

CHAPTER	NO.	DATE	TYPE	SUBJECT	SLIDES?
1: New Rule Sets	1	4 Aug (Mon); no conflict	Autobio narrative [key subject is first great mentor: Prof. Adam Ulam at Harvard, dean of Soviet for. pol./Marxism experts]	My first attempts at long-range futurology (Gorbachev Politburo paper at Harvard I couldn't publish + my "Jack Ryan" story of helping Navy make peace with Russians in first research project in DC)	none
	2	5 Aug (Tues); no conflict	Regular storyline	My story of the 21 st century as Globalization I, II and III and the concept of rule sets (out of whack and periods of rapid onset of new rules)	Possibly some version of the one I use [see PNM Book 1, page "2"]
	3	6 Aug (Wed); no conflict	Regular storyline	My stories about the 20 th Century as long "arcs" of rule-set "rises" and "falls": death of old balance of power, then rise and fall of bipolar security order with nuke rule set, and now rising globalization order with unclear/still unfolding terror/WMD rule set	May want to generate a new one: very simply trio of humps going left to right with descriptors on "rise," "peak" and "fall" of each arc (example: we had nonsensical "duck and cover" in early nuke rule set, then MAD, then arms control, but we are only at silly "duct tape and plastic cover" stage of WMD/terror era
	4	7 Aug (Thurs); no conflict	Regular storyline	Lay out the four potential paths/ scenarios for Globalization III, using classic Royal/Dutch Shell method of 2 Q's = 4 boxes	Definitely use brief slide [see PNM Book 1, page "4"]
	5	8 Aug (Fri); no conflict	Myth buster (summary/ segue)	The myth of chaos and complete uncertainty in national security planning	None anticipated

2: The Rise of the 'Lesser Included's'	6	9 Aug (Sat): no conflict	Autobio narrative [key subjects are William Manthorpe, Dep Dir of Office of Naval Intell in early 1990s + Capt. (now Prof at NWC and frequent collaborator) Bradd Hayes	Story of Naval Forces Capabilities Planning Effort, or "best and brightest" of Navy and Marines called for many-weeks-long conference to determine future course of naval forces following end of Cold War; result being historic White Paper "From the Sea" that I cowrote with Bradd	Slide of infamous "Manthorpe Curve" that predicted resurrection of Russian threat; which I later use as basis of celebrated article that deconstructs NFCPE gathering into "3 visions of the future": Transitioneers (managing world day-to-day as it transitions to new era), Big Sticks (focus on regional rogues like Saddam), and Cold Worriers (focus long-term on Cold War-like enemy which "inevitably" arises") [see PNM Book 2, page "6"]
	7	10 Aug (Sun): fly to DC late	Regular storyline	All the bad predictions made at the end of the Cold War regarding the future of the world (based on unpublished list I once penned: "Bad Stuff That Didn't Happen in the 1990s"; exception being rise of catastrophic terrorism	None anticipated (this sets up next section that says it was the small "lesser included's" that dominated the 1990s and beyond—not the great power war fears of a "rising near-peer competitor")
				Break 11 Aug to brief Chief of Naval Ops in DC + Commandant of US Coast Guard	
	8	12 Aug (Tues): no conflict	Regular storyline	Intro concept of Kenneth Waltz's 3 levels of perspective and make arguments about fracturing of US security market in 1990s, rise of governance gap (US mil built to fight other nations, but security dangers not from other states in conventional but "bad actors" (either state-free actors or criminal regimes)	Use some version of classic Ken Waltz slide (that I made up, his book had no graphics) [see PNM Book 2, page "8"] System vs Nation State vs

					Individual levels of perspective
	9	13 Aug (Wed): no conflict	Regular storyline	The story of the “downshifting” of US military responses over the past 25 years (used to be focused at system level on global war/Sov threat; then in 1980/1990s shifted more to state-on-state warfare in Mideast and “rogues” in general; then in 1990s shifted to internal situations/ failed states/ nation-building	Possibly use slide from brief [see PNM Book 2, page “9”]
	10	14 Aug (Thurs): no conflict	Regular storyline	The origins of the concept of the asymmetrical threat (the I’m-big-and-you’re-small school of strategy) and how it morphed into the concept of “access denial” (meaning potential enemies would seek to deny US access to their conflicts through asymmetrical means) and how all this became huge excuse to demand all sorts of new weapons and platforms from Congress	None anticipated
	11	15 Aug (Fri); no conflict	Regular storyline	The real asymmetry displayed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks (not a question of stopping our state-based military, but attacking our “system” and our “individuals”; our response? Take down Afghanistan! Why? That’s what the Pentagon does? Takes down states! But over time, three-pronged war emerges reflective of “fractured security market” (system-level financial war, state-based regime change war, and warfare against individuals (serial assassinations and special ops); point being, we had no plan for this multilayered	Slide from brief [see PNM Book 21, page “11”]

				warfare prior to 9/11, or no concept of war fought globally along otherwise peaceful unfolding of globalization	
	12	16 Aug (Sat); no conflict	Regular storyline	The new security linkages revealed by the 9/11 attacks: we now fight bad individuals who wage war across the system and receive support from rogue regimes; while global /system war is unlikely and state-on-state wars are disappearing and “failed states” are far less numerous than most “experts” claim, we for now don’t really understand how big a threat arises from these new linkages across Waltz’s three levels	Possible slide [see PNM Book 2, page “12”]
	13	17 Aug (Sun); no conflict	Regular storyline	The bifurcation of US military after end of Cold War between those who saw a future they could live with and those who didn’t see an enemy “worthy” of them; upshot being we spent 90s buying one military (high tech) and operating another (mil ops “other than war”); my story about being “therapist” to naval resource “barons” (every year decrying their schizophrenic behavior)	Use brief slide [see PNM Book 2, page “13”]
	14	18 Aug (Mon); no conflict	Myth buster (summary/ segue)	The myth of the Global Cop and perpetual war: of three dozen failed state situations in 1990s, we engaged in four; state-on-state wars disappearing; bulge of ethnic violence in early 90s slows down dramatically by end of decade; and rise of religious-based terrorism still minor compared to “world wars of past”. Plus, if you chart US crisis response activity of last 30	Maybe some chart comparing where we actually went in 1990s and are going now compared to all those countries where we don’t intervene—where the bulk of the global population actually live (this sets up next section defining Core and Gap); point being, the 1990s were a fabulous decade of growth and stability and not

				years, about 5% involved real combat in 1970s, ditto for 80s, 90s and even today	constant chaos and death
3: Disconnect- edness Defines Danger	15	19 Aug (Tues): doc appt in morn and brief in aft	Autobio narrative [key subject is first great professional mentor in defense industry: Dr. Hank Gaffney at Center for Naval Analyses]	Explain how I was taught how to think about strategic surprise as a young pol-mil analysts fresh out of grad school and working in my first defense think tank in DC in the early post-Cold War period: the classic Cold War-era “vertical scenario” versus the emerging post-Cold War era “horizontal scenario.” Point being I was taught the “big war” way of thinking about crises, even though the US has never really experienced that form in the Cold War (except, in proxy sense, in onset of Korean War). What’s interesting about distinction is that military tends to think only in terms of vertical scenarios while rest of USG and private sector really think almost exclusively about horizontal ones (huge gap in understanding, as mil thinks everyone else is clueless about “real dangers” and rest of society thinks military is “paranoid”	Possible slide(s), but probably not necessary [see PNM Book 3, page "15"]

				about threats.	
	16	20 Aug (Wed): teach elective in aft	Regular storyline	Story of the long-term shift from original strategic foci of Cold War (Europe and NE Asia to box in Sovs) to current (but a generation-in-the-making) focus on SW Asia (aka the Middle East)	I have a slide, but probably not needed [see PNM Book 3, page "16"]
				BREAK! I AND DAUGHTER GO TO FINAL PACKER GAME IN 21-24 AUG!	
	17	25 Aug (Mon); fly to Philly late	Regular storyline	Defining the Functioning Core (e.g., welcome connectivity, have robust enough legal/social systems to handle content flow)	None anticipated
				BREAK! TRAVEL TO GIVE INDUSTRY SPEECH FOR MONEY ON 26 AUG (signed this contract long ago)	
	18	27 Aug (Wed): teach elective in aft	Regular storyline	Defining the Non-Integrating Core (e.g., can't handle content flows, endemic conflicts, repressive regimes, leaders who refuse to leave)	None anticipated
	19	28 Aug (Thurs): no conflict	Regular storyline	Explaining the pattern of US military crisis response in the 1990s and showing how 95% of it occurs within the Gap; basic argument of disconnectedness defines danger	Use the sort of map from Esquire [see PNM Book 3, page "19"]
	20	29 Aug (Fri): no conflict	Regular storyline	Concept that globalization has to be viewed not as binary outcome (here or not, good or bad) but as historical unfolding or spread: show me where it is and I'll show you . . .and so on (stealing a lot of the Esquire text); define the Seam States here	None anticipated

	21	30 Aug (Sat): no conflict	Regular storyline	A litany of statistical differences that define the Core-Gap distinction: if you're leader is "president for life," then you're probably living in the Gap! And so on.	I have a huge number of these; many maps possible (for example, where all the civil wars are, where you're likely to step on a land mine, etc).
	22	31 Aug (Sun): no conflict	Regular storyline	The different-worlds-yields-different rule sets argument and why it is hard to be honest about that and how the Bush Admin keeps making new policy that seems to contradict long cherished national security ideals but really is about dealing only with the Gap (my old brief trick: I tell audience to yell out things they don't like about Bush Admin foreign policy and I respond to all with the phrase "... in the Gap!" Point of this being, it's ain't just George Bush's cowboy foreign policy that drives this seeming schizophrenic approach to world (you can trace much of this back to Clinton—for example the opposition to International Criminal Court). Another point: being honest with Americans, allies, and enemies about having two policies for two worlds is not being hypocritical, but honest	Don't need another map for this
	23	1 Sept (Mon) no conflict	Regular storyline	Drill-down on policy bifurcation regarding deterrence and preemption; lotsa to say here	Nothing needed
	24	2 Sept (Tues): no conflict	Regular storyline	Another drill-down on policy bifurcation regarding missile defense and arms control	Nothing needed

	25	3 Sept (Wed): teach elective in aft	Regular storyline	Where and not when unilateralism makes sense (regurgitation of op-ed I wrote on that subject): reality that any military ops we pursue in Gap will be largely unilateral in terms of combat, although we need allies for peacekeeping + focus on bilat security assistance to Seam States + reality of continuity of multilateralism throughout Core (example of FBI coop with China, Russia, etc on catching terrorists)	Nothing needed
	26	4 Sept (Thurs): no conflict	Regular storyline	The shift realized: the announced intention to rearrange US military basing structure around world (out of Old Europe and into New + lotsa new "mini-mart" bases throughout Gap	Map of bases probably good; there was great one of base gains and losses in 1990s in Atlantic that I have copy of
	27	5 Sept (Fri): no conflict	Myth buster (summary/segue)	Myth of Core-Gap really being just new expression of Arc of Instability and isn't that just code for Arabs and their oil! I say Gap is about whole lot more.	

4: The Core and the Gap	28	6 Sept (Sat): no conflict	Autobio narrative [key subject is great Wall Street mentor, retired Navy Admiral Bud Flanagan and the series of workshops we created together between War College and his firm, Cantor Fitzgerald—all held atop WTC1 at Windows on the World]	Story of what I learned from thinking about the future of globalization from Cantor Fitzgerald: best example being, when they saw a huge global problem looming in distance, they saw business opportunity to marketize the problem-set and make it go away over time (horizontal scenario) while military would view same situation as time bomb waiting to go off (vertical scenario). Explain whole point of NewRuleSets.Project: bringing nat security and Wall Street communities together to discuss stuff they never discuss before—like what if terrorists struck at Wall Street, what if there was war in Middle East, what if ...	None needed, though I have nice shot of me in front of screen at workshop at Windows on the World
	29	7 Sept (Sun): no conflict	Regular storyline	My story of what it will take for Globalization III to advance (key flows) and all the good things that will ensue. Also raise issue of possibility of screwing up Glob III	Lotsa stats on how Glob III has already made the world a better place, so maybe a table or two.
	30	8 Sept (Mon): no conflict	Regular storyline	Story of population growth and aging of global population: two key points being we begin to depopulate as species around 2050 and at same point we reach historic milestone where old outnumber young for first time in human history	I use some charts on this in the brief [see PNM Book 4, page "30"]
	31	9 Sept (Tues): no conflict	Regular storyline	Reality of declining Potential Support Ratio (number of 15-59 for everyone over 60 years of age) in Core while Gap's remains high through 2050, so obvious need for flow of people from Gap to	Slides from brief [see PNM Book 4, page "31"]

				Core; some of this will be permanent migration (hard politically for Europe and Japan), and some will be through global commute like that pushed by Philippines government.	
	32	10 Sept (Wed): teach elective in aft	Regular storyline	Reality of Developing Asia replacing North America as global energy demand center by 2020; this is huge shift in rule sets. Rising codependency between Asia and Middle East; rising fear of Asia about dependency, so efforts to tap Russian oil/gas, for example, by China and Japan.	Charts detailing the change [see PNM Book 4, page "32"]
	33	11 Sept (Thurs): no conflict	Regular storyline	Story of how disconnected Middle East is except for raw materials (energy) it trades; reflecting on the historical curse of oil and other precious raw materials in the Gap ; danger of world moving beyond oil to nat gas and hydrogen, so dangerous potential future scenario whereby Middle East is lost to history much like Sub-Saharan Africa, where nothing much of value originates in terms of global trade, other than precious metals and some oil	Probably nothing needed, although maybe a map of countries that are highly dependent on exporting of raw materials or other commodities (this I do not have at this time, but not too hard to put together, if desired)
	34	12 Sept (Fri): fly to IL late in day	Regular storyline	The story of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Glob II: the "triad" of US, Europe and Japan (Kennan's containment strategy realized financially decades later). Plus concept of "spheres of influence" created by heavy flows of FDI from triad to Gap states that are subsequently integrated into the Core over time	Slides from brief [[see PNM Book 4, page "34"]]

				BREAK! I AND SON GO TO SECOND HOME PACKER GAME IN GREEN BAY 13-15!	
	35	16 Sept (Tues): no conflict	Regular storyline	Story of expanding the Triad into the Quad (to include Developing Asia) and what that means for global security and development: this is the Marshall Plan people should be talking about—completely private sector flows integrating half of humanity and taking state-based war off table in Asia over time.	Maybe a graphic from brief [see PNM Book 4, page "35"]
	36	17 Sept (Wed); teach elective in aft	Regular storyline	A definition of “exporting security” and a review of the history of this public-sector export in relation to other public-sector exports like foreign aid. Plus key data showing how US “exports” have skyrocketed in post-Cold War era (measured as crisis response days put in by various services)	Possible chart [see PNM Book 4, page "36"]
	37	18 Sept (Thurs): no conflict	Regular storyline	Why focus of US exporting security will be Middle East for very long time. Reality that most of world’s conflicts occur in countries with low GDP per capita and history of Glob III shows that strong FDI flows (in combination with other good things) leads to econ development and end of conflicts; however you want to debate development, it doesn’t occur where FDI does not flow and FDI doesn’t flow into war zones. Good factoid: per capita GDP dropping in much of Middle East, like Saudi Arabia, which had per cap GDP of about \$28,000 20 years ago, and now is down to	slide from brief on conflicts and relation to GDP per capita [see PNM Book 4, page "37"]

				about \$8,000 with well over a third of its population under 15 years of age. Also explore death ratio is Palestinian-Israeli conflict and reality of "Berlin Wall" now going up between West Bank and Israel	
	38	19 Sept (Fri): I brief nat'l meeting of editorial writers in aft	Myth buster (summary/segue)	Myth that all this connectivity between US and outside world due to globalization leaves us highly fragile and vulnerable to disablement. My counter to audiences (from Y2K days) has always been: Other than US, name a country in which you'd rather experience a natural or unnatural disaster. 9/11 shows this in spades.	None anticipated
5: The Rise of System Perturbations	39	20 Sept (Sat): no conflict	Autobio narrative [key subject is Mitzi Wertheim, a "connector" (read Malcolm Gladwell's "Tipping Point") of the highest order; she is—informally—my speaking agent, promoting my material throughout DC, the business world, and academia]	Story of my pioneering study of Y2K as a way to understand the emerging nature of international crises in the age of globalization. Side-story of how I posted all the results of the Year 2000 International Security Dimension workshops on the Internet, only to become a cult figure among the Y2K digerati (and the hardcores began to describe me as the "real Agent Mulder"). Rumors culminate in Jack Anderson's column about me secretly training the U.S. military to take over U.S. society during the chaos unleashed by Y2K. Point of all this was my huge education in understand the growing role of the Internet and global connectivity in redefining the nature of U.S. national security. Our worst-case scenario got us a lot of nasty press concerning our fear-mongering, and it certainly was a bad description of 01/02/00. But it turned out	Probably use two slides. First details the scenarios on x-y. Second details the phased worst-case scenario (the Scenario Dynamics Grid). [see PNM Book 5, page "39"]

				to be a fascinatingly accurate depiction of the fallout that ensued after 9/11. Did we predict 9/11? Not the trigger, but the aftermath. What did we discover in this process? A new model of international crisis we called the "system perturbation."	
	40	21 Sept (Sun): no conflict	Regular storyline	The story of 9/11 as an existence proof of the concept of system perturbations. Present SP as combo of Vertical Shock and resulting Horizontal Scenarios.	Use slide from brief. [see PNM Book 5, page "40"]
	41	22 Sept (Mon): no conflict	Regular storyline	The follow-on System Perturbation to 9/11 known as the Big Bang (Bush Admin notion that if we take down Saddam, we trigger wave of rule-set change throughout Middle East). Question of what happens when US purposely tries to trigger a System Perturbation on someone else.	Use slide from brief [see PNM Book 5, page "41"]
	42	23 Sept (Tues): no conflict	Regular storyline	SARS as an another example of a System Perturbation: point being, it's not a matter of how many die, but how many rule sets are changes	No slide on this one yet
	43	24 Sept (Wed): teach elective in aft	Regular storyline	A point-by-point description of a System Perturbation (series of characteristics) + a breakdown of SPs in terms of process (agent, trigger, medium, transmission, barriers, consequences)	Have slide that displays metaphor of stone being dropped into still pond. [see PNM Book 5, page "43"]
	44	25 Sept (Thurs): no	Regular storyline	The goal of devising "rules" or observations about SPs.	Possible chart detailing differences between

		conflict		I propose five types of "rules" centered around five questions. Also explain concept of comparing Vertical Systems (more authoritarian) with Horizontal Systems (more democratic/federal)	Vertical and Horizontal Systems [see PNM Book 5, page "44"]
	45	26 Sept (Fri): no conflict	Regular storyline	First trio of rules regarding "Who's in charge?"	Might want to do list of all rules on single table. [see PNM Book 5, page "45"]
	46	27 Sept (Sat): no conflict	Regular storyline	Second trio of rules regarding "What's actually at risk?"	[see PNM Book 5, page "46"]
	47	28 Sept (Sun): no conflict	Regular storyline	Third trio of rules regarding "Where are the boundaries?"	[see PNM Book 5, page "47"]
	48	29 Sept (Mon): no conflict	Regular storyline	Fourth trio of rules regarding "How do we gain the upper hand?"	[see PNM Book 5, page "48"]
	49	30 Sept (Tues): no conflict	Regular storyline	Fifth trio of rules regarding "Where are the boundaries?"	[see PNM Book 5, page "49"]
	50	1 Oct (Wed): teach elective in aft	Regular storyline	Exploring notion that emergence of System Perturbation forces DoD into serious transformation. Asking three questions: Does 9/11 serve as existence proof? If yes, then does it signal need for new ordering principle for	[see PNM Book 5, page "50"]

				DoD? If yes, then do we now recognize super-empowered individuals like bin Laden and transnational networks like Al Qaeda as dominant trigger agents for such crises?	
	51	2 Oct (Thurs): no conflict	Myth buster (summary/segue)	The myth of the intelligence failure surrounding 9/11. Reality is that our focus on "big war" and China as future "near-peer competitor" meant that our whole national security system was biased against taking Al Qaeda as seriously as it needed to be. No amount of "smoking guns" beforehand would have changed that reality. Now with 9/11, our mania for China as enemy of future is gone. But this mania existed through most of Clinton Admin and was elevated by Bush Admin, plus Congress and Pentagon indulged in it ad nauseum, so plenty of blame to go around. But, of course, Hill wants a few heads on platters so Senators running for president can grandstand in front of cameras.	None needed

6: The New Ordering Principle	52	3 Oct (Fri): no conflict	Autobio narrative [key subject is my family and the system perturbation that hit us when our first born was diagnosed with advanced cancer at age 2]	Amazing story of our child's fight with cancer and our second child being born in midst of it. This led to extreme reordering of our lives and introduced me to concept of "new ordering principle." From this experience we learned many things, to include the notion of "how do you keep a vulnerable system alive when outside forces seek to kill it?" This becomes basis of analogy for thinking about keeping open US safe from terrorist strikes, and this analogy helps. "Emily Updates" refers to lengthy emails I sent around country to dozens of interested family, friends, and prayer circles during her treatment period. I later edited the mass of text into a book-length manuscript which I posted on the web. It is used by healthcare professionals at Georgetown U Hospital to train medical social workers and interns to this day.	Slide probably useful. Also have great photo of Em during treatment. [see PNM Book 6, page "52"]
	53	4 Oct (Sat): no conflict	Regular storyline	The concept of DoD's ordering principle as the core conflict model around which entire defense establishment is organized and that we need a new, broader model of crisis both to deal with security threats of Glob III and to effect truly broad and progressive transformation of DoD	Slide probably not needed [see PNM Book 6, page "53"]

54	5 Oct (Sun): no conflict	Regular storyline	<p>First of triptych explaining the evolution of the ordering principle from its origins in Defense Act of 1947 until today's current debate on what it should be. This section explains reality of Cold War ordering principle: we had Great Power War as system-level organizing principle; that yielded proxy wars at the level of the nation-state; that left, at the level of the individual, the so-called "lesser included" residual threat of terrorists, narco traffickers, et. Al</p>	<p>Should use slide that puts these concepts all together in grid-like fashion</p> <p>[see PNM Book 6, page "54"]</p>
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	55	6 Oct (Mon): no conflict	Regular storyline	<p>The second of the triptych: this one explains how things changed in the 1990s (we lose Sovs as system-level threat, downshift to “rogues” or “regional hegemons” and go with Les Aspin’s concept that 2 major regional wars equal the old notion of “great power war”). In effect, we trade in the old ten-foot-tall Sov threat for two five-foot-tall threats (Iraq and N Korea) stacked on top of one another in “near simultaneity.” But this abstract force-sizing concept overtaken in mid-90s by “near-peer competitor” and since we couldn’t dream of the Sovs coming back, we ginned up “rising China” (in effect, following the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995, we “fell in love” and all our dreams of high-tech future wars against future high-tech enemies were given new life. This dream of a “revolution in military affairs” later morphed into notion of “transformation” and it was key animating principle for hawks in incoming Bush Admin right up to 9/11. All serious strategic forecasting coming out of Pentagon right up to 9/11 said the future was all about fighting China! This was the intell failure of 9/11, but that finger will never be pointed.</p>	Keep with slide used in #54
	56	7 Oct (Tues): no conflict	Regular storyline	<p>The third of the triptych: explains nature of debate today. Some say, on individual level, that</p>	Use same graphics as #54

				<p>ordering principle of DoD should be keeping Americans alive (aka Homeland Security, Northern Command, etc.). Others say let's wage a global war (sometimes called WWIII [Friedman] or WWIV [Cohen, Woolsey] or "let's-kill-their-leaders-and-Christianize-them-all" [Coulter]) state-by-state, but this is the worst sort of open-ended fear-mongering definition of the threat. It scares the hell out of Americans, the Europeans, other potential allies, and everyone in the Gap we're trying to win over. I argue that US is system power, and so needs a system-level definition of both crisis and security. I call it System Perturbations. Do that well and the rest will follow.</p>	
	57	8 Oct (Wed): teach	Regular storyline	Revisiting concept that we are/have been progressively downshifting the focus of	Slide suggesting how we've been "running down the threats" over time

		elective in aft		<p>the US military from Cold War focus on system-level war to post-Cold War focus on nation-state-level rogues like Saddam and N Korea to new, individual-level focus on terrorists. I have been criticized my entire career for wanting to “ruin” the military by turning them into a giant, global police force and thereby letting its core warfighting capabilities decline. Critics say, this is what killed the Roman empire and the British empire: running the frontier while not staying sharp for the big, long-term threats. My counter will draw on Max Boot’s Savage Wars arguments, but will largely center on my notion that we need to view this as problem of success, not failure. We conquered global nuke war, we’ve come close to outlawing state-on-state war by showing our willingness to topple bad regimes, and now we’re increasingly specializing in stopping bad people from doing bad things.</p>	<p>(Sovs, then rogues, now terrorists)</p> <p>[see PNM Book 6, page "57"]</p>
	58	9 Oct (Thurs): no conflict	Regular storyline	<p>Key concept of “How much should our military force eventually mirror the international security environment?” If Cold War force had capabilities spread like diamond (portion of system-level strategic force and portion of individual-level counter-</p>	<p>Use graphic from brief</p> <p>[[see PNM Book 6, page "58" for “RMA-crowd pre-9/11” refers to very pure vision of high-tech, system-level force favored by Andy</p>

				<p>guerilla/nation-building capacity, but far largest portion of state-level counter-military capacity—meaning the bulk of our capabilities were designed around defeating other nation-states’ militaries), then I argue that today/future military should have spread more like hour-glass (heavy on system-level capabilities and heavy on subnational nation-building capabilities but lighter on counter-state military capabilities). In other words, we have too much capability to topple states but not enough to manage system-level threats (like WMD and missile proliferation in Gap) or deal with all those off-grid, failed states where terrorists are grown</p>	<p>Marshall in Office of Net Assessment, designed primarily for long-distance, push-button war with China; “+GWOT” refers to all that nation-building capability that Bush Admin swore off coming into power but new embrace with complete abandon as debacle of post-Saddam rebuilding effort emerges]</p>
	59	10 Oct (Fri): no conflict	Regular storyline	<p>Concept that System Perturbations represents the new “Greater Inclusive” that raises the old “lesser included” from an afterthought in strategic military planning to the new ordering principle. Point: in past, it took Great Power War to raze the global village (reordering of strategic environment), but today we see that a System Perturbation can lead to</p>	<p>Several graphics possible.</p> <p>[see PNM Book 6, page "59"</p> <p>for examples of potential graphics]</p>

				<p>huge change in strategic environment (Russia joins NATO, China goes from bad boy to new friend, etc., after 9/11). Additional arguments here about the merging of the Home Game (Homeland Security as we now call it) and the Away Game (or how we've thought about DoD for quite some time now: war as something that occurs only "outside, over there" to quote Maurice Sendak.</p>	<p>First slide (Greater Inclusive) makes point that before 9/11, it was assumed that if we built a military for great power war, it would handle (by default) all the lesser included. Now we know that isn't true. Now I say that building for great power war doesn't nearly encompass all the capabilities you need for new form of international crisis I call the System Perturbation.</p> <p>Second slide (Goal Posts Have Moved) resurrects "defense in depth" notion from #52 and explores notion of "3-front war"</p>
	60	11 Oct (Sat): no conflict	Myth buster (summary/segue)	<p>The myth that my material represents the second coming of Norman Angell. Angell wrote the "Great Illusion" in 1910, saying that the European powers were so economically interconnected that they'd never go to war, and if they did, they'd all be destroyed in the process. He was discredited by WWI, but in reality, his admonition was</p>	<p>No graphic needed, unless you want picture of Angel or cover of his book?</p>

				<p>completely on target. This charge is leveled at me by those who say Glob III is no different from Glob I, so we should stay focused on Great Power War. I say I am the second coming of Normal Angell alright, but I'm Normal Angell armed with nukes. Nukes changed everything (Joe Nye's notion of "crystal ball effect" where all great powers know in advance what would happen in event of nuke war). My point: no great-power-on-great-power war since nukes invented, so Glob III is hugely different from Glob I and my notion of connectedness defines safety is not idealism, but pragmatic understanding of security in age of deep globalization</p>	
7: The Transaction Strategy	61	12 Oct (Sun): no conflict	<p>Autobio narrative</p> <p>[key subject is Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, father of network-centric warfare, the Lenin to Andy Marshall's Marx on transformation, and my boss in Office of Secretary of Defense (as Director of Office of Force Transformation) for 20 months following 9/11</p>	<p>Story of my strange but close relationship with what many consider to be the Hyman Rickover of his age. I met Art first by writing a hugely popular critique of his concept of network-centric warfare, called "The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare." He becomes president of War College just as I join staff. It is his idea to do the Y2K study. He also oversees the NewRuleSets.Project study with Cantor Fitzgerald. He brings me to OSD as his "assistant for strategic futures" and my mega-brief</p>	<p>None needed</p> <p>There is story of joke I like to tell that might use graphics of some sort. Joke is, "What did Buddha say to the hot dog vendor? Make me one with everything!"</p> <p>When I met with Singaporean defense officials, they asked me, how is your work different from legendary OSD</p>

				<p>of all the key strategic concepts I've been working on for a decade finally comes together. The brief, with its concepts of Core-Gap, System Perturbations, Transaction Strategy, and System Administrator force becomes the basis for most of Art's key strategic concepts that he argues for (and starts to convince) with OSD and the Hill</p>	<p>futurist Andy Marshall? I said, Andy thinks about the future of war within the context of war. I think about the future of war within the context of everything else. In effect, my material is about everything but the hot dog.</p>
	62	13 Oct (Mon): no conflict	Regular storyline	<p>Concept of US transactions with the outside world:</p> <p>Environmentally speaking, we are 5% of world population but we generate 25% of world's garbage and pollution and extract 25% of world's energy (I call that "living large"); economically speaking we export sovereign debt and import beyond our means. But real transaction, IMO, is that we export security to world and—in return—are allowed to import a lifestyle beyond our means, given our defense burden. In effect, we export security to nations that prefer to outsource the function to US and instead focus on economic well-being (like</p>	<p>Maybe some graphics.</p> <p>[see PNM Book 7, page "62"]</p>

				Europeans, Singapore, Saudi Arabia and host of others). So we spend more on collective security in age of globalization because we enjoy it more than anyone else.	
	63	14 Oct (Tues): no conflict	Regular storyline	Strategic goal of Transaction Strategy explained: keeping Glob III's key flows (people, energy, FDI, US security exports) in balance	Several slides to choose from, but one seems obvious [see PNM Book 7, page "63"]
	64	15 Oct (Wed): teach elective in aft	Regular storyline	The Transaction Strategy detailed as 3 prongs: make Core resistant to System Perturbations; firewall Core off from Gap's worst eports; shrink the Gap!	Two slides to choose from, but neither essential in my mind [see PNM Book 7, page "64"]
	65	16 Oct (Thurs): no conflict	Regular storyline	Exploring the notion of resources needed to both secure America and shrink the Gap: concept of the "empty backfield" (football analogy) that we employed prior to 9/11 (basically, no homeland security to speak of), so need to rebalance spending on HLS versus System Administration—which really gets to roots of terror "outside, over there." Questions of wallet versus will (George H.W. Bush's Stae-of-Union phrase at end of Cold War) and question of burden sharing (public-private and US versus rest of world)	Several slides to choose from, but I'm not committed to any being in book [see PNM Book 7, page "65"]
	66	17 Oct (Fri): no conflict	Myth buster (summary/segue)	The myth of American empire: my counter is that empires are about enforcing maximum rule sets, whereas US, as befitting our type of John Mill's democracy, is all about enforcing merely minimum	See no need

				rule sets. In others words, empires are about telling world what they must do, whereas Sys Admin (like in IT) is just about telling “users” what they can’t do	
8: The System Administrator	67	18 Oct (Sat): no conflict	<p>Autobio narrative</p> <p>[key subjects are all the people who’ve supported my writings over the years, when many see me crank with grandiose, wildly optimistic views of world: like Robert Murray of Center for Naval Analyses; boss at Naval War College Lawrence Modisett; Fred Rainbow, of <i>Proceedings</i>; like Mark Warren and David Granger of Esquire; like Sam Huntington and Joe Nye of Harvard</p>	<p>Reality that I have been mentored and promoted by significant number of people over my career.</p> <p>Also the story of article I wrote after Y2K came and went, called “Life After DoDth or: How The Evernet Changes Everything.” In the article, I posit a Pearl Harbor-like disaster being inflicted on US and the result being the bifurcation of DoD into two forces: a warfighting force (Dept of Global Deterrence) full of high-tech warmaking ability and a system administrator force (Dept of Network Security) full of many of the organizations now sucked into the new Dept of Homeland Security (border, DEA, customs, Secret Service, FEMA) + the nation-building/small wars portions of DoD (special ops, Marines, surface navy, air force air lift, army regulars, National Guard civil affairs specialists).</p>	Don’t see need for any

				Well, one split does occur with 9/11 (Department of Homeland Security), but another one still coming: the creating of a Constabulary Force within DoD to deal with situations like post-Saddam Iraq. Creating this force, which is sorely needed, will take a huge leap of faith for the worst-case strategists in PNT.	
	68	19 Oct (Sun): flying to Germ. & writing en route	Regular storyline	The New American Way of War. I will distill my Top 100 rules of the American Way of War article down to a "top ten" a la Letterman. I will briefly review the ten "wars" of the last forty years that shaped this "way of war. Key theme will be the disaster that was the Powell Doctrine and how that misguided notion pushed by Powell and Weinburger handicapped the US in the post-Cold War era, only to be finally discarded in the post-9/11 global war on terrorism	Some slides considered. [see PNM Book 7, page "68"]
	69	20 Oct (Mon): recover day in Germ.	Regular storyline	Explore the operational issues or ground rules of having to operate militarily primarily in the Gap; give overview of military implications of Core-Gap divide	Some slides considered. [see PNM Book 7, page "69"]
				BREAK! KEYNOTE AT ALL-DAY MEETING OF NATO GROUND COMMANDERS	

	70	22 Oct (Wed): flying back to US & writing en route; teach elective (last) in aft	Regular storyline	Explore the personnel issues of the coming bifurcation of US military into smaller, high-tech warfighting force (warrior force focused on projecting power) and personnel-intensive lower-tech systems administrator force focused on exporting security; use post-Saddam Iraq rebuilding difficulties to explain why this is coming about; our forces will have to reconfigure themselves to meet this new constabulary function. This splitting-up will be a hallmark of the future American way of war; make strategic argument that DoD historically focused wrongly on feared danger of "access denial" (opponents denying us access to battlespace with their sneaky, asymmetrical warfare) when, in reality, it's not the battlespace where we're being denied access, but the "transition space" or "peace space" that necessarily follows-on to any combat situation. In a nutshell, it was easy to take down Saddam, but it's hard to win Iraq.	Some slides considered. [see PNM Book 7, page "70"]

	71	23 Oct (Thurs): no conflict	Regular storyline	Tour d'horizon of potential trouble spots around the world, positing the future of US crisis response as we seek to shrink the Gap; offer series of possible scenarios for how we do in our efforts to remake Iraq and set off a Big Bang effect in Middle East	Probably some map like what we did with Esquire; probably updating/reusing the country-by-country sketches. Have 2x2 scenario matrix already on Middle East [see PNM Book 7, page "71"]
	72	24 Oct (Fri): no conflict	Myth buster (summary/segue)	The myths that America can't survive as sole military superpower and that balance of power must reappear + US has no strong allies	None needed
9: A Future Worth Creating	73	25 Oct (Sat): no conflict	Autobio narrative [key subjects are optimistic futurists who've inspired me over my life: guys like Gene Roddenberry, Carl Sagan (who inspired from afar), and John Peterson of The Arlington Institute (who's promoted my career)]	Make basic case that optimistic futurists are always right in the end and that future dystopians are always wrong in the end, but bad news sells better and optimists are considered naïve + my basic belief that US can and should save world from itself because we are furthest along in this multinational experience that defines globalization—which, in the end, ends up looking an awful lot like us	None needed
	74	26 Oct (Sun): no conflict	Regular storyline	What must change in US national security establishment + signposts to look for as Glob III gets stronger and US leads Core	None anticipated

				in shrinking the Gap	
	75	27 Oct (Mon): no conflict	Myth buster (summary/ segue)	The myth that Americans don't care about the outside world + have huge fear of body bags and will refuse to shoulder any considerable burden	
	Ext	28 Oct (Tues): no conflict	Write Forward?		
	Ext	29 Oct (Wed): no conflict	Write Forward?		
	Ext	30 Oct (Thurs): no conflict	Write Forward?		
	Ext	31 Oct (Fri): no conflict	Write Forward?		