

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF DESTABILIZATION:
THE USA IN LATIN AMERICA, 1947-1989

by

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B.S., Black Hills State University, 2003
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A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Doctorate of Philosophy

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DISSERTATION APPROVAL

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in the field of Political Science

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Given the potential political, economic and reputational costs for violating international norms of sovereignty, we should expect to only rarely observe the adoption by states of risky foreign policies like destabilization (which is defined as the policy of changing the balance of power between a target government and its domestic opposition, with the aim of effecting the downfall of that target government.) Yet, history demonstrates that states regularly adopt destabilization as a foreign policy. My research addresses this puzzle: Why, given the high potential costs of violation of international norms, do policymakers opt to do so anyway? I argue that the answer lies in the breadth and intensity of conflicts of interest between destabilizing states and their targets. To illustrate my theoretical argument, I hypothesize the following: When policy makers perceive a broad and intense conflict of security, economic *and* ideological interests, they will adopt destabilization as a policy.

In this dissertation, I look at US relations with Latin American states during the Cold War. To demonstrate my hypothesis, I perform three comparative case studies. Each comparison examines two cases which are similar in most ways except, notably, the breadth of conflict of interest perceived by the US. In each negative case, I demonstrate that two, but not three types of conflicts were present and the US did not destabilize the target government, but instead chose different policy options. In the affirmative case, I demonstrate that all three types of conflicts were present, and the US destabilized the target government. I then briefly explore South African policy toward its neighbors, to illustrate that my theoretical explanation is

plausible outside of the context of US-Latin American relations. I conclude with a brief discussion on extension of the theory and implications of this study for foreign policy analysis.

DEDICATION

I dedicate my work to my family. Without the love and support, not to mention encouragement of my wife, Mallery, this work would not be completed. I plan on returning the favor as she goes through this same process in the coming months. And though my kids, Victor and Mica may not be old enough yet to fully understand what it is that I do, I hope that someday they will know that everything I have done so far and will do in the future is done with a mind to improvement of their lives as well as my own.

I would also like to take this moment to mention my mother. It was her encouragement and example that set me on the path that I am currently on and it is her instructions to me which I have frequently repeated in the course of my studies. She told me that it was imperative for me to go as far as I could in my education, because then my decisions about how I want to live my life will not be made for me by necessity; that is how her life turned out, and I should do my best to not repeat some of her choices. I knew, when she gave that advice, that it was important wisdom which I should follow, and I appreciated that advice every single day of my academic career.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the support and encouragement given to me, first of all by my wife. Without repeating anything said in the dedication, my wife was and is always my closest confident and friend, and always tells me what she thinks of my ideas. She is quite often my first filter, letting me know when something seems too far fetched, or when my writing style gets in the way of the thing I am trying to communicate, or when I have a good idea, presentation, or message. Additionally, she provides a crucial element in the presentation of my research, which is to make sure that I am able to explain what I am doing to someone who is not of the same intellectual discipline as I am. I am very grateful for both her input and her encouragement.

Secondly, I want to acknowledge the support I have received from the Department of Political Science as well as the members of the Faculty in that Department. The Department was enthusiastic about my joining it in 2007, and they continued to remain enthusiastic for this study during my dissertation process. The assistantships I was awarded over the years made my studies possible and without them, I would not be writing this acknowledgement today.

The advice I received from my committee chair, Stephen Shulman, was invaluable in the development of the theory and the research design of this dissertation. The very real frustration of the first year or so of this process ended up as a good project, and one that interested me. Much of that success was the result of contributions by and discussions with Stephen Bloom, Joseph Young and Fredrick Solt at various times over the course of planning and writing the dissertation.

I'd like to acknowledge the effort of Ari Weiss, the undergrad in our Department who assisted me in coding reliability. Ari's work for me is briefly discussed in several points in this

dissertation. Ari's enthusiasm for and insight into the project were extremely welcomed, and his independent coding of my data increased my confidence in my own analysis. Ari will make a fine scholar and a brilliant researcher in the near future, and I am happy to have had the opportunity to be around for the beginning of that career.

I want to briefly acknowledge the helpful comments made by members of my cohort in the Ph.D. program at SIUC as I worked through the conceptualization of destabilization in its earliest forms. Specifically, I would like to point out the contribution of Tatiana Vargas Maia. Her comments reoriented my thinking about the concept, because it was she who first proposed to me that it was not the US who caused the downfall of the governments I was looking at, but the people inside those countries themselves who did it. At once very humbling and eye-opening, this insightful comment offered a key piece to the puzzle which allowed me to go beyond a simple analysis of US history toward a broader, more generally applicable theory of foreign policy. She probably doesn't know how much that comment helped me out.

Finally, I'd like to also acknowledge the contributions of several of the professional academics who helped me to this point, but who are well outside of the process of actually writing this dissertation. These professors guided me during my formative years as I was learning not only fundamental information, but also was observing the way that they did things. Living up to their example has been a challenge for me, but one that is definitely worth it. The most influential professors in my life as a student are as follows:

Dr. Ahrar Ahmad, at Black Hills State University, was the most demanding professor I have ever took classes from. He also was the first professor to introduce me to diplomatic history. If there is any person I could be like as a professor, it would be him. I have followed his

example this far by earning a Ph.D. from his *alma mater*. It is my hope that I will be as good an instructor as he was, and still is.

Dr. Timothy Martinez, at Black Hills State University was a great mentor to me in my undergraduate career, and was always willing to sit down and talk about current events, or some strange thing that the US was doing overseas, or just about anything else I was interested in. He always had time for me, and I greatly appreciate that.

Dr. Riley Chrisman, also at BHSU was the professor who instructed my undergraduate historiography course. I must mention him, because his lessons about validity of various types of historical sources constantly haunted me throughout the writing of this dissertation. To some degree, it got me into a little trouble, but I think that the dissertation greatly benefitted from a discerning historiographic eye, whatever my committee says on the topic. Being able to evaluate sources is a skill which should be stressed in education and in writing, and his class was a superlative introduction to that practice. His lessons still directly influence me and my research to this date, a decade later.

Dr. Karen Ruth Adams, at the University of Montana, formally introduced me to IR theory during my Masters program. Her encouragement, and in some cases criticism of my work really were my first formal introductions to theory testing and rigor in political science. Her seminar opened my mind to ways of thinking and of explaining the world around me that I had not known enough to appreciate before.

And last, but not least, Dr. Jody Pavilack, in the History Department at UM was a wonderful instructor. She offered a graduate seminar on Latin American History that I enrolled in. The paper I wrote for her seminar--together with an earlier paper on Guatemala written for Dr. Louis Hayes in Political Science--was essentially the beginning of this project: Researching

the 1973 Coup in Chile was the first time I encountered and dealt with the concept "destabilization." She is one of the few people outside of my committee therefore, who have already previewed the dissertation that follows.

PREFACE

The original aim of this research was to understand what I saw as a very troubling tendency of the US Government to intervene against revolutionary governments. It is not exaggeration to say that this study began long before I actually knew anything about research, or had any idea where I was going in life. I first became aware of seeming paradoxes in the behavior of the US in 1987 and 1988, as the Cold War was winding down. From the perspective of a sixth grader, US policy toward the Soviets seemed very childish: It seemed that whatever the US wanted, the Soviets seemed to oppose, and vice versa. Growing up in the shadow of a potential mushroom cloud, that seemed like a terrible basis for policy, but of course, later developments showed that my first inklings were for the most part incorrect. There is no way I could have predicted at that time that within a decade, the Berlin Wall would be down, the Soviet Union would be a thing of the past, and the US would be helping Russia taking steps along the road to at least a market economy and a post-Communist political system. In 1987, it would have been impossible to imagine that our next intervention would be in Panama, against our friend Manuel Noriega. After that, Iraq would be our target, not the Soviets.

The quest to understand foreign policy decisions continued for me, however, as I grew up and watched events in the world unfold. In high school, I was glued to the television as we invaded Iraq: I thought that intervention on behalf of Kuwait was exciting, though of course, like most Americans I took the political explanations at face value. When I joined the military, I watched some of the backlash against US foreign policy in the bombings of the World Trade Center, the USS Kohl, and the US embassy in Kenya. When I arrived in California in 1997 and joined "I" Battery 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, I began training for the next war: the War in Iraq. The lower ranks did not know it at the time, but there was a very good strategic reason that

Marine Artillerymen in California were training for a potential war against Iraq during Clinton's second term.

I also was greatly affected by the events in Kosovo, especially after reading a story on the front page of USA Today in 1999--less than a month after the end of my enlistment--that the figures reported to the press in the lead up to the war were greatly exaggerated (Komarow 1999, 1.A). The Kosovo story was the beginning of my real awareness of the inconsistencies between political and diplomatic reality on the one hand and the stories that politicians tell to the public to get them to go along with those policies on the other. The article noted that Kosovo deaths were a fraction of the numbers reported by the government when the government was asking people to support the war. People said to be slaughtered by the tens of thousands had instead done what most people do when they realize that war is about to be visited upon them and their homes: they went to a different place. Kosovo had not been laid to waste as the Government had claimed and compliant reporters dutifully repeated. The mass graves US Government sources had pointed out in the Spring as US servicemen and women were being sent to fight in the conflict were actually freshly-plowed fields. The inconsistencies and outright falsehoods detailed by this article shocked me, so much that I still use it in my classes as an ad hoc explanation of why a country like the US ends up going to war.

"Then why exaggerate?" The article asks. Turns out that, in that particular case, to justify the war policy which they had already decided upon, policy makers needed to tap into the memory of the Holocaust. But it was clear that in the case of Kosovo, the choice of policy is what drove the narrative which whipped Americans into support for the war. The "facts" that were reported by an unquestioning press corps--including USA Today, for that matter--were simply the most dire, and often entirely unconfirmed reports. Conflicting reports were either

underplayed or ignored all together, but they also were certainly not reported. This article greatly shook my faith in the "official story" that comes from politicians.

When I left the military and returned to my studies, I chose to study US policy during the Cold War toward Latin America. My early focus was on Cuba, specifically the Cuban Revolution, the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Missile Crisis. One question guided my research: Why did Cuba become communist? The result of research done for assignments as well as some (not-very well written) independent research was that Cuba's move to the Soviet bloc was the result of a dual pressure on the Cuban Government. On the one hand, Castro desired to develop Cuba, and on the other hand, he desired for Cuba to be free of historical political and economic relationship that the Island had with the US. To resolve these issues, Castro had to turn to the Soviets for help, and to convince them to help he had to adopt Communism, formally in Cuba.

The conclusion I came to was that the US was not interested in Cuban development independent of US control, and decided early to prevent Castro from succeeding if he tried. Cold War imperatives were not considered by me at the time: the policy instead seemed selfish. Luckily, as an undergrad I had a number of professors who tolerated and encouraged what turned out to be polemics on my part. Perhaps they understood them as the grasping of a young man who sees something happening that he cannot adequately explain because he is ignorant, which would be quite generous if it were true. But I intended my papers to be indictments.

After the events of September 11th, 2001, US foreign policy moved to the center of discourse in this country. But it focused on the Middle East, while I still researched Latin America. I was able to tentatively point out several similarities between US policy there and US policy in the Western Hemisphere, though there were major differences as well. The biggest similarity I noted was in the stories told, once more, by our Government about why they adopted

the policy they were carrying out. These narratives were similar to the ones I was reading about in my studies of US intervention in Guatemala, or Chile, or Colombia or Venezuela (or Iran, eventually). The only difference was the "enemy" identified in the narrative. In Latin America during the Cold War--and afterward, as it turns out--the enemy was Communism, or something like this. In the Middle East, the enemy is terrorism. Either way, the reasons for actually being there are hidden from the American people who, if they were privy to the discussions leading up to the decisions, might not have actually supported them. At the very least, there is, and has been for a long time, a good reason to suspect the official justification for our overseas interventions.

I first began developing the theory of interventions that I present below during the Spring of 2006 in Karen Ruth Adams' International Relations Seminar. Dr. Adams' dissertation chair was Dr. Kenneth Waltz, and so naturally structural realism was well-presented in my Intro to IR theory seminar. Looking back at the seminar paper I composed for her, I can tell that my first efforts at theoretical comparison and hypothesis testing were very incomplete, but with her encouragement, I looked at US policy toward Hugo Chavez with less concern for making the strong case that US policy makers do not tell the truth, and with more interest in testing theory. Venezuela became an example of the structural realist explanation I would later adopt in this dissertation. The case of Venezuela under Hugo Chavez lay outside the Cold War structure, and yet US policy makers continued to adopt the same sort of policy that they did toward Latin American states that they did during the height of the bi-polar system of the Cold War. This paper was the first real paper that employed scientific method that I had written in my life, and the results stunned me. It was not Communism (or in Chavez' case, Socialism) necessarily that the US opposed. That was only part of the story.

More than half a decade later, I write the Preface for this dissertation. The intellectual distance I have travelled and the discipline I have gained in the meanwhile is quite stunning to me. I have taken those results from that early "test" of competing explanations for the same event forward many steps, and demonstrate below that the critique of one group, or the justification of another are not, in and of themselves, enough to explain the historical phenomenon that I have been interested in for a good portion of my life.

The picture is more complete when a researcher understands that policy makers always have a number of options at their disposal. Sometimes they are interested in avoiding conflict, and sometimes they are willing to accept the costs associated with it. But they are rarely vindictive or mendacious in their actions. This answers the earliest questions I had as a very young and ignorant kid during the 1980s. Policy makers make choices based on what they believe to be reality, even if it has nothing to do with what is really happening somewhere else. For me, this answers the Kosovo question. And it is far easier for policy makers to make a decision than to reverse course and try something else. Once they decide to try to change a situation that greatly concerns them, the more they try, the more costly reversal of that initial decision is. And therefore, they are more and more unlikely to change course when a policy is shown to not work. For me, this answers the questions I had about US policy toward Cuba in 1959-Present, just as it does US policy in the Middle East, 1990-Present (I could even say 1949 or 1952-Present). There are still a good number of question that I leave unanswered, or that I haven't asked myself yet, but this dissertation represents the sum total of my political education, from the first classes on US government and the role of the US in the world in elementary school through the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>CHAPTER</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
ABSTRACT	i
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
PREFACE.....	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xiii
LIST OF TABLES.....	xvi
CHAPTERS	
CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION AND THEORY	1
Destabilization as Policy.....	2
Destabilization as Method.....	8
A Theory of Destabilization.....	12
CHAPTER 2- RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS	32
Hypothesis of the Dissertation.....	32
Methodology.....	39
Case Selection.....	47
Data and Measurement	58
CHAPTER 3- US POLICY IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, 1961-1965	64
Conflicts of Interest in Argentina under Frondizi: Economic and Ideological.....	67
US Responses to Frondizi: Pressure but no destabilization.....	78
US Responses to Goulart: Destabilization.....	95
Concluding Comments: Argentina and Brazil.....	109

CHAPTER 4- US POLICY IN PERU AND BOLIVIA, 1969-1973	114
Introduction.....	114
Conflicts of Interest, Peru under Velasco: Economic and Security.....	119
US Responses to Velasco: Pressure but not destabilization	132
Conflicts of Interest, Bolivia under Ovando and Torres: Economic, Security and Ideology .	140
US Responses to Conflicts of Interest in Bolivia: Destabilization	151
Concluding Statements: Peru and Bolivia	158
CHAPTER 5- US POLICY IN EL SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA, 1981-1985.....	164
Introduction.....	164
Conflicts of Interest, El Salvador under Duarte and D'Aubuisson: Ideology and Security	169
US Reponses in El Salvador: Stabilization.....	184
Conflicts of Interest, Nicaragua under Ortega: Ideology, Security and Economics.....	192
US Responses in Nicaragua: Destabilization.....	204
Concluding Statements: El Salvador and Nicaragua	210
CHAPTER 6- SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY IN BOTSWANA AND MOZAMBIQUE, 1978-1985.....	218
Introduction- South Africa as a "Most Different" Case.....	218
Conflicts of Interest, Botswana: Security and Ideology	223
South African Responses in Botswana: Pressure but no destabilization	232
Conflict of Interest, Mozambique: Security, Ideology, and Economic	235
South African Responses in Mozambique: Destabilization.....	242
Concluding Statements: South African in Botswana and Mozambique.....	251
CHAPTER 7- CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSION	256

Recapitulation of the Dissertation.....	256
Limitations and Potential Challenges of the Study.....	260
Unexpected findings and possible alternative explanations	263
Extension.....	267
Conclusion and implications.....	269
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	273
VITA.....	282

LIST OF TABLES

<u>TABLE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Table 1.1: Conflict of Interest Typology and Specific Examples.....	21
Table 2.1: Gerring's Matching Strategy.....	40
Table 2.2: The Case Comparison Model, An Example	44
Table 2.3: Case Comparisons	46
Table 2.4: Operational Definition of Each Variable.....	53
Table 3.1: Conflicts of Interest in Argentina and Brazil, 1961-1965	65
Table 4.1: Conflicts of Interest in Peru and Bolivia, 1969-1973	117
Table 5.1: Conflicts of Interest in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 1981-1985.....	168
Table 6.1. Conflicts of Interest between South Africa and Botswana and Mozambique 1978- 1985.....	222

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORY

There are some things we do know about the way rational leaders make policy decisions about policy toward other states. We know, for instance that despite the widely-observed norms of sovereignty and non-interference, as part of the Westphalian interstate system, states regularly interfere in the affairs of other states. The interference comes in a number of ways. Much of this interference is considered by the international community to be widely-used though often distasteful part of diplomacy, which is itself a legitimate activity for sovereign states. Other interference, like invasion and destabilization¹ is a severe violation of these interstate norms, and often incurs a severe cost, both among the other actors in the interstate system, as well as among the domestic audience.

At some point, the foreign policy establishment of a state may opt to endure the normative and material costs associated with violation of these norms to pursue its foreign policy. In these instances, state leaders may decide that it is more costly to allow a foreign government to remain in place than it is to promote its downfall. Given the assumption that policy makers are rational, it seems somewhat counterintuitive that states nonetheless engage in policies that undermine the governments of other states, violating norms and potentially incurring costs, such as the condemnation of domestic and international audiences.

Given the potential domestic and international normative and material costs associated with the violation of international norms, why states adopt a policy of destabilization anyway? That is, why would the foreign policy apparatus of a state, which is well aware of potential costs

¹ By Destabilization, I generally mean the practice of one sovereign state either weakening the government of a target state directly, or strengthening opposition actors within that target state vis-à-vis the government, with the goal of weakening the target government, and eventually causing its collapse. I will define the term more completely below.

of both international and domestic condemnation (not to mention unintended consequences,) nonetheless adopt a destabilization policy toward another government, instead of some other policy, which may be more acceptable internationally and domestically? Answers to this question will help fill in the larger puzzle, and will touch on the choice of methods in the process.

Destabilization as Policy

Gil Merom provides a succinct description of destabilization when he writes, "The major goal of destabilization policy is to create the conditions that will induce the society to change its political leadership" (Merom 1990, 95). This goal is accomplished by creating and exacerbating economic, political, governmental, and military tensions within the target, with the aim of dividing and weakening a target government and altering the balance of force within the target state in the favor of local opposition elements (Bisley 2004, 52-53; Kornbluh 2004, 87).²

For this dissertation, I expand on Merom and Kornbluh and define destabilization as follows: Destabilization is an instrumentalist foreign policy adopted by one government against another, for the purposes of removing the political leadership of the target government from power. Destabilization is accomplished by changing the balance of power *within* a target state in favor of the opposition of the target government, using overt and/or covert psychological and cultural, economic, political and/or military tactics. If these four elements are present in some case of intervention, that case should properly be thought of as destabilization.³ I demonstrate that policy makers will adopt a policy of destabilization when they perceive a broad and intense

² Nick Bisley discusses destabilization in terms of support for counter-revolutionary actors, or as Bisley calls them "proximate actors" through the supply of arms, training, logistics and finance. This form is separate from a more direct form of intervention which involves invasion to remove revolutionaries from power (Bisley 2004).

³ It seems that this definition can also be applied to political chaos launched against the government by the opposition itself, without outside instigation. This concept, which might be referred to as "auto-destabilization", will not be explored in this dissertation.

conflict of interest between their preferred policy and the policies of another state. The adoption of this risky policy is the result of the unacceptable deviation, on the part of a target state, from a preferred status quo state of relations held by the destabilizing state. As the perceived conflict of interest becomes broader and more acute, the policy changes from one aimed at pressuring the target to change its policies into one which targets the political leadership of the state for removal.

The use of the term "destabilization" presents a number of problems. Most come from the fact that the term is widely used, but not formally conceptualized. As several authors note (e.g., Mars 1984; Merom 1990) destabilization as a concept is underdeveloped in the literature.⁴ As a result, the meaning of the concept is still contested. Because the term remains contested, few have attempted to use it theoretically. For example, many sources discuss destabilization as part of a historical analysis of relations between either the US and some small developing nation, or South African policy in the early 1980s. But there has been little effort made to actually develop a more general theory of destabilization as foreign policy itself. Merom exemplifies this underdevelopment of the term. He offers the conditions under which destabilization will *succeed*, a term that he measures as "collapse of the Government", but does not attempt to offer a theoretical explanation for the choice of destabilization over other potential policy choices. Percy Mars also attempts to offer a limited theory of destabilization, in terms of ideological conflict of interest between the US and socialist countries, specifically, in the Caribbean, but he fails to include other possible explanations that would justify the adoption of such a risky policy decision (Mars 1998).⁵

⁴ This conceptual problem is made worse by an empirical problem: the adoption of destabilization as policy is rarely directly observed in historical documentary evidence.

⁵ When discussing South African policy toward its neighbors at the beginning of the 1980s, the term "destabilization" is quite frequently used by analysts. The main problem with its usage in literature on South

A significant issue which hinders conceptualization of the term is disagreement over what range of phenomena that the concept covers. Some authors present a very large range of policy as "destabilization". Only during the 1970s did scholars begin thinking about destabilization as a *deliberate* policy of one state toward another. In doing so, they were lagging political developments. Michael Manley argues that destabilization was a deliberate policy involving local and foreign actors who worked in tandem for the purpose of creating political instability and "panic *by design*" (Manley 1982, 138).⁶ Manley's definition is one of the earliest to consider destabilization outside of a specific context; either as a function or result of sanctions, or as an ideological weapon. His definition is, however, too broad to be of much theoretical use. His definition looks at the creation of instability in a country, not the reason why that instability is created.

Some authors do the opposite of Manley. They greatly limit the definition, and therefore the possibility of extension of the concept, excluding potential cases from consideration. Percy Mars, for example argues that destabilization could only occur as a function of (capitalist) imperialism (Mars 1984). By limiting the total possible universe of events that can be under consideration, the concept loses the generalizability that broader definitions give it. Mars, like most authors who have written on this topic, explicitly focuses on one type of conflict to explain the adoption of the policy. Doing so creates more problems for the conceptualization of this

African foreign policy is that much of the secondary analysis discusses the term in too broad a context. They refer to destabilization in the same terms that Johnson (1988) refers to them. In this author's words, "It refers to all kinds of efforts on the part of a powerful actor, short of invasion, to eliminate another actor that for ideological, strategic, economic or political reasons is unacceptable... [Destabilization] seeks to destroy the government from within, to render a country ungovernable" (Johnson 1998, 22). As I discuss below, this definition is far too broad to be of use in defining this specific phenomenon. It does not refer to a particular target necessarily, nor to the phenomenon of using in-state actors. For a more complete discussion on destabilization in southern Africa, see Chapter 6 of this dissertation.

⁶ Michael Manley, incidentally, was the former prime minister of Jamaica who himself was the target of an eight year long destabilization campaign during the 1970s that resulted in massive political and economic instability and cost him the election of 1980. He subsequently wrote about the policy as it was applied to his government, and presents a very rare first hand account from a target of destabilization.

term, because it further limits the universe of potential cases by excluding cases where a researcher cannot observe that particular independent variable directly.

Other authors concern themselves primarily with the *tactics* associated with the policy. Authors like Merom, Hufbauer, *et al.*, and Marinov only look at the concept in terms of economic sanctions, for example. Hufbauer, *et al.* specifically discuss about 35 cases where destabilization⁷ is an explicit policy. The list is remarkably short considering destabilization's prevalence, but this is because these authors use the concept only in context of economic pressure, like sanctions, cutting off aid or embargos (Merom 1990; Marinov 2005; Hufbauer, *et al.* 2009). Their list fails to note all the cases of destabilization that occurs in the absence of economic sanctions regimes.⁸

The appropriate solution to this tension is to seek a middle ground between both groups. I do so by considering the broad concept of destabilization, and then talk about destabilization in specific instances. Gary Goertz suggests that researchers consider concepts in terms of family resemblances, by which a concept has several secondary characteristics, and a case is covered by this concept when it possesses a certain number of those characteristics. Intension and extension are accomplished by adding and subtracting "adjectives" describing those secondary characteristics, to the ideal-type of the concept--as in "*parliamentary* democracy" compared to a more extended "democracy". These strategies can allow mid-range conceptualization without stretching or limiting the concept too much to be useful (Goertz 2006, 69-83). In doing so, I can

⁷ By their definition, destabilization is only the use of economic sanctions to produce the removal of the target government.

⁸ For example, Hufbauer, *et al.*, neglects a clear case of destabilization in Guatemala in 1954, primarily because destabilization was not a stated goal of economic sanctions. In fact, economic sanctions were not vigorously applied in the Guatemalan case, and so it never makes it into Hufbauer's dataset. And yet, several others (e.g. Schlessinger and Kinzer 2005 and Immerman 1982) argue that destabilization occurred in Guatemala. This is one case where destabilization occurred and yet a prominent source which discusses destabilization did not include it because it is outside the scope of the study. This oversight suggests that destabilization is at least more prevalent than our sources suggest, and at most, a fairly common occurrence in the realm of foreign policy.

talk about destabilization in broad terms, and add different adjectives onto it, if I need to, so I can flesh out destabilization for descriptive purposes.

Fully half of this dissertation is doing this sort of conceptual work left undone by other authors who have written on the topic. The other half of the dissertation is to support my theoretical argument with empirical data. But this poses a significant challenge. It is often difficult to locate the “smoking gun” behind a destabilization policy. The general lack of hard evidence of the adoption of destabilization in available records makes destabilization a difficult concept to detect, let alone measure. This is probably why few have attempted systematic measurement of the concept. Many authors *use* the term, however, with little mind to measurement or a conceptualization. Policy makers regularly deny that they had anything to do with destabilization. If destabilization is eventually discovered, policy makers might claim that the policy was adopted in the service of some noble goal like democracy or “liberty.”⁹ Occasionally, these claims are sincere; often, when policy makers claim they are pursuing some normatively laudable goal, they are merely covering for the adoption of destabilization or some other type of interventionary policy that they have adopted.¹⁰

Despite the difficulties in finding direct evidence of destabilization, the policy itself is quite common. States will often attempt to undermine governments which pursue policy that conflicts with their own; if they have the capacity to do so, they may attempt to have the government overthrown all together. The history of US foreign relations with Latin America during the Cold War, for example is littered with accounts of US efforts to assist elements that

⁹ Henry Kissinger provides an excellent example of this sort of practice in his memoirs. Even though it has been solidly demonstrated that the events which transpired in Chile between at the early 1960's and 1973 were part of a destabilization campaign and Kissinger was a part of the discussions which allocated money and tactical planning for this campaign, Kissinger has consistently publicly denied that the US had any role whatsoever in Allende's overthrow (See, e.g., Kissinger 1979, 683; Kornbluh 2004).

¹⁰ A more theoretically developed concept may illuminate the search for data by correctly identifying phenomena and giving the researcher analytical tools to separate the signal from the noise, so to speak.

are friendly to the US but hostile to their own governments. In many cases, the assistance goes to help those elements in their efforts to overthrow their own governments. I discuss three such cases in Chapters 3-5 of this dissertation. As I highlight in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, "destabilization" was the name commonly applied by scholars to South African policy toward its neighbors in the early 1980s. This limited, but deep survey of the historical record makes my empirical case: the policy deserves a detailed analysis of what it actually is and why it is adopted.

This dissertation focuses on destabilization during the 60s, 70s and 80s but the policy is still regularly adopted today. For example, in 1998, the US Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the Iraqi Liberation Act which called for "regime change" in Iraq, and made 5 million dollars available to opposition groups in Iraq.¹¹ The language in the Act states that it should be the Policy of the US to "support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime" (105th Congress 1998, Sec 3). In the popularly monikered "Arab Spring" of 2011, President Obama issued several statements which simultaneously called for the downfall of Middle Eastern leaders and encouraged their domestic opposition. Obama even committed US equipment and personnel to the NATO effort that assisted the revolution which ousted Quaddafi in 2011.¹² Other examples of destabilization were Soviet efforts to oust Tito in Yugoslavia in the late 1940's and various Cuban adventures in South America during the 1960's. This small handful of examples demonstrates that destabilization is by no means a rarely-used tactic. Since the policy is adopted by a wide range of governments in a wide range of circumstances, destabilization is a concept that calls out for a more rigorous conceptualization and theorization.

¹¹ This money had previously been appropriated to the Defense Department to find and destroy weapons of mass destruction.

¹² This will provide an interesting extension of the theory I present in this dissertation in a few decades, when documents about US policy in the last year and a half, as I wrote this dissertation, finally become declassified and made available to the public.

Destabilization as Method

Part of the theorization of the concept includes a discussion on how the phenomenon occurs. As relations between two states worsen, one state often attempts to pressure another state to alter its policies. This pressure may work, for a number of reasons; occasionally, however the pressure fails. At this point, given a broad and intense perceived conflict of interest between two states, the state which perceives an unacceptable deviation from its preferred status quo abandons hope of altering policy, and begins looking for a more effective way to resolve the conflict. One of these ways is to instigate the ultimate collapse of the political leadership of the target state.

But complete collapse is only the ultimate goal. States may interfere with the ability of the target government to actually govern, and gradually delegitimize it over some time, so that its political leadership may lose an election, (e.g. Michael Manley in 1980) or must depart amid popular protest (Merom 1990; Kornbluh 2004). A state may provide aid to a government's opponents, even though they have little real chance of bringing down the government. Destabilization promotes instability in the target society, and does so by externally altering the balance of force within the target society, even if there is no guarantee of success. And any state can conceivably adopt destabilization as a policy if it is so inclined, and increase its intensity if it is capable. It is for these reasons that destabilization, as a political policy, deserves study and can contribute to a broader theory of state behavior.

Destabilization is tactically linked to foreign intervention. As noted above, Bisley asserts that the support of a revolutionary government's opposition by proxy is one way that states conduct counter-revolution (Bisley 2004, 52-53).¹³ Destabilization, which is a more indirect

¹³ Another way to alter a government in a target state is direct military intervention. Destabilization can occur against non-revolutionary governments as well, such as the constitutional government of Goulart in Brazil, Arbenz

intervention into the affairs of a target government, is intervention nonetheless. At some point, a destabilizing state decides that pursuit of its own interests in some intense conflict overrides the constraints placed upon it by adherence to norms of state sovereignty and non-interference. In such instances, it adopts destabilization as a policy against the government of another state. Destabilization therefore is of interest to those studying the violation of international norms associated with intervention in general.

Since destabilization is, at least tactically related to intervention, why not just consider it under that category? Why does it need a special category of its own? Destabilization is most certainly a form of intervention. However, it is conceptually different from other forms of interventions, in both its aims and its methods. Destabilization aims at replacing the *government*--the political leadership--of a target state. This assertion is controversial: Marinov argues that the target of this sort of intervention is more often aimed at alteration of some particular behavior of the government which is targeted, but Hufbauer, *et al.* states that there is a conceptual difference between policy aimed at altering behavior and policy aimed at overthrowing a foreign government. Marinov is actually more typical of most of the literature on the topic, but the definition of destabilization I offered above agrees with Hufbauer, *et al.* This is the primary difference, I argue, which conceptually separates destabilization from other types of interventions.¹⁴

in Guatemala, Allende in Chile and Manley in Jamaica. Though each of these countries sought to radically alter the relationship between their own countries and the status quo state, the US, none of these governments came to power through a revolution.

¹⁴ Goals of other types of intervention do not necessarily target the political leadership of the country: in fact they often aim specifically at changing policy of the target state rather than the political leadership of the target. Hufbauer, *et al.*, offer a comprehensive list of political and economic goals which do not meet the criteria of destabilization because they do not aim at removing a target government; they focus on merely pressuring the target government to change policy. These policy goals can eventually turn into destabilization, but this evolution is not necessarily inevitable. Included among these goals are seeking compensation for expropriations or interrupting some military action. Promotion of democracy within a target state is a special type of goal which can seem like destabilization. But the goal itself does not target the leadership for removal specifically. Instead, the goal is to get

Destabilization is specifically aimed at the leaders of the target state, and not necessarily the structural and institutional rules which govern relations between the governors and the people of the state. That is, destabilization targets those *who govern*. The major goal of destabilization is getting rid of a person or group of people who makes policy for a state. Regime change--the alteration of the constitutional system of the target state--*may* occur as a result of the destabilization, but that is rarely the aim of the policy.¹⁵ Often, the destabilizer will even use the institutions of the target society, like the free press or labor organizations, against the target government. If the target government subsequently responds by cracking down on those institutions of civil society, the opposition then appears to be a force for freedom and rights. A destabilizer can often manipulate and alter the balance of power within the target state just by "pouring millions of dollars into the vulnerable corners of that nation's national life" (Merom, 86).

But what about foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC)? Destabilization can also be conceptually linked to "regime change," as Hufbauer *et al.* and Alexander Downes demonstrate. In fact, Downes adopts a minimalist definition of "foreign imposed regime change", by which he means "that external actors remove one leader and bring another one to power" (Downes 2008, 9). Downes observes that there is a subtle difference between targeting the *government* of a state and its *regime*. The "shallow kind" of FIRC involves leaving the institutional apparatus in place and simply replacing the leadership with one that is more "pliable" to the interests of the intervener. The "deep" variety of FIRC also targets the institutional apparatuses of the target

the leadership to adopt democratic principles and/or institutions. The goal therefore remains a change in policy of the target, and not necessarily the downfall of the target government.

¹⁵ For example, when President Allende of Chile was overthrown by a military *coup d'état* in 1973, the result was not simply the replacement of one leader by another. In fact, the entire constitutional system of government of Chile changed in short order with the alteration of political leadership. While the goal of destabilization was not to replace the democratic government with an authoritarian one--as evidenced by the eventual sanctions placed upon that government by the United States starting in the Nixon and Ford Administrations--that was nonetheless the outcome.

country. But Downes separates FIRC conceptually from other forms of intervention, by noting that all varieties of FIRC involve the threat and/or use of force to accomplish the change the intervener wants to see. Destabilization overlaps with FIRC, as defined by Downes, in some ways, but also includes those cases where the government is replaced without external force being threatened or used.¹⁶ FIRC always involves the potential or actual use of force (Downes, 6-7). Destabilization can accomplish its goals through a variety of other methods including, but not necessarily requiring the threat or use of force. If a threat of use of force is implied, it is almost always used in support of the actions of the political opponents of the target government.

Closely related to this notion about regime change is humanitarian intervention or policy designed to promote democracy within a target state. These policies are designed to benefit the people of the target country, specifically. They have little to do with the interests of the intervener. If we assume that decision makers are rational actors, then destabilization should serve the interests of the destabilizer, more than the interests of the target. This is not to say that the "people" of the target state will not benefit from a destabilization: it may happen that the people of that state will actually gain something from the removal of a repressive dictator. But the goal of the destabilization is to eliminate the source of the broad and intense perceived conflict of interest--the government of the target state--and replace it with a suitable alternative. That is, the policy itself is instrumentalist, or self-serving. Cases where the goals of a state's policy lead decision makers to deliberately and knowingly incur costs from which their respective state will receive little or no direct benefit would not be counted as destabilization.

¹⁶ As noted, policy makers often try to hide their involvement in destabilizations, preferring to represent the events as if they were entirely internal conflicts of the target country. An explicit threat of force is avoided in these cases.

What is important to this concept is that the policy is adopted in the service of a destabilizer's interests and not in the interests or to the benefit of another.¹⁷

Finally, destabilization is conceptually separated from other forms of direct intervention in that it employs *in-target* actors--or, more correctly as Manley writes, a combination of *in-state* and *out-of-state* sources of instability (Manley 1982). Since the method of carrying destabilization out involves alteration of the balance of power *within* the target state to make it easier for those who oppose the government to remove it, the policy gives destabilizers a certain cover by allowing them to deny responsibility for unfolding events. It is easy for policy makers in a destabilizing state to deny involvement in a *coup d'état*, if they can point to in-target actors as the real actors behind the overthrow of the target government. In most, but not all cases of US destabilization, the US asserted that it was in-country actors who were responsible for the eventual collapse of the target government. The US often publically denied any involvement whatsoever, while subsequently-declassified documentary evidence tells the opposite story.

A Theory of Destabilization

Why would a government destabilize a target government in one case and not in another, though both cases are in many ways similar? What makes one state which was destabilized different from another state that was not destabilized? There is a long literature concerning why governments destabilize one another. Most of the literature deals particularly with US destabilization in the Western Hemisphere.¹⁸ This literature, comprised mainly of historical or

¹⁷ This distinction necessarily excludes cases where the goal of a foreign policy is actually improving the quality of life of the people of the target. Examples of this might be found among the histories of Peace Corps work, democratization and civil society building, and literacy campaigns. Actual promotion of democracy, civil society and human rights are not destabilization. The effects of those programs may have a destabilizing effect on authoritarian regimes, but the goal of the policy is to teach people how to read or to build infrastructure in the countryside, or teach them about constitutionalism.

¹⁸ While researching, I also uncovered a large body of secondary source materials on the Total National Strategy adopted by South Africa, which is widely represented to be a strategy of region-wide destabilization against South Africa's neighbors.

documentary accounts which are often atheoretical, cover one or a small handful of cases. These documents note *general* disagreement between the policy-making groups of states but do not often delve into conflict in a systematic way. In the literature, it is often one particularly intense conflict of interest between states which underlies these accounts of the decision for the destabilizer to abandon other forms of diplomatic pressure and adopt destabilization as the method of accomplishing its foreign policy goals.

Based on this historical literature, I argue that states practice a foreign policy which is driven by their interests. This is, of course, not a novel argument: Interest-driven foreign policy assumes that the policy, like those who create it, is rational, in that it is aimed toward accomplishing goals using efficient means. This type of argument, which reflects Allison and Zelikow's rational actor model, assumes that each state has interests, and the policy makers of a state will act rationally to fulfill their interests (Allison and Zelikow 1999). In an international context, a rational policy maker will still act with a mind to efficiently accomplish his goals. Since each actor in the international arena similarly has goals and interests, occasionally, there will be conflict.

Resolution of these goals is itself carried out in an efficient way. By "efficient," I mean accomplishment by the method which provides the greatest potential for reward at the lowest practical cost. If the conflict of interest is not intense, and is limited to one or even two general interest areas, it is often easier for policy-makers to resolve the conflict using forms of diplomatic pressure.¹⁹ Where the conflict of interest is intense over a wide spectrum of different

¹⁹ States have a wide variety of diplomatic tools at their disposal. Some of these tools include consultations between diplomatic personnel, condemnation in international forums, economic pressures, or other forms of pressure that may be considered more provocative, but do not aim to improve the position of the target's political opposition relative to the target government.

interest areas, diplomatic pressure will not produce results, and so policy makers may adopt a more risky, more costly policy of destabilization.

Again, this argument is not particularly controversial. Many authors argue something similar: Schlessinger and Kinzer and Mars argue that intense conflict of interest--either economic or ideological, respectively--led the US to destabilize governments in Guatemala and the Caribbean (Mars 1998; Schlessinger and Kinzer 2004). But the difference is that, in these accounts, the mere existence of an intense conflict of interest is enough to cause the policy makers of one state to seek the overthrow of the political leadership of another. I argue that states and their rational policy-makers are constrained by the cost of violation of international norms. Only when several intense, diverse conflicts of interest are perceived at the same time, will the foreign policy makers adopt the destabilization policy, despite the potential normative costs they may incur as a result.

The logic behind this theoretical argument comes out of rational choice modeling in general, and specifically, from a prospect theory of decision making, made famous by Kahneman and Tversky. In prospect theory, a person evaluates outcomes with respect to deviations from some reference point (the status quo), and gives more weight to expected losses than anticipated gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). By implication, a person is more risk-averse when he believes that he is winning, and more risk-accepting when he thinks that he is losing (Levy 1992, 171). Stated a different way, a person will prefer the status quo, but when that is upset, and the game results in an unacceptable deviation from his preferred status quo, he will wager big to return to the status quo. The standard analogy for this idea is that of the gambler. When a person has a sure chance of winning \$200 dollars or is offered a 50% chance to win \$500 dollars, with a 50% chance of winning nothing, he will more often take the sure thing. Conversely, when

he is given the choice between losing \$200 dollars or having a 50% chance of losing nothing with a 50% chance of losing \$500 dollars, he will more often take the riskier gamble. He is less willing to take big risks when he thinks he is winning, and more willing to take big risks when he thinks he is losing.

Prospect theory is a model of human psychology, and alone offers few predictions for foreign policy. This problem was at least partially resolved by Jeffery Taliaferro. Building on earlier work, Taliaferro developed what he called “Balance of Risk” theory, which combined prospect theory and defensive realism to explain why great powers intervene in the “periphery,” and continue to expend blood and treasure on interventions that appear to be failing (Taliaferro 2004). According to Taliaferro, the decision-making core of a state will be unlikely to adopt risky behavior, which does not have a predictable outcome, when they do not perceive a major crisis between states.²⁰ But when decision makers of a foreign policy apparatus--who are likely to all share information with one another--perceive a crisis or a significant and unacceptable alteration of the status quo, they will become more risk-acceptant. At this point, they will adopt policy which has fewer certain outcomes, and which could ultimately cost their state heavily, just to restore the status quo (Taliaferro, 30-32).

As used in this dissertation, prospect theory offers a powerful explanation for policy choices: As long as a Latin American state remained “with the US,” in terms of the three areas of interest that I look at (economic, ideology and security), and adopted policy which was not perceived as unacceptable deviation from the status quo, US destabilization did not occur.

²⁰ When I speak of the policy making apparatus of a state, I mean specifically the heads of state and government, relevant members of the cabinet, and senior military officers, and high ranking officials associated with foreign policy (Taliaferro, 22). By “risky” behavior, I mean specifically actions which does not have a predictable outcome.

Often, instead, the relationship was benign, but not overly helpful.²¹ But there are several cases where US policy makers perceived a substantial and unacceptable deviation from the status quo. In these instances, a country was thought to have adopted policy that conflicted with US economic, security, *and* ideological interests. This deviation was unacceptable for North American policy makers, and the US began to adopt risky policies, like destabilization, to attempt to restore the status quo relationship between the two states. These policies were carried out by helping some opposition group remove the political leadership who was making those seemingly “aberrant” decisions. Once the status quo was restored--that is, the target government was removed, replaced by one perhaps more willing to promote US interests as its own policy--the US position reverted once more to a position of risk-aversion.

Prospect theory therefore, points to why this dissertation’s hypothetical model requires high values on all three types of conflict to get a rational state to adopt the risky policy of destabilization. It takes the perception of a crisis to push a state to adopt such a costly policy as destabilization. The costs of discovery or failure include loss of prestige internationally, and the risk of being charged with hypocrisy, for claiming to support democratic governments while undermining them, as the US did in Brazil in the early 1960’s. But costs also included loss of prestige at home, as in the case of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, or the case of US involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende. Costs can be more tangible, as well, in terms of lost lives and money. The theory suggests that when policy makers are faced with a perceived extreme departure from the status quo, they will be more willing to incur the risk of potentially failing to

²¹ In fact, even when the US decided to help its friends, the aid programs were designed in such a way that the US-dominant status quo would not be upset. Its aid programs- like the Alliance for Progress- were often undercut and underfunded because the US was not willing to risk upsetting the status quo by empowering nationalists and reformers in recipient countries against their corrupt-but-friendly governments.

remove the target government and suffering international and domestic loss of reputation and money, all for the chance of restoring the status quo.

Conflict of Interest

Following the assumptions of rational actor and prospect theory, the policy-making apparatus of various states have interests, and the pursuit of these interests drive the state's foreign policy. Stephen Krasner argues that the US has interests--as any state does--and it is the systemic distribution of power which determines which interests are more salient at a given time (Krasner 1978). Margaret Daly Hayes draws on Henry Kissinger and argues that it is important that a state define its interests clearly, as this will help the state in development of its policy toward other states (Hayes 1984). Peter Smith discusses the conflict of *interests* between two states as a possible explanation for other, more intense types of conflict--like intervention and ultimately destabilization (Smith 2000). He asserts that when analyzing foreign policy, it is incorrect to look just at the interest of the intervener, but that the interests of the target often play a role in the decision to intervene.

Researchers can assume that all states, not just very powerful ones, have interests.²² According to Martha Finnemore, those interests are influenced by international norms, and in turn are a factor in state action (Finnemore 1996). The norms in the international system provide a permissive environment in which to form interests, and then to create policy to carry out those interests. But since each state has interests, it is also possible for those interests to clash between any two of those states. When there is an intense conflict of interest between two states, no state will necessarily abandon its own interests. The state may actually do the opposite: a state will retrench and defend its interests vigorously when interests clash, especially if another state's policies represent a great departure from its own policy preferences. As a conflict broadens,

²² See Callahan (2004) for a discussion of these interests and how they change over time in American foreign policy.

prospect theory suggests that a state will become less risk-averse and will adopt progressively riskier options to restore its preferred status quo.

As noted, this retrenchment could lead to a host of policy options. Diplomatic pressure to promote a state's interests is one thing, but if a state decides that this pressure will not suffice, it may adopt a much stronger method of promotion of their position abroad. They may attempt to get rid of the source of the conflict of interest in a target state. In other words, the government of one state may begin targeting the policy makers in the other state, because they feel they cannot get those policy makers to abandon their own interests and change their policies. At this point, the constraints provided by international norms no longer prevent the state from violating those norms in defense of their position: destabilizing policy makers have switched to risk-acceptance because of the unacceptable deviation from their preferred status quo. Sometimes, the only thing which dissuades a state completely from adopting destabilization as a policy is its relative capability, vis-à-vis the target. A state with more capability is more able to carry out its policies, but this doesn't stop weaker states from attempting it as well. But a state may view the policy as too risky in the absence of an acceptable alternative, a possible alternative explanation for not destabilizing in light of an intense, but not broad conflict of interest.

Of the many interests that states can possibly disagree over, there are three main categories of conflict of interest which I have noted in preliminary research.²³ These categories are security, economy, and ideological conflicts of interest,²⁴ and can be seen in broad foreign

²³ I conducted preliminary research for the purposes of case selection. I describe my research in Chapter 2.

²⁴ I owe much of my thinking with regard to these categories of interests to an article by Stephen M. Streeter on the way historians view US involvement in Guatemala in 1954. Streeter (2000) greatly influenced my thinking because it offered a good starting point for classification of literature not just on US destabilization in Guatemala, but also the interests which motivate various authors. The debate in the literature, according to Streeter, seemed to be about the motivations of the author him or her self, but actually, what the debate is really about seemed to me to be over which interests were driving US policy. Streeter noted, correctly, I think that the motivations and ideologies of the authors often determined how they presented their various stories about the same events. They focus on one set of data but down play another, for the aim, perhaps because of how they individually see the world. But history, even

policy and grand strategy statements, as well as more discrete sources, like Foreign Relations of the US.²⁵ When authors write about foreign policy, especially intervention and destabilization, they often adopt conflicts in one of these groups of interests as their causal variable for the policy, neglecting or downplaying the others. As I discuss below, however, the answer to why a state opts for risky policies like destabilization is not nearly so easy: A broad perceived conflict of interest is necessary for the most risky of policies, including destabilization.

Before presenting the various types of conflict of interest, it should be noted that many times, these interests can overlap. Economic nationalism, for example, is an economic conflict of interest, but it also affects security interests, because it often means that access to strategic materials will be affected. Tolerance of communism within a target state's borders can be thought of as an ideological conflict. But communism in a state can also affect security interests, given the perception of the US of Soviet intentions and the ability of communists in country to affect the balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union externally. If communists do not have any influence in a state's foreign policy apparatus, this would often not be seen as a security issue, though it may still be seen as an ideological conflict. A government that adopts communism likely will also adopt a host of economic measures which will distinctly threaten the FDI and trade interests of a capitalist country, so this adoption can also be seen as an economic conflict. The overlap makes these types of conflicts difficult to conceptually separate completely. But, based on the commentary of the policy makers who are reacting to perceived

when dealing with Guatemala, is not so simple as this: there is no one correct explanation for US policy choices, but in fact, as my research progressed, it seemed that not only were the interests these authors discussed present, but all three of them were present, in varying degrees at any given time in any given place. While Streeter discusses the reasons that authors adopt these different perspectives, providing a meta-history of the Guatemala narrative, his framework thus informs the framework of independent variables in this dissertation. In fact, he was correct, without being explicitly so: authors focus on the sets of interests they seek to either defend or critique, while discounting others. The existence of all three sets of interests, however, makes this sort of debate possible.

²⁵ See, for example, LaFeber (1993, 108-113) for a discussion of US strategic goals, enunciated by Kennan, which influenced US foreign policy throughout the Cold War.

changes in policy in a target, it becomes easier, at least to draw some lines around types of interests, and determine which interest is more at stake as policies in the target are perceived to diverge further and further from a preferred status quo.

Conflicts of interest are listed in Table 1.1 and then elaborated on below. It is important to note here that this is not an exhaustive attempt to define each of these variables. It would be very difficult to actually do that, given the conceptual overlap of each of these categories, as well as the requirement that the temporal and political context that each of these conflicts occur needs to be considered before judging where the conflict falls. This table and the following discussion is merely illustrative of some possible conflicts of these various types of interest.

Table 1.1: Conflict of Interest Typology and Specific Examples

Type of Conflict	Definition	Examples of policies adopted by cases in this dissertation directed <i>against status quo state</i> that causes perception of conflict	Main Proponent(s) of single-conflict explanation
Security	Adoption of policy by the target state which either alters or threatens to alter the balance of power between a status-quo state and its chief political rival against the status-quo state	Alliance with rival; supporting rival diplomatically; receiving military assistance from rival; kicking out military mission; reducing influence within target state; limiting freedom of military movement; killing of personnel; attacking property; inability to defeat rebellion/ reduce instability	Blaiser (1985), Dulles (1970)
Economic	Adoption of policy by the target state which directly and negatively impacts the financial, trade, or investment interests of the status-quo state	Nationalization of property; economic nationalism; punitive tariffs; embargoes; some forms of agrarian reform; limiting ability to extract commercial and strategic resources	Schlessinger and Kinzer (2005); Cox (1994)
Ideology	Adoption or toleration within a target state of a coherent viewpoint on the correct organization or function of government in a country which is seen as aberrant or incompatible with the viewpoint of the status quo state	Tolerance of communists within society and within government; adopting socialism as mode of domestic policy; human rights abuses; opposition or acceptance of apartheid; condemnation in domestic and international <i>fora</i> ; promotion of independent foreign policy	Immerman (1982); Rabe (2005b)

A number of arguments exist which place security conflicts as the cause for destabilization. These arguments primarily reflect a realist theoretical perspective. A security-based conflict of interest would include policies (or perceived policies) adopted in a target state which affect the perception of security among policy makers in another state (the “status-quo state”, in the terms used by prospect theory. This is the state which prefers the status quo.) *By this I mean, specifically, if a target's policies are seen to negatively alter the balance of power between the destabilizer and their chief geopolitical rivals, or directly threaten the security of the status quo state itself, the destabilizers perceive a security conflict of interest.*²⁶

There are a number of ways that this can occur. Alliance with an international rival would certainly qualify. Reducing the status-quo state’s power within a target state relative to a rival would also fall within this category. Doing things which prevent the status-quo state from securing itself also fits the definition of security-based conflicts of interest. Finally, pursuing policies that might indirectly create a security crisis for the status quo state would constitute a security conflict. A good example of this would be Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union in late 1960. Guatemalan purchase of weaponry from the socialist bloc in 1954 also fits under this category. And finally, the efforts of several Latin American States to block US attempts to isolate Cuba in 1961 and 1962 could possibly also affect US perceptions of security, especially when coupled with other actions that signal possible increase of Soviet power in the hemisphere

²⁶ This definition adopts essentially a defensive realist perspective with regard to status quo states. The Defensive realist positions was best laid out in Waltz' (1979) classic. Here Waltz describes a situation where a state will, acting rationally, attempt to preserve the status quo with regard to the balance of power in the international system. Balances of power recurrently form, says Waltz (124). He also says, explicitly, that "The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system." (126). This argument fits nicely with the status quo preferences predicted by prospect theory. See Taliaferro (2004, 30-39) for a discussion on Prospect theory and defensive realism. A loss of an ally to a rival, like Cuba's move to the Soviet Bloc in 1960-1961, will decrease one's relative power in the system, so a status quo state will attempt to prevent this if possible. This definition seems to fit well with Waltz' argument on the systemic effects on state policy, despite the controversy surrounding that argument coming from, among others, John Mearsheimer, who argues that since survival is the primary goal of states, they try to acquire as much power as they can. I would argue, with the defensive realists, that this overpredicts conflict.

or a decrease of US influence in the “Inter-American system.” More than anything, security based conflicts of interest affect the perceptions of power distribution in the system.

Security-based conflicts of interest are often discussed in terms of a quest for stability within in a target state. A government which is thought to be unstable may ultimately pose a threat to another state, simply because that instability can be exploited by that state's opponents. Walter LeFeber and Lars Schoultz are representative of this sort of literature. Both discuss the belief held by US policy makers that instability in places like El Salvador would open the door to Soviet infiltration in Latin America, which posed a threat to US security and put pressure on US policy makers to intervene by supporting the downfall of a number of governments (Schoultz 1987; LeFeber 1993). The same type of argument could be used to explain continued US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq- until those states are stable, they will always pose a threat to US security interests. As I demonstrate in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, the US was regularly frustrated by Salvadoran policy toward paramilitary death squads, not necessarily because the death squads were up to activities the US government didn't approve of, but because that policy made it difficult to potentially prevent the collapse of the Salvadoran government and to prevent the advance of communism to the Rio Grande.

In the security-based argument which places security interests at the heart of foreign policy decisions, State A (the “status-quo state”) has a set of security preferences (for example: do not support State A's strategic rival) that State B, for some reason, does not share. As this conflict becomes more intense, State A will destabilize the governing members of State B, hoping that those policy makers will be replaced by another group more amenable to the interests of State A. One major proponent of this sort of argument is Cole Blasier, who discusses US responses to revolutionary threats to its hemispheric domination, including its strategic rivalry

with the Soviet Union following World War II (Blaiser 1985). John FW Dulles writes about the threat that the openness of President Goulart of Brazil to communists and the Soviet Union posed to US security interests (Dulles 1970). This security-oriented explanation of US policy toward Latin America is the oldest type and usually reflects opinions of authors who are sympathetic toward US foreign policy.

The economic based conflict of interest occurs *when a target state is perceived to have adopted policies that adversely affect the economic (financial, trade, or investment, to name a few) interests of the status quo state.*²⁷ Among these policies are nationalization of assets owned by the status-quo state, especially when expropriation occurs without compensation or at a less than preferred level. Support for economic nationalist policies, such as high import tariffs or import-substitution can cause a conflict. Economic instability is also a major problem for a status-quo state, as instability causes bad investment climate, and can often lead to political instability. A good example of a severe economic conflict of interest can be seen in Cuba, in 1959-1960. During 1959, the Castro government issued an agrarian reform law which offered compensation for expropriated property owned by US firms at a lower level than that which was demanded. Castro refused to increase compensation or alter the way compensation was made, and the US responded by cutting its quote for Cuba sugar. Cuba responded by nationalizing

²⁷ This definition does not necessarily adopt a Marxian paradigm, though it overlaps with Marxist critique of foreign policy quite a bit. It is true that many of those authors, discussed below, who offered this set of interests as the motivating factor in policy making are often critical of the defensive-security based arguments, claiming that they are a front for the advancement of capitalist imperialism itself. These authors assert that foreign policy is an aggressive tool wielded by and for capitalist interests. For these authors, threats to the interests of capitalism become conflicts of interest for the state. Krasner (1978) however argues that this hard critique should be tempered a bit: During the Cold War, the US, as a superpower, could afford to look to creating the world according to a certain vision. This was a feature of the distribution of power in the international system which made the US fairly unique in the history of the world. But most countries, he notes, are still, and likely always will be guided by "material interests" because their survival is not necessarily assured. "A state whose core objectives are threatened," he writes "can rarely engage in creating a global order... Even when core objectives are not at stake, most states are likely to seek identifiable, usually material, objectives" (Krasner 1978, 339-340). Promotion of economic interests then is a necessity for most states, whether or not they are acting in the service of their capitalist actors, and hence, a more neutral explanation for the promotion of economic interests.

most other property owned by US forms, and the US embargoed Cuba in response. When refineries refused to refine Soviet crude oil, Castro nationalized whatever was left of US investments in Cuba, and the US responded by embargoing Cuba. This sort of provocation-response exemplifies an economic conflict of interest.

Current arguments about economic conflicts of interest draw primarily from Marxist critique, especially those dealing with dependency and imperialism. In this scenario, State A, the status quo-state has a certain set of economic preferences (often driven by its primary economic actors. For example, business may promote open markets to State A's investment and exports) while State B adopts policies which are perceived to diverge from those preferences. As this conflict becomes more acute, State A destabilizes State B's government, again hoping that it will be replaced by a group more interested in supporting State A's goals. Much of this literature asserts that economic interests of private economic actors within the status-quo state generate its foreign policy preferences, but this is not necessarily the case all the time.

Among the best-known, and bluntest examples of this type of literature is Schlesinger and Kinzer. In a very critical account of US destabilization in Guatemala in 1954, these authors lay the blame squarely on the shoulders of United Fruit Company and those in the US Government who carried out their interests. A somewhat more nuanced argument is found in Ronald Cox, who asserts that US corporations assist with creation of foreign policy, including destabilization, because they are both interested in doing so and able to do so, given the way policy is made (Cox 1994). Cox's argument differs from Schlessinger and Kinzer's because Cox asserts simply the consonance of interests between the US government and the Business community, while in Schlessinger and Kinzer, the US Government is actually doing the bidding of UFCo. Margaret Daly Hayes argues that economic relations form the basis of the US relationship with Latin

American states, even though US interests are primary political (Hayes 1984). In many cases, economic actors pressure policy makers to adopt certain policies, and often the policy makers comply. But this is not always the case, nor do policy makers always view their policy in terms of what is good for private economic actors.

Ideology forms the third basis for conflict between states. By an ideological-based conflict of interest, *the status quo state perceives the adoption or the influence of an ideology, or a coherent view on the correct function and organization of government and society held by or tolerated in the target state which it deems to be incompatible with or aberrant to its own preferences.*²⁸ During the Cold War, for example, the US viewed the adoption of “communism” as a conflict of interest: The interest of the US was for states to reject communism because communism was insidious and worked its way into governments, turning them, ultimately against the US and toward the Soviet Union. Governments who failed to root out communism in their countries were often targeted. Other ideological conflicts include the participation of people who held these incompatible ideologies in government. In the Brazilian case outlined in

²⁸ The concept "ideology" is highly contested in political science. To develop this particular definition, I followed the advice of Gerring (1997). The concept has been notoriously difficult to define, because according to Gerring, authors only actually agree on one characteristic of the concept: coherency. Other parts of the concept are debated in works on ideology, to the point where, Gerring notes, many authors have tried to jettison it all together. Gerring writes that any definition has to at least have coherency as a feature of the concept, and it must be differentiated from nearby concepts, such as political culture. But the definition which features this core concept may then draw on other features covered by other authors who use the term, as dictated by the context in which the term is being used. To come up with this definition, I started with the understanding that US policy makers themselves during the Cold War seemed to have a problem the perceived existence of Communists in Government. John Foster Dulles, when discussing the US' main issues with the Government of Guatemala in the early 1950's, exemplified this position. In a news conference on Guatemala on June 8, 1954, Dulles argued "If the United Fruit matter were settled, if they gave a gold piece for every banana, the problem would remain as it is today as far as the presence of Communist infiltration in Guatemala is concerned." (quoted in Streeter 2000, 63). Communism, for the US represented an incompatible way of ordering Guatemalan society. I considered the concept of ideology used by Krasner (1978) who discusses ideology as "a vision of how the world should be ordered on a global basis." (Krasner 1978, 334). For the purpose of this dissertation, I consider ideology as a view about how the *state*, not necessarily the entire world, should be ordered. This tied in with my reading about what "order" itself is, taken from the English School author David Armstrong, who looked at how other authors defined the term and adopted the following definition: "Order denotes stability and regularity in the pattern of assumptions, rules, and practices that are accepted as legitimate among the members of a given society and that [specifically] concerns the mechanisms of and limits to the process of change within that society" (Armstrong 1993, 6). From these, I defined ideological conflict of interest, based in an incompatible idea of how a state, its society and the world system should be ordered.

Chapter 3, the participation of Communists in government and in the labor movement was problematic, despite Brazilian Communists' preference for Cuba rather than the Soviet Union. In Argentina, the potential for resurgence of Peronism was more concerning to the US than was a threat of communism. Often the competing ideology was extreme nationalism, divorced from any pole in the Cold War (which the US occasionally described as "neutralism".) In the South African cases, public condemnation of apartheid was seen as an ideological conflict, as apartheid was at the core of the South African regime. These ideologies themselves might not challenge to status-quo: it is important, however that policy makers in the status-quo state see them as incompatible with their preferred ideological orientation.

These ideology-based arguments were originally based in psychological perspectives, but more recently, have been made from a constructivist, ideational perspective. These arguments are of two separate types: In the first, State A, the status-quo state misperceives the policies of State B for ones it has determined that it cannot accept because they are motivated by a rival ideology (for example, the US could not abide policies that it considered were promoted by communists and therefore aided communist infiltration into Latin America during the Cold War) and therefore, based on this misinterpretation, State A will destabilize the government of State B, in an attempt to get rid of the offensive political ideology, regardless of whether or not it actually existed there. The policy, however need not be a result of a mistake. It is entirely possible the target state actually adopted the ideology as perceived in the status-quo state, and their policies are consonant with that adoption. In either case the status-quo state finds the perceived adoption unacceptable, and therefore decides to work to have the offending government removed from office.

Two examples of this sort of argument are made by Richard H. Immerman and Stephen G. Rabe. Immerman actually takes issue with Schlesinger and Kinzer's account of the destabilization in Guatemala, arguing that the US actually believed that communists either had taken, or were on the verge of taking over the Arbenz government, and therefore destabilized it to prevent the establishment of a communist government in Central America (Immerman 1981). Rabe notes the US concern with the ideology of Communism and Castroism- even though those two are not necessarily tied to inevitability of Soviet takeovers of governments who tolerated them- and argues that US destabilization of the Jagan government in Guyana is best understood as an attempt to prevent the establishment of these two antithetical ideologies there (Rabe 2005).²⁹

Authors who adopt each of these three arguments--singularly--to explain US policy tend to ignore the other ones. They often make the argument that there is some intense conflict of interest involved in foreign policy decision making, and especially in the decision to work for the overthrow of another government. The problem is that while making the case for their chosen conflict type, they either neglect or entirely discount other types of conflict. The most extreme example of this sort of shortsightedness appears in Schlesinger and Kinzer's account of US corporate influence in the overthrow of the Arbenz administration in 1954. Others (notably,

²⁹ The second variety of this argument notes that policy makers in the status-quo state possess certain prejudices which cause them to view other states in a certain, often unfavorable light. Often these prejudices will be expressed as either racism or paternalism. According to this argument, regardless of what State B does, State A will interpret any of State B's policies as examples of incompetence or juvenility, and will act accordingly. Examples of this prejudice-based argument are found in Hunt (1987) and Schoultz (1998b). Hunt argues that a persistent racism, nationalism, and reactionism has driven US foreign policy toward the underdeveloped world, and that any attempts by a state in that group to assert its independence is met with resistance on the part of the US. Schoultz' argument is similar, though his paradigm is based in paternalism and ideas of "spheres of influence." The result is that the US maintained a certain ideological orientation toward Latin American states, and unless the states demonstrated that they fully understood their position in the international system, and adopted US preferences, they could become a target. An example of this was frequent US references to President Goulart in Brazil as "incompetent." At one point, a senior official even referred to Goulart as a "juvenile delinquent" while discussing possible successor governments in the event that Goulart was overthrown. In this dissertation, I do not really explore this line of conflict, as it is difficult to measure.

Immerman) point out that their argument is too focused on economics as the explanation of US involvement, to the exclusion of other possible explanations. Yet most of these authors fall into the trap of asserting one conflict is either the primary driver of destabilization policy, or the exclusive one. Often the explanation they offer is different from the explanation they are critiquing in their work.

But when authors adopt this "all others be damned" attitude in support of their own explanation, they do not allow for cases where their theory does not hold. For example, these authors often do not concern themselves with cases which do not fit their theoretical expectations. If authors assert that ideological conflict of interest is the primary driver of destabilization (as Mars does, for example), they may opt not even to deal with cases which are driven by other types of conflict. If these authors do discuss arguments that assert a conflict of interest other than the one they happen to support, it is usually as a strawman, designed to demonstrate the correctness of their own argument. They also fail to account for cases where their argument fails to account for *lack* of destabilization. For example, those who adopt the economic arguments cannot account for the non-destabilization of Venezuela following their nationalization of the petroleum industry in the 1970's.

Moreover, a conflict over a single type of interest, like economics, doesn't provide a reasonable explanation of why a state will ignore the constraints of international norms and willingly begin to accept the costs that accompany destabilization. In the language of prospect theory, conflict in a single interest area does not represent a crisis serious enough to make decision makers in a state switch from risk aversion to risk acceptance. As Finnemore noted, the constraint of international norms--including sovereignty and non-interference--generally sets the limits of acceptable action, and violation of those norms often comes with steep costs.

Consequently, a conflict of interest, even though it may be very intense, in only one of the categories, will not justify the normative and material cost that the state will potentially accept for violation of international norms, especially since other, less costly policy options will probably remain open in a more limited conflict.

A conflict in only one type of interest might, on the other hand, explain why a state would opt for less costly diplomatic options. When there is a conflict in only one of the three, or perhaps even two of the three types of interests discussed above, a state may still opt to maintain diplomatic pressure to attempt to get the target government to change its policies. For example, in the case of Bolivia, where the Government of Bolivia seized some US mining assets in the early 1950's (a conflict of economic interest), Bolivia's President was able to convince the US that there was no communist infiltration of the Government. The US consequently reacted differently in the Bolivian case than it did in Guatemala during the same period of time, even though both cases were similar in many ways. In fact, the US government actually offered aid to Bolivia to help stabilize the revolutionary government of the MNR (Blasier 1985; Rabe 1988).

This is one contribution to the debate that I make with my dissertation: To fully understand what drives a state to destabilize, researchers need to adopt a more nuanced and multifaceted view of the conflicts of interest that occur between states. The argument I make is that it is not, as most authors claim, primarily intensity of one type of conflict more than others that explains the adoption of destabilization as a policy. Instead, the answer to this puzzle, I argue, lies in how many different types of conflict of interest are perceived to be occurring at the same time. A broadly--rather than a narrowly--intense perceived conflict of interest between two states leads to the sort of risk acceptance that gives rise to the adoption of destabilization. As long as the conflict remains narrow--defined in this dissertation as the conflict of interest over

two, but not three, categories of interest--a state will attempt to pressure its adversary to change policy, but will not adopt a destabilization policy. This constraint is primarily driven by adherence to international norms. When the conflict of interest is broad enough--defined as intense conflict in *all three* categories of interest--the constraint of the norms, and associated costs for violation of those norms, is not enough to constrain the state as it decides that the only way to get the change in policy it seeks is to "get rid" of those who are making the offensive policy. I argue that this threshold between seeking policy change and working for the downfall of the target government is when there are intense conflicts in all three general interest categories between two governments.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Hypothesis of the Dissertation

From the discussion of the theory behind my explanation of the phenomenon of destabilization as a result of broad and intense conflicts of interest, I now propose a test to demonstrate whether or not the relationship between the independent variables, broad and intense conflicts of interest, and the dependent variable, destabilization, actually exists. I begin with the hypothesis of this paper.

Hypothesis: Broad and intense perceived conflict of interest between two states can cause a state to adopt destabilization as a policy.

Stated formally, I hypothesize that the adoption of the foreign policy of destabilization as a model looks like this:

$$E * I * S = D,$$

where all variables are expressed dichotomously, D= “Destabilization” E= “some intensity of conflict over economic interests,” I= “some intensity of conflict over ideological interests,” and S= “some intensity of conflict over security interests.” In this model, D is the mathematical product of E, I, and S. If any one of these variables E, I or S equals “0,” (or “no conflict detected”) then D also equals “0,” and I should not expect to find evidence of destabilization in the historic record. If all three of these variables equal 1 (that is “some intensity of conflict”) then D will also equal “1,” and I should expect to be able to locate either a stated decision to begin destabilization, or evidence that a decision has already been made off the record in the policy options that are adopted toward a target state. While I not test a hypothesis concerning a greater or lesser degree of intensity of conflict of interest on the choice to destabilize in this

dissertation, this can provide me with rich opportunities for future research. To count as an "intense" conflict for the purposes of measurement, policy makers take some definite action, whether it be changing or adopting policy or issuing some public statement of displeasure, to address the conflict.³⁰

Because destabilization is a policy directed at another state, my level of analysis must be a directed-dyad: each case will actually be one of a status-quo state--or the state which perceives deviations from its preferred status quo--whose policy will be directed at a "target," whose policy is perceived to deviate from the status quo.³¹ When the status-quo state perceives that the target has adopted policy which is unacceptably detrimental to the interests of the status-quo state, it may attempt to pressure the target to change its policies to those which are more preferable to the status quo state's interests. According to my hypothesis, this broad *perceived* conflict of interest in the status quo state causes destabilization, and may or may not have anything to do with the actual motivations or enactment of policies in the target.

In this hypothesis, I assume that the state, or more specifically, the foreign policy making apparatus within the state acts like a rational actor--though, with a distinctly non-unitary decision making process--and decision making is influenced by the underlying assumptions found in prospect theory. To be clear, I assume that policy is made, eventually: while there are a number of important inputs into the policy, eventually a policy is crafted, by some set of people. In the

³⁰ The independent variables are expressed dichotomously in this dissertation, either "zero" or "one". But these do not have to be the only values when thinking of destabilization. There can be varying levels of conflict, which would be expressed as a decimal. There can also be negative values. I would call negative values on the independent variable "consonance"--as opposed to conflict--of interest. Would "consonance of interest on one of the three variables, but conflict on the other two produce stabilization--or negative value on "D"--where a government realizes that it can offer constructive aid to help bring a generally conflictual--two of the three positive--relationship back into line? Would two negative values, or consonance of interest in two of the three categories, which would, by the math, produce a positive and a positive encourage the destabilizer to destabilize an ally to prevent it from becoming one where there is high conflict, as in the case of US-Nicaragua relations in the mid-1970's? These questions need to be explored but won't be explored here.

³¹ The policy adoption does not go the other way in the directed dyad. For example, as State A attempts to destabilize State B, there will not be a corresponding adoption of destabilization policy in State B toward State A.

US, that is usually the President and any special advisors and staff he has around him, high level cabinet secretaries and their assistants, and occasionally members of the diplomatic corps (as in the case of Brazil under Lincoln Gordon.) Foreign policy is also influenced by acts and opinions of Congress, which often serve to constrain or direct US policy. And policy is usually advised by private interest groups like the “business community” or the voters. However, policy is made by someone, and then others carry out that policy. For the sake of this dissertation, I follow Taliaferro (2004) and assume that foreign policy is actually crafted and executed by a small core around the President--the President, relevant members of the cabinet, senior military officers, and high ranking officials associated with foreign policy. I call this core the “policy making apparatus” or “policy makers” interchangeably. And often, since policy is directed from the highest levels of government, this apparatus often acts as a unitary actor, though occasionally, there is serious disagreement within the apparatus.³²

As discussed briefly above, the national foreign policy is not the creation of a single, solitary actor alone: No president crafts the National Defense Strategy himself. There is a process which occurs in which each relevant actor close to the President who often has some interest in foreign policy creation has the opportunity to add some input before the policy is crafted. Occasionally, the policy is crafted in secret, but it is more often developed by the policy making apparatus. During this process, details of the policy and the thinking of policy makers sometimes leaks to the press or finds its way into secondary actions in support of the primary

³² This model of decision making stands in contrast to other decision making models illustrated by Allison and Zelikow (1999), and assumes that the policy making apparatus has a set of foreign policy goals, weighs various options and acts in an attempt to efficiently accomplish the most of those goals with the least expenditure. This model puts the decision making *process* into a black box, but one, perhaps with a loose lid that we can look under to a small degree. We can do so by looking at the statements of policy makers to give us a hint as to the reasoning of their decisions. I admit that there are a myriad of inputs into the black box. These inputs can range anywhere from pressures exerted by an electorate in a democratic society, to the demand of multi-national corporations, to the personal opinions of the policy makers themselves.

policy which are (eventually) accessible by the public.³³ And then the world learns of the policy which has been developed, tying it to observable historical events.

I further need to address outside influences on policy creation, which are beyond the conflicts of interest. Other influences, such as public opinion or bureaucratic processes are outside the scope of this study. In a democracy, these influences may be strong, but it is ultimately the policy makers who make the decisions, and they often make those decisions without seeking approval from the population. As is the case, however, policy makers regularly take steps to avoid public detection. Furthermore, to some degree, policy makers are insulated from public pressure, especially given that many of those involved in crafting of foreign policy are appointed rather than popularly elected.

Bureaucratic processes and “logrolling” or vote trading, do play a role in decision making, but that role is usually limited to constraining or permitting foreign policy choices, and play less of a role in direct creation of foreign policy. It is, after all, the leadership of a country which must balance between contending pressures of constraints imposed by the structure itself, and the competing interests from different sectors of the domestic political landscape. Ultimately, the leaders decide, and often they decide policy which is not preferable to many, if not most of the interest groups that are contending for influence over the policy (Hermann and Hagan, 1998). Elected officials may vote to cut funding for some program, but a policy making apparatus bent on pursuing a policy may continue to do so either indirectly or covertly.³⁴ The

³³ For example, transcripts of meetings or CIA dossiers are subsequently declassified and made available to researchers. Many of these documents are buried deep within archives, open to the public but generally undiscovered. But a good many of them see the light of day, posted in online archives and books written by scholars who take the time to go into the archives and do the research there. Other times, the Government itself declassifies and publishes important documents in places like *Foreign Relations of the US*. It is in these records which have been made public after the events transpired, as well as secondary sources based on those records, where I will search for support for my hypothesis.

³⁴ For example, as President Reagan sought to continue to arm and supply the Nicaraguan Contras, the Congress passed a law that cut off funding, due to atrocities attributed to them. While this constrained Reagan from publicly

bureaucracy, which is itself charged to carry out policy, may slow the process down or obstruct the policy altogether, but only for so long as it takes for top policy makers to remove the obstructionists, and replace them with more compliant bureaucrats.

Ultimately, it is the foreign policy apparatus of the state which has the final say on policies, and if they encounter potential roadblocks in the form of negative popular opinion or bureaucratic constraints, this often does not affect the policy.³⁵ It is the foreign policy apparatus which, in consultation with relevant advisors, formulates and then enacts policy. In the US, this process occurs almost entirely within the executive branch, which is ultimately responsible for matters of state, though occasionally, the legislature does have the ability to practice oversight. But this oversight rarely prevents a policy from being carried out, as the example of the Iran Contra scandal demonstrated.

In this study it is output, the policy itself that I seek to explain. I do not look at how the interests and preferences are created or formalized, or how they make their way into the creation of policy. While these may be interesting to a social psychologist, this dissertation is focused instead on the policy which is created as a result of the conflict of interest between two states. Specifically, I am interested in why destabilization is adopted in some cases but not others, during the same period of time. Therefore, I assume that state interests fall into the broad categories of economic, security and ideological interests, and where those interests conflict with the policies of another state, I believe that the status quo state will adopt destabilization as a policy to deal with that conflict.

supporting the Contras, his national security team continued to covertly fund them, and a scandal eventually erupted as a result.

³⁵ In many cases, the policy is not revealed until well after the fact, as in the case of Chilean destabilization, for example.

Additionally, I am concerned with the perception of the policies of a target state held by the relevant members of the foreign policy establishment in the destabilizer state. In a way, it really doesn't matter what the policies of the target state actually are: what is more important is the way that policy makers in the destabilizer *view* those policies. As above, I am not concerned about the sources of misperception, but the results of that misperception. There is an extensive literature on misperception in international relations, where misperception comes from and the problems it causes for policy makers (See, e.g., Jervis 1976). Additionally, much of the available literature on prospect theory discusses the mechanisms behind risk aversion and acceptance, and aims to demonstrate that the theory does explain certain events in world history (See, for example, Farnham 1994 and McDermott 2001). While I am focused on that switch between aversion and acceptance, I am not interested in the psychological mechanisms that occur as policy makers become risk-acceptant. It is the result of that switch, and the *political* policies that arise as a result of the switch from aversion to acceptance that I focus on in this dissertation.

The policy itself is based on perception of that group of people which is ultimately responsible for crafting and enacting foreign policy. My hypothesis, and the corpus of literature it draws from, argues that what is important, as far as deciding whether or not to destabilize is concerned, is the *perceived* conflict between the policy preferences of a foreign policy making team, or those who ultimately have the final say in foreign policy, and the *perceived* policy preferences of a potential target. Once that perception of conflict nears a crisis point, the foreign policy created by this group of individuals switches from attempting to alter the policies of the target to altering the content of the governing body of the target. Naturally, there is a process involved in this switch, from a policy based on risk aversion to one based on risk acceptance or

even risk seeking, from a policy of pressure to a policy of destabilization. This switch is the one I seek to highlight in this dissertation.

My hypothesis may provide answers to the research questions listed above. What drives a state to adopt a policy of destabilization? I suggest that it is a particularly intense conflict over a broad spectrum of interest, perceived by the policy makers of a potential destabilizer. I assume that every state has foreign policy interests (generally: economic, security, and ideology) that it tries to promote. Where these three types of interest conflict between two states, this is where we should expect to see of the adoption of a policy of destabilization.

Further, this hypothesis assumes that policy makers have arrived at the point where they perceive the conflict of interest to be too general to proceed with pressure to attempt to alter the policy of the target. This occurs either because they have tried to alter the policy and, as the conflict deepens, are giving up on that course of action, or they do not believe that they will be able to alter the policy regardless of what pressure they apply.³⁶ The hypothesis of this dissertation assumes this argument which is based on prospect theory: Under the conditions where a broad conflict--all three intense types of conflict of interest--is present, policy makers decide that destabilization is appropriate and will adopt that as a course, regardless of the normative costs they may incur.

A closely related, but altogether separate question from the choice to adopt a policy of destabilization is one of method of carrying out the policy. Once a state decides to adopt destabilization as a policy, how does it go about conducting that program? I include a discussion of possible answers to this question as well, but do not formally test hypotheses related to the way a state enacts the policy of destabilization. There is some difference between intense types

³⁶ For example: Policy makers in the US assumed, due largely to the efforts of Kennan and other Cold War analysts, that no matter what it tried, communists could not be reasoned with, and so the only alternative was to attempt to either keep them from coming to power, or force them from power if they did somehow rise.

of destabilization and lower intensity types. This may be related to a state's capability: As much as a weak state may want to overthrow a target, it may lack the capability to do much more than the least intense forms of destabilization. Whether a state uses covert or overt means of destabilization may be related to a state's desire to protect its reputation, given the fact that it has chosen a policy that violates international norms. Whether or not it can succeed in the goal of seeing the political leadership of the target state overthrown, or why it chooses one type of tactic as opposed to another pursuant to the destabilization policy are both ultimately different questions from whether or not the status quo state will adopt destabilization.

This dissertation aims at providing an answer to the third question and leaves the first two to future research. While the question about means is very interesting, it is a separate question and would require a separate dissertation to fully explore. Where I discuss methods used to help bring about the downfall of the target government, I do so to demonstrate that the policy has been adopted. I do not mean to argue that there is some connection between conflicts of interests and the *tactics* used by the state to carry out the destabilization policy. So while I will not be able to avoid discussing the method of destabilization throughout this dissertation, I will not offer any formal hypothesis or conduct any formal tests.

Methodology

To accomplish this dissertation, I use a comparative case study design, which is designed to test my hypothetical argument about perceived crisis-level conflict of interest and offer an answer to my research question. I follow John Gerring, who lays out a matching strategy based on Mill's "Most Similar" design (Gerring 2007). In this method, cases are compared based on similar values of relevant control variables, with only the independent variable of interest being altered. The design would look similar to Table 2.1 below:

Table 2.1: Gerring's Matching Strategy

X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	X _n	Y
1	1	0	1	?
0	1	0	1	?

Where X₁ is the main explanatory variables, X₂, X₃, and X_n are other *theoretically relevant* explanatory variables, Y is the dependent variable, and 1 is "High", while 0 is "Low" or however this variable is measured.

George and Bennett note that meeting the standards for rigorous "controlled comparison" is very difficult. When matching cases for comparison, they must match on all possible explanatory variables--*all* possible X₂-X_n--except for the main independent variables, controlling for each, or the causal conclusions are not valid (George and Bennett 2005, 155). Finding comparisons which fit this description, however is a difficult, if not practically impossible activity. They are primarily concerned about this comparative method because unless the cases match on all possible independent variables, and the researcher can then control for those variables, there is no way to be sure whether or not the hypothesized explanation is valid or if it is the result of some unaccounted-for variable in the set of variables X_n (George and Bennett 2005, 154). This has led to their critique of the validity of causal statements made from comparative case studies, and their argument that the method needs to be refined.

John Gerring however, does not have such a strict requirement for conducting controlled comparisons (Gerring 2007). He does not require that researchers account for all possible independent variables in order for the comparison to be valid. Gerring's alternative to the strict-comparison strategy discussed by George and Bennett is a matching strategy. His argument is that this strategy is similar to experimental logic, where researchers don't create variables that account for every single possible alternative hypothesis. Instead, they focus on the theoretically relevant variables, which Gerring calls "vectors of control" (Gerring, 133). These vectors of control are then held constant. Then Gerring, following the example of researchers in the hard

sciences, asserts or assumes control on other variables which are not theoretically relevant to the design. He argues for the validity of this method by pointing out that researchers often do not create models which measure potential control variables that are assumed to be similar. If, for example, "... two countries can be assumed to have similar cultural heritages, one needn't worry about constructing variables to measure that heritage. One can simply assert that, whatever they are, they are more or less constant across the two cases." (Gerring, 133).

When these theoretically relevant variables are identified, the researcher can then begin to match cases based on their similarity in the values of the control variables. Cases become matched pairs when they have the same--or similar--values on all vectors of control (X_2 - X_n), and a different value on the main variable that is under examination.³⁷ In Gerring's version of "most similar" research design, if the values of all relevant independent variables are similar except one variable, the researcher can argue that variation in the dependent variable is the result of variation in the hypothesized main explanatory variable.

Gerring's version of "most similar design" can actually be used in conjunction with two strategies that George and Bennett present as alternatives to the standard "most similar" designs and strict controlled-comparison designs. George and Bennett suggest that valid inference can be achieved from two processes. The first of these is the congruence method, which evaluates the ability of a theory to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case, by noting the "congruity" between expectations and observed outcomes. Congruence method asks: "Do the variables vary to some hypothesized magnitude and in the correct hypothesized direction or not?" Put plainly, are outcomes congruent with theoretical expectations (George and Bennett, 181-185)? The second is process tracing, which is a method used to show the causal mechanism

³⁷ This is especially useful in what Gerring calls "rough matching," a method which is useful when the values of these variables are continuous [Gerring 135]

of some relationship with the aim of identifying all possible intervening variables (George and Bennett, 2006). The use of these methods, combined with Gerring's matching strategy will help me flesh my cross-case comparisons. Matching cases on theoretically relevant explanatory variables will help me isolate the effect of my main explanatory variable over two cases. Using congruency method will help me to determine the validity of my model by checking the measurement of variables, and the process-tracing method will help me make clear the causal mechanism implicit in my hypothesis.

There are some limitations to George and Bennett's strategy which make the most-similar design using matching preferable to building a study based exclusively on George and Bennett's strategies. For example, in the congruence method, the comparison is often longitudinal or counterfactual. Therefore, congruence is useful to study "within case" comparisons, while my study is cross-case comparisons. But this should not be a problem, as I can still conduct the congruence test within each case in a comparison. For example, if I note three types of intense conflict of interest in a case, and my theory anticipates the adoption of destabilization policies, if I observe those, then this lends support to the theory in that case. I should also be able to note *when* I expect destabilization policies to be adopted (beginning when conflicts become both intense and broad) and then see whether I begin to observe the adoption of destabilization at or near that point in time. The cross-cross case comparison then comes into play by noting congruence in both the case of "destabilization" and the case of "not-destabilization." If both cases demonstrate congruence, in George and Bennett's terms, I can say that the hypothesis is supported. I can then use this same method over three additional and similarly-designed comparisons to trace a pattern of behavior, and increase my confidence in my hypothetical assertions.

Similarly with process tracing, the method itself is useful, but George and Bennett require that the hypothesis needs to make explicit every step of the causal mechanism, and if an intervening variable is discovered in the process, the hypothesis need be amended (George and Bennett, 2007). My hypothesis is, on the other hand, very simple, and this standard, that every single part of the causal mechanism needs to be hypothesized (eventually), makes this sort of process tracing difficult. Nonetheless, process tracing is still useful to me because: 1) it helps demonstrate that the observation of congruence in each case is not spurious, and 2) it helps describe the processes by which conflicts of interest turn into policy to overthrow governments. If I am able to tell similar stories in both cases in a given comparison, that broad and intense conflict led to destabilization policy in the first case, and intense but limited conflict did not lead to destabilization in a second case, then process tracing becomes very useful in the cross-case comparison. These two strategies of establishing causal relationships in and of themselves can be used in conjunction with Gerring's "most similar" design to enhance the causal story provided by my chosen design.

In small-n comparisons, like the one I am proposing, selection of the case to be used in the comparisons will not be random, but I pay attention to possible spuriousness of my explanation, by attempting to control, generally, for other factors. To build each comparison, I adopt Gerring's (2007) matching strategy for the "most similar" case design. To match countries in each of the comparisons, I look for countries which have "broad" and "limited" scores in the "Conflict of interest" variable, and match two cases--one with broad conflict and one with limited conflict--controlling for Presidential administration. For example, in the next chapter, I match Brazil (a case of broad conflict) with Argentina (a case with limited conflict) during 1961-1965. This allows me to look at the outcomes in each case, and control for US Administration

(Kennedy-Johnson, or what would have been Kennedy’s term in office had he completed it.)

This will provide me with a very simple "most similar case" comparison that will allow me to demonstrate my hypothetical argument.

In each case, intellectual honesty demands that I state that I know the value of the dependent variable; the value is a fact of history, not something that I will discover. The cases themselves, however will be selected based on the values of the independent variables, rather than on the value of the dependent variable, so I can avoid the "cherry picking" accusation. To match cases and then perform the comparison, I look for two sorts of cases: Cases with conflicts of interest in two of the three categories- Gerring's "control group"--and cases with conflicts in all three areas of interest--Gerring's "treatment group." Those cases in the “control” group are labeled in this dissertation, “cases with limited conflict.” Cases in the “treatment” group are called “cases with broad conflict.”³⁸ I will then match a “limited” case with a “broad” case, controlling for US Presidential administration, and perform congruence tests on each of them while tracing the process of the conflict within that discrete period of time. An example of the comparison will look like the Table 2.2 below, which conforms to Gerring's schema for "most similar case design."

Table 2.2: The Case Comparison Model, An Example

	X ₁ = Conflict of Interest	X _n = Political Leadership	Outcome
Case 1	Limited (2 of 3 intense conflicts)	Nixon 1	?
Case 2	Broad (3 of 3 intense conflicts)	Nixon 1	?

In the above figure, the “?” does not mean I do not know what the outcome will be: As I mentioned above, I do know what the outcome is in each case. The “?” signifies the object of

³⁸ In cases where there is only conflict in one type of interest, this category would presumably be called “low” conflict, but at any rate, will not be studied in this dissertation.

the congruence study. Is the observed outcome congruent with the expectations or not? If it is then, I can argue that my hypothesis is plausible, and the process tracing that accompanies each case will then serve to strengthen the causal argument of the theory. If not, why not?

The most important control variable, which could pose an alternative explanation for a destabilization policy is the presidential administration in my chosen destabilizer. I will not attempt to assert that the foreign policy made by John Dulles as Secretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration is similar to the policy made by Henry Kissinger, so I need to control for this. But, since I believe that the causes of destabilization lie in the differences between policy preferences in the status-quo state and the target, any alternative explanations have to lie within the status-quo state, not the target: The destabilizing government decides whether or not to destabilize based on its own criteria. Other potentially confounding explanations are either not theoretically relevant or they fall under one of the explanations that are already built into the matches I made in the comparisons. What I am left with at the outset, for a potential confounding variable is the political leadership of the status-quo state. I control for this factor by only selecting cases which occurred during the same presidential administration, under the assumption that each Presidential Administration builds its own foreign policy team, and this foreign policy team often does not remain the same following an election.

Following this schema, I am able to show variation on the independent variable of interest, while controlling for the other independent variables, and then use that variation to explain whatever variation I see in the dependent variable. This comparison will be made four times, using two cases each, and changing the value of the control variable for each comparison.³⁹ Then I observe the degree to which destabilization occurs in both cases. I suspect

³⁹ I alter the value of the control variable between, not within, comparisons to demonstrate that the phenomenon is more a feature of the structure than of individual preferences or temporally local influences.

that in cases which possess two of the three conflicts, there will be other sorts of pressure for a change in policy, but no destabilization. In cases where all three are present, I expect to see destabilization. While I am laying out these cases, I can also discuss the tactics used, and perhaps make the case that more or less concern for damage to reputation will lead to more or less covert forms of destabilization.

To run this comparison, I set up four different comparisons, reflected in Table 2.3 below:

Table 2.3: Case Comparisons

		Conflict of Interest			Administration
		Security	Economy	Ideology	
Chapter 3	Argentina (Frondizi) *	0	1	1	Kennedy/Johnson
	Brazil (Goulart)	1	1	1	
Chapter 4	Peru (Velasco)	1	1	0	Nixon I
	Bolivia (Ovando/Torres) *	1	1	1	
Chapter 5	El Salvador (Duarte/D'Aubuisson)	1	0	1	Reagan I
	Nicaragua (Ortega)	1	1	1	
Chapter 6	Botswana (Khama)	1	0	1	Botha
	Mozambique (Machel) *	1	1	1	

* In the cases of Argentina and Bolivia, coups altered the course of US policy there before the end of the respective US administrations, and I stopped researching after those events. In Mozambique, Machel was killed in a plane crash, but after my period of investigation.

In each- "1" equals observed intense conflict, "0"= a "NOT" conflict, or no observed intense conflict

In each comparison, I expect that it was the addition of the "NOT" conflict which was present in the second case each time that led to destabilization. In each comparison, I need to demonstrate congruence between what I theoretically expect and what I observe in the historical record. I have to show that without that "NOT" conflict, destabilization was not adopted or pursued in the first case. This requires me to dig as deeply into declassified documents and secondary sources

as I can, so that I can show that in the second case, the addition of the "NOT" conflict made the difference.

My hypothesis, if it is supported, will demonstrate that all three conflicts are required: said another way, the overall conflict of interest must be really intense for a state to violate such serious international norms and promote the overthrow of a foreign government. The comparison will involve laying out the process of the decision making and showing that it was the addition of the third form of conflict of interest that made the difference in the value of the outcome. Or conversely, it is possible that the addition of the third form of conflict didn't correspond with a change in the dependent variable, and I note that as a potential disconfirmation of my hypothesis. If my hypothesis is supported, in the presence of each of the three different types of conflict of interest, I expect to see destabilization. Without one of them, and there should be no destabilization.

Case Selection

When selecting the universe of cases for the purposes of case selection, I focus on the issue of control. Given the simplicity of my model, control has to be built into the universe of cases that I select from. Since a directed-dyad is the appropriate level of analysis, given the fact that the policy is adopted by the government of one state and directed at the government of another state, I can achieve maximum control on one end of that directed-dyad by selecting the same country as the potential destabilizer in each case. Then, assuming that the interests of the destabilizer remain the same given the period of the Cold War, all I need to account for is changes in the political environment in the potential destabilizer.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ This is a fairly safe assumption for the US during the Cold War, and really only began to change as the Cold War began to wind down (Callahan 2004, 178).

The US provides an ideal potential destabilizer: the historical record is littered with US destabilization programs, most clearly in Cuba, but also in Guatemala, Chile, Grenada and others. And at the same time, the US maintains capabilities that allow it to engage in a full spectrum of diplomatic activity. In other words, the policy makers of the US can easily do something other than destabilize if they choose to do so. Consequently, especially within the temporal limits of this study, the period of time between 1947 and 1989, really the only thing that changes within the destabilizer is the group of people who are in charge. If I selected several destabilizers, I would not achieve such a high level of control on the "destabilizer" side of the directed-dyad.

In terms of the other side of the directed-dyad, I selected from a set of cases which are as similar as possible in many areas. Regional similarity was preferable. In my study, there are a number of features that recommend Latin America and the Caribbean as a pool of potential cases to draw from. First, there is a wide variation on the dependent variable within this region. In some cases, the historic record overwhelmingly supports the argument that destabilization occurred. In other cases, there is no evidence that any destabilization ever occurred. There is also a fairly wide variation in terms of the policies of these states over the four decades of this dissertation. This provides plenty of potential conflict of interest. On the other hand, there is enough similarity over the entire region to allow for matching, taking into consideration issues raised by George and Bennett and Gerring. The states in this region have relatively similar levels of economic, political, and military power, especially when compared to the potential destabilizer in the dyad. It shares a fairly similar historic relationship with the potential

destabilizer.⁴¹ The region therefore offers both a great deal of variation and a great deal of similarity.

Other confounding variables are themselves controlled for in case selection. In selecting and matching the cases, I can easily control for proximity (far vs. near to the destabilizer), size (large vs. small countries), relative power (wealthy/ relatively developed, vs. poor/relatively underdeveloped), and possibly even history (peaceful vs. contentious historical associations with the destabilizer.) While these controls will not necessarily be made explicit in the comparisons themselves, the way the cases are selected allows me to answer questions that might arise with regard to some potential intervening or confounding variables which I have not included into my model.

While I limit the geographical scope of this study to the US and Latin America, I also consider a relatively small time frame. My study includes cases from the Cold War years, following the publication of Kennan's (1947) "The Source of Soviet Conduct" and the subsequent establishment of the policy of containment. It goes through the US invasion of Panama in 1989. This 42-year period provides me with an excellent opportunity to test my hypothesis. It allows for me to control for polarity in the international system⁴² and it corresponds with a period of relatively indisputable US dominance in the region. Despite Cuban efforts, there was no serious challenger for US control of the region during this period. This period also allows me to clearly identify US interests, as well as alternatives to those interests proposed by Latin American states, and then US reaction to Latin American alternatives; in other words, this is an ample time period to observe variation on all my chosen variables.

⁴¹ See Tillema who notes that the Western Hemisphere and specifically Latin America has long constituted an area of "special interest" for the US (Tillema 1973, 26).

⁴² The world was more or less bi-polar during this period, with a slight change in the late 1960's as the Chinese and Soviet rivalry began to crack the socialist bloc.

There are some limitations to this study. The biggest is one of generalizability. While the conclusions I arrive at will implicitly assume the various controls I mention above, and only directly apply to Latin American cases, I believe that the mechanisms I identify will be valid for cases outside of this geographic and temporal realm, with the addition of appropriate control variables, such as those that I mention above. I do look at Southern African cases in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, and this survey study demonstrates that the theory can plausibly be applied out of the main context of the dissertation, but that chapter is merely a plausibility study. Deeper investigation will be necessary there to confirm the causal statements I make. The plausibility study does mitigate this limitation to some degree. I implicitly argue that it is not simply great powers which adopt destabilization: Any state can adopt a policy of destabilization.⁴³ The degree to which they are able to carry it out is, again, an entirely different question.

Other limitations of the study will be noted in the data and measurement section below. They are primarily centered on availability of data, given that much of the information which would conclusively demonstrate my argument may not be declassified.

Considering these points, I chose the cases described in Table 2.3 above.

Comparison 1 (Economics and Ideology): Brazil and Argentina during 1961-1965

Comparison 2 (Economics and Security): Bolivia and Peru during 1969-1973

Comparison 3 (Security and Ideology): Nicaragua and El Salvador during 1981-1985

Comparison 4 (Security and Ideology): Plausibility Study, Botswana and Mozambique 1978-1985

⁴³ The strategy for conducting the test need not change: any future research into this topic must simply pay attention to ensuring that cases which are being considered for comparison are matched in much the same way that cases from Latin America during the Cold War are matched. And then, if the potential destabilizer is the same in both cases, and the political Administration in the destabilizer is controlled for, this type of comparison can be made for cases outside of the western hemisphere, as well as cases which belong to a different time period.

Each of these comparisons, with the exception of the South African cases, have the above controls built into the comparison. Each comparison consists of two cases. The first case in each pair exhibited broad conflict of interest and the second case had more limited conflict of interest. Both cases in each pair exhibited these conflicts during the same presidential administration. Both cases in each pair are closely located to one another geographically-- the first two pairs are adjacent, the third pair is separated by a small bay of water, and the fourth set is separated by a country. Both cases in each pair have the same relative size and power. Among all cases, most of Latin America is represented. And the times selected cover three different decades: the first during the height of the Cold War and tensions with Cuba in the early 1960's, the second during a period where the US was preoccupied in South Vietnam, and the third toward the end of the Cold War. The African cases were selected during an acute foreign relations crisis in that country's history. Additionally, the three Latin American cases represent fairly well the spectrum of US political ideology, from liberal left under Kennedy and Johnson to conservative right under Reagan.

These cases were selected after building a preliminary database of conflicts of interest, which covered all independent South and Central American States.⁴⁴ Most of the preliminary data collection that built this database consisted of secondary sources, much of it from the *United States and the Americas* series published by the University of Georgia Press between 1990 and 2004. When that series did not cover a case, I resorted to other books, and in the case of Central America, (except Panama) relied heavily on the detailed account published by LaFeber. In the case of British Guyana, I relied heavily on several books by Stephen Rabe.

⁴⁴ Belize, which did not become independent until 1980, Suriname, which was a Dutch colony, and other states which were still dependent, such as French Guiana were not examined in the preliminary dataset. Large and/or historically significant independent Caribbean states were also included in the dataset. This list consists of Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Grenada, Trinidad, Barbados, and the Bahamas.

In this preliminary dataset, I noted “conflict” if it was mentioned that State X had pursued some policy which raised alarm (or some other such adage) in Washington. If the US took umbrage or expressed concern, or if relations were “frustrated” or damaged in some way by a policy chosen by a state, or if the US adopted or changed some policy in response to some action taken by the target Government, I noted a conflict, and cited each incidence in the dataset. I also attempted to note the duration of conflicts, though when no resolution date appeared in my literature, I simply noted the last year that information about that conflict appeared in the sources. I attempted to apply conservative rules to the preliminary data: If I was in doubt, I generally did not code it as a conflict, unless I knew from a different source (which I attempted to also note) that the conflict occurred.

To select which type of conflict, I operationalized my conflicts of interest along my definitions, which I previewed in Chapter 1. In Table 2.4, I summarize the operational definitions of each variable in the model. I add only that these conflicts need to make their way into policy documents and/or secondary sources which reference them.

Table 2.4: Operational Definition of Each Variable

Function	Variable	Definition
Independent Variable	Sec Conflict	<p>Policies adopted by the Target State are perceived by the status quo state to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threaten to negatively alter the external the balance between the status-quo state and its chief geopolitical rival(s), or • Threaten to reduce the relative power and influence of the status quo state in the region or • Directly threaten the security of the status quo state.
	Econ. Conflict	<p>Policies adopted by the Target State are perceived by the status quo state to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negatively affect the direct economic interests (specifically financial, trade and/or investment interests) of the status quo within the target state or region, and/or • Prevent the status quo state from acquiring strategic or economic resources, and/or • Otherwise significantly alter the preferred economic relationship between the status quo state and the target
	Ideol Conflict	<p>Policies adopted by the Target State are perceived by the status quo state to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • officially tolerate or adopt a worldview which describes the correct role and function of a government in a state generally, and/or • adopt a world view about the correct ordering of society in a state generally • which the status-quo state finds either incompatible with or aberrant to its own beliefs on the correct order and function of government and society.
Dependent Variable	Destabilization	<p>A policy adopted by the Status quo state which</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • alters the balance of force within a target country between a targeted government and its opposition, • with the <i>ultimate</i> (even if not immediate) aim of producing the collapse of that targeted government • and possibly (but not necessarily) its replacement by a government more amenable to the preferences of the status-quo state. • Through the use of instate actors and institutions
Control Variable	Administration	The term of head of Government in a status quo state.

Reference to US-Cuban relations in the early 1960's illustrates these conflicts well. One striking example of a major security conflict occurred when the Cuban government realigned toward the Soviet Union in 1960 and accepted Soviet nuclear missiles two years later. In adopting these policies, American policy makers perceived a drastic alteration of the balance of geopolitical power in the hemisphere and acted as if Cuba's realignment posed a significant threat to US security interests both in the hemisphere and in the world. This dramatic shift in geopolitical balance was typical of the conflicts I counted as security conflicts as I was conducting this preliminary research. Other, less dramatic examples often have to do with reaction to US policies in the region: Argentina and Brazil's unwillingness to follow the US lead on Cuban containment in the OAS, the acceptance of military hardware from Soviet bloc countries, and the support of CONTRADORA in Central American in the 1980s by a number of Latin American states was also seen as "security conflicts."⁴⁵

Economic conflicts were also highlighted in Cuban policy during the early 1960s. Prior to Castro's victory in the Revolution, the US had almost completely penetrated the Cuban economy. Directly following the passage of a controversial agrarian reform law and the subsequent nationalization of a number of properties owned by US investors, the US became incredibly alarmed. Eventually, an exchange of actions and counteractions between the US and Cuban governments led to a full nationalization of the entire economy and a US economic embargo of the island. The US opposed what it saw as illegal expropriation of US-owned investment on the island and attempts to alter the long standing economic relationship between

⁴⁵ CONTRADORA was a peace plan for the end to conflict and insecurity in Central America during the 1980's. The group was initially composed of Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and Panama. Their aim was to come up with solutions to the problems which worked for Central American nations primarily. Often those solutions ran afoul of US interests in the region which were primarily focused on continuing support for the Contras in Nicaragua and the Salvadoran Government in their civil war. For a good overview of Contradora and US opposition to it, see LeFeber (1993).

the US and Cuba. The policy of Castro's government therefore represented a major conflict of interest between the two states. Many examples in the preliminary research were similar to the actions taken by Castro's government, and frequently involved expropriation of some sort or attempts to end what was seen as a "dependent" relationship between a state and the US. Nationalization without acceptable compensation, refusal to adhere to standing contracts, initiating trade with the Soviets, Cuba or China, or attempting to delink one's economy from the status-quo state all provoked the perception of an intense conflict of economic interests.⁴⁶

Ideology, given its contested definition, proved a bit more difficult to operationalize. The major difficulty comes with its overlap of other concepts in the context of the Cold War. Often the US saw what a target did as the adoption of "communism" loosely defined, when the policy makers in the target saw their policies in quite different terms. US policy makers often mistook modernization programs and policies like import substitution industrialization as evidence of Communist influence in the Government. Often these governments did not counter the misperception effectively: they actively welcomed participation from Communists in their Government. The example of Cuba is telling here. Following the Revolution of 1959, which was not widely supported by the PSP (*Partido Socialista Popular*), Castro offered them the opportunity to participate in the Government in exchange for their help in making contact with the Soviets--this occurred directly following US responses to Castro's Agrarian reform

⁴⁶ Serving as a transshipment point for illegal narcotics became an issue in the 1970's and 1980s, but none of the cases which were eventually selected for this dissertation were perceived by the US as such. Transshipment of narcotics could be viewed as a security issue for the US, except that it didn't necessarily threaten US power vis-à-vis its rivals. The actors involved were economic actors: local politicians profited, but did so from the black market, and crime rose in the US as a response to drug importation, but the trade in drugs never really threatened US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, from the perspective of relative power. That the US backed actors in the drug wars who also participated in the drug trade--particularly in Colombia--demonstrates that they were not as concerned about the instability that drug trafficking caused central and South American states as they were about the economic aspects of the trade. That US policy makers framed the drug war in terms of security demonstrates more an acknowledgement of salient rhetoric for the US popular consumption than actual attitudes toward the international black market in drugs.

mentioned above. The Communists accepted, and Castro began a quick reorientation of Cuba's foreign policy to one that originally favored a neutralist "third camp" approach to one fully in line with Cold War preferences of the Soviet Union.⁴⁷

Cuba however was the clearest case of the influence of communism in the government of a Latin American state. In other states, the ideological conflict is more suspect to charges of misperception. The US would see a number of events as evidence of the influence of an aberrant ideology within the government. Having an active Communist Party which was both tolerated and free to act in the society was a sign that the target government sympathized with communists. Condemnation of the status quo state was a sure sign of the adoption of a different conception of world order, because it sought to undermine what the US thought as the legitimate orientation of the foreign policy of Western Hemisphere states. Blocking US efforts to isolate Cuba in the early 1960s was more evidence of the influence of Castro and Communists in the target governments. Later, having a negative human rights record proved to be a conflict of US interests: Under Jimmy Carter, the US Government condemned those with horrible records because they were ideologically committed to human rights, while under Reagan, negative human rights records hamstrung US efforts to obtain the geopolitical outcomes that it sought in the region. Finally, the adoption of "ultra-nationalism" which frequently manifested as states pursuing policies contrary to the advice of US diplomats, as in the case of Argentina and Brazil, was troubling for the US.

With these operationalizations in mind, I conducted a preliminary test of my model. For each country year, I multiplied the values for all three categories of conflict, as per the requirements of my model. If there was conflict in all three areas, it came out (predictably) as a

⁴⁷ See Thomas (1971, 1234-1271) for a full treatment of the rise of Communism and the PSP in Cuba during 1959 and the early months of 1960 leading the embargo and events which followed.

1. In these cases, I also searched the literature for destabilization programs launched by the US government against the target, which seemed to support the findings of the simple calculation described here. Each time I got a “1” in the destabilization row for the state-year, I was also able to detect US destabilization efforts going on at the same time.⁴⁸ In every single country-year which had a “1” in the destabilization category, I was able to locate historical evidence of US destabilization in the country. This preliminarily suggested to me that making a congruence claim would be plausible.

After this exercise was conducted, I merely had to select those countries where I observed broad conflict of interest, and match them with cases where I observed “limited” conflicts of interest, along the schema I presented above.⁴⁹ But this rigorous, rules-based process--which includes citations in the database--did yield matches that fit my criteria, and protects me against charges of selection bias. Given the historical record, I already knew the outcome of the preliminary research when selecting my cases, but matching them using this preliminary data allows me to test for congruence more completely and tell the story of how policies developed about using process tracing.

⁴⁸ Frequently, the source for these events was Blum 2004, which deals primarily with US intervention around the world. His work, while clearly motivated as a polemic against US foreign policy, happens to be a complete, well researched, and widely-cited volume chronicling US interventions since the end of the Second World War.

⁴⁹ The most difficult cases to find were those which had economic and ideological conflicts but not security conflicts. In the Western context, economic development was often conducted by the left, while those who preferred the traditional status quo were often conservative oligarchs. This suggests that the beneficiaries of the traditional system, the people who fought to hold onto that system and the source of organized and well funded opposition to reforms were one in the same group of people. US policy makers, who also preferred the traditional way of doing business because US-interests were heavily invested in that order, frequently saw the hand of international Communism in any effort to reform that system. Hence, economic and ideological conflicts often overlapped. But it was rare that leftists who promoted economic reform and had a different sense of the way things ought to be run within the country and the world did not at the same time pose a security threat to the US-- they frequently sought help from the Soviet Union because the Soviets were the rivals of the country whose economic and ideological preferences they were also at odds with.

Data and Measurement

Measurement of the three types of conflict of interest in a valid way proved to be a significant challenge, even with the scheme I have laid out in the above research design. The various measures I provide are: 1) A dichotomous variable for destabilization, which indicates whether the status-quo state adopted destabilization against the target or not, and 2) evidence that the US disapproves of the policies of the target states in each category.

As I noted elsewhere, observing the decision to destabilize directly in documentary evidence is quite difficult. Where I have access to transcripts of internal debates and consultations, I can find policy discussions which *add up* to destabilization against the target government. Few of these documents, however, ever use the word “destabilization” explicitly, unless they are publicly denying charges that they played any role “whatsoever” in the downfall of any governments anywhere. I do, however, have a standard that I can apply, provided to me by Hufbauer, *et al.* (2009). The standard they use when coding some case as “destabilization” is whether there was an explicit statement by some member of the policy making apparatus of the US that they intended to work for the weakening and/or downfall of a target government, specifically by assisting local actors who are opposed to that government. Hufbauer, *et al.*, use this standard in the detailed case studies that accompany their sanctions database.

This standard, however, excludes a number of cases where downfall of the government is not an expressed policy objective in the available record. It also has the disadvantage of taking policy makers at their word, assuming that what they say is actually what they are doing.⁵⁰ But

⁵⁰ One official, even if it is the Secretary of State of the US, making a statement about the policy of the government should not be construed as the actual policy that has been adopted. Henry Kissinger regularly denied publicly, that the US was involved in destabilization, though the historical record has since demonstrated that, when policy makers were speaking off the record, as they did in internal meetings, destabilization of at least one government in Latin America was indeed the policy of the Government of the United States (See Kissinger 1979, 683; Manley 1982, 223-225; and Kornbluh 2004 for conflicting accounts of some of Kissinger's activities.)

when policy makers openly proclaim that destabilization as a policy has been adopted, even if in so many words only, there is probably less reason to doubt them than when they deny it. The only remaining problem is that even if one government official announces the policy, he or she may not speak for the entire government, nor it is safe to assume that this policy maker is always on the winning side of the policy debate. As a result, there may be a number of cases where the policy to destabilize is not directly distinguishable from some other sort of policy, with a different goal.

In reality, I have a set of suspected destabilizations already in mind when I begin the study. The historic record demonstrates US destabilization of Chile in 1973 just as clearly as it demonstrates lack of destabilization in Paraguay or Antigua during the same year, even if there is no explicit policy statement one way or another available in either case. Because of the wide coverage of events during this period, Hufbauer's, *et al.* standard matched with my definition of destabilization is sufficient to code a case "destabilization" or "not destabilization."

I can determine that the policy of destabilization has been adopted when I begin seeing evidence in the historical record of a policy designed at first to assist local actors who are, in the words of the policy maker, sympathetic to US policy within the country under consideration, or constitute an "alternative" to the government that is being targeted.⁵¹ As the conflict deepens into a crisis, so does the policy of destabilization, though this claim will not be explicitly tested in this dissertation. A good example is the case where the US openly and explicitly announced its support for Cuban exiles sent to overthrow the Castro government in 1961. The announcement does not need to be as public as Kennedy issuing a public explanation for the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. If explicit support for in-target actors who are opposed to the

⁵¹ I prefer to find this evidence in primary sources themselves. If a secondary resource refers to a document I cannot get access to, I consider that as well, and make every reasonable attempt to find the primary document the secondary source refers to, given my limitations of time and resources.

target government is noted in a historic document, this will demonstrate that the US has adopted the policy, and are beginning to prepare for the eventual downfall of their target.

I support this conclusion with further documentation of the continued deterioration of relations between the US and the target state. If a destabilization policy is adopted, prospect theory suggests that the state will not readily lift it until the status quo is restored. Eventually, as the situation approaches crisis and conflicts become more acute and widespread over my three categories, more and more evidence enters the public record which illuminates the thinking of these policy makers. The policies described above often seem innocuous at first. Policy is developed and reiterated in support of friendly elements in the target society. Certain assets are identified and developed. Exasperation with the target government becomes increasingly apparent. Presidents start asking Ambassadors who would be suitable replacements for the targeted government. Occasionally, policy makers will resort to *ad hominem* attacks against the target. There is a trajectory to the deepening of this policy which can be witnessed over time which may not be evident in single snapshots in time that individual documents, taken on their own, represent. And in cases where there is no destabilization, a trajectory along this path is absent.

Measuring interests and conflicts in those interests was more time intensive.⁵² While I assert that states have interests, a persistent challenge has been to declare what those interests

⁵² On the topic of independent coding: I employed an undergraduate student who I knew to be a reliable and intelligent person, to code these conflicts of interest along with me. He had the same access to FRUS--as well as a trove of documents from the National Security archive online for the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan case--as I did, and he went through and performed much the same activity in coding as I performed. At times he was a bit more generous with his coding of conflicts than I was, and at times he was a bit less generous. After I selected my cases, I repeated the coding exercise that I had set up for my preliminary research described above, except instead of coding them by year, I coded the cases under investigation by conflict and by month. I often had more sources than Ari had--given that he only had access to FRUS--but when he followed my coding rules, we generally came out with at least the same conflicts of interest at generally the same time. Occasionally, he coded a security conflict as an ideological conflict, or vice versa. This discrepancy demonstrated to me that my coding rules to him were not entirely clear. When I clarified the rules and had him recode, the cases ended up looking similar. This exercise

actually are.⁵³ But the qualitative research design that I have chosen offers me some leverage on this issue: Precise measurement of a state's interests may not be possible. I merely have to be rigorous.

The literature itself illuminates the answer to what a state's "interests" are. While there are probably thousands of different potential interests that a state can have, and exponentially more potential conflicts between any two states, for the sake of this dissertation, I have divided state interests of the state into three main types: security, economic, and ideological. These categories are themselves divided into subcategories, and those subcategories are themselves divided, and so forth, but it is a perception of a more fundamental conflict which concerns politicians in the status quo state. My argument is that a state will not destabilize another based on a conflict of just one of those specific policies. In fact, even if there is conflict in just one (or even two) of the general categories, and even if that conflict is intense, a state will not likely destabilize another. Destabilization requires broad and intense conflict, according to my argument.

Measurement of conflict of these interests then is to some degree straightforward. I measure opposition to a target state's policies by looking at the potential destabilizer's policy statements found in primary and secondary sources, like declassified government documents⁵⁴ periodicals and newspapers which may contain op-eds by policy makers, or reports on US policy

produced at least some degree of confidence in me that the conflicts I noted in the documentation were the ones anyone following my coding rules (when correctly explicated) would interpret. I do not have exact figures for how likely any given observation would be the same between my own coding and Ari's coding, but given that his work was used by me as a check on my own work, I would certainly be interested in specifically replicating this exercise with a set of hard and fast rules about coding, to find out exactly how similar those two sets of interpretations are.

⁵³ Callahan (2004), Tillema (1973), Krasner (1978), for example, provide decent overviews of those interests. It is in these sources and others, where I look for outlines of US interests, both in general and during specific periods in US history. I can also find more concise and timely statements on US interests in a given country by looking at primary documents and the secondary sources based on them directly.

⁵⁴ I rely very heavily on declassified documents found in the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* for this matter.

preferences, and secondary sources from and about the status-quo state. It is important to look at the sources from the destabilizer's perspective, because the actual policy of the target state is not nearly as important as the perception of hostility to the destabilizer's policy preferences.

In other words, for this dissertation, the conflict that the destabilizer perceives is a far more important determinant of its policy than any policy of the target state. This does not mean that a real conflict does not really exist; what is important is what the destabilizer state's policy makers themselves think. After all, they create policy based on what they perceive to be occurring in the world around them. Public sources of information are especially important to measure these conflicts. It is here that policy makers will have the opportunity to tell a story from their point of view. Public sources of information, such as newspapers and journals, but more importantly, declassified government documents, offer an insight into the mindset of the policymaker at the time that decisions are being made.⁵⁵

If there is a predominance of complaints about the policy of some government, or expressions of "concern" (or other diplomatic codes) about this or that policy category, or alarming diplomatic statements about some policy category in a target state, which, most importantly, fits the same general coding rules as I provided above, I call this "intense conflict" in that particular category. An intense conflict, for the purposes of this dissertation, is one that prompts a response from the status-quo state. Much of what states do, even if it is irritating to the status-quo state, does not require a policy response. It may be enough for a Public official to express displeasure, and then move past it. But intense conflict requires commensurate and deliberative response. The status quo state, in response to an "intense" conflict of interest,

⁵⁵ Additionally, in a democratic state such as the US, policy makers often need to "sell" their policies to certain sectors of the public (see, e.g. Maoz and Russett 1993, 626). To some degree, government officials, especially in a democracy, need to satisfy the groups that provide them legitimacy, unless presented with an emergency situation. So policy makers will often attempt to spin events to make the public aware that something has happened, but also to make the case that the policy was justified.

usually ends up developing a policy response. Either they officially and publicly condemn an act, or cut off some economic relationship, or begin funding opposition movements. This is not an exhaustive list: the policy response can be as varied as the conflict of interest, but what is necessary is that the status quo state answers the irritant from the target state. When there is evidence of this sort of response, I code that as an intense conflict of interest.

The mechanism of the decision itself is illustrated by any declassified sources consisting of internal memos, memoirs of the decision makers themselves, newspaper/periodical and congressional investigations conducted after the fact and secondary sources which cover the events under consideration, which show how the addition of the third conflict in each comparison tipped the scales against that target state and led to the destabilization policy. When I show that the absence of the third conflict in each pair was linked to the absence of destabilization or, more frequently, the adoption of some less risky policy than destabilization, this further demonstrates my hypothesis.

Finally, the measurement of the single control variable, the political leadership, is accomplished through the selection of the pairs. There is some theoretical support for the argument that two-term Presidents often adopt different diplomatic postures during their second terms than they do in their first (Rabe 1988). So I think it is appropriate to include the number of the term in the variable as well. If it is a President's first term, the value will be expressed, for example, as "Nixon 1" and second, "Nixon 2". There is only one odd one. I include the final year of Kennedy's term, served by Johnson, as Kennedy's administration, as the foreign policy team was still essentially the same during the period between the time that Kennedy was assassinated and when Johnson was elected to the office in his own right.

CHAPTER 3

US POLICY IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, 1961-1965

Introduction

The comparison of US policy toward Argentina and Brazil during the early part of the 1960s demonstrates the hypothesis of this dissertation. The evidence describes various conflicts between the US and Argentina on the one hand, and between the US and Brazil on the other. Observed outcomes, non-destabilization in Argentina and destabilization in Brazil, are congruent with the hypothetical expectations of this dissertation. In this chapter, I demonstrate that policymakers in the US perceived two, but not three conflicts of interest in Argentina, and subsequently did not adopt destabilization as a policy. In Brazil they perceived conflicts of all three types of interests, almost after Joao Goulart took office, and subsequently, adopted a destabilization policy which ultimately led to his downfall. Conflicts of interest are summarized in Table 3.1 below.

I begin by outlining each case, noting the conflicts of interests perceived by the Kennedy Administration. I then compare the policies adopted in response to those perceptions. The perception of broad and intense conflict in the Brazilian case caused the US government to adopt the risky policy of destabilization against the Goulart government, but the level of conflict with Argentina was not enough to justify the adoption of the same policy against the Frondizi Government.

Table 3.1: Conflicts of Interest in Argentina and Brazil, 1961-1965

	Argentina (Frondizi)	Brazil (Goulart)
Ideology	Toleration of Leftists and Peronists in Government; independent stance on Cuba	Toleration of Communists in Government at national and local levels
Economics	"Developmentalism" led to financial instability; debt crises; trade with China	Policies led to financial instability; nationalization of ITT; unwillingness of Brazilian government to follow US economic advice
Security	NO CONFLICT (General Consonance with US foreign policy, except for Cuba)	Independent foreign policy led to closeness with Cuba; undermining US influence in Brazilian military
Destabilization?	No (Economic pressure to get Frondizi to alter policies, lifted at end when it appeared that military would move against him)	Yes (widespread support for Goulart's political opposition, encouragement of the military to act.)

The major US foreign policy challenge in Latin America at the beginning the Kennedy Administration was Cuba's joining the Soviet Bloc. Latin American alignment with the US, especially in terms of foreign policy toward Cuba--but also, to some degree, Communist China and the rest of the socialist bloc--was imperative to good relations between the US and its neighbors (Rabe 1999, 56).⁵⁶ It is, therefore, little wonder that the Kennedy, and then Johnson Administrations, would be concerned with the foreign policies of the two largest and arguably most powerful states in Latin America. Brazil was an emerging regional power, which possessed a number of human and natural features which made it a pre-eminent concern to US foreign policy makers. If Brazil fell to communism, the US position in the hemisphere would be greatly

⁵⁶ Stability in internal politics was also a great concern of the US. Reformist-minded constitutional governments provided the best bulwark against Soviet incursion into the hemisphere, but unstable societies could increase the potential of Soviet-guided communist parties seizing the advantage and following Castro's lead into the waiting arms of the Soviet Union. In addition to the relatively recent challenge posed by Castro's conversion to Marxist-Leninism and the placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1961 and 1962, there were the long-standing conflicts between the US and the Soviet Union, informed by events elsewhere--like Berlin, for example--which colored US relations with Latin America during this period. Vietnam was only beginning to take center stage in this period, and American Presidents were still paying close attention to events in the hemisphere.

weakened. Cuba, after all, only possessed a population of about 7 million. Brazil, on the other hand, had more than 70 million people living there: If the Soviets established another outpost in Brazil, the balance of power in the world would be greatly upset (Leacock 1990, 13). The US was very also interested in what went on in Brazil for hemispheric reasons: it was widely viewed that if US policies failed in Brazil, it would be difficult to achieve success anywhere else in Latin America (FRUS 12, 233: 488-490).⁵⁷

Argentina was similarly important in the region, though was under no real threat of a collapse toward communism or influence by the Soviet Union. The real concern for US policy makers over Argentina, besides the catastrophically collapsing economy was its preference to be a ring-leader in opposition to US policies in Latin America, which US policy makers believed came from a nationalist opposition to US dominance in the region. Argentina, for example, had been seen by US policy makers as an obstacle to their efforts to isolate Cuba and therefore a worrisome deviation from the US led Inter-American system, traditionally led by the US (Sheinin 2006, 119-120).

The cases of Brazil and Argentina present a good example of the prospect theory in action. The key to US attitudes toward both Brazil and Argentina lie in acceptability of the deviation from the perceived status quo in the region. As I demonstrate below, the comparatively limited conflicts of interest in Argentina, especially given the improving relations between the US and Frondizi, did not produce destabilization as a policy. Deviation from the status quo was less severe in Argentina than it was in Brazil, and therefore did not prompt the risk-acceptance seen in the Brazilian case. The path followed by US policy makers toward

⁵⁷ Doc. 233 of FRUS vol. 12 is a report of the Guidelines of US policy and operations with regard to Brazil, published in late 1962-early 1963. The document lays out the problems associated with US-Brazil relations, and assesses US policy for 1962, going into 1963. Historically, this document was published following the inconclusive attempts to influence the Brazilian elections and support candidates favorable toward US policies, but hostile to Goulart's government.

Argentina was more one of pressure with the aim of altering the policies than destabilization of the target government. The goal of US policy for Argentina was to get Frondizi to take Argentina's financial problems seriously, and to pressure Frondizi to abandon its independent foreign policy. The goal was not to get rid of the Frondizi government by supporting anti-Frondizi forces, either in the military or in the society.⁵⁸

Conversely, the broad and intense conflict of interest between the Kennedy/Johnson Administrations and the Goulart Administration presented an unacceptable deviation from the status quo of pre-1961 consonance with US interests, in turn making US policy makers more risk acceptant. Once the conflicts between the US and Brazil were perceived as insurmountable, the US fully embraced the policy of strengthening the Goulart government's domestic opponents with the aim of replacing Goulart all together. In that environment, destabilization became US policy.

Conflicts of Interest in Argentina under Frondizi: Economic and Ideological

At the beginning of 1961, relations between the US and Argentina were stronger than they had been historically, but were strained by several issues. The interests of the US were made clear early in Arturo Frondizi's administration: "The US Ambassadors in Buenos Aires were instructed to inform... Frondizi that the price of US support would be unequivocal support for free enterprise and anti-communism" (Tulchin 1990, 120). Economically, the US preferred a stable economy, with low inflation, a small public sector, and a robust climate for US investment. It also sought to promote the Alliance for Progress programs which aimed at small level construction, land reform, and promotion of literacy programs. It also sought to limit the economic connections between Latin American nations and Communist states including

⁵⁸ Frondizi, as I demonstrate, was still preferred by US policy makers to any other possible contender for office, even though intense conflicts of interest continued. The lack of an acceptable alternative suggests an alternative hypothesis which I did not anticipate, but which requires some consideration in future research.

Communist China (Rabe, 59; FRUS 12 Doc 174, 362).⁵⁹ In geo-political matters, the US was interested in limited Soviet influence, either directly or via Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. The US was also particularly interested in Argentine support its efforts to isolate Cuba in the Organization of American States (Rabe, 58-60; Sheinin, 136). Ideologically, the US was interested keeping communists from obtaining high government positions which could be used to break hemispheric unity, but the US was also concerned about nationalism of newly reactivated Peronists in Argentina, which could undermine the improving relations between the US and Argentina in other areas (Rabe, 61; FRUS 12 Doc 178, 366-368).⁶⁰

Argentine policy appeared to conflict with US preferences in a number of ways. Economically, Argentine policy followed the course of "developmentalism",⁶¹ which was designed to promote national priorities while attracting foreign investment Frondizi felt that "developmentalism" was absolutely necessary for the modernization of the Argentine economy. While Frondizi reversed the nationalist policies of his predecessors when coming into office and instituted an austerity program that alienated large sectors of his support base but which was preferred by the IMF (Sheinin, 115), Frondizi's inflationary economic policies were seen by American policy makers as exacerbating the financial crisis.

⁵⁹ Doc 174 of FRUS vol 12 includes, among other discussions of economic interest, a suggestion by President Kennedy that helping China out with trade would potentially help them to acquire the nuclear bomb, which could then pose a threat to the US as well as other nations affiliated with the US.

⁶⁰ Doc 178 of FRUS vol 12 outlines the Assistant Secretary for Inter-Hemispheric Affairs Edwin Martin's thinking on the rapidly disintegrating situation in Argentina just days before Frondizi's eventual removal from office. In it, he lists under the heading "Against Frondizi" the fact that Frondizi has made deals with Peron. In previous documents, US policy makers discuss the outcomes of the election where Peronists won a majority of the districts in Argentina, and the response that this will produce in the anti-Peronist military of Argentina.

⁶¹ For a long treatment of Frondizi's Developmentalist economic policies and the effects they produced in Argentine Society, see Szusterman (1993).

US policy makers expressed a general concern about Frondizi's "developmentalist" economic policy, despite his high marks on his commitment to US-led capitalism.⁶² For developmentalism to work, Frondizi understood the need for foreign investments, and decided that he should seek both financial and trade contacts where he could find them. This was not a new policy in Argentina. Juan Peron had maintained and restored ties with much of the socialist bloc following World War II and had committed Argentina to trade obligations it could not meet. But the US saw this policy as problematic: Any association with the Soviets was thought to be an opportunity for agents of communism to infiltrate a state, according to the standing Cold War logic.

Along those same lines, as Frondizi sought trade abroad to advance his developmentalist aims at home, the US, who competed with Argentina in agricultural and beef exports, was nonetheless miffed at the possibility of Argentine trade with the People's Republic of China. Kennedy informed Frondizi that the PRC, if it obtained nuclear weapons would be a great threat to the western world, and that it would be unfortunate if Argentina did anything which would help them in their ambitions. Ostensibly, "helping China" included selling them Argentine beef and grain (FRUS 12 Doc 174, 359-362; Rabe, 59).

Trade with China was not the only source of irritation for the US in the economic realm. The economic issues that Frondizi inherited were partially mitigated by Frondizi's stabilization efforts. But in turn, the Argentine balance of payments was damaged by Frondizi's desire to use government funds to build massive public works projects. Frondizi's policy continued the inflationary spiral and created a balance-of-payments crisis in Argentina after 1959 which

⁶² Frondizi received high marks for implementing stabilization programs within his country, and when Secretary of the Treasury Thomas Dillion visited Argentina in 1961, Dillion noted his pleasure with Frondizi's commitment to "international capitalism." (Rabe, 57). The US State Department's Bureau of International Affairs, who visited that same year, noted Argentina's harmonious relationship with the US since 1955, Frondizi's courageous stabilization program, and his proven alignment with the US and its interests (Sheinin, 120-121)

Fronidizi was unable to resolve (Whitaker, 230-231). The economic problems that Argentina faced as a result of Frondizi's developmentalist policies also decreased the willingness of US decision-makers to continue to supply money to Argentina. Inflation ate up the value of most of aid that came from the North: US aid typically came in the form of loans for projects that supported US policies, and had to be spent buying things from the US (Rabe, 154).⁶³

Many of the difficulties between the US and Argentina centered on the Alliance for Progress itself. Key to the good relations between Argentina, it seemed, was Frondizi's support for Kennedy's major Latin American aid initiative.⁶⁴ Support for the Alliance meant a much-needed infusion of capital to impoverished Latin American states, but, as the case of Brazil demonstrates, the Alliance was also a weapon to pressure Latin American governments to follow a strongly pro-US policy in their own foreign relations. Frondizi, for his part, strongly praised the Alliance, but encouraged the US to use Alliance funds for public works and longer term projects, which fit into his own "developmentalist" economic strategy for Argentina (Rabe, 57-58). The US preferred the funds to be used to build housing and promote land reform.

Fronidizi had early on been a great supporter of the goals and programs of the Alliance for Progress, and a champion of South American integration (Rabe, 58; Tulchin, 121; Whitaker, 232). Additionally, he had adhered to the pro-capitalist position preferred by the US, had early on settled all outstanding economic issues between the US and Argentina, and had been

⁶³ Frondizi eventually asked for a 1 billion dollar aid package to support Argentine priorities, but there is no evidence that this aid was ever supplied (FRUS 12 Doc 173, 357-359). This document lists Argentine requests for additional loans from the US in 1961 which were aimed at modernizing Argentine infrastructure. The Secretary of State advised the President to merely make a general commitment to aid Argentina, while these programs were discussed.

⁶⁴ The Alliance for Progress, first outlined in 1961, proposed to infuse billions of dollars of investment into Latin American states, aiming at developing the least developed states first. The focus of Alliance dollars were to create housing, decreasing illiteracy through the building of schools and increasing access to health care for the perpetually impoverished. The Alliance had a political goal as well: Investment was to be used to stem the inroads that Communism was making into the Western Hemisphere as a consequence of Castro's victory, the same way that the Marshall Plan worked at building a bulwark against Communism in Western Europe (Rabe 148-149)

welcoming to foreign investment. But he also believed that the US' priorities for the Alliance for Progress would not address the causes of underdevelopment: Frondizi preferred to use the money to build huge public works, while the US stressed social issues such as land reform (Rabe, 57-58).

When Frondizi met with Kennedy in September of 1961, he urged Kennedy to focus less on Cuba and more on setting Alliance programs in motion. The US responded by noting that the mood in Congress was now against putting money behind the pledges Kennedy officials had made earlier in the year (Sheinin, 137). Kennedy expressed to Frondizi that he believed Argentine priorities were misplaced and though he understood Frondizi's desire for development, but Cuba was a more pressing matter (Rabe, 60). According to the US assessment, shortly before Frondizi was overthrown, the policy of "developmentalism" caused economic instability, a deepening balance of payments crisis, (Whitaker, 230) and coupled with the independent policy on Cuba, the gradual withdrawal of US economic support.

Though Frondizi's pro-capitalist policies were consonant with US preferences and his stabilization program had been applauded by both the US and the IMF, the continued financial instability in Argentina was seen as a threat to US economic interests--and an opening to the US' adversaries--in Argentina. US relations with Argentina were correspondingly strained. But unwillingness of the US to provide meaningful aid to Argentina because of the Cuban issue and the deepening financial crisis meant that Frondizi could not buy off his opponents. Frondizi's austerity program had undermined mass support for his government at home, which in turn translated to harassment by both pro- and anti-Castro devotees, and greater unrest among labor.⁶⁵ The resulting economic instability was troubling for US policy makers: A failure of the

⁶⁵ Frondizi faced major strikes, riots and military threats throughout his entire term in reaction to his policies (Rabe, 58).

Fronidzi's stabilization plan would embolden those who sought a more Cuba-like solution to the nation's economic problems, which in turn would cause further complications between the US and Argentina (Sheinin, 119). A month before Fronidzi was overthrown by the military, the US approved a major aid package to Argentina, (Rabe, 61) but by then it was too late: The military had lost patience with Fronidzi and would soon definitively move against him.

Behind the economic conflicts in US-Argentine relations were ideological conflicts, mostly arising from Fronidzi's "independent foreign policy". US policy makers believed that if Argentina firmly denounced Castro and worked with the US to isolate Cuba, other nations who also supported abstention on Cuba would fall in line with the US (FRUS 12 Doc 115, 258-259).⁶⁶ Despite the fact that Argentina ultimately supported eight resolutions at the Punta de Este conference of the OAS, including one that denounced Cuba and condemned communism as "incompatible" with the inter-American system, Secretary of State Rusk suggested that Argentina had "let [the US] down" when they refused to take stronger action against Cuba (FRUS 12 Doc 144, 307-308). Kennedy advisor Walt Rostow added that Argentine delegates acted in a "contemptible manner" by proposing a "mealy mouth anti-communist compromise resolution" (FRUS, 12 Doc 145:308-309).⁶⁷ Fronidzi's attitude toward Cuba following Castro's victory in 1959 regularly "irked" the US (Rabe, 59). These problems added up to a major ideological conflict between the US and Argentina during the Kennedy Administration because they directly challenged the dominance of hemispheric policy previously enjoyed by the US: In

⁶⁶ Doc 115 of FRUS vol 12 is a discussion between Kennedy and Colombian Ambassador Turbay from September 1961. In this document, Kennedy is seeking the Ambassador's opinion of the success of the Lleras plan to isolate Cuba in the OAS. Turbay expressed that if the big players in South America--including Argentina--abstain on the vote, others will also abstain. This thinking seems to have influenced US policy toward Argentina, and led to a discussion between Kennedy and Fronidzi in FRUS 10, (Doc 264: 657-658).

⁶⁷ Doc 145 of FRUS, Vol 12 is written as a summary of the vote which was taken in the OAS, composed by Walt Rostow in Punta del Este, which was designed to garner hemispheric support for isolation of Cuba. The biggest countries in Latin America all abstained from supporting the US position, which was a great disappointment for US policy makers. Document 144, immediately preceding this one attributes severe internal problems as the reason for the abstentions, and Sec'y of State Rusk agrees that this justification is legitimate in all cases *except* Argentina.

a word they directly violated the preferred sense of hemispheric order which the US had heretofore directed.

On Cuba, US interests were clear: Alignment on hemispheric issues was of paramount importance, (FRUS 12 Doc 133, 288)⁶⁸ and any sign of cracks in hemispheric solidarity would be an opportunity for "international communism" to make further inroads into the hemisphere. For the US, Cuba was a part of the larger Cold War struggle. Frondizi's independence in foreign affairs was therefore seen as a succor to the communists internationally, but also to Argentine nationalists (i.e. the Peronists.) For the US, the struggle with Frondizi over Cuba was an example of the ideological choice of either being "with us" or "against us." Softness on Cuba put any country who even abstained into the latter category. Frondizi constantly made efforts to demonstrate Argentina's alignment with Washington on a number of very important points, and generally maintained a good relationship with US investors and the US government. Even so, he regularly "disappointed" the US on the Cuban issue, and several other points of foreign policy. In other words, he was not interested in supporting, to the letter, all of the US' Cold War goals because he was more interested in supporting his own nationalist goals (Rabe, 58; Sheinin, 136).

The conflicts of interest between Argentina and the US over Argentina's "independent" foreign policy can not really be described as security conflicts, given my definition in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. The security aspect of this conflict, while acknowledged, was more the context for a larger complaint concerning the ideology of a large, potentially powerful state in the Western Hemisphere not standing in solidarity with the US on a matter that was viewed in the US as among the most important international crises of the day.

⁶⁸ Doc 133 of FRUS 12 deals with the Cuban issue, from January 11, 1962. This letter was drafted by Robert F. Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs, and cleared by Secretary of State Rusk and approved by President Kennedy. The letter was to President Frondizi, from Kennedy, explicitly explaining US policy toward Cuba and a desire for "solidarity" on the Cuban issue.

It would be tempting to see the "independent" foreign policy as a security problem, as it tended to undermine the US' ability to influence events in the Western Hemisphere and enforce the policies that the US believed were in its own security interests. The independent foreign policy was most often expressed in terms of Argentine blocks to US-led efforts at hemispheric action toward Cuba. The US saw Cuba as a threat to US security, and the only way to ensure US security vis-à-vis Cuba was to get the Inter-American system to take a firm stand against Cuba. As Kennedy noted, Argentina was a key to the whole problem.

But the conflict was ideological because it fundamentally involved both how the US saw Argentina in the hemispheric system and how Argentina saw itself in the region and in the world. Argentina aimed at being a regional power, in many ways, and its position on foreign policy toward Cuba demonstrated that status. Argentina's unwillingness to go along with US preferences on Cuba, and encouraging others to follow a similar line irritated the US (FRUS 12 Doc. 144).

The issue was more irritating to the US for ideological reasons because it reflected a difference of opinion about the threat posed by Cuba to the inter-American system, and Argentina's role in dealing with that threat. The US saw Argentine unwillingness to support US objectives in the OAS as a matter of not fully understanding the US focus on Cuba, or the threat posed by the international communist conspiracy, and this was troubling for the US because it hurt the prospects for hemispheric resolution against Cuba (Sheinin, 120). In other words, Argentine independence hurt the sense of order that the US relied upon to accomplish its political goals in the hemisphere.

During his Presidency, Frondizi did not share Washington's preoccupation with Cuba, but was far more concerned about defending himself against nationalistic critique of his

government.⁶⁹ From the beginning of his Presidency, Frondizi has employed moderately nationalist rhetoric.⁷⁰ This language was intended to shore up Frondizi's domestic political situation vis-à-vis the Peronist and other nationalist opponents of his "developmentalist" economic approach, or to silence domestic critics of his independent stance toward Cuba. Apparently, this sort of nationalist rhetoric provoked "fits of anxiety" in Washington mainly because it reminded US policy makers of Peronism (Tulchin 1990, 120).

Throughout this period, the US was concerned about resurgent Peronist ideology in the Argentine labor movement.⁷¹ When Frondizi was elected in 1958, he had the staunch backing of Peronists, Communists, and most of the labor movement, including its largest union, the General Economic Confederation (CGE) which was Peronist and supported, among other things, national economic independence (Whitaker, 229). A return of Peronism under Frondizi was therefore worrisome to the US, because of the extreme economic nationalism and hostility toward US

⁶⁹ It is possible that even if Frondizi had wanted to, there was likely no way he could adopt the US line on Cuba without risking a possible revolt from nationalists and Peronists, who represented 1/4th of the electorate. He had immediately alienated his base with his austerity and pro-capitalist stabilization programs, and was subsequently plagued by strikes and labor unrest, mostly led by the critics of that policy among the left, who were themselves inspired by Castro's success, and among Nationalists who considered the implementation of IMF recommendations a "sell out" to the North (Rabe, 58). For Frondizi, a foreign policy "independent" of the US seemed to be a good solution. After all, Cuba was an island nation thousands of miles away and presented little threat to Argentina, or indeed toward most of Latin America. Support for Cuba would provide Frondizi an opportunity to shore up his support with nationalists who were angered at his austere economic positions through his display of "independence" (Tulchin, 120-121). In theory, it should have cost Frondizi little to support Cuba and gained him quite a bit. As it turns out, the revolt came not from the nationalists, but from the military that was both staunchly anti-Cuba and anti-Peronist. The ideological conflict was resolved by a military coup, and Frondizi's replacement quietly adopted the US line on Cuba, not because the US cajoled him to do so, but because domestic political actors were encouraging him to do so (Sheinin, 139).

⁷⁰ Frondizi's nationalist rhetoric was connected directly to the "independent" foreign policy on Cuba, his expression of the need to free Argentina from its "dependence" on Northern sources of investment, his aspiration to increase the influence of Argentina in international affairs and his determination to restore Argentina to a leading role in international affairs. His persistent "independence" in foreign policy led him to do things like receive Cuban Finance Minister and main architect of the Cuban Revolution Ernesto Guevara to the Capital in August 1961. Guevara's Argentine origins notwithstanding, US policy makers were convinced that Frondizi did not fully appreciate the threat that a Soviet-dominated Cuba represented to the Hemisphere (Rabe, 58-59).

⁷¹ Until 1949, Juan Peron had adopted anti-Americanism at home and "neutralism" in Cold War matters. Though relations improved somewhat after that, due largely to Peron's mismanagement of Argentina's economy and acute need for credit, old issues remained unresolved, and Peron often moved between support and criticism of the US (Sheinin, 96-100; See, also, FRUS 7: 370-371 for an example of the economic conflicts between the US and Peron.)

investment that it entailed. Peron had been ousted just six years prior to Kennedy assuming office, and the difficulties with Peron, who was in exile at the time, were nonetheless still very fresh in the minds of US policy makers. The US opposed the return of Peronism in Argentina, and was also concerned about possible alliance between leftist Peronists and communists in the labor movement (FRUS 12 Doc 177, 365). This issue became a crisis when Frondizi allowed Peronists to run in the 1962 elections. He probably hoped that this would temper their opposition to the government. Instead, the Peronists won a large number of elections causing concern for both the Argentine military and the US alike, though for different reasons.

Though Frondizi did not benefit from Peronism after 1959, the threat that Peronists posed to the Government of Argentina was troubling to the US. Given the independent (and divergent) stand on Cuba on several occasions between Kennedy's inauguration and Frondizi's overthrow, and combined with major Peronist electoral victories in 1961 and 1962, there was good reason for US policy makers to perceive an ideological conflict of interest between the US and Argentina. The "independent foreign policy" was especially troubling because US officials believed that closeness to Cuba would embolden military actors to intervene in the Argentine Government and the US feared that military intervention against Frondizi would then ignite Peronist violence, (FRUS 12 Doc 178, 366). This would, in turn, lead to the Peronists seizing power and bringing Peron back from exile in Spain. Additionally, they perceived that communists and Peronists might align, and would use military reaction to Frondizi's independent policies as an excuse to throw out the democratic government in favor of a hostile government, possibly headed by Peron himself (FRUS 12, 366-368; Rabe, 61).⁷²

⁷² To avoid this possibility, as the Frondizi government was collapsing, the US made sure that Peron remained in Spain, and, at the request of Frondizi, that he was not taking an active role in the disintegration of the political situation in Argentina (FRUS 12, doc 177: 365). This document is the report of a late- March 1962 response received by the Government of Spain, which ensured that Peron was not to be permitted to return to Argentina, and

Despite the intense economic and ideological conflicts, the security conflict was for the most part absent in US-Argentine relations during Kennedy's Administration. Nothing Argentina did threatened US security directly. Except for Cuba, Argentina's foreign policy was entirely in line with the US in all other major geo-political matters: the State Department's Bureau for Inter-American Affairs stated that Frondizi had "proven his alignment with the west" (Quoted in Sheinin, 120). There were no Soviet military missions to Argentina. Nothing in the documents suggests that there was any concern for Soviet political or military incursion in Argentina.⁷³ Argentina did not cancel its military agreements with the US, or reject military aid from the US when it was forthcoming. Argentina was seen as an enthusiastic supporter of the Alliance for Progress, which was designed to undermine the attractiveness of Soviet and Cuban alternatives. When documents surfaced that suggested Cuban interference in the Argentine Government, Frondizi angrily denied their authenticity and denounced any attempted interference in the affairs of a sovereign state (FRUS 12, Doc 173: 359).⁷⁴

Given conflict in economic and ideological, but not security interests, the model employed in this dissertation predicts that I should not expect to see destabilization. As a result, I argue that the observations in the Argentine case are congruent with my expectations. As I expect, intense conflict did not rise to the level which would have caused US policy makers to accept the risks that came with destabilization as a policy.

Indeed, there is a notable absence of evidence for destabilization, and most evidence available demonstrates that Frondizi's overthrow was a domestic affair, being conducted by

that he was not personally promoting civil disturbances in Argentina as Frondizi was quickly nearing the end of his time in office.

⁷³ Economic relations between the Soviets or the Chinese and Argentina were considered marginal, and primarily benefitted Argentina anyway (Rabe, 59).

⁷⁴ Doc 173 of FRUS Vol 12 details among other things, an account of documents found at the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires by a Cuban exile group, and released by the US government in September 1961.

domestic agents quite against the interests of the United States. When Frondizi ordered his OAS team to abstain on yet another US effort to isolate Cuba in January 1962, the military demanded that Frondizi break relations with Cuba; he subsequently complied to avoid a coup.⁷⁵ When Peronists posted significant gains in the elections of March 1962, the military decided that they had had enough. Frondizi was ousted from power on March 29, 1962, and replaced with the President of the Senate.

US Responses to Frondizi: Pressure but no destabilization

The US policy response to the conflicts I listed above was to encourage the Argentine military, with whom the US retained close and cordial contact, to pressure Frondizi to change his stance on Cuba. That is, the US wanted an *alteration of policy*, not a removal of the President. The Argentine military followed US advice, and Frondizi broke contact relations with Cuba a couple weeks after helping to defeat US efforts to expel Cuba from the OAS by abstaining. But when it appeared that military pressure might accidentally produce a communist-Peronist alliance in response, and there was no apparent successor to Frondizi who US policy makers preferred, the US encouraged their military contacts to not overthrow the government, but to support constitutional solutions. The military did not listen to the US the second time.⁷⁶

Rabe (56-63) calls the pressure the US exerted on one hand and unwillingness of the US to come to Frondizi's aid on the other hand "destabilization." His account of the overthrow

⁷⁵ The US, which had initially supported this pressure by the military, subsequently pulled back when it became clear that the military was planning to get rid of Frondizi. See FRUS 12, (Doc 175: 362-363), which outlines US opposition to any attempted coup against Frondizi by the military, and discusses the damage that would do to US-Argentine relations.

⁷⁶ Again, it seems that the US was more concerned about the lack of an acceptable alternative than they were with saving Frondizi. The US may not have actively supported the coup or helped the military conduct it, but they were concerned about the move because of a possible outcome which would have been worse for US interests in the country. As a result, they attempted to prevent the coup first, and then adopted a "wait and see" posture after it happened. This "lack of a more preferable alternative" will pop up again in future chapters. It represents a possible alternative hypothesis for why the US *did not* destabilize in the cases of Argentina, Peru, and El Salvador, but is not inconsistent with the theory which explains why the US *did* destabilize in Brazil, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. A more complete discussion on this alternative explanation is offered in the Conclusion of this dissertation

suggests that the US sat silently by as Frondizi was overthrown, and then gladly cooperated with the military-backed civilian who replaced him (Rabe, 61-62). This account, however, doesn't necessarily square with the government's own documentation.⁷⁷ The US' preference was made clear in a February 10th telegram from the Secretary of State Rusk to the US Embassy in Argentina: "We welcome foreign policy changes [in Frondizi's position on Cuba] brought about by internal pressures mainly from military. We believe however continued and extreme military pressure upon government would be contrary to US interests..."

Secretary Rusk goes on to state that the US would deplore the military's action against constitutional Government in Argentina, and encouraged the Embassy to point out the advantages of relieving pressure on Frondizi to its contacts in the Argentine military (FRUS 12 Doc 175, 362). After Frondizi changed his stance on Cuba in February, the US tried to get the military to let up on him, and then attempted--too late, as it turns out--to stabilize his government: The US Government approved a large aid package several weeks before the military overthrew him.

To further underscore the argument that the US did not destabilize in Argentina, US reactions to the coup are illustrative. When Frondizi was overthrown in late March, Kennedy advisor Arthur Schlesinger Jr. insisted on a very vocal condemnation of the military's action

⁷⁷ FRUS describes the situation where US pressure was on Argentine military contacts to *not* overthrow the government (FRUS 12 Doc 178, 368 n.2). This document discusses the orders given to US Embassy officials by State Department officials to specifically not intervene in anyway in Argentina. Note 2 references the instructions from March 23, 1962 stating, "It is our strong desire and policy that Frondizi not be forced to resign by military and nothing should be done that might in any way encourage the military to take such action." An earlier telegram noted in the same document was similarly explicit. The US should "avoid any intervention in Arg internal affairs." Elsewhere, the Acting Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs explicitly weighs the potential coup, and several outcomes. While the Secretary notes that Frondizi's cooperation with Peronists was a negative, there is no suitable replacement who would be able to withstand a communist-Peronist reaction. Therefore, the Secretary concluded, military overthrow of Frondizi would violate the interests of the United States (FRUS, 12: 368-369)

against Frondizi.⁷⁸ Ignoring this advice, Kennedy did not feel that he had enough information on the coup to issue a statement one way or the other (FRUS, 12, Doc 179: 371).⁷⁹ The US waited more than two weeks before quietly restoring relations with Argentina--following the lead of other states like Venezuela--and recognizing the military-backed Guido government. Given the explicit statement warning Argentine military officials not to overthrow the government, the US' wariness of other opposition figures--mainly the nationalist, anti-US and pro-Castro elements in the labor movement--and the time the US spent getting more "information" on what happened, it would be difficult to argue that the US destabilized Frondizi's government, by the definition I have adopted for this dissertation. This argument is commensurate with my hypothetical expectations for policy responses to intense, but limited conflict of interest between the US and Argentina such as I have laid out above.

What was apparent, however, was that the US was using economic aid as a tool to pressure Frondizi to alter his stance on Cuba. This conclusion also seems to fit my own hypothetical expectations. The US maintained levels of aid to the military--as well as the contacts that this aid purchased--and encouraged their connections in the Argentine military to push Frondizi to alter his policy toward Cuba.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ See, for example, FRUS 12 (Doc 175) as well as the attached notes within that Document which reference documents not included in FRUS proper. For example, in one of the referenced telegrams, The State Department "would deplore overthrow by armed forces of constitutional government." The Embassy in Argentina believed that a coup "would indicate a regression in Argentine political affairs and could not but help affect adversely our relations."

⁷⁹ In Document 179, of FRUS vol 12, Arthur Schlesinger lays out the debate around the coup against Frondizi. He weighs options for and against making a statement condemning the coup. His primary argument for is that he is sensitive to the notion that the US would support the overthrow of a democratic government by the military in other Latin American states. His arguments against revolved around the fact that the US really was caught unaware by the coup and didn't have enough information about the character of the government which would replace Frondizi. The debate was apparently resolved weeks later when the US, following democratic Venezuela's lead, also recognized the military-backed Guido government.

⁸⁰ When Frondizi complained about rumored US pressure on the military to get him to change his policy, Kennedy neither confirmed nor denied the accusation (Rabe, 60).

To further pressure Frondizi, the US withheld important aid from Argentina: In January 1962, Kennedy hinted to Frondizi in a letter that aid might be forthcoming if Frondizi cooperated with the US on Cuba (FRUS 12 Doc 133, 288-289; Rabe, 60).⁸¹ Frondizi did not initially respond, but instead retained his independence, and joined five other Latin American nations in abstention on the resolution which would have excluded Cuba from the OAS, greatly angering US Policy makers. Less than two weeks later, the Argentine military forced Frondizi to break relations with Cuba under threat of *coup*. Only when Frondizi broke relations with Cuba, and the US began to express concern about Argentine military intervention did they approve a \$150 million aid package under the Alliance for Progress for Argentina (Rabe, 61).

Two months later, Frondizi was “physically” removed from office by the military. The US, for its part, did not recognize the new military government for several months. This fact suggests that the US did not play a role in the coup, nor was it even consulted. But, US policy makers were not necessarily distraught about Frondizi’s departure, either. After all, for years, Argentina had been the “key obstacle” to US action against Cuba (Sheinin, 119). Lack of US sympathy for Frondizi aside, available documentary evidence supports my argument that the US had not adopted destabilization as a policy against Frondizi. This was, I argue because the conflicts of interest were not broad enough to cause the Kennedy Administration to accept the costs associated with supporting Frondizi's downfall, especially since the outcome was very uncertain and therefore very risky.⁸² As I will demonstrate below, US-Brazil relations did not follow the same path. As the US was attempting to stave off a military coup in Argentina, they

⁸¹ Doc 133 of FRUS vol 12 is a direct letter from Kennedy to Frondizi from January 1962 which discusses, among other things, the importance of adopting the US line on Cuba and suggesting that if Frondizi was more willing to adopt the US line, the US Government--particularly the Congress--would be less hesitant to offer aid to Argentina.

⁸² The lack of an acceptable alternative increased the potential costs of supporting Frondizi's overthrow by the Argentine military for the still risk-averse Kennedy Administration.

were formally implementing a recently-adopted destabilization policy aimed at undermining and then eventually toppling the Goulart Government just to the north.

Conflicts of Interest in Brazil under Goulart: Economic, Security, and Ideology

US interests for Brazil were stated clearly by the State Department toward the end of 1962: "A stable, friendly, democratic Brazil is in the US interests" (FRUS 12: 488-490). According to the State Department, Brazil was among the front-ranking nations in the world, and that failure of US programs and policies in Brazil would hinder US policy elsewhere. At the same time, State recognized trouble in US-Brazilian relations. From the very beginning of Joao Goulart's administration, US policy makers perceived serious ideological and economic conflicts existed: Goulart's past association with Communists and Brazil's financial crisis were at the front of the US' expressed concerns. Additionally, a security conflict emerged in mid-1961 as Brazil attempted to get more aid from the US and threatened to turn to the Soviet bloc if aid was not forthcoming. Goulart made this security conflict worse after coming to power by constantly attempting to reduce US influence in the Brazilian military. All of these conflicts added together produced a growing consensus among US policy makers that led to direct and explicit support for the military coup against Goulart in March of 1964.

The largest outstanding issue in January of 1961, as Kennedy took office was Brazil's severe financial crisis. The crisis was due largely to government overspending on the public sector and the always tenuous economic situation in the northeast part of Brazil, a situation which was recently exacerbated by a deep drought. The US and Brazil strove to work together to ameliorate that situation (FRUS 12, 424-426). The US was primarily concerned by the impoverished state of Brazil's Northeast because they viewed the conditions under which people

lived there as a breeding ground for communists (FRUS 12, 423-424).⁸³ The Northeastern region of Brazil would subsequently become a serious problem for American policy makers: US officials were convinced that the Northeast would become a stronghold for pro-Castro communists in Brazil. To make matters worse, the Brazilian head of the Superintendency of Northeast Development (SUDENE) did not share the United States' concern for the local development of communism, and welcomed efforts by all committed to solving the problems of the Northeast onto his staff, even leftists (Leacock, 15).

As Goulart stepped into power following the abrupt resignation of his predecessor Janio Quadros and a near-civil war aimed at preventing him from assuming the Presidency, the US for its part hoped that Brazil would take the steps necessary to resolve its major economic and financial crises and work to ameliorate the conditions in the Northeast. The US soon learned that Goulart was not Quadros. Goulart's commitment to financial stabilization was suspect from the beginning of his administration. US policy reflected this apprehension. Any new aid should be predicated upon whether Goulart demonstrated his commitment to financial stabilization and the goals of the Alliance for Progress (FRUS 12: 445-446). That the US adopted this policy toward providing its traditional ally support when Goulart came into power demonstrates that US policy makers were not convinced that Goulart would not destroy the Brazilian economy.

The US became convinced that the austerity programs endorsed by Quadros in May 1961, which the US had more or less endorsed as having a great potential of stabilizing the economy had failed completely by December (FRUS 12: 441-444). The State Department noted

⁸³ A US journalist who travelled to Brazil in 1960 reported back that pro-Castro Marxists were making great progress in organizing the peasants of the region. The Marxists were intent on making life difficult for the US by pointing out the failure of the Brazilian establishment to address issues such as disease, illiteracy, and high unemployment (Leacock, 14).

the dramatic increase of inflation in Brazil over the last quarter in 1961 (Parker, 14).⁸⁴ President Kennedy began to make several public statements about his concern for the economic crises faced by Brazil and the threat that economic instability posed for political stability in Brazil.⁸⁵ The fact is: the US never believed that Goulart was not on board with US proposals for the Brazilian economy, and Goulart did little to alter that impression. It was such a situation that, in 1963, the US Ambassador in Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, insisted that Goulart was not negotiating over economic issues in "personal good faith" (Parker, 41).

Several economic issues beyond failure or refusal to deal with the financial crisis irritated relations between the US and Brazil. In February of 1962, the governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizzola, nationalized the assets of International Telephone and Telegraph within his state without compensation. The Government of Brazil, realizing the strain this action placed upon US-Brazil relations, offered to underwrite the cost of the expropriation, apparently to the satisfaction of US Department of State (FRUS 12, 456-457).⁸⁶ The issue of compensation for Brazilian nationalization of ITT assets, however, remained outstanding until the end of Goulart's presidency, as did inability to arrive at a settlement on another US asset known as AMFORP (American and Foreign Power), which the US actually encouraged the Brazilian government to

⁸⁴ Many of the US' concerns, such as refusal to revalue Brazilian currency, raise taxes or trim the bloated public payroll would be very difficult, legislatively, for Goulart to accommodate, even if he wanted to. Given his weak position in power, which was hamstrung by constitutional limitations on his ability to advance an agenda, Goulart felt that he would be unable to alienate what base remained with him by adopting US preferred policies.

⁸⁵ See, for example, FRUS 12 (486-487 n. 2).

⁸⁶ Document 221 of FRUS Vol. 12 discusses the expropriation of ITT subsidiary properties by Brizola in Rio Grande do Sul. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Barall suggested in the document that the Government of Brazil underwrite the settlement for compensation for the expropriation. The document went on to discuss the statements made by State in response to the expropriation and the reasons those statements, which expressed concern and interest, were made, which was to forestall pressure from the US business community. What the document doesn't cover was the eventual passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill for 1962, which required the US to cut off aid to countries which expropriate US assets without adequate compensation. This amendment was passed as a direct response to the ITT expropriation in Brazil (Parker, 17).

purchase as part of an aid package.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, the general deterioration of the Brazilian economy over the next few years led the US Ambassador to Brazil to eventually conclude that Goulart was “incompetent” (quoted in Parker, 11).⁸⁸ By early 1964, the US became extremely concerned about Goulart’s commitment or ability to prevent a financial collapse in Brazil.

Finally, there was the conflict over outright economic nationalism preferred by Goulart. The Brazilian legislature passed, early in Goulart’s administration, a very controversial profits remittance law. Among other things, this law limited the amount of money that foreign-owned corporations could take out of the country. Early US pressure on Goulart postponed its passage into law for a couple years, but eventually, Goulart signed the profits remittance law. In March 1964, Goulart took economic nationalism a step further by signing into law a radical land redistribution act that was favored by leftists in Brazil. The act expropriated underused lands within ten miles of all highways, railways and waterways in Brazil. It also expropriated all privately owned oil refineries and placed them under the control of PETROBRAS, the nationalized Brazilian petroleum industry. While the Ambassador Lincoln Gordon had earlier attempted to pressure Goulart against this law’s passage, they were ultimately unable to stop it. But by this time, destabilization had already been adopted and the law merely made matters worse.

Security was an acute issue in Brazilian-US relations, on par with and in many ways closely related to the economic conflict. Early in Goulart’s administration, the President followed through on the promises made by his predecessor and re-established relations with the

⁸⁷ AMFORP was a power company owned by a US firm. When Brizola expropriated ITT properties within Rio Grande do Sul, he also expropriated AMFORP subsidiary assets. AMFORP proposed a compensation arrangement that including the National Government buying the property which had been expropriated, and Goulart agreed. But terms of purchase were never firmly agreed upon while Goulart was President, and the inability to come to a settlement on these two properties quickly became a source of irritation for the United States. For a short discussion of the AMFORP and ITT expropriations, see Weis (154). Parker (16-19, and 41-45) and Leacock (90-92)

⁸⁸ See also FRUS 12 (507-512).

Soviet Union. This came on the heels of successful diplomatic and trade missions to other parts of the Soviet bloc and to Communist China.⁸⁹ The US, for its part, discouraged such activity as it led to opportunities for the Soviets to penetrate the country and cause havoc among US allies. The US was further irritated when Brazil decided that it would purchase military helicopters from Poland in 1963. Goulart expressed the reasoning for this was the US' reluctance to sell him the helicopters. This issue and similar ones only worsened relations and deepened an ongoing conflict in the security realm.

Brazil's actions in hemispheric affairs were more troubling for the US than their association with the Soviet Union. Like Argentina, Brazil adopted an "independent foreign policy." This led Brazil to regularly vote against the US on Cold War issues in the Western Hemisphere. While Goulart was still Vice-President, in April of 1961, Quadros and Frondizi met and declared their adoption of "permanent consultation" on issues of hemispheric security and Cuba (Weis, 145).

But unlike the Argentine case, the US saw what seemed to be a pro-Cuba position as more of a security threat in Brazil than it ever was in Argentina. Brazil was poised to become a major power in the region, while Argentina was on the decline. Pro-Cuba action in Brazil was seen in conjunction with the volatile situation in the Northeast. Most of the activism in the Northeast was being organized by pro-Castro groups, and US policymakers saw the Northeast as a ripe potential location for a Cuba-like revolution (Leacock, 13). Softness on Cuba--which for US policymakers meant openness to communist and Soviet infiltration--and the visits made by Quadros and Goulart to Cuba, the Soviet Union and China only increased the threat to the US that the Northeast would collapse and would take the rest of the country with it. A communist

⁸⁹ Goulart had been in the People's Republic of China on a trade mission when Quadros resigned in late 1961, prompting his premature return to Brazil and the ensuing constitutional crisis.

Brazil would represent a major gain for the Soviets which would dwarf their gains in Cuba (FRUS 12, 441-444).⁹⁰

Those two conflicts were dwarfed in comparison to the security conflict that rose from Goulart's policy toward the Brazilian military itself. Goulart's dispersal of Brazilian forces that he didn't think were loyal to him was seen as a security threat to US policy makers very early in his administration, because these actions tended to reduce US influence in the branch that they believed was "a pro-US... factor of equilibrium."⁹¹ The conflict was noted in the US as early as November of 1961, in a complaint lodged by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Hayden Williams to the State Department (FRUS 12, 450-452).⁹² The gist of the letter, which was echoed by a National Intelligence Estimate on Brazil two weeks later, was that the anti-Communist elements of the military had suffered a psychological defeat as a result of Goulart becoming President of Brazil (FRUS 12, 455-456).⁹³ The recommendation of the letter, which eventually became US policy, was that every effort should be made to maintain and strengthen contacts between the US and Brazilian armed (FRUS 12, Doc 218: 452). The

⁹⁰ Doc. 212 of FRUS vol 12 discusses the National Intelligence Estimate for Brazil in August of 1961, shortly before Quadros resigned. This document discussed, among other things, the "political and social ferment" of Brazil at the time, and Quadros' efforts to improve the situation. While the document discusses the watchfulness of Communists in Brazil at the time, it also expects that Communists in the Northeast will continue to exploit the economic and social conditions there. Documents in the same volume from earlier in that year discuss US concerns over Quadros' independent foreign policy and the socio-economic crisis in the Northeast. Doc 212 refers to Goulart, for the first time, as a fellow traveler.

⁹¹ Being considered "pro-US" or "pro-democracy" was code for being "anti-communist" and eventually, in Brazil's case, "anti-Goulart." US documents reflect this usage of these terms, especially as destabilization deepened in Brazil.

⁹² Doc 218 of FRUS Vol 12 discusses a complaint by the Assistant Defense Secretary for International Security Hayden to the State Department about Goulart's actions against anti-Communist elements of the military. The document notes the belief that the Brazilian foreign policy under Goulart was already oriented toward the Soviet Bloc and Cuba, and therefore directly opposed to US interests in Brazil.

⁹³ Doc 219 of FRUS Vol 12 is the Intelligence Estimate for Brazil conducted in early December, 1961. This document echoes the earlier document from Defense and warns of excellent conditions for Communist and Soviet influence in Brazil. The document, however, notes that it will be somewhat unlikely that Communists will exert significant influence over Brazilian foreign policy, more than the "independent foreign policy" of Quadros and Goulart already have.

Brazilian military, if not the Government, had demonstrated its willingness to intervene against a mutual enemy (“communism”) and therefore deserved to be trusted.

This conflict continued throughout Goulart's Presidency. US policymakers were constantly frustrated by their inability to influence Goulart through the military, because Goulart frequently used his powers to promote junior officers that he knew to be loyal to him personally over more senior officers. Those officers who Goulart passed over for promotion were officers who were close to the US, or at least not pro-Goulart. Consequently, US efforts at influencing and undermining Goulart through the creation of an alternative source of power and authority in Brazil, were themselves being thwarted by Goulart (Parker 45-46). Given the US' view that the military was the only institution that could be counted on to ensure US interests in Brazil, Goulart's constant meddling with them produced a great amount of anxiety among US policy makers, from the first weeks of Goulart's administration until the very end (FRUS 12, 508-509).⁹⁴

Finally, intense ideological conflict marked US-Brazilian relations throughout the entire period of Goulart's Administration. From the very beginning of Goulart's Presidency--in fact, for years before Goulart became President--the US was extremely concerned about his refusal to crackdown on communists within Brazil. One of the first reports on Goulart deals with his known association with Communists. The National Intelligence Summary on Brazil in December of 1961 noted that, for the short term, the growth of Communism in Brazil was

⁹⁴ Doc 240 of FRUS vol 12 is the last document from the Kennedy Administration on Brazil in FRUS, dated Sep 30, 1963. This document is essentially a national intelligence estimate for Brazil in the coming months. While the document does suggest that it would be against US *policy* to intervene either overtly or covertly in support of any attempt to overthrow Goulart, an important caveat is included in this statement: "Barring clear indications of serious likelihood of political takeover by elements subservient to and in supported by a foreign government." In the event of a foreign inspired takeover, action should be directed against the takeover itself, not against Goulart, but the document does not rule out action directed against Goulart himself. After this time, we see comments from US policy makers arguing that Goulart will establish a pro-Soviet, pro-Communist, personalistic dictatorship, in conformity with this policy statement.

expected to continue unabated, as Goulart and other Brazilian officials showed them “tolerance” (FRUS 12, 453). The head of the Superintendency of the Northeast was a suspected communist, as were the people who were organizing the peasant brigades there. The President’s brother-in-law was a nationalist who many in the US--including the Pentagon--considered a communist, and who certainly had received help from Communists (FRUS 12, 450-452). The subject of "softness" on and tolerance of communism coursed throughout most of diplomacy between the Kennedy and Goulart Administrations.

Ambassador Gordon noted the “new tack to the left” by May of 1962, and discussions between the US and Goulart continued to raise, repeatedly, the issue of communism in Brazil (Parker, 22). In November 1962, US Attorney General and brother of the President Robert Kennedy arrived in Brazil to express, among other things, US distaste for Goulart’s unwillingness to get rid of the Communists in his country and in his Government. Nothing seemed to work. By the second half of 1963, US officials were convinced that Goulart, who asked the legislature for a declaration of a state of emergency, ostensibly to deal with the mounting economic and political unrest in Brazil, was set on overturning democracy in Brazil and establishing a “personalistic” dictatorship. According to US policy makers, Goulart would use this dictatorship to hand the government of Brazil over to his friends, the Communists, who would then refashion Brazil as a Soviet satellite, *a la* Cuba (Weis, 162; FRUS 31, 400-401).⁹⁵

It is interesting, however that at the same time US officials noted their suspicion of Goulart’s commitment to democracy, they were also generally convinced of his demagoguery and “ineptitude” (FRUS 12, 509). The Kennedy Administration, to the end, argued that Goulart was a masterful manipulator of the political situation in Brazil, refusing to do things that would

⁹⁵ Doc 182 of FRUS 31 is a description of the personalities involved in Brazilian Politics. This document was drafted by Thomas Mann in January 1964, from notes he took during a meeting with Ambassador Gordon. Included in the document is the assessment: "Possibility of a Goulart coup followed by an eventual commie takeover."

alienate his supporters on the left and among the ultra-nationalistic groups in Brazil. At the same time, this same unwillingness would also produce no improvement in the political and economic situation in Brazil. By the end of 1963, the US was convinced that earlier descriptions of Goulart as an “opportunist” were correct and by the beginning of 1964, the US was already drawing up contingency plans for the collapse of the Goulart Government.⁹⁶

Goulart's personal "ineptitude" and "opportunism" created problems for the US because it allowed Communists inroads into the Brazilian Government. Goulart was seen as either unwilling or unable to effectively counter their infiltration (FRUS 31, 400). For US policy makers, this would naturally lead to Goulart's handing the government over to the Communists. Ambassador Gordon reported in August 1963 that Brazil was in "substantial imminent danger" of falling to communism because of Goulart's policies, especially after full presidential powers had been restored (Gordon, quoted in Weis, 162). When Gordon met with Goulart in late February of 1964, he noted the concern the US felt over communist infiltration in Petrobras (Brazil's nationalized petroleum industry), several government ministries, and prominent labor unions as well as Goulart's legalization of the PCB (Communist Party of Brazil) (FRUS 31, 403).⁹⁷

⁹⁶ See, for example, the incredibly damaging Draper Report (FRUS 12, 472-479). In late 1962, Kennedy sent a special working group, under the leadership of William Draper to Brazil to assess the political and economic situation there. Draper, whose interviews were confined almost entirely to the US business community in Brazil and pro-US elements in the Brazilian military (the group did also meet with Goulart and members of his government as well,) painted a very unfavorable picture of the conditions in Brazil, both for US capital, as well as other US interests. The report contained a recommendation that the US should intensify intelligence and recruitment operations and maintain contacts with political and military elements "of a potential and more friendly alternative regime," and should be prepared to support those elements in case Goulart was replaced as a result of "the impending financial crisis or some other eventuality." Gordon objected to this policy later, but apparently, if this was not already going on when the Draper Report came back, it began soon afterwards. The Draper Report is heavily excerpted in FRUS. The full document, discussed in Leacock, lays out a proposal to allow the financial crisis to continue unabated for the purpose of causing a coup against Goulart, and his replacement by a pro-US right wing government. Leacock notes that Gordon rejected that option (Leacock, 124-127)

⁹⁷ Doc 183 of FRUS 31 covers the meeting between Gordon and Goulart in February of 1964. Concerns addressed include Goulart's apparent public comments about working with France to help Latin America end its dependency on the United States, comments that Gordon responded to with some "asperity." It also mentions Gordon's

Goulart was convinced that he could easily control the communists in Brazil, but Gordon did not believe him at all: the standard belief among US policy makers was that he was inept. But even if Goulart had the skills to do so, the US would not have accepted Goulart's claims: Such a thing as a democratic government "controlling communists" was not conceivable in the dominant Cold War paradigm. Gordon left the meeting convinced that the Soviets were not going to be assisting Brazil as they had Cuba, but he was now also convinced of Goulart's desire to seize personalistic dictatorial power and then turn the government over to the communists (FRUS 31, 412-418).⁹⁸

During the first few months of 1964, up to Goulart's final ouster, US policy makers expressed a genuine concern that all the above conflicts were now at crisis levels for the US. The Brazilian economy was more or less in a state of collapse.⁹⁹ The Brazilian government was unable or unwilling to resolve long standing issues over expropriated property, even as it threatened to deepen its nationalization program and, from Washington's point of view, exacerbate the financial crisis which threatened to undermine the stability of the country. A major conflict of security interests rose as Goulart continued to counter US influence in the Brazilian military and frustrate one of the main avenues of US influence over Brazilian affairs.

expressed displeasure over Goulart's refusal to do anything about the communist infiltration into his government and Goulart's apparent "prejudice" against the Alliance for Progress. Gordon's conclusion was that Goulart had become more open toward US proposals, but only because moves toward the Soviets had been unproductive and Goulart intended to undermine support for Governor Lacerda, who was favored by the US.

⁹⁸ For an account of the deepening crisis see FRUS 31, Doc 184: 405-407. Doc 187 of FRUS 31 is a telegram from Gordon to Mann at the Department of State, written in March 26, 1964, directly before Goulart was removed from office. In this telegram, Gordon definitively expressed concern that Goulart was out to seize personalistic dictatorial control of Brazil, which would ultimately lead to Brazil falling under control of the Communists. Goulart's populist measures issued earlier in the month were designed, according to Gordon to discredit the Constitution of Brazil and weaken resistance. Gordon notes that Congress and the military oppose what Goulart is doing, but cannot accomplish his removal through impeachment. Gordon also notes the rise of Castello-Branco, and endorses his conspiracy with the following sentences: "[The] Castello Branco movement shows prospects of wide support and competent leadership. If our influence is to be brought to bear to help avert a major disaster here... this is where both I and all my senior advisors believe our support should be placed." Gordon also recommends delivery of arms and ammunition, as well as the dispatch of an aircraft carrier to support the *coup*.

⁹⁹ Parker gives a good account of the collapse of the Brazilian Economy, and the efforts made by Goulart and the US to attempt to resolve the crisis.

The security issue was compounded by Goulart's "independent foreign policy" which was expressed as improving the relationship with the Soviets, purchase of Soviet weaponry, refusal to help the US isolate Cuba in the OAS and toleration of pro-Cuban groups in the volatile Northeast. These two conflicts by themselves would not have produced destabilization in Brazil. In many ways, these problems pre-dated Goulart's arrival in office: though they became more intense under his administration, all of these conflicts began in the Quadros Administration, which the US did not destabilize.¹⁰⁰

But the ideological conflict was added to the calculus of US foreign policy makers when Goulart became President, and as I demonstrate below, destabilization as a policy was adopted shortly following Goulart's rise. The US was preoccupied with Goulart's open association with Communists in Brazil from the very beginning, and his willingness to allow them to take an active role in the government of Brazil and its unions was more than the US would tolerate. In the early 1960's, given history of US McCarthyism, the "losses" of China and Cuba to Communism, and the deepening of the Vietnam conflict, there was no way the US could accept the existence of communism in Brazil. The fact that many--including Ambassador Gordon himself--believed that Goulart was not a communist himself was unimportant to policy makers: Goulart was seen as "soft on Communism" and this was just as bad.¹⁰¹

Added to this was the low personal opinion most policy makers held of Goulart, and the predictions they made based on that opinion. The US was convinced that Goulart was entirely inept on the one hand,¹⁰² and on the other hand manipulating the social levers within Brazil to

¹⁰⁰ Instead, under Quadros, the US worked diligently to improve its relationship with Brazil, and to overlook much that it objected to in Quadros' government, including strengthening ties to Communist countries.

¹⁰¹ Mann's summary of Gordon's opinion of Goulart, from FRUS 12, Doc 182: 400

¹⁰² "...childish, erratic... personable demagogue" were the words Ambassador Gordon used to describe him in 1964 (FRUS 31: 400). Later, Goulart was referred to as an "incompetent juvenile delinquent" by NSC staff member Gordon Chase (FRUS 31: 408)

create a situation which he would use to acquire extraordinary powers from a compliant legislature, and then turn the country into a communist riddled dictatorship. Brazil then could be easily handed over to the Soviets, costing the US a major strategic ally in the region, as well as dealing another blow to hemispheric security. The broad and intense conflicts of interest in the Brazilian case suggest that a different foreign policy option would be adopted with regard to Goulart than had been adopted to the relatively more limited and less intense conflict of interest between Kennedy and Frondizi. As I demonstrate, that does appear to be the case.

Like Frondizi in Argentina, Goulart's predecessor Janio Quadros got along well with Kennedy.¹⁰³ Even though Brazil opted to maintain an independent foreign policy along lines similar to those followed by Argentina, Brazil had maintained a long and close relationship with the US on security matters, which dated back to World War II. Brazil also maintained a generally favorable attitude toward US investment, and there were no serious outstanding economic issues, save the rapidly disintegrating economy and the crisis in the Northeast. Finally, Brazil had a fifteen year old constitution, and appeared to be well onto the track to becoming a friendly economic and political power in the region.

The first real signs of tension in US-Brazilian relations came in mid-1961. Because he insisted on "independence" in Brazil's foreign policy, Quadros regularly praised Cuba and Castro, promised to reopen diplomatic relations with the Soviets and other communist nations, and proclaimed that Brazil would not automatically follow the US on all Cold War matters, but preferred to pursue Brazilian interests. When US Ambassador Berle offered Quadros what

¹⁰³ The relationship was so close that when Quadros was running for President in 1960, he praised Castro, proposed increasing diplomatic ties with both China and the Soviet Union, and criticized some corporations for exploiting Brazil, but US officials viewed that nationalist rhetoric as mere political expediency (Leacock, 5).

amounted to as a 100 million dollar "bribe"¹⁰⁴ to support US action against Cuba, Quadros shocked the Ambassador by turning it down, several times. Quadros ostensibly claimed that the \$100 million being offered with the implicit understanding of Brazilian support on Cuba, but even this sum was not nearly enough to fix the problems Brazil was facing (Leacock, 22-23). Meanwhile, Brazil also welcomed Marshal Tito from Yugoslavia, and was in the process of building economic relations with China. The US, nonetheless, continued to believe that Quadros maintained independence in foreign affairs and flirted with neutralism to strengthen his domestic position *vis-à-vis* the Brazilian left and were inclined to continue to offer him support (FRUS 12, 461-463).

Eventually, relations between the Kennedy Administration and the Quadros government began to falter. The sticking point, as in Argentina, was the US-Cuba crisis and Brazil's refusal to assist the US in its efforts to isolate and remove Castro. The US was not able to get Quadros to abandon his support of Cuba, even with the promise of a massive aid program. Meanwhile, Quadros welcomed missions from the Soviet Union and re-established relations with them, and sent his Vice President, Joao Goulart to China to negotiate trade deals. But then Quadros resigned unexpectedly in August 1961. An immediate constitutional crisis occurred, where the high military leadership, who opposed Goulart, refused to allow him to be sworn in and threatened civil war.¹⁰⁵ Only when a unit that was loyal to Goulart refused to join the coup did the rest of the military relent, and allow Goulart to be sworn in as President, albeit with very

¹⁰⁴ A "bribe" was what outgoing Ambassador to Brazil John Moors Cabot called the \$100 million loan offered to Quadros to get him to join the US in the upcoming Bay of Pigs invasion. Quadros saw it in the same terms (Cabot, quoted in Rabe, 65).

¹⁰⁵ The military had previously removed Goulart from his office as Labor minister under President Vargas, due to a controversial policy concerning minimum wages, and his accused collaboration with Communists and radical militants (Parker, 5).

limited Presidential authority. The Congress also established a parliamentary form of government for Brazil as part of the compromise (Parker, 5-6).

The reaction from the US was one of confusion at first, but then concern (Weis 1993, 148). At first, the US was willing to give Goulart “the benefit of the doubt” and continue as if the traditionally close and cordial relations between the US and Brazil still existed (Parker, 7). At the same time, US diplomats in Brazil were proposing that the US be “slow” in offering Brazil new aid due to Goulart’s known past association with communists and his anti-US positions. Meanwhile the US would keep all the agreements it made with Goulart’s predecessors, because delaying aid might strengthen Brazilian nationalist criticism of the US (FRUS 12: 445-446). Relations between the US and Brazil deteriorated from that early point, especially given Goulart’s willingness to maintain independence in Brazilian foreign policy and his refusal to jettison communists and nationalists from positions of authority.

US Responses to Goulart: Destabilization

US response to the conflicts of interest in the Brazilian case were, as my hypothetical expectations predicts, quite different than they were in Argentina. The Brazilian case demonstrated very serious economic and ideological conflicts between the US and Brazil, similar to the Argentine case. But additionally, there was the added component of the security conflict, where Goulart’s softness on communism and--from the US perspective--mismanagement of Brazilian economic and political policy opened up the possibility of a significant portion of the country falling to pro-Castro Communists, and dragging the rest of the largest and potentially most prosperous country in Latin America down with it into the Soviet bloc. When the issue of the Northeast disappears from US records, the efforts Goulart made to undermine US influence

among the Brazilian military took the forefront,¹⁰⁶ and finally, the possibility of communists seizing control of a hypothetical but perceptually very possible Goulart dictatorship dominates US policy making during the last half a year or so of Goulart's administration.¹⁰⁷

As the model predicts, the US adopted destabilization as a policy in Brazil. And destabilization as a policy was adopted very early. My empirical research suggests that the conflict of interest was deep and intense enough for the US to begin considering it as early as November of 1961, where all three conflicts are present. When Goulart became President as a result of Quadros' resignation in September of 1961, "concern [about the susceptibility of Goulart to communism] turned to panic." According to the Charge d'Affairs in Brazil at the time, the military and members in the American business community attempted to get the US to intervene to prevent Goulart's accession, but the US opted to take no position (Knippers Black 1977, 40). The official "wait and see policy" of the US Government on Goulart--which was similar to the policy adopted by the US government six months later in Argentina--held that the constitutional crisis was a Brazilian matter. But that position did not last long: it was soon replaced by deep concern about Goulart and a plan to undermine his ability to govern Brazil.

US pressure on Goulart began as soon as he took office. At the very beginning of Goulart's Administration, US diplomacy focused on resolution of the economic crisis in Brazil, alteration of the "independent" foreign policy, and dealing with the social and political crisis in

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, FRUS vol 12, Doc 240, dated September 30, 1963. This paper talks about short-term outlook for Brazil and discusses, among other things, Goulart's manipulation of the military.

¹⁰⁷ See, for example, FRUS, Vol 31, Doc 181, which is the first document in FRUS from the Johnson Administration, and details Thomas Mann's assessment of the situation in Brazil. In this Document, hr discusses the potential for a coup in Brazil, more or less dismissing the possibility, but also noting what was by this time a fairly common belief, that Goulart might be somewhat disposed toward "dictatorship in violation of the constitution." Mann adds that he thinks that Goulart will moderate, but nonetheless, just in case, "... the military should be viewed as a potential politically strong restraining force against Goulartist undemocratic excesses." The idea that Goulart could potentially overthrow the democratic constitution of Brazil permeated US thinking on Brazil from at least this point forward, though Parker and others suggest that that sort of thinking predates this document by perhaps half a year (Parker, 43).

Brazil's Northeast. But US officials were also still trying to understand the person who had just become Brazil's President. The policy adopted by the US toward Goulart's government in October of 1961 was to continue providing aid such as had already been committed to by that time, but refrain from making any new commitments. The stated goal of this policy was to *pressure* Goulart to take the steps preferred by the US to turn the Brazilian economy around. The US had adopted a similar policy in Argentina at about the same time. The US continued to apply this pressure as it sought to take some constructive steps at debt restructuring. In December, the US released 40 million dollars of its May 1961 aid commitment, but held back more than 125 million dollars until it was satisfied that Brazil was making sound efforts at stabilization (Parker, 14-15). The efforts to play "carrot and stick" on the economy would continue throughout 1962 and into the early part of 1963, by which time the US had lost all hope that Goulart would do anything about the economy.¹⁰⁸

By late 1961, the US Embassy was already being approached by coup plotters, who the US decided, at the time, not to help because they did not appear to be organized well enough. The receptivity of US policy makers like Lincoln Gordon to entertaining coup plotters demonstrates that US policy was already bending toward destabilization even at that early time (Parker 10-11). By December, the US was convinced that the Government of Brazil tolerated communists in the Government of Brazil, and made the outlook for the growth of communism in Brazil "favorable" in the short term (FRUS 12: 453-454). This conclusion confirmed for US policy makers what they had long suspected about Goulart, and added the second major conflict of interest.

¹⁰⁸ But the policy was soon supplanted by destabilization: the continuation of this policy merely demonstrated that the economic conflicts were probably the easiest of the three to resolve.

A month before the visit by the coup plotters, the US noted that Goulart had already shaken up the military, and dispersed and demoralized anti-communist elements of the Armed Forces. In the same telegram, stating US short term policy toward Brazil to the Embassy, they also noted the potential for increased orientation toward the Soviets and Cuba (FRUS 12: 450-452). Combined with the collapse of stabilization efforts begun by Quadros and the deepening economic crisis--which itself represented a pathway to opportunity for Communists, according to the prevailing thought of the time--all elements of a very broad conflict of interest were in place by the end of 1961. The conflict intensified for a couple months. In February of 1962, ITT property in Rio Grande do Sul was nationalized by Governor Brizzola and Brazil assisted Argentina and a number of other countries in Latin America in scuttling US efforts at the OAS to isolate Cuba.

By this time, it is likely that the US had definitely adopted a policy designed to destabilize Goulart's government. Kennedy himself appears to have made the earliest decisions to begin the destabilization campaign. USAID director Hamilton Fowler was pressed by Kennedy in February of 1962 to use AID funds to do some project that would produce a favorable impact on the elections that were to be held in October of 1962 (FRUS 12, 455-456).¹⁰⁹ Within four months, a \$1 million project to build schools in Pernambuco had been launched. The goal was to help the pro-US candidate for Governor of that state against his pro-Goulart opponent (Leacock, 122). This early evidence of weakening a target government by supporting its opponents demonstrates my hypothesis, and offers an example of destabilization almost precisely when my model suggests it should be found.

¹⁰⁹ See Note 1. This letter is an affirmative response by the director of USAID to a direct request made by Kennedy from late January 1962. Note 1 describes the original request

US destabilization in Brazil was a three-pronged approach. The earliest destabilization programs involved support for local projects by the US government. As argued above, this type of destabilization began very soon after Goulart took power. Destabilization of this sort took place when the US aided state and local governments who they judged to be more competent than the central Government. But there was a political component to this aid as well: The governors that the US assisted were widely viewed to be anti-Communist, and eventually also anti-Goulart. This type activity demonstrates destabilization, because, by my definition of destabilization the action altered the balance of power between the target government and one or more domestic opposition groups, to the detriment of the target government.

It must be noted that opposition to Goulart would have existed whether or not the US chose to aid it. Domestic opposition to Goulart existed long before he took office, while Brazil and the US were still very close.¹¹⁰ But the choices made by US aid officials, as representatives of Kennedy's policy in Brazil, served to strengthen and stoke these opposition groups. Without US aid, it is difficult to tell whether they would have been as effective as they eventually were in weakening Goulart's ability to effectively govern the country, but with US aid, they were both strengthened and emboldened to take firmer stances against Goulart's policies. Aiding pro-US, anti-Goulart governors and mayors in Brazil helped consolidate a competing source of authority within Brazil whom the US could later turn to, both to provide legislative and executive pressure on the Goulart Government, but also to weaken the effectiveness of Goulart in dealing with mounting crises in the country, thereby undermining his legitimacy throughout areas that were

¹¹⁰ For example, Goulart, as Labor Minister under his political patron and mentor Vargas in the 1950s, was forced to resign by the military over concerns about his political orientation. His election as Vice President angered a number of very important and influential sectors of Brazilian society, and opposition to his accession to the Presidency, as described above, provoked a near civil war in Brazil.

controlled by anti-Goulart officials. This type of activity made it very difficult for Goulart to actually govern Brazil.

By the late 1962, the offering of aid to friendly local governments which had gone on throughout the year crystallized into a policy. When Attorney General Robert Kennedy was tapped to travel to Brazil in December 1962 to stage a “confrontation” with Goulart over political and economic conflicts, Goulart’s reception and his willingness to change the orientation of his government would determine whether or not the US would thereafter “avoid ostentatious favoritism toward those elements in Brazil friendly to us but hostile to President Goulart” (FRUS 12, 481).¹¹¹ Showing “ostentatious” favoritism to the opposition was held out as an explicit threat if Goulart did not comply with US interests in the country. Once there, Kennedy proceeded to follow directions to confront Goulart about communism in Brazil, as well as attempt to influence the composition of Goulart’s cabinet (FRUS 12, 483; Parker, 34).¹¹² Goulart’s response to the points about communism was that it wasn’t as great a problem as the US imagined, his subsequent cabinet choices--especially his choice for Labor Minister--concerned Ambassador Gordon and the policy, which had been in practice for a year went, continued (Parker, 31-34).

Between Robert Kennedy's trip to Brazil and the Summer of 1963, the policy of deliberately bypassing the central government and helping those elements in Brazil which were

¹¹¹ Document 230 of FRUS, Vol 12 discusses the plans that the NSC put together in December of 1962, directly before sending Attorney General Robert Kennedy to Brazil to stage a confrontation with Goulart over its failure to address the outstanding conflicts between the US and Brazil in a way that the US preferred. The document suggests three possible policy options: that the US do nothing, that the US attempt to change the political and economic orientation of the Goulart Government, and a third option, which was not declassified, for some reason, leaving historians to wonder just what the third option actually was. At any rate, the US decided that changing the orientation of the Goulart Government was the only option likely to produce results preferred by the US at the end of 1962.

¹¹² Courses of action for the US in pursuit of the goal mentioned in the above foot note include "Seeking to influence key Goulart advisers receptive to our views." and "Continuing to encourage Brazilian moderate democratic elements in Congress, the Armed Forces and elsewhere who advocate domestic and foreign policies which we can support." The document adds, " Also we need to present our views on the political front immediately so that we can bring our influence to bear on important near-future political decisions (e.g., appointments to the new cabinet)."

hostile to the Goulart government became known as “Islands of Administrative Sanity”, the name of which was coined by Ambassador Gordon himself (Leacock, 135; Parker, 47). The policy involved unofficial withdrawal of US support for the central Government under Goulart, which legislators in the US began thinking of as a “bottomless pit” for aid. Simultaneously, the US would increase direct support for state and local governors who, ostensibly, appeared to have “well thought out” programs and who were performing according to Alliance for Progress standards (Parker, 46-47).¹¹³ The tactics associated with this policy ultimately hurt the Government of Brazil by undermining the legitimacy of the Central Government *vis-à-vis* those opponents who adopted a pro-US position.

Another tactic adopted by the US in 1962 involved the support of political candidates who were favorable to US preferences and opposed Goulart by providing Brazilian candidates several millions of dollars through US banks (Knippers-Black, 74; Parker 27). In early 1962, the local CIA front organization, known as the Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action (IBAD) began working with a rightist Brazilian businessmen’s organization, the Institute of Research and Social Studies (IPES) to begin influencing Brazilian elections. Money started flowing into the campaigns of pro-US candidates.¹¹⁴ Advice on campaigning was also distributed to anti-Goulart candidates in 1962. One incident involved the Governor’s race in Pernambuco, where the US

¹¹³ When the influential and leftist governor, Miguel Arraes who had won against a US supported opponent, complained about US preferences for his opponent and subsequent supply of aid that helped his opponent politically, Ambassador Gordon noted that all funds for projects had been released by the Central Government (Gordon, cited in Parker, 47). Other tactics of hurting pro-Goulart governors included slowing funding for projects which had been approved or bogging projects down in “studies” (Parker, 47-48).

¹¹⁴ Ambassador Gordon later estimated the amount of not exceeding \$5 million, most of which went to buy radio airtime, advertisements in magazines and billboard space (Leacock, 120). Most of the money came from the CIA itself, washed through the Bank of Boston, First National City Bank of New York and the Royal Bank of Canada. Additional money was raised among US and Brazilian business interests (Leacock, 120-121). Part of this information covered by Leacock was provided by former CIA agent Phillip Agee, who was stationed in Latin America in the early 1960's. Agee's journal, which contains incredibly detailed, and highly sensitive material was published and received almost universal condemnation by the CIA. Agee notes that these banks were fronts for funding of CIA covert operations in Latin America. Leacock's sources also include interviews from Gordon taken years later.

consul directly advised and supplied the pro-US candidate with anti-communist films, pamphlets and books from USIA and assisted with public relations (Leacock, 121).¹¹⁵

In the end, the results of US efforts on this tactic were less than spectacular. US influence was judged to be irrelevant in many elections: local issues and personalities were more important to voters than a candidate's stance on Cuba or communism in Brazil. Some candidates preferred by the US were elected, others were badly defeated. Two leading anti-US candidates had actually been elected to Congress: one was Leonel Brizzola, who had nationalized ITT in Rio Grande do Sul earlier that year. At the end, there was no crystallization of the anti-communist position in the Congress and in State governments the way the US had hoped there would be (Leacock, 124). Despite its failure, the goal of this tactic was to help ensure the election of anti-communist, pro-US candidates, and harm the prospects of those seen as pro-Goulart (and therefore anti-US) candidates.¹¹⁶

The final tactic involved maintaining contacts with friendly elements of the military and assisting them. One aspect of the policy present in Brazil, but absent in Argentina, which suggests the adoption of destabilization was the planning for a successor. As US-Brazilian relations deteriorated to crisis level, the US regularly developed strategy for an ultimate collapse of Goulart's government. Development of strategy is not, in and of itself, evidence of destabilization, but it does show the mind of US policy makers, who viewed a number of contingencies as both entirely realistic, and often quite possible.¹¹⁷ In its contingency planning, the US was prepared for the possibility of an extremist-leftist overthrow of the constitutional

¹¹⁵ Leacock assumes that other US consuls in other states performed similar services for other candidates.

¹¹⁶ FRUS is relatively silent on US involvement in the 1962 elections, with the exception of AID's response to Kennedy on aid programs that would influence the fall elections. Leacock, stated that CIA and Embassy officials noted with "chagrin" that two anti-US candidates had won their elections against US backed candidates, while some US favorites supported by pro-US governor Carlos Lacerda had lost badly (Leacock 124). US goals for the elections are laid out more explicitly in Parker (26-27).

¹¹⁷ For example, in Document 187, of FRUS Vol 31, Ambassador Gordon put the chances of a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Late March 1964 at "a good deal less than 50-50.)

process, led, apparently by Goulart himself. To counter this, US policy makers proposed that the US maintain and increase good relations with at least the military as well as right wing groups, to act as a moderating force on Goulart (FRUS 31, Doc 181: 398-399).

In this case, what the policy makers in the US meant was that the military was reliably anti-Communist and pro-US (FRUS 12, Doc 218: 452). The military was the one segment that could be counted upon to support US strategic interests, both in the hemisphere as well as within a larger Cold War context. It was, in the words of the communiqué from the Department of Defense to the Department of State, “a factor of equilibrium [in that it could counter the leftward drift of Goulart] (FRUS 12, Doc 219: 453). And it was here that the US ultimately put its trust in resolution of the crisis.¹¹⁸

This tactic proved to be crucial for US destabilization policy: It was, eventually, the military who overthrew Goulart. The US had long maintained its connections with the Brazilian military, since well before World War II (Knippers-Black, 162-178). Despite Goulart's efforts, the US continued to see the Brazilian military as a "stabilizing" force in Brazilian politics and maintain contact with key elements of the Brazilian military, most often through the Defense attaché, Colonel Vernon Walters. Walters, who would remain a central figure in US-Latin American policy for the next three decades, had a long history of association with the Brazilian military, and was assigned to Brazil to both strengthen ties between the US and the Brazilian military and keep the Embassy fully apprised of everything that was happening in the Brazilian Military. The most important information he passed on included all the coup plotting that occurred throughout Goulart's administration. As a result of his efforts, as well as the policies of

¹¹⁸ This decision to support military resistance against Goulart was explicitly stated in Document 187, cited above, though FRUS provides ample evidence of the trust the US has long placed in the Brazilian military as a "moderating" force in Brazilian society, much of it cited above.

the US Government, the Brazilian military was identified as “friendly” to the US even as Goulart’s government entered its final months in 1964 (FRUS 31, Doc 185: 408-410).¹¹⁹

Maintenance of the relationship with friendly elements in the military falls under destabilization because it cultivated the relationship between the destabilizer and a group opposed to the target government. Making contacts, building connections, and increasing influence among the military of Brazil helped the US acquire more information about one of the most important institutions in Brazilian society, but it also helped the US influence the course of events in Brazil through this sympathetic institution. The military, already suspicious of Goulart, at the very least became convinced of the correctness and international support for its eventual intervention in the Government of Brazil.

Without US aid, again, the military may have acted anyway. They had a long history of intervention in the Government of Brazil. But US support served to encourage their organization around a single plan and leader, boost their resolve, and then justify their efforts with promises of quick recognition and material aid should they need it. It also gave the US an opportunity to influence the outcome of the coup.

During the succession crisis after Quadros’ resignation, publicly the US kept a low profile while still maintaining contact with friendly elements of the military. During most of 1962, the US continued to assist the Brazilian Armed Forces by increasing its aid under the Military Assistance Program over the previous four years by 17 million dollars even as it was cutting aid for other projects (Knippers-Black, 165). With the arrival of Walters at the beginning of 1963, the US Embassy was always more well-informed about various plots rising from the

¹¹⁹ Doc 185 of FRUS Vol 31 discusses the economic and political situations in Brazil in January of 1964. Interestingly, Goulart is referred to as "childish" and a Communist takeover is judged to be "conceivable" in this document. The document also evaluates sources of opposition to Goulart, including the governors of the States and the relationship with the Military. It further talks about efforts of the US government to counter what they see as misleading messages about the US in Brazil, being spread by the Brazilian Government.

Officer corps of the Brazilian military than Goulart was. Walters', for his part, stated that when he was approached about taking the post in Brazil in 1962, he was told that Kennedy would not be averse to seeing Goulart overthrown, so long as the government which replaced him was stable, anti-communist and aligned with the West (Walters Interview, quoted in Parker 63).

Throughout 1963, it was the policy to continue to support and encourage "moderate" elements in the Armed Forces to act as a counterbalance to Goulart's perceived drift to the left. Put simply, the goal was to "strengthen the determination and capability of the Brazilian armed forces to detect and cope with Communist infiltration and subversion, and other civil disorders" (FRUS 12, Docs 230 and 234, 483, 490). When the US referred to communist infiltration, they were referring to the policies of and officials within Goulart's government, which they were convinced was riddled with communists.

By 1963, destabilization in Brazil was in full swing, but there was a possibility of a breakthrough on the economic conflict between the US and Brazil which could have potentially altered the course of US policy in the country. In early 1963 Goulart's new Finance Minister, the relatively moderate San Tiago Dantas concluded an agreement with AID administrator David Bell.¹²⁰ Dantas had developed a "Three Year Plan" for economic stabilization which included revaluation of Brazil's currency, plans for agrarian and fiscal reform to control inflation, and public works funded by increased taxes on the wealthy and decreased government subsidies for industries. The US basically supported these proposed measures (Gordon, quoted in Parker, 34).

What became known as the Bell-Dantas agreement, based on Dantas' proposals for the Brazilian economy was a severe austerity package that was more or less unpalatable to Goulart's

¹²⁰ The US was disposed toward working with Dantas, but given their mistrust of Goulart, US policymakers were not holding out much hope of success for his programs.

base and what supporters he had in the legislature (FRUS 12, 490-493).¹²¹ The US recognized this, and internally were concerned that the resulting collapse of the Brazilian economy would lead to Goulart's formal adoption of a far-left nationalistic line which was hostile to the US and US interests. The US then felt that the result would be almost inevitably a military coup, which, if Goulart was able to repel it successfully, would lead to his purging the armed forces, and the establishment of an authoritarian personalist dictatorship, in the mode of Fidel Castro. This matter was the greatest concern for American policy makers.¹²²

As 1963 ran its course and, in the estimation of US policy makers, the Brazilian political and economic situation deteriorated, the US continued its support for the Brazilian military unabated, and encouraged them to act as a brake on Goulart's now perceived dash to the left. In late 1962, the special Counterintelligence Assessment Team, headed by William H. Draper Jr. proposed that the US should make every attempt to increase the training of Brazilian Officers and to "unobtrusively maintain contact with, any military and political elements of a potential and more friendly alternative regime..." The US, the team further argued, should be prepared to promptly and effectively support any such alternative government should Goulart be deposed (FRUS 12, Doc 228: 475).

In 1963, Ambassador Gordon signaled support for the development of these alternatives, but more importantly, he warned against *premature* coups. Given that he had witnessed the failed attempt to prevent Goulart from becoming President, the still disorganized situation of a

¹²¹ Document 234 of FRUS Vol. 12 discusses US assessment of the "character" of the Goulart Regime, from late February 27, 1963. This document is a Special National Intelligence Estimate, Composed in anticipation of the arrival of the Brazilian Foreign Minister to discuss a possible last-ditch effort to obtain US assistance for the collapsing Brazilian economy, describes Goulart as "essentially an opportunist" who associates with leftists and communists, not interested in radical reorientation of Brazilian foreign policy, but primarily interested in personal power and prestige, unwilling to make politically damaging decisions.

¹²² Concerns about establishing an anti-democratic "dictatorship" composed of Goulart and his ultra-nationalistic, leftist, and communist supporters began appearing in FRUS in September 1963, and were no doubt inspired by earlier reports from the US Embassy in Brazil, the Pentagon, and the Department of State (FRUS 12, Doc 240: 507-512; Parker 43-45).

potential core of coup plotters and the military's traditional disposition toward the Constitution, a premature action would serve to provoke a strong backlash against the military and a demoralization of anti-Goulart forces (FRUS 12, 494-498).¹²³ Throughout the rest of 1963, the US maintained its contacts in the military and kept abreast of all developments, preparing, as the Ambassador advocated, for Goulart's replacement by a more desirable set of individuals more favorable to US policy makers.

Close association with the Brazilian military led to a coordination of action between the US and conspirators in Brazil's military who eventually brought about the downfall of the Goulart Government. Following the death of Kennedy in November 1963, Johnson's Assistant Secretary for Inter-American affairs, Thomas Mann, announced that the US would no longer automatically oppose rulers who came to power through other than constitutional means.¹²⁴ This was merely the green light that Brazil's coup plotters needed: The US would support them--or at least not oppose them--when they decided to move against Goulart. The fact is: The evidence presented demonstrates that the US had been planning for the downfall of Goulart and advising the anti-Goulart elements within the Brazilian military on its options for more than a year before the coup actually happened. Mann's statement merely provided enunciation for what had become US policy in not just Brazil, but the entire world.

¹²³ In this Document undated, but covered by a memo dated March 6, 1963, Gordon argues that in addition to the traditional relationship between sovereign countries the US and Brazil, the US should strengthen "anti-communist" and "pro-democratic" elements outside of the government. Among those elements are traditionally conservative elements in Brazilian society like the Church, the Military, and the business community. The purpose was, according to Gordon: "... reducing the likelihood of a further leftist-nationalist swing by Goulart and, if this proves impossible, to prepare the most promising possible environment for his replacement by a more desirable regime in the event that conditions deteriorate to the point where coups and counter-coups are attempted."

¹²⁴ This policy, which came to be known as the "Mann Doctrine" was first reported about in the US press on March 19, 1964, on Page 1 of the New York Times. The article was subsequently criticized by US policy makers, including Ambassador Gordon, who believed it unfairly represented US policy under Kennedy (which, according to Gordon, was not automatically pro-democratic) and didn't really represent as big a shift in US policy as the article suggested (Parker, 62-63).

This statement, reported publicly in the New York Times, was very important for those plotting the overthrow of Goulart in Brazil. Directly before Mann's statement, US reports coming out of Brazil indicated that coup plotters in the military would like to act but were still disorganized and leaderless (FRUS 21, 405-407). Coming on the heels of Goulart's controversial expropriations earlier in the month, the statement (and at least tacit support it implied) was the shot in the arm that the Brazilian military needed to finally move. By March 23rd, the coup was suddenly well-organized under the leadership of General Castello Branco and the US was looking for ways to support it.

The US had full knowledge of all plans: it had in fact been consulted beforehand and kept well-informed. Between receiving word of Castello Branco's assumption of leadership and the coup itself, the US developed contingency plans and offered logistical and diplomatic support (FRUS 31, 418-420). US Embassy staff apparently also offered advice on how to accomplish the coup so as to get quick recognition from the US Government (FRUS 31, 412-418, 429-430).¹²⁵ Gordon noted on March 28th, that "[The US Embassy is] meanwhile undertaking complementary measures with our available resources to help strengthen resistance forces," including support for anti-Goulart--"pro-democratic," in Gordon's words--street protests and direct, but discreet encouragement for "democratic" forces in the Congress, business community, and military.

¹²⁵ Doc 187 has been discussed above, and includes recommendations by Ambassador Gordon and the US Embassy in Brazil that the US be prepared to assist the impending coup with weapons, petroleum and an aircraft carrier. Importantly, Gordon bases his recommendation in the concerns expressed to him by Castello-Branco's group of coup-plotters, especially the need for arms and ammunition, and offers the Aircraft carrier as a symbol of US interest in the outcome of the eventual coup. Doc 188 is the Response by the State Department expressing hesitation about the seriousness of the coup, but nonetheless offering to make public statements against Goulart and informing the US Embassy to tell the coup plotters what they have to do to get quick US recognition. For a more detailed list of what the US eventually provided the coup plotters, see Doc 194 dated March 30 and Document 198, Dated March 31st, both telegrams from the Department of State to the US Embassy in Brazil.

None of these discussions were shared with the legitimate constitutional government of Brazil. In fact, the US had covertly endorsed extra-constitutional means by pro-US elements to prevent suspected extra-constitutional activity by Goulart, who the US opposed. After this day, documents about the crisis show open collaboration between US Embassy personnel and coup plotters in the Brazilian military, though Gordon himself claimed that he had no direct contact with the coup plotters (FRUS 31, 424). The documentary evidence forcefully demonstrates that the US was intimately acquainted with the events of the coup and were very sensitive to the possibility that too overt a role for the US could damage the prospects for the anti-Goulart forces within Brazil (FRUS 31, 439). The coup was over by April 1, 1964, and the Acting Secretary of State George Ball recognized the new government at three o'clock the next morning (FRUS 31, 448).¹²⁶

Concluding Comments: Argentina and Brazil

In both cases, the evidence suggests very strongly that my hypothetical arguments should be accepted. There were only two types of conflict in US-Argentine relations during this period: Ideological and economic. Consequently, I note that, contra Rabe, the US did not destabilize Frondizi's government. Conversely, in Brazil, I discovered very intense conflict of interest from an early period of Goulart's Administration, and despite efforts to resolve at least one of them, the US ultimately accepted the risk associated with destabilization and helped Goulart's opposition overthrow him.

Theoretically I expect that the US response to Frondizi's policies would have been different had a genuine security conflict been present. A security threat, in the form of closer

¹²⁶ This Document is an editorial addition to the FRUS, which contains a statement by George Ball from an outside source. Anecdotally, Ball reports that when President Johnson found out that the military government had been recognized overnight, he was reportedly "furious". Ball explained that he hadn't informed Johnson because it was 3 am. Johnson warned him to never do that again, but then added "I'm not saying what you did wasn't right, but after this I want to know."

military ties between the US' geopolitical rivals and Argentina in 1961 would have represented a significant threat to the US, because it would remind US policy makers of Cuba. Frondizi was overthrown only a few months before the Cuban Missile Crisis, and it is a safe assumption that the US took any Soviet incursion in the hemisphere seriously. But what is clear was that that security threat to the US did not exist in Argentina, except tangentially (given Argentina's independent foreign policy) and consequently, the lack of destabilization policy toward Argentina confirms my theoretical expectations.

The Brazilian case represents marked difference from the Argentine case, both in terms of the mechanisms of each case as well as the responses. The three types of intense conflict of interest were present in Brazil almost from the beginning. Two, at least predated Goulart's rise to the Presidency. The US knew about the financial crisis and the increasing unwillingness of the Government of Brazil to adopt US solutions to the problem. US policy makers knew of Goulart's ideological orientations for years before he came into office. As soon as Goulart began manipulating the military structure in response to the near-civil war, the conflict became acute and the US responded as I predicted. It is possible that had the US and Brazil been successful in implementing the Bell Dantas agreement, tensions would have been reduced and the US would have altered policy: My theory predicts that as well. But that didn't happen, and the crisis simply grew deeper.

Theoretically speaking, the Argentine situation did not represent a large enough violation of the preferred status quo held by US policy makers to cause them to switch from risk-aversion to risk-acceptance. The "wait and see" attitude which was expressed in statements like "[Let] the Argentines work out their own salvation" (FRUS 12, 368 n.5). Except for Argentine independence on Cuba and the growing Peronist threat in the economic realm, Argentine-US

relations were improving steadily since Frondizi took power. Relations between the US and Argentina were generally good, again, excepting those conflicts I identified above. The US preferred good relations with Argentina, needing Argentina's vote on various anti-Cuban resolutions in the OAS (FRUS 10, 657-659), and the US noted that Argentina was generally in accord with US economic interests for the region. Consequently, the scope of the conflict of interest between the US and Argentina was limited to such a degree that the US opted to pressure Frondizi to change his policies (using its contacts in the military) over getting rid of him completely. It even noted, in Frondizi's final days, a sensitivity to the appearance of supporting a military coup in a democratic and friendly nation, arguing that a military coup in Argentina will set a bad example for the rest of Latin America (FRUS 12, 366-368).

The Brazilian case is also a demonstration of prospect theory. Very soon after Goulart became President, his policies represented a significant shift away from US priorities. As the perceived distance between Goulart's policies and US preferences grew, the US began being willing to adopt greater risks to attempt a return to the status quo. When Goulart's policies failed to meet those preferences, a crisis developed, and the US began doing things that ran counter to the Kennedy Administration's stated position.¹²⁷ Mann's 1964 announcement merely provided the tacit go-ahead for the Brazilian coup, which itself had long been in the making among opposition groups fully within Brazil. The US had known about the coup planning the entire time, but had not shared its information with the Goulart Government, despite repeated expressions of the long and amiable relationship between the US and Brazil. And the US advised the conspiracy on how to be recognized by the US almost immediately following the coup.

¹²⁷ As Lincoln Gordon put it, Kennedy was not necessarily as supportive of democracy as he let on in public, or was suggested by Mann's statement in March of 1964 (Parker, 62).

As prospect theory suggests, in examples of a great deviation from the status quo, the status quo state will accept greater risk to get relations back to that preferred state. The case of Brazil demonstrates that theory well, as policy choices adopted by the Kennedy Administration got riskier and more costly as the crisis deepened. For example, selecting governors to receive US aid was a low cost option: Lincoln Gordon was even able to make the case that the US acted in accord with Brazilian law in clearing all contributions through the Brazilian Government. Supporting candidates in the 1962 elections costs significantly more, and the US needed to maintain sensitivity to Brazilian opinion of US interference in Brazilian politics, as is reflected in the US Government's distancing itself from Governor Lacerda, because they felt that perception of that relationship was damaging US reputation in Brazil.¹²⁸ Associating with the military was not in and of itself a very costly choice, but endorsing and then helping to coordinate a coup with them is extremely costly. Destabilization became a policy early, but it is possible that economic pressure and pro-US propaganda through Alliance for Progress projects would have been enough to resolve the situation had Goulart shifted course. The fact is, he chose not to shift course, but instead deepened the crisis even further from a US perspective. US responses track this deepening crisis well.

Argentina also presents a case for an alternative hypothesis: In cases where the US did *not* destabilize, one factor could be the absence of an acceptable alternative. This outcome, which I did not originally hypothesize, nonetheless seems plausible, especially in light of prospect theory's expectations. The lack of an acceptable alternative would be seen as further increasing costs of adoption of destabilization beyond the costs associated with high-risk options like destabilization. The conflicts of interest between the US and Argentina were serious:

¹²⁸ See Doc 239 for a discussion of the problems caused by the perception of too close a relationship between Governor Lacerda and the United States at the end of 1963.

Argentina was threatening to collapse due to an unresolved financial crisis, and Argentina constantly frustrated US efforts to deal with Cuba as it saw fit. But these crises, in light of the lack of an acceptable alternative, were not enough for the US to actively seek a replacement for Frondizi. Though the military had their own mind about the matter, the US actually warned them off, and then hesitated when the military acted independently. The result was viewed as something the US could live with only after a close ally, Venezuela, recognized the government weeks later. And Kennedy's advisors were even split on that matter.

The "lack of acceptable alternative" appears in other chapters, and the discussion is the same. Whether or not it influenced the decisions in the destabilization cases, it seemed to act as a constraint on policy in the cases where the conflicts were more limited. This does not pose a threat to my theoretical explanation of the adoption of the policy. But only future research will show whether or not it should be included as a corollary to my theory.

From here, we travel ahead in time to the height of the Vietnam War and the Nixon Administration. Nixon for his part intended to have little to do with Latin America. His visit in the 1950s when he was Vice President, left a sour taste in his mouth for the region, and he insisted that Latin America didn't matter. But as events played out, we see a repeat of the above stories in Peru and Bolivia during his first Administration. As it turns out, the election of an openly Marxist politician in Chile thwarted Nixon's intentions to ignore the region, and this event had profound implications for US policy toward Chile's neighbors to the north.

CHAPTER 4

US POLICY IN PERU AND BOLIVIA, 1969-1973

Introduction

Following the tumultuous period between 1950 and 1965, the late 1960's were a time of relative calm in Latin America. By the beginning of Nixon's Administration, US focus in Latin America had been largely altered, from development and nation building of the Kennedy Administration and the Alliance for Progress to using early, swift and decisive intervention to prevent "two, three, many Vietnams" from blowing up in Latin America.¹²⁹ The Cold War had progressed between the US and the Soviet Union, but the US now saw Latin America--always excepting Cuba-- as a relatively stable zone once more fully in support of US objectives.

Nixon himself had a low opinion of Latin America. He reportedly told future Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, "The only things that matter in the world are Japan and China, Russia and Europe... Latin American doesn't matter" (Nixon, quoted in Walter 2010, 169). The major foreign policy issues of Nixon's first term were in Southeast Asia, not Central or South America.¹³⁰ Meanwhile, following the US' intervention in Brazil discussed in the last chapter, as well as Johnson's 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic, US policy makers had discovered

¹²⁹ The phrase "two, three, many Vietnams" came from Ernesto Guevara's message to the Organization of Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, also known as the "Tricontinental" published in September 1967 (For the full speech see Guevara, 2003, 350-362). The speech discussed the problems that would be caused for the US if several little revolutions that resembled the Vietnam War in miniature erupted across the underdeveloped portions of the world simultaneously. Guevara's thesis was that having to deal with several revolutions of this character at the same time, given the US' inability to decisively win the war against what was essentially a guerrilla army in Vietnam, would stretch US resources too thin and would crack US power in the world. A month after this speech was published, Guevara was defeated and killed.

¹³⁰ The Vietnam War involved hundreds of thousands of US troops, caused more than 40,000 US casualties and was spread out over eleven years: in Nixon's first year alone, close to a half a million US service members were involved in the conflict. Meanwhile the largest US troop involvement in a Latin American conflict during the 1960's only involved hundreds of US troops and lasted just a few weeks, though the actual occupation of the Dominican Republic following cessation of hostilities lasted more than a year, and only cost the US 216 total casualties, most of whom were merely wounded.

that US interests in Latin America could be maintained relatively easily and comparatively inexpensively.

US power seemed to hold sway in the region: the capstone of the era was the death of the Argentine revolutionary Ernesto Guevara in Bolivia in October 1967. Guevara had arrived in Bolivia several months beforehand, and attempted to re-create the Cuban *foco* model of guerrilla insurgency, successfully employed in the jungles and forests of Cuba, in the South American altiplano. But he failed to make important connections to the people of Bolivia and was roundly rejected by Bolivian Labor, who themselves were struggling for legal status, as the main Labor organization in Bolivia had been outlawed by the government at the time. Guevara was tracked down and killed by Bolivian forces under the command of General Juan Jose Torres, who was Army Chief of Staff during the campaign. US Army Rangers assisted the Bolivian Forces in the hunt for Guevara, using the CIA manual on counter-insurgency, which interestingly was modeled after Guevara's own guerrilla manual. Meanwhile, Torres was bound for other things, as I discuss later. With Cuba more or less contained, rightist governments in charge in Brazil and Argentina, more or less friendly governments in charge in Paraguay, Colombia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Guyana and Panama, and other major issues not yet on the horizon, in January 1969, it seemed that Nixon could afford to pay most attention to the pressing issues of an active war in Southeast Asia. Only during the latter half of his first administration would Nixon's full attention be pulled back toward Latin America, as Chile became a matter of interest for American policy makers after October of 1970.

The comparison of this chapter is between the cases of Peru and Argentina during the relatively calm time of President Richard Nixon's first term. There are several important differences between the cases presented in this chapter and the ones presented above. Unlike

Brazil and Argentina in the early 1960s, the Presidents of Peru and Bolivia in the late 1960s did not come into power constitutionally: Both Presidents came to power themselves as a result of military coup. Unlike Brazil and Argentina, both of which were very powerful with widely diverse economies which were not deeply dependent on virtually exclusive trade with the US, Peru and Bolivia were economically underdeveloped, and trade with the US was their primary source of national income. Though Peru was a minor power in the region, neither state came close to their larger neighbors to the east and south in terms of power. Both states had very volatile political climates while Brazil and Argentina were comparatively more stable.¹³¹

None of the differences between the first set of cases I examined in the previous chapter and this set affected the posture the US took toward them. Neither did the party affiliation of the President of the United States and those he selected to assist him in the creation of US foreign policy--Kennedy was a Democrat, Nixon, who was his chief rival in 1960 was a Republican. What is important is the degree of the conflict of interest between the US and each of the states under examination, as I assert in this dissertation. I give a brief overview of the major conflicts of interest in the Peruvian and Bolivian cases in Table 4.1 below. In this comparison, as in my last one, my hypothesis is demonstrated.

¹³¹ Bolivia had had 114 governments in 146 years, for example. For a broad treatment of political instability in Bolivia, see FRUS (E-10, Doc 105: 4). This document from FRUS is a memo of the 40 Committee's planning of US involvement in unfolding events in Bolivia during the summer of 1971. The main thrust of the document is that the US should do something, like provide cash and guidance to the opposition so that the US could play a role in the rapidly changing political situation in Bolivia. The main concern of most of the policy makers present was the risk of being left behind, of getting "into the game" when it had already ended.

Table 4.1: Conflicts of Interest in Peru and Bolivia, 1969-1973

	Peru	Bolivia
Economics	Nationalization of IPC remained unresolved, fisheries	Nationalization of Gulf Oil and other US properties
Security	Purchase of military equipment from USSR; expulsion of Military mission; Costal waters/overflight issue	Closeness with Soviet Union; hostility toward US military mission; expulsion of Peace Corps and CIA labor groups, damage and confiscation of US Government property
Ideology	NO CONFLICT- Velasco was committed Anti-Communist/ nationalism seen as tactic to reduce domestic opposition	Allowing communists and labor radicals to first participate and then to supplant government, nationalism used to incite masses; potential collapse and realignment toward Soviets
Destabilization?	No (Economic Pressure to change policies)	Yes (US funded alternative, and assisted with overthrow of Torres Government in favor of Banzer)

In Peru, outstanding conflicts of interest were primarily economic- and security-based but as I demonstrate, the US had few major concerns about the ideological orientation of the Peruvian Government. There were major conflicts of interest, as I describe below between the Nixon and Velasco administration. And yet, the US eventually decided to pressure, rather than destabilize Velasco. The primary reason was that the nationalist ideological orientation of the Velasco regime was seen in Washington as being more moderate than some of the Peruvian alternatives and anti-US rhetoric that was often exercised by the Peruvian Government was dismissed as being for local consumption. More importantly, Velasco's explicit opposition to communism in Peru, both in word and in deed, put him squarely into consonance with Washington's preferred ideological position and set him in contrast with nationalists in other countries whose governments the US opposed during the same period of time, like Chile or

Bolivia. Consequently, Velasco who came into power three months before Richard Nixon did, outlasted Nixon in office by a full year.

On the other hand, all three types of conflict of interest existed in US-Bolivian Relations during the ten month long Torres Administration. The US was far more concerned about General Torres' brand of nationalism than they were in the Peru case, and combined with his expropriation of US assets and his hostility to the US military mission, the United States Information Agency (the main outlet for US public relations), ORIT, (the CIA backed "labor union" designed to provide an alternative to more radical local labor organizations) and the Peace Corps in Bolivia, US reaction was not difficult to anticipate. One example was reported--perhaps apocryphally--in *Presna Latina* which described US Secretary of State Rogers expressing the US position to his Bolivian counterpart, "Let me tell you that we have every intention of seeing that Torres is overthrown" (Quoted in Lehman 1999, 162). Recently declassified documents support the argument that locating and supporting "political alternatives" to General Torres was US policy, at least from early March 1971 forward (FRUS E-10, Doc 97, 1-2).¹³² In the transcript of a conversation between President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, both men discuss getting the CIA to put together a coup against Torres in July, 1971. Subsequent documents are almost entirely dedicated to the execution and the results of that planning.¹³³

¹³² Doc 97 of E-10 of FRUS dated March 15, a memo from an NSC Staffer, Hewitt, to Kissinger, discusses US inquiries into possible political alternatives for Torres. The document notes that the Ambassador in Bolivia prefers accommodation of Torres to replacement, but as in other documents from this time (and as history turns out) the Ambassador's opinion is regularly overruled in Washington. In a later document (Doc 101) Kissinger refers to the Ambassador as a "softy" in regards to the impending covert action program.

¹³³ See FRUS E-10, Docs 101 through 109. Doc 101 is especially telling, and demonstrates direct involvement of the President of the United States in the creation of policy toward Bolivia, and is probably the closest thing I will ever come to a "smoking gun" in this comparison. Subsequent documents discuss the creation of that policy. Most of these have significant and noticeable redactions. Document 108, a memo from the Director of the CIA to the President, which is dated three days after the coup that overthrew the Torres Government, remains entirely

The cases of Peru and Bolivia demonstrate the theory that underlies this dissertation. For example, in the Peruvian case, Henry Kissinger explicitly stated that unless Velasco developed a pro-Castroist position which would require some action to be taken against him, "The dimension of the present problem therefore is simply not worth taking the risk of US intervention and the consequences that would result for our hemisphere and international position (FRUS E-10, Doc 605, 4).¹³⁴ The evidence I provide below demonstrates that the conflict of interest in the case of Peru was never at such a crisis level where the US set about to destabilize the Velasco government. At the same time, the conflict of interest between the US and Bolivia under Torres had quickly risen to a point where the US was explicitly talking about helping the opposition in Bolivia organize against the Government just a few months after he came into power. US efforts subsequently contributed to a US supported-coup by the Bolivian military two months later. The departure from the preferred status quo was so great in so short a time that the US quickly found "high risk" options like destabilization of the Torres Government and support for opposition groups, even those which were terribly organized and presented little probability of success, to be completely acceptable as courses of foreign policy.

Conflicts of Interest, Peru under Velasco: Economic and Security

As Nixon was being elected President of the United States, the new military Government of Peru, under General Juan Velasco was launching a major challenge to US interests in the country. Those interests could be summed up as protection of US business and anti-

unreleased, though a placeholder document remains. Currently, I can only guess at what it says, but circumstantially, I would evaluate it as fairly important and highly sensitive.

¹³⁴ Doc 605 of FRUS E-10 dated July 2, 1969 from Kissinger to Nixon, discusses US policy options vis-à-vis Peru's refusal or inability to settle the IPC issue in a way that satisfies the US company. The document actually argues against the application of the Hickenlooper Amendment and discusses ways to keep that from happening. Importantly, it also makes my argument that without that "pro-Castroist" ideological orientation of the Peruvian Government, the US should avoid intervening in a way that will weaken the Government of Peru, and instead maintain pressure designed to get Velasco to come to terms on IPC.

communism.¹³⁵ Actions taken by countries that conflicted with these interests would become subject to US concern. The policies of Peru which conflicted with at least some of these interests would dominate US foreign policy attention in Latin America until the rise of Socialist president Allende the following year (Walter, 169).

The conflict between the US and Peru during Nixon's first term were essentially economic, but there were serious security implications that came from at least some of those conflicts. The first and possibly most irritating conflict to the US was the Peruvian Government's full nationalization of the assets and holdings of the International Petroleum Company, a company which was technically a Canadian firm, but which was 99.9 percent owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey (FRUS E-10, Doc 581, 3).¹³⁶ The other conflict involved Peru's insistence that their territorial waters extended 200 miles off their shore, and threatened US commercial fishing interests, but also US trans-shipment and overflight and sea travel lanes which utilized the Humboldt Current that ran up the western side of South America. These two issues combined with Peru's willingness to increase both diplomatic, trade and military ties with the Soviet Union, The People's Republic of China and Cuba, which closely resembled the independent foreign policy practiced by Goulart in Brazil earlier in the decade.

There is very little in US-Peruvian relations from this time which does not deal with economic conflicts between the US and Peru. A major earthquake in Peru in 1970 and the

¹³⁵ This summary of US interests was actually provided in a memo from the Peruvian Embassy to the Government in Peru. The memo, dated January 15, 1969 was an appraisal of the incoming Nixon Administration by attaché Carlos Alzamora (Walter, 170). Walter notes that nothing that Nixon did or said during his first administration countered this appraisal.

¹³⁶ Doc 581 of FRUS E-10, written by the National Security Council as an overview of US relations with Peru to April 1969 as the President and his team were preparing to decide how hard to push Peru on the IPC case and whether or not to apply the Hickenlooper Amendment to punish Peru for nationalization. The document recommended taking a moderate line on Peru, denying aid, but at the same time, refraining from application of the Amendment for fear that this action would strengthen the hand of anti-US nationalists in Peru and throughout Latin America. This document is fairly typical of documents on Peru, stressing the desire to maintain good relations with Peru, in spite of the conflicts of interest with them.

resulting humanitarian crisis was an exception to an otherwise almost completely singular narrative in diplomatic documents. The main economic conflict of the period was the International Petroleum Company (IPC) nationalization, which actually began under Velasco's predecessor, President Fernando Belaunde.¹³⁷ The IPC issue in Peru caused significant trepidation for the Nixon Administration during his first Administration. The issue remained unresolved, though Nixon continued to reassure the US Congress that significant progress was being made, in order to avoid application of the Hickenlooper Amendment. Several ideas were floated to attempt a resolution of this issue, and progress--or the potential for progress, anyway--was regularly discussed among Nixon and his advisors. At one point, a plan by Phillips Petroleum Company to buy out the IPC properties--thereby covering some of the outstanding tax liability claimed by the Government of Peru--was floated (FRUS, E-10, Doc 606)¹³⁸ and at another point, US officials said they would be happy if Peru offered even "one dollar" as a token

¹³⁷ Belaunde had nationalized the La Brea and Pariñas Oil fields, owned by the IPC in 1967, but had agreed to a very controversial settlement offer which left IPC in control of its refining and distribution operations, as well as offered them generous compensation for the property that had been expropriated. Peruvian nationalists were greatly angered by this action, because as they saw it, IPC had been illegally extracting crude oil from the oil field. IPC claimed subsoil rights to the field, which the Peruvian government did not recognize. Peruvian nationalists believed that IPC owed a large amount of money in back taxes which went unpaid to Peru for what it saw as its national resources. An apparent disagreement over the terms of settlement for the matter ultimately led to the coup which brought Velasco to power. For an excellent summary of the history of the dispute between IPC and Peru, see Goodwin (1969). For a full account of the coup and its aftermath, see Walter (2010, 142-167). When Velasco took power, the result was an immediate and expropriation of IPC's operations associated with the La Brea and Pariñas oil field, including a refinery at Talara. And then, on February 6, Velasco ordered the full nationalization of all IPC holdings in Peru when IPC refused to pay a bill presented to it by Velasco's Government which charged it close to 70 million dollars for the extraction of crude in Talara. The IPC issue remained a conflict throughout Nixon's first Administration and though it often seemed as if the US and Peru were getting close to a solution of the matter, they never actually did.

¹³⁸ Doc 606 of FRUS E-10, which was a report from Kissinger to Nixon, written in July of 1969, summarizes Government of Peru actions toward US capital and discusses the Agrarian Reform law recently enacted by the Velasco Government. In it, Kissinger notes appreciation that the Hickenlooper Amendment was not enacted, because he felt that the US and Peru now had some breathing space to work out their outstanding issues. Kissinger also notes US policy toward Peru at the time, which he called "economic pressure" that had cut off credit to Peru and decreased inflows of foreign capital and financing for projects, without formal application of the Hickenlooper Amendment.

compensation for IPC expropriation (FRUS E-10, Doc 636).¹³⁹ But US officials remained frustrated at Peru's unwillingness to come to term preferred by the US on the IPC issue. As of December 1972, after Nixon had been re-elected, IPC remained outstanding.

IPC was not the only economic conflict faced in US-Peruvian relations during the period. The issue of Peruvian seizure of US fishing boats was a longstanding issue (and will be discussed here as a security conflict). In June 1969, the Government of Peru issued a comprehensive Agrarian Reform law which expropriated a large amount of the sugar growing properties and bank accounts of W.R. Grace Paper Company. Later, the Government of Peru attempted to expropriate Grace's paper and chemical plants, claiming that these operations fell under the Agrarian Law, but withdrew after Grace protested (Walter, 193; 209). The US Government however did not make any comment on the expropriation in the literature at the time; Peru and Grace eventually reached agreement on the matter, in principle, by June 1970, though compensation was agreed upon much later (FRUS E-10, Doc 630, Walter, 381).¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Doc 636 of FRUS E-10, dated August 4, 1972, discussed ongoing difficulties at finding a resolution for the IPC issue at the end of Nixon's first term. The memo is from Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms to Kissinger, and summarizes a meeting between former US Treasury Secretary and now Nixon's Special Emissary, John Connelly and Velasco. Secretary Connelly reportedly told Velasco that Nixon wanted the "dollar" as a symbolic recognition of the right of corporations to be compensated for having their property expropriated, but at any rate, the value of the expropriated property was "but a crumb" compared to Standard Oil's investments elsewhere in the world. Connelly, it was reported, informed Velasco that even a token compensation would result in the US opening up credit from all sources. The admission by Connelly to Velasco that the US was blocking credit (Velasco had long complained about this) caused the meeting to become "heated", in Helms' words. Velasco reported that he had found other sources of credit from socialist countries.

¹⁴⁰ Doc 630 of FRUS E-10 is a telegram from the US Embassy in Peru to State, dated from July, 1971. It summarizes US conflicts with Peru to date, and evaluates the costs to Peru as a result of US policy toward Peru. It also discusses a moderation in the Peruvian government toward US interests, but which was subsequently undermined by US economic "pressure" and denial of access to credit. The telegram asserts that as moderation toward the US did not produce a softer line from Washington (and in fact, the US took a harder approach toward expropriations as a result of this moderation), there was no longer any incentive for the Government of Peru to adopt a moderate approach. Instead, they became more convinced that they should pursue independence from the US, and proceeded to make contacts with socialist countries and recognize Castro's Government in Cuba. The Embassy lays out State's position: "In Short, Peru may have now decided that the prospects for meaningful US support are too low or its price too high, or both. GOP may feel that it has less to lose in these circumstances than US from a confrontation." The memo closes by strongly arguing for a re-evaluation of policy toward the Government of Peru, a suggestion which was repeated several times in the documentation, and which that Nixon ignored, regularly.

Beyond nationalization of petroleum, Peru also targeted minerals. In May 1970, the Government of Peru issued a new mining law which nationalized the marketing of minerals from Peru, notably copper. The US government, at this early point, noted that it caused the US business interests some concern, though also suggested that the full impact of the law would not be fully understood for a half a year, when the new law would be fully promulgated and implemented (FRUS E-10, Doc 615).¹⁴¹ They also noted that the new mining law was typical of laws passed by the Velasco Government toward foreign economic interests: Velasco followed a nationalist line and sought to control marketing of Peruvian resources to reduce the influence of foreign capital in Peru. The report declared that the decree, which negatively affected US business interests, would create problems for US- Peru relations, and "This aggressively independent stance assumed by the [Government of Peru] also increases frictions between the two governments and makes the search for solutions to our outstanding bilateral problems even more difficult" (FRUS E-10, Doc 615).

The mining decree did not come back up for a while, because later that month, Peru suffered a major earthquake, and the US became focused, for a time on relief efforts (FRUS E-10, Doc 616).¹⁴² The First Lady of the US went to Peru as a goodwill gesture.¹⁴³ This visit greatly (though temporarily) improved relations between the US and Peru, and smoothed over, at least publicly, the major outstanding issues between the two governments.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ Doc 615 of FRUS E-10 is a memo from State to Kissinger written May 1, 1970. This memo gave an overview of the mining law as a response to a request for information on the law and its features. The memo also gives a summary of holdings by US firms in Peru, and note specifically the concern felt by the Southern Peru Copper Corporation.

¹⁴² Doc 616 of FRUS E-10 is from the President to the Secretary of state, dated June 8, 1970. The memo simply outlines assets and aid that the President wishes to make available for earthquake relief in Peru.

¹⁴³ Nixon said her visit would give the visit a more personal feel, as to an official one. Nixon's advisors thought she would be more welcomed there than Nixon would be, especially given Nixon's disastrous visit there thirteen years before, when he was Vice President (Walter, 231-232)

¹⁴⁴ It is interesting to note that in a goodwill gesture (though with some concern for US reputation as well). the US government coordinated with the Governments of Iceland and Canada to allow overflight of Soviet relief aid (which

While there was a general conflict between the US and Peru on economic terms, security issues were primarily associated with two main conflicts specifically. The first one was Velasco's regular association with the Soviets and other socialist nations, including Cuba. This conflict rose in Nixon's first month in Office, when the Administration was considering whether or not to suspend aid and the sugar quota over the nationalization of IPC. Kissinger warned Nixon that suspension of aid would likely push Peru into a hostile stance toward the US in foreign policy, and lead the Government of Peru to deepen ties with the Soviet Bloc, a process which began under the preceding President (FRUS E-10, Doc 576).¹⁴⁵ Kissinger's beliefs seemed to be confirmed when, in February, Velasco's government very publicly established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁶

Ultimately, the US estimated that the Soviets were unwilling to help Peru to the degree that Peru would have needed to replace US influence in the country, though didn't rule out the potential for the Soviet Union expanding its role in Peru, but this conclusion did not alleviate early concern for the close relationship between Peru and the Soviets (FRUS E-10, Doc 591).¹⁴⁷

The issue came to a head in May, 1969 when Velasco kicked out the US military mission in Peru

represented the largest Soviet airlift operation to date), even though the Executive Secretary of the Department of State was concerned that the Soviets were just trying to take advantage of the publicity and there was some risk to US naval and aircraft in the overflight areas (FRUS E-10, Doc 617).

¹⁴⁵ Doc 576 of FRUS is an early appraisal of the situation in Peru, the first of the Nixon Administration that appears in FRUS, and was issued eight days after his inauguration. The memo was prepared by the State Department for Kissinger to present to the President, and discusses the background of the IPC issue in some detail, US policy to that point, and possible implications within Peru of various US policy options.

¹⁴⁶ Later documents reveal that the US was ultimately not much concerned about strengthened ties, as it related to security interests. A document issued two months after this early appraisal attributes the attempts to increase ties to the Soviets to Peruvian nationalism and a desire to demonstrate independence in foreign affairs, rather than hostility toward the US (FRUS E-10, Doc 580). In this document, dated March 7, 1969 was available to the President and his foreign policy team as they decided whether to apply sanctions to Peru over the nationalization of IPC. Most of the other advice presented in FRUS to the President and Kissinger at this time supports the statements of this document.

¹⁴⁷ Document 591 of FRUS E-10 was dated April 10, 1969 and is an intelligence summary prepared by the CIA (presumably for Nixon). The document gives an insight into the type and character of intelligence coming into the Nixon Administration as they were attempting to resolve the IPC issue. The CIA had decided that the Government of Peru was run by "extremists" and discusses political alternatives to Velasco within Peru. The Agency surmises that Velasco may be in power for a while and advocates the application of strong economic pressure as a way to convince Velasco to deal with the US on IPC. Ultimately, this was the policy which was followed by the Nixon Administration.

over suspension of military sales to Peru required by US law, ending decades of close cooperation between the two countries' militaries (Walter, 190; FRUS E-10, Doc 598).¹⁴⁸ This action caused great concern for US policy makers because it signaled loss of influence for the US in the region.

Despite initial hesitancy on the part of the Soviets to help Peru, Velasco remained able to credibly leverage potential Soviet (and other outside) military and economic assistance against the US' unwillingness to supply aid, as they did, for example during the earthquake or in November 1972. As senior advisers were reviewing US policy toward Peru, which had essentially remained the same throughout the entire Nixon Administrations, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs Leddy noted that Soviet influence in Peru was great and growing as a result of US policy, despite the basically pro-US orientation of the Peruvian military.¹⁴⁹ He noted with significant concern about a Soviet pledge to the Government of Peru for 200 million dollars of military credits, and argued that a hostile regime on the West coast of South America would be very concerning the Defense Department (FRUS E-10, Doc 639).¹⁵⁰ There is no indication in this document that the Soviet credit was some new

¹⁴⁸ Document 598 of FRUS E-10 was a memo from Kissinger to Nixon, dated May 22, 1969, just before Velasco removed the US military mission from the country. The memo discusses the matter of military aid and the possible removal of the mission, and notes that the President could inform Velasco of a waiver of the rule about suspension of military aid to countries who expropriate the property of US firms in order to either prevent or delay the removal of the US military mission. The President approved this course of action, but ultimately it did not have an effect on the decision to remove the military mission. While military sales were restored later, the issue of US military aid being delayed, as was other US aid and credit, remained an issue between the two governments throughout the duration of Nixon's first term.

¹⁴⁹ It should be noted that the Department of State regularly called upon the President to re-evaluate and alter his policy toward Peru, a call which often went entirely unheeded in Government documents.

¹⁵⁰ Document 639 of FRUS E-10 is the memorandum of Meeting of the Senior Review Group, who were charged with reviewing US policy toward Peru. The meeting took place November 14, 1972, after Nixon had been re-elected. The options presented in Document 638 of FRUS E-10 were discussed with most of the officials coming down in support of opening new initiatives of credit but keeping what amounted to the same policy of economic pressure on Peru to force a settlement of IPC. Defense and State were the only ones who preferred abandoning the policy and adopting a more friendly stance toward Peru. In attendance was also now General Vernon Walters, who was intimately involved with US activity in Brazil earlier in the decade. Walters now served the US Government as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

development. On the contrary, it appears that it is merely the most recent offer for assistance on the part of the Soviets, and represents the warming of the Soviets to the Peruvian Revolution which had occurred during Nixon's first Administration and was exemplified by their support during the Earthquake.

A far more important security conflict was Peru's assertion that its territory extended 200 miles out to sea. Both Peru and Ecuador had made this claim for decades before Nixon came into office, while the US recognized the standard 12 mile limit, arguing that the remaining 188 miles were international waters.¹⁵¹ While this matter could be viewed as an economic conflict, the fact that the property of Americans was being fired on by ships that were loaned to Peru by the US government during a dispute over territorial waters was troubling from a security standpoint (FRUS E-10, Document 581). But more pressing than fishing interests was the rights of the US military to use the eastern Pacific Ocean to conduct naval and air operations in the Southeast Pacific Ocean and which fell within the boundaries of the sea claimed by Peru.

The overflight issue, associated with the territorial waters matter was first addressed by Nixon's administration in April of 1969, when Kissinger directed various cabinet departments and agencies to study the application of the Hickenlooper Amendment in response to the IPC conflict and the overflight problem (FRUS E-10, Doc 594). Relations were irritated again when the Peruvians seized US fishing vessels operating without licenses in waters claimed by Peru that May. The US responded with an application of the Pelly Amendment, which had been passed a year earlier in response to Peruvian seizures, and which cut off military aid and a significant portion of non-military supports for the Government of Peru. The Government of Peru

¹⁵¹ This issue had caused friction annually as Peru seized US fishing boats that were operating in waters that it claimed as its own and either fined the owners of the vessels or confiscated the ship itself. The US, for its part, defended US fishing interests and passed laws in the US Congress that punished countries that confiscated or fined US fishing boats (Walter, 67).

responded by expelling the US military mission, causing the security conflict described above (Walter, 190-191). The seizures of US vessels continued for the next few years, and the overflight issue remained unresolved more than a year later (FRUS E-10, Doc 618).¹⁵²

There was, however, a much larger issue beyond simple military overflights.¹⁵³ The US had always insisted that Peru only had sovereignty out to 12 miles, which put the fisheries being exploited by North American fishermen into international waters. But the question of fishing rights became a security question for US policy makers: If the US Government decided to send the navy to protect fishing vessels, actions of the Peruvian government in asserting their territorial claims could spark a war. If the US acknowledged Peru's claim, on the other hand, US security interests would be severely compromised globally.

Put simply, the Defense Department believed that if the US granted Peru their claim to the 200 mile line, they would have to grant all countries claims, and then the US armed forces would be severely hampered when attempting to move through the oceans of the World, an activity that it deemed absolutely vital to its security interests. All of the world's straits would be closed to military passage. The Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas would be under the control of potentially hostile elements. US operations would be severely restricted or eliminated all together in region that the US believed were vital to US national security (areas such as North

¹⁵² The issue was discussed in this document in terms of a discussion that Ambassador to Peru Jones had with the Foreign Minister of Peru in an attempt to clarify the status of overflights.

¹⁵³ In a very comprehensive article published in the Stanford Law Review in 1971 about the fisheries conflict, author David C. Loring provides an excellent chronology of the entire conflict, dating back before Peru officially asserted its limited sovereignty out to 200 miles off its shore, and US began opposing those claims. The author asks the question: Suppose US naval vessels were called in to protect US fishermen from attacks by Peruvian naval vessels in the disputed waters (a scenario that the author deemed to be increasingly likely). Peru would call that something close to an act of war, while the US would argue that it was operating in international waters and that the acts of the Peruvian navy in seizure of American vessels were more akin to acts of piracy (Loring 1971, 393). US interests in the fisheries conflict were illuminated by this article. Specifically, Loring discusses the precedent that would be set by US acceptance of Peru's claim to the 200 mile limit. Citing interviews with high-level Defense Department Officials who present an undivided statement of US military and Defense interests, he writes: "Succinctly stated, military experts believe that Peru's claim, when considered in relation to United States global interests, threatens to immobilize the Department of Defense (Loring, 429)

Korea, China, North Vietnam, and Cuba), making defense of the US and its interests around the world impossible. Therefore, the fisheries dispute in Peru, while seeming to be a localized commercial dispute between two states who claimed rights to exploitation of the same resources, actually was a much larger dispute concerning very vital geopolitical security interests. As Loring wrote, "United States policy is not designed to protect such a narrowly parochial interest as California fishermen; [the California fishermen] are incidental beneficiaries of a military policy (Loring, 431).

There were several significant and intense economic and security conflicts between the US and Peru during the period, but there was no serious ideological conflict. While the government of Peru engaged in nationalism which led it to conflict with the US in the above areas, the general in charge of the Peruvian government, General Juan Velasco, was well-known and regularly referred to, both at home and in the United States, as anti-communist. As time went on, the US saw value in this position, especially as it began to grow concerned with the socialist government of Salvador Allende in Peru's rival Chile after 1970.

That Velasco was seen as a committed anti-communist, and therefore of use to the US as a bulwark against Chile caused the US to seek to moderate its policy toward Peru where it was not willing to do so in Bolivia. The US saw in Velasco an example of reformism and an acceptable form of nationalism--as opposed to Allende in Chile--and was therefore more willing to tolerate limited expropriation and regular seizures of US fishing boats, as well as association with the Soviets and Cuba. The US adopted this policy more because it was concerned about the alternative, which was a much harder anti-US posture should Velasco be ousted which might then revert to more of a Chilean model. It was because of this that Kissinger noted that the degree of conflict in US Peruvian relations did not justify the risk of US intervention in Peru.

There were a few ideological issues between the US and Peru during this time, but for the most part, the US downplayed these issues, for a number of reasons. At the beginning of Nixon's administration, when members of his administration were attempting to take stock of the ideological character of Velasco, he was most often described as an extreme nationalist. Early in Nixon's term, Kissinger did not make a judgment on the ideology of the Government of Peru under Velasco. Instead, he characterized the Government as using the anti-US nationalist sentiment already existing in Peru at the time as a foundation upon which to build its appeal (FRUS E-10, Doc 576). Regardless of the ideology of the President of Peru, Kissinger predicted that this prevailing sentiment would make settlement of the IPC and other outstanding issues difficult.

Kissinger's summary was fairly typical of early characterizations of Velasco's regime. Most followed this pattern and blamed reluctance to settle in a way preferable to the US on this "extreme" nationalism, but also did not specifically name Velasco as having fully embraced that sort of ideology. For example, in the lead up to the decision whether to impose the Hickenlooper Amendment in March 1969, the CIA reported that even though Velasco was surrounded by ultranationalist extremists who were, for the most part, anti-American, "We have no evidence to indicate that the advisers on the political left have influence on Velasco which is different from or greater than that of the other ultranationalists" (FRUS E-10, 580).

In fact, around the same time, a narrative from the NSC Study group on Latin American Affairs was composed which set the tone for US appraisals of the character of Velasco's government going forward. In their report, Velasco was actually called increasingly "anti-American." But Velasco and the military had taken power to reform Peru and address many of the historical inequalities of the society where the civilian governments had been unable to,

"...believing that unless these things are done soon there will be a resort to radical egalitarian solutions which could bring political and economic chaos and destroy the armed forces as they presently exist" (FRUS E-10, Doc 581, 8).

From then on, members of the Nixon Administration sought a *modus vivendi* with the Velasco Government. Even though he was seen as an extreme nationalist, and therefore unwilling to accede to US demands for compensation, he was preferable to various alternatives: most notably, after mid-1970, the Chilean model. Policymakers in the NSC concluded that Velasco was "certainly not a Castroist" but could more accurately be described as similar to Peron in Argentina (FRUS E-10, Doc 600). By the end of November, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Viron Vaky concluded that the Velasco Government was not specifically anti-American, but instead was just opposed to the way US corporations attempted to do business in Peru (FRUS E-10, Doc 610).

Added to this, the US government had long known that Velasco was anti-Communist. Velasco had stated as much many times, and the US government never had any issue with the validity of that statement. In fact, Kissinger went so far as to cite Velasco's November 1970 anti-communist speech as a reason that the US should work to build a new relationship with the military government of Peru, "... and to influence the course of their 'revolution' away from Cuban/Chilean patterns and into channels that may be more acceptable to us (FRUS E-10, Doc 621).¹⁵⁴ The ideology of the government of Peru was not conflictual, specifically because it did not tend to support communism, but was instead, described eventually and then from that point forward as "reformist".

¹⁵⁴ Doc 621 of FRUS E-10 is a memo from Kissinger to Nixon, written in November 1970, after the socialist Salvador Allende had been elected in Chile, in spite of US efforts to intervene there. The memo contained a large portion of a speech Velasco made to the Peruvian Institute of Business Administration, as well as recommendations based on Velasco's vociferous condemnation of communism.

Conflicts between the US and Peru were at a high point in 1969 and 1970. After this point, Peru and IPC was put more or less on the back burner of US foreign policy attention, despite the ongoing nature of the conflicts discussed above. The event which took the attention of the US off of Peru was the election of Allende in Chile, in early November of 1970.¹⁵⁵ Before November of 1970, Peru occupied a central place in US-Latin America policy making. During the second half, Nixon was focused on containing the example of Chile, and (as I demonstrate) Bolivia, whose policy was in many ways more radical, the conflicts more sharp, and the time frame much more compact.

Theoretically, I do not expect to find evidence of destabilization in Peru: there were only two out of three types of conflict of interest present in US-Peru relations. Perceived ideological conflict was not present, not even in the beginning months of both Nixon's and Velasco's Administration. Even though Velasco's government was repeatedly characterized as ultra-nationalist and anti-American, US policy makers had come to an early conclusion that nationalism was merely an excuse for a real desire for reform, Velasco was not unfriendly to the US or unwilling to at the minimum work to resolve outstanding issues, and most importantly, that he was definitely opposed to communism, and therefore, not in any danger of promoting communism in the hemisphere. Outstanding issues aside, the degree of crisis between the US and Peru, according to my expectations, should not cause the US to adopt a policy of destabilization toward the Government of Peru under Velasco.

¹⁵⁵ This fact is evident in the sharp drop off of FRUS documents on Peru after this time. There are twice as many documents in FRUS from before November 1970 as there is after that date, even though November 1970 is roughly half way through Nixon's first term. The conflicts that are outlined in the first 45 documents did not go away after that date, but the Government of the US had finally decided to seek a modus Vivendi with Peru.

US Responses to Velasco: Pressure but not destabilization

History bears this conclusion out and supports my hypothesis. After the initial period in US-Peru relations, where the US attempted to determine the character of the Velasco Government, the US was committed to two, often competing, courses of action in Peru: compensation for nationalized property and restoring normal relations with Peru, in that order. At the beginning, when it looked like Velasco might be calling a bluff from the US, the Nixon Administration imposed covert sanctions like cutting off credit and interfering in efforts by Velasco to get funding for capital improvement projects from other countries. Meanwhile, Nixon publicly tried to push for settlement of the IPC issue and others. But when a policy option threatened to alienate Velasco, and make him distance his government from the US, Nixon often opted for a softer line toward Velasco. This commitment to restoration of normal relations with Velasco despite the intense conflicts outlined above demonstrates that the US was not interested in seeing Velasco removed from office. The goal was, instead, to pressure him to change his policies but to keep him in power.

Full nationalization of IPC, which occurred less than three weeks following Nixon's inauguration, forced his Administration to pay attention to Peru. The US had early decided that it should attempt to maintain as good of relations as it possibly could during the crisis. Nixon's initial position set the standard in dealings with the Peruvian Government in later months and years. But doing so became a problem for Nixon because of US Law itself, which required automatic application of the Hickenlooper Amendment if six months had passed and expropriated property had not been fully compensated by the nationalizing government (FRUS E-10, Doc 576).

As late as March 6, 1969, a month before sanctions were to take effect, US intelligence doubted that the Government of Peru would meet the minimum requirements necessary to avoid the application of this sanction, scheduled to take effect April 9, 1969, and discussed implications of the sanctions. According to this estimate, the IPC issue was wrapped up in "emotional nationalism." The advisors surrounding Velasco were no longer moderate, as they may have been originally, but now "ultranationalist," and application of sanctions would alienate the people of Peru and Latin America against the US, strengthening, in the process the conviction of the Peruvian nationalists to act further against US property (FRUS E-10, Doc 580).

As the deadline for the application of the Amendment approached the Nixon Administration was presented with three scenarios that could possibly play out in Peru. The first scenario was that Peru made no credible attempt to resolve significant outstanding issues of IPC and fishing boats. The second scenario involved Peru making some attempts to resolve the issue, but not firmly committing to full resolution of the conflicts, and the third dealt with Peru fully acceding to US demands for compensation. The first two scenarios contained "hard" and "soft" line responses to Peru. The hard line often took the form of letting the Amendment be applied as well as some other sanctions, either to punish the government of Peru or to set an example for other countries who might be considering expropriation, while the soft line involved letting Peru off the hook, so to speak, not applying the Amendment. Then implications for each of these options were discussed (FRUS E-10, Doc 581).¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ Doc 581 is an excellent document that discussed US options as the deadline for application of the Hickenlooper Amendment approached. Policy makers were not under any illusion that Scenario Three would play out, and therefore the scenario only contained one paragraph under the heading "Scenario three- Real Progress Toward a Solution- Sanctions not applied". All scenarios advocated at the very least that *economic* pressure be kept on Peru, which involved the reduction in aid until a full resolution were accomplished; this tactic hearkens back to US policy toward Argentina and Brazil. Hard line approaches often involved cutting many, if not all US programs and aid to Peru, thereby significantly damaging the Peruvian economy, while the soft line approaches usually involved doing the minimum required by the law.

The Nixon Administration also sought out advice on how to handle the IPC affair from a variety of sources before making the decision on the course of action that he should take toward Peru.¹⁵⁷ The NSC's position toward Peru was that the hard line options will not likely pressure Velasco to change his position, while soft line options will not provide a deterrent toward future expropriations by Velasco and others. However, the advice on this issue illuminates the policy goals of the Administration: "The hard line is less likely to induce long-range solutions or a quick return to friendly relations." The NSC also explicitly advocated against the use of economic pressure to attempt to produce political change in Peru because "... it is too unpredictable a lever. It could just as well create a more intransigent and anti-US nationalism, even if it succeeded in changing persons" (FRUS E-10, Doc 585, 1).¹⁵⁸

Later policy discussions boiled US policy objectives down to three goals: to produce a settlement that results in net gain for IPC, improve the political position of the US in the hemisphere, and limit further uncompensated expropriations of US properties (FRUS E-10, Doc 597).¹⁵⁹ Because of the policy discussions around how to avoid the application of the Hickenlooper Amendment, Nixon eventually adopted a three pronged approach to dealing with Velasco.

The first part of this policy involved avoiding the application of the Hickenlooper Amendment. To do this, Nixon needed to demonstrate that the Government of Peru was

¹⁵⁷ One source Nixon received advice from was banker and business owner William Pawley, who relayed a message from the President of the Dominican Republic Juaoquin Balaguer to Nixon (See FRUS E-10, Doc 584). President Balaguer offered the insight that it would be important for the US to not let governments in Latin America get away with expropriation of US property without any fears of reprisals. Balaguer also notes that the law requires the US to take certain actions, like cutting aid, but also--more importantly for the interests of the Dominican Republic--to cut the sugar quota from countries that expropriate. Balaguer added furthermore that US law required that the aid and quota suspended from a country which expropriated be redistributed to other Latin American countries.

¹⁵⁸ Doc 585 weighs the various options presented in Doc 581 and seems to suggest that both lines are not good but the hard line would hurt both a potential for a settlement on IPC and US Peru relations longterm.

¹⁵⁹ Doc 597 of FRUS E-10 was a memo from Viron Vaky, of the NSC, to Kissinger from April 28, 1969. Like many other documents from around this period of time, this one discusses implications of deferment of the Hickenlooper Amendment. This document also outlines details of USIA programs in Peru to counteract the negative output from the US' adversaries there over the IPC affair

"appropriate steps" toward resolution of the IPC issue. To determine this, Nixon sent Ambassador John Irwin as a special envoy to Velasco to open negotiations (FRUS E-10, Doc 586). Irwin and Velasco got along very well, and Irwin was able to get Velasco to make a substantial promise to compensate IPC. Irwin had wide latitude to work some sort of settlement out with Velasco: no option was off the table, so to speak, and eventually, a satisfactory agreement was made which allowed Nixon to avoid application of the Hickenlooper Amendment while negotiations were ongoing.

As the April 9th deadline approached, and there was apparently no appropriate steps being taken to resolve the IPC matter, the Nixon Administration demonstrated that avoidance of application of the amendment was their chosen policy, and essentially reset the clock on the six month time limit, asserting that because IPC had been nationalized during Johnson's Administration, and Nixon had subsequently come into office, it took him some time to send a negotiating team to Peru. Therefore, the US and Peru had not actually been negotiating for six months, but two and a half weeks, and this was enough to avoid application of the amendment. While that was a mere technicality, it shows that Nixon and his advisors were genuinely interested in avoiding a policy which would exacerbate US-Peruvian relations. Application of the Amendment would also increase tensions between the US and the rest of Latin America: Kissinger warned that "Velasco could mobilize the hemisphere against us" using the Hickenlooper Amendment as evidence of US aggression. In short, in order to avoid making matters worse between the US and Peru, Nixon would have to assert that the fact that Velasco was talking to Irwin counted as an "appropriate step" (FRUS E-10, Doc 588).¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ Document 588 of FRUS was a memo from Kissinger to Nixon from April 3, 1969 informing him that the deadline for application of Hickenlooper was fast approaching, and no progress had been made to that date, between Irwin and Velasco. And yet if the President was interested in avoiding application of the law, they would have to come up with a "fig leaf" in Kissinger's words to hide the fact that there were no appropriate step taken, and it

Given that Nixon agreed with his advisors who suggested that he do what he needed to do to avoid application of the Hickenlooper Amendment because of the drastic consequences it could have for US interests in Peru and the rest of Latin America, Kissinger recommended the second stage of US policy at the end of March 1969. He advised Nixon to bring maximum pressure on the Velasco government, specifically to cause Velasco "to yield in the subsequent negotiations" (FRUS E-10, Doc 587).¹⁶¹ These pressures, which were specifically not aimed at weakening the Velasco Government, but instead getting him to settle the IPC issue, included maintaining the threat of new sanctions, continuing to delay new aid, and encourage the delay of international loans and investment.¹⁶² In doing so, other countries would see that expropriation of the property of US firms was not costless, and Velasco may be pressured to come to terms favorable to the IPC.¹⁶³

These two planks were designed to provide a bit of breathing room. Nixon wanted time to get the US into a posture of confrontation, if need be, which the US was not in by the time the deadline to apply the Amendment came up. Delaying the amendment and keeping the economic pressure on Velasco would give the US time to at least limit the damage caused by the Amendment if, after three months, the US still needed to apply it. It would give the Nixon

involved creating the above fiction. Kissinger went further and described the economic pressures that Nixon would eventually adopt against Velasco, and which would form the basis of US policy toward Peru during Nixon's first term.

¹⁶¹ Document 587 of FRUS E-10 is a memo from Kissinger to Nixon advising him of policy options, given the policy objectives stated in earlier documents, from March 29, 1969. By this time, the policy to avoid application of the Amendment had been all but decided, and the only question was how to maintain the maximum pressure without actual application of the Amendment.

¹⁶² The private sector in the US and other countries indicated that they were firmly on board with the policy of the Nixon Administration. See FRUS E-10, Doc 595., the April 17, 1969 memo from Kissinger to Nixon on continuing economic pressure on Velasco.

¹⁶³ It is important to note that the Nixon Administration was sensitive to the implications of this policy. For example, mid-April, Kissinger advised Nixon to approve a housing loan which the Administration had been delaying for months, to avoid the charge by Velasco and other nationalists of bad faith or economic aggression (FRUS E-10, Doc 590).

Administration the opportunity to "work on getting a few friends lined up" (FRUS E-10, Doc 589).

As reports soon demonstrated, the number of possible opponents of Velasco who could help the US in a potential confrontation or destabilization were very few, and none of them more preferable than Velasco.¹⁶⁴ What was possible, however, was something more akin to "out of the box" thinking on IPC, where perhaps a third Party would offer to buy out IPC's properties for the tax burden Peru said they owed, and the Peru could negotiate with IPC for a settlement. The President publicly set a review date for August 6, 1969, and then privately agreed to keep maximum economic pressure on Velasco with the aim of producing a settlement (FRUS E-10, Doc 594). This policy remained essentially in effect through August, and indeed, through Nixon's first term, despite protests from the US Ambassador to Peru and others that it wasn't working, and that it might be having the opposite effect.¹⁶⁵

The last part of the Nixon approach toward Peru involved dealing with the issue caused by the periodic seizures of US fishing boats and the assertion of the 200 mile limit. US responses to the fishing conflict were more subdued than they were for the nationalization affair. In February 1969, Peruvian naval forces seized one US fishing boat, the *Mariner* and machine-gunning the another, the *San Diego* that were fishing for tuna in waters that Peru claimed under its 200-mile claim (Clayton 1999, 183-184). This event raised demands in the US Congress for

¹⁶⁴ See, for example, FRUS E-10, Doc 591, which lays out the political situation within Peru in early April. IN this produced by the CIA, Velasco has neutralized any potential threat to his power within the Military and within civil society. The CIA came to a conclusion that Velasco may be in office for a long period of time, and so the US should engage in reducing the nationalist impulse of Velasco in Peru and in Latin America, while continuing to induce Velasco to moderate his position vis-à-vis IPC. The US should also seek help from influential friends of Peru to encourage Velasco to understand that accommodation with the US was also in Peruvian interests. The following day, Kissinger summarized this report for the President and advocated for the CIA's suggestions.

¹⁶⁵ See, for example, FRUS E-10, Doc 683, which is a review of US policy toward Peru from the end of September 1972. The report was produced at the request of the NSC, and finds that, among other things, "On the other hand, this policy has contributed to an adversary relationship between Peru and the U.S., which in turn, has provided opportunities for exploitation by the USSR... U.S. pressure probably has contributed to Peruvian assertions of independence."

US naval escorts of US fishing boats, which would have brought US and Peruvian forces into direct contact. The Congress opted, instead, to pass the Pelly Amendment, which automatically cut military aid to countries--specifically Peru and Ecuador--which attacked US boats on the high seas because these countries were using vessels on loan from the US. The effect for Peru was an immediate end to the Foreign Military Sales Program, a provision which didn't actually take place until the Pelly Amendment was passed.¹⁶⁶

In May, Kissinger advised Nixon to instruct US Ambassador Jones to inform Velasco that the US sought to avoid confrontation. The US would look into a waiver for the military aid embargo if Velasco would agree to accept Rockefeller, allow the US military mission to remain, and agree to attend a three state fisheries conference with the US and Ecuador. The US encouraged Peru to work with them to come to some reasonable solution to the fisheries issue (FRUS E-10, Doc 598).¹⁶⁷ The invitation to the fisheries conference was eventually accepted by Velasco, but not before the US military mission was expelled.¹⁶⁸ This position was later revised and conditions for lifting military sales ban became tied to Peru's commitment to attend a quadripartite fisheries conference, which included the US, Ecuador and Chile (FRUS E-10, Doc 602).¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Peru discovered the fact that military aid was cut off, and protested. Its protest included disinviting Nelson Rockefeller, who had planned a May visit to the country as a representative of Nixon to try to get the IPC matter resolved. Velasco also expelled the US military mission (Clayton, 258).

¹⁶⁷ Doc 598 of FRUS E-10 is a memo where Kissinger documents his instructions to Ambassador Jones for Nixon, from May 22, 1969. Nixon approved Kissinger's recommendations.

¹⁶⁸ Document 601 offered a review of Peruvian military opinions concerning the expulsion of the US military mission in Peru in late May, 1969. Opinions were fairly supportive of Velasco's action, and generally critical of US influence in Peru. This document, more than any that preceded it, foreclosed any thoughts the US may have had to this point of replacing Velasco with another person in the Peruvian Military, and it was clear that the US now also understood that they could do no better with a more "moderate" (quotes in text) civilian leader. Consequently, developing and improving a long term relationship with Velasco now became a priority.

¹⁶⁹ Doc 602 from FRUS E-10 is a memo dated May 27 from Ambassador Jones in Peru to Nixon describing a possible opportunity to get Peru to agree to a fisheries conference. Nixon approved this recommendation, and that approval was communicated to Velasco, who agreed to attend the fisheries conference by mid June.

By August, when progress on IPC and fisheries was reviewed again, the Nixon Administration had more or less come to terms with the fact that Velasco was not going to be swayed by application of formal sanctions. Kissinger summed up the reality of the matter by arguing that Velasco was not in and of himself the problem: the hesitancy on Velasco's part to resolve the outstanding conflicts was more a symptom of rampant nationalism in the entire officer corps, and in most of the country itself. Sanctions under the Hickenlooper Amendment were not going to correct that. They would probably have the opposite effect instead. Kissinger therefore concluded:

"Even if we could bring Velasco down, we have no one to put in his place; we could therefore be no closer to solution on IPC, and merely have shifted the problem to one of reaction to US intervention... The dimension of the present problem therefore is simply not worth taking the risk of US intervention and the consequences that would result for our hemisphere and international position" (FRUS E-10, Doc 605).

This statement, which Nixon agreed with, formed the basis of US policy toward Velasco for the rest of Nixon's first Administration and beyond. It is also a vindication of my hypothetical expectations. FMS sales were resumed July 3, and though they were later restricted again, the US and Peru worked together to avoid further reprisals against US fishing boats during the next tuna harvest. Economic pressure continued to be applied to Peru, if for no other reason than the US wanted Peru and others to know that they couldn't get away with expropriation without response from the US government. When the Government nationalized ITT properties in Peru, they quickly negotiated a settlement whereby Southern Peru Copper Company could buy them out. This eagerness for a settlement bolstered Velasco's claim that IPC was a special case, which calmed the US investment community. The Earthquake that occurred the following summer reset US-Peruvian relations again--the US was a major contributor to the relief effort. While disputes remained outstanding, and new ones were added to the old ones, US policy for

non-overt economic *pressure* aimed at getting Velasco to resolve outstanding conflicts remained essentially the same through the end of 1972. The threat of Hickenlooper itself became nullified by regular deferrals.

Conflicts of Interest, Bolivia under Ovando and Torres: Economic, Security and Ideology

The outcomes in Bolivia were quite different than they were in Peru. The conflicts between the US and Bolivia were both intense and significantly broader than they were in Peru, despite the fact that US interests in Bolivia, compared to almost anywhere else in Latin America, were quite limited. Bolivia is a landlocked and relatively weak country, with some of the most dramatic poverty on the continent. Bolivian society was for the most part a remnant of the past: its people were largely Quechua speaking descendants of ancient Andean tribes, and were for the most part poor and uneducated, while its middle class was very small and relatively uninfluential when compared to the oligarchy who ruled the country. The government of Bolivia was characterized by instability; the *coup d'état* was fact of political life that followed a well known script which most people in Bolivia were familiar with (Dunkerley 1984, 174-175).¹⁷⁰

So it is somewhat perplexing that this clearly minor state in the middle of South America would suddenly be described by senior Nixon Administration officials as "the most dangerous situation in South America" in September of 1970 (New York Times, 23 Sep, 1970, 13). This is a fairly interesting characterization given the outstanding issues in Peru at the time, as well as the looming victory of socialist Salvador Allende in Chile which would take place less than a month later. What was it that suddenly drew the attention of the US to Bolivia at this time, and resulted

¹⁷⁰ Dunkerley 1984 is a book which is widely cited by those who are writing about the events covered in this chapter. It is the most comprehensive English language history of the Torres Administration--including FRUS, which has a number of large gaps, and at least one document that has not been declassified which, given its location in the record, suggests that there are a number of very important facts about US involvement in Bolivia during the period which is not yet known to anyone, save those who were involved in the events themselves.

in US adoption of destabilization policy toward General Juan Jose Torres, who helped the US track down and kill the revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara?

The answer lies in the fact that US interests in Bolivia, limited though they were, were still perceived to be threatened by Bolivian policy, starting during the Administration of General Alfredo Ovando.¹⁷¹ Despite the limited *number* of US interests in Bolivia, those interests were still very important. Bolivia stood at the strategic center of South America, and therefore could influence events in its other, larger, "more important" neighbors. And though US supply points were diverse, and US reserves in tin were enough to offset any stoppage in supply, Bolivia was still one of the leading suppliers of several strategic resources. Furthermore, the US felt a responsibility to help Bolivia to a position of self-help because of the special relationship with Latin America that the US asserted. Most importantly, the US looked at Bolivia as a test case, the goal of which is worth repeating in full:

"This is the test whether a government which launched itself as extremist, leftist, and possibly even Castroist, can be nurtured back to moderation, induced to pay for what it took in exercising its undisputed sovereign right to nationalize property, and shown that its true interests lie in resumed constructive collaboration with the US and its neighbors. The results of this test may well have hemisphere-wide importance, for better or for worse" (FRUS E-10, Doc 88).¹⁷² Clearly, the US was very concerned with the direction of US-Bolivian relations, even in

spite of its relatively unimportant status, because of the implications that the actions of Bolivia's Government had for US relations with Bolivia's more important neighbors. Beginning in 1969, US interests came into direct conflict with Bolivian policy a number of times, and broadened

¹⁷¹ The General who overthrew the previous President Siles a mere four months after Siles assumed power on the death of President Barrientos, who was a staunch supporter of US policies in Latin America and in Bolivia specifically. For a succinct summary of Bolivia's military government after 1964 and US involvement with it, see Blum 2004, 221-229.

¹⁷² Document 88 of FRUS E-10, written as Ovando showed some signs of actually moderating the nationalist position which characterized his first months in office was a memo composed by the Embassy in Bolivia for the State Department. The memo consists more or less of a summary of the annual report from the Ambassador to the State Department, and should be viewed as a recapitulation of US policy in Bolivia, rather than a statement designed to influence future policy toward Bolivia, as many other memos are.

very quickly after October of 1970. By early 1971, there was broad and intense conflict of interest between the US and Bolivia, and it is during this time and in this context that the Nixon Administration issued some of its most explicit statements about destabilization of the Government of Bolivia.

The story of conflicts of interest in Bolivia actually begins during the year long Administration of General Ovando. Ovando took power in Bolivia September 26, 1969, just as matters between the US and Peru were beginning to settle down.¹⁷³ Kissinger's early descriptions of Ovando follow: "He is strongly anti-Communist. He is friendly to the U.S. and has been cooperative with U.S. officials. But he is also a strong nationalist and likely to want to be 'independent' of U.S. influence" (FRUS E-10, Document 79). Kissinger continued in this document to predict that US economic interests will likely be affected, probably in the form of higher royalty payments, taxes, or the forced creation of joint economic ventures with Bolivian firms. Kissinger finally warned that Ovando might feel the urge to nationalize.

He didn't have to wait long for the direst of his predictions to come true. In mid-October, 1969, the Ovando government seized all of Gulf Oil's properties in Bolivia, and threatened to expropriate the properties of other US firms as well (FRUS E-10, Doc 80).¹⁷⁴ The Nixon Administration, through the Ambassador to Bolivia, launched an official protest, and demanded to know what Bolivia's plans for compensation were. But the Nixon expected that Bolivia would

¹⁷³ Ovando took power from President Siles, who was the civilian junior partner of General Rene Barrientos, who himself had taken over in Bolivia during the 1964 Coup where the then President of Bolivia, Victorio Paz was offered a choice between being taken "either to the cemetery, or to the airport" (unnamed Bolivian Officer, quoted in Blum, 2004, 221). Ovando had been the Army Chief of Staff under Barrientos, and had long publicly expressed a desire to become President of Bolivia. After only 5 months of the Siles government, he launched a coup that put him in charge of Bolivia.

¹⁷⁴ Document 80 of FRUS E-10 was a memo from Kissinger to Nixon describing the Gulf Oil expropriation. It was written October 17, 1969, the same day the nationalization occurred. Gulf Oil had long been a major player in the exploitation of Bolivian petroleum resources and was the single largest foreign investor in Bolivia. They were also very closely associated with the Bolivian Government. The helicopter that President Barrientos had been flying in was a Gulf Oil helicopter.

only offer a token compensation, and this might not be enough to prevent the application of the Hickenlooper Amendment in April, 1970. At the same time, Kissinger also evaluated the political situation within Bolivia. He opined that Ovando was weak and not entirely in control of the country--a belief later confirmed by the Ambassador to Bolivia, Ernest Siracusa, in direct talks with the General.¹⁷⁵ Soon, relations between the US and Bolivia were described as "grave" (FRUS E-10, Doc 81).

During this period, the main economic conflicts between the US and Bolivia consisted of the Gulf nationalization, and the potential nationalization of the property of several other US firms inside Bolivia. Among these were Matilde (zinc) Mining, Bolivian Power¹⁷⁶ and South American Placer Mining (FRUS E-10, Doc 82).¹⁷⁷ When asked if the US Government should expect further nationalizations, Ovando responded that the answer to that question depended on how those corporations acted within Bolivia. But this response was clearly not satisfactory to the US Ambassador in Bolivia. Nor was Ovando's offer to compensate Gulf Oil only for their "fixed property above ground" by hiring an outside party to evaluate the value of the expropriated property, sell crude oil that Gulf Oil considered its own at a premium--or the amount that Gulf

¹⁷⁵ For example, while Ovando considered what to do vis-à-vis Gulf Oil, the Commander in Chief of the Bolivian Armed Forces, General Juan Jose Torres, went ahead and occupied Gulf Oil's properties. Kissinger stated that this was a demonstration that the government was now not under Ovando's control, but under the control of radical nationalists. Kissinger wrote a very interesting sentence: "There is no evidence that the Bolivian action was in any way influenced by the Peruvians, except possibly by example, or that there is any link between the two governments." The signal here was that the US government's relationship was improving with Peru at the same time that it was worsening in Bolivia. Though the two acts looked the same, the US would pursue a different course of action in Bolivia than it was pursuing in Peru (FRUS E-10, Doc 80, 2).

¹⁷⁶ Bolivian Power was apparently speculating on the Bolivian currency at this time, which prompted Bolivian action against them.

¹⁷⁷ Document 82 of FRUS E-10 is a memo of the conversation between the US Ambassador to Bolivia, Ernest Siracusa, and Ovando that took place on October 23, 1969. In this document, Siracusa carries out the directives found in Document 81, and discusses the rapid deterioration in US-Bolivian relations following the Gulf nationalization. His conclusion was that Ovando was not able to comment on compensation or further nationalizations because he himself was not fully in charge in Bolivia, and would not necessarily be able to prevent more expropriation even if he wanted to.

had overpriced the crude for the purposes of information that it passed on to the Bolivian Government--and then using the proceeds to pay Gulf off (FRUS E-10, Document 83).¹⁷⁸

Once direct meetings between Ovando's government and Gulf Oil began, the issue of expropriations cooled off for some time. Determination of compensation, and the way that compensation would be handled--in light of the apparent need to do it in a way which wouldn't arouse nationalist anger in Bolivia--caused the matter to drag on over the remainder of Ovando's administration. A month before Ovando was overthrown the following October, the US Ambassador announced that Gulf had accepted Ovando's compensation package (FRUS E-10, Doc 91)¹⁷⁹

Other economic issues, meanwhile, appeared in US-Bolivian relations. For example: in December, the Ambassador in Bolivia noted with regret the expulsion of the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT), which was the CIA's labor front that had long been active in Latin America and the failure to renew the contract with the AFL-CIO's labor liaison in Latin America, known as AIFLD (FRUS E-10, Doc 84).¹⁸⁰ While those groups would maintain some

¹⁷⁸ Document 83 of FRUS E-10 is a memo written on November 6, 1969 and is an internal State Department memo concerning the progress of compensation negotiations. The memo was for information purposes, and there is no notation that Nixon or Kissinger read it. However, this information helped the State Department form the policy that direct negotiations between the Government of Bolivia and Gulf Oil should be facilitated as soon as possible, or else relations between the US and Bolivia would continue to deteriorate.

¹⁷⁹ Doc 91 of FRUS E-10 is a report by the Ambassador to State announcing the acceptance of Ovando's settlement offer to Gulf as compensation for expropriation from September 5, 1970. It is important to note that while several authors, Dunkerley especially, suggest that the US played a role in Ovando's overthrow, this document shows instead that Bolivia was in the process of passing the test that the US talked about, was moderating the nationalist impulse which brought it to power, and was salvaging its relationship with the US. The problems that Ovando faced were coming from Ovando's domestic opponents. The Ambassador noted that Ovando privately confided to him that he expected to be attacked for his settlement of the Gulf Oil compensation matter.

¹⁸⁰ Document 84 of FRUS E-10 is a memo from Ambassador Siracusa to State written in mid December covering a discussion between him and Ovando to ask about progress of the Gulf Compensation, as well as to address what the Ambassador referred to as "the present hate campaign" being engaged in by members of Ovando's Government against the US. This term was brought up in response to Ovando's accusation of a CIA plot against the Government in collusion with Gulf Oil and the US Embassy, a charge that the Ambassador did not particularly or explicitly deny, at least not in this document. It should be noted that both ORIT and AIFLD were implicated a long history of labor agitation against leftist governments in Latin America. Both played a key role in the destabilization of Cheddi Jagan in British Guyana at the beginning of the decade. And both groups would play a role in Chile, in the destabilization of Salvador Allende during the following two years.

influence in Bolivia for a time, Ovando's successor would finish the job in February of 1971 with the closure of the Bolivian Center of Syndical Education (CBES) (Dunkerley, 186).

Other conflicts did not appear until Ovando was overthrown in early October of 1970. During Ovando's short term, general economic and political instability of Bolivia caused problems for the US.¹⁸¹ His eventual replacement, the former Commander in Chief of the Bolivian Armed Forces General Juan Jose (J.J.) Torres, was fired during the spring of 1970 as Ovando moved to the right. But Ovando was himself ousted by a coup and counter coup a few months later which left Torres in charge of the country.¹⁸² The deciding factor in Torres' ultimate victory was not the military forces he had organized; the Central Bolivian Union (COB) called a general strike for the 7th of October to protest the overthrow of Ovando and this action convinced many officers to abandon Miranda's junta. Torres was simply the last man standing "on a day when Bolivia was ruled by no less than six Presidents (Dunkerley, 176-177). The coup greatly frustrated the Nixon Administration. Their hard work getting Ovando to come around to a more moderate position, as evidenced by his offer for settlement of Gulf Oil was now being reversed by someone who was clearly more radical than his predecessor, or as Viron Vaky noted,

¹⁸¹ For example, FRUS E-10, Document 90, written by the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs to Nixon, describes ongoing guerrilla activity in Bolivia. According to the report, pro-Castroist guerrillas of the "National Liberation Army" (ELN) destroyed the property of isolated mining operations owned by US firms and took a couple people hostage. While the Bolivian Army was judged capable of dealing with that particular threat, should a more general guerrilla outbreak occur, the Bolivian Army would not be able to effectively contain it. Therefore, State advised the President to make ammunition and MAP grants available to Bolivia. This document reflects a gradual and tentative warming of relations between the US and the rightward shifting Ovando, but none of this came in time to save Ovando, whose government was overthrown a little more than a month later by the Bolivian military.

¹⁸² Torres' previous claim to fame was the mastermind of the campaign which captured and killed Guevara in 1967, and his well-known populist bent. The coup which overthrew Ovando was a complicated affair, which involved one group of rightist officers, under the command of Commander in Chief Rogelio Miranda actually removing him from office. This group controlled a number of key elements of the Bolivian Armed Forces stationed at important points in the country. Meanwhile, another group of important military units, stationed at other key points in the country, publicly pledged to support Ovando. Some of these units were key in transport, and therefore hamstrung the potential deployment of the rebellion. The garrison at La Paz, the most important unit in the country, had declared support for Ovando's removal, but had not extended its support to the Miranda junta. As Ovando and Miranda were negotiating Ovando's removal from office, a third group was being clandestinely organized by General Torres at the El Alto Airbase in La Paz, and included the air transport unit, the palace guard and several officers who had previously publicly backed Ovando. This group publicly declared themselves in opposition to the Miranda Coup.

the Peruvian Generals, who the US had for the most part settled with by that time (FRUS E-10, Doc 93).¹⁸³

Early US appraisals of Torres were highly critical. As Kissinger reported to Nixon the day of the coup, Torres was seen as ultra-nationalist, anti-US and leftist. The "Ovando test" was being undone, but what was more troubling for the Administration was the potential of a synergistic relationship between radicals in Bolivia and the potential government of the socialist Salvador Allende, who was about become President in Chile, and who the US had already gone to great lengths to prevent from taking office.

Kissinger's initial appraisal was that there would be conflict between the US and Torres: Kissinger identified his ideology as "ultra-nationalist, leftist and anti-US (FRUS E-10, Doc 93). The CIA proposed that the relationship that the US had cultivated with Ovando be extended to Torres, to keep him from radicalizing Bolivian policy, though they also based their recommendation on his the assumption that he was not "unredeemable." This suggests that the CIA also believed that there would be conflict, and they were trying to nip it before it became intense (FRUS E-10, Doc 94). Kissinger agreed with the appraisal, and added that Torres was not ideological, but pragmatic, populist, and fit the stereotypical impression of the "caudillo" (FRUS E-10, Doc 95).¹⁸⁴

Economically, problems started from the first day of Torres' Administration, when throughout the country, workers and students associated with the COB General Strike which

¹⁸³ Doc 93 of FRUS is Kissinger's informational account of the developing situation in Bolivia from October 7th, 1970. The document included a biographical sketch of Torres as well as a general account of the coup and counter coup that removed Ovando and allowed Torres to "take over the country".

¹⁸⁴ Docs 94 and 95 are early characterizations of Torres. Both were written by Kissinger for Nixon. Document 94 from a day after Torres took over, contains the recommendation from the CIA which rested on the assumption that Torres may not be "unredeemable" as Allende was and which Nixon apparently accepted. Document 95, written a week later, repeated much of the same information and demonstrates that a week after the coup, the US was still trying to figure Torres out personally, and would base much of their policy on what they learned about how he intended to govern. Both documents stressed that Torres has pledged to honor the commitment to compensate Gulf Oil that was concluded by Ovando.

helped bring Torres to power occupied businesses, radio stations, and even US government property at LaPaz, Sucre, Cochabamba and Oruro. Several US Marines, who were attempting to defend the La Paz offices of the US Government-owned Bolivian-American Center, were beat up and threatened with death by the occupiers (Dunkerley, 182). Torres, remembering the important role played by Labor in his rise to power, eventually officially recognized these "cooperativisations" and the Ambassador Siracusa demanded 45,000 dollars in compensation and guarantee of return of the property. The Bolivian Government offered to negotiate, but were unwilling to run out the occupiers (Dunkerley, 181-182).

In January, 1971, a coup under the leadership of Colonels Hugo Banzer and Edmundo Valencia (who were both closely associated with Miranda the previous fall) failed, due largely once more to the activation of the masses, and the threat of another strike by the COB. This coup served to push Torres even further to the left, but more importantly, it served to encourage the Bolivian Left itself. More occupations followed. In response to popular pressure, Torres renationalized the copper tailings recovery operations at Catavi, and in late April nationalized Matilde Mine, as well as a handful of other operations in Bolivia. Torres also finally closed down the last offices of the ORIT and AIFLD-backed Bolivian Center of Syndical Education (CBES) in February, and expelled the Peace Corps in May (Dunkerley, 184-186).

Washington's answer to these events was paltry in terms of response, but very damaging to Bolivia: Nixon approved tin sales, and in doing so applied one of the few remaining pressures that the US had in Bolivia which exerted any sort of force at all. But soon after this policy was applied, it was reversed again. It is believed that, in reversing the tin sales, the President was

responding to a formal appeal from the Bolivian Ambassador (FRUS E-10, Doc 99; FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. IV, Document 440).¹⁸⁵

In terms of security and ideology, the US was deeply concerned about the potential for the Soviets to take advantage of the chaos in Bolivia and establish a foothold on the continent, as Siracusa put it in June 1971, "at a very cheap price" (FRUS E-10, Doc 102).¹⁸⁶ Even before Torres took power, the Government of Bolivia under Ovando established diplomatic relations with the Soviets, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania in an attempt to demonstrate independence from the US. With improved commercial and political relations with the Soviet bloc, the US saw the potential increase in Soviet presence and influence in Bolivia as a function of the decrease of influence of the US, and felt that something needed to be done quickly.¹⁸⁷ At the same time, the US Ambassador noted that the Left, which the US was now convinced had control of the Government--or at least was uncontrollable by the Government--was calling on Torres to kick out the US military mission (FRUS E-10, Doc 102). As a result of the rise of leftism in Bolivia, the US government set out to find a way to assist those elements in the military which they considered "moderate" alternatives to the extremism which now held sway in the Bolivian society and which the Government of Bolivia seemed entirely unwilling to do anything about.

¹⁸⁵ Doc 99 of FRUS E-10 is an editorial note that discusses the basic chronology of the decision on tin policy of the Nixon Administration. Document 440 of Volume IV of FRUS 1969-1976 is a memo from the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness to Kissinger. The memo covers the April 9th decision to suspend tin sales indefinitely and presents a request to grant an exception to that decision, being made on behalf of a firm affiliated with US Steel which the Director reports will present minimal impact on US-Bolivian Relations.

¹⁸⁶ Document 102 of FRUS E-10 was a memo written by Arnold Nachmanoff of the NSC to Kissinger. In this memo, the author wrote a brief history of Torres' move to the left, as well as advised Kissinger to propose a military aid package which would strengthen the military for when they were prepared to move against Torres, despite there being currently no preferable alternative to Torres.

¹⁸⁷ FRUS does not offer specifics, which were found in a CIA briefing that was attached to the original document, but not included in FRUS.

Siracusa's concerns were not entirely wild. Following the January Banzer Coup, Torres made a rousing speech praising the power of the people in defense of his government. Reportedly, the crowd broke out in a chant of "Revolucion Socialista". Torres attempted to return to the theme of his speech, what he referred to as a "Nationalist Revolution" but was unable to move the crowd to his point. And then, in what must have confirmed Washington's worst fears, Torres responded to the crowd by saying, "We are here to proclaim that the Nationalist Revolution will go *where ever the people want to take it*" [emphasis my own] (Dunkerley, 184). Surely this statement must have immediately raised alarms, at least in the US Embassy in La Paz!

With Torres' tacit blessing, leftists in the Labor and Student movements in Bolivia convened the Popular Assembly on June 22, which in effect supplanted the formal institutions of democracy and legislation in Bolivia, and aimed at establishing a radical, anti-imperialist agenda for the county. The assembly, which met in the Legislative Palace itself, was the product of popular opposition to the January Coup and Torres unwillingness to suppress radical leftist forces in the labor and student movements. Its stated objective was "the achievement of national liberation and the installing of socialism in Bolivia" (Dunkerley, 194). It was the Popular Assembly which pressed Torres to expel the Military Mission, as well as push whatever was left of US influence out of the country. The Brazilian Ambassador to Bolivia, General Hugo Bethlem, described the Assembly "the continent's first soviet under the direction of Russia" (Dunkerley, 196). US opinions of the Assembly, as well as the general state of affairs in Bolivia seemed to mimic Bethlem's viewpoint (FRUS E-10, Doc 104).¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ Document 104 of FRUS E-10 was the 40 committee memo that discussed US policy toward Torres from late June forward. The 40 Committee was the secret committee set up to develop covert operations against foreign governments. In this document, the Committee discusses the search for moderate alternatives to Torres, both in the National Revolution Movement (MNR) as well as the military of Bolivia. The committee acknowledges that

It is here that security and ideological conflicts overlap.¹⁸⁹ The reported increase in influence of the Soviets, the expulsion of the Peace Corps and threatened expulsion of the US military mission, as well as the attacks on US property and the assault of US servicemen during the October coup and the apparent weakness of the Torres Government to contain or prevent the activities of the radicalizing Left in Bolivia all amounted to a security threat for the US, which they acutely felt the need to address. But these were also viewed by the Nixon Administration as the result of the rise of a radical left, which Torres tolerated and to some degree promoted, and its influence on the Torres Government. The distinctly anti-US tone of the radicalized Left and the freedom of movement and action that Communists and leftists of other stripes felt in Bolivia caused a great deal of concern for US policy makers. More troubling were the statements of the support and encouragement that Torres had made himself for radicalization and for the Left. Combined, these actions amounted to evidence of a strong ideological conflict between the US and Bolivia.¹⁹⁰ By June of 1971, relations between the US and Bolivia had gone from offering Torres an opportunity to remain a friend of the US to Nixon and Kissinger authorizing the CIA and the 40 Committee to begin searching for an alternative to support in Bolivia by no later than early June, eight months after Torres had taken office. The US adopted destabilization as a policy toward Bolivia by at least this late date. The result of policy conflicts in Bolivia was dramatically different in Peru, because of the inclusion of the ideological component. In Peru,

charges against the US for covert operations are nothing new, but then again, this will be an asset if their activity is discovered: "Since the CIA has been accused regularly (and falsely) of innumerable plots and activities in Bolivia, one more accusation should not cause excessive public reaction."

¹⁸⁹ When I discussed the problem of independence of variables in this dissertation, I noted that often they will overlap, and one variable can be closely related, i.e. not independent from another in some cases, and this made it necessary for me to use a case study approach, rather than a more quantitative approach to establish causal links between these events in-country and the policy outcomes in Washington. At any rate it is rare that events like those described above happen in a vacuum, where it is easy for US policy makers to pick out one type of conflict from another. Bolivia under Torres was such a case.

¹⁹⁰ Among these statements were support for the Popular Assembly and talk about wiping out the distinction between rich and poor, made during, for lack of a better word, his inaugural address.

Velasco had made no secret of his distaste for radical leftism and Communism. In Bolivia, Torres openly endorsed radical leftism.

US Responses to Conflicts of Interest in Bolivia: Destabilization

US response toward the broad and intense conflicts of interest in Bolivia is more difficult to ascertain than responses to the comparatively more limited conflicts in Peru. There are a number of reasons for this: timing is one I have mentioned above, but beyond this, the time frame is more compressed than it was in relations with Velasco. The crisis unfolded in Bolivia over the space of ten months between the time when Torres became President and when he was overthrown, as contrasted with Velasco which was spaced out over more than seven years.

As a result, one notes a certain unpreparedness to US-Bolivian relations: the US was still attempting to evaluate Torres when relations took a sharp turn toward crisis.¹⁹¹ Before June 1971, responses toward conflicts of interest with the Bolivian Government were relatively limited. In late December of 1969, Ovando complained of the plot being directed against him by the CIA, Gulf Oil and the US Embassy. The Ambassador did not deny the accusation, but instead responded that it was difficult to determine Ovando's positions toward the US as long as an anti-US hate campaign was being carried out by Ovando's government (FRUS E-10, Doc 84).¹⁹²

From January 1970 on State Department policy was aimed at identifying elements within the Bolivian government which would be able to *pressure Ovando to moderate his positions*.

The goal was first and foremost to build a positive relationship between the US Ambassador and

¹⁹¹ It is also possible that much of the documentation of US responses remains classified. At least one of the main actors in the affair, Henry Kissinger, is still living, and doesn't even really mention the response to Torres in his memoirs.

¹⁹² Secondary sources give credence to Ovando's charges when they indicate that the US had cut off aid to Bolivia to protest the Gulf nationalization and that there was an active CIA covert operation going on that targeted Ovando at the time (New York Times, Dec 14, 1969, 22; Blum 227).

Ovando, but the Embassy was to do what it could to avoid the appearance of interference in the Bolivian Government. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs made this policy explicit: "I want to make it perfectly clear that we do not have in mind preparations for replacing the present Government but rather working with moderate and constructive elements on the scene to influence the present Government." This seems to contradict the reports that the CIA was working to destabilize Ovando at that time (FRUS E-10, Doc 85). But this policy, if taken at face value, also supports my hypothesis: During Ovando's administration, the ideological conflict was not very acute, though there were intense conflicts in the other two areas of interests, so consequently, I would not expect to see destabilization.

Apparently, this policy paid off. When Ovando approached Ambassador Siracusa at the end of January about another alleged CIA plot, Siracusa advised him that he had come to Bolivia instructed to pursue the friendliest course possible, but this was impossible to do as long as these accusations kept coming up. Ovando agreed, and said that he would publicly confirm the legitimacy of the US diplomatic mission and the Ambassador (FRUS E-10, Doc 86). The policy announced at the beginning of the month was beginning to bear fruit, and relations were apparently improving.¹⁹³ Ovando reversed his confrontational course, cracked down on student groups, sacked the leftist General Torres, and made definitive progress on the Gulf Oil issue (Blum, 227). Relations improved to the degree that the US was suddenly able, within the space of two months, to talk about Bolivia as a test case for redemption of a nationalist reformist government through *pressure* (FRUS E-10, Doc 88).

¹⁹³ But there are a number of troubling omissions from this document. Some points in the discussion are entirely redacted. Others are only mostly redacted, followed by the line "I agreed on the desirability of this and it will take place." The very next point in the document starts with a redaction, and then says, "Comment: I believe that it is in Ovando's interest to suppress or minimize the *threatened scandal*, that he desires constructive relations with us... and that therefore this is no trickery involved." What scandal this is, the document does not say. Blum is, however, willing to make a guess. He writes "But then... it seems... someone got to Ovando with an offer he couldn't refuse."

Unlike the Peruvian case, in April, the US was clear that appropriate steps were being taken to resolve the Gulf issue and therefore avoid automatic application of the Hickenlooper Amendment. This led the US to gradually lift the economic pressures, restore Military Assistance Program aid, and begin opening the pipelines of credit (FRUS E-10, Doc 89). In Mid-September, Ovando announced that his government had come to terms with Gulf Oil, and made a compensation offer that Gulf accepted. The crisis was gradually abating, and it seems that the pressure was yielding results. By August, the US was actively *stabilizing* the Bolivian Government against active leftist insurgencies that had appeared in the country by supplying more military assistance and ammunition to fight against guerrillas in the countryside (FRUS E-10, Doc 90).

And then, suddenly, it was all over: Torres took power in early October 1970 in a confusing set of coups and counter coups. The US scrambled to try to maintain what had been built over the previous year with the Government of Bolivia. The initial overtures to Torres were made with a measure of apprehension. On the day following Torres' rise to power, Kissinger wrote to the Nixon about an idea floated by the CIA. In this plan, the US would quickly announce that it was "not automatically his enemy." If Torres were to act reasonably and not instead engage in "far out radicalization," despite his "problems" the US would be willing to establish a *modus vivendi* with his government. The US was willing to continue to give Torres the benefit of the doubt through December, at least (FRUS E-10, Doc 96).¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁴ Document 96 of FRUS E-10 is an internal state document which discusses the decision of Nixon to extend the suspension of sales of tin from US reserves. It described Torres' government as essentially moderate, and argues that an extension of the suspension will help him consolidate his government against more radical elements. The issue it deals with specifically, the suspension of tin sales, concerned Bolivia directly: If the US sold off its tin stockpile as it had intended to do, the price of tin, which was Bolivia's most significant export, would drop and the Bolivian economy would suffer dramatically. The US government had agreed not to sell the tin in a hopes that Torres opt for a more moderate course, as opposed to a radical one.

Kissinger's initial impressions about Torres apparently pervaded US policy making over the next half a year. The lever used by the US in attempting to influence Peruvian policy was the threat of reduction of US tin stockpiles. If the US decided to release tin on the open market, the mere announcement of the plan would send tin prices tumbling. The effect on Bolivia, which relied on tin exports to subsidize its economy, was devastating. Consequently, while it appeared that Torres was in charge in Bolivia, US policy makers believed that this lever of pressure could be applied to get him to alter his policies. The US decided not to sell its tin in December to continue to allow Torres to consolidate his regime and follow a moderate course, which included honoring the compensation deal for Gulf Oil (FRUS E-10, Doc 96).

After the January coup attempt, it slowly became clear where the real power in Bolivia lay, and it wasn't necessarily with General Torres. For the second time in three and a half months, the masses had performed the definitive act in opposition to the right who were attempting to take control of the Government in Bolivia. The impulse now lay with the organized and radical left. The US was relatively slow in coming to terms with this fact, but Torres' encouragement of the Left on top of the economic and security conflicts between the US and Bolivia led the US to begin looking for alternatives to Torres.

By March, the US government was researching whether or not there were any such alternatives to Torres. At this point, the consensus was that there was no real alternative to Torres, and the US should continue to try to exert pressure on Torres to get him to alter his policies toward those preferred by the US, at least for the time being.¹⁹⁵ Economic pressure similar to the pressure being applied in Peru, was once more exerted on Torres and the tin stockpile sales issue once more was being considered by the US government (FRUS E-10, Doc

¹⁹⁵ Here is another example of the "no acceptable alternatives" hypothesis. It held in Bolivia, apparently, for only a few months, until a point where Torres was viewed as being so bad by American policy makers that a number of previously rejected alternatives suddenly looked more acceptable in comparison.

97). By April, Siracusa believed that a serious crisis had been averted, mainly because the US agreed once more to suspend tin sales (FRUS E-10, Doc 98). But that feeling was to end by May 1st, when Torres endorsed the Popular Assembly, nationalized Matilde Mine and tried to improve relations with the socialist Government of Allende in Chile (FRUS E-10, Doc 100).

US responses to the crisis in Bolivian conflicts crystallized following the establishment of the Popular Assembly in Bolivia in June of 1971. US officials from the Defense Department publicly described Bolivia as the most dangerous situation in Latin America because of the potential for Soviet gains there. And there is no statement from the National Security Advisor or the President declaring that alternatives to Torres would not allow US interests to be advanced in Bolivia as in Peru. In fact, it is just the opposite: As soon as Nixon gave the go ahead, US policy makers began casting about for alternatives to Torres within the military, and created policy to ensure that they could still maintain influence when Torres was finally overthrown. By mid-June, Nixon demonstrated that the US had begun thinking in terms of CIA support for a coup to remove Torres (FRUS E-10, Doc 101).

US policy switched by that point, from trying to pressure Torres to alter his trajectory into crisis to getting rid of Torres. They had concluded by this time that the policy they had pursued would not work to resolve the conflicts between the two governments. The National Security Council stated as much in June: "The prospects for protecting US interests and perpetuating our influence in Bolivia are not good *no matter what we do.*" With this in mind, the US retooled its policy toward Torres. The Nixon Administration set about to undermine him and definitively destabilize his already weak government (FRUS E-10, Doc 102).

History records the various aspects of US Policy. On the one hand, Nixon approved a recommendation to increase MAP aid to the Bolivian military, with the expressed goal of

building good relations between the US government and the Bolivian military. The US believed that the Military could act as a "moderating" influence on Torres, and would be inclined to do so if they could be sure of US support. This policy, which mirrors US policy in Brazil under Goulart, was the same as picking a side in a potential coup, and was meant to produce the same results. Run in tandem with this policy was a decision to not approve any new loans, and not help Torres get credit in international lending agencies--but not necessarily hinder the Government of Bolivia there either, at least early on (FRUS E-10, Doc 103).

In late June, it was firmly decided to support Torres' political opponents: "We propose that this next step now be taken and that we exploit the existing relationships for the more positive objective of promoting an acceptably moderate and unified opposition to Torres" (FRUS E-10, Doc 104). This involved, for the most part, funding and defraying the propaganda costs of civilian oppositions, the old National Revolution Movement, and the "moderate", anti-Torres elements in the Bolivian military (FRUS E-10, Doc 104). At a July meeting of the 40 Committee, the group convened by the President to organize covert action, representatives from the relevant US Cabinet departments expressed their opinions on the policy. Most were in favor of destabilization, and the only ones who suggested any reservations were the State Department who advocated for continuation of the pressure policy, and the Defense Department who didn't trust that the military would offer any better alternatives to Torres (FRUS E-10, Doc 105).

How much of a role the US played in the direct planning and execution of the coup is not covered in FRUS. There was some controversy in mid August over the US handing money to the Bolivian conspirators, (FRUS E-10, Doc 107) so it is clear that the US knew about the eventual coup well before hand, and the US was at least partially--though likely completely--funding the effort. At any rate, given the use of the money set out by the 40 Committee and from

other sources, it is hard to believe that the US did not play a role in at least some of the coordination of the coup.¹⁹⁶

The US Embassy had full knowledge of the coup. The CIA had at the very least funded and organized the scattered and disorganized opposition to Torres in civil society and the military. US military personnel directly assisted the coup in important ways at critical moments. It is, however, still unclear of the degree to which the US was involved directly in Torres' overthrow. The day after Banzer took power in Bolivia, the US government denied any involvement (New York Times Aug 30, 1971, 3). But the evidence points directly to US involvement at a fundamental level.

The change in policy by the US from pressure to destabilization occurred between March and June of 1972, and by August, the US had been solidly supporting opposition elements in Bolivia for two months. Given the chaotic environment of Bolivia during the period, two months was all the US-supported opposition needed to rid themselves of a relatively weak, highly polarizing leader like Torres. I can say for sure that the opposition would have acted without the US- they had already tried in January without any indication of US support. But the evaluation of the US during the destabilization was that the US should help to prevent them from launching another premature effort, and so that the US could maintain some influence over the outcome. US policy directly weakened the government to the point where a disorganized and disparate opposition could get rid of Torres. And US responses toward the coup show approval of its outcome.

¹⁹⁶ There is a huge hole in the documentation around these events. There is a document that is entirely classified from the day of the coup. The next document was from 4 months later, after Colonel Banzer, back from Argentina and supported to some degree by US Major Robert Lundin, had overthrown the Government of Bolivia, succeeding in August where he had failed in January. Lundin at the critical moment, made US Air Force radios available to Banzer's groups when their own radios had failed (Dunkerley, 200).

Concluding Statements: Peru and Bolivia

The hypothesis in the cases of Peru and Bolivia is demonstrated. In the case of Peru, there were intense conflicts of the economic and security interest dimensions. And yet, because the US accepted Velasco's statements against communism and believed that there was no moderate alternative to him, the ideological conflict did not occur. Velasco was the best, in terms of ideology that the US was going to get. The US was initially concerned about Velasco's nationalism, but this concern was soon overshadowed by the very real problems of IPC nationalization, and the fisheries issue, which were both long standing issues, and remained, for the most part unresolved by the time Nixon was sworn in for his second term. Instead, the US went out of its way to develop a relationship with Velasco that was productive, if not friendly. Nixon's advisors felt that a tougher line would produce a less favorable result in the government, and restricted US policy to applying pressure on Velasco, specifically to get him to change his firm stance on IPC, other outstanding nationalizations, and the fisheries/200 mile limit.

On the other hand, the US destabilized the Torres government when the ideological component, caused by Torres support for a radicalizing left and his willingness to at least consider some of their proposals, was added to the outstanding economic and security issues that rose over Torres' ten month long administration. It is clear that at the beginning of the Torres Administration, the US government's relations with Bolivia were improving and the US originally decided to offer some critical support in an attempt to ensure moderate, pro-US outcomes from Torres. A series of shocks reversed this policy, and by June 1971, the crisis was broad and intense to the degree that Nixon and Kissinger are on record discussing a CIA led coup against Torres.

When Nixon's attention was dragged to Bolivia by reports from the Popular Assembly, the initiatives that Torres endorsed in Bolivia, the expulsion of the Peace Corps and the threatened removal of the US military mission, all of a sudden, the Nixon Administration realized that things had progressed in Bolivia to a crisis level. The conflict of interests was both intense, in that very serious matters were at stake for the Nixon Administration, and broad in that the conflict covered a wide spectrum of interests, where all three types were represented to the Nixon Administration. Predictably, and conforming to my hypothetical expectations, Nixon adopted, almost immediately, a very costly policy and then, over the next few months, carried it out. The evidence we have available, limited though it is shows that the US played a decisive role in the coup that eventually ousted Torres.

Planning and contingency development occurred, again on the record, over the next few months, and then the primary record goes completely silent as US destabilization policy is carried out in Bolivia. The US denied their involvement, though the documents demonstrate that this sort of claim is entirely untrue. Meanwhile, when the documents pick up again in January of 1972, the Ambassador, who was such key player in development of US policy in Bolivia, reports that life in Bolivia has completely changed, and things are going well under Banzer, the fellow who replaced Torres, and who was helped, at the critical moment, by uniformed US service personnel, using US government property. The circumstantial evidence of US destabilization is convincing.

It should be noted that during much of the period studied in this chapter, Chile was the primary concern of the US in the region--Peruvian and Bolivian Conflicts were treated more as distractions. But their relationship to Chile also affected US responses to them respectively. The US Government became very focused on the Chilean government, and a country adopting a

positive relationship with Chile after Allende's election was akin to recognition of Cuba during the early part of the decade. Allende was perceived to be such a threat to the US that the US had been attempting to prevent him from being elected and taking power in Chile since the Johnson Administration. The Nixon Administration added a special emphasis to this effort, and sank a significant sum of money to throw his Government off balance and cause his downfall by strengthening his opponents in Chilean society and in the Chilean military.

With such a major foreign policy challenge looming in the background, events in Peru and Bolivia took on additional significance to the US. What happened here would have implications for the entire rest of the continent. Consequently, conflicts between these states and the US were magnified, and the Nixon Administration perceived threats around every corner. When the US became aware of the fact that there was no alternative to Velasco, but more importantly, when it was clear that Velasco was not going to present an ideological challenge--Velasco's private diplomacy yielded genuinely positive results, whatever his public support for nationalism in Peru--the US decided then that it was more of an interest for the US to accommodate his government, accept that it was probably around for the long haul. Subsequently, Velasco's government became one model for military governments in Latin America--a model to which the Torres Government was regularly and unfavorably compared.

These results vindicate the theory and demonstrate the hypothesis. In Peru, the deviation from the Nixon Administration's preferred status quo was just acceptable enough to prevent the adoption of the extremely risky policy of seeking Velasco's replacement through destabilization. The US, instead, adopted policy with the aim to get him to moderate his policies, more toward the policies preferred by the US. In Bolivia under Torres, however conflict was intense and broad enough, that the deviation from the status quo under Torres, which the US set at the end of

the Ovando Administration was unacceptable. This caused the US to adopt a very risky policy of destabilizing the government and promoting Torres' overthrow by elements in the Bolivian military. Furthermore, the US was even willing to risk discovery, to some degree, both because they assumed that nobody pays any attention when Bolivia issues statements about CIA intervention, but also because they were concerned about the establishment of another Russian client in a country that was both relatively insignificant, and yet could serve as a base to influence events on the entire continent.

A word on source material seems appropriate here. Most of the chronology of the Torres government and the policies that conflicted with US interests in Bolivia is not given in FRUS. Why that is the case is not clear. Many of the later documents on the Torres Administration in FRUS are published with little context as to the historical background that they appear behind the events they are reporting. I suspect the reason is that, similar to Peru, Nixon's attention was taken entirely off those relatively insignificant countries and focused squarely on Chile. The disappearance of an abundance of substantial documentation in FRUS occurs for Bolivia right around the same time as it does in Peru.

Consequently, while Torres' government, and the civilian forces unleashed by the rise of the populist, leftist General were engaged in several very incendiary activities in Bolivia, FRUS hardly reports on any of it at all.¹⁹⁷ Six months come and go with a few documents relating to Nixon's tin policy and its moderating effects on the Bolivian Government before a transcript of a telephone call between Kissinger and Nixon appears, which Kissinger appears to inform Nixon

¹⁹⁷ We know that the State Department, at least was aware of these events. On January 14, 1972 Ambassador Siracusa wrote a summary of some of these events in his annual summary for 1971, several months after Torres had been removed from power. These events included the damage of 100,000 dollars of US Government Property in the Coup of 1970, Leftists running roughshod in the country and subjecting the Embassy and the US to a "constant barrage of vicious and inflammatory anti-American propaganda" with reprisals for all those who opposed, threats to the private sector, occupation of several US government offices, expulsion of the peace Corps and USIA, bombings, terrorism, guerrilla activity, and etc. The Ambassador noted that the only bright spot of the Torres Administration was that Gulf Oil negotiations "went on positively and fruitfully" (FRUS E-10, Doc 109)

that the US may have a serious problem in Bolivia, Nixon answers that he has been made aware of it by the Secretary of the Treasury Connelly. Kissinger assured the president that he has already asked the CIA to "crank up an operation, post haste" and start working with the "military" by which he means the element of the military that opposes the Government "or this thing is going to go down the drain." Nixon then asks what the CIA thought the US needed in Bolivia. "A coup?" Nixon asked. Kissinger answers that before they even think about a coup, the US still needs to get a better idea of all the players in Bolivia, and that the CIA is supposed to provide a report soon which will give them a better idea of who and what they are dealing with. Nixon closes by reminding Kissinger (and himself) that "we gave those goddamned Bolivians that tin... Reverse that" (FRUS E-10, Doc 101).¹⁹⁸

In conclusion, the Nixon Administration was, to some degree circumspect about their role in the events in foreign countries. They often attempted to hide, to a large degree actions that would diminish US prestige, or to spin events in a way where the US appeared to be on the correct side of international norms.¹⁹⁹ As the release of documents about Nixon's Latin American policy would begin to reveal starting with the Church investigation the US role in the overthrow of at least one government--but actually quite a few more--was very deep, and involved schemes of an almost Byzantine nature. The documents looked at in this particular chapter did not come to light until 2010, but like the Church Hearings, confirm what historians have suspected all along: the US not only had a role in the overthrow of Bolivia, but could be

¹⁹⁸ Document 101 of FRUS E-10 is the transcript of a portion of a telephone call between Nixon and Kissinger from June 11, 1971. This document is striking because it immediately follows several reports from the State Department that deal with the decision of the US government not to sell off its tin stock, with the aim of helping Torres stave off more radicals. The mood in the previous documents was that the US sought to find a way to continue to strengthen the Torres government and prevent it from following a more radical course toward socialism. This abrupt shift suggests that either several documents are missing from the record, or, more likely, in my estimation, the Nixon Administration was not paying attention to Bolivia as matters progressed beyond control toward conflict with the US.

¹⁹⁹ Fortunately, there are a small handful of secondary sources which cover this sliver of history. Dunkerley's text is the most complete.

none other but a significant player in the whole affair. When compared to US policy toward Peru, at the same time, and noting the difference, my theoretical explanation for the difference in policy despite many of the same circumstances, becomes more plausible.

CHAPTER 5

US POLICY IN EL SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA, 1981-1985

Introduction

Contrary to the secretive conduct of US Policy during the Nixon Administration, during the Reagan Administration, the US was very openly involved with aiding a rebellion against the established political leadership of one country (Nicaragua) while aiding the leaders of another against its own insurgency (El Salvador). In this chapter, I argue that there were several intense conflicts of interest in both countries: In El Salvador, there were security and ideological conflicts, but no economic conflict, and so the US did not adopt destabilization. In Nicaragua, the conflict was sufficiently broad, and destabilization was the response.

While the international rivalry continued through the 70s the US and the Soviet Union had more or less established a *modus vivendi* under détente which involved spheres of influence that were not supposed to be trampled on.²⁰⁰ Latin America--with the exception of Cuba, of course, who continued to defy US policy preferences--fell squarely within the US sphere throughout most of the 1970s.²⁰¹ Following the coup against Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, Latin America was for the most part quiet. There were insurgencies that continued in the mountains of Colombia and Peru against rightist leaders there, but for the most part, the Soviets, who were now for the most part completely underwriting the Cuban economy, were hardly interested in taking on another economically and politically expensive client in Latin America.

²⁰⁰ During the Carter Administration, US foreign policy departed, in some ways from the policy illustrated in the previous chapters of this dissertation. As the events I described during Nixon's first term were taking place, Nixon was also conducting very open and very promising diplomacy in the People's Republic of China and with the Soviet Union. The result was a period known as détente, where the two superpowers, if nothing else, adopted a less acerbic posture toward one another. The US, for instance, became a primary supplier of grains to the Soviet Union in the early 1970's (Brada 1983).

²⁰¹ For an excellent overview of policy toward Central America during the Carter Administration, see Schoultz (1987, 39-50).

As the 1970s wore on, the relative calm in the region evaporated. In Central America, civil unrest, latent for years, exploded. The crisis for US interests began first in Nicaragua, where long time US ally, Anastasio Somoza was overthrown by the the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 1979; the US had first attempted to secure Somoza's removal in favor of a more moderate alternative to prevent the rise of the Sandinistas to power. The next major insurgency hit crisis levels in El Salvador in early 1980, as the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) became the umbrella organization that unified the various small insurgencies and obtained the support of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Communists in Cuba.²⁰² The US had been unable to prevent the accession of a Marxist insurgency to power in Nicaragua, but they thought perhaps they had a chance to do so in El Salvador. By 1981, UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick called Central America "the most important place in the world for the United States right now" (Quoted in La Feber 1993, 271).

All of this was laid against the back drop of the rise of human rights as a major point in foreign policy. Jimmy Carter made human rights a focal point for his policy in 1977, and tied US aid to a decent human rights record. The result was fairly predictable: Most authoritarian governments in Latin America which the US had backed in the recent past, resented what they saw as interference in their internal policy, and only occasionally paid lip service to the cause of

²⁰² The FMLN was composed of the Faribundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FARN). These three groups actually became active earlier in the decade as the military government in El Salvador, characterized by blatantly fraudulent elections, political murders and disappearances, increased their repression following the cutoff of US military aid in 1976, and the refusal of the Romero Government to do anything to try to get it back. Toward the end of the decade, the US reversed course on human rights in El Salvador, because US policy makers feared the growth of leftist forces and European influence which threatened to supplant US influence there. The Romero Government took this shift as an endorsement of the policy of state-terrorism, and he was ultimately overthrown by reform minded junior military officers, who themselves fled the country soon afterward to avoid a right wing coup. In April 1980, following the death of Archbishop Oscar Romero--no relation to the other Romero--who had supported free elections by a Rightist death squad affiliated with the Salvadoran military, the 3 insurgent groups joined with 16 other leftist and reformist political groups to form the FMLN (the military arm) and the FDR (Revolutionary Democratic Front, or the political arm). FMLN's opening attacks against the Government began shortly before President Reagan was inaugurated in early 1981.

improving their human rights records. When the State Department reported El Salvador, Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay as "gross violators" of human rights, rather than change their domestic policies as the US wanted, these states simply told the US that they did not want any aid (LaFeber, 211).

This act denied the Carter Administration any leverage over the policies of those countries. Eventually, US aid was restored, without much change in the human rights record. Though Carter had to reverse course on human rights to regain some influence in the affairs of these countries, human rights had entered into the American political debate. It remained a priority in Congress long after Carter left office. During the 1980's as the Reagan Administration reprioritized human rights below Cold War security concerns, the cause of human rights would be taken up by the Congress, and certification of improvement of human rights became a major issue as a condition for US aid. The discussion about the priority of human rights that occurred in the US would frustrate Reagan as much as the conflicts between the US and other countries.²⁰³

Reagan's foreign policy toward Latin America, in general, was simply a policy of Cold War confrontationalism. Most of Reagan's advisors remembered the end of the Vietnam War, and almost all of them shared the conviction that 1) Vietnam was a good war which 2) could have been won, 3) through military means if only 4) the US had shown a commitment to the fight and no backed down.²⁰⁴ Reagan and his administration were determined to demonstrate US power in the face of communist incursion, and were dedicated to the cause of rolling back what

²⁰³ Following the Nixon Administration, the US Congress and the US public had deliberately attempted to shift the balance of power within the foreign policy making apparatus away from the President. A number of congressional hearings and leaks to the American press, especially following the revelation of US involvement in the Chilean coup in 1973, had embarrassed the Executive branch and led to the reigning in of the CIA. From that point on, the Congress sought to play a much larger role in foreign policy creation, putting several limitations on the ability of the President to act as he saw fit abroad.

²⁰⁴ For a long treatment of the comparison made by the Reagan Administration and the conflicts in Central America, see Patterson (1988), especially Chapter 14.

they saw as Cuban and Soviet aggression in Central America and the Caribbean. Conservatives in the US looked at the Vietnam War as a challenge: The US government, with enough money and military hardware could do things differently AND provide a different outcome, one where the Communists do not win, and one where the US comes out the victor. This historical precedent guided US foreign policy choices in the early part of Ronald Reagan's first term. As Alexander Haig said of US involvement in El Salvador, using Vietnam as a context: "This is a war you can win, Mr. President" (Quoted in Nieto, 314).

US policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua represent a significant departure from the cases illustrated in the previous two chapters. Unlike the previous two chapters, both of these two cases faced active insurgencies: In El Salvador, the US-backed government was being attacked by leftist guerrillas in the FMLN, while in Nicaragua, the Leftist Government was targeted by US-backed Contras. Additionally, both crises predated the inauguration of President Reagan in the US: The first major assault of the Salvadoran insurgency occurred a week and a half before Reagan was inaugurated, while the US had cut off all aid to the Sandinistas in December 1980.²⁰⁵ Additionally, both of these countries were comparatively close to the US, and the US had long been a major player in their respective societies. Despite these differences, the results of the conflicts of interest between these two countries and the US are the same as in the other two comparisons: In the country where only two of the three conflicts of interest existed (El Salvador), the US did not destabilize. In fact, the US spent a huge sum of money to *stabilize* that government. In the country where all three conflicts were present (Nicaragua), the

²⁰⁵ The US actually had destabilized the Somoza regime in 1979 to provide a moderate alternative to Somoza and the Sandinistas. Carter had adopted something like a destabilization policy after the 1980 election, though it was deliberately very limited, and often looked like a program determined to ensure the existence of an opposition in Nicaragua, rather than to definitively help the opposition against the Government.

US did adopt destabilization as its policy. Main US conflicts of interest with El Salvador and Nicaragua respectively are presented in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Conflicts of Interest in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 1981-1985

	El Salvador	Nicaragua
Ideology	Human Rights; Paramilitaries	"Communism" (Marxist orientation of Gov't) "Totalitarian Dungeon"
Security	Inability to Win vs FMLN/ Potential loss threatens US Security	Exporting arms to El Salvador, Soviet/Cuban "Stooge"
Economics	NO CONFLICT (US supported Agrarian Reform)	Socialist Economics, opposed to Capitalism, Aid from Cuba and Soviets
Destabilization?	No (Stabilization)	Yes (Contra War)

In El Salvador, there were significant ideological and security concerns raised by the Government of El Salvador's unwillingness to take meaningful action to reign in human rights abuses committed by rightist paramilitary units affiliates with the security forces of El Salvador and their inability to effectively deal with a leftist guerrilla war which threatened to engulf all of Central America. And yet, the US supported El Salvador's plan for agrarian reform, and so a serious economic conflict between the US and El Salvador did not exist. The result was that the US ended up spending more than 2 million dollars a day by 1985 in aiding the Government of El Salvador against the Marxist FMLN (LaFeber, 312-13).²⁰⁶

In Nicaragua, at the same time, the US actively created a Contra-Sandinista force which conducted open combat against the Government of Nicaragua. All three conflicts were present in US-Nicaragua relations: Economically, US investment had fled as a result of Sandinista expansion of the public sector and the socialist economic model; investment was replaced largely by aid from Cuba, the Soviets and other socialist nations. US security interests were threatened

²⁰⁶ On the surface, this represented a seeming paradox which I touched on in Chapter 2: According to my theory the US would destabilize a country with three conflicts of interest, but it does not intuitively follow that the US would actually *stabilize* a country when two intense conflicts of interest existed, and certainly not to this degree! I discuss this issue below.

by the existence of an open ally of both Cuba and the Soviet Union so close to the Panama Canal Zone, and the US argued throughout the period that Nicaragua was behind the arming and training of Salvadoran guerrillas. Reagan regularly used this argument to attempt to gain support both for the Contra War and more aid to El Salvador. Ideologically, the US was opposed to the "totalitarian" ideology of the Sandinistas: it was simply unacceptable to the United States that a communist state should exist on the continent. The result fits my hypothetical expectations. The order to begin the destabilization was officially given in December of 1981, but the operation was in place and training contras months before and was being run by the CIA.

Even though the situation in the world had greatly changed between 1973 and 1981--and much more so since the height of the Cold War in the early 1960s--the policy of the Reagan Administration was still driven by a mechanism very similar to Kennedy's and Nixon's: broad and intense conflicts of interest led the US government to seek destabilization of a foreign government. Reagan's case demonstrates just how far a President would go in promoting US interests abroad, by bending the law almost to the point of breaking it in El Salvador while almost entirely ignoring the laws passed by Congress in the case of Nicaragua, both as a response to a particular perception of threat in the US.

Conflicts of Interest, El Salvador under Duarte and D'Aubuisson: Ideology and Security

Before Ronald Reagan was elected to the Presidency in 1980, his future UN Representative, Jeane Kirkpatrick, established a dichotomy which, if not necessarily realistic, nonetheless guided the Reagan Administration's thinking in Central America, as in the rest of the world. Kirkpatrick said that there was a meaningful distinction between "authoritarians", on the one hand who were dictators, often, but ones who supported traditional social arrangements and could be democratized and "totalitarians," on the other, who were bent on imposing a totalist

ideology, Marxist-Leninism, on their society and were resistant to change within their society. In short, Kirkpatrick noted a difference between dictators of the right and dictators of the left (Kirkpatrick, 1979). Her analysis was adopted by the Reagan Administration: In March of 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced that the US would work with authoritarians because they "were more likely to change than their totalitarian counterparts (Haig, in LaFeber, 276). Given this preference for rightist authoritarian governments, The US would continue to support the rightist authoritarian government in El Salvador, even as it acknowledged that the government was more or less behind human rights abuses and its inability to eliminate the Marxist insurgency in its country represented a significant security threat for the US.

In the case of El Salvador, the ideological conflict of interest with the US was one of human rights. It is fair to note that the Reagan Administration apparently abandoned human rights as an issue in its foreign policy: Reagan's critics in the US Congress and among the US public regularly criticized him for this. But Reagan did not *ignore* the human rights abuses which took place overseas. Instead, he prioritized anti-communism, and argued that a focus on human rights had allowed communism to spread into areas where it had not been before. In fact, many of Reagan's policy advisors spoke against a focus on human rights, because focusing on human rights hampered the ability of the US to defend US allies who were threatened by insurgent forces which were aligned and armed by the Soviet Union. According to the Reagan Administration, Carter lost Nicaragua because of his promotion of human rights over US security interests (Schoultz, 51).²⁰⁷

²⁰⁷ In the words of Jeane Kirkpatrick, the US too often criticized allies for the human rights records, while doing nothing to rollback the gains made by totalitarian governments (Kirkpatrick, 1979, 35-36). This (over-) emphasis on human rights was one of Reagan's main critiques of the Carter Administration: the focus on human rights and expanding civil liberties and so forth had caused the US to cut off aid to Somoza at precisely the point where the Sandinistas were able to overthrow the government and establish a totalitarian regime there. So it is not correct to say that Reagan was deaf to the issue of human rights abuses, as his critics did. Instead, Reagan's policy should be seen as a trade off: his Administration valued defeating communism in El Salvador more than human rights.

Most of the conflict around human rights came not from within the Administration, but from Congress and the American public. The pressure from Congress, which was more committed to the cause of human rights and did not automatically share the President's priorities concerning communism in El Salvador was ultimately enough to force Reagan to pay attention to and prioritize human rights. Beginning in late 1981, Congress required Reagan to certify that human rights were improving as a condition of continued military aid to El Salvador. Despite evidence that indeed human rights were not improving, Reagan regularly recertified El Salvador (Schmitz 2006, 211).²⁰⁸

As far as the public were concerned, when they found out about the Administration's plans to send Green Berets into Central American states with horrible human rights records, to serve as "military advisors" to those states, connections to Vietnam were immediately drawn and protests were immediately organized. A Time Magazine poll taken in March 1981 showed that 60 percent of Americans were opposed to US military involvement in Latin America, and only 2 percent approved of it (Cited in Nieto 2003, 315). Reagan's policy statements and certifications on human rights were designed to placate this opposition while still continuing to promote a military solution to the crises in Central America.²⁰⁹

Reagan was simply not interested in repeating history: He prioritized preventing a communist takeover in El Salvador over human rights.

²⁰⁸ Schmitz 2006 is an excellent monograph on the topic of US support for authoritarian dictatorships around the world during the Cold War. In the section on Reagan's El Salvador policy, Schmitz notes that in December 1981, Salvadoran security forces had conducted a raid at El Mozote, and massacred more than 700 people. The story of the massacre broke in the US on January 27, 1982. The next day, the Reagan Administration certified that human rights were improving in El Salvador, and then justified its certification by denying the Salvadoran Government's involvement and blaming the FMLN. An initial investigation concluded that there was no conclusive evidence of a massacre, and while there had been killings, the killings had been done by the FMLN. Eventually the US Ambassador was forced to conduct a fuller investigation, and he concluded that while the FMLN version of the events was not accurate, there was evidence to suggest that Salvadoran security forces were involved in excesses that "should not have happened." His open criticism of Salvadoran security forces following the investigation led to a sharp rebuke by the Administration, because it jeopardized the US position vis a vis the certification (Schmitz, 211-212).

²⁰⁹ As will be discussed below, the Reagan Administration regularly exaggerated facts, spread false reports, and practiced covert activity to ensure that military aid continued to flow to El Salvador and Honduras (Schmitz, 202-

In October 1982, the US Ambassador Deane Hinton courted official Administration displeasure by publicly calling rightist death squads associated with the Security forces of El Salvador a "mafia" and saying "The mafia must be stopped. Your survival depends on it... The gorillas of this mafia, every bit as much as the guerrillas of (the provinces of) Morazán and Chalatenango, are destroying El Salvador" (quoted in Miller, 1987). The Salvadoran Chamber of Commerce roundly condemned these comments, not because they were inaccurate, but because they made El Salvador look bad in the international press. Reagan dismissed Hinton, because these comments essentially contradicted the official position on El Salvador adopted by the Administration. But soon, pressure from Congress succeeded in moving the cause of human rights up the list of Reagan's priorities, if for no other reason than it refused to fully fund Reagan's requests for aid for El Salvador as a result of their dismal record on human rights. The human rights situation got so bad that eventually, the Reagan Administration could no longer justify their recertification.

While the Administration disavowed Hinton's comments, a year later when Hinton's replacement Ambassador Thomas Pickering more or less reiterated the same point, tied Salvadoran progress in cracking down on death squads to continued US aid and called the death

203). For example, the White Paper on Communist Aggression in El Salvador, which formed the justification for US policy toward that country, was quickly revealed to be entirely manufactured. Few accepted its assertions. And yet Reagan continued to use it to justify US involvement in El Salvador, and it also began the basis for US support for the Contras: the military aid was supposed to be for interdiction of arms between Nicaragua and El Salvador. In 1984, Congress cut off all funds for CIA operations in the region because the money they were supposed to be using to interdict arms from Nicaragua to the FMLN was instead being used to fund the Contra war, also in contravention to the Congress' position (Nieto, 333, 339). It is important to note that Ambassador White, who was relieved from his post for not supporting Reagan's calls for military aid, subsequently testified before Congress in opposition of this military aid. Contravening the Administration's claims, he said "The chief killer of Salvadorans is the government security forces." (quoted in Kramer 1981, 20). While it is possible that the Reagan Administration set out to actually trick the Congress into continuing to supporting Reagan's policies, it is far more likely that the Reagan Administration selectively interpreted data and reports to support its views on the dangers of a communist takeover in El Salvador. Given that Reagan surrounded himself with those who agreed with him on foreign policy matters, it is not too hard to argue that the reports that Reagan accurately represented the reports and data that he received on El Salvador. This would then suggest a strong confirmation bias in Reagan's policy rather than some sort of mendacity.

squads "fascists who serve the communist cause and threaten to destroy [El Salvador's] Democracy," the Regan Administration stood by the comments (Pickering, quoted, AP 1987, B10).²¹⁰ A month later, Vice President Bush personally informed Salvadoran President Alvaro Mangana that his cause was being undermined by the unwillingness of the Government to crack down on death squads. Bush continued, saying that the death squads were just as repugnant to him, President Reagan, the Congress and the US people as the leftists (Bush, quoted in Schmitz, 215).

The issue of human rights was actually an ideological conflict on two levels of decision making. On the lower, domestic level, it represented a theoretical conflict of worldviews where the Congress believed that the US should conduct policy to promote the cause of human improvement and the President demonstrated that he was more concerned about US state survival. For Reagan, a defeat for the government of El Salvador would be a defeat not only for Reagan's attempts to rollback communism in Central America. Failure in El Salvador actually threatened an advance of communism toward the border of the US. The Congress and the American public did not necessarily see the conflict in these terms. For many of them, supporting a repressive regime in El Salvador with a poor record on human rights was inconsistent with American values.

This conflict of ideologies posed two main challenges for Reagan's policy: It caused important US legislators and the American public at large to question the reasoning that repressive dictatorships on the right were preferable to repressive dictatorships on the left. It also gave liberal critics of Reagan's policies ammunition to impede his policy, which was directed

²¹⁰ This article was an AP article which was reprinted across the country on the day following Ambassador Pickering's comments. Importantly, the article noted that the White House cleared the comments by the Ambassador, and those comments included an expression of frustration that the Salvadoran government was unable to crack down effectively on the death squads, though there was no acknowledgement of official collusion between the two groups in the speech.

toward stabilizing the Salvadoran government against leftist rebels.²¹¹ At the heart of the matter of human rights was an ideological commitment.

But that commitment was, for the President and his advisors, at least, not necessarily to the protection of the rights of people in El Salvador or promotion of the interests of the poor there. Reagan was not even particularly committed to the maintenance of the Government of El Salvador, except in the face of a completely unacceptable alternative: the victory of the FMLN in El Salvador.²¹² Reagan's policy was primarily focused on rolling back communism in Central America.²¹³ The policies of the Government of El Salvador were therefore frustrating the efforts of the Reagan Administration to prevent communism from taking over in El Salvador, which would then, in Reagan's view represent an unacceptable security problem. In order to prevent communism from advancing to--and then beyond--the southern border of the US, Reagan felt that the Government of El Salvador needed to stop doing the things it was doing which allowed his critics in Congress to hamper his efforts to prevent that outcome.

The human rights issue became an ideological conflict on a bigger level than for the Reagan Administration because of the apparent unwillingness or inability of the Salvadoran Government and security apparatus to reign in the actions of the death squads. The Government

²¹¹ The policy preferences of the US Government on this matter were laid out by Alexander Haig in his advice to Reagan in 1981. He argued that Duarte represented the best hope of defeating the FMLN, but the President was failing to win the majority of the Congress to the idea that the Salvadoran government was doing anything to prevent death squads from acting freely in El Salvador, and therefore deserved US aid. If Reagan was able to make the case that the Salvadoran government was taking firm steps to deal with issue, it would "...strengthen our hand with Congress." Reagan was ultimately not successful and Congress eventually required the Reagan Administration to certify progress on human rights in El Salvador (Haig, quoted in Schmitz, 201-11)

²¹² For example: The US believed that Duarte represented a moderate position between extreme right and extreme left. But when Duarte lost the March 1982 elections to a coalition led by the far Right under Roberto D'Aubuisson, the military was pressured by the US to put up the "moderate" former banker Alvaro Mangana as President. The Reagan's policy toward support for the Salvadoran government did not change, however. IN 1984, however, a major effort by the CIA was launched to ensure the outcome in Salvadoran elections in favor of Duarte. The policy of the Reagan Administration toward stabilization in El Salvador did not change, regardless of who was in office there (LaFeber 217-218)

²¹³ For an overview of the moral argument surrounding the Reagan Doctrine and "rollback" as a foreign policy, see Johnson 1998.

of El Salvador had a certain idea of how to crush the revolution in El Salvador, and that did not necessarily include a strong commitment to human rights. The support of the actions of paramilitaries, however, became and remained Salvadoran government policy, largely because most of them were in one way or another, tied to the Salvadoran government.²¹⁴

At no point did the Government of El Salvador make a serious attempt to prevent the death squads from carrying out their war on the population of the country. In fact, following the election of Roberto D'Aubuisson to the head of the legislature, even less was done than before to prevent their activities--D'Aubuisson himself was one of the founders of the most notorious death squad in the Salvadoran conflict and its political party. The Salvadorans believed that theirs was the right to decide how the war was fought and tying US aid to improvement of human rights amounted to interference with internal affairs.

The US did not see it that way. If Reagan wanted to get money to defeat communism in El Salvador, he had to certify improvements of human rights in El Salvador. He could not do that convincingly while the death squads, with at least the tacit support of the Salvadoran government, were doing their work in the countryside.²¹⁵ As Advisor Richard Allen informed

²¹⁴ The US Ambassador, as well as the FBI and CIA and the Secretary of State himself regularly reported that the death squads and political killings were affiliated with elements of the Salvadoran Government. Those acts were frequently carried out by Salvadoran security forces themselves, and the head of the Salvadoran legislature, Roberto D'Aubuisson, was also the head of a paramilitary organization called ARENA, which was directly implicated in the killing of the reformist Archbishop Romero in 1980. D'Aubuisson was ultimately charged with the crime in 1984 (Blum, 356). Indirect problems included the complete failure, for years of the Salvadoran justice system to even bring anyone to trial for the murders of American citizens in El Salvador: People were ultimately convicted for the murders of American Churchwomen, for example, in 1984, when the murders happened in 1980. IN general, the biggest frustration was over the complete inability to do anything about the military-affiliated death squads in El Salvador. IN 1981, Secretary of State Haig reported to Reagan that "[Provisional President] Duarte thus far has been ineffective in confronting the military or curtailing their excess" (Haig, quoted in Schmitz, 211.)

²¹⁵ It is not correct to think of Reagan's position on human rights as simply a crass calculation to increase aid to El Salvador. Important voices in the Reagan Administration forcefully spoke out against the slaughter of human beings in El Salvador, most notably the two Ambassadors to El Salvador and the Vice President of the United States. These very clear protests against the human rights abuses should be taken at face value, just as historians should take the Reagan Administrations comments about "freedom" and "independence" and "democracy" at face value, as indicators of the positions of the Administration. Whether they were uttered from an ideologically based analysis of the situation is another matter entirely. But often these were moral arguments used in the service of national security positions as well as a genuine commitment to the cause of man (Johnson, 512-13).

the President in April 1981, "... Our effort in El Salvador will succeed or fail first in the United States, and not in El Salvador (Allen, quoted in Schmitz, 210). Consequently, the ideological orientation of the Salvadoran government in support of death squads, almost more than anything else, represented a significant threat to Reagan's war against communism in Central America.

The Reagan Administration regularly presented its cause for aid as being crucial in the fight against Marxist-Leninism in El Salvador and weakening communism worldwide by denying it yet another victory (Schmitz, 212). The ideological conflict caused by the Salvadoran adoption of this aberrant ideology--resolution of the political conflict in the country by toleration, or actual promotion of death squad violence in El Salvador, despite US calls to reign them in--was not resolved during Reagan's first administration, even after the Vice President visited El Salvador to complain about human rights abuses.²¹⁶ Following Duarte's return to the Presidency in 1984--his candidacy was supported by millions of dollars from the CIA-- human rights abuses continued unabated, but so did Reagan's support for the Government there, in spite of the criticism Reagan took for supporting such a repressive regime (Schmitz, 216).

Part and parcel to the issue of human rights was the conflict over national security. The US saw the inability of the Government of El Salvador to defeat the leftist insurgency in the country to be a serious threat to US national security because a collapse of El Salvador meant the advancement of Soviet-backed power toward the US. From the beginning of the Reagan's administration, the consistent narrative from the Reagan Administration described how the FMLN was being armed and funded by Cuba and Nicaragua, which were both presented by the Reagan Administration as proxies for the Soviet Union. Two months after Reagan entered into office, the State Department offered what it referred to as "definitive" evidence of Cuba's hand in

²¹⁶ La Feber reports that between 1979 and 1985, 50,000 Salvadorans were murdered or disappeared by the Death Squads (La Feber, 312).

the Salvadoran Civil War (Schmitz, 205; White 1981, 1).²¹⁷ The Reagan Administration pointed to the similarity between the evolution of the conflict in El Salvador and the development of communist insurgencies in other troubled spots in the third world (Schmitz, 205).

Since Reagan firmly believed in the link between the Soviets and the FMLN--via Cuba and Nicaragua--it is unimportant that few others in the US were convinced of that connection. It is even less important that the link between the FMLN and the Soviet Union did not actually exist, especially after 1981.²¹⁸ What was important was that the Reagan Administration continued to use the connection to make the argument that El Salvador was incapable of winning the war itself. The US never believed that the Salvadoran Government was up to the task of defending its own country against the leftist insurgents, and this became the most often used justification for expansion of the US military presence in El Salvador.

For example, in March 1981, Secretary Haig certified to Congress that "emergency" military aid was necessary: His justification was that daily, insurgents are attacking the infrastructure of El Salvador. While the Salvadoran military performed well in defeating the FMLN's "final offensive" of January 1981, "Their number... and technical ability are not now sufficient to the task [of winning the war against the FMLN]. In fact, they cannot adequately protect the country's infrastructure system from the widespread but separate attacks being

²¹⁷ This document presented by the State Department is based on a telegram sent from the Embassy in San Salvador to the Secretary of State, covering an investigation of recently captured FMLN documents that purportedly implicated Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement. This memo was the document upon which the case for Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement in the Salvadoran Civil War was built. The memo was later found to be fraudulent in a number of ways, but the Reagan Administration continued to stick by the assertion that Nicaragua and the Soviet Union, via Cuba were behind the training, arming and funding of the Salvadoran Rebels. Said the

²¹⁸ La Feber argues that by 1981, the FMLN was made up of several groups which disagreed on tactics, strategy and politics. He notes that only the smallest factions in the coalition trusted Cuba: Other groups actively opposed Soviet involvement in the conflict. Insurgent Ferman Cienfuegos is quoted as saying "We accumulated \$60 Million [through kidnappings and ransoms]... We wouldn't have bothered if we were Soviet-Cuban Proxies" (La Feber, 313-314). As a matter of fact, while there had been some agreement early on for the Soviets to provide weapons, most of the weaponry that the guerrillas got early was bought on the open international arms market, and later, most of it came from the Salvadoran military. Ironically, then, US military aid spent to defeat the insurgents was once more arming them.

conducted [against it] each day" (Haig 1981, 4).²¹⁹ And yet, the conflict was nonetheless the fault of the Salvadoran Government who used US aid to remain in power. The things they did or permitted to be done by rightist death squads without any real sanction ended up alienating most of the people of El Salvador, making the victory of the FMLN that much more likely. There didn't even need to be a real connection to the Soviets or the Cubans or the Nicaraguans.

Soon, supporting the Salvadoran Government became a test of US resolve to fight against what the Reagan Administration continued to characterize as Soviet aggression in Central America. In early 1983, UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick privately warned the President that without a substantial increase in US military aid, the FMLN would eventually win the war, even as she publicly proclaimed that the "guerrillas are not winning anything (Kirkpatrick, Quoted in La Feber, 318). The President noted in early 1983 that if the US was not able to defend itself "there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble and the safety of our homeland would be in jeopardy" (Reagan, quoted in Schmitz, 214). In January 1984, the President returned to the theme of the inability of the Salvadoran government to crush the rebellion when he agreed with the Kissinger report which stated that the cause of the insurgency was Soviet actions.²²⁰

In late 1984, as Reagan was about to be re-elected, Salvadoran President Duarte, who the Reagan Administration had supported as a moderate alternative to extremists in two separate elections, complained about US influence over the conduct of the Civil War. He claimed that the

²¹⁹ This memo was a confidential memo from Secretary of State Haig to Ronald Reagan which justified the request of 20 million dollars in emergency military aid to El Salvador. In addition to the incompetence it discussed, another frequent source of US frustration in El Salvador was the unwillingness of Salvadoran political and military officials to take the advice provided them by Reagan Administration. For example, an early complaint about the refusal of the Salvadoran Government to take US advice was lodged by US Ambassador to Nicaragua Lawrence A. Pezzullo at the end of January 1981. In his complaint he expressed his frustration that, at the same time the US government is trying to make the case that Nicaragua is arming Salvadoran rebels, the Foreign Minister of El Salvador insisted on maintaining a cordial and friendly relationship with the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua (Pezzullo 1981, 1-3).

²²⁰ The inability of the government to definitively win out over the rebels was, in turn, the result of the refusal of the US Government to properly fund US military aid to El Salvador, according to Reagan (Schmitz, 215-216)

"root of the problem" was that the US government was trying to micromanage the war and Duarte's use of US aid (Duarte, quoted in Blum 2004, 358). He attempted to open negotiations with the rebels in a speech to the UN, and began discussions in late 1984. But the Secretary of State George Schultz, who replaced Haig in 1982, joined with the Salvadoran Military, who were by this time entirely dependent on US aid. Together, they pressured Duarte to not accept rebel demands for a new government and a reorganization of the Salvadoran Military in an attempt to deal with the death squads. Predictably, talks soon broke down after that and the war continued (La Feber, 318).

The security conflict was similar to the ideological conflict in that that the actions of the Salvadorans were actually improving the chances that the FMLN would win. This represented an unacceptable situation for Reagan. While the government of El Salvador permitted the death squads to continue their work in the country, the people of El Salvador who were not terrorized into submission were driven to support the rebels. Ultimately, it became clear that the Nicaraguans were no longer supporting the rebels, and yet the rebels were still fighting, gaining ground, and holding off government forces there. The US' commitment, up to 2 million dollars a day was being wasted. The Salvadoran military was directly responsible for at least some of the success of the rebels, because they themselves participated in paramilitary activity. And yet Reagan still supported the Salvadoran military because, in his estimation, to not do so was to virtually guarantee an unacceptable outcome: victory for the FMLN, communism throughout Central America, and eventually "Red Dawn" in the US.²²¹

²²¹ "Red Dawn" is the name of a popular movie that was released in the US in 1984. It is one of the great propaganda films of the Cold War. The movie was a fictional account of a combined Nicaraguan-Cuban-Soviet invasion of the US and the efforts of a small group of patriots to turn back the tide of the invasion. There was no explanation about why this happened, except one small note when actor Powers Boothe blamed it on the inevitability of the two largest powers on the planet finally deciding to try to find out who was the most powerful. Patrick Swayze, star of the movie, wrote in his autobiography that the author reportedly asked Alexander Haig, who had recently left the Reagan Administration to help write the story. Haig's participation in the making of the film

In contrast to the ideological and security conflicts between the US government and the Government of El Salvador, there were few conflicts along economic lines between the two countries. US investment in El Salvador was never extensive, and generally speaking El Salvador was rather friendly to US corporate interests, which remained, for the most part at liberty to continue business as usual in El Salvador during Reagan's first administration. There was a significant decline in US investment in El Salvador, but the reaction of US capital was a reaction to the instability in the country and not Government hostility toward investment. El Salvador welcomed US investment there and often protected it, but this was not enough to create a good business climate that actually attracted US investment.²²²

One major policy element that the Salvadoran government embarked on which was actually supported by the Carter Administration first and then the Reagan Administration was the Agrarian Reform.²²³ The Salvadoran reform was supposed to improve the lot of the Salvadoran poor by giving them land upon which they could make a living for themselves. The aim, then, was to defuse in El Salvador the causes of the revolution that had occurred in Nicaragua. The US fully supported the agrarian reform in El Salvador because US officials believed that giving land to peasants leads to the adoption of a conservative ideology. In short, according to one

extends, apparently to a review on the original cover of the movie which calls it " one of the most realistic and provocative films I have ever seen." and participation as a consultant on MGM board of directors in charge of making the movie. I was not able to independently confirm any report of Haig's participation in the film, nor does his name appear as a consultant in the film's credits, but that said, the film is a fairly accurate illustration of Reagan's dire predictions from the period should communism spread through El Salvador and beyond.

²²² There was significant economic decline in El Salvador as a result of the civil war: The State Department noted a 25% decline in the Salvadoran economy between 1979 and 1983. US corporate investment fled the country to avoid the bloodshed and the destruction, withdrawing \$100 million in investment--or 2/3rds of all US FDI--between 1978 and 1984. But the civil war was largely to blame for this drop: hostility of the government toward US investment was never an issue (La Feber, 315). The problem was the insecurity in the country created a bad business climate. CEO's and managers of US businesses eventually need to travel to meetings by armored car. Despite the effect on US investment in El Salvador, I must reiterate, it was not the policies of the government of El Salvador which threatened US business interests directly.

²²³ It was far less comprehensive than the Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform, which was launched about the same time, and was actually envisioned by the US as an alternative to the Nicaraguan model, which aimed at empowerment of the rural poor through land reform.

Embassy official in 1980, "... we're going to be breeding capitalists like rabbits (Unnamed Embassy official, quoted in Riding 1980, A11). Also, unlike the Nicaraguan reform, US officials actually had a direct hand in the development of the agrarian reform program (Blum, 356; Deere 1984, 173).

The US supported the agrarian reform from the start.²²⁴ The Carter Administration was instrumental in designing the reform itself: The reform was the "key element in the US-designed counter revolutionary strategy" (Deere, 171). In El Salvador, the government stalled on reforms, and in some cases reversed them.²²⁵ As it became clear in the US that the Agrarian Reform was failing, the gains were not being realized by as many people as originally envisioned, and landlords were resisting the reforms by kicking peasants off their lands--or having them murdered outright--the US stepped up its pressure on the Salvadoran government. The Congress tied aid to certification of the deepening of agrarian reforms in Nicaragua.

In time, like other concerns of the Reagan's Administration, the potential of the victory of the FMLN superseded US pressure on the Salvadoran government to fully implement the Agrarian reform. Beginning in 1982, the State Department regularly certified progress on agrarian reform, calling it a "remarkable success story (Deere, 175). But by this time, the law

²²⁴ There is some evidence which suggests that the Reagan Administration, when it took over, more or less admitted that it while it would like to see agrarian reform advance, the first priority was, as always, defeating the leftist insurgency in El Salvador using military means. In a letter to a William Ford, UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote that the fundamental problem that Reagan was dealing with in El Salvador was trying to improve the economic and political situation in the face of a leftist rebellion. "In El Salvador," she wrote, "an end to the present suffering and violence would permit that nation to *begin* [emphasis mine] the process of economic reconstruction and progress." (Kirkpatrick 1981,1). Reagan was clearer on the matter: "Winning the war came first, 'then go forward with reforms.'" (Reagan, quoted in La Feber 314-315).

²²⁵ Following the 1982 elections, the rightist controlled constituent assembly attempted to gut the agrarian reform program by cancelling the part of the Agrarian reform known as "Phase II," which would nationalize major Salvadoran-owned banks and export markets to guarantee peasants the credit they needed to buy the land they were working and prevent capital flight, and temporarily suspending "Phase III," which grants titles to those who have had rental contracts. The US-backed President Mangana, responding to US pressure, announced that the rights of the peasants already granted titles under Phase II and III would be protected, and the Reagan Administration used this pronouncement as evidence that the government of El Salvador was committed to the progress of the Agrarian Reform (Deere, 176). Privately, however, it made it known that continued aid depended in part on progress of the Agrarian reform, and the Salvadoran government stepped up titling of peasants under Phase III for a short time.

which required the certification of the agrarian reform had not been extended (because of a Presidential veto) and it had faded to a much lower priority for the Reagan Administration, lower, perhaps lower than even human rights. Eventually, the US simply stopped asking about the Agrarian Reform.

By the time Duarte was elected President in the summer of 1984, any chance at meaningful land reform had been ended in the Constituent Assembly (La Feber, 318). And yet there is no indication that the US responded negatively to the development: The land reform had long been seen as a failure, and certainly did not accomplish its goal, which was to prevent the radicalization of the peasantry (Deere, 185). But by the time it was more or less gutted, the US stopped caring: other concerns had become higher in priority, and Duarte, the preferred "moderate" had again gained power in El Salvador. In 1984, the US congress passed a bill that granted \$300 million new dollars in aid for El Salvador, in hopes of shoring up the Duarte government.

Part of this de-emphasis of the agrarian reform had to do with pressure on the Reagan Administration from the right in the US. As Reagan came into office, many of his supporters voiced concern over the agrarian reform, most notably Phase II. That section allowed the government of El Salvador to nationalize banks owned by the Salvadoran oligarchy and much of the export market. The program had been originally promoted *by the US*, during the Carter Administration, as a method of ensuring that peasants could get credit for the things they needed to become effective farmers, and to ensure that they had a market when they produced crops.²²⁶

²²⁶ The US actually worked with the Salvadoran government in developing the Agrarian reform during the Carter Administration, consequently, many of the provisions were US designs. Nationalization of these two sectors of the Salvadoran Economy was seen as crucial to the success of the Agrarian reform. Given that both of them were controlled by the old oligarchy, and the old oligarchy had a material interest in seeing the Agrarian Reform fail, if these sectors remained in the hands of the oligarchy, they would be used as weapons against the peasants. It is not too difficult to imagine an El Salvador where the Agrarian reform is promoted, and yet the peasants do not have

This section of the reform was later attacked by opponents of "socialist" solutions which were "inimical to our own free enterprise and capitalist marketing system" (Samuel Dickens, quoted in Schoultz, 56).²²⁷ The Reagan Administration answered these charges by informing those who supported the reforms that the Salvadoran Government was making progress on Phase I and Phase III of the Agrarian Reform while omitting any reference to Phase II, and at the same time, telling critics of the reform that nationalization of banks and the export sector were "not policies that the United States pursues around the world... But it is the program that the government [of El Salvador] has." That government, the Administration continued, was under threat of attack and subversion by International Communism, and therefore needed US support. This conflicting message seemed to placate both sides of the debate (Bushnell, quoted in Schoultz, 57). The agrarian reform was not a conflict of US interests in El Salvador: despite its criticism by some on the right, it was actually supported by the US government.²²⁸

The major conflicts of interest between the US and El Salvador during the first Reagan Administration, the ideological and security conflict, were based in unwillingness or the inability of the Salvadoran government to reign in its death squads and conduct the war against the FMLN the way the US thought. The government created a major headache for the Reagan Administration who was committed to preventing what he perceived to be a Cuban-Soviet

access to the program because the banks refuse to loan them money and then there is no place for them to sell their goods (Schoultz, 43).

²²⁷ Samuel Dickens was a representative of the American Legion. His statement summarizes the complaints from Senators, Congressmen, CIA officials, and even Reagan Advisors like Roger Fontaine, who wrote in 1980 that the Agrarian reform was bringing the country to "near economic ruin by desperate and sweeping reforms" (quoted in Schoultz, 56)

²²⁸ The President again certified progress of the agrarian reform in January of 1983, noting that close to 36,000 peasants had filed for titles to cultivable lands, and in March, the Salvadoran Constituent Assembly extended the deadline to file another 10 months. Six months later, Reagan again certified the progress on the Agrarian Reform, noting that despite problems, the military was actually ending illegal evictions which had been a significant problem in the past. The government continued to certify progress on Agrarian reform even though the Constituent Assembly again, in June 1983 attempted to provide loopholes which would allow those who formerly owned large estates which had been broken up in March 1980 under "Phase I" to reclaim their land and evict those who were now living there. Meanwhile, death squad activity increased in advance of any decision that was made by the Constituent Assembly (Deere, 177).

backed Marxist guerrilla group from taking over in El Salvador. Reagan was a staunch anti-communist: this is evident from his positions on roll back. He also opposed the Soviets, and sincerely believed that they were behind the troubles that the United States' Central American neighbors faced. But as long as the Salvadoran government refused to change the way it did things within the country, Reagan's ability to help them fight the communist insurgency there was limited: there was little to convince liberal critics of Reagan's policies that the government in El Salvador was worth the aid the US sent them.

And yet there was no major conflict of economic interests in El Salvador. The existence of the political instability caused US investment to flee, but for the most part, there was no hostility toward US economic interests shown by the Salvadoran government.²²⁹ As a matter of fact, their major economic program, the agrarian reform, was US designed and supported. If there was a conflict, it was in the fact that the US did not believe that the Government of El Salvador was implementing it fast enough for it to be useful in undermining the influence of the leftists on the poor in the country. The US pressured the Salvadoran government for years on this issue, but the flow of aid continued whether or not the Salvadoran government actually implemented any parts of the reform. By the time the reform was more or less abandoned late in Reagan's first term, the US had itself long de-emphasized it as a condition for aid.

As I demonstrate, the absence of that third category of conflict of interest in El Salvador led to a radically different policy outcome toward the government of El Salvador than it did toward the government of Nicaragua, where all three types of conflicts were present from the very start of the Reagan Administration.

US Responses in El Salvador: Stabilization

²²⁹ Not even the bank nationalization that was part of the Agrarian Reform troubled the US, who actually authored the proposal. The banks that were nationalized as part of the agrarian reform were controlled by Salvadoran oligarchic interests, not the US capital.

Unlike the other cases I looked at, the case of "not Destabilization" in El Salvador is much more than that. In the "not destabilization" outcome in Argentina, the government was overthrown by a coup that the US opposed. In the "not destabilization" outcome in Peru, the US established a *modus vivendi* with Velasco that, while conflict remained, lasted longer than Nixon did. But in the case of El Salvador, the US actively stabilized the government of El Salvador.

The US used aid, both economic and military, as well as actual US military personnel to ensure that the Salvadoran government did not fall to the opposition within the country. The Reagan Administration also used diplomatic support to attempt to rally the people of the world to the Salvadoran cause. They were utterly and completely committed to the survival of the Salvadoran government in the face of the Salvadoran insurgency, regardless of the character of that government or who was in it. While Reagan had his preferences²³⁰ this fact did not diminish US support when D'Aubuisson and his far right coalition controlled the Constituent Assembly, because the US still had a "moderate" President in Alvaro Mangana that they could support. In the case of El Salvador, because the alternative (a victory by the FMLN) was seen as such a terrible outcome, the US was willing to actively stabilize the Government of El Salvador, despite the conflicts of interest. In fact, as described above, some of the conflicts were conflicts specifically because they made it more difficult to stabilize the government of El Salvador.

In making the case for military aid, the security conflict was illustrated clearly: A loss to Soviet-backed insurgents in El Salvador meant that the forces of communism would topple a

²³⁰ The US obviously preferred Duarte to D'Aubuisson, for example and actively intervened on behalf of their preferred candidate. During the 1984 Presidential elections, the CIA spent several million dollars in support of the Duarte Candidacy, both during the National Election and during the special runoff election that followed. The US saw Duarte as a moderate alternative to D'Aubuisson and the ARENA government which had controlled El Salvador since elections in 1982. While there is no evidence that US covert aid to Duarte made much of a difference, Duarte's election was followed up by \$300 million of aid provided by the Congress, in hopes that "a centrist government would emerge that could end the human rights abuses and bring reforms to El Salvador. As it turned out, Duarte was no more able than he had been previously to control the rightist death squads, and the best he was able to achieve against the rebellion was a stalemate (Schmitz, 216).

government which was practically on our borders. As Ronald Reagan said in March of 1981, the problem was not just in El Salvador. This was a fight for the entire Western Hemisphere: If Communists, backed by the Soviets win in El Salvador, they will attack other Central and South American countries, "and, I am sure, eventually North America." This is why the US was working to stop Soviet- and Cuban-backed terrorism and revolution from being exported into El Salvador, and why the US must help in El Salvador (Reagan, quoted in Schmitz, 208).

Implicit in Reagan's requests for US aid to El Salvador was the assumption that the Government of El Salvador was moderate, and therefore worthy of US support, but also unable to handle the insurgency on its own. According to Reagan's argument, El Salvador was weak compared to the combined forces of Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union, and a corresponding commitment from the US government for military and economic aid was necessary to prevent its failure and collapse. The National Security Council, in February of 1981, argued that without US military personnel in the country, there would be no hope of avoiding the collapse of the Duarte Government at the hands of "Marxist Left." US commitment to protecting its other allies in the region, specifically Honduras would then be in doubt as well. On a positive note, presence of US military units in El Salvador would act as a moderating force on the abuses of the military as well: human rights abuses would be reduced by the "disciplining effect on Salvadoran troops" (Schweitzer and Fontaine, quoted in Schmitz, 207).²³¹

This belief in the inability of El Salvador to prevent a FMLN victory on its own explains why the US not only did not destabilize the government of El Salvador, getting rid of it in favor of some other government that would follow US policy preferences closer than the Salvadoran

²³¹ General Robert L. Schweitzer was in the NSC until he made some radical and unauthorized remarks concerning Soviet nuclear buildup in October of 1981, when he was transferred to the Pentagon. IN these comments he warned that the Soviet Union had superiority in three different classes of nuclear weapons and was "on the move, they are going to strike..." (Stout 2000, 1). Roger W. Fontaine was a staffer at the NSC who supported day to day aspects of US National Security Policy for Latin America.

government did. Instead, they did the opposite: they stabilized the government, dumping an inestimable sum of money and arms and ammunition and logistical support into the Salvadoran conflict. This also explains why Reagan incurred the anger of the Congress repeatedly, and why he was willing to take criticism for what appeared to be a dishonest presentation of objective facts to the US Congress and its people. This is also why Reagan certified El Salvador over and over again, despite scanty grounds for re-certification. The alternative was perceived by the Reagan Administration to be so horrible that it could not, if Reagan had the power to prevent it, be allowed to occur.

Consequently, Reagan stabilized the Salvadoran government, not out of any particular love or appreciation for the authoritarians in charge of a broken political system in a dysfunctional country, not out of any historical affinity between the US and the people of El Salvador, but out of a genuine concern that failure in El Salvador meant a direct threat to US security. This conclusion is therefore consistent with my hypothetical and theoretical expectations: the outcome of "not stabilization" was unacceptably risky in the perception of the Reagan Administration (and eventually the Congress as well, who continued to approve his aid requests despite the scant evidence provided by the Administration for improvements in human rights and deepening of the agrarian reform) given the relatively limited. Since in the case of El Salvador, "not stabilization" equaled a victory for the FMLN, the Reagan Administration stabilized the Salvadoran government to prevent that unacceptable outcome from occurring.

US efforts to stabilize the government of El Salvador were already underway when Reagan entered office. But he greatly accelerated and deepened US military involvement in El Salvador. Most of his early requests for more aid were justified by the "White Paper" which presented what the Reagan Administration called "definitive evidence" of Soviet and Cuban

intervention in El Salvador (Schmitz, 205). While few in Congress and in the American public accepted the assertions of the White Paper, the Reagan Administration nonetheless persisted in linking the Salvadoran rebellion to outside, specifically Cuban and Soviet intervention. In 1983, Reagan stated in no uncertain terms: "There is a war in Central America that is being fueled by the Soviets and the Cubans. They are arming, training, supplying and encouraging a war to subjugate [El Salvador] to Communism. The Soviets and Cubans are operating from a base called Nicaragua. And this is the first real Communist aggression on the American mainland" (Quoted in Schoultz, 49). This assertion was restated over and over again during the first Reagan Administration.

The Congress of the US was reluctant to support Reagan's efforts in El Salvador. Their main outstanding problems with Reagan's policy had to do with the dismal human rights record of the Government, which were openly affiliated--at best--with the paramilitary death squads. The inability (or unwillingness) of the government to control the activities of the extreme right, especially following the rise of D'Aubuisson to prominence in the Constituent Assembly, and the fear of growing US involvement in the Salvadoran Civil War gave the US Congress ample excuse to block as much as 60 percent of the total aid requested by the Reagan Administration in the first two years (Schmitz, 209). But this did not stop the Reagan Administration from finding ways to stabilize the Salvadoran government. "Every aid program at the disposal of the United States was employed in the rescue operation. Even the most innocuous and apparently 'humanitarian' assistance became part of the US-sponsored counterinsurgency strategy" (Landes, 154).

For example, beginning in 1981, as capital flight became critical, the US began using direct foreign exchange support into El Salvador. The goal was to reduce El Salvador's balance

of payments deficits, assist El Salvador's private sector acquire raw materials, and (most importantly) free up money for the conduct of the war against the insurgents. ESF support increased five fold between 1980 and 1981, and then three fold on top of that the following year. Since ESF funds could be spent on anything by the recipient government, without restrictions, ESF support then was able to be used by the Salvadoran government to buy war materials on the international market (Landes, 153).²³²

In addition to ESF support, USAID also funded a "pacification" program in the countryside. This primarily involved civic action (winning the "hearts and minds" of the peasants,) but also re-education of peasants in training of cooperative peasant leaders. AID funding also provided direct support for programs that allowed the Salvadoran Army to use US food to feed peasants and internal refugees. This food subsequently became a weapon: when guerrillas were suspected to be nearby, the Army would cut off food supplies. When a village was suspected of harboring guerrillas or aiding the insurgency, food could be cut off. Food could be used to force internal refugees to comply with government demands. Finally AID funded the construction and repair of the country's infrastructure, which was regularly targeted by the insurgents, but which was vital for the Government forces to carry out their war efforts against the rebels and their "pacification" programs against the peasants (Landes, 153-156).

²³² In an effort to address the economic situation in El Salvador, particularly, and Central America in general, the Reagan Administration coordinated with the governments of Canada, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia to develop the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Its beneficiaries would be those countries which bordered the Caribbean Basin, excepting Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua. The goal was to provide \$350 million in supports and offer tax free access to US markets for "nontraditional products" from beneficiary nations. Ultimately, the program benefitted multinational companies and US investors more than it benefitted Caribbean nations (Nieto, 315). CBI was manipulated by US producers who lobbied the US congress to exempt various goods from the free trade provisions where they conflicted with US interests. These goods included textiles, oil, watches, and leather goods, for example. In those areas where the goods did not compete with American production--coffee and bananas, for example--US producers had no problem with that. The effect was, predictably, to make Latin American government most dependent than ever on US finished goods while tying Latin American states more firmly to the US market and monoculture within their own countries (La Feber 287).

US military "advisors" and CIA operatives arrived in El Salvador in early 1980. While they were officially limited to an advisory role, this did not prevent them from going into the field with Salvadoran troops once they were there. A small scandal occurred when US military personnel were photographed carrying rifles and fighting side by side with Government forces (Blum, 358). US mercenary presence was also prevalent there: In August 1983, for example, the Washington Post wrote a story about how editors of the magazine *Soldier of Fortune* were training and arming mercenaries, and accompanying them on patrols with the Salvadoran military. The US Ambassador apparently applauded this solution to the problem that uniformed US advisors were not supposed to participate in combat actions (McCartney, 1983, A14).

Military aid was continuous and widespread, but so was political support. Even as Congress grew increasingly impatient with Reagan Administration justifications for ever increasing demands for money and aid to El Salvador, the Reagan Administration responded by repeatedly signing certifications on El Salvador's human rights record and the progress of the Agrarian Reform. The incident at El Mozote in late 1981 cast doubt on the Administration's claims of improving human rights, but the Administration simply denied Salvadoran military involvement; acknowledging evidence of some killings there, the Embassy placed the blame on the guerrillas.²³³ When this was not convincing enough for Congress, Reagan simply sidestepped them and signed an executive order that sent another 55 million dollars of "emergency" defense equipment to El Salvador (Schmitz, 212).

There is no reliable figure to serve as an estimate to the total amount of aid that the Reagan Administration supplied to the Salvadoran Government--six billion is the estimate that most people use when talking about military equipment alone. But the problem with that figure

²³³ The Embassy officials in charge of the investigation never actually visited El Mozote, but instead interviewed Salvadoran military officials.

is that so much of what the Reagan Administration classified as "development" aid was really military aid (Blum, 357). Eventually, Reagan's support for the government there went off the books. What stayed on the books was subject to oversight by a Congress that Reagan saw as increasingly hostile to his policies.²³⁴

In summary, the stabilization program of El Salvador resulted in billions of dollars of various types of aid being dumped into what was essentially a black hole in El Salvador. The US government, and especially the Reagan Administration, certainly considered it worth it to stabilize the government. The effort was always to prevent the fall of the government to the FMLN. In this, my hypothetical expectations are supported. But the El Salvador case presents a bit of a paradox. There is a bit of a counter-intuitive finding here, which is somewhat unique to El Salvador in the cases I examine. My hypothesis certainly does not predict the degree to which El Salvador was stabilized. I expect destabilization with three conflicts of interest. I would not necessarily expect to see the exact opposite policy when two of the three types of conflicts of interest are present. And yet, it seems that this is what happened in El Salvador. Despite the fact that there were two conflicts present in this case, the US actively stabilized the government of El Salvador. This is an interesting finding.

However, when considered in light of the alternatives faced by the Reagan Administration--namely, the collapse of the Salvadoran government and the victory of the FMLN--the support Reagan gave to the Salvadorans is consistent with my theory. In other cases, the *lack* of an acceptable alternative may have played a role in lack of destabilization: at that point, adopting a foreign policy of destabilization was too risky, and was certainly not justified

²³⁴ Reagan and others, notably, Henry Kissinger complained that if the war was lost in El Salvador, it was because the US did not see fit to adequately fund his demands (Schmitz, 215-216). This, interestingly enough was the same reasoning that he and other conservatives used to explain the communist victory in the Vietnam War, a war he at length attempted to reject comparison to.

by the rather limited scope of the conflicts of interest. But in El Salvador, the risk of not stabilizing, *more so than not destabilizing*, was entirely too high, and represented a more unacceptable outcome than maintaining the Salvadoran government in place, despite the conflicts of interest created by their policies.

In other words, the potential alternative in the Salvadoran case was known: the FMLN, who the Reagan Administration believed to be Marxist in the service of Cuba and the Soviet Union, would take over, and make the conflicts which did exist far worse. In order to prevent that, Reagan needed to continue to support the government there. This is an explanation which is consistent with my theory, even though it may seem counterintuitive given my hypothetical setup. Part of this may be the result of the overlapping nature of the conflicts themselves. The US stabilized El Salvador to prevent further ideological conflict, which would result from a communist government taking over in San Salvador. US stabilization also served to prevent a deeper security conflict, which would have been caused by the rise of a perceived Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan puppet government in a former ally in the event that the FMLN won. Stabilization then was used to prevent a deepening of the two types conflicts that did exist.

I turn now to Nicaragua, against which Reagan launched a destabilization which was nearly to the degree of open military intervention. Unlike Nixon, Reagan never attempted to hide his support for the opponents of the Nicaraguan Government: Instead, Reagan openly and warmly supported the Contras, who he referred to as being like the Founding Fathers in Nicaragua.

Conflicts of Interest, Nicaragua under Ortega: Ideology, Security and Economics

For Reagan, the conflicts of interest were spelled out clearly in three main documents: The Republican Party's Platform of 1980, the Report from the Committee of Santa Fe, and

Jeanne Kirkpatrick's 1979 *Commentary* essay, "Dictatorships and Double standards."²³⁵ In these documents, those who would eventually become influential in Reagan's Central American policy put forth a unified message: The Carter Administration had failed to prevent Communists from establishing a beachhead in Nicaragua, because it was focused on human rights, rather than fighting the Cold War and preventing the Soviets from making gains in the Western Hemisphere. Because the Carter Administration focused on human rights before security issues, the US often, in the words of the 1980 Republican Party Platform, "undermined the very governments under attack. As a result, a clear and present danger threatens the energy and raw material lifelines of the Western world."

The criticism was broadened a couple sentences later: "The evidence of the Soviet threat to American security has never been more stark and unambiguous, nor has any President ever been more oblivious to this threat and its potential consequences." On Nicaragua, the Republicans were very clear in outlining the policy their candidate, if he won, would adopt: "We deplore the Marxist Sandinista take-over of Nicaragua and the Marxist attempts to destabilize El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras... However, we will support the efforts of the Nicaraguan people to establish a free and independent government" (Republican Party 1980). In a few

²³⁵ It is interesting to note that Reagan came into office in January of 1981 and almost immediately began destabilizing the government of Nicaragua. This presents an empirical problem for my hypothesis, given that the test is whether or not conflict of interest between two governments *leads* one to destabilize the other. Much of Reagan's foreign policy toward Nicaragua was more correctly viewed as a response to what his Administration perceived as the previous Administration's failure, rather than a crisis which developed during the time that Reagan was in office: The crisis was, so to speak, already fully formed by January 20, 1981, and the policy outcome was more or less already decided before Reagan took the oath of office. But the test is still valid, because it is possible to look at the positions and the documents to which Reagan subscribed, as well as several of the earliest documents in his Administration which confirm the ideas set out in the earlier papers. By the time that Ronald Reagan signed the policy document which officially authorized covert activities designed to support the Contras against the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua on December 1, 1981--or NCDD 17 three weeks earlier which authorized the CIA to conduct covert operations against the Nicaraguan Government--destabilization had already been underway for almost a whole year.

sentences, US interests in Nicaragua were summed up; all three types of interests were present in the GOP's platform position, as was the recommended policy response.²³⁶

The Report of the Santa Fe Committee was presented to the incoming Reagan Administration, and advocated rollback in Nicaragua. This document discussed the necessity not only to contain the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, but to destroy them completely. Marxists, the document claimed, were being driven by Cuba and the Soviet Union to expand "Marxism-Leninism." Its first target was El Salvador. As a result, the Committee advocated the destruction of the Sandinista Government, which the conservatives in the US government argued were in the process of arming the rebellion in El Salvador, using weapons sent from the Soviet bloc via Cuba (La Feber, 274). The committee's report was apparently supported by conservatives in the Heritage Foundation who, immediately following Reagan's election, translated them into the policy of "rollback." Their hypothesis was that not only could Communism be contained, but its gains could actually be reversed. Nicaragua was on the rollback list provided to the incoming Administration by the Heritage Foundation (Landes 1984, 149).

Finally, Reagan was also highly influenced by Jeane Kirkpatrick's 1979 Commentary piece. Kirkpatrick wrote on the distinction between rightist authoritarian governments. According to Kirkpatrick, the US should support "authoritarian" regimes because, though they may oppress their people as much as leftists, they are not "totalitarian" states--leftist dictatorships were--and could change--where "totalitarian" states could not change (Kirkpatrick, 1979).²³⁷ It

²³⁶ What the Republican Party failed to note, however, was that Carter himself had begun to destabilize the Sandinista Government in 1980. Those events are covered below. Nicaragua was a political problem for Carter: The failure to note US responses in late 1980 to Nicaragua was not accidental, given the speeches and comments made by prominent GOP congressmen and senators at the time.

²³⁷ This distinction between the two types of dictatorships served an ideological function. It set US policy firmly on the side of the traditional ruling groups in Latin America, the oligarchy, the military, and the commercial elites, but also set the US in opposition to those groups who would reform their respective societies, and therefore attempt to renegotiate their nation's relationship with the US. By referring to those regimes described as "authoritarian" and arguing that the US ought support them, Kirkpatrick was advocating a status quo arrangement in the hemisphere,

indicated that the US should increase support for right-wing dictatorships, regardless of their human rights records, but it also asserted that leftist dictatorships should be opposed.

Apparently, no matter how bad human rights were under right-wing governments, they would automatically be worse under leftist governments, for no other reason than the country was "totalitarian."²³⁸

Secretary of State Haig repeated Kirkpatrick's thesis in early 1981: An authoritarian regime, like that in El Salvador and Honduras, he explained, "customarily reserves for itself absolute authority in only a few politically sensitive areas." These areas rarely include the economy. Totalitarians, by comparison, attempt to assert control over all areas, including the economy. Because of this, totalitarian communist regimes, not authoritarian rightist governments, should face the criticism: their human rights records were far worse than authoritarian governments, and they were far less likely to change (Haig, quoted in Schmitz, 206). After all, human rights abuses were "an integral part of Marxist-Leninist dictatorships" (Schmitz, 195).²³⁹

and ultimately repudiating US support for modernizing reform movements that was originally championed, at least rhetorically, by Kennedy and his successors. In practice, there was little distinction between "authoritarian" regimes and "totalitarian" regimes, except that one group ruled illiberally from the right, and the other from the left.

²³⁸ This distinction was borne out in the Reagan Administration's rhetoric about Nicaragua, especially when compared to El Salvador. Although more than 70,000 people, most of them civilians, died in the Salvadoran Civil war, Nicaragua was described as a "totalitarian dungeon" by Reagan and claimed that Nicaraguans had it worse under the Sandinistas than blacks had it under Apartheid (quoted in Blum, 300). Later, he referred to Sandinista rule as a "Communist reign of terror" (quoted in Schoultz, 54). When the human rights certification of El Salvador came under scrutiny in light of the El Mozote massacre, the Reagan Administration was quick to point out that human rights under the Sandinistas were as bad, if not worse (La Feber, 315). This hyperbole continued throughout Reagan's first Administration: Blum reports that members of the Kissinger Commission who went to Nicaragua in 1983--and spent most of their time there interviewing members of the opposition--characterized Nicaragua as worse than it was under Somoza, while Kissinger allegedly stated that life in the country was as bad as it was in Nazi Germany (Blum 300)

²³⁹ To demonstrate their case about the horror of human rights abuses in Nicaragua, the Reagan Administration frequently used photographic evidence which was later shown to be misrepresentative. One example occurred as the Sandinista Government removed several thousand Miskito Indians from their land along the isolated Atlantic Coast. The Catholic Church--strongly opposed to the Sandinistas--criticized the violation of human rights and the US picked up on the condemnation. Kirkpatrick, after she became Ambassador to the US used these photos to demonstrate that the Sandinistas were conducting genocide against the Miskitos. Secretary of State Haig presented photos which he claimed showed Sandinistas burning dead Miskito Indians. The Administration were forced to

From these three sources, the policy of the US toward Nicaragua became apparent, even before Reagan arrived in office. Nicaragua, the Reagan Administration repeatedly asserted, was a totalitarian state, clearly in league with the Cubans and the Soviets. They sought to nationalize property and harass the private sector and establish a command economy in the Western Hemisphere. They aided leftist guerrillas trying to overthrow a friendly government in El Salvador, posed a threat to vital US interests, and therefore, could not be tolerated. It was a mistake, furthermore to attempt to contain Nicaragua, or to try to deal with them through negotiations, because their continued existence would mean continued threats to US interests in the area. In this mindset, the stage was set for destabilization from Reagan's first day in office.

All three conflicts of interest were present from before Reagan even began his term. Reagan campaigned and won, partly on the claim that the Carter Administration had failed to prevent the Sandinistas from taking over, and then the policy of the Carter Administration toward Nicaragua *after* the Sandinistas took over was insufficient to prevent them from advancing toward the US via El Salvador. When Reagan came into office, the conflicts between the US and Nicaragua immediately became much sharper than they had been under Carter, and were immediately raised to crisis level.

The most pointed crisis of the three types of conflict was ideological. Reagan's Administration was, in a word, anti-communist. US-Nicaraguan relations were contextualized by the US assertion that the Sandinistas were "Marxist" in their orientation.²⁴⁰ This presented an

backtrack on these claims when it was revealed two weeks later that the photos were taken in 1978, while Somoza was still in power in Nicaragua, and the corpses being burned were killed by Somoza's National Guard (Nieto, 326). But at the time, the claims were widely accepted because they fit the paradigm that leftist dictatorships do this kind of thing to their own people. While presenting this evidence, the Reagan Administration continued to certify the improvement in human rights in El Salvador, even though the military and security forces of El Salvador, through affiliated death squads, continued to kill Salvadorans.

²⁴⁰ One early document, published by the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC) from March 1981, is "The Sandinistas and the Creation of a One Party State." The Document states plainly, "Since seizing power, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) has transformed a national triumph into a partisan victory... and put

ideological conflict for the Reagan Administration which, no matter what else happened, was insurmountable. Given the hard ideological position of Reagan toward communists, and the persistent characterization of the Sandinista government as Marxist--whether they were or not--the case was made, long before Reagan took office that the Sandinistas were leftist in their political orientation and Marxist in their worldview. The Sandinistas had developed an independent foreign policy, (which allied with Castro and with the Bishop Government of Grenada,) and set themselves at odds, ideologically with the incoming Reagan Administration. Given the Sandinistas' need to deepen their move to the left in order to secure aid from Cuba and the Soviets ---in light of the economic "strangulation" policy of the US--this was a conflict that was never resolved during Reagan's first Administration.²⁴¹

Once the determination was made that the Sandinistas were indeed ideologically Marxist, everything they did was seen in that light. If they built their military, the action was viewed by the US as a precursor to invasion of neighbors, and eventually the US, and not a defensive move against constant incursions by former Somocista guards and eventually US-backed Contras. If they nationalized parts of the economy, it really didn't matter that their focus was initially on the former properties of the Somoza family. Their perceived intent was to establish a command economy hostile to the previous economic arrangement whereby US capital had a free hand in Nicaragua. The US government even before Reagan took power, had assumed that there was no

Nicaragua well onto the path of becoming the first authoritarian Marxist state in Central America" (NFAC 1981, 4). The document goes on to highlight the ideological links between the Sandinistas and Cuba, and concludes, "Ideological affinity and historical debt have ensured Havana major influence in shaping key Sandinista Institutions to provide the FSLN an unassailable power base" (NFAC, 6). Like most of the primary documents from the National Security archive, there is no indication about what was eventually done with this document, but it is illustrative of Reagan Administration policy, and seems to reaffirm what the US government had said to that time about the Sandinistas.

²⁴¹ The US government knew that the Soviets were not interested in subsidizing Nicaragua to the same degree that they supported Cuba, and yet they knew that the Soviets were more than willing to supply Nicaragua with military equipment and advice. A June 1981 assessment of Soviet Influence in Nicaragua published for the State Department by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research argued that Soviet influence was strong in strategic matters, but the Soviets were unwilling to provide economic assistance (BIR 1981). It is likely that the Soviets were more interested, as La Feber states, in keeping the US bogged down in Central America (La Feber, 293).

way to save Nicaragua from communists, and by as late as early April 1981, the Reagan Administration came to that same conclusion, though it is likely, based on the historical evidence, that he had come to that conclusion long before he ever arrived in the White House.²⁴² The existence of a Marxist-oriented government in Central America was as intolerable to Reagan as the existence of a Marxist-oriented Government in the Cuba had been to his predecessors, Republicans and Democrats alike.

Reagan's ideological predisposition against Communism overlapped, in several ways, with his concern about US security. While campaigning for office, Reagan argued that the Caribbean was "rapidly becoming a Communist lake in what should be an American Pond" (Quoted in La Feber, 274). He eventually described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" who would commit any sort of atrocious act to create a Communist world (Quoted in Patterson. 256). Implicit in his Administration's concern over communism was that communism causes instability: Communism was "evil" and expansionistic, both the US and Latin America are susceptible to the instability caused by expanding communism, and therefore, radicals in Latin America become tools of the Soviet Union to threaten US security because they are inherently anti-American and pro-Soviet (Schoultz, 109-128).²⁴³ His administration reconceived "détente" as a scheme which only helped the Soviets and the Cubans take advantage of US policies on human rights, and which only punished US allies, while leaving leftist governments alone (Schmitz, 194). Reagan even dusted off the domino theory, which stated that if one country

²⁴² See (Schoultz, 53, n. 47) for a long discussion on the decision to finally cut off aid to Nicaragua in early 1981, and its relationship to the perception of Communism in Nicaragua.

²⁴³ As Schoultz argues, the task of Reagan's first Administration was to radically shift the conversation in US Foreign Policy from addressing instability as a structural matter caused by poverty, poor government, and underdevelopment to one which more served US strategic goal. Instability was no longer about poverty; now it was the result of Soviet Adventurism. Schoultz argues that the goal of shifting the conversation to one about dealing with the "communist threat" and ultimately the Soviet Union was successful. Given that this was the goal of the Reagan Administration, the seeming cynicism on the one hand and the apparent bumbling on the other hand of Reagan's Central American policy which resulted in apparent wins for Reagan's critics is better explained (Schoultz, 63-64)

becomes communist, others around it will eventually also fall. "Remember," Reagan argued as he was running for office, "we are the last domino (Quoted in LeGrande 1981, 45).

The supply of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador was seen as a more explicit security threat. Reagan's administration came into office as the US was pressuring the Sandinistas to stop supplying arms to the Salvadoran Rebels. The Carter Administration suspended aid to Nicaragua in December of 1980 because, it asserted, the rebels were being armed and funded by the Soviets and Cuba through Nicaragua. Secretary Haig, when he assumed office at the beginning of 1981, predicated the return of US aid on Nicaraguan suspension of arms transport to the FMLN. By early April, the State Department reported that it no longer had evidence of arms supply coming from Nicaragua, but the Reagan Administration still refused to restore aid, because the Administration found it difficult to believe these findings, given what they believed about communism and the Nicaraguan government. Apparently the State department believed that "some arms traffic may be continuing and other support very probably continues." Nicaragua, finding that its change in policy did not produce a change in the US' willingness to give aid eventually resumed some limited arms shipments (La Feber, 305).²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ The case for the alleged massive Nicaraguan conduit to Salvadoran rebels was scanty. As discussed above, there was not much evidence that the Sandinistas had much of a supply operation going into El Salvador. And yet, this was used as a major justification made by the Reagan Administration for providing money for covert operations against Nicaragua. Blum cites a former CIA Agent, David MacMichael who was involved in analysis of military and political developments in Central America. MacMichael noted that "arms interdiction had never been a serious objective... The Administration [sic] and the CIA have systematically misrepresented Nicaraguan involvement in the supply of arms to Salvadorean [sic] guerrillas to justify efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government" (Quoted in Blum, 295). These comments mirror earlier comments made by former Ambassador White before a Congressional hearing, who said "The United States is not producing the evidence [of Nicaraguan arms shipments to the FMLN] because they do not have it." and career Foreign Service officer Wayne Smith, who himself wondered why the evidence of Cuban shipments to Central America had likewise not been produced (quoted in Schoultz, 63). Except for the part about the Government misrepresenting Nicaraguan involvement, the assertion of massive Nicaraguan arms shipments to the support the Salvadoran rebels nonetheless became the Reagan Administration's own justification for funding for covert operations against Nicaragua

But what was significantly more troubling to the US was that Nicaragua itself began, in 1980 to create of a massive army for itself (La Feber, 240).²⁴⁵ This process was ongoing through the start of Reagan's Presidency, and the trend only increased as the Contras began stepping up their war during 1981. By 1982, the US observed that the Sandinistas were importing Soviet equipment and advisors to build a 25,000 man army and a 30,000 man militia (La Feber, 305).²⁴⁶ By 1984, 40 percent of Nicaragua's budget was spent on maintaining a 75,000 man army (La Feber, 307). While this buildup was in response to the constant harassment of Nicaragua by Contras which conducted regular raids from Honduras, the US policy makers pointed to it as evidence of Nicaragua's intentions to spread its revolution and threaten US sea lanes through and around the Panama Canal and the Western Mediterranean Sea. In December of 1981, Haig warned the OAS of Nicaraguan hostility toward its neighbors, and proclaimed that it would not allow Central America to become "a platform for terror and war" (Haig, cited in Nieto, 331).²⁴⁷ Whether or not Nicaragua had the intention, or even the capability, for that matter to credibly threaten its neighbors in the region, or threaten US commercial interests for that matter, what was important was US perceptions of the threat. Given the beliefs of the Reagan Administration

²⁴⁵ "Massive" is a relative term. It may be true that Nicaragua had one of the largest militaries in Central America. Yet, the firepower of one US aircraft carrier group was greater than the total strength of all Central American militaries combined, and the US had two stationed in the region. Meanwhile Nicaragua had no air force to speak of, and no real navy. The objective condition of the Nicaraguan military also rendered US claims that it was trying to protect vital sea lanes and access to the Panama Canal rather moot as well. And yet, the US maintained, at least in part that its support for our allies in the region and opposition to the Sandinistas was to address this concern, along with the others (Blum, 296).

²⁴⁶ The US government also accused the Sandinistas of importing T-55 tanks from Cuba, as well as other sophisticated military equipment from Libya and socialist bloc nations. Given the uselessness of main battle tanks in the jungle environment of Central America, it is natural that the Nicaraguan government should deny this charge. One report that discussed this event, which was published by the US Government, doubted the veracity of some of these reports (Serafino 1981, 14)

²⁴⁷ One of the main charges that the Reagan Administration leveled at the Nicaraguan Government was that they were preparing to attack Honduras. The Sandinistas countered that the US was trying to trump up a Nicaraguan-Honduran war to give the US an excuse to intervene (Flynn 1984, 112). Nicaragua, however, had no reason to invade its neighbors. It is clear that not even Nicaragua's neighbors took this concern seriously (Blum, 296).

about Communist and Soviet aggression, the construction of a military suggested that Nicaragua was indeed planning to use it for aggressive purposes.

Finally, there were several economic conflicts between the US and Nicaragua. Most US investment in Nicaragua was never really threatened by the actions of the Nicaraguan revolution. The Sandinistas focused on taking over economic activity of the Somoza family and most US firms continued to maintain their involvement in the Nicaragua as they had before.²⁴⁸ But as the Sandinista government moved left, it became more and more involved in the Nicaraguan economy (La Feber, 305-306).²⁴⁹ The goal of the Sandinistas' early economic intervention was to delink Nicaragua from the US-dominated economic arrangements which had existed for almost a century and to empower the citizens of the country.

The first component in this overall program to end Nicaragua's economic dependence on the US was a comprehensive agrarian reform, signed into law officially on July 19, 1981, but which had been developing since the early months of the Sandinista period. The Nicaraguan reform aimed at quite a different end than the limited and ultimately aborted reform in El Salvador. Soon after the Sandinistas took power, they seized the lands owned by Somoza and proceeded to distribute them to the peasants. In 1981, the Sandinistas deepened the agrarian reform by nationalizing all land which was underutilized or utilized inefficiently. Those who used the land "efficiently" were eventually granted title to the land, either individually or in collectives. Ultimately, by 1984, less than 20 percent of the land remained under state control (La Feber 306). At the heart of the Sandinistas' agrarian reform was an effort to transform the

²⁴⁸ In 1980, many US companies continued to do business in Nicaragua. Ultimately, they probably believed that they could tame the Sandinistas and remind them of how important US investment was to Nicaragua (Burbach and Herold 1984, 203). Some large US companies even stayed in Nicaragua: IBM and Exxon continued to do business with the Sandinistas. By the beginning of 1981, that had, for the most part changed.

²⁴⁹ Early nationalizations were focused on agriculture, where the Somozas had previously dominated. They also introduced an agrarian reform aimed at politically mobilizing the masses, which I describe below).

very social, economic and political fabric of Nicaraguan society (Deere, 178). The US opposed the Nicaraguan agrarian reform that was designed to bring peasants into the revolution by giving them a stake in the success of the revolution and their efforts to expand the state sector at the expense of the private sector: that would be "the last thing that would serve US interests..." (Deere, 170). The US' preferred alternative was represented in the Salvadoran agrarian reform.

In this regard, the Nicaraguan agrarian reform was different than the Salvadoran agrarian reform, which sought to diminish the peasants' demands for redress of their grinding poverty and misery. Nicaraguan reform was not designed to defuse the revolutionary impulse of the peasants as they were in El Salvador, but to bring the peasants into the political system. The threatened success of Nicaragua's agrarian reform at providing peasants not only land, but also a better quality of life and an opportunity to participate in the political process for the first time, threatened to undermine the US critique that totalitarian governments made life worse for the people stuck in the "totalitarian dungeon": it violated an essential paradigm of the Reagan Administration's world view and threatened to undermine the justification for US efforts against the Sandinistas. Consequently, it was opposed by the Reagan Administration (Deere, 178).²⁵⁰

The agrarian reform was only part of the reason for the conflict of economic interests between the US and Nicaragua. Nearly all of the Sandinistas' economic policies confirmed the beliefs held by the US government in general and the Reagan Administration specifically. Even though the involvement of the Sandinista government in the economy was actually rather

²⁵⁰ One proponent of Reagan's economic policies in the region was Michael Novak. According to LaFeber, Novak was to "reaganomics" and the use of "free market" mechanisms as solutions to economic crises in Central and South America as Kirkpatrick was to support for authoritarian regimes (LaFeber, 286). Novak's theories formed the theoretical underpinning of such programs as the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which was seen as something similar to the Alliance for Progress, but which eventually only helped American businesses in all sectors except those which they didn't compete (LaFeber, 286-87). Novak argued that "liberty" was necessary to being able to feed the people of a country. Breaking free of state control was essential, in turn to "liberty" (Novak, cited in La Feber, 286-287). As the Nicaraguans deepened their involvement in the public sector of Nicaragua, the Reagan Administration was able, under this line of thinking, to make the case that the formerly "free" people of Nicaragua were being oppressed by the Sandinistas.

limited, the Reagan Administration saw it as just the first step to the ultimate establishment of a command economy in Nicaragua. In every way, a large public sector employed by the Sandinistas violated the tenets of the economic doctrine preferred by the Reagan Administration. As the Sandinistas took over more and more of the private sector to promote their plan for development of the country, attempt to improve the lot in life for the people of Nicaragua and protect themselves politically from a popular backlash caused by unmet expectations, the business sector of Nicaragua became increasingly alienated. US concerns were thus confirmed.

Added to this was the predictable capital flight that often accompanies revolutions. Under pressure from the US government, combined with the tightening of controls on the private sector by the Sandinistas themselves, fewer and fewer corporations felt comfortable in Nicaragua. For Nicaragua, this led to a vicious cycle: the more they tried to protect themselves against the effects of the loss of aid, the more they tightened control over the economy. It did not matter that, later on, the Sandinistas changed their economic policies in light of the unsustainability of a large public sector: by that time Reagan was committed to their overthrow (LaFeber, 306). Capital flight was "death by a million cuts." By late 1981, one Nicaraguan official admitted "We have failed economically (Unnamed Nicaraguan Government Economist, quoted in La Feber, 306).

These three conflicts of interest greatly increased the probability of a destabilization policy toward the Government of Nicaragua. Once more, my hypothesis predicts that I should see destabilization in this case. Based on the secondary and primary sources that I utilized, I can conclude that my hypothesis is supported: given that the three types of conflict existed, for the most part, before Reagan took office, he wasted little time in beginning a destabilization campaign against the Sandinistas.

US Responses in Nicaragua: Destabilization

Much like El Salvador, the Nicaraguan case is strange within the scope of this dissertation. Unlike Brazil, and possibly also unlike Bolivia, US military forces and CIA forces were directly and verifiably involved in the destabilization of Nicaragua. But in Nicaragua, the operation was clearly CIA directed and run. Until 1982, the CIA went through Argentine intermediaries, but following Falklands/Malvinas War, where the US sided with Great Britain, Argentina withdrew its support for the Contra War. After that, the Contra war became an entirely CIA-run operation (Nieto, 325).

The story of the connection between the conflicts of interest and destabilization in Nicaragua is very short: The citizens of the US more or less voted for it, twice. Ronald Reagan ran on the platform which advocated the destruction of the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua. The platform is very clear on this issue: "... We will support the efforts of the Nicaraguan people to establish a free and independent government." Policy papers prepared for Reagan before his inauguration were explicit in their advocacy for roll-back of Soviet "adventurism" in Central America. Seeking the removal of the Sandinistas was already a current policy topic in the Congress and in the Carter Administration when Reagan took power. Reagan's zeal for carrying out that program is explained specifically by his desire to win the Cold War in Central America and in other underdeveloped parts of the world. There is no confusion on this point.²⁵¹

²⁵¹ The US intervention in Nicaragua has been covered in many sources, many of which served as resources for this chapter in this dissertation. The case that the US intervened in Nicaragua as a result of these conflicts is told in many ways, by many people. It even led to a massive scandal involving Marine Col. Oliver North, who was convicted of breaking several laws accepting bribes, obstructing a Congressional inquiry, and destruction of sensitive documents. Those details are outside of the scope of this dissertation chapter, and so do not need to be recounted here. What is more important, for the sake of the test is that these very sharp conflicts of interest, which objectively predated Reagan's inauguration in 1981, were heightened by Reagan's anti-communist perspective and led to a continuation of Carter's program into a full fledged US destabilization program under Reagan.

Not only did Sandinista domestic policies violate US policy preferences,²⁵² but so did their perceived leftist political orientation, their perceived foreign policy, and their perceived economic policy.

As the Sandinista victory became inevitable, Carter had tried to get Somoza to leave the country and establish a caretaker government that would diffuse the Sandinistas' momentum while denying them office. Somoza refused and was eventually removed from office by the victorious rebels. Soon after this began, the Carter Administration began supporting "moderate" alternatives to the socialist government within Nicaragua. US aid was redirected to private actors in the business community as well as the American Institution of Free Labor Development (AIFLD), a CIA operation which had been active players in destabilizations in Guyana, Chile, and Jamaica. At the same time, Carter denied military aid to the Sandinistas, which weakened them *vis-à-vis* the cashiered national guardsmen and former Somocistas who were in the process of regrouping into units which would eventually become the Contras, and who spent the intervening years harassing, robbing, and committing various other atrocities in Nicaragua from their bases in exile (Blum, 291).

In early 1980, a crucial aid bill for Nicaragua was held up in Congress by the influence of former Somoza lobbyists and allies, and the Sandinistas, desperate for aid, turned to the Soviets, from whom they received 100 million dollars in trade deals. Eventually the US passed the aid bill--because western banks pressured the US government to avoid a default of the 1.5 billion dollar debt inherited by the Sandinistas from Somoza--though importantly, none of it was military aid. Jesse Helms, who opposed the aid explained during the debate the position which

²⁵² Sandinistas violated US policy preferences more so in the Reagan Administration than in the Carter Administration. But this is not to suggest that the Sandinistas had any friends in government during the Carter Administration, even though Reagan went to great lengths to paint this picture anyway for political purposes (Schultz, 51).

eventually held sway in the Reagan Administration: "What we are going to decide today is whether the US taxpayers' money is going to be used to support a Communist regime. We would see US aid going for Marxist central planning, confiscation of agricultural land and industrial plants and ensconcing... loyal Communists in high-paying government jobs" (quoted in Schoultz, 46-47).

At the same time, the CIA began organizing former officers of Somoza's National Guard and military officers and funding anti-Sandinista press, unions and parties. In response, the Sandinistas reacted by increasing their control over the private sector, jailing private opposition leaders and establishing censorship. By the end of 1980, Carter had cut off all but a food aid program, and the Sandinistas were in the process of securing more money from the socialist bloc. The stage was set for Reagan to launch the Contra War (La Feber, 240-241).

While the Carter Administration's policies are outside the scope of this analysis, Reagan's claims about them were only partially correct. Carter did in fact attempt to prevent the Sandinistas from obtaining office, and then when they did, he immediately set out to destabilize the Sandinistas.²⁵³ Given this situation, it is difficult to say that any one act or position pushed the *Reagan Administration* into destabilizing the Sandinista Government. Since the ideological and security conflicts were present at the beginning of Reagan's Administration, and he had run on a platform of support for the "people" of Nicaragua in their attempts to "establish a free and independent government," I therefore focus on the economic conflicts.

²⁵³ Blum's account is fairly extensive on this topic. Soon after the Sandinistas took power, Carter authorized the CIA to support opposition groups within Nicaragua. Blum states that the expressed purpose of the aid the US sent to Nicaragua was to "strengthen the hand of the so-called moderate opposition and to undercut the influence of [socialism] in Nicaragua" (Blum, 291). In December 1980, the Carter Administration cut all aid to Nicaragua, except programs designed to strengthen the private sector in Nicaragua, which became significant players in the opposition movement (Landes, 148)

There is evidence that the formal decision to actually begin the destabilization of the government of Nicaragua did not occur immediately upon Reagan taking office. The Reagan Administration noted that the Sandinistas were Communists, but the Sandinistas did not yet have the strength to destroy the non-Communist opposition within Nicaragua.²⁵⁴ Reagan's policy then was to provide, in early 1981, an aid package to prop up that opposition community the same as Carter had done before him. Reagan asked for \$35 Million to be provided in the FY 1982 budget to private sector based groups who, in the words of Acting Assistant Secretary of State Bushnell, "have held out for more than a year as a strong force against those who would establish a totalitarian state" (Bushnell, quoted in Schoultz, 52). Secretary Haig put a different spin on the request. This money was to go to those who were seeking a "moderate"--read non-Sandinista--outcome. Haig argued that the money was to aggravate the prospects for Sandinista success (Haig, in Schoultz, 53). Even by early 1981, the course for destabilization was being laid, though it was not completely set; at this time, hope for success lay with elements within Nicaragua.

By April, that hope had more or less been abandoned.²⁵⁵ The Reagan Administration asserted that Nicaragua was behind the violence in El Salvador, and even though it could certify that no weapons were being shipped from Nicaragua to El Salvador, this did not mean that Nicaragua was not supplying rebels and instigating their civil war. Reagan used this as

²⁵⁴ This opposition consisted primarily of the Church and the business community.

²⁵⁵ As noted above, Schoultz, in his footnotes, argues that the decision was formally advanced in April but everything suggests that the decision to cut off all aid and abandon hope for building a moderate alternative in Nicaragua had been made by mid February (Schoultz, 53, N. 47). This pushes the decision by Reagan to destabilize the Nicaraguan government back to at least that early. But, given my discussion, I would argue that the choice to destabilize the Sandinistas was made, by Reagan long before that. I have no doubt that Reagan, upon entering office, was fully informed about Carter's efforts to destabilize the government there, information that he would not have necessarily have had access to before winning the election in November of 1980. Once Reagan began transitioning into office following the election, the sum total of Carter's Nicaragua policy would have been known to him. It was that policy which was carried out through Reagan's inauguration, up until February, when Lars Schoultz suggests that it was changed in favor of more active support for armed opponents to the Sandinistas. At any rate, by November of 1981, the policy which had been adopted many months prior, was formalized into law.

justification to cut off all funding to Nicaragua, including the remaining \$15 million in disbursements from a Carter allocation (Schoultz, 53).

The Carter aid was food aid, and its cutoff was designed to create severe conditions within Nicaragua. It succeeded in its tasks, because the Sandinista government had not fully reorganized the agriculture sector of the country from the Somoza era system in which most of the productive land in the country grew export crops (Landes, 149). At the same time, the Reagan Administration cut off international credit, ended ExImBank trade financing and ended Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) guarantees.²⁵⁶ The effect was to crush Nicaraguan access to credit and investment which is badly needed to obtain basic materials. Some companies stayed, and Nicaragua got some aid from foreign countries in Western and Eastern Europe, but it was nothing close to what was needed to make up for Nicaragua's sudden ejection from the world financial and trade system (Landes 149-150). In late 1981, the US collaborated with Chile and Argentina to get Nicaragua to withdraw its request for 30 billion dollars to rebuild its fisheries industry. When asked why the US adopted this policy, an unnamed Treasury Department official reported that "'We had an overall political problem with the direction' of the Nicaraguan Government (Quoted in Landes, 150).

Ultimately, these measures did not produce the uprising among the bourgeoisie--who mainly opted to simply flee the country and abandon their operations--or the poor, who were, in 1981, still fervently pro-revolution. The Reagan Administration, therefore debated other solutions to the problem. They seem to have settled on support for the Contras by fall of 1981. The Contras were former Somocista military and government officers as well as a large part of Somoza's former National Guard who had fled the country to Honduras and Costa Rica

²⁵⁶ These guarantees were necessary to encourage private investment to go into volatile areas: without assurances against nationalization, no investor would be willing to take the risk.

following the Sandinista victory in 1979. There they had regrouped into a relatively disorganized set of raiders and criminals who conducted sporadic raids along the Nicaraguan border from their hideouts in the jungles.

The CIA became involved in late 1981,²⁵⁷ and brought in Argentine trainers. Training began in late October, and by early December the first units were ready (Nieto, 325). Back in Washington, Ronald Reagan signed NSDD 17 on 11 November which officially authorized the CIA operation--it had already been covertly underway for some time--and then on December 1, he signed NSC Directive 03340, which authorized covert paramilitary action "against the government of Nicaragua." A few days later, the FDN (the Democratic Forces of Nicaragua as the CIA dubbed the Contras) launched their first assaults into Northern Nicaragua. The US embassy served as a command center for the operations, all of the "brains" behind the operation were Americans, and Honduran Ambassador John Negroponte was described as the "boss" of the operation. This was the opening salvo of a not-so-secret war that Reagan pursued all eight years of his Administration (Nieto, 316; Flynn, 104-106).²⁵⁸

Given the evidence and the outcomes, in the case of Nicaragua, I can say confidently, that my hypothesis is confirmed. Broad and intense of interest led to the adoption of destabilization as US policy. The Reagan Administration came into office and immediately perceived ideological, economic and security conflicts of interest. In fact, those conflicts were present prior to Reagan being inaugurated, and the US under Carter began to respond as my theory would predict. It is not a problem that the conflicts preceded Reagan's Administration. I have

²⁵⁷ As noted, however, they had begun to organize the core of what would become the FDN, or the Contras in the Carter Administration.

²⁵⁸ Flynn actually describes a situation where in late 1981, Vernon Walters, US military Attaché *par excellence* had been sent to Argentina "earlier that year" to secure the cooperation of Argentina and to organize the training of a 1000 man army. These troops subsequently received payment from the NSC, who allocated in November several million dollars for the conduct of paramilitary operations against Nicaragua (Flynn, 105).

demonstrated above that those conflicts were perceived by Reagan and his advisors, and his policy response was to formally adopt a destabilization strategy, aimed at assisting first a "moderate" alternative in the private sector in Nicaragua, and then a proxy army made up of the Sandinistas' political opponents based in Honduras and Costa Rica. But this conclusion is not without caveats and implications, as I discuss below.

Concluding Statements: El Salvador and Nicaragua

The cases of US policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua respectively demonstrate support for my hypothesis. While they do present some challenges for it as well, which should be explored in future research, they also illustrate the prospect theory well.

Prospect theory is illustrated by the case of El Salvador in that, given the lack of broad and intense conflict of interest, the US did not accept the risk of overthrowing the government there. This was especially important during the period of time when D'Aubuisson was the head of the Constituent Assembly and Mangana was the President of El Salvador. The US clearly preferred Duarte to Mangana and Duarte's PDC (the Christian Democratic Party) to D'Aubuisson's ARENA Party. And yet, the US nonetheless accepted the accession of D'Aubuisson, even though they knew that that meant the "moderate" had lost to an extremist. The US knew that human rights violations would continue unabated, and the government would be just as incapable of ending the insurgency one way or another, but even though they disliked the rightist government in El Salvador, the Reagan Administration still worked to strengthen it against the FMLN.

When the next elections came up, the US demonstrated their dislike for ARENA by dumping several million dollars into Duarte's election campaign. But there had not been a serious enough violation of the preferred positions of the US and the status quo to justify a risky

policy like destabilization. As long as the Government of El Salvador could give the Reagan Administration the thinnest evidence that it was attempting to improve its human rights and continuing the agrarian reform, the Reagan Administration continued to work, instead to actively *stabilize* the government of El Salvador and to fight for aid from the US Congress. While there was a disagreement over human rights, and while there was a disagreement about the inability of the Salvadoran government to produce a decisive victory against the FMLN despite the millions of dollars a day that the US was supplying it by 1985, what was clear was that the Reagan Administration and the Salvadoran Government were in complete consonance about the need to defend against the FMLN. This consonance was enough to allow the Reagan Administration to overlook, to some degree, the outstanding problems.

In terms of the theory, the preferred status quo was that the FMLN not be allowed to win. When the government and military, affiliated with the paramilitaries and the death squads of El Salvador committed human rights abuses, it made it harder for the Reagan Administration to maintain that one single policy goal because it made it that much harder for the Reagan Administration to convince the American people and the American Congress that the Government of El Salvador was worth helping. But there was never really an economic issue at stake here, so the maintenance status quo was never *really* in much doubt: When Congress cut off direct aid, Reagan found money elsewhere, and it lasted until the Congress restored funding after El Salvador demonstrated that they were "doing something" about the conflicts of interest. Human rights abuses slowed until the US sent more money. The Government went on the offensive and killed a few guerrillas here and there until the US sent more money. The strategy was at best a maintenance strategy, but then again, it served the goals of the Reagan Administration in some way: the FMLN never won decisively in El Salvador. If it cost the US 2

million dollars a day to accomplish that, Reagan demonstrated that support for that government was preferable to allowing the FMLN to win.

In Nicaragua the story was the exact opposite: There was seemingly nothing that the Government of Nicaragua could do, short of unconditional surrender to the Contras, which would have been acceptable to the Reagan Administration. The problem was the fact that they were believed to be communists, and the Reagan Administration had committed to removing communism from Central America. If the Sandinistas privatized large portions of the public sector--as they eventually did in their agrarian reform--this was not enough for Reagan. If they committed to not interfering in El Salvador, as they did in early 1981, and several times later on this was not enough. Even if there was decisive evidence that they were *not* sending weapons to the FMLN which the US government itself acknowledged, as was the case in April 1981, this was not enough.

The problem for Reagan was that communists were in power in Nicaragua. Just as this was an unacceptable outcome in El Salvador, this was an unacceptable situation in Nicaragua, and consequently, Reagan was willing to adopt destabilization, fund a semi-covert army, and then, when military funding for the Contras was cut off by the Congress who passed the Boland Amendment, which made it illegal to fund the Contras, members of the Reagan Administration simply broke the law to continue to fund them and support them, even if there was no evidence that the Contras were winning. The CIA even went so far as to begin mining ports in Nicaragua in 1984, which had the effect of destruction of several ships--including some owned by British and French companies-- that were trading with Nicaragua, but were otherwise unrelated to the

conflict. This action was against international law, and Nicaragua sued the US in the International Court of Justice (Nieto, 344).²⁵⁹

In Nicaragua, as in El Salvador, the US had one over-riding priority. The elimination of the Sandinista Government superseded, eventually, even adherence to US and international law. The preferred status quo was the one which did not include communists in charge of the government of Nicaragua. The US was willing to conduct more and more risky policy to return to their preferred position, before Nicaragua was "lost" to the communists. This involved supporting many of the same elements who had controlled Nicaragua before the victory of the FSLN, mostly the Somocista among the Contras. All was done in pursuit of a restoration of the pre-Communist government in Nicaragua: this was what was implied in the term "roll back." The policy to seek the overthrow of the Sandinista government was adopted before Reagan even took office.

While the hypothesis is demonstrated, the question of "an acceptable" alternative also can be raised here. When looking at alternatives in El Salvador in 1981, the ones that the US discovered were both unacceptable. The US documents and secondary accounts describe the Duarte Government and PDC-Controlled Constituent Assembly as a moderate alternative between radical leftists in the FMLN and extreme rightists in the military and in the paramilitaries. Consequently, when the Salvadoran government conducted elections in 1982, the US supported Duarte against the Rightists under D'Aubuisson.²⁶⁰ When the Right won anyway,

²⁵⁹ Barry Goldwater, who had a long history of supporting anti-communism in the US and in the world, famously wrote to CIA Director William Casey. His words are worth repeating here, to show just how unpopular Reagan's policy toward Nicaragua had become in the US Congress by 1984: "[It is] and act violating international law. It is an act of war. For the life of me, I do not see how we are going to explain it" (Quoted in Nieto, 344). It is important to note, also, that Barry Goldwater famously said, as he was accepting the nomination of Ronald Reagan's Party twenty years earlier, "I would remind you that extremism in the defense of Liberty is no vice. And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue."

²⁶⁰ The leftists did not participate in the elections: they remembered the experience of 1980, when reform protests became opportunities for peasants and reformers to be killed in the streets by the military. Blum describes the

the US pressured the military to name a "moderate" Alvaro Mangana as President. But there was no change in US policy (La Feber, 317). When they got another chance to influence the Salvadoran elections, in 1984, the US government once more supported their preferred candidate, Duarte, and this time he and the PDC won. And yet, there was no change in US policy toward stabilization of the Salvadoran Government. In this case, it did not matter who the alternative was: so long as the FMLN did not win the war, US policy would remain the same.

In Nicaragua, similarly, the alternative was automatically preferred. At the early stages, the US hoped that someone from the business community or the church would step up and offer themselves as a viable alternative to the Sandinistas. But when it appeared that this was not going to happen, the US began supporting a different alternative. The Contras were the preferred alternative beginning in mid 1981, and though they were regularly accused of killing civilians, imprisoning people, raping and kidnapping women, collecting their own taxes, and outright theft of US funds, this did not diminish US support for them (Nieto, 330). In all cases, even though the alternative was possibly (in reality) worse than the Sandinistas were, in the Reagan Administration's calculus, they were far better because they were not communists.

In El Salvador, there is a possibility, which can be explored in a later study, whether the possibility of getting a worse alternative played a role in the decision to continue supporting the Government of El Salvador, even though the Rightists affiliated with the Death Squad leader D'Aubuisson won the 1982 elections. If the US would have destabilized D'Aubuisson because of his death squad connections, it is possible that the FMLN would have won the civil war, and that was a fate far worse for Reagan than simply allowing the election to stand and continuing the

results of these reform protests in San Salvador in 1980. Protesters marching in a January 1980 demonstration were sprayed with DDT from a crop duster and then shot to death once they reached the central plaza in San Salvador. More than 20 people were killed and 120 wounded in the assault and resulting return fire. Two months later, a general strike was met with violence that killed 54. At the funeral for Archbishop Romero, a bomb was thrown from the Presidential Palace which killed more than 50 mourners (Blum, 355).

same policies as before the election. The alternative explanation for US policy choices in light of the Right's victory over the US' preferred candidate is at least plausible enough to merit further study. And in Nicaragua, clearly, the alternative, whatever it was, was preferable, from the very beginning.

The story of the *creation* of US foreign policy in the Reagan Administration also deserves a note here. To this point, I have asserted that the main engine of policy creation has been the President and his immediate advisors. But this core began to weaken in the 1970s to allow more actors, and specifically, more veto players to come into the process. In turn, this made US policy much less coherent than it had been in the past. As the Congress increased its role in the making of foreign policy, US foreign policy interests became murkier: On any given point, there was a larger divergence of foreign policy interests than there had been before the mid-1970s. The Congress, controlled at this time by Democrats, still insisted that human rights have a high priority in foreign policy, but the Reagan Administration prioritized fighting communism and perhaps definitively winning the Cold War. By 1981, US foreign policy was still, for the most part made by the President and his immediate advisors, even though the Congress was able more than ever before to prevent its implementation; the bigger the conflict between the policies of El Salvador and the interests of the US Government, taken by now as a whole, the bigger the problem this created for Reagan in pursuit of his anti-communist foreign policy. Consequently, El Salvador's human rights record was a serious conflict for the Reagan Administration whether Reagan wanted to focus on it or not,

Finally, the above analysis offers the first inklings on the question of the effects of each type of conflict on the policy to destabilize. In both the El Salvadoran and the Nicaraguan cases, at least, concern about the advancement of Communism seemed to take precedence over other

types of conflict. This can be seen in the way that policy makers framed their arguments for aid in each of the respective wars.

The documentary evidence provided by the Government, *public statements notwithstanding* suggest that the Reagan Administration did not put much priority on the economic and security issue, though they were presented on a regular basis as being very serious. It was almost as if they did not take those conflicts as seriously as the conflict over ideology. Nicaragua is especially illustrative. While a hostile government in Nicaragua could conceivably threaten US economic interests by disrupting the flow of vital strategic resources from other parts of the world,²⁶¹ and while it is possible that the US believed that the Soviets were directing everything in Nicaragua and were using Nicaragua as a base to launch a military limited nuclear attack on the US, followed by a conventional invasion coordinated with the Cuban and Nicaraguan Armies,²⁶² these other interests were often used as justifications for the policies Reagan adopted to combat the spread of Communism.

There is no evidence to suggest that the Reagan Administration actually believed that the Soviets *were* building bases in Nicaragua. All the arguments deal with Nicaragua acting as a *transshipment conduit* for weapons and materiel to the FMLN. Nicaraguans themselves admitted that they purchased great quantities of Soviet and socialist-bloc weaponry and hardware; the Soviet Union admitted that it supplied these weapons (La Feber 293). Some of the *materiel* could have gone to the FMLN. But the Soviets were not directing the trade, and the United States only ever accused them of doing so in public statements designed to elicit support for Reagan's policies.

²⁶¹ See Schoultz' discussion on strategic materials (144-159).

²⁶² As *Red Dawn* ridiculously suggests

Similarly, the US proclaimed the bravery of the private sector which was holding out, but they never really expressed, privately, that Nicaragua was a threat to US shipping lanes. Nor did they ever argue that any specific company was being threatened, the way Kennedy and Nixon had, for example--IBM and other US firms continued dealings with the Sandinistas would have put pay to that notion. But claims like this did serve a purpose: They were employed whenever the Reagan Administration needed to justify its policies against Nicaragua. And yet, the desire to rollback Communism was a very sincerely held position, from the beginning to the end of the Reagan Administration; to some degree, Reagan's policies were ultimately vindicated. The Soviet Union began its collapse on his watch.

It is therefore possible to say, without having actually explored this particular hypothesis, that the desire to destroy Communism, at least in the case of El Salvador and Nicaragua, was the primary motivator for US policy toward those two countries. I raise this point more as a question for future research: Which type of conflict of interest is most important at a given time, and why?

My hypothesis thus supported in the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan cases, I now inquire whether or not this hypothesis can be plausibly demonstrated outside of the US-Soviet, Western Hemisphere situation in which the previous three comparisons were set. I explore whether broad and intense conflicts of interest were the cause of South Africa's destabilization policy toward Mozambique, while a more limited conflict in South African-Botswana relations caused a different outcome.

CHAPTER 6

SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY IN BOTSWANA AND MOZAMBIQUE, 1978-1985

Introduction- South Africa as a "Most Different" Case

The hypothesis is demonstrated in US-Latin American cases during the 60s, 70s and 80s. But there is the possibility that the historical relationship between the US and Latin America, or the features of the system in the bipolar context of the Cold War could have influenced the outcome. The model, if simply left to cases I presented above, is then open to critique on those lines.²⁶³ To see whether or not my hypothesis travelled to other parts of the globe, I decided to conduct a cursory investigation of relations in Southern Africa during PW Botha's premiership.

In many ways, the Republic of South Africa was similar to the US during this period of time. Firstly, South Africa was *the* major player in the region. It pictured itself as a regional power, upon which its neighbors should depend economically and politically, and whose example its neighbors should follow. Following major diplomatic successes in early-1984, and the earlier relaxing of Western attitudes--notably the US and Great Britain--toward the apartheid state, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha²⁶⁴ asserted South Africa's new role as leader of the region: "[No] problems in southern Africa can be resolved unless the legitimate interest of this regional power, South Africa, are taken into account" (Quoted in Hanlon 1986, 41). South Africa treated its status alternatively as a sort of Monroe Doctrine, as when it demanded that

²⁶³ The criticism of "cherry picking" cases that seem to support the hypothesis from the outset is one that I have been conscious of the entire time, and it is one that I have attempted to account for with my model and case selection: I have attempted to find cases where the outcome I wanted to explain occurred, but I matched it with a case where the outcome I sought to explain did not occur at the same time, essentially setting up three separate quasi-experiments for the dissertation. I controlled for a number of geographic and demographic factors implicitly in the case selection--such as proximity to the US, size, relative power, to a small degree culture--and explicitly for temporal concerns by controlling for US Presidential Administration. I also discovered, in the course of the investigation, a possible competing hypothesis--the "no better alternatives" explanation--which could at the very least mitigate the desire to destabilize, but which nonetheless requires further study. But all of these cases were examined under a somewhat limited field of view: The way the US treated states in the Western Hemisphere may be different than the way other states treated their neighbors in other places in the world.

²⁶⁴ Pik Botha and PW Botha were not related to one another.

Cubans leave Angola, and a Warsaw Pact, when it "talked of establishing the same kind of hegemony over southern Africa that the USSR had over Eastern Europe" (Hanlon, 41). By the mid-1980s South Africa was confident enough to feel that it could both recognize the legitimate interests of global super-powers--the US, primarily--in the region, and at the same time, demand that it had special interests with which the super-powers were not to interfere, primarily the system of apartheid and white-minority rule.

South Africa, at this period was far and away the most powerful state in the region. By the mid 1980's South Africa was certainly working on nuclear weapons; it eventually produced six operable nuclear weapons.²⁶⁵ This fact alone demonstrated the vast disparity between the power of South Africa and that of its poorer neighbors, who could not even seem to effectively prevent South Africa from attacking them or walking across their borders and blowing up several buildings in their capital city.²⁶⁶ When considering relative power, South Africa in southern Africa was the regional equivalent of the US in Latin America.

Similarities aside, South Africa was not a major player in the Cold War, nor was it closely allied to any side in the Cold War. The US had long abhorred the racial policies of apartheid South Africa, even though, in service to the cause of anti-communism, the Reagan Administration eventually moderated US policy toward South Africa. South Africa, for its part, used anti-Communism and the claim of a "total onslaught" by the Soviet Union through Angola and Mozambique, which it claimed were Soviet proxies, as a method to get western states to

²⁶⁵ In 1977, the UN Security Council placed an arms embargo on South Africa, citing the development of nuclear weaponry in South Africa as one of its justifications (Geldenhuys 1984, 206). This embargo did not eventually prevent South Africa from producing weapons anyway.

²⁶⁶ In Angola, for example, the South African invasion was only turned back when Cuba intervened on behalf of the MPLA. Before that, SA operated at will within Angola. In another example of South African power in the region, South Africa attacked the capital city of Gaborone, Botswana in 1985.

support its quest for regional hegemony.²⁶⁷ But South Africa pursued its own interests in the region first. In the late 1970s Pik Botha spoke of South Africa adopting a neutral course in the East-West issues of the day (Hanlon, 23). Though the arrival of Ronald Reagan in 1981 signaled a change in relations between the US and South Africa,²⁶⁸ the US never fully embraced the apartheid government, and occasionally even dealt with South Africa's regional adversaries-- notably socialist Mozambique after 1984.²⁶⁹ South Africa was in a real sense an international pariah. It was this status that convinced South Africa that they were under a total onslaught from the international community in general and their neighbors in particular, and this sense of threat guided much of their foreign policy from the late 1970's onward. Communism was a more often than not convenient name to call the total onslaught.

Other differences make the case that South Africa and the US are little alike.²⁷⁰ One significant difference is that, in available literature, when one searches for the term destabilization (rather, "destabilisation"), it is South African foreign policy, not US foreign policy that is most frequently examined. While destabilization is rarely discussed as a policy

²⁶⁷ For a comprehensive overview of the "total onslaught" and the resulting "Total National Strategy" see the work of one of its primary exponents, Deon Geldenhuys (1981). For a more critical evaluation, see Davies and O'Meara (1985).

²⁶⁸ Ronald Reagan's Administration, in dropping human rights as one of the main tenets of US foreign policy, established what was known at the time as "Constructive Engagement" with South Africa. This policy included pressuring South Africa, behind the scenes, to end its apartheid system, encouraging it to make peace with its neighbors and attaching a number of economic enticements to get it to negotiate its outstanding issues with the world. The policy was initiated by the Thatcher government in Britain and was joined by Reagan when he took office. In the case of South Africa, the US adopted this policy because it was, in the words of US Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker, "We are concerned about the influence of the Soviet Union and its surrogates in Africa." (quoted in Hanlon, 23). To better fight the Cold War, and secure vital South African minerals, the US adopted a more friendly policy toward South Africa. For a longer treatment of "Constructive engagement," See Schmitz 2006.

²⁶⁹ Saul (1999) gives a brief overview of US association with Frelimo in Mozambique. The Reagan Administration was in contact with Frelimo from 1982 forward, and through various offers for loans and aid, got Frelimo to temper its socialist project. Eventually, the Chester Crocker noted that the Reagan Administration had to defend its support for the Government of Mozambique against elements of the US right, who had chosen to back Frelimo's South African backed opposition uncritically (Saul 1999, 131-32)

²⁷⁰ These differences include, for example, absolute power, geographic location, history, demographic makeup, ideological orientation, GDP and related economic factors, level of popular and bureaucratic inputs into legislation and policy making, relationships with its neighbors, standing and reputation in the world, and so forth.

adopted by the US, making it difficult to find scholarly work on the topic with regard to the US, "destabilization" is widely accepted as the name for the policy of apartheid South Africa toward its neighbors.²⁷¹ This makes South Africa an ideal case for study of the phenomenon of destabilization.

Given the many differences between South Africa and the United States, using South Africa as the destabilizer to superficially test the theoretical explanation of this dissertation should provide a nice plausibility probe to determine whether the outcomes of the test are specific to the US-Latin American context during the Cold War, or whether the theory can be applied more generally.²⁷² In this chapter, I look at South African policy toward Mozambique and Botswana during the premiership of PW Botha, from the formal adoption of the Total National Strategy in 1978 through 1985 (when Botha became State President of South Africa). I represent these conflicts of interest in Table 6.1 below.

²⁷¹ See, for example, Ellis (1994) which deals with destabilization in association with South Africa's position as a dealer in ivory while its neighbors attempted to clamp down on poaching, or Evans (1984) which discusses the development of the policy in reaction to the attempts by South Africa's immediate neighbors to form security and economic alliances as counter-weights to its power in the region, or Davies and O'Meara (1985) which discusses the development of the policy in relation to the Total National Strategy, or John Saul's chapter in Ali and Matthews (1999) which looks at the internal and external roots of the civil war in Mozambique, laying at least part of the explanation for the conflict on South Africa's policy of destabilization, as well as sources listed elsewhere in this chapter. Almost every source which looks at South African relations with its neighbors following the development of the Total National Strategy in one way or another references destabilization, explicitly, as *the* name for South Africa's policy toward some, if not all of its immediate neighbors.

²⁷² At the outset, I have to acknowledge that the evidence I lay out in support of my argument will be limited almost exclusively to secondary interpretive sources, and therefore, my own interpretation will be based on the interpretation of others. I anticipate criticism on this line, but the purpose of this chapter is to merely demonstrate that the explanation is not merely limited to the context of the Western Hemisphere during the Cold War: an examination of South African policy toward its neighbors demonstrates that my theoretical argument can plausibly explain cases outside those limits.

Table 6.1. Conflicts of Interest between South Africa and Botswana and Mozambique 1978-1985

	Botswana	Mozambique
Security	ANC presence/ Refugee Policy/ Frontline States Coalition	ANC presence
Ideology	Black Majority rule/Prestige/Refusal to legitimize Apartheid or Bantustans	Marxism of Frelimo, Black Majority rule, support for National liberation
Economics	Not a significant conflict, given Botswana's total dependence on SA for transport etc.	Represented the linchpin for economic delinkage through SADCC, which threatened to cause the collapse of the entire South African economy
Destabilization?	No: SA Policy aimed at ending support for ANC and recognizing Bantustans	Yes: Through both direct assaults aimed at ANC and economic targets and through integral support for Renamo

In Botswana, two conflicts of interest, security and ideology existed, but Botswana, during this period, remained economically dependent on South Africa and therefore there was no intense economic conflict of interest. In Mozambique, however, all three conflicts of interest were present during the period. Mozambique was a leader of both the front-line alliance which sought to counter South African power in the region, and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which sought to encourage southern African states to delink their economies from South African capitalism. Mozambique's government was controlled by the the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), an avowedly "Marxist" party bent on establishing socialism in Mozambique. Mozambique, like Botswana, was black-majority controlled, and as a result, supportive of sanctions against the apartheid Government of South Africa.

As a result of the limited nature of the conflicts of interest, Botswana was not a target of South African destabilization during this period. But in response to broader conflicts, Mozambique was. The evidence will demonstrate, at the very least, that the theoretical explanations of this dissertation are plausible in these southern African cases.

Conflicts of Interest, Botswana: Security and Ideology

South African interests in Botswana during the Botha premiership were similar to their interests region-wide. South Africa developed what was, in effect a grand strategy, called the "Total National Strategy" (TNS) in response to a perceived "total onslaught" (Davies and O'Meara 1985).²⁷³ The core of the TNS was to create a "constellation of states" ("Consas") which maintained their traditional core-periphery economic relationship with South Africa, and insulated South Africa from national liberation struggles taking place in other parts of the continent. Consas was also supposed to support--tacitly, at least--South African apartheid policies and recognize the South Africa-created Bantustans in South Africa and Namibia.²⁷⁴

At the heart of South African strategy was the desire to establish regional hegemony for its own security. "What South Africa would really like is sympathetic, non-socialist neighbors who would accept apartheid, support South Africa in world forums, and remain economically dependent on it" (Hanlon 1986, 58).²⁷⁵ Previous to the period, the Republic of South Africa had

²⁷³ Davies and O'Meara summarize the Geldenhuys (1981) article, who discusses, at length, the features of the "total onslaught" as well as the 12 point strategy adopted to counter it.

²⁷⁴ Bantustans were created by South Africa with the aim of geographically separating Black and White South Africans. Blacks were to be removed to these "Bantustans"; South Africa then "recognized" them as independent countries, gave them various levels of autonomy, and demanded that other states in the region also recognize them. Hanlon (1986) states that the Bantustans were a cornerstone of South Africa's apartheid policy, and so if it could get other states to recognize the Bantustans, this would lead to recognition and legitimization of apartheid itself (Hanlon, 63).

²⁷⁵ South African interests were fairly specific. Economically, South Africa sought to remain the economic focal point of the region and the flow of capital, goods and workers through and to South Africa. South Africa wanted other states to expel the ANC and South African refugees from the entire region. Additionally, South Africa promoted the idea of "non-aggression treaties" with other states that would allow South African troops the right to enter into neighboring states to act as "policemen" to protect South African interests. South Africa wanted others to recognize the Bantustans and the apartheid regime in South Africa and support for South Africa in the OAU and the

been internationally condemned for its apartheid, but had relied on its border states and the colonial regimes immediately adjacent to its possessions to maintain links to the outside world and to keep it safe from dangerous ideas of national liberation.

While Portuguese authorities still controlled Mozambique and Angola, and whites controlled the government of Rhodesia (future-Zimbabwe), South Africa felt secure behind a *cordon sanitaire* which separated it from Black Africa. It could then rely on use of economic power and political pressure in the region to more or less control the government policies of the black-ruled but dependent government of Botswana and influence the governments of Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho. When those white-dominated governments fell in the mid-and-late 1970s South Africa suddenly felt insecure: in fact it became convinced that what was once a safe border would now become a border over which attacks on white-rule in South Africa would come. To some degree they were not incorrect: The collapse of white-rule in southern Africa coincided with a renewal of ANC attacks within South Africa (Hanlon, 58; Davies and O'Meara, 187-189).

Botswana ran afoul of South African preferences in a number of very important ways. By the early 1980s, South Africa was pressuring Botswana to do four things in particular: "Stop making anti-apartheid statements, recognize the Bantustans, expel South African refugees, and sign a non aggression pact" (Hanlon, 220). Of these four things, the anti-apartheid policy and the recognition of the Bantustans were ideological interests of South Africa, and the expulsion of refugees and the non-aggression pact were security issues. Botswana policy on these issues represented conflicts of interest which South Africa took very seriously. During the period under investigation, Botswana had expressed interest for economic development independent of South

UN. Finally, they wanted their neighbors to publicly oppose sanctions on South Africa and end to public outcry against apartheid (Hanlon, 61-64). It is not entirely clear whether South Africa fully expected its neighbors to adopt these policies, but it is clear that South Africa would not let its neighbors alone until they did.

Africa, and had joined the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) but had not delinked itself from South African capitalism.²⁷⁶ As a result, there was no serious economic conflict between Botswana and South Africa at this time.

Botswana's refugee policy was older than the country itself was. The use of Botswana as a refugee transit zone to the north began officially in the late 19th Century (Dale 1995, 31). As the insecurity of South Africa increased in the late 1970s this longstanding policy became a serious problem for South Africa, especially since, by this time, South African refugees were remaining in Botswana instead of simply transiting through it. While Botswana gained international accolade for its asylum policies, South Africa began, at this time to see this policy as a threat (Dale, 40-41). South Africa referred to the African National Congress (ANC) as a "terrorist" organization, and believed that many of the refugees who went to other countries were either active members of that terrorist organization, or were easily recruited into it. A country on South Africa's borders who permitted these refugees therefore to remain within their borders and safely launch attacks on South Africa across those borders was itself complicit in attacks on South Africa.

Efforts at limiting the movement and activity of refugees within Botswana did not significantly alter South African perception of the threat posed by the ANC in Botswana, nor their appraisal of Botswana's role in ANC attacks on South Africa. It apparently did not matter to South Africa that Botswana made attempts to curb the political activity of South African

²⁷⁶ The SADCC was a direct challenge to South African economic dominance in the region and served to stymie the efforts of the South Africans to bring southern African states closer economically and therefore politically through the Constellation of Southern African States (Consas). South Africa was aware that lessening economic dependence on South Africa was one of the primary goals of SADCC. South Africa also linked the effort at regional integration, without South Africa as a leader or even a member, with an effort to deepen South Africa's political and ideological isolation with the international community (Geldenhuis 1981, 22). It is notable that SADCC's headquarters were in Botswana, and yet Botswana was not able to fully embrace the SADCC's program until later in the decade. For a good overview of Botswana policy, see Dale (1995).

refugees²⁷⁷ or that Botswana's ruling party had stated in its platform from the mid-1970s, and repeated in 1979 that Botswana could not "afford to permit its soil to be used as a launching pad by liberation movements for attacks against any of our minority-ruled neighbours. To do so," the Government argued, "would be to endanger the very independence which we are pledged to safeguard" (quoted in Polhemus 1985, 234).²⁷⁸ South Africa treated Botswana as if it were complicit in the ANC's campaign in South Africa and conducted raids within Botswana against refugees seeking asylum there (Dale, 42). As late as early 1985, South Africa repeated earlier allegations that ANC guerrillas were entering South Africa from Botswana and the South African-backed government of the Bantustan Bophuthatswana threatened to pursue ANC terrorists back into Botswana (Hanlon, 222), a statement tantamount to threat of invasion by South Africa.

Botswana's refugee policy was the largest security threat to South Africa during the period. But it was not the only one. The willingness of Botswana to join the so-called "Front Line States" diplomatic coalition with Mozambique, Lesotho, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe posed a direct challenge to South African political dominance in the region because it challenged and largely circumvented South Africa's Consas plan (Evans 1985, 1). The Frontline States coalition was important not because it transferred weapons and assistance to regional liberation movements, but because it provided an opportunity for states in the region to coordinate their foreign and national security policies, outside the control of South Africa. It thus gave otherwise weak governments a much greater degree of influence in the region, on the

²⁷⁷ To curb the political activity of South African refugees, Botswana adopted policies like moving them to highly undesirable camps in the rural parts of northern Botswana in hopes that they would soon move on, or offering only marginal recognition to the ANC as an organization.

²⁷⁸ In fact, contrary to the claims of South Africa, the ANC camps were not in neighboring states; front-line states were only used as transit states for bases in Tanzania and Angola. Nonetheless, South Africa often chose to "intentionally confuse" normal refugees with ANC guerrillas (Hanlon, 22) Botswana complicated the matter through the mid-1980's by allowing ANC members to remain in the capital of Gaborone, so long as the ANC promised to not conduct attacks on South Africa from Botswana territory (Hanlon 219.)

continent, and on the international stage that they would have alone (Weisfelder 1985, 282-283). Given South Africa's perception of a "total onslaught" this coalition presented a significant challenge to South Africa's program for security through hegemony, and led to complete regional isolation for South Africa by late 1979 (Evans, 3). In addition to this was the outright willingness of Botswana to maintain a Soviet Embassy in the capital and purchase weapons from the Soviet Union. According to Hanlon, "This provoked outrage from South Africa about Botswana becoming a communist 'base' in southern Africa, followed by a barrage of press attacks" (Hanlon, 221). Taken as a whole, Botswana's policy conflicted with South Africa's security preferences.

South African-Botswana ideological conflict centered on apartheid: First, Botswana refused to recognize the Bantustans.²⁷⁹ Botswana's position on apartheid was especially troubling for South Africa. Like almost all other states in the world, Botswana refused to deal with South Africa's Bantustans, or recognize them as independent from South Africa.²⁸⁰ Botswana did not even maintain a regular diplomatic relationship with South Africa, though apparently, the two countries cooperated on issues where avoidance was impossible (Dale 1985, 219). Refusal to recognize or deal with the Bantustans was tantamount to repudiation of South Africa's preferred way of social arrangement, and signified a threat to South Africa's system of government.

²⁷⁹ Recognition of the Bantustans would have amounted to *de facto* recognition of apartheid.

²⁸⁰ An example mentioned by Hanlon of Botswana's refusal to recognize these Bantustan and thus South African separation policy which led to their creation was when South Africa dammed the river which flows into Botswana's capital city. Botswana complained, and South Africa insisted that the Bantustan Bophuthatswana was actually responsible for the damming projects, and so Botswana must deal with them. The World Bank held up loans until Botswana resolved issues with its neighbors, Botswana refused to talk with a Bantustan, and South Africa refused to talk with Botswana. As a result, Botswana was forced to divert a significant portion of its money to its own dam project earlier than expected, taking those resources away from other projects (Hanlon, 220)

This rejection came from an explicit policy of "non-racialism" promoted by the Botswana's Government following independence.²⁸¹ Botswana's policy of "non-racialism" set it in stark contrast with white-ruled states like apartheid South Africa. Diplomatic relations with South Africa, as well as the Bantustans were avoided because, as Botswana's President Khama argued, South Africa was certainly not "non-racial" and any permanent exchange of diplomatic personnel would be viewed as an "unnecessary and gratuitous legitimization of the system of apartheid" (Dale 1985, 213). Relations with the Bantustans would have similarly been seen as an acceptance, on Botswana's part, of the policy of racial separation and separate development for whites and blacks in South Africa.

This policy of direct and outspoken opposition to the ideology of white-rule in South Africa, which was, after all at the foundation of the apartheid government, was very troubling for South Africa. Botswana's policy was based on an abiding rejection of racism, "especially when practiced by whites" and the Government of Botswana deliberately attempted to minimize contact between its government and South Africa, while emphasizing ideological differences between the two states (Davies 1985, 219). As with Botswana's refugee policy, the world tended to look at the policies of Botswana with approval while showering disapprobation on South African policies.²⁸² South Africa's prestige suffered when compared to its neighbor, the much smaller, much weaker, and majority ruled Botswana. Botswana's advocacy for majority rule in its neighboring states of pre-independence Zimbabwe and South African-occupied Namibia in

²⁸¹ Botswana was a small, weak majority-ruled multi-party pluralist democracy adjacent to one of the larger, more powerful states on the continent which also effectively excluded the vast majority of its population from most aspects of civic life and was, for the first decade and a half, almost entirely surrounded by white-minority ruled governments. Naturally, this situation affected its own ideological orientation as the only majority ruled state in the region.

²⁸² Botswana, for example, was often held up as a model of democracy in the region because the leaders of Botswana were committed to democracy in both word and in deed (Dale, 218). Meanwhile, Reagan, Thatcher, and Begin and Shamir were noteworthy exceptions to the otherwise almost universal condemnation of Apartheid in South Africa.

international forums was a direct ideological challenge to the racial preferences of the government of South Africa.

A highly prestigious country like Botswana offered a great challenge to South Africa's goal of setting itself up as the hegemon for the region: a direct challenge to South African moral authority in the area was sitting right on its border. Botswana, a prestigious majority ruled democracy, refused to diplomatically legitimize apartheid, and instead, tacitly offered itself as an alternative model to South Africa's neighbors. Black majority rule in a nation renowned for its human rights policies made a white minority-ruled state which was roundly condemned for human rights violations under apartheid look that much worse.

Other states, in turn, saw how the world treated a state which had established a modern, liberal democracy that was ruled by its majority race, and they saw how the world treated the country that disenfranchised the vast majority of its population, and excluded them from economic and social opportunity. The choice of which example to follow was clear. Botswana, in conducting its internal affairs as it did, undermined the claims of white supremacy that lay at the heart of South African society and government under apartheid, and therefore it also undermined South African pretensions to regional hegemony. Insult to injury was merely added by that same state's condemnation of apartheid in international forums. Adoption--and success--of black-majority rule in Botswana was the heart of the ideological conflict between South Africa and Botswana.

While security and ideological conflicts were fairly stark, an economic conflict did not present itself during the period. Botswana was influential in the formation of the SADCC, which was the economic formulation of the Front Line States coalition, and set itself up as an alternative to the Consas plan from South Africa. But Botswana's historical dependence on

South African markets and Rhodesian trains for transport of Botswana's goods to ports was never seriously addressed during the early 1980s.²⁸³ The depth of Botswana's economic dependence on its neighbors illustrates why there was no economic conflict: "Postal and telecommunications channels went through South Africa... [The] great bulk of air traffic from Botswana transited Johannesburg. In particular, Botswana's imports and exports relied upon access to South African ports and the South African rail system to which Botswana was linked by Rhodesian Railways" (Polhemus, 230). Botswana was part of the South African Customs Union, and the Rand Monetary Area--until 1976, it had no currency of its own--and most of the country's finances were dominated by banks headquartered in South Africa. Botswana was dependent on its neighbors for its fuel, foodstuffs, and as a desert country, its water (Polhemus, 230-31).

Given the deep economic dependence of Botswana on its minority-ruled neighbors, particularly South Africa, the government of Botswana did not ever seek to delink from the economy of South Africa. Instead, what it tried was a slow process of decreasing its dependence on South Africa. Botswana focused on development of various sectors of its economy so it could begin doing for itself what others had previously done. While this included, perhaps something like import substitution, Botswana deliberately did not attempt to exclude South African investors from the economy (Hanlon, 230).

In areas where Botswana did attempt to delink itself from South African economic dominance, it met with some marginal success. Botswana's withdrawal from the Rand zone in 1976 gave the Government the power to control its own exchange and monetary policies which

²⁸³ Botswana is landlocked, and relies on overland transportation of its products. As dependent as Botswana was, what is significant is that one of its main exports was diamonds, which provided the country with a level of per capita wealth on the level of an oil-exporting country: by 1984, diamonds represented 76% of the country's total exports and Botswana had a 50-50 joint venture with De Beers where Botswana keeps 75% of the profits (Hanlon, 226). Botswana also exports beef in great volume. Consequently, it needed the port facilities and transportation links through South Africa to get its products to the world.

allowed it to control inflation and stimulate economic growth. But the establishment of Botswana's currency was not a threat to the Rand in the region because of other economic linkages and because of the currency's non-convertibility in the region. The Pula remained tied closely to the Rand (Hanlon, 231). Another attempt to delink was in the insistence that coal for one of the nation's power plants come from Botswana, rather than South Africa. But again, this was not a conflict with South Africa: The coal that would run the power plant was mined by a South African Company, and the contractors who were building the power plant were South African (Hanlon, 231).

In the end, nothing Botswana could do, even if it so desired, in an effort to move out of its traditional economic relationship with South Africa, would ever be a threat to South Africa. The links between the two economies were so complete, and they were almost all controlled by South African interests, that if Botswana ever appeared to be threatening South African interests, South Africa would simply refuse to move Botswana's products to its ports and markets or wreak some other sort of havoc on Botswana's economy. South Africa could exert this sort of pressure through mere threat. One example is that Botswana built tanks to hold three months worth of fuel for the country, but could not get South Africa to sell them enough fuel to actually fill them. There was nothing that prevented Botswana from buying the fuel from non-South African sources, especially those in the SADCC: the Government opted not to, however, perhaps out of fear that the South African Defense Force (SADF) would simply come in and destroy the tanks (Hanlon 220).

In summary, very deep conflicts of interest between Botswana and South Africa existed. Those conflicts were along security and ideological lines, but not at all along economic lines. Botswana was regularly accused of taking in refugees who would use Botswana as a base to

terrorize South Africa. Botswana did not effectively counter this perception, and in fact, seemed to encourage it through its central role in the Front Line States coalition which sought to end white minority rule in Rhodesia and continued regional isolation imposed on South Africa. Ideologically, Botswana set itself in outspoken opposition to South Africa's racial policies, and used its international prestige to apply leverage on South Africa, posing yet another challenge to South Africa's designs for the region. But economically, there was no conflict: in fact there could be none. South Africa so completely controlled imports and exports from Botswana that this link alone was enough to prevent Botswana from even attempting some the more ambitious delinkage policies that its neighbors adopted. Because of the state of relations between South Africa and Botswana during the Botha Administration, where two but not three intense conflicts of interest existed, my hypothesis argues that I should not expect to see South Africa adopting a policy of destabilization toward the Government of Botswana during the early 1980's.

South African Responses in Botswana: Pressure but no destabilization

In response to the limited conflicts of interest, destabilization, as I have defined it in this dissertation, did not actually occur in Botswana. While South Africa did engage in a number of very serious violations of Botswana's sovereignty over the period under evaluation, none of them aimed to change the balance of force between the Botswana Government and its internal opposition, and there is no evidence that Botswana's government was targeted for collapse by South African policy. Instead, South Africa meant to pressure Botswana's government, in a number of ways, to change its policies to those preferred by South Africa, especially on the ANC and criticism of apartheid issues.

Incursions did take place. Monthly during 1981 and 1982, South African forces violated Botswana's border, especially its border with Namibia. Several incidents were reported where

South African troops fired at members of the Botswana Defense Force from Namibia, and other occasions when they came across the border to kill or kidnap Botswana citizens (Hanlon, 221). Other times, they crossed the border and attempted to recruit citizens to fight in the SADF. The South African airforce regularly violated Botswana airspace. The worst cases of South African violations of Botswana sovereignty came as South Africa stepped up its war against ANC in 1983 and 1984. Commandos crossed the border and bombed buildings, blew up vehicles and kidnapped South African refugees in the capital of Botswana, which was less than ten miles from the border.

Each of their targets, South Africa argued, were affiliated in some way with the ANC. Botswana complained of the violations to South Africa, but South Africa insisted that Botswana must sign a non-aggression pact which included a promise not to allow their territory to be used as staging grounds by the ANC for attacks into South Africa. Botswana refused, claiming that this pact would simply be an invitation for South African invasion, and then reiterated their own policy, which welcomes South African refugees, as well as the ANC, so long as they do not use Botswana as a base with which to attack South Africa (Hanlon, 222).

Violations of Botswana sovereignty were meant to pressure Botswana to change its policy vis-à-vis refugees and the ANC. There is evidence that the pressure was eventually successful, to some degree. In early 1985, as South Africa more or less laid down an ultimatum to Botswana and the Bantustan Bophatswana threatened to pursue "terrorists" into Botswana, Botswana's new foreign minister met with South Africa's foreign minister. South Africa apparently dropped its demands for a non-aggression pact, and Botswana expelled 17 ANC members from Botswana. Again, Botswana reiterated its policy on not allowing rebels to establish bases on their soil or use Botswana as transit to South Africa. A few months later

another bomb exploded, and then the following month, South African commandos conducted a spectacular raid on Gaborone which killed 12 people--nine of whom were South African refugees--destroyed a number of houses and vehicles, and hurt relations between Botswana and South Africa. The target of the raid, according to the chief of the SADF, was a "nerve center" of ANC operations in Gaborone; it was not the Government of Botswana (Hanlon, 223).

Outside of direct incursions, South Africa provided other pressure on Botswana to get it to change its policies. South Africa used its economic dominance as leverage to punish Botswana for many of its policies. For example, when Botswana would occasionally make a strong statement against apartheid in the UN or OAU, South Africa would withhold refrigerator cars necessary to carry Botswana beef to market for a few days. On other occasions, South Africa would not send fuel to Botswana, creating temporary fuel shortages.

In order to get Botswana to recognize its Bantustans, South Africa dammed up the rivers flowing north into Botswana's capital. When Botswana wanted to discuss South Africa's preferential trade policies for its own industries, despite the fact that both countries belonged to the Southern African Customs Union, South Africa held up Customs Union payments owed to Botswana and demanded that its Bantustans be allowed into the customs union (Hanlon, 220-221). All of these policies, again, were not meant to weaken Botswana's government *vis-à-vis* its internal opposition. Instead, the goal was to get Botswana's government to change its policies toward those more to South Africa's liking.

Given the aim of South African policy toward Botswana, and given that its target was Botswana's policies rather than the composition of Botswana's government, I cannot say that South Africa aimed at destabilizing Botswana in the first half of the 1980's. There is no evidence that South Africa supported the Government of Botswana's opponents. There was not even a

domestic opposition movement beyond an opposition Party within Botswana for South Africa to support.²⁸⁴ Following the 1985 raid by South African commandos, even the opposition Party joined with the governing Party to criticize apartheid South Africa and its bellicose foreign policy, "in a public display of national unity." If South Africa's policy was to strengthen the opposition Party *vis-à-vis* the governing Party, its actions produced exactly the opposite effect. But again, the charges listed above were denied by the opposition, and there is not much evidence to fully support the claims of South African political interference (Hanlon, 225).

Conflict of Interest, Mozambique: Security, Ideology, and Economic

Much like Botswana, the conflicts of interest between South Africa and Mozambique occurred in the context of the perceived "total onslaught" which gave rise to the "Total National Strategy." Mozambique, more so than Botswana, was a threat to South African regional policy because not only was the government of Mozambique controlled by a guerrilla Party which had successfully secured Mozambique's independence from Portugal in the 1970's, but that Party was Marxist in orientation, and sought to comprehensively delink itself from South Africa's economy. Mozambique seems to have been on the mind of South African policy makers who perceived the "total onslaught" in the first place, and developed their strategy of destabilization in response.

The conflict between South Africa and Mozambique can be summarized as follows: Mozambique gave political cover to the ANC and openly welcomed its members to live in the country. It was an influential player in the Frontline States coalition and an enthusiastic member of the SADCC. Its ports and railroads offered southern African states realistic alternatives to

²⁸⁴ Hanlon does mention that this opposition Party did receive help from South Africa in the 1984 elections, but he also notes that evidence for this claim was "not firm" at best (Hanlon, 225). But even then, the aim of the policy was to create opposition for Botswana's refugee policy or to create support for a non-aggression pact similar to the Nkomati accord, not necessarily to weaken the Governing Party.

South African economic dependence. And it was ruled by Frelimo, which was the former liberation army bent on transforming Mozambique into a socialist country, and who insisted on maintaining friendly relations with members of the socialist bloc (Davies 1989, 109). All of these conflicts represented direct security, economic and ideological challenges to the apartheid government of South Africa. Of these conflicts, the harboring of the ANC and the associations with the Soviets and Cubans represented security conflicts, the adoption of socialism as a governing ideology and the opposition to apartheid in general were ideological conflicts, and the centrality of Mozambique infrastructure and its willingness to use it to help other states delink their economies from South Africa represent economic conflicts.

ANC's presence within Mozambique was a major source of concern for South African security. Frelimo was a long standing opponent of apartheid in South Africa (Campbell 1984). For a while after independence, Frelimo was tied up with a war against Rhodesia, but when the minority-government in that country fell itself to be replaced by a black-majority government--due largely for Mozambique's support of their rebel group--and ANC stepped up attacks in SA after 1980, the intense threat to South African security deepened. In a period of less than half a decade, South Africa had gone from being surrounded by sympathetic governments, the majority of which were controlled by whites, to a region which was at the very least unsympathetic, if not hostile to South Africa and almost to a country opposed to South Africa's policies (Evans, 3). "The situation in the region, in short, had changed dramatically. The bedrock on which South Africa's regional policy had been built- the buffer states- finally proved to be sandstone rather than granite" (Davies and O'Meara, 188). Because of this shift, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, ANC gained more or less freedom of movement into and through Mozambique, and after 1980, was supported, to a large degree by Frelimo. As in Botswana, however, ANC was not

allowed to build bases in Mozambique (Thompson 1988, 23). Their activities were severely curtailed after the Nkomati Peace Accords in March of 1984.

Marxism and Soviet involvement in Mozambique were both real concerns for South Africa. For example, there was a "treaty of friendship" between Mozambique and the Soviets. The Soviets provided manpower, advisors, technical expertise and actual weaponry, both light and heavy, to Mozambique. The Soviet Union, however, did not have bases in Mozambique, because the Constitution prevented the establishment of bases by foreign countries (Thompson, 25; Campbell 848). Following Reagan's election in 1980, South Africa's rhetoric about a total Marxist onslaught was regularly seen as an excuse to attack Mozambique, and it seems that, after early 1981, it was the method used to obtain and retain US support for South Africa: The battle against Frelimo, after all was a fight against world communism. South Africa wanted to be seen as the regional hegemon, and therefore painted "Marxism" as the common enemy which threatened the entire region and encouraged blacks both inside and outside of South Africa to oppose the domestic policies of South Africa (Davies and O'Meara, 190). Soviet involvement was more than a cynical foil to the Botha Government: it was seen by South Africa as an instigator behind opposition to South Africa's designs for regional domination.

The concern about Soviets in Mozambique had more to do with the belief that the Soviets were behind the ANC than concern that the Soviet Union would attack South Africa through Mozambique.²⁸⁵ South Africa still made the argument about Soviet involvement in Mozambique, because the issue threatened South African security. South Africa was a target because it was wealthy, developed and presented an obstacle to the establishment of Soviet

²⁸⁵ Geldenhuys (1981) gives a good summary of the "total onslaught" that South African policy makers perceived. He argues that South Africa has been under communist threat since at least the end of World War II. Geldenhuys notes that one of the main exponents of the "total onslaught" perception, General Magnus Malan, claimed the objective of the total onslaught is the "overthrow of the current constitutional order and its replacement by a subject communist-oriented black Government" (Malan, quoted in Geldenhuys, 3).

power in the region. But, as PW Botha argued, direct military confrontation with South Africa would be far too expensive, so Marxists used various means to completely assault the foundations of South African power within South Africa--including, as it turns out, white-rule. (Botha, cited by Geldenhuys 1981, 4).²⁸⁶

Security interests were far less tied to ideology in southern Africa than they were in Latin America. Ideologically, the socialist Frelimo posed a challenge to South Africa the same way Botswana did: its opposition to apartheid set Mozambique in ideological opposition to the policies of South Africa. Mozambique, while it was part of the Portuguese Empire was seen by South Africa as part of its *Cordon Sanitaire* that insulated it from the black-ruled portions of Africa. But when Mozambique won its independence, the ideological conflict began. Mozambique, more than Botswana, represented an example of a potentially successful non racial state on South Africa's border. This example would "question the very core of the apartheid ideology... [and] prove an inspiration to the quiescent movement inside South Africa" (Hanlon, 131).

Non-racism was not such a strong ideology in Mozambique as it was in Botswana. But the ideology of national liberation, expressed in the language of Marxism, was troubling for South Africa, because it offered an example for South Africa's internal dissidents. Much of the refugee situation described in the Botswana section of this chapter was caused by South Africa crackdowns of internal dissent. South African policy makers, in turn, believed that this dissent was being stoked by refugees in neighboring states, the ANC, and the governments which harbor

²⁸⁶ Interestingly, the proponents of the total onslaught thesis also group western powers, namely the US under Carter in with the Soviets, major international institutions, and Black movements in Africa, or, in other words, all those groups who placed sanctions on South Africa. That, of course, all changed when Reagan was elected, and the focus of US policy moved from human rights to anti-communism. See, for example, the previous chapter (Geldenhuys, 5)

them. To those people, the solution would be simple: attack the ANC and the Governments which harbor them abroad and the problems within South Africa would end (Hanlon, 22).²⁸⁷

The success of national liberation as an ideology therefore, concerned South Africa greatly, for the implications it had for its own citizens who were in the process of uprising within South Africa. Nationalism was a real threat for a white minority government which systematically disenfranchised and dehumanized its black majority of two different countries. It was made worse by the fact that Mozambique referred to itself as "socialist" and attempted to follow an Eastern European socialist model (Campbell 1984; Saul, 127-129).²⁸⁸

Security and ideological conflicts of interest between South Africa and Mozambique were closely coupled with economic concerns. Looking at Mozambique and South Africa with a wide lens puts this conflict into some perspective. South Africa was a capitalist society. It was dominated by various state sanctioned monopolies that required labor and raw materials from the surrounding states. In return, these monopolies controlled all of the transport, shipping, marketing and investment in the region. As long as neighboring states continued to supply these companies with raw materials and labor, the South African system continued to function for the benefit of South Africa.

A competitor in the region would certainly threaten South Africa's economic position in southern Africa. And a successful socialist one who is not dependent on South Africa could serve as a model for other states in the region and an incentive for them to also attempt to break away from South Africa. If other regional economies were to break away from South Africa and

²⁸⁷ Gelednhuys (1984, 206-210) seems to confirm this attitude with regard to South African isolation: much of the problems that South Africa faced internationally were not caused by the policy of Apartheid, but were the result of the international Community's response to denunciations of white-minority rule in South Africa by regional states, including Mozambique. The Total National Strategy called for the application of pressure to get states to curb their denunciation of apartheid (Geldenhuys, quoted in Davies and O'Meara, 191).

²⁸⁸ South Africa also controlled Namibia at this time.

follow Mozambique's example toward economic independence, South Africa's economy, already under pressure from internal revolt, would simply collapse (Thompson 26-27). South Africa's Consas was an effort to prevent this from happening, but that plan was more or less killed when Front Line Coalition states joined together with newly independent Zimbabwe to form the Southern African Development Coordination Conference in 1980 (Hanlon, 17).

Consequently, even more than in Botswana, where delinkage was simply not a realistic possibility, efforts by the Mozambican government to develop its economy independent of South Africa greatly concerned South Africa. The Lusaka Declaration, which founded the SADCC, declared that the first priorities of SADCC were to rehabilitate and modernize transport links in Angola, Tanzania and Mozambique (Hanlon, 19). Of all SADCC countries, Mozambique provided the closest ports, the most extensive system of rails and port facilities, and a trade orientation toward Western Europe rather than to other African States (Davies, 109).

Mozambique, as a key player in SADCC, conflicted with South African economic interests because Mozambique made SADCC a workable plan, and the SADCC could conceivably provide all member nations with the things that they needed but which were currently dominated by South African interests. South Africa, having been deliberately excluded, correctly assumed that the economic health of its nation would be damaged greatly by a successful SADCC (Hanlon 20-21; Thompson, 26).²⁸⁹

²⁸⁹ The SADCC, in Mozambique especially, was particularly threatening to the South African economy. Since the SADCC's expressed mission was to develop the member-states to the point where they no longer needed South African economic linkages, this program greatly threatened South African economic interests in the region. In Mozambique during the end of the colonial period, South Africa had overtaken Portugal to become the main supplier of goods and services to Mozambique. South Africa supplied foodstuffs, spare parts and servicing of machinery to Mozambique. Most travel, most investment, most infrastructure that Mozambique depended on came either from or through South Africa (Hanlon, 134). In turn, Mozambique offered South Africa an important port as well as opportunities for tourists who took advantage of a more liberal moral climate in Mozambique than existed in South Africa.

Mozambique was therefore the linchpin in any potential SADCC success: it was to be the potential replacement for South Africa in the transport and shipping sectors. In acknowledgement of its central role in the success of SADCC, the transport commission, which would oversee the shipping of goods from SADCC countries to non-South African ports and then to the world, was set up in Maputo, Mozambique's capital, and the first annual conference was held there in 1980 (Hanlon, 135). In response, South African commandos raided Maputo two months later and then again in March, 1981, and a railway embargo was placed on cargo to Maputo from South Africa for two weeks.²⁹⁰ A series of other economic actions were taken by South Africa in retaliation for Mozambique's central role in the regional delinkage and development effort that set itself in opposition to the status quo economic relationships preferred by South Africa.

The development of SADCC threatened to interrupt almost all of South Africa's regional economic linkages, and Mozambique was at the center of that effort as well as the prospects for its success. As Hanlon puts it, "The independence of Zimbabwe and the founding of SADCC raised the possibility of shifting the majority of regional imports and exports back to Mozambican ports" allowing not only Mozambique, but the entire region as a whole the possibility of undermining their own dependence on South Africa (Hanlon, 132). This was a serious threat to South African economic interests: In Mozambique, in contrast to the situation in Botswana, delinkage was not only possible, it was actively pursued. Mozambique actually had the power to undermine South African interests in the country as well as in the region.

²⁹⁰ Of primary importance to SADCC and South Africa alike was the port of Maputo. The General Manager of the South African Railway, which moved cargo through southern Africa, once commented, "It is an economic necessity that the railway line to and harbour of Maputo should remain accessible to South Africa" (quoted in Hanlon, 132). Maputo was the port through which South Africa supplied its hinterland and extracted its resources, because it was much less expensive to bring goods overland to Maputo and then ship them down the coast than it was to attempt to truck them across South Africa. Delinkage under SADCC threatened this long standing economic relationship.

All three types of conflicts were present in South Africa-Mozambique relations. As a result, my hypothetical model says that I should expect to see South Africa adopt destabilization against Mozambique. As I demonstrate below, that is precisely what happened after 1981. South African forces both directly attacked Mozambique and targets within that country, but also funded, trained, armed and actually revitalized a nearly dead organization that was left around from the Rhodesian war days: The Mozambique National Resistance (alternatively either MNR or Renamo.)

South African Responses in Mozambique: Destabilization

In Mozambique, destabilization was adopted as a policy soon after the TNS was put in place and pursued until the apartheid regime itself was dismantled beginning in the late-1980s. South Africa used a combination of Botswana-style incursions into Mozambique, and destabilization that was very similar to the Contra War in Nicaragua during the same period. South African destabilization, much like the destabilization described in the previous chapters of this dissertation, was designed to allow the South African government to claim that they were not responsible for the things that were happening to the target government. In this way, the South African action was very similar to US action in Nicaragua, though the US was a bit more bold about its support for the Contras than South Africa was.

In Mozambique, the analogue was a group known as Renamo. In April 1985, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha acknowledged support for Renamo: "There was a time when we helped to train Renamo and assisted it. There was such a time... They approached us for assistance and we realized that it would further the aims of South Africa to help them" (quoted in Davies 1989, 104).²⁹¹ What Botha did not say was that at the time of his admission, but which documents discovered later that year conclusively revealed that South Africa was still

²⁹¹ The Government had previously denied any involvement whatsoever.

helping Renamo attack the Government of Mozambique, crippling it and undermining its ability to deal with several crises that were at the time wracking the country, despite signing a "non-aggression" treaty known as Nkomati in early 1984 (Davies, 105).

South African direct attacks were aimed primarily at ANC targets, which it was willing to attack openly. Between 1981 and 1982, South African Defense Forces launched several attacks into Mozambique, targeting ANC members there. Dozens of ANC members were killed there during this period. In 1983, South Africa stepped up the frequency and the intensity of its attacks against Mozambican targets. South African jets bombed the city of Matola and a suburb of Maputo with shrapnel rockets. South Africa claimed that 40 ANC had died; in reality, the raid killed only three jam factory workers and an ANC man "washing his car" while injuring dozens of Mozambican women and children (Hanlon, 139).

One goal of these direct incursions was to hurt the SADCC by crippling Mozambique's ability to act as a realistic alternative to South Africa in transport and trade, thereby decreasing dependence of Southern African states on South Africa. Many of the targets chosen by South Africa, including railroads, port facilities, oil pipelines, bridges, and other infrastructure, were targets that allowed Mozambique and the SADCC to potentially compete with South Africa. South Africa even targeted marker buoys in Biera Harbor, to prevent ships from correctly navigating into and out of port there (Hanlon, 136-38).

Another goal of these direct incursions was to pressure Mozambique to sign a "non-aggression" pact and curtail the activities of the ANC in its territory. The two states negotiated what became known as Nkomati Peace Accords, and signed the agreement in March of 1984. According to the agreement, Mozambique would expel the ANC from its borders. South Africa and Mozambique agreed to not allow their respective national territories to be used as bases for

groups seeking to attack the other, and some trade deals were concluded that involved the safety of South African tourists in Mozambique. In fact, as history demonstrates, this agreement cost South Africa nothing: the units it was supporting were already in Mozambique and states like Malawi, who were not party to the Accord (Hanlon, 147).

The direct incursions often carried the same aims in Mozambique as they did in Botswana. Occasionally, the attacks were not directed at the ANC, but at Mozambique itself, such as in the instance where an SADF lieutenant was blown up by his own bomb when he was attempting to demolish one of Mozambique's strategic transport installations (Davies, 109). After 1982, targets of economic and strategic importance took precedence, though South African continued to target ANC in Mozambique until they were expelled in 1984 following Nkomati.

As damaging as these South African direct attacks were to Mozambique, they were merely "a sideshow in its undeclared war on Frelimo" (Hanlon, 139). The real damage was done by Renamo.²⁹² Given the action of Renamo in Mozambique, it is clear that this was the main vehicle of South African destabilization of Frelimo, just as the Contras were the main vehicle of destabilization of the Sandinista Government. The South African Defense Force trained Renamo, directed its operations, and regularly met with Renamo forces within Mozambique (Thompson 1988, 35).

²⁹² Renamo was founded in the mid-1970s by the white-minority government of Rhodesia, and was made up of former Portuguese security forces who fled to Rhodesia after independence (Hanlon, 139). In this way, Renamo was very similar in composition to the Contras which were used as a proxy army by the Reagan Administration against the Sandinistas. Renamo was similar to the Contras in two other ways: First, it was almost entirely composed of former members of the security services and funded and supplied by the regional power as an arm of its foreign policy. Like the Contras, Renamo was viewed negatively by the local population: it was not based in any sort of homegrown resistance movement. Lastly, it was almost completely defunct as a group before its powerful patron rebuilt it from the ground up (Hanlon, 140). Thompson (1988) makes the argument about the similarities between the Nicaraguan and Mozambique cases explicit. In this article, the author even argues that the US collaborated, on tactical and diplomatic levels with South Africa in its destabilization of Frelimo (Thompson 1988, 22).

A much clearer picture of SADF involvement with the operational aspects of Renamo, taken from the "Gorongosa" Documents was captured by Frelimo in 1985 and presented to South Africa as evidence of their ignoring the Nkomati Accord. This involvement showed a fundamental connection between the SADF and Renamo that reached to the highest echelons of South Africa's military apparatus. As of 1988, a South African Brigadier General remained in charge of operations of Renamo, and a South African Colonel remained in charge of logistics, according to a former Renamo member who fled the conflict and spoke on the topic in Britain (Davies, 106). Renamo was a South African organized, led, and supplied operation, even if South Africans were not the ones who were doing the fighting within Mozambique under the Renamo banner.

Renamo used a wide array of tactics to undermine the legitimacy of Mozambique's government. Among these were propaganda--which had a limited effect given the lack of access to mass media,--use of control-through-terror tactics against isolated villages throughout the country, and blaming Frelimo for droughts and famine in the country (Thompson, 29).²⁹³ Renamo was able to acquire sophisticated weaponry from various right wing groups world wide, and most importantly, was constantly supported by the South African Government, who supplied them and recruited from bases in Malawi.

While South Africa nearly cut rail traffic between South African and the port of Maputo in half between 1975 and 1983, Renamo was busy inside Mozambique attacking health and aid workers, ruining the breadbasket of Mozambique, stopping transportation from Zimbabwe and

²⁹³ The famine, at least, was instead caused by Renamo and South African attacks against the transport infrastructure in Mozambique and killed 100,000 people in Mozambique before western states sent aid. The foreign response itself was ineffective: Donors routed contributions through South Africa because aid was organized in such haste that only South Africa actually had the infrastructure to carry the supplies to Mozambique (Hanlon 143-144).

Malawi into Mozambique and explicitly targeting Red Cross food and medical supply trucks.²⁹⁴ All this occurred against a backdrop of destruction and loss of human life from the savage actions of Renamo in the countryside. Combined, these actions had the dual effect of delegitimizing Frelimo, which was unable to effectively deal with a massive humanitarian crisis (Thompson, 32-34).

The destabilization of Frelimo by South Africa, both through its direct incursions into Mozambique as well as its support for Renamo, combined with the drought and accompanying famine more or less forced Frelimo to come to terms with South African demands for a "non-aggression" pact in 1983 and 1984 (Hanlon, 143). Following the signing of the Nkomati pact, US aid was restored to Mozambique, and the US relations improved slowly over the next few years to the point where the Reagan Administration was actually defending Mozambique policy against support for South Africa (Saul 131-132). However, Nkomati was seen as something entirely different in South Africa. There was pressure, following the signing of the agreement, for South Africa to change its policy toward Frelimo, and for a while, it appeared to do precisely that. According to the Nkomati accord, South Africa was to suspend its support for Renamo. As a gesture, South Africa shut down Renamo's radio station and temporarily suspended air drops of supplies to MNR (Hanlon, 144).

However, if there is any thought that Nkomati, or some change in Mozambican policy on ANC was actually what South Africa was after in its direct and indirect campaigns against Frelimo, it must be noted that directly before Nkomati was signed, South Africans dropped six months of supplies to Renamo, and ordered them to avoid direct contact with Mozambican forces, so as to conserve their ammo. Instead, Renamo should focus on sabotage of the

²⁹⁴ This is merely a sampling of Renamo action within Mozambique. Davies regularly refers to the action of Renamo as a "bandit assault" (Davies, 114).

infrastructure of the country and terrorism, making their way through the countryside south to the capital. Rather than bringing peace, the war escalated (Hanlon, 145). Three weeks after Nkomati was signed, Renamo cut the power lines from South Africa to Maputo for the first of several times during the following year. South Africa intended the war to continue secretly, even though it got what it claimed it wanted from Frelimo publicly: the expulsion of ANC from Mozambique and tacit diplomatic recognition for apartheid. Its real goal was nothing short of rendering Mozambique's government unable to govern. By 1985, evidence of continued South African support for Renamo was overwhelming and undeniable, and even led Foreign Minister Pik Botha to hold a news conference "to admit a host of violations" (Hanlon, 145-149).

It may be tempting to accept the official explanations for South African involvement in Mozambique as being limited only to the removal of ANC members and change of Mozambique's political behavior (Geldenhuys, quoted in Davies and O'Meara, 203). But South African behavior itself makes it difficult to do so.²⁹⁵ Before 1985, South African policy makers denied any association with Renamo, though framed their attacks on Mozambique as an attempt to get Mozambique to change their policy with regard to ANC and to get them to sign a non-aggression pact with South Africa. They got that in Nkomati. So what explains their continued support for Renamo following Nkomati? South Africa only acknowledged their operational and logistical support for Renamo after incontrovertible evidence was presented to them and the world in the Gorongosa documents. Until that point, they had done what they could to cover up their activity through Renamo.

²⁹⁵ I was not able to actually find direct evidence of the policy adopted by South Africa which aimed specifically at undermining Frelimo to the point that it could be overthrown by Renamo. The authors I cited had accessed South African documents to some point, but very little was found in South African sources which contradicts their official representation of their involvement in Mozambique.

The circumstantial evidence, based on the *actions* of South Africa in Mozambique, points to a South African policy of destabilization of the Government of Mozambique, more than the goal of getting them to change their policies. Indeed, most scholars who look at the case tend to agree that South Africa targeted Frelimo itself, even though South Africa claimed in public that this was not the goal.²⁹⁶

This conclusion is problematised by the lack of South African policy documents on the matter, but it is also made more difficult to evaluate given well documented differences between the South African Diplomatic establishment and their allies in the business community, on the one hand who appear to have sincerely wanted to come to terms with Mozambique favorable to South Africa and the military establishment who was closely aligned to Prime Minister Botha, on the other, who advocated "quick fixes"--that is, simply getting rid of Frelimo--to the conflicts of interest in Mozambique.²⁹⁷ Regardless, South African policy documents themselves are, for the most part absent. South African policy was officially supportive of removal of ANC from Mozambique, and they did what they could to otherwise hide their involvement in whatever else was carried out in Mozambique, until there was no longer a credible way to do so.

The evidence of the "Gorongosa" and other captured documents described above demonstrate that the closure of MNR radio by South Africa was their extent of "withdrawal of

²⁹⁶ Davies and O'Meara who actually get closest to citing South African policy documents on Mozambique of all the documents used in this chapter, note that scholars tend to over-simplify South African strategy in southern Africa, and Mozambique specifically as "destabilization", which was a "disincentive" for other states. They note that authors fail often to consider the constructive, or "formative" things South Africa tried to do to pursue its foreign policy, such as Consus, and the fact that the disincentive policies often kicked in only after the incentive policies had failed to produce an outcome favorable to South Africa (Davies and O'Meara, 184-185). Other authors, who themselves use less evidence than Davies and O'Meara provide--by citing Geldenhuys--argue that South African goal lay in establishing Consus, punishing states for their policies, and maintaining the Soviet-Cuban presence in southern Africa for the purpose of manipulating the West into support for apartheid (Price, 1984; Metz, 1986)

²⁹⁷ A good account of the disagreement between the Military and the Diplomatic establishments in South Africa is found in Hanlon. Davies notes that it is not correct necessarily to place the differences in policy on the conflict: Both groups agreed that pressure needed to be placed on Mozambique and the SADF played a role in that. The difference was in the mixture of political and military options, as well as the preferred outcomes. The Diplomatic group tended to be more in favor of allowing Frelimo to remain in power, while the military was set against allowing Frelimo to continue to control the country completely (Davies 110-112)

support" for Renamo. "A diary captured during a [Mozambican] government attack on the MNR stronghold at Casa Branca suggested that the South Africans never really intended to uphold their part of the bargain" (Metz 1986, 498)²⁹⁸ This sort of evidence, tied with the historical events as they occurred, sheds doubt on the official proclamations from the Government of South Africa during the period. It is enough, at least to question South Africa's contrary statements that their goal was simply the elimination of ANC in Mozambique: even after ANC was out of Mozambique, for the most part, they continued their support for Renamo.

But the goal of South Africa in Mozambique was less clear than the fact that they continued the destabilization. By my definition, destabilization aims at changing the balance of force between a target government and its opposition, for the purposes of removing the targeted political leadership from power. But I also noted that complete collapse was only the ultimate goal, and added the following: "States may interfere with the ability of the target government to actually govern, and gradually delegitimize it." Mozambican destabilization is more correctly conceived in these terms, because South Africa decided early on that Renamo could not win against Frelimo, but if Frelimo was seen as weak, the social divisions within Mozambique would be enough to render Mozambique inert in the region. "There is general unanimity among observers that Pretoria never, at any time had any serious intention of trying to replace Frelimo with the MNR" (Davies, 113). Attempting to do so would impose such a cost on South Africa, that it wouldn't be worth the risk. South Africa would be responsible to support a puppet government which did not have any actual support among the population.

²⁹⁸ See also Hanlon, 51-52 for a brief discussion on the differences between the Foreign Policy establishment in South Africa who may have wanted to keep to Nkomati because it allowed them to increase their reputation abroad and the political right in the military establishment who argued; according to a headline in the nationalist newspaper *Die Afrikaner*: "No Peace possible with the Communists."

The best that South Africa could hope for then was that Renamo be forced to be admitted to the government as a junior, but influential part of the government, to prevent Frelimo from menacing South Africa's interests in regional hegemony and economic domination of southern Africa (Davies, 113). Their early hope was not the full removal of Frelimo, but the alteration of the content of the Government of Mozambique more towards South African preferences in the region. Thompson, in her comparison of the Contras and Renamo, is more explicit: "... [It] became clear that the real target was [Mozambique's] own government, their experiments in social transformation" (Thompson, 23).

As hope for forcing Renamo to accept South African influence in their Government faded, South Africa appears to have settled for a Mozambique wracked by chaos, or, "keeping the country in a state of permanent crisis and attempting to render it ungovernable" (Davies, 113). This then became the state of affairs in Mozambique: if South Africa's problem was a socialist government in Mozambique with the intent and the ability to oppose South African designs for the region, making it impossible for them to do so when it became clear that they could not be removed completely from power, was South Africa's strategy. It had the same effect as if Frelimo had been removed entirely and replaced by a neutral state.²⁹⁹

Frelimo itself made matters worse. In attempting to react to Renamo's general war on the population of Mozambique, Frelimo appeared both insensitive and bumbling, revealing the Government's failures in bold relief. The weaknesses inherent in Frelimo's program itself were laid bare for the country to see by Frelimo's inability to pursue its agenda in the face of a foreign

²⁹⁹ Davies notes that Renamo was aware of its role in the chaos-mission of the South African government: "[Renamo] has never produced a coherent political programme, nor, in practice, sought seriously to mobilize positive support among the people in areas in which it operates" (Davies, 113). Renamo never attempted to explain to the population the reasons for its campaign nor what it planned to accomplish. Instead, according to a US State Department report cited by Davies, they relied on terror and intimidation to maintain their supply of food and forced labor, and "inflict misery on the local people" (Davies, 114).

backed insurgency, and collapse of Frelimo's platform, observed years later, was much less the result of Renamo's success than the inability of the Government to deal with them adequately while maintaining the moral high ground (Saul, 128-29). As the war dragged on, and more and more of the country was destroyed, Frelimo began adopting many of the practices of Renamo, and in the end, began to seek a settlement. But by this time, South Africa itself was changing, and in the early 1990s, Renamo moved from its role as proxy army for apartheid to political party who contested in elections. It joined the legislature in 1994, having not defeated or overthrown Frelimo, but certainly having accomplished the mission of keeping it inert for more than a decade.

While it would appear that establishing Renamo as an alternative to Frelimo was not deemed "realistic" as a strategy by South Africa, there is one interesting side note to report, which occurred after the period of my analysis. Mozambican President Samora Machel did not live to see the end of the conflict: he died, along with several other top Frelimo leaders, in a plane crash in 1986. The plane crashed in South African territory. The leadership of several countries in the region blamed South Africa for sabotage of the plane (Thompson, 35). There is no solid evidence, however, which either exonerates or indicts South Africa for the crash.

Concluding Statements: South African in Botswana and Mozambique

In both cases, my hypothetical expectations are met. In Botswana, security and ideological conflicts were met by violations of the sovereignty of Botswana and economic pressure applied on Botswana's economy from South Africa. But the aims of that policy were limited, because South Africa still essentially controlled the levers of Botswana's economy. It could apply pressure, and did apply pressure, to attempt to make Botswana's government alter its policies more toward a direction of South Africa's liking. The adoption of a more risky policy

like destabilization, especially given South Africa's apparent concern for building its prestige and legitimacy through tacit recognition of its apartheid policy in the Bantustans, was entirely unnecessary and perhaps even inappropriate. South African pressure was, to some degree successful during the period under investigation. As a result of the lack of the conflict of economic interests (due to the great degree of dependence of Botswana's economy on South Africa) none of South Africa's actions were aimed at destabilizing Botswana's government.

Mozambique, however, suffered a full range of destabilization because of its conflicts of interest. When South Africa discussed a total Marxist onslaught, Mozambique was one of the countries it was referring to. Mozambique represented a challenge to South African political and economic dominance of the region, and policies of the Mozambique Government under Frelimo with regard to the ANC and the SADCC were seen as direct threats to South African security. The result was a wide range of destruction carried out by South African forces and Renamo, the South African backed insurgency operating both within Mozambique as well as from based in Malawi, which was armed, trained, supplied and commanded by the South African Defense Force. Mozambique's drought during the early 1980s combined with the sheer destruction of Renamo's and the SADF's combined action to produce a man-made famine which killed off 100 thousand Mozambicans and rendered the government of Mozambique ineffective in the eyes of the people and of the world. Even though South Africa achieved its stated goals with the Nkomati Accords, its unstated goal was the overthrow of Frelimo, and it continued to support Renamo in that effort, even after it became clear that this was going on a year and a half later.

This study demonstrates the plausibility of my argument outside the Western Hemisphere, and outside of the Cold War context. While I admit that this study is short, and the sources are (with the exception of Geldenhuys, who was "one of the Botha regime's leading

academic consultants on foreign policy issues." [Davies and O'Meara, 190]) second hand and interpretive, the conclusions I draw here still hold. Nobody I have cited, or whose research I consulted disagrees that the conflicts I have listed were indeed serious sources of irritation between Botswana, Mozambique and South Africa respectively.

Additionally, the South African response toward Botswana and Mozambique is consistent across all sources. Some offer different details as to historical fact, but all agree that South Africa pressured Botswana, but did seek to destabilize the government there, while in Mozambique, destabilization is exactly what South Africa did. I can, at the very least, draw the correlation between my two sets of variables: conflict of interest on the one hand and destabilization (or not-destabilization) on the other. A more in depth study of the speeches and internal documents of the Botha Government would undoubtedly strengthen that claim. But those are, for the most part inaccessible to me, given time and location constraints.

But demonstrating the plausibility of my argument in an outside setting was all I really set out to do in the first place with this chapter. My goal was to demonstrate that the theory could explain the difference of policy between some non-US, non-Western Hemisphere, non-Superpower, non-Cold War protagonist and the neighbors with which it had conflicts of interest. South Africa, to some degree was an easy pick: as I noted, most authors--and certainly all the ones I cited, with the possible exception of Geldenhuys--discuss South African policy toward its neighbors in this period as "destabilization". Apartheid South Africa during the TNS even becomes a case study for destabilization as foreign policy, as in the case of Thompson (1988).

South Africa is different enough from the US to make the argument that most of the characteristics that are used to describe the US in this period will not describe South Africa, and

yet South Africa acted as my hypothesis would expect it to act in response to conflicts of interest with its neighbors anyway.

In other words, it is not the geo-political position of the US relative to the Cold War and to Latin America which makes the US destabilize its neighbors in some cases and not in others. I can make a plausible argument broad and intense conflict of interest could cause ANY country to adopt destabilization as a policy against its neighbors. Botswana and Mozambique were also fairly easy picks. Both cases are somewhat well documented here in the United States-- Botswana usually for reasons other than South African policy, and Mozambique because of precisely that reason. This study is of further interest, because, as I briefly mentioned above, the cases are in many ways similar to the El Salvador and Nicaragua cases, and in many important ways, very different (El Salvador, for example, did not have diamonds, and therefore was not in a great position to criticize the US, though it may have liked to at times.)

A major contribution of this plausibility study which I did not consider prior to its selection and writing was the degree to which it demonstrates a case where the different types of conflict of interest are to a large degree separate, despite the fact that they look almost identical, in terms of conflict of interest, to the cases in the preceding chapter. One of the issues I faced when designing the main study was that my variables were often not independent of one another--they were always very closely related. But the Southern African cases demonstrate, more than anything else, that these variables can be independent of one another while still producing the predicted outcomes. For example: delinkage is conceptually different from the non-racialist ideology, which is itself can be argued is separate from support for ANC. Each of these types of conflict of interest can be examined without reference to the others in southern Africa, where it may be more difficult to do that in Latin America. This comparison then provides me a greater

degree of confidence in the validity of my theoretical explanation. I can make a strong argument that all three types of conflict, separately, are *necessary* to produce destabilization; without one, destabilization will not occur.

In short, my hypothetical expectations held in Southern Africa. If, given the differences between South African and the US, the hypothesis still holds, it is plausible for me to conclude that the many aspects of the US which I did not account for which could present themselves as competing explanations for US policy in the region may be discounted. In other words, by infirming possible alternative explanations, which may suggest something special about the US that leads the US to destabilize its neighbors, I strengthen my own theoretical argument. In addition, I provide the plausibility that this theory can be expanded outside of the Western Hemisphere and outside of the Cold War context. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the policy is not dependent on the effect of one major conflict, but that all three are necessary to the adoption of the policy. This study demonstrates the potential, therefore, for generalizability of my theory.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSION

Recapitulation of the Dissertation

Over the past six chapters, I have explored the relationship between conflicts of interest and destabilization as a policy with the aim of developing and testing a theory of foreign policy decision making. During the recent period of history, following the end of the Second World War at least, destabilization has been a widely practiced policy, and yet as phenomena, it has not been rigorously examined. The goal of this dissertation then was to do precisely that: to answer the question about why a state would adopt such a potentially costly policy as destabilization.

I found my answer by applying prospect theory, which argues that a policymaker, in a situation where he or she perceives an unacceptable deviation from the status quo, will make more costly choices, and as the crisis deepens, he or she will opt for more and more costly options than would have otherwise ever been considered. Destabilization, precisely because it violates a number of international norms, is potentially one of the more costly options a state can choose, short of outright war. My answer to the puzzle was that destabilization is adopted in response to a broad and intense perceived conflict of interest between two states.

The work I have completed was exacting work. Few have made any sort of attempt to define the concept of destabilization, let alone conceptualize it. Almost nobody has attempted to formulate and test a theoretical explanation of the phenomenon. In my dissertation, I not only developed a theory which is based in the literature on decision making in foreign policy, but I developed a rigorous test which allowed me to evaluate my theory. The theory withstood the tests, and I am able to confidently report that there is a causal connection between broad and intense conflicts of interest and adoption of destabilization as a policy.

This is especially evident when viewed in comparison with cases which had conflict of interest, but that conflict was more limited in its scope. Just as the existence of a broad crisis of interests led policy makers to adopt destabilization in the "treatment" case of each pair, the lack of a broad crisis produced the lack of policy in its "control group" match. The outside comparison further demonstrated that the effect was not caused by some factor peculiar to my universe of cases under examination. With a different status-quo state, on a different continent, with a different degree of power, with different geopolitical goals, the effect is still the same and is caused by the same broad conflict of interest.

The contribution of this dissertation, therefore, has the real potential to be quite broad to the understanding of a number of important questions in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. This dissertation addresses how states treat one another in the international system. It looks at the power of norms and the degree to which rational policy makers are willing to bear the costs of violating them. It talks about how states can go from a friendly relationship to an adversarial one. It can illuminate the question about why wars and interventions begin. And it can also show how adversarial relationships can potentially end. The contribution of this dissertation also goes beyond the field itself. At the heart of this research, the question is also an historical one: Why did the US do what it did to its neighbors during the Cold War. Historians of the era can draw heavily from the research completed here to answer their own questions.

There are also normative implications of the findings of this dissertation. The expectations I had while conducting my research were many times paradigm driven: Since I was analyzing foreign policy through a structural realist lens, the conclusions themselves tended to adopt a structural realist bias. But there are a number of points that this research raised that can

be looked at from different points of view. For example, Constructivists can look at these conclusions and see constructivism throughout the entire dissertation. Norms themselves have the power that people say they do. There are things that other states can do to increase the potential for compliance with those norms, but in the end, if a group of policy makers do not acknowledge them, the norms have no power. This failure to acknowledge norms can cause decision makers in both status-quo states and in target states to act in ways which are contrary to what is viewed--after the fact, perhaps--as rational. The question of "rational" behavior is itself subject to comment: the critical theorist could look at this dissertation and say, "Rational is what those in charge say it is. It is self-reinforcing. If we assume that rational does not exist, then it becomes very difficult to justify the behavior of people who decide to have other governments overthrown."

This dissertation looks at these big questions and others; it is not a limited study about a small well-studied concept, and it is certainly not replication. It offers a rigorously tested theory on one foreign policy option, to be sure, but the policy it analyzes is one that most states can use, given that the inputs are similar. Surely, before there were such things as states, as we know them today, destabilization would not have been practiced. When the king was divinely chosen, or rather, believed to be--it would be absurd to attempt destabilization. Doing so would not touch the legitimacy of the king, which did not rest on the opinion of his people, but on the opinion of his God. It would also simultaneously undermine the legitimacy of the king attempting the action. But in the era of nation-states, with governments whose legitimacy rests upon the tacit consent of the governed, civil societies, and mass media, destabilization becomes a very real option for a number of reasons.

First, it is relatively easy to carry out. Most states are not immune to infiltration by the agents of another state. Even at the height of the Cold War, both the US and the Soviet Union had their spies passing sensitive information back to their respective governments about the other. Some states may be more or less effective in dealing with destabilization if they detect it, but far too often, destabilization is detected too late for most.

Second, destabilization does not have to be expensive. The range of tactics associated with the policy is wide, and there are options available for states with limited resources. The degree of political penetration demonstrated in the above chapters required the resources of powerful nations who were dedicated to a specific outcome, and yet, in most cases I looked at, the total costs of the operation were minimal enough as to avoid detection by government watchdog groups in the public. When large scale operations were conducted, the public weighed in, but in the total universe of cases I looked at, those operations were few and far between. Most US destabilization was like Brazil and Bolivia, and not like Nicaragua-or Guatemala, Cuba or Nicaragua. Small countries, therefore can conduct destabilization to a comparative degree as the US did in Latin America during the Cold War, and likely will if they have comparable conflicts of interest.

Third, it is easy to avoid detection for their actions or absorb the costs of violation of norms. Few states in the world outside the region had much of a problem with how the US conducted its hemispheric relations. Many states criticized the US for the embargo against Cuba, but continued to trade with the US anyway. To some degree this mitigates many of the costs associated with norms violation. Small states can therefore more easily get away with small scale operations against their adversaries, and especially if they have a powerful patron state, can avoid the costs of their behavior.

Finally, the work I have done in this dissertation provides the beginning of a formal definition of state interests. I have identified three types of interests that states have, and have tested the relationship between those three general classes of interests and the foreign policy choices of a state. This process illuminates the way forward for researchers who would like to test interest-based hypotheses formally. The theoretical work done on interests and destabilization itself can be used to create a database to attempt to determine the degree that conflicts affect the decision to adopt destabilization, or other types of interventions. For my future research, this work forms an invaluable contribution to a larger theory of intervention.

The research I conducted for this dissertation and the analysis of that data led me to conclusions which have a wide range of implications, especially for the understanding of this concept of destabilization. It fills in a noticeable gap in literature, and conceptualized a widely used, but contested concept in foreign policy analysis

Limitations and Potential Challenges of the Study

There are a few limitations I note with this dissertation. One issue which has plagued my research is the lack of reliable data, on the one hand, and a mountain of raw data on the other hand. For example: In the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan cases, there was no definitive accepted set of documents to draw data from the way I was able to do with Foreign Relations of the US for the earlier two comparisons. Instead what I had access to was several dozen megabytes of raw, generally uncontextualized documents, which often gave no hint about who wrote them and rarely gave any indication whatsoever as to what use they were put. Consequently, the process of marrying the facts of history with those documents was more or less an educated, though subjective guess. Since I was hesitant to proceed on that route, I went with more reliable accounts which were found in second hand interpretive accounts. These cases are very well

documented, but lacking the primary sources, I was simply using other historians' interpretations to form my own interpretation. Whenever possible, I tried to use (or find) actual statements from the policy makers and report them in my dissertation chapters, but often that too was difficult.³⁰⁰

The opposite side of this situation also made data collection problematic. Often, in FRUS, documents were missing. These documents would have shed important light on events as they transpired. While the documents that FRUS provides are considered by State Department Historians to be "definitive" documents of the foreign policy matters that they cover, often they refer to documents which remain in the archives and are therefore inaccessible to a researcher who is not able to go to the archives to cross reference the documents and their sources. In many instances, going back even to the Brazil and Argentina cases, documents are clearly missing from the record because they haven't been either fully or even partially declassified. A placeholder document is in its place in the online archive: Given the trajectory of events as well as the secondary accounts of the events, a researcher *knows* what that document says (and why it remains partially or completely classified.) But the content of the document cannot be cited because one can never be sure without significant interpolation of events. Consequently my confidence in the completeness of my own analysis is lessened.

The passage of time was related to the question of difficulty in measuring my variables: As time went on US interests in the region changed, even though the main types of interests remained the same. So what was a provocation for one Administration was possibly a minor irritant for another. I attempted to account for this by stating, at the beginning of each section, what US interests for the target at that period of time were. The researcher will need to uncover

³⁰⁰ I did not even attempt such an exercise in the South Africa case- This analysis was based almost entirely on secondary sources, and I noted as much in the chapter.

the interests of a potential destabilizer for a potential target at a given time before an evaluation of the conflict of interest can actually take place.

The change in foreign policy preferences and national interests over time militates to a degree against parsimony of the theory, at the very least, and leaves my work somewhat open to the charge of selection bias. Someone may easily say that I selected cases which confirmed my hypotheses and then bent the concepts behind the independent variables until they fit my definitions. In fact, the problem of changing interest is not anticipated by the assumptions behind a structural theory: the problem with defining these concepts firmly, and especially the difficulty of adopting one definition of national interests to cross two and a half decades of time suggests to me that a structural approach does not offer a complete picture of what is going on, not in my dissertation, and not in foreign policy analysis in general. At least there is another part of the story which this dissertation doesn't quite tell because it begins by adopting a structural approach to analysis of destabilization.

Beyond this study in particular, the theoretical assumptions I made when I was working on this topic leave quite a bit of work for me to do in the future. As I note above, this dissertation explicitly assumes a structural analysis. That is, I talk about individuals, but only as parts of the larger structure. My argument asserts as much: it really doesn't matter who is in charge or even (as with the case of South Africa) which country we are referring to, what is important is the relationships between states in terms of their respective national interests. Given certain values on the inputs (conflicts of interest), the outcome (a destabilization policy) is predictable. Another problem with this formulation other than the one I mention above, as is a problem with many structural arguments is that it tends to over predict conflict. While not tested in this dissertation, it is a reasonable assumption to think of cases where broad and intense

conflict of interest led to some other policy. It would not be incredibly difficult to imagine that a country could easily adopt a different policy, to include changing their own policy preferences in the name of good relations with their adversaries. Interests can change (they do change), and it is possible that the pressure of some policy other than destabilization may be enough to cause that change without destabilizing the government, even in cases of broad and intense conflict of interest. Only a study of all cases who have ever had conflicts with one another, coupled with a complete set of interests and their correct categorization into one of the three types I discuss can say for sure both whether it actually is the conflict or something else.

To be intellectually honest, I have to admit that the broader policy implications of this hypothesis have not been tested. I know, for example, that in the two and a half decades that I examined, in the Western Hemisphere, under a very specific historical and geo-political context, the argument seems to hold. The addition of the southern African cases demonstrates that at least it is a plausible explanation outside of that context. But without further study, it is impossible for me to know whether the results I identified were a feature of the structure of international relations and foreign policy itself, or simply an anomaly which has something to do with countries that the US interacts with during the 60s, 70s and 80s. I can say with a degree of confidence that the theory holds in earlier and later times and in different parts of the world, but further research is necessary to demonstrate that confidence. Of the cases I analyze, the relationship does seem to be there, reliably.

Unexpected findings and possible alternative explanations

While writing this dissertation, it became clear to me (soon after it became clear to others, I should note) that as I analyzed the cases of destabilization and not-destabilization, I would note that often the US would hold off on destabilization sometimes, because there was no

preferable alternative. This sub-phenomenon, which has the potential of being an alternative explanation, at least for not-destabilization (or not-destabilization at first, followed by more serious pursuit of the policy later, as perhaps in the case of Brazil) was observed in Argentina, where, despite the conflicts of interest, the US still attempted to stave off the inevitable coup because US policy makers were concerned about the replacement of Frondizi. They were not so interested in saving Frondizi as preventing a worse alternative, and given their limited information about what that alternative would be, they imagined the worst, a leftist-Peronist alliance which might end up posing a more serious threat to US interests than Frondizi did. I noted the hesitation in the Peru case, and it was even more apparent in the Salvadoran case, where the alternative (an FMLN victory) was completely unacceptable to the US.

It is important to note that this alternative explanation represents a possible alternative explanation for "not-destabilization", not for the adoption of destabilization. In the destabilization cases, the US had an idea of who might replace the target leader, but often there was little discussion about the reasons why they preferred that alternative. There was no discussion, for example that "General X is much more interested in aligning the country with US interests, and so he deserves US support." Instead, the situation has simply gotten so bad that anyone would be preferable to the target, and therefore, the US ended up backing the person or the group with the best chance of success. In Brazil, that eventually became Castello Branco, though as I demonstrated, the US was destabilizing Brazil long before Castello Branco stepped up to lead the coup which eventually ousted the President. In Bolivia, the group the US preferred, the MNR, was deemed unable to conduct the overthrow, so the US went with the group who had already attempted a coup the previous February. In Nicaragua, the US government supported the Contras, not because they were the freedom fighters that the Reagan

Administration described them in the American Press (everyone knew better and few believed Reagan's characterization of the former security apparatus of a brutal dictatorship) but because they were not the Sandinistas. In short, in the destabilization cases I examined in this dissertation, the US adopted destabilization in response to the conflicts with the current government, not necessarily out of consideration of who would succeed the toppled target government.

But the "no better alternative" argument could possibly explain the negative cases. While this could potentially infirm my theory, it also presents an opportunity for future research. As I discuss in the next section, the limitations of this dissertation need to be addressed: my aim is to address the limitations of both my own work here as well as any competing hypotheses which rise as a result of that effort throughout the course of my academic life.

Beyond a possible alternative explanation, there were a number of unexpected findings. My early suspicion that perception of policy makers plays a major role in the making of foreign policy decisions was confirmed by the research. The conflict of interest is inherently about the perception of conflict: even in cases where interests were actually quite a bit more similar than US policy makers thought they were, the perception of conflict because of a certain set of preconceived notions about communism during the Cold War genuinely affected policy responses. For example: The US saw the independent foreign policies of South American countries as being pro-Soviet, rather than taking the words of the leaders of those country at face value. The Government of Brazil constantly stressed its long history of good relations with the US, but the process of asserting national priorities over the Cold War security imperatives held by the US made US policy makers see an enemy in Goulart.

Another thing I discovered while doing this dissertation was that attitudes of policy makers toward the "other" in each dyad played into these perceptions. I was not able to test these sort of attitudes and deliberately avoided doing so in the interest of completing the dissertation. But I cannot deny that it is highly likely that decision makers in each country had sets of assumptions about the other player in the dyad, and those assumptions made conflicts appear worse than they might have otherwise actually been. There may have been a latent paternalism toward Latin America held by US policy makers which made them feel threatened by Latin American states asserting that they should be able to control their foreign policy and internal policy the same way the US did, and a latent resentment of that paternalism in Latin American leaders which led them to stick on points that they could have otherwise easily gave up on.

These attitudes toward one another may have artificially sharpened an otherwise manageable disagreement into a perceived crisis. Measuring that perception proved tricky for me, however: Because my argument depended on this idea of a perceived conflict of interest, the dissertation ended up being longer than I originally intended. The sheer amount of data needed to demonstrate my arguments added dozens of pages more than I would have had if I was using a dataset and analyzing regression coefficients. While both of these above points would add to the causal mechanism, they are very difficult to demonstrate. The closest I get to something like this is probably Nixon's quote about the giving "those goddamned Bolivians that tin..." (FRUS E-10, Doc 101).

While I accomplished what I set out to accomplish, which was to test the hypothetical relationship between conflicts of interest and the policy of destabilization, there is still much to say on the topic which is not, and cannot be in this dissertation. At the very least, I can say that this topic needs a great deal more of study.

Extension

At this point, before I end this discussion, I should mention some places I might go with this research. Most of the difficulty faced during the research of this topic was in conceptualization and measurement. The issues start with the concept of destabilization itself. What literature is currently available is either too vague (that is, the definition is too general) to be of much use in the conduct of a rigorous study based on it, or far too narrow to be applicable outside of the cases that the researcher wants to discuss. Consequently, I needed to do a lot of preliminary conceptual work to be clear about what I was even looking at and looking for. One extension of this research will then be to explicitly and more fully conceptualize the term than I have done even here, and then publish that conceptualization as a start of a broader discussion in the field of foreign policy. I began to do this at the same time that I was writing the first part of this dissertation, in a paper about US policy toward Jamaica. That paper and the first chapter of this dissertation can serve as a jumping off point for a much fuller examination of the concept "destabilization": What it is, what it is not, how it happens, how it can be avoided, but most importantly, how to measure it.

A second extension of the study involves exploring the alternative hypotheses I discuss above. The "no better alternative" argument certainly shows promise in explaining why a country would opt to not destabilize a target. It almost goes without saying that, given the overprediction of conflict by structural theories, there are plenty of cases where there is broad and intense conflict and yet no destabilization. An exploration into the alternative explanation can help set the outer bounds of the concept: While the conflict of interest explanation I provided in this dissertation does a good job (I can say that based on the results of my own analyses) to explain destabilization when it happens, there is some challenge to it when

destabilization does not happen. This will also begin an important discussion, as far as this concept is concerned, about the magnitude of effect that conflicts of interest have on destabilization: to what degree does broad and intense conflict cause destabilization; to what degree does each type of conflict add or subtract on the likelihood of adoption of destabilization, an so forth.

Along with this discussion, I absolutely need to test the criteria I used to define conflicts of interest. As I noted, Ari and I often came up with somewhat different scores when coding these conflicts. It is clear to me why that it: The rules I used to code these conflicts did not cover the full range of data that he and I looked at. If I came up with ten characteristics of a security conflict, we would run into perhaps thirty different kinds of conflicts that were probably security, but we had to use our discretion, because there was nothing that says "This is a security conflict." The coding scheme had not been tested before hand. And even so, the coding rules I adopted could not possibly cover all potential issues of policy between two countries.

Additionally, we had to consider the historical context of the things we were trying to code. As a result, some conflicts which looked similar to the types of conflict that was classified as "security" might not have been scored as such: they might have been more correctly scored as ideology. This introduction of subjective interpretation into the coding of these conflicts decreased my overall confidence in the coding. What I need to do, then is to eventually go through the documents, and actually list all the conflicts, so that I can characterize them and use them to recheck my coding. From there I can more confidently argue that some issue is definitely a conflict of interest, it is a particular conflict of interest, and others would certainly agree with me. This is the process of making the rules, rather than testing them. Given that I

note my coding process as a major limitation of this dissertation, it would seem that that would be a process I would need to devote far more time and thought to than I did in this dissertation.

Finally, I would like to put all of this extra work together and see if a quantitative component could be developed to test this hypothesis. The deep research, the congruity test, and the explication of a causal mechanism still leaves my findings open to challenges. I could make my cases air tight, and people would still be able to hit me on selective interpretation, or of only finding cases which demonstrate my argument, or other common criticisms that qualitative studies are hit on. While case studies are valid political science, a quantitative component that is done could serve as a check to this study, at the very least. It could also tell a number of things that the qualitative side of it does not tell. It could make clear just how much of a role these conflicts, when properly coded, have on destabilization, or more importantly, on the likelihood of destabilization. It could also tell me, for sure, whether my explanation about conflicts of interest and deviation from a preferred status quo, actually does most of the theoretical work to explain the results, or if it is some other alternative that offers a better explanation. If the quantitative study is a Large N Study, which would not have been possible at the level of detail I have provided here (and would necessarily get at a different research question anyway) I could make a solid case for generalizability. At the very least, it would help me avoid many of the critiques that I have been sensitive to the entire time I have written on this topic.

Conclusion and implications

In conclusion, while it is difficult for me to make a solid causal claim about all states everywhere for all time, what is important is that this is a start, and it tells us something important about the foreign policy choices of decision makers in the US--as well, perhaps, as states which are similar to the US. The US has both the power and the demonstrated desire to

destabilize other states in the pursuit of its interests. The South African cases demonstrate that not only the big powerful states at the top of a bi-polar system, but also smaller, less powerful states can and do adopt destabilization policies as well, and proceed to carry them. It makes a plausible case for further study into the foreign policy of smaller states, like Venezuela in the 21st century, for example.

Destabilization is both widely used, and fairly rare at the same time. On the one hand, any state can potentially adopt a policy of destabilization and proceed to carry it out. On the other hand, there are still a number of constraints to that policy, importantly, international norms which states violate at their own risk. But leaders' perception also plays a big role in the degree of constraint. If, for example, a state believes that they can change the policies which they don't agree with by other forms of pressure, they may opt to avoid destabilization and other costly foreign policy choices. If they believe that having the current group in power removed would not change anything, perhaps they may adopt a policy of invasion. Perception of not only the crisis, but also the potential outcomes serves both as a constraint and a permissive factor.

I demonstrated my hypothesis, even given my research model's limitations. And I essentially performed three replications of the test to demonstrate that my theory holds even as various implicit and explicit controls are accounted for. It is my hope that someday, someone will look at this work when they are considering what policy they would like to adopt toward some other country that they are having trouble with. Hopefully, they adopt a less confrontational, and perhaps a more normal policy--in the sense of international norms--because if this dissertation demonstrates anything it is that things do not have to be the way they have always been. Each choice of a policy maker is exactly that, and that assumes that some other choice could possibly be made.

The US government did not have to destabilize governments in Latin America: it *chose* to--quite deliberately, as it turns out. Given the outcomes of US policies in Latin America which I did not explore in this dissertation, but happen to know about as a point of history, it is possible that if different choices were made, Latin America would look a bit different than it looks today. Civil wars and dirty wars and military dictatorships and imprisoned islands could have been avoided. The deaths of hundreds of thousands of the poor and the marginalized might have been avoided if the US had simply let the people of their respective countries choose their own destinies instead of the US deciding that it ought do what self-centered elites in the US wanted to force outcomes beneficial to US interests.

But if this dissertation is never used to guide foreign policy makers, I hope, at least that it will be of use to those who are outside the process looking at it. If scholars and analysts view current events in terms of history, they will be able to not only correctly identify the policies of a respective government, but hold policy makers responsible for those policies. There will probably be nobody made to account for the gross violation of international norms I have described in my cases above; but, if I may adopt a normative attitude toward this analysis at last, that state of things should not be repeated, especially since we now know what we are looking for.

Policy makers need to know that they are being watched, and the things that they are doing cannot remain forever hidden from view. They need to be held to account for their actions, and the death and destruction that often follows, as a result. I have outlined a number of instances where the policy makers made decisions which may have not directly affected their own lives one bit. But those policy makers are the ones who often got away with their actions: the people of those countries I described often suffered for decades because of a selfish and crass

policy promoted by members of the US government, cynically sold to the American people as a morality play between good and evil, rather than accurately portrayed as the advancement of the interests of one set of elites against the interests of another set.

Policy makers may justify it how they like: they may attempt to ignore or deny their participation, or claim that their actions were the rational response to a given situation, as this dissertation does, but the facts remain what they are. The policies the US adopted in the past led to a level of carnage that most citizens in the US neither knew about, nor particularly cared about because we were all too busy enjoying the results of the relationships our Government fostered or forced around the globe. The people of the country are just as responsible for the blood spilled as a result of US policies as the Government of this country is, but now it is up to us to make a difference and to refuse to accept the official stories of the battles waged by our "good" system against the evils which lay beyond our borders. At last, this dissertation demonstrates that the US is no different from other states, at the very least. No better and no worse: but it also doesn't have to be this way, because we can and should demand better of our policy makers.

Since we now know what we are looking for and at, historians, political scientists and citizens have no excuse, except laziness, for not holding these people to account for their destructive foreign policy. That account must begin today.

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