

HIT TWO BIRDS WITH ONE STONE: STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING IN THE POST-MUBARAK ERA

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ABSTRACT

When speaking publicly, it is common that a politician is out to achieve several goals and to address several issues at the same time. This is partly because the discourse is open to individuals and groups that have different interests and needs as well as different commitments and positions, but also because the responsibility of a politician is rarely one-dimensional. In this paper, I aim at highlighting the strategic discursive choices made by a politician who is addressing multiple issues simultaneously. As a case in point, I analyse an argumentative text from post-Mubarak's Egypt. I identify the argumentation structure of the text and employ the concept of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999; van Eemeren, 2010) to analyse the argumentative moves that play a role in the discussion of several issues simultaneously. The analysis provides insight into complexities of the Egyptian political scene at a critical moment in the history of a country in revolution. There, under the influence of the revolutionary mood where everything needs to be re-considered arguers find themselves more and more having to address several issues at the same time. The analysis offers also general insights into the discursive choices made by a politician who is addressing multiple issues simultaneously. In particular, it shows that an important dimension of the strategic design of argumentative moves involves pursuing desirable effects in relation to the several issues addressed with one and the same move. In order to capture this dimension, I propose to reconstruct the discourse as a series of 'simultaneous discussions'. By analysing arguers' strategic manoeuvring as occurring in between these discussions, the choices that are strategic across issues can be highlighted and a more refined analysis of the discourse can be offered.

Keywords

Argumentation; Egypt; Multiple dispute; Public political discourse; Simultaneous discussions; Strategic manoeuvring

INTRODUCTION

Addressing multiple issues simultaneously is common in public political discourse. When speaking publicly, it is common that a politician is out to achieve several goals and to address several issues at the same time. This is partly because the discourse is open to individuals and groups that have different interests and needs as well as different commitments and positions, but also because the responsibility of a politician is rarely one-dimensional. In order to appeal to their heterogeneous audience and to address the multiple issues they need to address, politicians strategically craft their arguments so that their position in relation to each of the issues they address is supported. In this paper, I would like to shed light on the strategic discursive choices made by a politician who is addressing multiple issues simultaneously. As a case in point, I analyse an argumentative text from post-Mubarak's Egypt. The text was announced as a 'letter of love to the Ikhwan youth'¹ written by Hamdeen Sabahy, a prominent revolutionary leader and ex-presidential candidate, during the second round of the Egyptian presidential elections of 2012. The letter was important, not just because it addressed several topical issues, but also because it articulated the views of many Egyptians who were unhappy with the growing polarisation of the political scene between ex-regime loyalists and Muslim Brotherhood supporters.

In order to highlight the strategic choices made by Sabahy, I employ the concept of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999; van Eemeren, 2010). In Section 2, I will introduce the concept, focusing on its potential for the analysis of discourse in which multiple issues are discussed. I will also elaborate on the proposal I have made in previous work to reconstruct the discourse in which multiple issues are discussed as a series of 'simultaneous discussions' (Mohammed, 2011, 2013). In Section 3, I will analyse the general argumentation structure of Sabahy's letter. This will include the identification of the different standpoints expressed by Sabahy and the argumentation advanced in support of each. The structure will reveal the importance of a few argumentative moves that are relevant to the discussion of more than only one standpoint. In Section 4, I will focus on one of these argumentative moves. The move will be analysed as strategic manoeuvres occurring between 'simultaneous discussions'. The analysis will highlight the specific discursive choices that Sabahy makes in his attempt to strike a balance between being reasonable and effective as he responds to the several questions at issue. The analysis of Sabahy's strategic manoeuvring as occurring between 'simultaneous discussions' will allow a better understanding of how political considerations influence Sabahy's argumentative choices.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the analysis of Sabahy's letter, the concept of strategic manoeuvring will be central. The concept was coined by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999) to refer to arguers' attempts to get their points of view accepted within the boundaries of

¹ The youth of the Muslim Brotherhood.

reasonableness. The basic assumption here is that arguers try to balance between the need to be reasonable, in a dialectical way, and the wish to get their points of view accepted, which is to be effective from a rhetorical perspective. In line with the pragma-dialectical view of argumentation as being basically aimed at critically resolving differences of opinion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 11-18)², eventually, strategic manoeuvring refers to arguers' attempt to strike a balance between their dialectical obligation to the critical resolution of differences of opinion and their rhetorical objective to resolve such differences in their own favour.

Every move in argumentative discourse can be analysed as a strategic manoeuvre. According to van Eemeren and Houtlosser, arguers manoeuvre strategically in every move they make:

In principle, people engaged in argumentative discourse always have to reconcile their pursuit to maintain reasonableness and their pursuit to achieve effectiveness; because of this argumentative predicament they always have to maneuver strategically (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 40).

In every move, arguers can be expected to make expedient choices from the topical potential available to them, adapt their contributions optimally to the expectations and demands of their audiences, and use the most effective presentational devices in presenting their standpoints and arguments (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, p. 484). The topical selection, audience adaptation and presentational devices are three aspects of strategic manoeuvring that are inseparable in practice, but which can analytically be distinguished in order to refine the characterisation of the strategic function that an argumentative move fulfils (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 93). Taking these three aspects into account when analysing argumentative moves helps the analyst to highlight the specific strategic choices that arguers make in the course of their attempts to reach outcomes that are favourable to them.

Furthermore, looking at argumentative moves from the perspective of strategic manoeuvring can also help the analyst highlight the link between contextual considerations and the discursive choices arguers make. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser emphasise that it is necessary to situate the analysis of arguers' strategic manoeuvres in the context in which the argumentation occurs, for the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring are in some respects determined by contextual preconditions (van Eemeren 2010, p. 129). In fact, one of the four main parameters for determining the strategic function of a certain argumentative move

² According to van Eemeren (2010), the assumption that argumentation is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion can be made even "when people argue with each other without really wanting to convince each other but are in the first place out to win over an audience of onlookers ("the gallery"), as is the case when two political rivals are debating each other on television in election time. Even in such cases, arguers "still have to conduct their argumentative discourse with each other as if it is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits in order to maintain decorum and to appear reasonable to the viewers who are their intended audience" (p. 1).

is the constraints imposed on the discourse by the institutional³ context of the argumentative exchange (van Eemeren, 2010, Ch.6).⁴

Another important concept in the analysis of Sabahy's letter, especially for highlighting the strategic choices made in order to address several issues simultaneously, is the concept of a multiple dispute (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 16-22). Within the pragma-dialectical approach, an important step in the analysis of argumentative encounters is the identification of the type of argumentative disputes (or argumentative differences of opinion) at issue. Argumentative disputes are defined in terms of the number of propositions involved in the difference of opinion and the positions assumed by the arguers in relation to each of the propositions. Disputes can be either single or multiple, depending on whether the difference of opinion is about one or more than one proposition. Disputes can also be non-mixed or mixed, depending on whether the initial standpoint is faced with mere doubt or also with opposition. The simplest type of difference of opinion occurs when a standpoint meets with doubt. It is the elementary form of differences of opinion: a single non-mixed dispute. Other sorts of difference of opinion are complex differences that consist of a combination of differences of opinion of the elementary type, for example, single mixed or multiple non-mixed (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 16-22). Each type of dispute entails different commitment for arguers and arguers typically manoeuvre strategically in order to define the difference of opinion in a way that is favourable to them. This is, in fact, something Sabahy does in the letter, as the analysis in section 4 will show.

For the purpose of studying argumentative discourse in which several issues are simultaneously discussed, multiple disputes are particularly instrumental. Multiple disputes typically arise when an arguer brings up two or more issues at the same time. As van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007, p. 22) explain:

A dispute may also become [...] complex if, rather than one issue, several issues become subject of discussion. If for each of these issues a standpoint is taken which is not accepted, each standpoint necessitates an obligation to defend it, this way creating a multiple dispute.

In analysing argumentative exchanges in which the dispute is multiple, Van Eemeren *et al.* recommend the analyst to break the multiple dispute into a series of single ones. For example, van Eemeren and Grootendorst advise that "in cases of quantitative complexity the multiple dispute can always be broken down into a number of single disputes" (1992, p. 20). As van Eemeren *et al.* explain, this is because:

³ It is important to keep in mind that van Eemeren uses the term institutional in a very broad sense, to cover not only formally established organisations but also "socially and culturally established macro-contexts [...] in which certain (formally or informally) conventionalized communicative practices have developed" (2010, p. 129).

⁴ The other three parameters for analysing the strategic function of a certain argumentative move are: the results that can be achieved by making the moves concerned; the routes that can be taken to achieve these results and the commitments of the parties defining the argumentative situation (van Eemeren, 2010, Ch. 6).

The questions that are raised in this type of multiple non-mixed dispute can be solved independently. Such a 'quantitative' multiple dispute can therefore without difficulty be dissected into a number of single disputes. This would also be the case if the dispute were – wholly or partially – mixed, instead of non-mixed (2007, p. 22).

In the above quote, van Eemeren et al. distinguish between multiple disputes in qualitative sense and those disputes which are multiple in quantitative sense. As they explain it, the difference between the two lies in the relationship between the standpoints at issue. In a quantitatively multiple dispute, often simply referred to as multiple dispute, the multiple standpoints are independent from each other. In a qualitatively multiple dispute, on the other hand, the standpoints have a contrary relationship in which only one of them can be acceptable. An example of a qualitatively multiple dispute will be analysed in Section 4.

Breaking up multiple disputes into elementary ones helps the analysis get a clear idea of what positions the different arguers take and what obligations are incurred on them in view of the positions taken. However, for the analysis of the strategic aspects of argumentative discourse, it is necessary to consider the relationship between these elementary disputes. This is especially because, in this type of discourse, it is often the case that an argumentative move is strategically designed to contribute to several issues simultaneously. As the analysis of Sabahy's strategic manoeuvring in Section 4 will show, so much of the strategic manoeuvring involved would go unnoticed if elementary disputes that constitute a multiple one would be analysed in isolation.

In order to capture the strategic aspect of argumentative moves that are meant to address several issues simultaneously, I have, in previous work, proposed that an argumentative exchange in which several issues are addressed be reconstructed as a series of several 'simultaneous discussions', each of which is about one of the issues (Mohammed, 2011, 2013). The discussions, in this proposal, are of course not to be understood in the actual sense of a real life discussion that takes place in a specific time and place. It is rather a dialectical analytic reconstruction of a real life discussion, defined in terms of a standpoint and the argumentation advanced in support of it. Two discussions are simultaneous if there is at least one argument, or one argumentative move, that plays a role in both discussions without any of the discussions being subordinate to the other.⁵ As the analysis of Sabahy's letter will show, a more refined analysis of the strategic aspects of the discourse can be gained by analysing arguers' strategic manoeuvring as occurring between 'simultaneous discussions'.

⁵ Arguments that play a role in supporting more than one conclusion are usually referred to as divergent arguments (Thomas, 1973). The advice of van Eemeren et al. to break multiple disputes into single elementary one is in fact in line with Thomas' who suggests that divergent arguments are treated as several separate arguments "having the same basic reason but leading to different conclusions" (p. 36), a view which is also shared by Freeman (1991, p. 234).

LETTER OF LOVE TO THE IKHWAN YOUTH: SABAHY'S STANDPOINTS AND ARGUMENTS

Sabahy's letter to the Ikhwan youth comes in the context of the Egyptian presidential elections of 2012. Hamdeen Sabahy is an Egyptian politician, active in the opposition since the late seventies, and a prominent leader of the revolution that started in January 2011. Sabahy was one of the most important candidates in the first round of the presidential elections, which was held in late May 2012. Out of the 13 candidates, that ran in this first round, 3 got considerably high percentages of votes. First came Mohammed Morsi, the candidate of the Ikhwan, with 24.78% of the votes. Second came Ahmed Shafiq, the last prime minister under the Mubarak regime, with 23.66% of the votes. Sabahy came third with 20.74% of the votes. On the basis of the results of the first round, a second round was announced, in which only the first two candidates were to compete.⁶

The results, and the decision to hold a second round, intensified the already-heated public discussion, and triggered a lot of protests. Many were unhappy. Some could not believe that the last prime minister in the Mubarak regime can become the president of the post-revolution Egypt, others were unhappy with what they saw as the Muslim brotherhood's pursuit to hegemonise power (at that time, the Muslim brotherhood had already become a majority in both houses of Parliament and they had a majority in the Constituent Assembly). Others were unhappy with the timing and procedure of the elections, for they thought that it doesn't make sense to elect a president before the constitution that determines the powers of the president is finalised. And the discussions were getting more and more heated. For some, things became clear: the candidate of the revolution (Morsi) is running against the candidate of the ex-regime (Shafiq). But for many others, things were not so simple black or white. Sabahy's letter came in the middle of all that. It was first published in the official site of his campaign (Sabahy, 2012) and was republished in the major newspapers and news sites, it went viral on social networks and triggered a lot of discussion.

In the letter, Sabahy addressed three main issues. First he defended his credibility as a revolutionary activist and a political leader. This was necessary for his credibility was challenged, especially by activists from the Muslim brotherhood who saw that his reluctance to express support for their candidate in the second round was a sign of betraying the revolution. Second, he addressed the issue on how to vote. Many, especially his supporters, were waiting for his advice concerning this issue. His advice did not come in a straightforward manner, though. Third, he addressed a much broader issue, namely the issue of the revolution in general. Sabahy was not the only one to do that. Many voices were at the time re-assessing the revolution and its outcome and discussing the possible next steps. The identification of these issues is based on a detailed argumentative analysis, in which Sabahy's standpoints and arguments were reconstructed. The analysis

⁶ The second round was held on 16 -17 June. Morsi won with a very narrow margin. He got 51.8% of the votes and Shafiq got 48.2%.

is based on Sabahy's original letter published in Arabic. In Appendix 1, an English translation of the letter, prepared by the author for the purpose of this paper, can be found. The detailed argumentation structure of the letter is in Appendix 2. I will be quoting excerpts of the letter as well as parts of the structure whenever needed in the analysis.

In his letter, Sabahy can be seen to express three main standpoints. He is clearly defending the claim that *I, Sabahy, am a credible leader of the revolution (standpoint 1)*. The standpoint, as such, is not explicitly expressed in the letter. Nevertheless, the arguments that defend it cannot be missed. In fact, as the argumentation structure in Appendix 2 shows, the arguments in support of this standpoint constitute the majority of the arguments in the letter. Sabahy can also be seen to defend the standpoint that *One should neither vote for Morsi nor for Shafiq (standpoint 2)*. Sabahy does not express this standpoint explicitly, either. What he expresses explicitly is the two sub-standpoints that *One should not vote for Morsi (sub-standpoint 2.1a)* and that *One should not vote for Shafiq (sub-standpoint 2.1b)*. The analysis in the next section will show that leaving the main standpoint about the vote implicit is a strategic choice. Finally, Sabahy is also arguing that *The revolution should continue (standpoint 3)*. The argumentation structure makes it clear that many arguments are used to support more than one standpoint at the same time.

For example, an important argument in Sabahy's letter is the argument that he represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defends their rights and interests. The argument can be reconstructed from the passage below:⁷

“What brought me into Parliament was [...] support from farmers, fishermen, the poor and from those who sacrificed their souls and blood: martyr Latifa and martyr Fathia in 1995, and martyr Joum'a Ziftawi in 2005, and others who sacrificed their eyes and bore wounds so that their dream comes true. I, the humble, embody their dream as the one who represents them and defends their rights and interests”

It is clear that the argument plays a role in defending Sabahy's credibility as a political leader. Sabahy can be viewed to argue that:

1 (I, Sabahy, am a credible leader of the revolution)

(1.9) (I am the one who represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)

1.9.1 I am the one who represent farmers, fishermen, the poor and those who bore wounds and who sacrificed souls and blood so that their dream comes true

⁷ In the passage, another important argument is expressed, namely that Sabahy has the support of farmers, fishermen, the poor and those who bore wounds and who sacrificed souls and blood so that their dream comes true. This argument is reconstructed as 1.2.2.1 in the structure (Appendix 2).

The argument plays a role, also, in the discussion about the vote. Sabahy uses the argument in support of his sub-standpoints that *One should not vote for Morsi*:

2.1a One should not vote for Morsi

(2.1a.4) (The Ikhwan do not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)

(2.1a.4.1) (I am the one who represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)

2.1a.4.1.1 I am the one who represent farmers, fishermen, the poor and those who bore wounds and who sacrificed souls and blood so that their dream comes true

As well as the sub-standpoint that *One should not vote for Shafiq*:

2.1b One should not vote for Shafiq

(2.1b.3) (Shafiq does not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)

(2.1b.3.1) (I am the one who represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)

2.1b.3.1.1 I am the one who represent farmers, fishermen, the poor and those who bore wounds and who sacrificed souls and blood so that their dream comes true

Furthermore, the argument plays a role in the discussion about the revolution in general, defending the standpoint that *The revolution should continue*:

3 The revolution should continue

3.1b The goals of the revolution have not been achieved yet

(3.1b.2) (The political process is not delivering satisfactory outcomes)

(3.1b.2.2) (None of the candidates for presidency represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)

(3.1b.2.2.1) (I am the one who represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)

3.1b.2.2.1.1 I am the one who represent farmers, fishermen, the poor and those who bore wounds and who sacrificed souls and blood so that their dream comes true

It is this kind of 'sharing' of arguments that defines what I would like to refer to as 'simultaneous discussions'. In the next section, I will analyse the strategic manoeuvring in advancing the argument above. The analysis will highlight the strategic choices made as well as the favourable outcomes pursued in each of the three 'simultaneous discussions', the discussion about Sabahy's credibility, the discussion about the vote as well as the discussion concerning the revolution.

LETTER OF LOVE TO THE IKHWAN YOUTH: SABAHY'S STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING

Sabahy's assertion that he is the one who represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defends their rights and interests is clearly relevant to the defence of his credibility. It is a quite straightforward argument for the standpoint *I, Sabahy, am a credible leader of the revolution*. After all, a political leader who represents the depoliticised and defends their rights and interests is indeed a good leader. However, the assertion is formulated in such a way that its role goes beyond providing support for the standpoint about the credibility of Sabahy. Sabahy is not asserting merely that he does represent the depoliticised and defend their rights and interests, which would suffice to support his credibility. By saying that he is *the one who* represents them and defends their rights and interests, he is also implying that the others, namely the two candidates running in the second round of elections, do not do that. The assertion implied by the formulation, namely that *neither Morsi nor Shafiq represents the depoliticised and defends their rights and interests*, can function as an argument that supports Sabahy's position in relation to the other issues he addresses. The assertion supports both the standpoint that *One should neither vote for Morsi nor for Shafiq* as well as the standpoint that *The revolution should continue*. The most conspicuous aspect of Sabahy's strategic manoeuvring in advancing this argument is the choice of formulation, i.e. the choice of presentational devices. Sabahy formulates his argument in such a way that it is an argument that supports all of the standpoints he advances in the letter.

It is important to bear in mind that, as mentioned earlier, Sabahy does not advance the standpoint that *One should neither vote for Morsi nor for Shafiq* explicitly. This is not surprising. Such a standpoint would convey a challenge to the legitimacy of the electoral system, a system that requires voters to vote for one of the two candidates. Given that Sabahy had participated in the first round of the elections, expressing such a challenge would not be in his interest. Challenging the elections now would seem to be motivated by his loss, and he would be accused of being inconsistent: in favour of elections when he had a chance of winning and against them after he had lost. In order to avoid the undesirable commitment to challenging the electoral system, Sabahy leaves the standpoint *One should neither vote for Morsi nor for Shafiq* implicit, and advances the two sub-standpoints that *One should not vote for Morsi* (sub-standpoint 2.1a) and that *One should not vote for Shafiq* (sub-standpoint 2.1b), instead. By doing so, he frames the disagreement about the vote as a qualitatively multiple dispute (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007, p. 24), which, as it will be shown, is a favourable definition of the disagreement for him.

A qualitatively multiple dispute arises when the parties to a difference of opinion express contrary standpoints (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007, pp. 22-24, p. 57). In relation to the second round of the Egyptian presidential elections, the disagreement can be defined as a qualitatively multiple dispute in which at least four main contrary standpoints are advanced: *One should vote for Morsi* (+/p₁), *One should vote for Shafiq* (+/p₂), *One should invalidate his/her vote* (+/p₃), and *One should boycott the elections* (+/p₄). The four contrary standpoints

were strongly present in the public debate around the elections. Different political activists and groups argued in favour of different positions.⁸

In a qualitatively multiple dispute, commitment to one of the standpoints entails commitment to the opposite of contrary ones. So, for example, if an arguer defends that *One should vote for Morsi* (+/p₁), the arguer can be held committed to *One should not vote for Shafiq* (-/p₂), *One should not invalidate his/her vote* (-/p₃), and *One should not boycott the elections* (-/p₄). However, in this type of disputes, opposition to one standpoint does not necessarily entail any commitment to any other contrary one. So, one can be opposed to *One should vote for Morsi* (i.e., express -/p₁) without being committed to *One should vote for Shafiq* (+/p₂), or to *One should invalidate his/her vote* (+/p₃) or to *One should boycott the elections* (+/p₄).

Framing the disagreement as a qualitatively multiple dispute is advantageous to Sabahy as it allows him to express opposition to standpoints expressed by his opponents without advancing any (positive) standpoint of his own, or clearly expressing his position concerning other standpoints in the debate, i.e. concerning whether or not *One should invalidate his/her vote* (+/p₃) and whether or not *One should boycott the elections* (+/p₄). In other words, framing the disagreement as a qualitatively multiple dispute allows Sabahy to express opposition to both Morsi and Shafiq, i.e. to argue that *One should not vote for Morsi* (-/p₁) and that *One should not vote for Shafiq* (-/p₂), without committing himself to anything concerning the legitimacy of the elections.

It is interesting to note, here, that eventually, Sabahy ends up not guiding his followers on how to vote in the second round. This can certainly not be interpreted as lack of interest on Sabahy's behalf. In view of the multiple mixed audience of Sabahy and the multiple issues he would like to address, the ambiguity in Sabahy's position is actually rather strategic.⁹ The ambiguity saves Sabahy from an inconsistency that he wouldn't be able to avoid if he expresses a clear position. If he expresses support for the standpoint that *One should invalidate one's vote* (+/p₃), he will commit himself to the participation in the elections, which is something he would rather avoid, mainly because he has just publicly asked for alternative measures (namely the presidential council). Similarly, if he expresses support for the standpoint *One should boycott the elections* (+/p₄), he will be challenging the legitimacy of the elections, which, as explained above, he would

⁸ Sabahy's manoeuvring can be seen as an instance of what David Zarefsky identifies as a common type of strategic manoeuvring in political argumentation, namely reframing the argument (2008, p. 324). The manoeuvring is aimed at reframing the argument as an argument about a risky question (Hamblin, 1970, p. 216). In his discussion of the fallacy of many questions, Hamblin distinguished between safe and risky questions: while safe questions can have as answers only statements that belong to a specified finite sets of alternatives, risky questions do not have such a finite set to choose an answer from (1970, p. 216). Sabahy's manoeuvring is eventually about reframing the argument about what started as an institutionally safe question *Who should become president, Morsi or Shafiq?* into an argument about the risky question *What should an Egyptian do in relation to the second round of elections?*

⁹ Sabahy's ambiguity concerning the vote can be considered strategic, from the perspective of Eisenberg's view of strategic ambiguity (1984). For Eisenberg, an ambiguity is strategic once it is purposefully used by individuals to accomplish their goals. Eisenberg notes that strategic ambiguity promotes unified diversity and is therefore often a political necessity.

rather not do openly. Furthermore, if he takes a clear position, either in favour of invalidating one's vote or in favour of boycotting the elections, Sabahy would risk antagonising an audience that is broader than he could afford. Thanks to his ambiguous position, he can remain on the same side together with those who think that Egyptians should invalidate their votes as well as those who think that Egyptians should boycott the elections altogether. In other words, he manages to minimise the disagreement space with both those who did not vote for Morsi and those who did not vote for Shafiq, which allows him to put himself on the same side with a greater number of revolutionaries than he would be able to do, if he expresses a clear position.¹⁰ This is very useful for Sabahy in the discussion about his credibility. Thanks to this ambiguity, he can avoid a challenge from the many Egyptian youth from different ideological affiliations whom he claims to represent.

In view of the positions Sabahy takes in this qualitatively multiple dispute, the assertion that *neither Morsi nor Shafiq represents the depoliticised and defends their rights and interests*, implied in "I, the humble, embody their dream as the one who represents them and defends their rights and interests", conveys more criticism to the two candidates than it conveys challenge to the legitimacy of the electoral process. By expressing only the (sub-)standpoints that *One should not vote for Morsi* and that *One should not vote for Shafiq*, which is totally acceptable in qualitatively multiple disputes, Sabahy guides his audience to interpret his assertion as arguments in support of these two standpoints. He can be seen as arguing that *One should not vote for Morsi* because *the Ikhwan do not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests* and that *One should not vote for Shafiq* because *Shafiq does not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests*. This, he hopes, will save him from the commitment to *The elections are illegitimate* because *none of the candidates for presidency represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests* because *neither Morsi nor Shafiq represents the depoliticised and defends their rights and interests*.

Sabahy's choice of how to he expresses his position concerning the vote, is another case of manoeuvring the strategic effects of which go beyond the defence of one standpoint only. In the discussion about the vote, Sabahy manoeuvres strategically in order to reach a definition of the disagreement that is favourable to him. From the topical potential available to him, he chooses to express the standpoints for which he has strong arguments and avoid taking positions which can be politically unfavourable. He adapts to the audience, in particular to the numerous depoliticised Egyptians, and he chooses to leave implicit the standpoint that might alienate many of them. But the choices Sabahy makes do not help him avoid inconsistency and strengthen his case in relation to the issue of the vote only. His choices help him support his case in relation to the issue of his credibility as well. It is important to note, however, that the strategic choices made in the discussion

¹⁰ Out of the 51 million Egyptians registered voters, 27.3 million did not vote. Out of the 23.6 millions who voted, there were 12.4 million voters who did not vote for either Shafiq or Morsi.

about the vote could not have reached the effects desired had they not been combined with choices in the discussion about the revolution in general. Despite his attempts, Sabahy could not totally avoid commitment to *neither Morsi nor Shafiq represents the depoliticised and defends their rights and interests*. After all, this is a commitment that is incurred on him on the basis of his statement. In order to make sure that such a commitment did not incur on him commitment to challenging the elections, Sabahy introduced another standpoint that could be supported by this argument, namely the standpoint that *the political process is not delivering satisfactory outcomes*, and that therefore *The revolution should continue*.

In other words, the assertion that *neither Morsi nor Shafiq represents the depoliticised and defends their rights and interests* can be understood as an argument for a standpoint that is unfavourable to Sabahy, namely that *The elections are illegitimate*. In order to avoid the inconsistency that such a standpoint will attribute to him, Sabahy advances another standpoint that can be supported by this same assertion, namely that *the revolution should continue*. By making the standpoint about the revolution explicit, and bringing it up early in the introductory paragraph of the letter, Sabahy gives prominence to the issue of the revolution, hoping to make the issue of the vote seem secondary. The latter can help him avoid undesirable commitments in relation to the elections.

It is important to realise that it was necessary for Sabahy to explicitly advance a standpoint that can be supported by the argument that *neither Morsi nor Shafiq represents the depoliticised and defends their rights and interests*. That is to say that he couldn't have just left the argument without a standpoint that is explicitly advanced, which is something quite common and unproblematic in argumentative discourse. That is because without such an explicitly advanced standpoint, Sabahy would have had (even more) difficulty avoiding the commitment to the standpoint that *The elections are illegitimate* and he would have, consequently, had even more difficulty keeping his position consistent. So, eventually, addressing the third issue helped Sabahy convey the message he wanted to convey without falling into an inconsistency in his position concerning the second issue. Eventually, Sabahy's strategic manoeuvring in the discussion about the revolution, namely his choice of explicitly advancing the standpoint that *The revolution should continue*, was necessary for his manoeuvring in the discussion about the vote to work.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper, I have analysed the strategic manoeuvring in an important text from the post-Mubarak Egypt. The analysis provides insight into complexities of the political scene at a critical moment in the history of a country in revolution. While the need to address several issues simultaneously is a typical characteristic of public discourse, there, under the influence of the revolutionary mood where everything needs to be re-considered, this is intensified and arguers find themselves more and more having to address several issues at the same time. In his letter, Sabahy manoeuvred strategically to hit not just two, but even three birds with one stone. He wanted to defend his credibility, to make it clear that the candidates of the old regime and the Muslim Brotherhood do not deserve people's

vote, as well as to encourage the Egyptians to go on with their revolution until its goals are achieved. In order to do that, he formulated his arguments in such a way that they could play a role in defending several standpoints, and he made strategic choices of what to leave implicit and what to express explicitly in order to define the disagreement to his own advantage, to avoid inconsistency, and in order to boost his credibility.

The analysis of Sabahy's letter does not provide insights into the Egyptian political scene only. After all, the strategic discursive choices it highlights can be made by politicians who are addressing multiple issues simultaneously, in general. The analysis shows that the desirable outcomes pursued by certain argumentative choices made by the arguer are not necessarily restricted to the discussion of one issue only. This can be thought as only natural in discourses that address several issues simultaneously. Because, in such discourses, argumentative moves are typically meant to contribute to the discussion of more than one issue at a time, the strategic manoeuvring involved in designing them similarly involves the pursuit of desirable effects in relation to the several issues addressed. An important dimension of the strategic design would be lost if the discussions of the different issues were analysed independently without capturing the strategic manoeuvring that occurs between them.

The proposal to reconstruct the discourse as a series of 'simultaneous discussions' is meant to prevent this shortcoming, in particular. By analysing arguers' strategic manoeuvring as occurring in between discussions, the choices that are strategic across issues can be highlighted and a more refined analysis of the discourse can be offered. Of course, despite the gains obtained from analysing strategic manoeuvring as occurring in between discussions, the proposal, like any other proposal, faces challenges. One of the main questions that require further consideration is the question of how to define the dialectical obligations of arguers across discussions. This might prove particularly difficult in view of the lack of definite temporal boundaries for political arguments, which is considered by Zarefsky (2008) as one of the main characteristics of political argumentation. As Zarefsky rightly observes, as a result of the lack of temporal limits, "different arguers, in fact, may be at different stages of the same argument" (2008, p. 320). The question of dialectical obligation is a very important question that needs to be addressed in future work.

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APPENDIX 1: HAMDEEN SABAHY'S LOVE LETTER TO THE IKHWAN YOUTH

Sabahy in a letter to the Ikhwan youth

(01 June 2012)

You were oppressed, I stood for you... You participated, I was your partner... You dominated, I fought you.

I am against state tyranny and against the hegemony of the Ikhwan.

The eagle¹ of the revolution, Hamdeen Sabahy, addressed a “love letter” to the youth in general and to the youth of the Ikhwan (the Muslim Brotherhood) in particular, in which he said:

“I would like to say to the Ikhwan youth that I love you; you and the other Egyptian youth, the Arab nationalists, the leftists and liberals, and all of the youth of Egypt who stood for me in the battle for presidency, honoured me with its trust and laid on me the responsibility to participate in continuing the revolution and in achieving its goals”.

He added: “I would like to tell the Ikhwan youth, who are angry and reproaching me, that I love you all. For I was defending the Ikhwan when they were oppressed by the ex-regime, I stood for them when they could not find anyone else outside their group standing for them, and when the revolution came, we were partners in the liberation squares. Then the parliamentary elections came. The Karama Party participated in this step together with the Ikhwan, aiming to form a unified national list, so that the partners in the revolution become partners in the Parliament. But when the Ikhwan aspired to hegemonise all the powers, I stood against them”.

In clearer words, Sabahy told the Ikhwan youth: “When you were oppressed, I stood for you, when you participated I was your partner, and when you dominated I fought you”.

He continued: “I would like to clarify that I do not equate between the two candidates running in the second round of the presidential elections. Despite all the reservations we have concerning the electoral process, there is a candidate who represents the old regime, and I am against him, not out of political considerations only, but also out of ethical and patriotic considerations, and there is a candidate who represents a party which took part in the revolution, no one would deny that, but which now does not respect the partnership and diversity that made the revolution succeed and wants to snatch, seize and hegemonise. Therefore, my clear position is the following: I am against state tyranny and against the hegemony of the Ikhwan, who were not satisfied with a majority in both the lower and upper houses of Parliament, even though they had promised not to pursue majority in Parliament, nor with pursuing hegemony in the Constituent Assembly, but they are now pursuing hegemony over all state bodies by taking over the presidency as well”.

The eagle of the revolution said in his letter: “Hamdeen Sabahy, the one who defended you when you were in jails and was ahead of you in confronting tyranny, hegemony and the scenarios of prolongation and succession [during the Mubarak regime], the one who stood for you in your electoral conferences and supported the Karama candidates regardless of his opinion concerning the fairness of the distribution of posts, is the one who is saying, firmly now, that he is against you not only as of today. The angry youth should not be angry at me, for my position has been known since they announced the composition of the Constituent Assembly, when I said that I was against this composition and against the Ikhwan’s pursuit of hegemony and power monopoly”.

Hamdeen emphasised: “I said this was a mistake already when Khairat Al Shater

¹ Sabahy has been often referred to by his supporters as the ‘eagle of the revolution’. In Egypt, throughout history, different birds of prey (falcons, vultures and eagles among others) have been used as symbols of power and sovereignty. The falcon was strongly associated with Horus, one of the oldest and most significant deities in ancient Egyptian religion. The eagle is strongly associated with the Ayyubid rulers since Saladin (12th and 13th centuries). The ‘Eagle of Saladin’ was used in the Coat of Arms of Egypt following the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 and since then it’s widely considered as a symbol for revolutionary Egypt. The eagle still appears on the Coat of Arms of Egypt and on the Egyptian flag. Even though the bird used to refer to Sabahy is the vulture (بشر), the eagle would capture the power symbolism better in English.

became a potential nominee for the presidential elections, and I asked that they withdraw him and later that they withdraw the substitute candidate. Then I said the word that hurt everyone: I am not going to accept a president who is an Ikhwani or a better Ikhwani”.

“My position concerning this has been clear from the beginning. To those who are asking me now to support the Ikhwan’s candidate, I say that I am not against the Ikhwan; I am still, like I have always been, a strong defendant of the Ikhwan and of their full right to be a genuine party in the political scene, but I think that their monopoly of powers will be harmful to them and to the nation”.

Hamdeen added, decisively: “I say it firmly: I am not going to give my voice to the candidate of this group because they are going to hegemonise. I reject this hegemony just like I rejected the exclusion of the Ikhwan when they were excluded. I will stand against the hegemony of the Ikhwan exactly like I will stand against the reproduction of the Mubarak regime”.

“I say to the Ikhwan youth: I entered the Parliament thanks to God and the people, and not because the Ikhwan supported me. I entered the Parliament not because I was supported by the Ikhwan or any other political force. What brought me into Parliament was God blessing and support from farmers, fishermen, the poor and from those who sacrificed their souls and blood: martyr Latifa and martyr Fathia in 1995, and martyr Joum’a Ziftawi in 2005, and others who sacrificed their eyes and bore wounds so that their dream comes true. I, the humble, embody their dream as the one who represents them and defends their rights and interests”.

Finally, “I advise you not to be devoted to attacking me, for I am not the one running for the post now. It’s true that I am convinced that I will become president with God’s will and the support of the people, and maybe even faster than many think. Then, I would treat you with love as I’ve always done with you and with the others.

Sabahy emphasised: “Had the Parliament had a majority of Nasserites, I would have asked the Ikhwan to nominate an Ikhwani candidate. Had the Parliament had a majority from the general national movement, I would have demanded an Ikhwani candidate”.

APPENDIX 2: THE ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURE OF HAMDEEN SABAHY'S LOVE LETTER TO THE IKHWAN YOUTH

(1) (I, Sabahy, am a credible leader of the revolution)

- 1.1 I love ALL the Egyptian youth, even those who are criticising me
 - 1.1.1 I love the Ikhwan youth¹
- 1.2a I have the support of the Egyptian people
 - (1.2.1) (I have the support and trust of many Egyptian youth from many ideological affiliations)
 - 1.2.1.1 I have the support of Egyptian youth from the Arab nationalists, the leftists and liberals, and others
 - (1.2.2) (I have the support and trust of great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians)
 - 1.2.2.1 I have the support of farmers, fishermen, the poor and those who bore wounds and who sacrificed souls and blood so that their dream comes true
 - 1.2.2.1.1a I had the support of martyr Latifa and martyr Fathia in 1995, and martyr Joum'a Ziftawi in 2005,
 - 1.2.2.1.1b I have the support of Ahmed Harara
- 1.2b I have God's blessing
- (1.3) (I am a defendant of the oppressed, even when they're not from my party)
 - 1.3.1 I am still, like I have always been, a strong defendant of the Ikhwan and of their full right to be a genuine party in the political scene²
 - 1.3.1.1 I was defending the Ikhwan when they were oppressed by the ex-regime / I stood for them when they could not find anyone else outside their group standing for them / I defended them when they were in jails
- (1.4) (I am the partner of those who seek partnership)
 - (1.4.1) (I was the Ikhwan's partner in the revolution when they sought partnership)³
 - 1.4.1.1 I was the Ikhwan's partner in the liberation squares when the revolution came
 - 1.4.1.2 I stood for the Ikhwan in their electoral conferences
 - 1.4.1.2.1 My party, Karama Party, participated in the Parliamentary elections with the Ikhwan
- 1.5 I stand against the hegemony of power
 - 1.5.1 When the Ikhwan aspired to hegemonise all the powers, I stood against them / I am against the hegemony of the Ikhwan
 - 1.5.1.1 I have opposed the composition of the Constituent Assembly
 - 1.5.1.2 I have opposed the nomination of Khairat Al Shater as a candidate in the presidential elections, and have asked that the Ikhwan withdraw him
 - 1.5.1.3 I have opposed the nomination of a substitute candidate [Morsi] in the presidential elections, and have asked that the Ikhwan withdraw him

¹ The sub-argument is also used to support the argument *I am not against the Ikhwan* (1.10).

² The sub-argument is also used to support the argument *My positions are clear and consistent* (1.8) and the argument *I am not against the Ikhwan* (1.10).

³ The sub-argument is also used to support the argument *I am not against the Ikhwan* (1.10).

- 1.5.1.4 I said it clearly that I am not going to accept a president who is an Ikhwani or a better Ikhwani⁴
- (1.6) (I do not fail to consider the difference between a candidate who represents a party which took part of the revolution and a party that was part of the old regime)
- 1.6.1 I do not equate between the two candidates running in the second round of the presidential elections
- 1.6.1.1 While I am against Shafiq out of political, ethical and patriotic considerations, I am against the hegemony that the election of Morsi will bring about the hegemony of the Ikhwan
- 1.7 I am against state tyranny
- 1.7.1 I was in the frontline in confronting tyranny, hegemony and the scenarios of prolongation and succession during the Mubarak regime
- 1.7.2 I am against the reproduction of the Mubarak regime / candidate who represents the old regime
- 1.8 My positions are clear and consistent
- 1.8.1 I have always opposed the Ikhwan's pursuit of hegemony and power monopoly
- 1.8.1.1 I have opposed the composition of the Constituent Assembly
- 1.8.1.2 I have opposed the nomination of Khairat Al Shater as a candidate in the presidential elections, and have asked that the Ikhwan withdraw him
- 1.8.1.3 I have opposed the nomination of a substitute candidate [Morsi] in the presidential elections, and have asked that the Ikhwan withdraw him
- 1.8.1.4 I said it clearly that I am not going to accept a president who is an Ikhwani or a better Ikhwani⁵
- 1.8.2 I am still, like I have always been, a strong defendant of the Ikhwan and of their full right to be a genuine party in the political scene⁶
- 1.8.3 I reject the Ikhwani hegemony just like I rejected the exclusion of the Ikhwan when they were excluded
- 1.8.4 I will stand against the hegemony of the Ikhwan exactly like I will stand against the reproduction of the Mubarak regime
- (1.8.5) (I would support a candidate from a revolutionary party that does not have a majority in Parliament)
- 1.8.5.1 I would ask the Ikhwan to nominate an Ikhwani candidate if the Parliament had a majority of Nasserites.
- 1.8.5.2 I would demand an Ikhwani candidate if the Parliament had a majority from the general national movement
- (1.9) (I am the one who represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)
- 1.9.1 I am the one who represent farmers, fishermen, the poor and those who

⁴ Sub-arguments 1.5.1.1 - 1.5.1.4 are also used to support the argument *I have always opposed the Ikhwan's pursuit of hegemony and power monopoly (1.8.1)*

⁵ Sub-arguments 1.8.1.1 - 1.8.1.4 are also used to support the argument *I am against the hegemony of the Ikhwan (1.5.1)*.

⁶ The sub-argument is also used to support the argument *I am a defendant of the oppressed, even when they're not from my party (1.3)*, and the argument that *I am not against the Ikhwan (1.10)*.

bore wounds and who sacrificed souls and blood so that their dream comes true⁷

1.10 I am not against the Ikhwan

1.10.1 I love the Ikhwan youth⁸

1.10.2 I am still, like I have always been, a strong defendant of the Ikhwan and of their full right to be a genuine party in the political scene⁹

1.10.3a I do not deny that the Ikhwan took part in the revolution

(1.10.3b) (I was the Ikhwan's partner in the revolution when they sought partnership)¹⁰

(1.10.4) (I would support an Ikhwani candidate if the Parliament didn't have a majority from the Ikhwan)¹¹

1.10.4.1 I would ask the Ikhwan to nominate an Ikhwani candidate if the Parliament had a majority of Nasserites.

1.10.4.2 I would demand an Ikhwani candidate if the Parliament had a majority from the general national movement

(2) (One should neither vote for Morsi nor for Shafiq)

2.1a One should not vote for Morsi

2.1a.1a If Morsi becomes president, the Ikhwan will hegemonise¹²

2.1a.1a.1a The Ikhwan aspire to hegemonise all the powers / want to snatch, seize and hegemonise

2.1a.1a.1a.1 The Ikhwan were not satisfied with a majority in both the lower and upper houses of Parliament, nor with pursuing hegemony in the Constituent Assembly, but they are now pursuing hegemony over all state bodies by taking over the presidency as well

2.1a.1a.1a.2 The Ikhwan did not allow a fair distribution of seats in their alliance with the Karama Party for the Parliamentary elections

2.1a.1a.1b Morsi is the candidate of the Ikhwan

2.1a.1b The hegemony of the Ikhwan should be opposed / rejected

2.1a.1b.1 The hegemony of the Ikhwan would be harmful for them and for the nation

2.1a.1b.1.1a The Ikhwan are just one of the parties that constitute the diverse Egyptian political scene / the revolution

2.1a.1b.1.1a.1 There are also Arab nationalists, leftists, liberals ... etc

2.1a.1b.1.1b It was partnership and diversity what made the revolution succeed

⁷ The sub-argument is also used to support the argument *The Ikhwan do not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests* (2.1a.4), and the argument *Shafiq does not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests* (2.1b.3) as well as the argument *None of the candidates for presidency represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests* (3.1b.2.2)

⁸ The sub-argument is also used to support the argument *I love ALL the Egyptian youth, even those who are criticising me* (1.1).

⁹ The sub-argument is also used to support the argument *I am a defendant of the oppressed, even when they're not from my party* (1.3) and the argument *My positions are clear and consistent* (1.8)

¹⁰ The sub-argument is also used to support the argument *I am the partner of those who seek partnership* (1.4)

¹¹ This is a slightly more precise version of the argument *I would support a candidate from a revolutionary party that does not have a majority in Parliament* (1.8.5)

¹² The argument is also used to support the argument *None of the candidates running in the second round of the presidential elections would bring about a democratic regime* (3.1b.2.1)

- 2.1a.1b.2 the exclusion of the Ikhwan was rejected (2.1a.1b.2') (the hegemony of the Ikhwan and their exclusion earlier are equally unacceptable)
- 2.1a.1b.3 the reproduction of the Mubarak regime should be opposed (2.1a.1b.3') (the hegemony of the Ikhwan and the reproduction of the Mubarak regime are equally unacceptable)
- (2.1a.2) (The Ikhwan do not keep promises)
 - 2.1a.2.1 They have pursued a majority in both the lower and upper houses of Parliament even though they had promised not to pursue majority in Parliament
- (2.1a.3) (The Ikhwan did not express strong / real opposition to the Mubarak regime)
 - 2.1a.3.1 The Ikhwan were not in the frontline in confronting tyranny, hegemony and the scenarios of prolongation and succession during the Mubarak regime
- (2.1a.4) (The Ikhwan do not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)
 - (2.1a.4.1) (I am the one who represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)
 - 2.1a.4.1.1 I am the one who represent farmers, fishermen, the poor and those who bore wounds and who sacrificed souls and blood so that their dream comes true¹³
- 2.1b One should not vote for Shafiq
 - 2.1b.1a Shafiq represents the old regime
 - 2.1b.1b There are political, ethical and patriotic grounds for opposing the candidate of the old regime
 - 2.1b.2 Shafiq will reproduce state tyranny¹⁴
 - (2.1b.3) (Shafiq does not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)
 - (2.1b.3.1) (I am the one who represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)
 - 2.1b.3.1.1 I am the one who represent farmers, fishermen, the poor and those who bore wounds and who sacrificed souls and blood so that their dream comes true¹⁵

¹³ The sub-argument is also used to support the argument that I am the one who represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests (1.9) and ultimately the standpoint *I, Sabahy, am a credible leader of the revolution* (1), the argument *Shafiq does not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests* (2.1b.3) as well as the argument *None of the candidates for presidency represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests* (3.1b.2.2)

¹⁴ The sub-argument is also used to support the sub-argument that *None of the candidates running in the second round of the presidential elections would bring about a democratic regime* (3.1b.2.1), and ultimately the standpoint *The revolution should continue* (3)

¹⁵ The sub-argument is also used to support the argument that *I am the one who represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests* (1.9) and ultimately the standpoint *I, Sabahy, am a credible leader of the revolution* (1), the argument *The Ikhwan do not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests* (2.1a.4), as well as the argument *None of the candidates for presidency represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests* (3.1b.2.2)

3 The revolution should continue

- 3.1a The revolution should continue until its goals are achieved
 - 3.1a.1 The youth of Egypt want the revolution to continue until its goals are achieved
- 3.1b the goals of the revolution have not been achieved yet
 - 3.1b.1 The youth of Egypt believe that the goals of the revolution have not been achieved yet
 - (3.1b.2) (The political process is not delivering satisfactory outcomes)
 - (3.1b.2.1) (None of the candidates running in the second round of the presidential elections would bring about a democratic regime)
 - 3.1b.2.1.1a Shafiq will reproduce state tyranny¹⁶
 - 3.1b.2.1.1b Morsi will bring about Ikhwani hegemony¹⁷
 - (3.1b.2.2) (None of the candidates for presidency represents the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)
 - (3.1b.2.2.1) (I am the one who represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests)¹⁸
 - 3.1b.2.2.1.1 I am the one who represent farmers, fishermen, the poor and those who bore wounds and who sacrificed souls and blood so that their dream comes true

¹⁶ The argument is also used to support the sub-standpoint *One should not vote for Shafiq (2.1b)*

¹⁷ The argument is also used to support the sub-standpoint *One should not vote for Morsi (2.1a)*

¹⁸ The sub-argument is also used to support the standpoint *I, Sabahy, am a credible leader of the revolution (1)*, the argument *The Ikhwan do not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests (2.1a.4)*, and the argument *Shafiq does not represent the great numbers of depoliticised Egyptians and defend their rights and interests (2.1b.3)*.

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