

Polities and Size: Legitimizing or Limiting?

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Abstract

Bhutan credits its size for its achievements, one of which is the peaceful transition from an absolute monarchy to a multi-party democracy. Despite the wide acceptance of democratic institutions, a successful polity can be established regardless of the type of regime, and it relies on legitimacy derived from its citizens. This paper argues that territorial size is inversely related to the success of the dynamic legitimizing process, where governments in smaller states are better able to claim and consolidate authority. However, the relentless progress of globalization has changed the sociopolitical architecture and eroded the benefits of being a small state. Governments should therefore reevaluate and reinvent their legitimizing strategies to shape culture, as it continues to have a strong effect in determining the relationship between the authorities and the people.

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1. Introduction

The modern state, as an autonomous territorial-political, is a form of social organization. Inherent in it is a hierarchy where the government is endowed with power and the benefits that the position of leadership offers in exchange for the provision of certain needs that the individual cannot fulfill. Clearly, these advantages are sufficient to motivate the incumbent to assume the position and seek to perpetuate its rule. Continued subscription to the contractual agreement by both parties signals the success of the polity. While there has been extensive discourse on the strategies that the government employs to claim and sustain its legitimacy, I seek to examine the effect of a fundamental characteristic of the state on these strategies.

I posit that territorial size is negatively associated with the success of the dynamic legitimizing process and that governments in smaller states are better able to consolidate authority. To test my hypothesis, the level of legitimacy in a state was regressed on the corresponding territorial size while controlling for the other bases of legitimacy. Analyses on 40 countries across 16 years suggest that the size effect is small, leading me to further hypothesize that globalization has changed the international political architecture and consequently, eroded the benefits of being a small state. Governments should reevaluate their legitimizing strategies in light of the cultural grip of the government-citizen relationship.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Understanding and Operationalizing Legitimacy

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the political landscape has been defined by “exclusive and absolute sovereignty,” where states, as the units of functionality, are demarcated by invariant territorial boundaries (Thongchai, 1994, p. 149). Easton (1957) presents a clear and

useful definition of the state – it provides the framework of operation for the political system, which comprises three entities: the regime, the government and the political community.

It is important to note the distinction between the government and the regime because calls for a change of government typically do not signal a similar intention to modify the type regime. The regime provides the structure of rule that becomes institutionalized; that is, it lays down a set of consensus values and norms that governs the functioning of society, which can be interpreted as the ‘rules of the game’. The government assumes the role of a player in occupying the positions of authority that the regime prescribes (Easton, 1965) and is consequently endowed with power. It is not possible to isolate the government-citizen relationship when examining the political system of a state, because the type of regime affects that relationship. Yet, citizens are often able to distinguish their opinions on the government from that of the regime (Muller, Jukam & Seligson, 1982) despite the interaction between the three entities. Thus, political support can be analyzed on two dimensions – diffuse support for the political system, which is principally directed towards the regime, and specific support for the government (Easton, 1965).

Weber argues that even though the government has the right to assume the authoritative role in the system, it is contingent on the people’s belief in its moral authority (Alagappa, 1995, p. 2). It is this belief that confers onto the government the right to hold and wield political power in order to satisfy the demands of its citizens. Legitimacy, or specific support, is therefore a necessary condition of governance and must be continually cultivated. It is contextual because it is a conscious project of the government: the type of legitimacy is determined within the framework that the regime provides and it shapes the motivations behind obedience, the government structure, and the means of governance (Weber, 1974).

The legitimizing mechanism is mutually reinforcing between the government and the people. Legitimacy is primarily derived from the settlement of demands that individuals or groups in the society cannot fulfill. The “special organized effort” that is required to meet these demands entails some form of social organization (Easton, 1957, p. 387-390), and the fundamental function of the government is to provide goods and services that fulfill the demands of the people, and in return, it is endowed with certain advantages, namely power or the “means of administration,” and material rewards (Parsons, 1947, p. 63). The nineteenth century Balinese state appears to contradict this model of governance: it emphasized rituals and symbols, which reflect the hierarchical order of the cosmos itself and creates authority for the leadership without it having to serve any administrative function (Geertz, 1981). However, it satisfies the demands of the people who rely on such spectacles to buttress their religious beliefs; they shape their lives around this conception of the universe. The fulfillment of demands is therefore the mechanism by which the contract between the government and the citizens is enforced.

According to Easton (1957), the types of demands that people make vary among societies because there exist different characteristics, such as culture, demography, and ecology, which confer onto each society a “unique quality” (p. 388). Geertz (1973) defines culture to be the pattern of meanings embedded in symbols, through which men “communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life” (p. 89). In contrast to his emphasis on symbolism, Malinowski (1944) proposes functionalism: culture consists of institutions, within which activities and attitudes are “means to an end” (p. 150). Over time, despite its varying definitions, culture redefines the norms, values, and beliefs that form what Durkheim (1984) calls a collective consciousness. This set of shared beliefs and morals becomes the underpinning of society as it provides a set of criteria that allows the people to decide, as a

group, on certain demands over others (Parsons, 1951, p. 11-12). This solidarity is reinforced by societal interactions (Durkheim, 1984) and the government-citizen relationship is particularly salient in shaping it. The government influences culture by means of its education policies, effectively directing the collective will. Consequently, the cultural grip on the people's demands is strong.

All institutions and social practices exist in historical continuity (Alagappa, 1996, p. 17). Religion used to be the core of society (Weber, 1930) but as culture evolves, the role of religion becomes eclipsed by the demands of the modern state such as security, social order, welfare, freedom, and justice. As it further evolves, the scope of demands in modern societies has expanded to include the sociological and economic (Gilley, 2006b, p. 49). By successfully catering to these demands, governments are able to mobilize popular support and consolidate their authority.

The operationalization of legitimacy is subject to much contention. Stokes (1962) defines political trust to be the "basic evaluative or affective orientation [of the people] toward the government" (p. 64), which can be measured by the Trust-in-Government scale, an attitudinal scale that Robinson, Rusk, and Head (1968) have developed. However, these surveys are unable to distinguish between specific support for the government and diffuse support for the political system. There are arguments that these surveys evaluate the amount of specific support, or the level of legitimacy that the government enjoys, and not attitudes towards the political system as a whole (Citrin, 1974; Lipset & Schneider, 1983; Muller, Jukam & Selignson, 1982). This is because when the disparity between public and government interests is large, the former's demands are not met and political trust may be low. On the other hand, there is also the case for a correlation between political trust and diffuse support, where sustained low levels of trust

would threaten the regime (Miller, 1974). Hill (1982) identified the ambiguity of the “government” as the source of contention – it is unclear if it refers to the incumbent at that point of time or the regime and its institutions.

In addition to the substantive problems associated with using political trust to operationalize legitimacy, there are measurement and validity problems with the use of Trust-in-Government responses derived from surveys. Given that only a certain sample population completes a survey, representativeness is questionable. It is also subject to non-response bias since non-respondents usually differ from respondents in characteristics and attitudes (Singleton & Straits, 2010). A further problem lies in surveying oppressive regimes, where the citizens’ response would be positively skewed due to fear of severe repercussions should they respond otherwise. Furthermore, legitimacy is a continuous variable (Gilley, 2006a). By attempting to operationalize it in broad, discrete response categories of trust, the Trust-in-Government scale is insensitive to extreme sentiments and is not able to accurately reflect changes in responses over time (Muller, Jukam & Selignson, 1982).

It is prudent, then, to look at objective measures of legitimacy, such as the level of internal violence that reflects political stability. Modern political strategy appear to follow Durkheim’s notion of the collective consciousness in that it seeks to assimilate various elements of the society, merging and translating them into what appears to be a shared will (Day, 2002). Legitimacy founded on the common good assumes cultural homogeneity within the state; that is, citizens in each state have similar value orientations that shape their attitudes and behaviors. A corollary would be that legitimacy becomes impossible to achieve in culturally divided states due to the polarity of demands on the state (Gilley, 2009). Since there are diverse preferences in the populace, the fact that the citizens have different and often conflicting demands from the

government means that the government will inevitably be unable to uniformly satisfy all demands. Given that the state is organized in a hierarchy and legitimacy is a construct, it begets competition for control over the advantages endowed by the positions of leadership, which is aligned with the state's quest to extract resources from the land and its inhabitants (Scott, 2010, p. 4-5). Political contest is therefore inherent in the system. There exists a scale of the degree of support and at the negative end, the contest of legitimacy would lead to opposition and resistance (Alagappa, 1996; Muller & Jukam, 1977). When the level of popular support is sufficiently eroded, it stimulates the articulation of dissent in behavior that ranges from refusal of participation to the extreme end of violent acts, such as political protests, rebellions and coups d'état. Resistance is a political choice that is a manifestation of the flight or fight mentality; the people have autonomy to withdraw from the government's sphere of control by leaving the state, or seek to change the existing political system (Miller, 1974, p. 951). Since political dissatisfaction arises from the perception that the government is not fulfilling its end of the contractual bargain, and consequently, does not possess the right to rule, the people would typically also regard legitimate means of engendering change as ineffective and resort to violence (Miller, 1974).

It does not discount the fact that coercion is inherent in every political system, even when it is based on communal relationships and interests are aligned (Weber, 1947, p. 137). The motivations behind the people's willingness to conform to the social hierarchy are varied – it could be a performance to serve their material self-interests (Scott, 2010, p. 244) or due to the lack of a credible alternative leadership. When voluntary submission is not readily available, the government has to regulate society by oppressive control or the threat of it. In the suppression of resistance, the government enforces obedience by violent means, which would imply that it is not

legitimate. However, when the majority of the public who are not victims of violence perceives the use of force as necessary to defend the political status quo and maintain social order in response to the threat of state violence, it indicates acquiescence to the government's right to rule.

Thus, the lack of violence, regardless of whether it is due to tacit acceptance, indifference or suppression, indicates that the contract between the government and the people is enforced and obeyed, and allows for enduring governance. In this scenario, the level of internal violence would then reflect the extent of the government's legitimacy. As Przeworski (1986) asserts, the lack of political contest or a credible alternative leadership is sufficient for political stability and heralds a successful government.

2.2. Why does size matter?

Territorial Size and Peripheries. Hansson and Olsson (2011) argue that the size of a territory is negatively associated with the strength of the rule of law and follow with a corollary that the location of the capital in the center of the country is also a significant factor of institutional quality. Their discourse is founded on the idea of a nation-state as possessing exclusive territorial boundaries and a sense of homogeneity within these boundaries (see Thongchai 1994). They have also proved that land area is more significant than population in the political discourse on size. The boundaries that determine the state clearly demarcates the sphere of the government's influence in that it has the right to project its authority only up to its borders. This is congruent with the philosophy espoused by Rousseau, who claims that small states are superior "because their rulers can see for themselves the harm that is being done and the good that is theirs to do" (Rose, 2005, p. 4). Since its perimeters define the state, there should theoretically be a uniform distribution of authority within its borders (Anderson, 1972, p. 29). By

extending its influence in equal measure throughout its territory, the government of a smaller state would have an advantage in the concentration of its authority.

In practice, however, power in the modern state is centralized. Consider the South East Asian states: parallels can be drawn to the pre-modern mandala state, which is defined by its center instead of its boundaries (Anderson, 1972, p. 28). Political power diffuses according to a “spatial decay-function” from the centers of polities (Hansson & Olsson, 2011). This is evident in the concentration of power in the political elites due to their proximity to the center. For example, in Indonesia, the palace group and private staff under the respective regimes of Guided Democracy and the New Order regimes held and exercised a tremendous amount of power (Anderson, 1972, p. 37). There is a corresponding inequitable distribution of wealth and opportunities for development, as evident in Thailand. The regional disparities between Central Thailand and the rural areas are attributed to the dominance of Bangkok, where the seat of the government is located, and state neglect of rural populations (Prasert, 1987). Hewison (2012) contends that socioeconomic inequalities have fuelled the recent conflict between the ‘Red Shirts’ and ‘Yellow Shirts’, where the ‘Red Shirts’ are associated with farmers and workers from the rural North, while the ‘Yellow shirts’ consist of the middle class population in Bangkok and pro-monarchy political elites (p. 145).

The government’s influence in the imposition of social order and the establishment of norms and mores also follows the diffusion pattern. Scott (2010) argues that administrative, economic, and cultural standards of behavior that bind individuals in a social group are propagated throughout the state from the center with the aim of enforcing conformity (p. 4). The modern state seeks to absorb and engulf the people within its territory by institutionalizing behavioral norms, primarily through its legal system, as well as its education and religious

policies. This births two effects that are detrimental to the legitimacy of the government. Firstly, the state-society relationship at the peripheries is more superficial because social norms and values fail to penetrate as deeply. In its failure to foster an affective relationship grounded on feelings of belonging or a common identity, there would be less willingness to comply with societal norms and competing ideologies are able to take root. Secondly, less enforcement resources are allocated to the peripheries, which implies that the rule of law is not as strictly enforced as in the political nucleus (Hansson & Olsson, 2011, p. 8-10). This accords the people at the peripheries greater autonomy to deviate from normative behaviors and actively articulate their dissent. The cumulative effect is the amalgam of resistance that threatens the government's legitimacy.

Moreover, certain hinterlands have characteristics – geographical inaccessibility, cultural and language diversity, agricultural practices that enhance mobility, and a fissiparous and egalitarian social structure – that make them a “shatter zone”, a zone of refuge from the hegemonic power of the state that Scott (2010) terms as *Zomia* (p. 7, 327). These shatter zones offer an alternative way of living that challenges the fundamental nature of the state, where acephalous societies exist and even thrive in the peripheries. Larger territories are more likely to host such communities, whereas small states often do not have sufficient territorial space to harbor them (Laos and Burma are two exceptions). Even though most of these hinterlands (the remaining ones exist in Afghanistan, Somalia, Burma, north-east India, and the Amazon) have been absorbed by the state post-World War II as part of a legitimizing strategy and retreating to these ungovernable zones is no longer a valid option, their legacy persists since a polity is shaped by history (Parekh, 1992). The notion of state evasion as a political choice lingers in the social consciousness of larger countries that encompassed shatter zones and increases the likelihood of

behavior that is inimical to state governance, particularly in rural areas. Since land area is negatively associated with the level of urbanization, smaller states would have less of an urban-rural divide and tend to be better adapted to elicit compliance.

China presents a seeming contradiction to the hypothesis that governments in smaller countries are able to achieve and maintain legitimacy more easily. It is the fourth largest country in the world and the largest in Asia, yet its government enjoys a high level of legitimacy: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has managed to gain and sustain the support of the people spanning the urban-rural spectrum (Guo, 2003). Since assuming leadership after the communist revolution of 1949, it has only suffered two major political crises (the Tiananmen Incident in 1976 and the Tiananmen Square Protest of 1989), both of which it effectively suppressed. While the CCP has had to adapt and reinvent its ideology in response to these crises (Holbig, 2006), it has retained its right to rule.


However, China's administrative division reinforces the negative association between size and legitimacy. It operates similarly to a federal system, where political power in China diffuses from the CCP's seat in Beijing to the provincial level that comprises 23 provinces, four municipalities, four autonomous regions and two special administrative regions (P.R.C. Government, 2012). The central-local government relationship has evolved to a de facto federal system (Zheng, 2006), where provincial authorities have a considerable degree of autonomy to formulate and implement policies in prefectures, counties and cities under their jurisdiction. Parallels to the mandala system can be drawn from the vertical division of authority in China: state power diffuses to the provincial level; at the provincial level, power is diffused from the local government to the boundaries of the sub-state unit. This distribution of authority impels the people to identify more closely with their local government than the central government. Thus,

the CCP's legitimacy is likely to have resulted from the successful consolidation of authority from the smaller provincial units.

The United States is another such example. Although Americans do not necessarily identify more with their state or local government than the federal government, Hetherington (2004) argues that they have significantly more faith in the former, because they are perceived to be more responsive and efficient. Thus, the leaders of smaller political units are more successful at inspiring trust and garnering popular support.

Critiques would point to the fact that resistance is most often birthed in the center of power instead of the peripheries, and thus territorial size does not influence the success of the legitimizing process. Indeed, many of the challenges to state authority come from central forces such as students and the military. In Thailand, for example, there has been a series of student-led protests and military coups since the revolution of 1932. Similarly, in Indonesia, the Suharto-led revolution and the later riots that forced his resignation were challenges from the center. However, this does not controvert the fact that larger states, in harboring hinterlands, have a greater potential for conflict, especially with the growing urban-rural divide, as evident in Figure 1. Thus, territorial size is an impediment to the consolidation of authority.

Resources. The government requires resources to develop and sustain the administration; the three main types of provisions are finances, communication and transportation (Weber, 1947). Scott (2010) argues that as the modern state develops its institutions as a result of modernization and globalization (p. 4), it would be able to expand the ambit of its influence. This increases the salience of resources as a factor in the consolidation of political power.

Figure 1 Plots of country size against the frequency of internal conflict (magnified on the right)

Note: Data on the frequency of internal conflict is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/ Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/ PRIO) Armed Conflict Database and counts internal armed conflict between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups(s) with and without intervention from other states. Data on country size is obtained from the World Bank database and measures land area in km^2 .

Given the positive correlation between territorial size and natural resources, larger states would have access to more resources (Hansson & Olsson, 2011). By appropriating them, the government obtains the necessary finances for the operations of the administration. Moreover, channeling wealth into the administration would promote the development of the government and generates power. As a result, the government accumulates a larger stock of power that has the potential to be converted into authority.

Contrary to the above points, I argue here that globalization has eroded the advantages of size. The modern state does not have to be self-sufficient in order to be wealthy. In fact, Sale (2010) has shown that territorial size is negatively associated with Gross Domestic Product per capita – 77 percent of the world's prosperous countries are small.

It follows that the effective allocation of resources to increase productivity, instead of simply their amount, is a more important factor in the accumulation of wealth and power. Kahn (2011) posits that the government has a proclivity for opportunistic behavior, where it appropriates resources for its own benefit by increasingly interventionist measures, unchecked taxation or corruption. Corruption tends to be less prevalent in smaller countries since there is a higher degree of market openness, which serves as a “disciplining device” (Hansson & Olsson, 2011, p. 17). Moreover, administrative costs increase with distance. Despite the advancements in transportation and communication, the collection and distribution of resources would incur higher transaction costs as a simple function of distance. Thus, the demand for resources increases with territorial size and becomes a primary constraint on the sources of legitimacy in larger states.

Performance. In the modern state, where personal and aligned economic interests form the underpinnings of the state-society relationship (Weber, 1947), the government is legitimized by virtue of its function – competence increases administrative efficiency in catering to the demands of the public. Extending beyond the economy, the successful realization of the collective will in other domains, such as social welfare, contributes to the legitimizing process. Legitimacy that is derived from meeting the expectations of the people, a function of their self-interest, is therefore sufficient for the initial claim of leadership.

Alagappa (1996) argues that legitimacy of this type is unreliable in the long run because it is contingent on forces that are not within the government’s realm of control, such as rising expectations and the global economy (p. 41). However, beyond its instrumental function, performance reifies societal norms and values, and reconciles the rational model of governance with the idea of nationalism as an ideology. Performance can then be regarded as a means to an

end. Recognition and acknowledgement of the government's role in securing advantages permeate the vernacular language and quotidian behaviors (Bluhm, 1974), which entrenches it in society as a procedural norm that is independent of the personal interests of its members. This influences the culture in the state, which in turn defines the demands of the people.

Routinization and habitualization of expectations underpins the reciprocal relationship between culture and societal demands. As it displaces expediency as the source of legitimacy, it would provide greater stability to the government (Weber, 1947).

Having established the salience of performance in the legitimizing process, it becomes crucial to dissect its determinants in the security, welfare, justice and economic spheres (Alagappa, 1996). According to a study by Alesina and Spolaore (2003), the size of a country is positively correlated with the size of its population and thus, larger states would tend to exhibit more heterogeneity in preferences. Although large countries may adopt a federal system that delegates certain policy decisions to the local government, there are policies that have to be implemented on a national level, such as defense policies. With greater divergence in preferences, the policies designed and implemented to fulfill the demands of the people will meet with increased preference discordance and consequently, political dissent.

On the other hand, larger states benefit from economies of scale in the production of public goods: the per capita costs are lower in bigger countries (Alesina, Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2005). Security can also be considered to be a public good that is provided in a more cost-effective way. Moreover, Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) contend that larger states are less vulnerable to foreign military attacks. They highlighted the correlation between territorial size and market size as the most significant advantage arising from economies of scale. Larger countries typically benefit from a larger stock of resources, both physical and human, and a

bigger internal market presents more opportunities for financial flows and trade within the country, which alleviates the border effect of high transportation costs (Alesina, Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2005).

But in contrast to Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg's argument, I contend that in a globalized market, these benefits of size have been eroded. The contemporary economic architecture favors trade, where participation in the global market substantially boosts prosperity, and accordingly, smaller states since they tend to have a higher degree of market openness. In my analysis below, I argue that globalization has swung the balance in favor of smaller states. Governments seeking legitimacy on the basis of performance would thus be hindered by larger territorial size.

3. Data and Variables

3.1. Dependent variable: Legitimacy

In this study, legitimacy is defined to be the extent to which citizens acknowledge the government's right to hold and exercise power in order to meet their demands. In its absence, the people have a choice of articulating their dissidence in displays of civil unrest and violent attempts to overthrow the government. The lack of violence indicates that the people recognize and acquiesce in its claim to leadership. Thus, legitimacy can be operationalized by the probability of political destabilization by violent means, where a higher probability of deposition or secession reflects a lower level of legitimacy.


Data for legitimacy is obtained from the World Bank Governance Indicator (WGI) for Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism. It measures the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including

politically motivated violence and terrorism. The scale runs from -2.5 to 2.5 and a higher risk of destabilization lowers the country's score. It is an aggregate indicator that is suitable for broad cross-sectional comparisons over time. Figure 2 not only compares the level of legitimacy across the sampled countries over time, but also shows that there is no trend of increasing political stability.

The measure is based on several hundred constitutive elements that encompass the incidences of violent conflicts, social unrest and terrorism, security ratings, and frequencies of aggressive acts to suppress resistance. There are two types of underlying sources: 1) expert assessments from commercial businesses, the public sector, and non-governmental organizations and 2) surveys. The former includes the Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide and Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, while the latter includes the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer Survey and the Gallup World Poll. These individual variables are first rescaled from zero to one and standardized to allow comparisons across countries and over time. They are then weighted by their correlation and aggregated into the composite measure using the unobserved components model.

A key assumption is that the world average level of governance is the same in each year. While this does not allow for analyses of trends in global averages, it remains useful for cross-sectional and longitudinal studies (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010). The strength of the WGI lies in its emphasis on reporting uncertainty by providing margins of error. Caution must be taken when interpreting changes in a country's score over time as they can be attributed to three factors: changes in the underlying source data, the addition of new data sources for a country that are only available in the more recent period, and changes in the weights used to

Figure 2 Graph comparing the level of legitimacy in countries over 16 years



aggregate the individual sources. While year-to-year changes in the score may not signal significant changes in governance performance, it adequately describes the trend over a longer period of time, such as a decade. This study factors in the limitations of estimating governance and acknowledges that it is by no means conclusive.

The average of the mean levels of legitimacy over 16 years across the 40 countries in this study is -0.53. This suggests that governments in general would face difficulties in consolidating their legitimacy and sustaining their rule. There are potentially illuminating social implications by further examining such a notion (an interesting area to explore is if societies inherently tend towards atrophy).


3.2. Independent Variable: Country Size

In this paper, country size refers to territorial size, or more particularly, land area in squared kilometers. Data is obtained from the World Bank database. It measures only the land territory and does not include areas under inland water bodies, such as major rivers and lakes, claims to continental shelves, and exclusive economic zones (World Bank, 2013).

Descriptive analysis of the data on the 40 countries included in this study supports a weak but positive association between country size and the level of legitimacy (the correlation coefficient is 0.04 and it is not statistically significant). Larger land area is associated with an increased tendency of political stability, a trend that is contrary to the hypothesis proposed in this study. However, this finding can be explained by the five countries, which have territorial sizes that far exceed the others'. When the five large countries are removed from the analysis, there is an association in the opposite direction that is consistent with the proposed hypothesis – larger

countries are associated with lower levels of legitimacy. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between country size and legitimacy.

Figure 3. Relationship between country size and the mean level of legitimacy over 16 years



3.3. Covariates

Besides country size, there are other variables that are included in the regression model, as they have the potential to confound the legitimizing process. Indeed, the results of the regressions below show that when these covariates are controlled for, the positive association between land area and political stability of all 40 countries is reversed. Performance has been identified as a salient factor in the legitimizing process and encompasses the economic, welfare, and spheres (Alagappa, 1996). Other factors of government legitimacy are technological openness and the type of regime.

Economic performance. Economic performance is a measure with several indicators: the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, employment rate, inflation rate, and income distribution. Data are obtained from the World Bank database.


The GDP includes the gross value added by resident producers and product taxes but not subsidies that are excluded in the value of the product and the annual growth rate is calculated based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Employment is measured as a ratio to the population and comprises those aged 15 and above. The inflation rate is obtained from the consumer price index and reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services.

Both the GDP and unemployment rates measure the efficacy of the economic system while inflation rates reflect the level of economic stability. Income equality implies a relatively moderate level of welfare across the state, while relative deprivation would reduce legitimacy (Gilley, 2006b, p. 50). However, the GINI index, which measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households deviates from a perfectly equal distribution, has more than 70% of the data missing and is dropped from the analysis.

The economic indicators, GDP growth rates, employment rates, and inflation rates are plotted against levels of legitimacy in Figure 4. Preliminary analyses contradict the expectation that all three indicators would have an association with political stability in the same direction and that it would be positive. Although employment and inflation rates are positively associated with political stabilization probabilities, GDP growth rates are not.

Social development. The level of social development, or the level of welfare that the people enjoy, affects the level of satisfaction with the government, and consequently affects the

Figure 4. Relationship between economic performance and the level of legitimacy averaged over 16 years




level of support for the government. It is my assumption that, when political support is sufficiently eroded, the people will articulate their dissent through violent means.

There are several indicators of social development for which data from the World Bank database are available. Life expectancy is estimated at birth and reflects the mortality trend in the state. The level of healthcare provision, such as health services, nutrition activities, is measured by the total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Gender equality is observed in two domains: workforce participation and education opportunities. The former measures the percentage of women, age 15 and above, who are active in the workforce, while the latter is the gross enrollment ratio of females to male and comprises students who enter school early or late and those who have to repeat a grade. The literacy rate reflects the education level in the state, which would contribute to the level of welfare and improve “legitimacy judgments” (Gilley,

2006b, p. 50), the process and rationale behind an evaluation of the government but because more than 80% of the data are missing, the variable is dropped from the analysis.

Social development is positively associated with the level of legitimacy, although to different extents for the four indicators – life expectancy, healthcare expenditure, and gender equality in the workforce and education. Figure 5 reveals that healthcare provision, as a percentage of GDP, is most strongly associated with political stability, which might be due to the fact that it is the one factor of the four that the government has the most influence over. Gender equality in the workforce is a bigger factor than in secondary school education. This could be attributed to the indicator of political stability published by the WGI, which measures the probability of destabilization by violent means and it is likely that the people who articulate their dissent are in the workforce, rather than in the education system.


Figure 5. Relationship between social development and the level of legitimacy averaged over 16 years



Security performance. One of the basic needs the people rely on the state to provide is security from external aggression and internal violence, which can be met through an adequate level of militarization. While threats to security may originate from foreign actors, a strong military also adds to the threat of state violence when governments choose to build legitimacy through coercion. Yet, when the response to this threat is to regard violent means as necessary to maintain social order, it indicates that the people tolerate or acquiesce to the government's right to rule. Regardless of whether it stems from the provision of security or the suppression of potential resistance, a positive correlation between the degree of militarization and legitimacy is expected.

Data is extracted from the Global Militarization Index. It assesses how much weight the government places on maintaining its military and reflects resource allocation considerations and is scaled from zero to 1000. It is supplemented by two indicators from the World Bank database: the number of active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces as a percentage of the total labor force, and military expenditure that measures all expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces, defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects, paramilitary forces, and military space activities as a percentage of GDP. It is important to exercise caution when analyzing this variable since there is insufficient information on what is included in military budgets and purchases that are not.

Security performance is expected to be positively associated with the level of legitimacy. However, as in Figure 6, the level of militarization is not congruent with military expenditure and the number of armed personnel. Moreover, the latter two indicators exhibit a negative association with political stability, where higher military expenditure and a larger force size are

Figure 6 Relationship between the level of militarization and the level of legitimacy

detrimental to stability. This phenomenon can be attributed to several reasons. Firstly, larger defense expenses underscore the need for politically unstable governments to rely upon patriotism and military loyalty as the only way to legitimize themselves. Secondly, the military is often the source of instability; even if it is not the perpetrator of coups d'état, it still plays a decisive role in determining the success of the putsch (Powell & Thyne, 2011). Following from this point is that the separation of powers in the state increases the probability of a military coup, thereby reducing political stability. Countries that buck the trend of decreasing stability with higher militarization levels such as Singapore, Israel, and Switzerland have civilian control over the military. Lastly, it reflects resource diversion from other channels that could have generated greater economic benefits, compromising the economic performance of the government.


Openness. The degree of technological openness potentially affects the political environment in the state. Preference homogeneity tends to increase with access to information, which increases the potential for resistance. The ease of communication also facilitates the mobilization of resistance. Both the Internet and mobile cellular have provided and expanded the reach of information and communication.

Using data from the World Bank database, Internet usage measures the number of people, out of 100, with access to the worldwide network, while mobile cellular usage measures the number of mobile cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 people.

Type of Regime. While recognizing the distinction between the government and the regime, there is a degree of association between the two entities of the political system. A measure of the level of democracy in the country is obtained from the Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2011. It is a bidirectional scale from negative ten to ten, where a complete democracy would be rated ten and the autocratic regime on the other end is negative ten. Liberal democracies would endow the people with more autonomy and legitimate means to express their dissent and effect change. Conversely, the lack of such avenues to articulate discontent would induce resistance in non-legal and oftentimes, violent forms (Miller, 1974). This would erode the government's legitimacy, operationalized in this paper as the level of political stability.

Gellner claims that political autonomy is a choice (Scott, 2010, p. 29) manifested in the form of a fight or flight dichotomy. Instead of resisting state influence, dissatisfied citizens could choose to seek refuge elsewhere either by fleeing or emigrating. Figure 7 illustrates the downward trend of citizens leaving in more democratic and politically stable states. Flight is an

Figure 7 Top: Relationship between net immigration and the type of regime (left), and the level of legitimacy (right) in 2010; bottom: relationship between the number of people leaving the country as refugees and the type of regime (left), and the level of legitimacy (right) in 2010



Note: Data is obtained from the World Bank database. Net migration is total number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants and includes both citizens and noncitizens. The past migration history of a country or area, the migration policy of a country, and the influx of refugees in recent periods are taken into account to derive five-year estimates of net migration. Data sources include border statistics, administrative records, surveys, and censuses. When no official estimates can be made because of insufficient data, net migration is derived through the balance equation, which is the difference between overall population growth and the natural increase during the 1990-2000 intercensal period (World Bank, 2013). Refugees are recognized under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, in accordance with the UNHCR statute, people granted refugee-like humanitarian status, and includes those seeking temporary protection. Asylum seekers, defined to be people who have applied for asylum or refugee status but have not yet to receive a decision, or those who are registered as asylum seekers are excluded (World Bank, 2013).

endogenous indicator as it not only reflects the low levels of legitimacy in the state but is also a consequence of the failure of the government to consolidate its authority.

4. Methodology

4.1 Data frame

This study uses panel data to account for any other country-specific differences, such as cultural background and history. These country traits are assumed to be time-invariant since they are generally deeply rooted in the society and take a long time to change. It tracks 40 countries from 1996 to 2011 but excludes 1997, 1999, and 2011 as data from the World Governance Indicators are not available for those years.

The countries are selected to represent different regimes, regions, and geographic size. Using data from the Polity IV Project, countries are first sorted according to their current polity score¹; that is, the level of democracy, before being ranked by the number of years the regime has persisted. Combing through the entire dataset reveals that 60% of the countries in the world are democratic, 10% are autocratic and the remaining 30% are anocratic.² The 40 countries in the sample are selected to reflect this distribution – 24 are democracies, 4 are autocracies, and 12 are anocratic. Land area is also taken into account, and figure 8 shows that there is no correlation between the types of regime and country size for all 40 countries. It is interesting though, that when the five biggest countries are excluded, there is a slight association between country size and the type of regime: larger countries tend to have less democratic institutions.

¹ A polity score between +6 and +10 reflects a democracy; a score between -5 and +5 reflects an anocracy; and a score that is less than -5 reflects an autocracy.

² Anocratic countries exhibit both democratic and autocratic traits.

Figure 8 Relationship between country size and the type of regime measured by the polity score for 40 countries averaged over 16 years




Table 1 in the Appendix summarizes the characteristics of the 40 countries that are sampled in this study across the time frame of 16 years. Specifically, it displays average values over these 16 years for the key variable of interest, the level of legitimacy, and several independent variables that include country size, economic, social, and security performance indicators, the level of technological openness, and the type of regime.

4.2 Imputing missing data

Descriptive analyses revealed missing values. Since the data is missing at random and the sample size is large, multiple imputation on all variables using the Amelia package in R was implemented. Furthermore, trends in each country across time are factored in the imputation model; past and future values of each variable are likely to be

correlated with the present value and thus, lags and leads are included (Abowd, Kramarz & Woodcock, 2008).

4.3 Regression Models

Model 1. The level of legitimacy, operationalized as political stability, is regressed against country size using a fixed effects model and the ordinary least squares method. There is some correlation between the country's error term and the level of political stability, which suggests that there are certain time-invariant characteristics that potentially influence the latter. The fixed effects model corrects for these country-specific characteristics and assumes that they are unique to each country since each country's error term and constant term is independent of the others.

The performance bases are covariates in the model. Economic performance has three indicators: GDP growth, the employment rate, and the inflation rate. The social development factors are life expectancy, the level of healthcare provision, and gender equality in the labor force and the education system. Security provisions are operationalized by the level of militarization, the size of the military, and military expenditure. The level of technological openness, measured by internet and mobile cellular usage, and the type of regime are also controlled for.

Country size, as measured by land area in squared kilometers, is divided by 1000. This allows for a more logical interpretation of the coefficient, as small differences in territory are not significant. The log of the level of militarization, measured on a scale of zero to 100, is taken for the same purpose. The percentage increase in the log value would result in the same difference in legitimacy regardless of the baseline level of militarization.

Model 2. The indicators of each variable are expected to be correlated. Thus, factor analysis using the principal component method is performed on the covariates to reduce multicollinearity and the number of variables. It identifies latent variables that can explain the variations in the multiple observed indicators; that is, the observed indicators can be modeled as linear combinations of the factors plus an error term.

The correlation coefficients and factor scorings are presented in Tables 2 and 3 of the Appendix. Out of the three economic indicators included, only employment is not correlated with the other two. The inverse correlation between GDP growth and the inflation rate is reflected in the factor loadings. So the economic variable, which previously had three indicators, is transformed into two factors using regression to score the coefficients: the first is obtained by multiplying GDP growth, the employment rate, and the inflation rate by -0.4, 0.5, and 0.7 respectively. Almost all of the indicators for social development are correlated with one another and the variable can be measured by two factors instead. Openness and security performance were operationalized by indicators that are highly correlated; they can be reduced to a single factor.

Country size and the type of regime are measured by the same variables as in Model 1. Fixed effects are also accounted for.

5. Results and Discussion

5.1 Size as a limiting factor of legitimacy

The results support the hypothesis that the level of legitimacy decreases in larger countries and are presented in Table 4 of the Appendix. Both models are statistically significant since the F-test statistics yield corresponding p-values that are less than 0.00.

For every 1000 km² increase in land area, the score for political stability decreases by 0.016 and 0.0178 on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 for Models 1 and 2 respectively. Governments in larger states face a higher risk of destabilization or deposition by unconstitutional or violent means. Although the effect of country size on legitimacy is statistically significant at the 90% (95% in Model 2) confidence level, its substantive effect is small. This suggests that there are other factors that contribute more to government legitimacy.

In Model 1, only the employment rate, life expectancy, gender equality, and the number of military personnel are statistically significant at the 95% significance level. However, both indicators of gender equality (the percentage of females in the workforce and the female-to-male ratio in secondary education enrollment) have negative coefficients. Increasing female participation in the labor force and in secondary education actually decreases the level of legitimacy. This contradicts expectations of a positive association since higher female participation in institutions suggests a correspondingly higher level of social development in the country, which typically boosts the government's legitimacy by virtue of its performance.

In Model 2, all factors except for the first social development factor and the type of regime are statistically significant. In addition, the type of regime does not have a substantive effect on the political order. This reinforces the distinction between specific support for the government and diffuse support for the political system as a whole, and corroborates Muller, Jukam and Seligson's (1982) argument that citizens are able to distinguish between the two types of political support.

5.2 Decoupling the territory and the state

I posit, from the lack of a size effect on legitimacy, that defining a state by its territorial boundaries is losing its relevance in the contemporary political discourse as a consequence of globalization. As the socio-political structure evolves from the state level to one that encompasses sub-national, regional, and global bodies, governments should reconsider their strategies to build and consolidate legitimacy.

Globalization has multiple competing definitions and interpretations, but can generally be defined as the process of integrating “peoples of the world” (Albrow & King, 1990), where flows of goods and services, information, ideas, and people increase in “extensity, intensity, velocity and impact” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999, p. 21). Despite the hype over the forces that are shaping the socio-political realities in the contemporary world, it is critical to realize that they are part of a phenomenon that exists in historical continuity – its content may have changed but its object is still to transform and redefine communities.

Model 2 yields both economic factors as statistically significant in legitimizing governments and having more than three times the substantive effect of country size. This is congruent with hyperglobalism, an approach with proponents such as Luard (1990), Ohmae (1996), and Albrow (1996) who attribute globalization to economic integration. These hyperglobalists assert that a new global order is emerging as regional and international institutions eclipse the relevance of the nation-state and its authorities. This evokes Alagappa’s (1996) point about the unreliability of economic performance as a source of legitimacy because it depends on forces that are not within the government’s realm of control, such as rising expectations and the global economy (p. 41). As

economies transition from the industrial to the post-industrial, transnational movements, particularly in the economic sector, have intensified, increasing the interdependence between economies. Increasing privatization and deregulation have also reduced the role of the state in the economic sector (Sassen, 2005, p. 27). Thus, supranational institutions have emerged as credible alternative institutions to those at the state level. A post-industrial culture has simultaneously developed (Abrahamson, 2004, p. 5), further shaping the people's expectations. The global structures and norms that are taking root, as well as the declining role of the nation-state, have increasingly made the demarcation of the state a "non-issue" (Herbst, 2000, p. 141).

Regional structures have developed alongside global institutions. Skeptics would dispute that the three regional blocs, that is, Europe, Asia-Pacific, and North America, reticulate the global economy. Hirst and Thompson (1996) opine that the validity of the European Union in meeting the economic concerns of member states lies in its revenue base, from which it is able to provide aid and regulatory measures, and its knowledge of the regional situation (p. 167). It is unable to replace state governments as the governing body because it is not efficient enough and consequently unable to consolidate legitimacy based on efficacy (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 168). The extent to which such judgments hold for the other economic blocs is debatable. The Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional organization that is only starting to ramp up its functions. As its member states develop economically, socially, and culturally, and the organization becomes more proactive in the international arena, not only does it add to the prestige of the organization, it also contributes substantively to its efficacy, thereby cultivating the potential for it to supersede weaker governments in the region.

Skeptics also assert that inequality in the global economy contributes to nationalism and not to a global society. Yet current trends suggest that ASEAN, as a supranational body, may become more salient in the future. Inequality in ASEAN has introduced greater homogeneity in the administrations of member states – for example, member states have tried to model their economy after Singapore's³. The likelihood of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), as well as the South East Asian countries, to surpass the Western dominance is quite high. Taken together with Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton's (1999) claim that the Western clout in global affairs impedes the formation of any international order, ASEAN or another regional institution has much potential to supplant state leadership in the region.

Abrahamson (2004) argues instead that major cities are the political units *du jour* because they house activities that integrate diverse parts of the nation and serve as connections to other cities. States are no longer defined by their territorial boundaries but by their nexus of activity. Since the 1970s, transnational movements have picked up, intensifying the interdependence between cities, and the nations they represent, in social, cultural, and economic exchanges. This seemingly contradicts the borderless global structure proposed by the hyperglobalists, but the cities in effect function as the nodes in an international system. They house a growing international business community, which Sassen claims exert an increasing influence in shaping their development. She further argues that the larger the international business community within the city, the more legitimate the competing claims on the city are (Abrahamson, 2004, p. 8). However, as firms and business executives increasingly make up the population of the urban cities and

³ Singapore was one of 'four tigers' in the East Asian Miracle, exhibiting spectacular economic growth.

displace the poorer citizens, they are marginalizing these communities, pushing them to the peripheries. This increases the population at the peripheries and subsequently, the likelihood of resistance.

Moreover, the mobility and interconnectedness afforded by globalization and modernity introduces another destabilizing factor. As members of a minority group become part of a wider community, there will be greater pressure on the state's efforts to assimilate them. The Uyghur population in the Xinjiang region of China is a case in point: its members are increasingly connected to the Uyghur diaspora, drawing attention from international organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, to Beijing's campaigns⁴ as it works to eliminate any internal or external threat to its control over the region by the total assimilation of its population.

The negative coefficient of technological openness indicates that access to information and ease of communication increases the risk of political destabilization, hindering the governments' effort to build legitimacy. Thurow has determined control of the knowledge process to be the most valuable commodity in the modern economy and has also identified the vast consumption of and heavy reliance on information to be unique to the modern epoch (Abrahamas, 2004, p. 9). Technological developments have expanded the reach of the mass media and together with electronic capitalism have formed what Appadurai (1996) terms as a "community of sentiment", a series of experiences that are shared by people across states (p. 8). The salience of information is undoubtedly a result of globalization and influences the legitimizing process by setting the level of preference heterogeneity in the society.

⁴ Two of the most prominent campaigns that Beijing has implemented are the "Develop the West" and "Strike Hard" campaigns (Bovingdon, 2010).

Divergence in interests translates into more dissident views and provokes resistance. Taken together with the large effect that security provisions has on political stability, it suggests that the function of the military is primarily to regulate the internal environment and suppress homegrown resistance through the threat of state violence rather than to defend from foreign aggression. This creates a downward spiral of legitimacy: resistance provokes military repression, which begets more dissatisfaction, and so on. This presents a bleak and morally reprehensible view of the state.

It seems convenient to disregard the type of regime because of its lack of substantive and statistical significance. The globalization hypothesis would also explain why democratic institutions do not matter in the legitimizing process since the state institutions are being supplanted. Yet one possible reason would be that the variable itself does not capture the characteristics of the state. For example, Indonesia and France have a polity score of 9, which would suggest that they exhibit similar standards of democracy. However, they would be on the extreme ends of the scale with respect to their cultural traits. Religion, which many theorists view as the principal component of culture and central to society (Allan, 2005), is a striking example. Firstly, according to Weber, religion has brought about different paths of social development in Western and occidental societies (Allan, 2005). Capitalism has replaced the belief in magic in France while the Javanese ascription to rituals and magic (Anderson, 1972) has persisted in Indonesian culture and shapes political behavior even today. Furthermore, although religiosity is expected to dip with the advent of science and modernity that accompanies globalization, Appadurai (1996) contends that it is instead more significant in today's mobile and highly networked political system (p. 7). Parallels can be drawn to the tribes

of Zomia: both communities are similarly flexible and adaptable, and their methods of subsistence do not require them to stay rooted to a territory. The appeal of soteriology that religion offers is present in those periphery communities and directs their behaviors, extrapolating to today's political system would imply the same appeal.

Culture then, provides "value orientations" (Parsons, 1947, p. 11-12) that shape skills, habits, and styles. It subsequently defines the demands of the people and directs their behavior. This set of values, or the ethos, is projected upon by ideas. Ideas are in turn produced by the collective imagination, which have a projective force and fuels action (Appadurai, 1996, p. 6). The polity score that dictates a number from a scale of 20 is hardly able to capture the nuances of the imagination.

6. Conclusion

The size of the state does affect the success of the dynamic legitimizing process since the environment within which the government exercises its authority coincides with territorial boundaries. However, an analysis of 40 countries over 16 years has highlighted that although governments of smaller states are likely to enjoy a higher level of legitimacy, the size effect is not significant. Globalization has changed the sociopolitical architecture, rendering territorial demarcations of the state and consequently, territorial size increasingly irrelevant. This erodes the advantages of being a small state. Instead, states that are flexible and more adaptable to the postindustrial environment are better able to broker mutual agreement of the societal contract. It is therefore imperative that governments reevaluate and reinvent the bases of their legitimacy in response to the evolving socioeconomic and political conditions. Instead of emphasizing performance, they should focus their efforts on implementing strategies that

shape culture, especially education policies. Culture in turn directs action by providing value orientations, thereby influencing the demands on the government.

Globalization raises the stakes of designing and implementing successful legitimizing strategies as it affords high mobility and encourages openness. The government with an effective strategy would want to, and be able to, propagate the state culture beyond its territorial borders. On the other hand, the government that fails to do so would find its legitimacy being increasingly threatened by information flows and cultural exchanges. The emergence of credible non-state leadership alternatives inflates the benefits awarded to the government that is able to shape the regional or international environment. Not only would it be able to provide a cultural direction that is favorable to its rule within the territory, but it would also be able to influence other countries through these supranational apparatuses. This underscores the notion that culture will continue to play a salient role in defining the relationship between the authorities and the people.

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Appendix

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of 40 countries averaged over 16 years

	AUS	BGR	BRA	CHE	CHN	COL	ECU
Legitimacy	0.97	0.27	-0.09	1.30	-0.48	-1.80	-0.75
Country Size (km²)	7,682,300	109,107	8,459,420	40,000	9,327,480	1,109,500	250,551
Economic Performance							
GDP growth	3%	3%	3%	2%	10%	4%	4%
Employment rate	61%	47%	63%	65%	73%	57%	64%
Inflation rate	3%	16%	7%	1%	3%	8%	16%
Social Development							
Life expectancy	80	72	71	81	72	72	74
Healthcare provision	8%	7%	8%	11%	5%	7%	6%
Female workforce participation	45%	47%	42%	45%	45%	40%	39%
Female-to-male secondary education	98	97	110	95	101	110	102
Security Performance							
Level of militarization	472	695	475	462	438	544	552
Military personnel	1%	3%	1%	1%	0%	2%	1%
Military expenditure	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%	4%	3%
Openness							
Internet usage	58%	24%	22%	63%	14%	16%	11%
Mobile cellular subscriptions	78%	78%	51%	88%	32%	49%	48%
Type of Regime	10	9	8	10	-7	7	7

	EGY	FRA	GRC	IDN	IND	IRN	IRQ
Legitimacy	-0.61	0.57	0.39	-1.40	-1.18	-1.00	-2.29
Country Size (km²)	995,450	547,665	128,900	1,811,570	2,973,190	1,628,550	436,666
Economic Performance							
GDP growth	5%	1%	2%	4%	7%	5%	5%
Employment rate	43%	51%	48%	62%	57%	40%	32%
Inflation rate	8%	2%	4%	12%	7%	17%	16%
Social Development							
Life expectancy	71	80	79	67	63	71	69
Healthcare provision	5%	11%	9%	2%	4%	5%	4%
Female workforce participation	22%	46%	40%	38%	28%	18%	17%
Female-to-male secondary education	93	100	101	98	81	95	67
Security Performance							
Level of militarization	619	524	694	405	455	582	585
Military personnel	3%	1%	3%	1%	1%	3%	7%
Military expenditure	3%	3%	3%	1%	3%	3%	4%
Openness							
Internet usage	12%	44%	26%	5%	3%	8%	1%
Mobile cellular subscriptions	32%	71%	83%	33%	20%	29%	28%
Type of Regime	-4	9	10	7	9	0	-5
	ISR	ITA	JPN	KHM	KOR	LBN	LKA

Legitimacy	-1.36	0.61	1.00	-0.66	0.30	-1.20	-1.27
Country Size (km²)	21,640	294,131	364,500	176,520	97,352	10,230	62,710
Economic Performance							
GDP growth	4%	1%	1%	8%	4%	5%	6%
Employment rate	51%	44%	58%	80%	59%	41%	52%
Inflation rate	3%	2%	0%	6%	4%	3%	10%
Social Development							
Life expectancy	80	80	82	60	78	71	73
Healthcare provision	8%	9%	8%	6%	6%	9%	4%
Female workforce participation	46%	39%	41%	50%	41%	24%	33%
Female-to-male secondary education	100	99	100	71	99	111	104
Security Performance							
Level of militarization	902	496	340	527	625	619	568
Military personnel	7%	2%	0%	4%	3%	6%	3%
Military expenditure	8%	2%	1%	2%	3%	4%	4%
Openness							
Internet usage	34%	34%	55%	1%	61%	17%	4%
Mobile cellular subscriptions	101%	110%	72%	20%	76%	32%	32%
Type of Regime	10	10	10	2	8	7	5

	MAR	MEX	MMR	MWI	MYS	PAK	PHL
Legitimacy	-0.38	-0.52	-1.25	-0.08	0.22	-1.95	-1.31
Country Size (km²)	446,300	1,943,950	653,504	94,280	328,550	770,880	298,170
Economic Performance							
GDP growth	5%	3%	11%	5%	5%	4%	4%
Employment rate	46%	58%	75%	75%	60%	49%	59%
Inflation rate	2%	8%	21%	16%	3%	9%	5%
Social Development							
Life expectancy	70	75	63	49	73	64	67
Healthcare provision	5%	6%	2%	7%	4%	3%	3%
Female workforce participation	27%	34%	49%	50%	35%	18%	38%
Female-to-male secondary education	81	105	100	81	68	76	111
Security Performance							
Level of militarization	589	282	-	122	528	565	395
Military personnel	2%	1%	2%	0%	1%	2%	0%
Military expenditure	3%	1%	2%	1%	2%	4%	1%
Openness							
Internet usage	19%	17%	0%	1%	40%	5%	8%
Mobile cellular subscriptions	47%	44%	1%	7%	67%	23%	45%
Type of Regime	-6	7	-7	6	4	1	8

	RUS	SAU	SDN	SGP	THA	TUR	UKR
Legitimacy	-1.05	-0.26	-2.27	1.11	-0.53	-0.91	-0.23
Country Size (km²)	16,379,085	2,149,690	2,376,000	685	510,890	769,630	579,340
Economic Performance							
GDP growth	4%	4%	5%	6%	3%	5%	3%
Employment rate	56%	47%	48%	63%	72%	44%	53%
Inflation rate	16%	3%	20%	2%	3%	28%	18%
Social Development							
Life expectancy	67	72	59	79	73	71	68
Healthcare provision	5%	4%	5%	3%	4%	5%	7%
Female workforce participation	49%	14%	28%	41%	46%	27%	49%
Female-to-male secondary education	98	92	93	-	107	81	98
Security Performance							
Level of militarization	763	674	478	830	551	642	635
Military personnel	2%	3%	1%	7%	1%	3%	1%
Military expenditure	4%	9%	3%	4%	2%	3%	3%
Openness							
Internet usage	18%	19%	3%	53%	13%	20%	8%
Mobile cellular subscriptions	80%	80%	16%	99%	53%	57%	63%
Type of Regime	5	-10	-5	-2	7	7.23	6

	USA	UZB	VEN	ZAF	ZWE
Legitimacy	0.39	-1.20	-1.16	-0.15	-1.13
Country Size (km²)	9,157,003	425,400	882,050	1,214,470	386,850
Economic Performance					
GDP growth	2%	6%	3%	3%	-2%
Employment rate	61%	53%	59%	39%	79%
Inflation rate	2%	-	27%	6%	295%
Social Development					
Life expectancy	77	67	73	53	46
Healthcare provision	15%	6%	5%	9%	0%
Female workforce participation	46%	40%	38%	43%	48%
Female-to-male secondary education	101	97	113	107	86
Security Performance					
Level of militarization	582	283	423	394.08	419.74
Military personnel	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%
Military expenditure	4%	1%	1%	1%	4%
Openness					
Internet usage	60%	7%	16%	9%	7%
Mobile cellular subscriptions	65%	24%	55%	61%	16%
Type of Regime	10	-9	4	9	-3

Table 2 Correlation coefficients for each variable in Model 2

Economic	GDP growth	Employment	Inflation	
GDP growth	1			
Employment	0.04	1		
Inflation	-0.19*	0.22	1	
Social	Life expectancy	Healthcare	Female labor	Female education
Life expectancy	1			
Healthcare	0.39*	1		
Female labor	-0.03	0.28*	1	
Female education	0.34*	0.37*	0.18*	1
Openness	Internet	Cellular		
Internet	1			
Cellular	0.75*	1		
Security	Expenditure	Personnel	Militarization	
Expenditure	1			
Personnel	0.58*	1		
Militarization	0.53*	0.53*	1	

Note: Statistical significance at the 95% level is marked with an asterisk (*).

Table 3 Factor scorings for each variable in Model 2

Economic	Factor 1	Factor 2
GDP growth	-0.40	0.73
Employment	0.46	0.66
Inflation	0.65	-0.01
Social Development	Factor 1	Factor 2
Life expectancy	0.37	-0.52
Healthcare	0.44	0.08
Female labor	0.23	0.83
Female education	0.41	-0.07
Openness	Factor 1	
Internet	0.53	
Cellular	0.53	
Security	Factor 1	
Expenditure	0.40	
Personnel	0.40	
Level of militarization	0.39	

Table 4 Coefficients and standard errors of Models 1 and 2

	Model 1		Model 2
Country Size (1000)	-0.0157+ (0.00830)	Country Size (1000)	-0.0178* -0.00841
Economic Performance		Economic Performance	
GDP growth	0.00286 (0.00280)	Factor 1	0.0680* -0.0283
Employment rate	0.0342* (0.00935)	Factor 2	0.0711* -0.0262
Inflation rate	-0.000169 (0.000270)		
Social Development		Social Development	
Life expectancy	0.0292* (0.0131)	Factor 1	-0.0638 -0.0398
Healthcare provision	0.0160 (0.0115)	Factor 2	-0.658* -0.128
Female workforce	-0.120* (0.0157)		
Female education	-0.00345* (0.00174)		
Security Performance		Security Performance	
Log militarization	0.121 (0.0833)	Factor 1	0.153* (0.0468)
Military personnel	0.0474* (0.0225)		
Military expenditure	0.0140 (0.0206)		
Openness		Openness	
Internet usage	-0.00216 (0.00165)	Factor 1	-0.0781* -0.0207
Mobile cellular	-0.000305 (0.000669)		
Type of Regime	-0.000614 (0.00710)	Type of Regime	-0.00448 (0.00724)
Constant	29.27+ (15.87)	Constant	33.32* (15.96)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance are marked p < 0.10 +, p < 0.05 *.