Survey 2004
Transatlantic Trends Survey 2005
Transatlantic Trends Survey 2006
Transatlantic Trends Survey 2007
Transatlantic Trends Survey 2008
Transatlantic Trends Survey 2009
Transatlantic Trends Survey 2010
12. Appendix

Question Wordings

2004

Age

VAR004 D. 2- APPROXIMATE AGE
D. 2 Age groups
1. 18 to 24 years
2. 25 to 34 years
3. 35 to 44 years
4. 45 to 54 years
5. 55 to 64 years
6. 65 +
997. Refused

Education

VAR005 D. 3 LAST GRADE OF SCHOOL COMPLETED
D. 3 Last grade of school completed
1. Elementary school or less
2. Some high school
3. Did you graduate from high school
4. Did you graduate from college
5. Do you have professional degrees beyond the college degree
997. Refusal

Gender

VAR003 D. 1 GENDER
D. 1 Gender
1. Male
2. Female

Econpower

VAR100 A. ECONOMIC POWER IS MORE IMPORTANT IN WORLD AFFAIRS THAN MILITARY POWER
Q. 26a We are almost at the end of the interview, please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following... Economic power is more important in world affairs than military power.
1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Disagree somewhat
4. Disagree strongly
997. Dk/ Refusal

Terrorism

VAR017 C. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Q. 6 I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to [the United States/ Europe] in the next 10 years. Please tell me if you think each one on the list is an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all... International terrorism
1. Extremely important threat to Europe/the US in the next 10 years
2. Important threat
3. Not important threat
997. Dk/ Refusal

Natoess

VAR044 Q. 14 SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT NATO IS STILL ESSENTIAL TO OUR COUNTRY'S SECURITY. OTHER SAY IT IS NO LONGER ESSENTIAL. WHICH OF THESE VIEWS IS CLOSER TO YOUR OWN?
Q. 14 Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country security. Other say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?
1. Still essential
2. No longer essential
997. Dk/ Refusal

2005

Age

VAR005 D. 2- APPROXIMATE AGE
D. 2 Age groups
1. 18 to 24 years
2. 25 to 34 years
3. 35 to 44 years
4. 45 to 54 years
5. 55 to 64 years
6. 65 +
7. Refusal

Education

VAR006 D. 3 LAST GRADE OF SCHOOL COMPLETED
D. 3 Last grade of school completed
1. Elementary school or less
2. Some high school
3. Did you graduate from high school
4. Did you graduate from college
5. Do you have professional degrees beyond the college degree
6. Refusal

Gender

VAR004 D. 1 GENDER
D. 1 Gender
1. Male
2. Female
VAR120 Q22. We are almost at the end of the interview, please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following. a) Economic power is more important in world affairs than military power?

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Disagree somewhat
4. Disagree strongly
5. DK
6. Refusal

Terrorism

VAR031 Q7a. I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to Europe/US in the next 10 years. Please tell me if you think each one on the list is an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all.

c) International terrorism

0. Not asked
1. Extremely important threat to Europe in the next 10 years
2. Important threat
3. Not important threat
4. DK
5. Refusal

Natoess

VAR082 Q13. Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country’s security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?

1. Still essential
2. No longer essential
3. DK
4. Refusal

2006

Age

VAR004 D. 2- APPROXIMATE AGE

D. 2 Age groups
1. 18 to 24 years
2. 25 to 34 years
3. 35 to 44 years
4. 45 to 54 years
5. 55 to 64 years
6. 65 +
7. Refusal

**Education**

VAR005 D3 AT WHAT STAGE DID YOU COMPLETE YOUR FULL-TIME STUDIES?
D3 At what stage did you complete your full-time studies?
1. Elementary (primary) school or less
2. Some high (secondary) school
3. Graduation from high (secondary) school
4. Graduation from college, university or other third
5. Post-graduate degree (Masters, PHD) beyond your in
6. [Other qualification]
7. [Refusal]

**Gender**

VAR003 D. 1 GENDER
D. 1 Gender
1. Male
2. Female

**Econpower**

VAR076 Q27.1 ECONOMIC POWER IS MORE IMPORTANT IN WORLD AFFAIRS THAN MILITARY POWER
Q27.1 We are almost at the end of the interview, please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following. [READ OUT – RANDOMLY ROTATE - ONE ANSWER PER LINE]
Economic power is more important in world affairs than military power
0. Not asked
1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Disagree somewhat
4. Disagree strongly
5. DK
6. Refusal

**Terrorism**

VAR037 Q13A.1 A) INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM Q13a.1 I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to Europe/US in the next 10 years. Please tell me if you think each one on the list is an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all. a) international terrorism
0. Not asked
1. Extremely important threat to Europe/US in the next 10 years
2. Important threat
3. Not important threat
4. DK
5. Refusal

**Natoess**

VAR021 Q10A. SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT NATO IS STILL ESSENTIAL TO OUR COUNTRY’S SECURITY. OTHERS SAY IT IS NO LONGER ESSENTIAL. WHICH OF THESE VIEWS IS CLOSER TO YOUR OWN?
Q10A. Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country’s security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own? [READ OUT - ONE ANSWER ONLY] - [If respondent asks for explanation: "NATO is our military alliance with the [United States\countries of Europe]"]
(IF 'SPLIT BALLOT A')
1. Still essential
2. No longer essential
3. DK
4. Refusal

2007

Age

Age group
(-999) Refuse to answer/Don't know
(1) 18-24
(2) 25-34
(3) 35-44
(4) 45-54
(5) 55-64
(6) 65+

Education

Education At what time did you complete your full-time studies?
(-999) Refuse to answer
(1) Elementary (primary) school or less
(2) Some high (secondary) school
(3) Graduation from high (secondary) school
(4) Graduation from college, university or other third-level instruction
(5) Post-graduate degree (Masters, PHD) beyond your initial college
(6) Other qualification

Gender

Gender
(1) Male
(2) Female

Econpower

Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following.
q25_1 Economic power is more important in world affairs than military power
(-999) Refuse to answer/Don't know
(1) Agree strongly
(2) Agree somewhat
(3) Disagree somewhat
(4) Disagree strongly

Terrorism

And in the next 10 years, please tell me how likely you are to be personally affected by each of the following threats
q8_1 International terrorism
(-999) Refuse to answer/Don't know
(1) Very likely
(2) Somewhat likely
(3) Not too likely
(4) Not likely at all

**Natoess**

q14 Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country’s security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own? (-999) Refuse to answer/Don’t know
(1) Still essential
(2) No longer essential

**2008**

**Age**

AGE D2. Approximate age
1 18-24
2 25-34
3 35-44
4 45-55
5 55-64
6 65 +
7 DK/NA

**Education**

D3. At what stage did you complete full-time studies?
1 Elementary (primary) school or less
2 Some high (secondary) school
3 Graduation from high (secondary) school
4 Graduation from college, university or other third-level in
5 Post-graduate studies (Masters, PHD) beyond your initial c
6 Others
7 DK/NA

**Gender**

D10 Gender
1 Male
2 Female

**Econpower**

Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of the following.
Economic power is more important in world affairs than military power
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree somewhat
3 Disagree somewhat
4 Disagree strongly
5 DK
6 Refusal

**Terrorism**
And in the next 10 years, please tell me how likely you are to be personally affected by each of the following threats. - International terrorism
1 Very likely
2 Somewhat likely
3 Not too likely
4 Not likely at all
5 DK
6 Refusal

Natoess

Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?
1 Still essential
2 No longer essential
3 DK
4 Refusal

2009

Age

AGE D2. Approximate age
1 18-24
2 25-34
3 35-44
4 45-54
5 55-64
6 65+
99 RA

Education

D3. Stage full-time studies completed
1 Elementary (primary) school or less
2 Some high (secondary) school
3 Graduation from high (secondary) school
4 Graduation from college, university or other third-level institute
5 Post-graduate degree (Masters, PHD) beyond your initial college degree
6 Other qualification
99 RA

Gender

D1. Gender
1 Male
2 Female

Econpower

Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following.
Q29_1. Economic power is more important in world affairs than military power
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree somewhat
3 Disagree somewhat
4 Disagree strongly
98 DK
99 RA

Terrorism

Not asked

Natoess

Q11. Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country’s security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?
1 Still essential
2 No longer essential
98 DK
99 RA

2010

Age

Age respondent - categorical
1 18-24
2 25-34
3 35-44
4 45-54
5 55-64
6 65+
99 RA

Education

EDUC D3 - At what stage did you complete your fulltime studies?
1 Elementary (primary) school or less
2 Some high (secondary) school
3 Graduation from high (secondary) school
4 Graduation from college, university or other third level institute
5 Post-graduate degree (Masters, PHD) beyond your initial college degree
6 Other qualification
99 RA

Gender

Gender respondent
1 Male
2 Female

Econpower

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Q33.1 - Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following...
- Economic power is more important in world affairs than military power
  1 Agree strongly
  2 Agree somewhat
  3 Disagree somewhat
  4 Disagree strongly
  98 DK
  99 RA

  **Terrorism**

  Not asked

  **Natoess**

  Q11 – NATO still essential for country's security?
  1 Still essential
  2 No longer still essential
  98 DK
  99 RA