

INTRO TO CLOUD ENCRYPTION FOR NON-TECHIES



CONCEPTS AND CONSIDERATIONS



Alec Campbell
Excelsa Associates Inc.

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Introduction

- ◎ This is for a non-technical audience
 - Overview of concepts and issues
 - General discussion of advantages, disadvantages
 - Role of encryption in privacy protection for cloud-based data
 - Some policy implications

- ◎ For technical details, consult a security expert with cryptology expertise

What is encryption?

- ⦿ Encoding information in such a way that only authorized parties can read it.
- ⦿ Content is encrypted using an encryption algorithm, generating “ciphertext” that can only be read if decrypted.
- ⦿ Theoretically possible to decrypt without the key, but not computationally feasible.
- ⦿ Does not prevent interception - just denies the content to the interceptor.
- ⦿ Password protection is NOT encryption.


What is a “key”?

- ⦿ Secret value used to encrypt or decrypt the data.
- ⦿ Ensures only those with the key can read encrypted content.
- ⦿ Your password is not the key, but may be used to generate the key.
- ⦿ Keys are often also encrypted.


Encryption types

- ◎ Symmetric (e.g. AES, Twofish, etc.)
 - Use same key to encrypt and decrypt
 - Sender must provide key to receiver, often manually
- ◎ Asymmetric (PKI; e.g. PGP)
 - Private and public keys, usually exchanged automatically
 - Sender encrypts with receiver's public key (published)
 - Receiver decrypts with matching private key (secret)
- ◎ Special cases
 - SSL/TLS
 - Digital rights management (DRM)
 - Virtual private network (VPN)
 - Homomorphic encryption

Public Key Encryption



Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)



How it's used

- ◎ Data in transit
 - Encrypted connection
 - Internet (SSL/TLS), wireless networks (WiFi, Bluetooth)
 - Encrypted communications data – e.g. encrypted e-mail attachment
- ◎ Data at rest
 - While stored on provider servers
 - While on workstation

Provider Encryption

- ◎ Most encrypt data in transit
 - SSL/TLS or via client-side encryption in app
- ◎ Some encrypt data on their servers
 - Most of these retain control of the keys
 - Protects from outside attacks
 - Does not protect against provider insider attacks
 - Some provide client control of keys
 - Protects against outsider and provider insider attacks
 - Does not protect against client insider attacks
 - Requires client key management

Zero Knowledge Encryption

- ⦿ Term used when cloud provider cannot decrypt data
 - e.g., Apple/FBI debate
- ⦿ Protects against attacks by outsiders and provider insiders
- ⦿ Requires that client manage encryption keys
- ⦿ May not be feasible if data need to be processed in the cloud
 - Future: homomorphic encryption

DIY Encryption

- ◎ Encrypt attachments to messages
 - manual or auto (using app)
 - desktop vs handheld
 - 3rd party products
- ◎ Encrypt data before transfer to cloud
 - software available
- ◎ Issues
 - Key management
 - Archiving and records management
 - Insider risks

Risks Addressed by Encryption

- ◎ Access by unauthorized persons or organizations
 - E.g., transmission errors, software bugs, device loss, etc.
 - Outsider snooping
 - Insider snooping (without keys)
- ◎ Reduces risk from outsider attacks
 - Hacking (without keys)
 - Theft of devices or storage media
- ◎ Improper disposal of personal info on electronic media
- ◎ Greatly reduces risks from accidental privacy breaches

Defeating encryption

- ⦿ Insider attacks
 - Cannot protect against people with access to keys
 - Even zero-knowledge encryption is vulnerable to your own staff
- ⦿ Obtain the key - “social engineering”
 - Phishing and other online exploits
 - E.g. email: “Your credit card account has been frozen...”
 - Key loggers
 - Requires physical access to device
- ⦿ Brute force attack
 - Automated guessing of password
- ⦿ “Back door”
 - E.g., proposals from some in law enforcement to have ‘secondary’ keys held in escrow
- ⦿ Algorithmic flaws
 - Avoid proprietary encryption schemes – details of reputable schemes are public.

Management issues

- ◎ Loss or corruption of keys (key management)
- ◎ Difficulty processing data encrypted at rest
 - Future: homomorphic encryption
- ◎ Issues with long-term archival storage of encrypted data
- ◎ Painting a target
 - (It's encrypted so it must be important...)

- ◎ *All these issues can be managed.*

Legal Requirements

- ⦿ Canadian legislation does not explicitly require encryption.
- ⦿ But it does require adequate security measures to protect PI.
- ⦿ For cloud services and portable devices, some level of encryption usually required for adequate protection,
 - E.g., HTTPS (SSL/TLS), whole-disk encryption
- ⦿ Commissioners expect appropriate use of encryption.
- ⦿ “Zero-knowledge” encryption is best, if you can manage its challenges.

Policy Issue Examples

- ◎ Privacy vs security
 - “Surveillance Society”
 - Law enforcement & national security
 - “back doors” – e.g. Apple/FBI, key escrow
- ◎ Contractual and legal issues
 - Whose laws apply? (hint: maybe not yours)
- ◎ Role and accountability of encryption service providers
 - Who is at fault for a breach?
 - Liability disclaimers
 - Cannot contract out of accountability

Summary

- ◎ Encryption greatly improves security of cloud-hosted data
 - Essential for data in transit
 - Highly desirable for data at rest
 - Zero-knowledge encryption best if feasible
- ◎ But encryption cannot protect against all risks
 - Provider insider attacks if provider holds keys
 - Client insider attacks when client holds keys
 - Social engineering (password theft)
- ◎ Use other methods for latter risks
 - Segregation of duties, internal key controls, training, etc.

Recommendations

- ◎ Cloud Security Alliance: sensitive data should be:
 - Encrypted for data privacy with approved algorithms and long, random keys;
 - Encrypted before it passes from the enterprise to the cloud provider;
 - Should remain encrypted in transit, at rest, and in use;
 - The cloud provider and its staff should never have access to decryption keys.
 - For processing decrypt to transient secure memory.

Resources - Information

- IAPP [website](#)
- [Cloud Security Alliance](#)
- Commissioners' websites

Resources – Software Examples*

- ◎ Encryption gateways
 - [CipherCloud](#)
 - [Tresorit](#)
- ◎ Encrypted storage, backup
 - [iDrive](#) (OK)
 - [SpiderOak](#) (OK)
 - MS OneDrive, Google Docs
- ◎ Encrypted email
 - [Hushmail](#) (Canada)
 - [ProtonMail](#)

We're done!

Questions?

Alec Campbell

Excelsa Associates Inc.

780-945-0123

alec@excelsa.ca

www.excelsa.ca