Beyond Nuclear---The Alliance for a Green Economy---

March 9, 2012

Mr. Bill Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001
By Email: MSHD.Resource@nrc.gov

Mr. Borchardt:


The joint petitioners are requesting the following emergency enforcement action with regard to the undue risk to the public health and safety caused by the continued power operation of Entergy Nuclear Operation’s James A. FitzPatrick nuclear power plant in Scriba, New York.

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[ATTACHMENT]
INTRODUCTION

Beyond Nuclear¹ and The Alliance for a Green Economy,² which includes the Center for Health, Environment & Justice, Citizens’ Environmental Coalition, Peace Action New York State, CNY Citizens’ Awareness Network, Syracuse Peace Council and Peace Action Central New York, hereafter referred to as “the joint petitioners”, request that the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) immediately suspend all power operations at the James A. FitzPatrick nuclear power plant in Oswego, New York pending emergency enforcement actions as provided in this petition by federal law (10 CFR 2.206).³

The joint petitioners’ request is based on the significant fact that the operator of the FitzPatrick nuclear power plant, a General Electric Mark I Boiling Water Reactor (Mark I), refused to voluntarily install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) on reactor’s containment system also known as the “hardened vent” as requested by the NRC in

¹ Beyond Nuclear is a 501(c)3 organization based in Takoma Park, MD http://www.beyondnuclear.org

² Alliance for a Green Economy is a New York State-based organization, whose members include Center for Health, Environment & Justice, the Citizens’ Environmental Coalition, Peace Action New York State, Peace Action CNY, the CNY chapter of Citizens Awareness Network, and the Syracuse Peace Council.

Generic Letter 89-16, “Installation of the Hardened Wetwell Vent,” issued on September 1, 1989.4

The “hardened vent” was recommended by the NRC in order to close out outstanding and unresolved severe accident issues in the GE Mark I boiling water reactor as the result of the inherently unreliable pressure suppression containment system. Generic Letter 89-16 (GL 89-16) requested that all GE Mark I operators voluntarily make “modifications that substantially enhance the plants’ capability to both prevent and mitigate the consequences of serious accidents.”5 These enhanced capabilities covered by GL 89-16 included the installation of a “reliable hardened vent system.”6 The operators of FitzPatrick Mark I Boiling Water Reactor refused to make modifications to its Mark I containment. Instead, the FitzPatrick operators rely upon the analyzed capability of a ductwork venting system for low pressure venting of containment that pre-existed to the GL 89-16 request. The pre-existing containment vent is intended for such purposes as purging the Mark I pressure suppression containment for worker access during routine maintenance, repair and refueling. It was not designed with the intention to be used as a severe accident mitigation system.

Furthermore, FitzPatrick is publicly identified as the “one exception” among the 23 Mark I reactors in the United States to not voluntarily install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) also known as the “hardened wetwell vent” and the “hardened vent.”


5 Ibid, GL 89-16, p. 1

6 Ibid, GL 89-16, p. 1
The modifications requested by NRC for installation of the Direct Torus Vent System were intended to protect and preserve containment integrity of the Mark I pressure suppression containment system in the event of a severe nuclear accident.7

Petitioner, Beyond Nuclear, has previously filed an emergency enforcement petition with the NRC on April 13, 2011 that separately challenges the adequacy and reliability of the installation of the experimental Direct Torus Vent System or “hardened vent” as installed on these other Mark I containments.8 The DTVS includes an 8” hardened steel line that by-passes the Standby Gas Treatment System (the radiation filtration component in the nuclear power plants off-gas release system to the environment). The “hardened vent” by-pass line was installed for the purpose of avoiding back pressure that could lead to the rupture and failure of the vent path anywhere along the path to the 300-foot tall off gas vent stack release point. The Direct Torus Vent System as also installed on the GE Mark I units at Fukushima Daiichi dramatically failed to mitigate the nuclear accidents following the prolonged Station Black Out event that began on March 11, 2011. On December 13, 2011, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the NRC formally decided to “ACCEPT” portions of the Beyond Nuclear April 13, 2011 emergency enforcement petition for further review by the


agency including the petitioner’s requested action for the revocation of NRC prior approval of installation of the DTVS or hardened vent for these Mark I units.⁹

However, in the matter of this emergency enforcement petition, the joint petitioners assert that the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not install the DTVS. The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the DTVS as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima Daiichi. The joint petitioners instead request that the Fitzpatrick operating license be immediately suspended as the result of the undue risk to the public health and safety presented by the operator’s reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick’s pre-existing ductwork containment vent system. The risks and uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick assumptions and decisions as regard NRC Generic Letter 89-16 as associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health and safety. The joint petitioners request that the suspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge to the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.

**JOINT PETITIONERS REQUEST THE IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION OF THE FITZPATRICK OPERATING LICENSE**

In full light of the demonstrated multiple failures of the GE Mark I containment and hardened venting systems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in the

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days following the March 11, 2011 Station Black Out (SBO) event, the joint petitioners seek the prompt and immediate suspension of Fitzpatrick operations because;

1) the GE Mark I Boiling Water Reactor pressure suppression containment system is identified as inherently unreliable and likely to fail during a severe accident due to the containment’s small volumetric capacity;

2) the capability of FitzPatrick’s pre-existing containment vent as approved for severe accident mitigation is not a fully ‘hardened vent’ system as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and therefore presents greater and undue risk to public health and safety in the event of a severe accident from the current day-to-day operations than previously analyzed and assumed;

3) the capability of FitzPatrick’s pre-existing containment vent as approved relies upon non-conservative and faulty assumptions including the assumption that there are “no likely ignition sources” along the pre-existing containment vent line during a Station Black Out event that would increase the risk of the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident that might require opening the pre-existing vent line and would instead threaten containment integrity. Such faulty assumptions place a non-conservative and undue risk on the public’s health and safety in the event of a severe accident during the current day-to-day operation;

4) the capability of Fitzpatrick’s pre-existing containment vent system uniquely allows for a severe nuclear accident to be released at ground level with
unanalyzed and unacceptable radiation dose consequences which presents an undue risk to public health and safety in the adjacent communities and beyond;

5) the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe dramatically and exponentially changes the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analyses as used to justify reliance on a pre-existing containment vent system that now represents a greater and undue risk to public health and safety;

6) the continued day-to-day reliance upon the significantly flawed pre-existing containment vent system as would be relied upon to mitigate a severe accident at the FitzPatrick Mark I reactor presents an undue risk to the public health and safety while industry and NRC deliberate over unresolved issues associated with the unreliable Mark I containment and experimental criteria for a renewed attempt to establish a “reliable hardened vent.” Industry and the NRC could be engaged for many more years than is currently intended per Order still pending from NRC Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 5.1.10

7) the identified containment vulnerability, the non-conservative if not false assumption of “no likely ignition sources” in the pre-existing vent line and the unacceptable consequences of failure of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent place both greater uncertainty and undue risk on public health and safety and not reasonably justified by arbitrarily assigning a low probability of the occurrence of a severe accident.

REQUESTED EMERGENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

As a result of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident involving the five (5) General Electric Mark I Boiling Water Reactors (Mark I) and multiple failures of both the Mark I pressure suppression containments and the Direct Torus Vent System or “hardened vent” at four (4) units beginning on March 11, 2011, the Petitioners request that the NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license and that the reactor unit be placed into cold shutdown until the following emergency enforcement actions are enacted, completed, reviewed and approved by the NRC and informed by independent scientific analysis;

1) Entergy Nuclear Operations’ Fitzpatrick nuclear power plant shall be subject to public hearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make containment modifications and did not install the Direct Torus Vent System or DTVS, otherwise known as “the hardened vent,” as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other GE Mark I in the US;

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations shall publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system as previously identified as “an acceptable deviation” from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of
the Direct Torus Vent System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:

a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and;
b) “unlikely ignition points” as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.

BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT

The General Electric Mark I Boiling Water Reactor’s pressure suppression containment system is documented to be vulnerable to failure during a severe accident due to containment melt through, over-pressurization and hydrogen gas generation and explosion as the result of a severe accident. This is in large part due to the Mark I pressure suppression containment system’s relatively small size, volumetrically, which is one-sixth (1/6th) that of the large dry containment systems for the Pressurized Water Reactors. As a result of design vulnerability to severe accidents, the NRC and the


industry collaborated to design and voluntarily install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) or “hardened wetwell vent” to provide control room operators with a “last resort” option during a severe accident challenge to deliberately and temporarily defeat containment through a hardened venting system retrofitted to the wetwell component of the GE Mark I pressure suppression system to save it from permanent rupture and the catastrophic release of radiation.\textsuperscript{13}

On September 1, 1989, the NRC sent to all Mark I operators including the New York Power Authority (NYPA) Generic Letter 89-16, “Subject: Installation of a Hardened Wetwell Vent (GL 89-16).”\textsuperscript{14} GL 89-16 requests that all Mark I operators voluntarily to modify the pressure suppression containment systems by installing the Direct Torus Vent System “to reduce the vulnerability of the BWR Mark I containments to severe accidents.”\textsuperscript{15} The generic letter further states, “Specifically, the Commission has directed the staff to approve installation of a hardened vent under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 for licensees, who on their own initiative, elect to incorporate this plant improvement.”\textsuperscript{16} The NRC communication then explicitly identifies, “Continued reliance on pre-existing capability (non-pressure-bearing vent path) which may jeopardize


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, p.1

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, p. 1
access to vital plant areas or other equipment is an unnecessary complication that threatens accident management strategies.”\textsuperscript{17}

The NRC Generic Letter 89-16 concludes, “For the aforementioned reasons, the staff concludes that a plant modification is highly desirable and a prudent engineering solution of issues surrounding complex and uncertain phenomenon. Therefore, the staff strongly encourages licensees to implement requisite design changes, utilizing portions of existing systems to the greatest extent practical, under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.”\textsuperscript{18}

Yet, on September 28, 1992, a little more than two years later, the NRC in fact provided the FitzPatrick operator with its approval to continue to operate with an accepted deviation from the guidance of GL 89-16 for just such a “pre-existing capability.”\textsuperscript{19} The NRC approved a pre-existing vent path from the FitzPatrick Mark I containment system. Rather than install the requested modifications to by-pass the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS), FitzPatrick made no modifications to its pre-existing duct work as-built by crediting and acknowledging that the pre-existing vent line would rupture at low-pressure and grossly fail at that portion of the “non-pressure-

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, p. 2\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, p. 2\end{flushleft}

bearing vent path” in the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building blowing off
the double doors to the outside environment at ground level.

In an earlier October 27, 1989 communication, NYPA had replied to GL 89-16
stating, “The Authority has reviewed Generic Letter 89-16 (Reference 1). This letter and
its attachments satisfy the staff’s request that each Mark I licensee inform the NRC of its
plans to install a hardened containment vent. For the reasons outlined below and further
detailed in Attachment 1, the Authority will not volunteer to install a hardened vent at
FitzPatrick at this time.”20

The FitzPatrick operator states that the refusal is based on a cost-benefit
analysis that does not warrant the requested modifications. First, the FitzPatrick
operator states that the NRC staff did not justify why the Direct Torus Vent System or
“hardened vent” should be given special treatment. Second, the operator’s analysis and
the unique features of FitzPatrick do not justify installation of the “hardened vent.” And
finally, the NRC generic communications requesting the vent installation contradict other
previous NRC studies.21

On December 6, 1991, FitzPatrick operators provided NRC with their final
position in the power authority response to the NRC request for plant modifications.22
The operator concludes the FitzPatrick duct work vents originally installed in the nuclear

Document Room microfiche 510706:107-128

21 Ibid, NYPA, 10/27/1989, Attachment 1, p. 3

power plant would meet most of the criteria of GL 89-16 and any additional modifications for issues including the bypass of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) would not be cost beneficial.\textsuperscript{23} The Standby Gas Treatment System is the radiation filtration system on a containment ductwork system normally used to purge containment to the atmosphere for low-pressure release events including routine operations. The operator concluded that this existing vent path would be adequate for a high pressure venting system up to the Standby Gas Treatment System located in an adjacent auxiliary building to the reactor building. This radiation filtration system is only rated to withstand an increased pressure of “a few PSI.”\textsuperscript{24}

The FitzPatrick operator concluded that the pre-existing ductwork vent would very likely fail and rupture at the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) in a building adjacent to the reactor building. The FitzPatrick operator acknowledges at this point that the high-pressure radioactive effluent “would then enter the SGTS room and once the room is slightly pressurized, would be relieved through a set of double doors that open to the environment.”\textsuperscript{25}

In other words, the Fitzpatrick operator, rather than voluntarily install a requested “hardened vent” line that would by-pass the vulnerable Standby Gas Treatment System and vent a severe accident through the nuclear power plant’s 300 foot tall vent stack as attempted at Fukushima Daiichi, the operator would allow the venting system to rupture

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, NYPA, 12/06/1991, Attachment, p. 6 of 18
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, NYPA, 12/06/1991, Attachment, p. 8 of 18
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, NYPA, 12/06/1991, Attachment, 8 of 18
at the radiation filtration bed system and over-pressurize the Standby Gas Treatment System room and blow off the doors in the adjacent building releasing the high-pressure steam, radioactivity from the reactor core and potentially hydrogen gas generated by nuclear fuel damage to the environment. This radioactive and potentially explosive release would occur at ground level. The operator describes this feature and severe accident action plan to be an “acceptable deviation” from criteria described in the NRC Generic Letter 89-16.26

The failure of the DTVS’s to open at Fukushima Units 1-3 and the associated explosions in Units 1-4 demonstrated fundamental design flaws in the modified Mark I design. Fitzpatrick’s reliance upon an unmodified pre-existing vent path significantly increases the uncertainty and probability of containment failure in the event of a severe accident and thereby significantly increases an undue risk to the public health and safety.

The joint petitioners contend that the demonstrated failures at Fukushima Daiichi indicate that “deviations” from GL 89-16 are not “acceptable” and place the public at greater and undue risk during a severe accident at FitzPatrick.

The FitzPatrick operator further assumed that during a Station Black Out (SBO) accident (the complete loss of Alternating Current and Direct Current power supplies to reactor safety systems) as what occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, the valve operations for venting during the SBO event would be performed, as they must, manually by station personnel, inside of the reactor

26 Ibid, NYPA, 12/06/1991, Attachment, 8 of 18
This is not a conservative assumption given the demonstration that Tokyo Electric Power Company workers at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi were not able to perform manual operations to open or keep open valves related to the Direct Torus Vent System as installed per Generic Letter 89-16.

The capability of the Fitzpatrick pre-existing containment vent is justified by non-conservative assumptions that rely upon a combustible gas explosion during a Station Black Out (SBO) accident to be “unlikely.” They state, “Combustible gases such as hydrogen or carbon monoxide are generated only during core damage events such as SBO. Not only are SBO sequences unlikely, but by their very nature they minimize concerns about equipment being energized (ignition sources) in the vent path including the SGTS room.” The operator further states in response to the GL 89-16 requested action that the “alternate action would be to install a hard pipe around the SGTS at an estimated cost of $680,000 (Reference 3). Since the combustion in the existing vent path is not risk significant [emphasis added], the Authority does not plan to modify the FitzPatrick vent design to reduce ignition sources.”

The joint petitioners contend that this is an extremely non-conservative cost benefit assumption given the demonstration of as many as four (4) separate hydrogen events.
explosions caused by separate ignition sources at the Fukushima Daiichi Mark I reactors following the prolonged Station Black Out event beginning on March 11, 2011. The joint petitioners argue that facts bear out that during a Station Black Out event at a Mark I reactor that ignition and combustion in the vent path cannot reasonably be ruled out and rather would appear to make hydrogen gas detonation likely. While the FitzPatrick operator has argued that the Station Blackout Event itself de-energizes electrical systems, a simple spark can suffice to cause detonation and similar consequences as demonstrated by the Fukushima Daiichi catastrophe.

Consequently, the joint petitioners argue that the undue risk arising from the current operation of the FitzPatrick nuclear power plant with the pre-existing vent as the exception to the recommendations and guidance of GL 89-16 must be immediately, separately and independently re-analyzed post-Fukushima for its logic, accuracy and adequacy. The joint petitioners argue that the continued operation of the FitzPatrick Mark I on the assumption that a severe accident is an acceptably low probability event and that, in such event, hydrogen gas combustion is an “unlikely” event represents an unreasonable and undue risk to public health and safety.

THE FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT MUST BE PROMPTLY SHUTDOWN FOR THE IMMEDIATE REVIEW AS THE EXCEPTION TO ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN AT ALL OTHER GE MARK I BOILING WATER REACTORS CURRENTLY BEING CONSIDERED BY THE NRC TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 5.1
In response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe, the NRC established the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) to develop recommendations for regulatory actions, identify challenges to implementation of those actions, include the technical and regulatory bases for those actions, establish milestones and schedules to include stakeholder involvement.  

The NRC Near-Term Task Force has recommended that the agency issue an Order to all Mark I and Mark II operators to install a “reliable” hardened vent.  

The NRC communications from the Office of the Executive Director of Operations as informed by the NRC Near-Term Task Force state that “All Mark I plants have installed a hardened vent.” [Emphasis added]  

As the joint petitioners have provided in the aforementioned citations, this NRC statement is neither accurate nor true. The operators of the FitzPatrick nuclear power plant refused to voluntarily install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS), and more specifically refused installation modifications to the pre-existing vent line that would bypass the Standby Gas Treatment System. While Generic Letter 89-16 provided that “Where the backfit analysis supports imposition of that requirement [installation of the reliable hardened vent], the staff is directed to issue orders for modifications to install a ____________

30 “Prioritization of Recommended Actions To Be Taken In Response To Fukushima Lessons Learned,” Executive Director of Operations to The Commission, US NRC, SECY 11-0137, October 3, 2011. Purpose, p.1


reliable hardened vent," the agency did not do so. Instead, the FitzPatrick operator relies upon the pre-existing vent system and a number of assumptions now demonstrated to be false by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe.33

The joint petitioners therefore conclude that because the Fitzpatrick unit is unique and the exception to the requested actions recommended by NRC GL 89-16, the continued day-to-day operation of the nuclear power plant relying upon the pre-existing containment vent system which is only partially hardened poses a greater and undue risk to the public health and safety as the consequence of containment failure during a severe accident.

The FitzPatrick nuclear power plant’s power operations should therefore be immediately suspended pending the requested enforcement actions.

The joint petition signatories are listed as follows:

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