I have been asked to address the question of whether or not “liberal arts” is a distinctively Western concept and what the answer to that question might imply for liberal arts education in a pluralist society.

I will argue in two directions: First, that the ancient Indian concept of education aimed at educating the whole person, a combination of religious formation, training for a profession, and the liberal arts in the broadest sense of the word. To this extent, we might emulate the ancient Indians (more precisely the ancient Hindus, if I may use that troubled term to refer to the Sanskrit-writing, non-Buddhist inhabitants of India before 900 C. E.) and acknowledge that they had a broader view of education than we have, broad at least in the sense of what an education should include. But they were not as broad in the sense of who should get that education: it was limited to the so-called twice-born men, the upper classes of ancient Hindu society, and only a few privileged women. This limitation raises the question that I think haunts all idealized educational systems, including the Greek, the question of privilege vs. true democracy. Is it possible to take the good points from these ancient systems and simply expand the franchise, or are they inherently elitist? I will argue, nervously and perhaps overoptimistically, that they can be expanded for our purposes.

Second, I will argue that the liberal arts nowadays must go far beyond what the Greeks and Hindus imagined, because they did not know us but we know not only them but so many other cultures; and so, to close the circle, we need to know not just what the Greeks knew (the assumption underlying the 19th century British concept of higher education that still pollutes our Great Books programs and our Core Classics programs) but what the Hindus knew (and, of course, the Arabs, and the Navajo, and all the other Others that “pluralist,” not to mention “global,” implies).

Let me begin with what I know best, the classical Hindu approach to education. The Hindus believed that each human life should pay balanced attention to dharma, artha, and kama, known collectively as the three aims of human life (purushartha) or the trinity (trivarga). For assonance, one might call them piety, profit, and pleasure, or
society, success, and sex, or duty, domination, and desire. More precisely, *dharma* includes duty, religion, religious merit, morality, social obligations, religious merit, the law, justice, and so forth. *Artha* is money, political power, and success; it can also be translated as goal or aim (as in the three aims of human life), gain (versus loss), the meaning of a word, and the purpose of something. *Kama* represents pleasure and desire (what the Germans call *Wollust* and *Lust*), not merely sexual but more broadly sensual—music, good food, perfume, and so forth.

This basic trinity is one of several important triads in Hinduism, whose role in Hindu intellectual history demonstrates that "three" became a kind of shorthand for "lots and lots"; these threes represented the multivalent, multifaceted, multiform, multi-whatever-you-like nature of the real phenomenal world. The world of the triads is the India of fabled elephants encrusted with jewels and temples covered with copulating couples, a paradigm that began in the earthy, vibrant text known as the *Rig Veda*, the oldest sacred text in India, composed in about 1,000 BCE, and still prevails in certain traditional sectors of Hindu society and religion today. It came to share center stage with another paradigm that might have subverted or destroyed it altogether, but which, instead, simply came to supplement it as an alternative view of human life; this is the ascetic movement, which offered a fourth goal of life, *moksha*, or release from the cycle of transmigration. The omphalosceptic yogis who composed the early Upanishads over a period of a few centuries, probably beginning in the seventh century BCE, fled from the sensual world of sex and sacrifice but did not destroy it. Some texts, from that period and later, list the aims of human life not as a triad but as a quartet, in which the fourth goal is release, *moksha*, the goal of the religious renouncer. Thus the *Kamasutra* (composed in Sanskrit in North Indian in the third century C.E. and first known in Europe in 1883) says:

A man's lifespan is said to be a full hundred years. By dividing his time, he cultivates the three aims in such a way that they enhance rather than interfere with each other. Childhood is the time to acquire knowledge and other kinds of power, the prime of youth is for pleasure, and old age is for religion and release. Or, because the lifespan is uncertain, a man pursues these aims as the opportunity arises, but he should remain celibate until he has acquired knowledge. [1.2.1-5]
It is interesting to note that, two millennia before Michel Foucault, the *Kamasutra* recognizes that knowledge is a form of power. The author, Vatsyayana, also slips in “release” right there with *dharma* (religion), thus reconfiguring the four goals back into three goals, each ideally appropriate for one of the three stages of life; “religion and release” is the third goal, for old age, a goal never mentioned again in this text. In this Vatsyayana is accurately representing the value system of the dominant triadic trend of Hinduism, and I will follow his lead, bracketing the life of renunciation which, itself, bracketed the other three goals and did not participate in the basic world of education and the liberal arts in classical Hinduism. Thus, for example, Ashvaghosha, in his life of the Buddha, written around the time of the *Kamasutra*, describes the ideal world into which the Buddha was born:

No one enjoyed pleasure just for sexual ecstasy; no one hoarded wealth [artha] for the sake of pleasure. No one performed acts of dharma for the sake of wealth [dhanam]; no one harmed living creatures [in sacrifice] for the sake of dharma.¹

This concept of balance is one that the texts never lose sight of, and we too should bear in mind. Thus the *Kamasutra* advises us:

Undertake any project that might achieve the three aims of life, or two, or even just one, but not one that achieves one at the cost of the other two. [1.2.41]

The commentary (written a thousand years later than the text, in the 13th century) goes on to argue that you can’t just work this out for yourself; you need a formal education:

You can, of course, learn about pleasure from other teachings, just as you can read meaning into a hole shaped like a letter of the alphabet that a bookworm has eaten out of a page, but you do not understand what you should do and what you should not do. And so people say:

A man should not be congratulated if he happens to succeed at something without knowing its science, for it is pure chance, like a bookworm eating a hole in the shape of a letter of the alphabet. [1.1.1]
The metaphor of the bookworm, which is used often in Indian metaphysical arguments, is analogous to our quantum metaphor of the odds against a monkey randomly typing out the works of Shakespeare. Continuing this argument about the importance of formal education, the Kamasutra imagines what its opponents might object to a text about pleasure. These opponents it calls “scholars,” a term normally quite honorable in ancient India but here amounting to something like “dried up old pedants” or the old definition of a Calvinist: someone who fears that someone else, somewhere, is having fun:

Scholars say: "It is appropriate to have a text about religion, because it concerns matters not of this world, and to have one about power, because that is achieved only when the groundwork is laid by special methods, which one learns from a text. But since even animals manage sex by themselves, and since it goes on all the time, it should not have to be handled with the help of a text." Vatsyayana says: Because a man and a woman depend upon one another in sex, it requires a method, and this method is learnt from the Kamasutra. The mating of animals, by contrast, is not based upon any method, because they are not fenced in, they mate only when the females are in their fertile season and until they achieve their goal, and they act without thinking about it first. [1.2.16-20]

The fact that men and women depend upon one another means that they must communicate their wishes to one another, as equal partners; therefore they need language. Vatsyayana also assumes that people worry about the future, and this, too, makes even the most basic animal act an act of culture. (The commentary tells us what people think about, more precisely what animals do not think about: “Animals do not wonder, "Has he reached his climax or not?" and therefore wish to mate a second time. And so, since the goal of animals and humans is not the same, animals need no method for sex. Animals, moreover do not first think, before engaging in sex, "What will happen to religion, power, sons, relatives, and the prosperity of our faction?" Sex just happens to animals in their own way.” Walt Whitman had a similar thought:

"I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contained, I stand and look at them long and long. They do not sweat and whine about their condition, They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins. . ."
All human acts, therefore, even making "the beast with two backs," as Iago called it, require language for communication and forethought, language requires culture, and culture requires education, a text, a shastra.

The *Kamasutra* is a shastra. The word shastra indicates a science (including what we would call a human science or social science as well as a “hard” science); it can also designate a text within that science. A person who has mastered such a science is called a Shastri, a name that many Hindus bear to this day. The erotic science known as *kama-shastra* ("the science of kama") is one of the three principle human sciences in ancient India, the other two being the science of religious and social law (*dharma-shastra*, of which the most famous work is attributed to Manu, the *Manavadharmashastra* or *Manusmriti*, known as the *Laws of Manu*) and the science of political and economic power (*artha-shastra*, whose foundational text is attributed to Kautilya, the minister of Chandragupta Maurya). (Both of these texts are roughly contemporaneous with the *Kamasutra*; the *Laws of Manu* was one of the first texts that the British Orientalists translated into English, in 1794, while the *Arthashastra* was not known to European scholarship until 1910. The *Kamasutra* was first translated into English in 1883.) Each of these three sciences required a particular form of education. For dharma, one would study the Veda and its subsidiary texts; for *artha*, one would train in a profession; and for kama, one would master the 64 arts described in the *Kamasutra*. Let us consider each of these in a bit more detail.

What did students of dharma study? To begin with, the Veda and the six subsidiary sciences, called the Vedangas or “limbs of the Veda,” which included the rules for the performance of a sacrifice but also phonetics; metre and prosody; etymology; grammar; and astronomy. These six basic Vedangas went on to generate further subsidiaries of the subsidiaries, including logic and mathematics (it was India that invented the concept of “zero”; what we call the Arabic numerals are in fact Indian numerals), literary theory, and the six classical schools of metaphysics. And, most important of all, there was the great corpus of dharma texts, manuals of religious and secular law, with their enormous and continually growing commentaries.

How did the student master these texts? A young man of the three upper classes would study the Veda with a guru. You could not take the Veda down off a shelf and
learn it by yourself. The Rig Veda was preserved orally even when the Indians had used writing for centuries, used it as the writers of Linear B used their script, for everyday things like laundry lists and IOU's. But they refused to preserve the Rig Veda in writing because it was a magic text, whose power must not fall into the wrong hands. Unbelievers and infidels, Untouchables and women were forbidden to learn Sanskrit, the sacred language, because they might defile or injure the magic power of these words.  

If the sacred chants were to be spoken by such people, it was believed, the words would be polluted like milk contained in the skin of a dog. Ancient Vedic texts state that "a pupil should not recite the Veda after he has eaten meat, seen blood or a dead body, had sexual intercourse, or engaged in writing." People who read and recite (rather than memorize) the Veda are grouped with corruptors and sellers of the Veda as people heading for hell.

The text of the Rig Veda was, therefore, memorized in such a way that no physical traces of it could be found, much as a coded espionage message would be memorized and then destroyed (eaten, perhaps -- orally destroyed) before it could fall into the hands of the enemy. And not only was it feared that misuse might injure the text; it was also feared that misuse might injure the person who used the text. Its exclusively oral preservation ensured that the Rig Veda could not be misused even in the right hands: you had to read the Rig Veda in the company of a wise teacher or guru, who would make sure that you were not injured by its power as the sorcerer's apprentice was injured when he meddled with magic that he did not understand.

Now, one might suppose that a text preserved orally in this way would be subject to steadily encroaching inaccuracy and unreliability, that the message would become increasingly garbled like the message in a game of Telephone; but one would be wrong. For the very same sacredness that made it necessary to preserve the Rig Veda orally rather than in writing also demanded that it be preserved with meticulous accuracy. The Rig Veda is regarded as a revealed text, and one does not play fast and loose with revelation. It was memorized in a number of mutually reinforcing ways, including chanting in a group, which does much to obviate individual slippage. According to the myth long preserved in the tradition of European Indology, when Friedrich Max Müller finally edited and published the Rig Veda at the end of the nineteenth century, he asked a Brahmin in Calcutta to recite it for him in Sanskrit, and a Brahmin in Madras, and a
Brahmin in Bombay (each of the three spoke a different vernacular language); and each of them said every syllable of the entire text exactly the same as the other two said it. In fact, this academic myth flies in the face of all the available evidence; Max Müller produced his edition from manuscripts, not from oral recitation. Yet, like all myths, it does reflect a truth: the *Rig Veda* was orally preserved intact long before it came to be preserved intact in manuscript. There are no variant readings of the *Rig Veda*, no critical editions or textual apparatus. Just the *Rig Veda*. So much for the fluidity of oral texts.

Now consider the opposite case: the expected fixity of written texts dissolves when we look at the second sort of Indian classic, typified by the epic *Mahabharata*. In contrast with the divine *Rig Veda* that was "heard" (*shruti*), the *Mahabharata* is regarded as relatively man-made, "remembered" (*smriti*). It is acknowledged to have been reconstructed very differently by all of its many authors in the long line of literary descent from its first, human author. Though the epic was preserved both orally and in manuscript, it is so extremely fluid that there is no single *Mahabharata*; there are hundreds of *Mahabharatas*, hundreds of different manuscripts and innumerable oral versions. The *Mahabharata* is not contained in a text; the story is there to be picked up and found, to be claimed like a piece of uncultivated land, salvaged as anonymous treasure from the ocean of story. It is constantly retold and rewritten both in Sanskrit and in vernacular dialects. Thus the forms taken by the classics of India challenge our Western assumptions about permanence and impermanence as well as the corollary distinctions that we make between written and oral texts. In India, we encounter more oral traditions than written ones, and more fluid traditions than frozen ones. But more than that; we find a reversal of the link that we assume exists between what is written and fixed, on the one hand, and what is oral and fluid, on the other.

The other great reversal is in our expectation that people who can read are literate, which of course they literally are, and that people who cannot are illiterate, ditto. But since people in India know their classics by heart, and have them flowing in their veins, even if they cannot read them, they are by any reasonable standard head and shoulders above literally literate Americans who can sign their names to their credit card contracts but learn about the meaning of life only from the oral (more precisely visual) culture of television. Here is a moment to pause and modify our definition of an elitist education.
is difficult to assess how broad a spectrum of ancient Indian society could read Sanskrit and therefore knew the texts first-hand. The production of manuscripts, especially illuminated manuscripts, was necessarily an elite matter; men of wealth and power, kings and merchants, would commission texts to be copied out for their private use. But the Kamasutra makes explicit the argument that people who cannot read may also know their texts:

Throughout the world, in all subjects, there are only a few people who know the text, but the practice is within the range of everyone. And a text, however far removed, is the ultimate source of the practice. "Grammar is a science," people say. Yet the sacrificial priests, who are no grammarians, know how to gloss the words in the sacrificial prayers. "Astronomy is a science," they say. But ordinary people perform the rituals on the days when the skies are auspicious. And people know how to ride horses and elephants without studying the texts about horses and elephants. In the same way, even citizens far away from the king do not step across the moral line that he sets. [1.3]

So this is distance learning in ancient India. And the commentator explains: [1.3.6, 8], "If just one person who knows the text practices it, another learns it from him, and another from him, and so on, no matter how far removed. Even people who are not astronomers pick up the information from somewhere or other. But in this case, too, the text is the ultimate source."

It is often said that only upper-class men were allowed to read Sanskrit, particularly the sacred texts, and we have seen that some texts do in fact say this, but the very fact that the texts dealing with religious law (dharma) prescribe punishments for women and lower-class men who read the sacred Sanskrit texts suggests that some of them did so. And there is hard evidence that women could study Sanskrit texts, at least the non-sacred texts. The Kamasutra explicitly argues, ahead of its time in India and way ahead of us, that women, too, should be educated:

A man should study the Kamasutra and its subsidiary sciences as long as this does not interfere with the time devoted to religion and power and their subsidiary sciences. A woman should do this before she reaches the prime of her youth [comm.: 1.3.2 The prime of her youth is the period while she is still in her father's
house], and she should continue when she has been given away, if her husband wishes it.

Scholars say: “Since females cannot grasp texts, it is useless to teach women this text.” Vatsyayana says: But women understand the practice, and the practice is based on the text. This applies beyond this specific subject of the Kamasutra, for –[and here he makes the argument I have just cited above, about knowing how to calculate the full moon without reading the text on astronomy.] The case of women learning the Kamasutra is like those examples.

And there are also women whose understanding has been sharpened by the text: courtesans and the daughters of kings and ministers of state. A woman should therefore learn the techniques and the text, or at least one part of it, from a trusted person, in private. And alone, in private, a virgin should practice the sixty-four techniques that take practice. But the people qualified to teach a virgin are: a foster-sister who grew up with her and has already made love with a man; or a girlfriend who has had the same experience and with whom she can converse without risk; one of her mother's sisters who is her age; an old servant woman who is trusted and can take that aunt's place; a female renunciant with whom she has previously been intimate; and her own sister, if that sister takes her into her confidence about her own love-making. [comm.: The foster-sister is the daughter of her wet-nurse. Her own sister, that is, her older sister, can teach her if she trusts her enough to make love with another man right under her eyes. Otherwise a sister would not want to teach even her own sister, because of their rivalry]

The commentator also gives a significant gloss on the “but” in the sentence that begins “But the people qualified to teach a virgin”: “[1.3.14] The word ‘but’ is used to distinguish women from men, who, because of their independence, easily find instructors.” So here again we are dependent on the human element, the other human being who knows something and teaches it to you. This does not contradict the “bookworm” argument in favor of formal education: you do need the text, but not necessarily in the original language, or on paper. It is again a matter of oral education, as it was in the case of the Veda, but this time of a different sort (education in kama rather
than dharma) and necessarily oral for a different reason (not because the text must not be written down but because the pupil may not know Sanskrit).

We might, therefore, make an argument that despite the overt elitism of the general system, ancient Indians of all levels of society, including those officially excluded, were in fact quite well educated. We might also take another tack, and argue that we may imagine the possibility that we can do what they did not do, that we can take their broad curriculum and apply it to a broader range of students than they would have done. We must admit that we find some of these possibilities, such as the possibility that women, too, might have studied these texts, only by transcending, if not totally disregarding, the original context and by excavating the traces of a transgressive subculture. Were we to remain within the strict bounds of the historical situation, we could not notice the possibility of human beings acting against their moment in history, perhaps even against the authors of the texts that they used. Only by asking our own questions, which the authors may not have considered at all, can we see that their texts do contain many answers to them, fortuitously embedded in other questions and answers that were more meaningful to them. Adam Gopnik has made this point well, with reference to some of the Western classics: "A lot of the skill in reading classics lies in reading past them... The obsession with genetic legitimacy and virginity in Shakespeare; the acceptance of torture in Dante--these are not subjects to be absorbed but things you glide by on your way to the poetry." We need to read past the outer husk of the patriarchal and hierarchical assumptions and obsessions of ancient Indian culture, not only to get to the precious kernel within—the valid insights into educational possibilities—but to get to our own obsessions, our own pressing agendas. Marc Bloc wrote about the historian's need to squeeze out of the data evidence that it may not want to give, evidence often lurking in the silences and lacunae behind what is actually said, the dog that doesn't bark. This is what I think we must do when we scan the documents of ancient India for clues about our contemporary need for a new kind of liberal education.

The need for a guru might seem to rule out the possibility of any illegal appropriation of the text. For even if you could take it off a shelf, you would not be able to understand it; you needed the living commentary provided by the guru. More than that, you needed to learn, by the guru’s example, how to live the life of a good person.
The Veda was not merely learned, it was performed, and it generated a number of subsidiary sciences that such a performance required; these, too, the young man would learn from his guru. It is a matter of role models, of apprenticeship, of what Michael Polanyi called *Personal Knowledge*. But this is not in fact the only type of education that India provides. After a few centuries, in addition to single teachers (the guru model, which persists in India right up to the present day) there soon developed colleges where large numbers of young men went to study. No longer was education always one on one (or one on a few—a guru might have several students at once)—the students in the colleges lost that—but a far wider span of people could be educated. Could women have studied there too? Perhaps, but only if cross-dressed like Yentl (and there many stories of cross-dressing women in ancient India, too).

So much for education in *dharma*. For *artha*, there was the *Arthasastra*. The *Arthasastra* enumerates 4 sciences instead of the 4 goals: philosophy, the three Vedas, economics, and the science of politics. [1.2.1] But there were also many others sciences, preserved in texts about medicine, astronomy, architecture, the management of horses and elephants, and so forth, which we have already seen the *Kamasutra* allude to. But the Sanskrit texts are merely the tip of the iceberg, the only preserved part of an iceberg that also included training in all professions for people of all classes, and women too. This is the guild tradition of the castes, many of which were professions handed down from father to son, or from mother to daughter (in the case of courtesans, for instance). Here again the Polanyi artistan model is in the foreground, the very basis of the education.

Finally, there was education for pleasure, which included the arts. Listen to what this liberal arts education includes, according to the *Kamasutra*:

The sixty-four fine arts that should be studied along with the *Kamasutra* are:
singing; playing musical instruments; dancing; painting; cutting leaves into shapes; making lines on the floor with rice-powder and flowers; arranging flowers; coloring the teeth, clothes, and limbs; making jeweled floors; preparing beds; making music on the rims of glasses of water; playing water sports; unusual techniques; making garlands and stringing necklaces; making diadems and headbands; making costumes; making various earrings; mixing perfumes; putting on jewelry; doing conjuring...
tricks; practicing sorcery; sleight of hand; preparing various forms of vegetables, soups, and other things to eat; preparing wines, fruit juices, and other things to drink; needlework; weaving; playing the lute and the drum; telling jokes and riddles; completing words; reciting difficult words; reading aloud; staging plays and dialogues; completing verses; making things out of cloth, wood, and cane; woodworking; carpentry; architecture; the ability to test gold and silver; metallurgy; knowledge of the color and form of jewels; skill at nurturing trees; knowledge of ram fights, cockfights, and quail fights; teaching parrots and mynah birds to talk; skill at rubbing, massaging, and hairdressing; the ability to speak in sign language; understanding languages made to seem foreign; knowledge of local dialects; skill at making flower carts; knowledge of omens; alphabets for use in making magical diagrams; alphabets for memorizing; group recitation; improvising poetry; dictionaries and thesauruses; knowledge of metre; literary work; the art of impersonation; the art of using clothes for disguise; special forms of gambling; the game of dice; children's games; etiquette; the science of strategy; and the cultivation of athletic skills. [1.3.15]

The commentary explains some of the more arcane of these arts:

They cut shapes out of the leaves of trees such as birches, to decorate their foreheads; they make lines in the form of designs on the jeweled floors of temples of Sarasvati or the god Kama, with rice-powder of various colors. Unusual techniques are various spells to make someone stop loving someone else, or to reduce someone to a single sense organ, or turn his hair gray, and so forth. They complete words by putting on the final syllable; difficult words can be tongue-twisters or anagrams; they complete verses by adding the last quarter to a verse of four parts. Woodworking is useful for making things like sex tools, carpentry for making things like chairs and beds. Massage done with the feet is called rubbing, massaging the head with the hands is called hairdressing, and massaging the rest of the body with the hands is called massage. Languages made to seem foreign are strings of real words, which, by the transposition of syllables, become devoid of real meaning and can be used as a secret code. Alphabets for memorizing are textbooks that teach the technique for remembering what has been heard or written; literary work consists in making poetry
and poetical ornaments. Clothes are used to disguise something small to make it look big, and something big to make it look small. Athletic skills include things like hunting.

Long lists of this sort are what Francis Zimmermann has characterized as agglutinative categories, a common way of organizing knowledge in the ancient world. Or in the world of Lewis Carroll, more precisely the Mock Turtle: "We had the best of educations . . . : Reeling and Writhing, of course, to begin with, and then the different branches of Arithmetic--Ambition, Distraction, Uglification and Derision. . . . .There was Mystery, ancient and modern, …then Drawling, Stretching, and Fainting in Coils." Lewis Carroll knew a lot about India, and satirized it often. The idea of the Common Core may be common across cultures, but the actual content of each core is decidedly uncommon, indeed just as arbitrary as Lewis Carroll's. T H. White’s is one of my favoritess:

"The best thing for being sad," replied Merlyn, beginning to puff and blow, "is to learn something. That is the only thing that never fails. You may grow old and trembling in your anatomies, you may lie awake at night listening to the disorder of your veins, you may miss your only love, you may see the world about you devastated by evil lunatics, or know your honour trampled in the sewers of baser minds. There is only one thing for it then--to learn. Learn why the world wags and what wags it. That is the only thing which the mind can never exhaust, never alienate, never be tortured by, never fear or distrust, and never dream of regretting. Learning is the thing for you. Look at what a lot of things there are to learn--pure science, the only purity there is. You can learn astronomy in a lifetime, natural history in three, literature in six. And then, after you have exhausted a milliard lifetimes in biology and medicine and theocriticism and geography and history and economics--why, you can start to make a cartwheel out of the appropriate wood, or spend fifty years learning to begin to learn to beat your adversary at fencing. After that you can start again on mathehtmatics, until it is time to learn to plough."

At the end of this survey of ancient Indian education, what have we learned? That, in ancient India, some parts of education were more elite than others, particularly religious education; other parts were more easily extended to a broader franchise, to
women as well as men. We learn the importance of a human being to teach you even when you have access to lots of books about the subject; and we learn the value of oral communication, perhaps an answer to the growing illiteracy of our own televised culture. We learn about the respect for education in the arts of life as well as the sciences. A lot to learn.

But we in our very different moment in human history also have different problems, and different ways of going about solving them. What can we take from ancient India that is relevant to the conditions under which we now educate masses of people? 90% of the children in Chicago public schools are black. White people are educating their children privately. Is this the result of racism or economics, or both? To put it differently, why has education become a luxury item? Liberals believe in the liberal part of liberal arts education, the part that assumes that women and people of color also deserve an education. Are knee jerk liberals really jerks? Can their vision supply some of the energy as well as the direction that we need in order to defend the embattled citadel of liberation education? The main loss in the wide democratization of this model is precisely the one-on-one teacher/student ratio that ancient India gloried in. With rising unemployment, why don't the number s of teachers rise as the population rises, maintaining the same ratio, perhaps one per ten? And must distance learning remain an oxymoron? Is a correspondence course better than nothing? These very real problems hover, like hungry ghosts in the Buddhist tradition, standing outside in the cold, pressing their noses against the glass windows of the warm rooms in which we meditate on the goals of liberal education. We need to talk about this, but I have no answers, no expertise in public policy; that was not a part of my own liberal education. Instead, I want to move to the second half of my agenda, and to move from my praise of what my Orientalist predecessors would have called the wisdom of the east (ex oriente lux) to make an argument for the importance of including in our own liberal education a far greater attention to the wisdom of other cultures.

As a student of comparative religion, more particularly comparative mythology, I visualize the goal of a liberal education as the ability to translate, in the broadest sense of that term. I believe that in the present globalized and democratized world an educator, but also a truly educated person, should develop several overlapping skills: first, the
cross-cultural ability to write between cultures, as it were, explaining one to another; second, the eclectic ability to draw upon different disciplines to illuminate a text; third, the conventional translator’s ability to write between languages; and, last, the transcendent fourth, the popularizer’s ability to explain the world of scholarship to the broader reading public. There is a close analogy between translating from one culture to another, translating texts, using different theories to gloss a text, and writing jargon-free English for interdisciplinary studies. More than that: these are the skills that a humanist needs to maintain in order to offset the losses occasioned by the rise of identity politics in the academy. In this second part of my talk, I will defend each of these four practices (my answer to the four goals of ancient India) individually while simultaneously arguing that they need one another, and I will argue that a liberally educated scholar must be eclectic in the matter of both cultures and disciplines, a translator in every sense of the word, and a popularizer in the best sense of the word.

The value of putting together the pieces from different cultures is great, intellectually, politically, aesthetically, and morally. The modern comparative study of religion was in large part designed in the pious hope of teaching our own people that "alien" religions were like "ours" in many ways. The hope was that, if we learned about other religions, we would no longer hate and kill their followers; that "to know them is to love them." Emmanuel Levinas argues that the face of the other says, "Don't kill me;" this is the face that the comparative enterprise strives to illuminate. A glance at any newspaper should tell us that this goal has yet to be fulfilled in the world at large.

But the academic world, having gone beyond this simplistic paradigm, now suffers from a post-post-colonial backlash. In this age of multinationalism and the politics of individual ethnic and religious groups, of identity politics and minority politics, to assume that two phenomena from different cultures are "the same" in any significant way is regarded as demeaning to the individualism of each, a reflection of the old racist attitude that "all wogs look alike." In our day, too, and at the other end of the anti-colonial continuum, seeing correspondences between cultures has come to be regarded as politically retrograde for different reasons. As Annie Dillard discovered in China in 1983, "Mao said that there is no such thing as 'human nature'; there is only class nature. To talk about human nature is, then, to undermine the theoretical basis of
socialism. . . . That people, despite differences in culture, have feelings in common. . .
was, as recently as four months ago, a somewhat risky statement in China. It’s still
risky in America, in many politically sensitized academic cultures.

Moreover, in the present climate of anti-Orientalism, it is regarded as imperialist
of a scholar who studies India, for instance, to stand outside (presumably, above)
phenomena from different cultures and to equate them. The present trend is to study only
one cultural group—Jews, blacks—or only one gender, and, indeed, to study one’s own
cultural group or gender. This is a trend fueled, in large part, by the high moral ground
assumed by disciplines, such as feminism and cultural studies, that argue, or imply, that
their subject matter (racism, sexism, the class struggle, genocide) has such devastating
human consequences that there is no room for more than one answer (there goes
interdisciplinary studies); and that, moreover, the experiences (more particularly the
sufferings of injustice) of the particular group are unique and therefore not
comprehensible to anyone who has not, comme on dit, “been there.” (There goes
comparative studies, indeed, area studies in general, taking non-western civ with it on the
way down). I would challenge the trend of limiting those who study that group to those
within the group—women studying women, Jews studying Jews—a trend which, if
followed slavishly, would automatically eliminate not only my tiny, precious world of
cross-cultural comparison but the more general humanism of which it is a part. In my
own case, this sort of identity politics has led to a very nasty attack on me and on my
students by a right-wing Hindu, not a scholar but simply a business man with the leisure
and capital to flood the internet with his invectives, whose argument is that I have no
right to tell anyone my ideas about Hinduism because I am not a Hindu; that I should stop
writing and listen to him, because he is a Hindu.

Moving away from real politics to academic politics, the emphasis on individual
cultures tends to generate a smaller and smaller focus until it is impossible to generalize
even from one moment to the next: nothing has enough in common with anything else to
be compared with it even for the purpose of illuminating its distinctiveness; each event is
unique, like William James's crab, who insisted that he was not just a crustacean but
himself alone. The radical particularizing of much recent theory in cultural
anthropology, for instance, seems to deny any shared base even to members of the same
culture, much less to humanity as a whole.16 If we start with the assumption of absolute difference, and the belief that each culture can only be understood from the inside, by the insider, that no one can study anyone else, there can be no conversation, and we find ourselves trapped in the self-reflexive garden of a Looking-Glass ghetto, forever meeting ourselves walking back in through the cultural door through which we were trying to escape.17 Identity politics may lead to a form of paralyzing reductionism and demeaning essentialism, and thence into an area where "difference" itself can be politically harmful. For, where extreme universalism means that the other is exactly like you, a distortion that must indeed be avoided, and that people like Talal Asad have taught us to avoid, extreme nominalism means that the other may not be human at all.18 Many of the people who argued (and continue to argue) that Jews or blacks or any other group defined as "wogs" were all alike (that is, like one another) went on to argue (or, more often, to assume) that they were all different (that is, different from us white people, us Protestants), and this latter argument easily led to the assertion that such people did not deserve certain rights like the rest of us. Essentialized difference can become an instrument of dominance; European colonialism was supported by a discourse of difference.

Indeed, the members of a single cultural "group" may be very different, and it is just as insulting to say that all Japanese are alike as to say that the Japanese are just like the French. (The essentialism of time can be just as harmful as the essentialism of place; we cannot explain Shakespeare simply by understanding "the Elizabethan age.") The culturally essentialized position is, in itself, both indefensible and politically dangerous. Yet it is often assumed in "culturally contextualized" and historically specific studies: "Let me tell you how everyone felt at the fin de siècle in Europe and America." The focus on the class or ethnic group, if monolithic, can become not only boring, but racist. My aim is an expansive, humanistic outlook on inquiry, one that enhances our humanity in both its peculiarity and its commonality.

The argument for understanding any phenomenon only in terms of its cultural context, when followed to the end of its line, is like Thomas Kuhn's argument about commensurability: theoretically, it is impossible to get out of one scientific paradigm to another, but we do. And indeed, two cultures are never entirely commensurable, but one can, nevertheless, mense them together. They are, if not co-measureable, at least what I
would call co-mensable, co-thinkable; and then we can move on to the criterion that keeps castes together [and apart] in India: commensality. We can, I hope, dine with other cultures, if not measure them as we measure our own. Commensality is also very much what a pluralist education is about: sitting down at the same table.

If I have now convinced you that it is a Good Thing to bring together texts from different cultures—which, in academia, also often means bringing in different disciplines, since Classics claims to own the ancient Greeks, anthropology to own the Inuit, post-colonial studies India, and so on—let me proceed to the question of what to do with them once we have them. Since most texts from traditional societies have multiple sources (and a postmodern case could also be made, has been made, for the intertextual interdisciplinarity of novels, too, the anxiety of influence), it seems to me that our understanding of these composite compositions should be equally multifaceted. This brings us to the second of our liberal arts skills, eclecticism. Any single approach to a text can be enriched, its shortcomings overcome, by combining it with other methods of interpretation. (The blind man and the lame man, or the two drunks.) Yet the word for this, the "e"-word, is a dirty word to people in academia who feel that one should fish or cut bait, make up one’s mind about the way to proceed.

I think that interdisciplinary eclecticism is essential to the liberal arts. Different scholars will produce different scholarly quilts that bring together different texts. Not only will different interpretations be produced by different sorts of interpreters, but each individual interpreter will approach "the same" text in different ways at different times. It follows, therefore, that any cross-cultural study will have to be sufficiently multivalent at least to acknowledge the validity of all of these sets of variants, if not necessarily to employ all of them at once. The many refractions of a text require multiple techniques--each maintained by a separate discipline--to isolate their various facets, and it is not necessary for a single scholar to encompass them all. It is banal, said Carlo Ginzburg recently, to speak of interdisciplinary studies; how could we be so foolish as to assume that any piece of evidence would yield its secrets to only one discipline?¹⁹

I am arguing for a toolbox of methodologies, a rag-and-bones bag not of themes but of methods, which every scholar/bricoleur should have and from which she will select what she regards as the most appropriate tool(s) for any particular analysis.²⁰ Are
all methodologies created equal? Surely not, but each has, like an individual in a
democracy, a right to a day in court. Does the eclectic scholar have to resign from the
club of intellectual discrimination and respectability? I hope not.

Every telling of a story is an interpretation, and it has been well argued that no
text ever stood in the way of a good interpretation. As the historian William McNeill
once remarked, "Really important texts are those susceptible of being richly and diversely
misunderstood. An author can always aspire to that dignity." And Roland Barthes has
rightly insisted that, in proposing one meaning, a subjective choice, one must not
suppress other meanings. Moreover, he continues:

The meaning of a text can be nothing but the plurality of its [symbolic] systems,
its infinite (circular) "transcribability": one system transcribes another, but
reciprocally as well: with regard to the text, there is no "primary," "natural,"
"national," "mother" critical language: from the outset, as it is created, the text is
multilingual. But there are limits to the pluralism of interpretation. There is an old Jewish story about
a Rabbi who gave a particular interpretation of a text and said, "Isn't that right?" "No,"
replied his opponent. "But there are seventy different interpretations of Torah," said the
first Rabbi. "Yes," said the opponent, "but that is not one of them." Even Collingwood
admitted that, though you can indeed tell the story of Caesar's assassination in various
ways, there are ways in which you can't tell it: you can't say that Caesar killed Brutus. It
is possible both to misinterpret and to misuse texts. We misinterpret them whenever we
ignore context and difference, and we misuse them in the ways to which postcolonial
discourse has alerted us. We can, therefore, eliminate some interpretations, but we
should still be left with more than one.

The richness and nuance of the best sort of scholarship is nourished in the context
of a university: a community in which a number of scholars work together on different
projects in different ways. I am talking here not about compromise but about maintaining
each of several conflicting views in its integrity—acknowledging what each discipline in
its own world has to say about the matter at hand—but then going on to hold them in a
balanced tension, like chemical elements resolved into a suspension rather than a
solution; there is no solution, in either a chemical or a logical sense, for the elements of a
great text. By refusing to modify these component elements in order to force them into a synthesis, the eclectic scholar celebrates the postmodern idea that the universe is boundlessly various, that everything occurs simultaneously, that all possibilities may exist without excluding each other, that untrammelled variety and contradiction are ethically and metaphysically necessary.\textsuperscript{23}

People can also read other books about the cultures that we draw on for our comparative studies. We don't all have to do the same thing, or do it in the same way; we can stand on the shoulders of giants, or, as the case may be, pygmies, and they can stand on ours. From each, her own. All of us must, like Blanche Dubois, depend upon the kindness of strangers. My argument here is for the academy, for multidisciplinarian, multicultural approaches. I would hope that the respect for "difference" (and pluralism, and diversity) which prevails in official academic circles would extend to the methodologies within the academy at large. When did scholarship cease to be a collective enterprise? When did interdisciplinary values cease to apply to comparative studies? When did the "uni" in "University" come to refer to ideology? Perhaps we should rename our institutions Multiversities (with overtones of multivocal, multivalent, multicultural) or Polyversities, if not Diversities (let alone Inversities--for structuralists--and Perversities--for our academic enemies.). Whatever we call it, the academic world should never be a place where there is only one poker game in town. It should be a place where we can say, as in an ice cream parlor or hamburger joint: "Make me one with everything" (a phrase that can also be read as a pantheist prayer).

Let us therefore assume that we will in fact read texts from various cultures, not merely our own, and that we will interpret them in various ways. This takes us to the last two liberal arts skills that concern me here: translating and popularizing, skills that bring us once again to the shadow side of democratizing: reaching out to people who lack languages and specialized knowledge. Let us then go on to assume that some of us will take the trouble to learn languages and produce translations for the benefit of those who have not yet learned those languages.

When I took Joseph Campbell to task in the \textit{New York Times},\textsuperscript{24} concluding by stating that he was neither a scholar nor a gentleman, Sam Keen wrote a letter to the editors accusing me of being envious. If he meant that I wish as many people bought my
books as bought the books of Joe Campbell, he was right. After all, why else do scholars write? After we've achieved tenure (or had it thrust upon us), and found ways (usually ways other than writing) to make enough money to live on, we write to satisfy our narcissism: we want people to hear what we have to say. As we wait to catch a plane for some arcane academic conference in Heidelberg or Bangalore, we scan the shelves of the airport bookstore, hoping, irrationally, to find our own books there, wedged between Judith Krantz and Stephen King (and, one supposes, next to Nietzsche's Greatest Hits and the Classic Comic version of Gibbons' The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire).

Many academics shadow box that sort of marketing by creating schizophrenic, Jekyll-Hyde titles even for their academic books, Mr. Hyde preceding the colon with a lurid metaphor ("Desire, Death, and the Rape of the Earth"), and Dr. Jekyll (Ph. D., not M. D.) trotting along shame-faced, post-colonically, to tell the boring truth ("Fatal Accidents in the Coal-Mining Industry in Pittsburgh between 1840 and 1865").

Our envy of the popularizers is compounded by our fear that the millions of people who read popular academic books in our field, books that we regard as wrong-headed, will never get the right stuff because they will never read our books. We fear that the reductionism of popular writers in our fields will present such an easy version of the subject that good scholars (like ourselves) will be unable to persuade the lazier members of the reading public to invest in a more challenging view of the subject. Or, perhaps we fear that such reductionism will so trivialize the subject that general readers will feel it not worth their time to find out more about it. Michel Foucault is said to have accused Jacques Derrida of giving bullshit a bad name; bad popularizers give good scholarship a bad name. Bad popularizers muddy the pitch for the rest of us. For there is a Gresham's law in academic publishing: bad books drive out good books. But the assumption that a good scholar would not prostitute herself by writing a popular book, and that there are therefore no good popular academic books, is a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is that attitude that makes the popular academic book an oxymoron. Moreover, we keep hoping that, pace all the academic snobs, we ourselves might write a good popular book. And it is this desire that we project into our scorn for those who, in our judgment, sell out. They make us mad because they make us ashamed of our own dreams.
To say that I wish I could sell my books the way that Joseph Campbell sold his is not to say that I wish I had written his books. As a card-carrying academic I am supposed to be committed to a guild-view that is in direct conflict with my desire to sell millions of copies of my books, a view that condemns both the contents of popular books and the audience that reads them. What keeps most academic snobs from trying to write for a wide readership is the assumption that an audience large enough for an academic book to make it onto the New York Times Best-seller list must be stupid, that twenty million Frenchmen can't be right, that the people who read Judith Krantz are all brain-dead, simply because they are so numerous.

The code of the Sanskrit Establishment, my own particular club, seems dedicated to making Sanskrit seem as arcane as possible, in order, one can only assume, to make their own expertise seem all the more wonderful. Academic snobs want to believe that they are so unusually learned and/or intelligent that only a small élite could possibly be capable of appreciating their writings. Theirs is the St. Crispin's Day Syndrome: "We few, we happy few." They seem to believe that the average IQ of the readers of any book is a ground-zero calculation, a number reached by dividing some constant by the sum total of all the readers of a book, the individual IQ falling in direct proportion to the number of readers.

Academic snobbery, which rails so much against reductionism, is itself highly reductionist in its stereotyping of potential audiences: on this side, in green tights, the great-unwashed, hoi polloi (you notice that I do not say "the hoi polloi," thus subtly demonstrating that I know Greek), hoi polloi, moving their lips as they devour the latest self-help book; on that side, in crimson tights, the people who drop one another's names in The New York Review of Books. There is no middle ground between, on the one hand, the half dozen scholars familiar with all the primary sources in all the original languages, and, on the other hand, the people who take Judith Krantz to the beach. (Academic snobbery implies, further, that these two groups are mutually exclusive, forgetting that scholars, too, have their Judith Krantz days, or, more often, nights). In Carl Reiner's film, The Producers, the Nazi author of the musical comedy about Hitler is horrified to see the audience laughing at his beloved Führer. Infuriated by his inability to stop them, he shouts out, "You are the audience; I am the author. I outrank you!" This attitude is fatal to any scholar who wants to reach a broader audience.
The trivialization of the potential audience for the "popular academic book" betrays an attitude that Groucho Marx noted long ago: "I wouldn't be a member of any club that would have me as a member." Translated into the values of the academic world, the maxim goes, "I wouldn't read the books I write." Now, this is a paradox to which translators, like myself, are particularly prone: people capable of reading the text in the original produce, for the consumption of other people, translations for which they themselves by definition have no use. By this logic, no one should ever produce a translation at all, for the reasoning goes something like this: "Why should I bother to write a translation for anyone stupid enough (or lazy enough, or uneducated enough) to make use of a translation?" But of course, translators do read translations, and not just to dissect them in reviews for academic journals. They read them to get ideas for their own wordings (regarding the rival translation as a kind of topic-specific Roget's Thesaurus); they read them for their critical apparatus, for the discussions of variant readings and variant interpretations; they use them to find their way quickly around a very long text (it's always easier to skim in English than to skim in Sanskrit); and sometimes (unless, of course, it is a text that they themselves have translated) they read them to decide whether any of the extant translations are good enough to assign to their students. And it is this last use of translations which ultimately breaks down the false dichotomy between saints who read the texts in the original and sinners who rely upon the despicable crutch of a translation. For we must respect our students as our younger peers, and we do not expect them to know all the languages that we know. My fantasy of selling a million copies of my book is, therefore, not a fantasy about my own transformation but a fantasy about a newly conceived audience, millions of ordinary people who are suddenly overpowered by an inexplicable desire to throw their copies of Judith Krantz into the paper-recycling bin and spend their afternoons at the beach reading my revised dissertation instead.

What I have said of translation can easily be extended to the broader task of writing and teaching in an interdisciplinary way more generally conceived, writing for people who have not been initiated into our particular disciplinary club. The challenge of writing a good popular academic book is precisely the challenge of translating a particular subject from the technical language and jargon in which academics normally
couch it into the simpler language of the non-specialist, without losing the essence of the original. That is no easy task, but it is possible.

What are we willing to do to reach a wider audience? How far are we willing to compromise? The Buddha taught the importance of upaya, which used to be translated as “skill in means” and nowadays might really be called methodology; he meant that you can teach anything to anyone but you must find the precise level at which that person can enter the stream of meaning of the concept in question. George Lucas once said that he "distills" myths "in a way that can relate to a twelve-year-old." That "distillation" is the Buddha's upaya, but it may also be the point at which the myth is killed, the point at which the medium murders the message. The distillation effect is what haunts our dreams of writing that best-seller and turns them into nightmares of self-betrayal: How could we put in all the subtlety, all the detail, all the ambiguity that we need in order to do justice to the richness of our subject, and yet keep it simple enough for a "general audience" to grasp? What is an author profited, if she shall gain a $100,000 advance, and lose her own soul of academic integrity? The dilemma was expressed by David Tracy, who, when asked to rewrite his book to make it more accessible, complained, "But I can't fly any lower without crashing."

One way to keep from crashing is, as I have suggested, to develop a more generous assessment of the mentality of the "general audience," to grant that we do not have to fly all that low to reach their level. Another is to pay more attention to careful, straightforward writing. We can begin, at least, by translating all technical terms, but most academics are unwilling to do that. The anthropologist M. N. Srinivas coined the term "Sanskritization," a process by which a caste that wishes to shift to a higher status begins to eat purer food and to use Sanskrit terms in place of vernacular terms. Academics are great Sanskritizers. But where castes rise in both power and status by Sanskritizing, academic books rise in (readership) power but fall in (academic caste, more precisely tenurable caste) status by de-Sanskritizing. Thus the decision to spell the name of the dark blue Hindu god "Krishna" rather than "Krsna" makes a book academically déclassé, inauthentic. But I would argue, employing a corollary of the Groucho Marx syndrome, that people in the club, people who do know Sanskrit, can figure out what the Sanskrit must be on a word without diacritics, just as people who
know Hebrew can figure out the words even when the vowels are left out, and people outside the club, people who don't know Sanskrit, will just be annoyed and confused by them. (There are occasional instances where a macron or a dot is needed to distinguish one word from another, and on those occasions they can be supplied). Not surprisingly, the move to dispense with diacriticals meets with resistance from the old guard Sanskritists. But there is also a kind of back-formation devotion to diacriticals on the part of people who do not know Sanskrit and want to make it look as if they did, like the back-formation that drove the heroine of Gentleman Prefer Blondes to say, "A girl like I." Once when I wrote an article for the catalogue of a great big Smithsonian exhibition about India, and purposely chose to omit the diacritical marks for the benefit of what I regarded as a non-Indological audience, the person who edited my copy—not an Indologist--, without consulting me, put in the macrons but not the subscript dots. When I pointed out the inconsistency, Our Lady of the Macrons countered: "Well, we wanted it to look correct, but we didn't want to put people off." This is not the sort of compromise I have in mind.

To persist in popularizing our subjects we must simultaneously find (if I may borrow Reinhold Niebuhr's prayer, more popularly known as the Alcoholics Anonymous prayer) the serenity to endure the opprobrium of our more anal-retentive colleagues; the courage to try to persuade them that scholarly standards can in fact be maintained even in the absence of macrons; and the wisdom to maintain our own standards when popularizing publishers ask for changes that would, in fact, undermine them, when they ask us to fly so low that we really might crash. The problem lies not in our stars (or even our super-stars, the talk-show academics) but in ourselves, in our own ways of presenting our subjects to our various audiences.

Scientists seem to be better than humanists at walking the razor's edge between popularizing and selling out. Are humanistic studies somehow less reducible than the sciences? Or is it that scientists assume that they have two languages and must translate from one to the other? Stephen Hawking once remarked that his physical disability had contributed to his ability to make his ideas accessible to so many people: since he couldn't just scribble arcane formulae on the blackboard, like other physicists, but had to find words to explain to people what he was talking about, he developed the ability to
express in words what other physicists could not say, or would not take the trouble to say. Most humanists assume that we all speak the same language, and therefore they do not make the effort to translate from what is often a different discipline, in effect a different language, a technical language, into everyday English. The successful academic popularizers in the humanities have succeeded in part because they write very clearly but also because they have had the knack of focusing on issues that are not exactly trendy but timely, relevant, controversial--issues that people besides scholars care about. If we are unwilling to leave the field of popularization to scholars whom we scorn, we must, unlike most academics, respect the wider audience to whom our books should be addressed; and we must, unlike most bad popularizers, respect the intrinsic ability of our materials to speak to all sorts of people--ordinary people, like ourselves.

1 Buddha carita canto 2, 14: cashcit sishewe rataye na kaamam  kiaamaartham artham na jugopa kashcit; kashciddhahaartham na cacaara dharmam  charmaaya kashcinna cakaara himsaam.
2. For a discussion of the oral transmission of the *Rig Veda*, see Louis Renou, *The Destiny of the Veda in India* (Delhi, 1965), pp. 25-26 and 84.


6. E. H. Gombrich has used the image of a barely audible radio transmission, which we cannot quite hear and which we therefore complete by projecting our own expectations onto it, to describe what happens when we fill in the sketch of a piece of art with our own projections of visual images (*Art and Illusion*, 2d ed., New York, 1961, p. 204). And we have seen above how Levi-Strauss has used the metaphor of fragmentation to describe the process by which mythology deconstructs its inexpressible truth.
7. It is of these manuscripts that Muller remarks, in his introduction to the printed text of the Rig Veda (London, 1890), "The MSS. of the Rig-veda have generally been written and corrected by the Brahmans with so much care that there are no various readings in the proper sense of the word" (p. ix).


10 Pollock, “The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory.”
11 For those who rejoice in longer lists, I cite Foucault's list (first page of the Preface to The Order of Things), citing Borges's list citing a Chinese encyclopedia's list of animals: "animals are divided into: [a] belonging to the Emperor, [b] embalmed, [c] tame, [d] suckling pigs, [e] sirens, [f] fabulous, [g] stray dogs, [h] included in the present clarification, [I] frenzied, [j] innumerable, [k] drawn with a very fine camelhair brush [l] et cetera, [m] just having broken the water pitcher, [n] that from a long way off look lies flies."


16. I am indebted to Sarah Caldwell for this cogent summary, in her introduction to my lecture at Ann Arbor on February 7, 1997.

17. Lewis Carroll, Through the Look-Glass, chapter two.

18. In fact, nominalism is the basis of both extreme difference and universalism, but that is another story.

19 Carlo Ginzburg, talk at the Humanities Center, University of Chicago, February 5, 2003.
20. O'Flaherty, introduction to Women, Androgynes.


22. Roland Barthes, S/Z: An Essay, p. 120.

23. O'Flaherty, Siva, p. 318.