1. Introduction

In his 1930 essay, “Three Independent Factors in Morals,” John Dewey argues that normative ethical theories struggle to do justice to moral experience, routinely falling short in the tasks they take themselves to perform when their proponents insist unnecessarily upon the conceptual or explanatory primacy of any one of three “factors” that an agent must weigh during moral deliberations. The three factors that he identifies are the facts pertaining to either a) “principles” (the Right), b) “consequences” (the Good), or c) “approbations and disapprobations” (virtue and vice). It is an initial privileging of one or another of such factors that gives rise to our main contrary systems of normative ethics. This strife of systems is possibly unavoidable, but in order to be true to moral experience an agent’s “reflective morality” has to recognize the elliptical nature of evaluations of agents and their actions in terms of a–c; it more specifically has to recognize the independence of the intuitions that motivate each such system of normative ethics, and the subsequent partial or limited perspective that reflection on each factor provides.

Dewey’s moral philosophy as he developed it during and after the 1930’s is not only non-reductionistic in this sense of being deflationary about debates between consequentialists, deontologists and virtue theorists as competing “complete” accounts of normative ethics; he was also in his own account of reflective morality explicitly pluralist, as he held that reflective morality is improved by employing resources from all three of the systems of normative ethics in the reflection and judgment that is called for when the agent faces a morally problematic situation.

Dewey’s “Three Independent Factors” (hereafter TIF) paper proved seminal in the development of his mature theories of value and reflective inquiry, especially in his most productive decade of the 1930’s, which produced Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) and in Theory of Valuation (1939). The task Dewey set for himself in TIF guided the development of the second edition of his Ethics and subsequently informed his theory of inquiry and his “general theory of value.” Dewey’s aim was to look beyond the competing “one-sided” systems in search of a single way to order normative ethical theory; it was to ask what would aid our actual practices of inquiry, reflection, and judgment, and “what permanent value each group contributes to the clarification and direction of reflective morality” (LW 7, 183).

In this paper we identify and describe three factors—in no small degree the epistemological analogues of the Good, the Right, and Virtue in ethical theory—that we recognize as each contributing to epistemic goodness or value. These different “springs,” to use Dewey’s metaphor, are 1) agent reliability (the
causal etiology of belief), 2) synchronic epistemic rationality (epistemic responsibility in the present time-slice), and 3) diachronic epistemic rationality (epistemic responsibility across time). The groups that insist on the conceptual primacy or epistemic centrality of one or another of these factors in the evaluation of epistemic agents and their beliefs also give rise to competing “systems” offering contrary accounts of epistemic value or goodness: most naturally these are the systems of reliabilist externalism, evidentialist internalism, and virtue epistemology. These groups typically also take themselves to be offering “complete” accounts of epistemic goodness, while the present approach views them as one-sided theories whose reductive ambitions are doubtful, and when allowed to fester often side-track philosophers onto counter-productive focuses of debate. Inspired by Dewey’s non-reductive, “independent factors” approach to moral philosophy, we want to extend his methodology by posing a similar question with respect to the main competing accounts of epistemic normativity: What “permanent value” does each of our epistemic analogues contribute to the clarification of the sources of epistemic value and to the direction of our intellectual inquiries?

Dewey was explicitly concerned with a theory of inquiry encompassing both moral and intellectual problems, and with a “general theory” of value or valuation not restricted to moral judgment or practical reason. There are of course many important differences between moral and epistemic goodness that indicate the need for different treatment. But these differences do not on our view stand in the way of our applying Dewey’s method to the debate about philosophic normativity, nor do they hinder our asking the specific analogue question about what permanent value each factor identified above contributes to the clarification of epistemological goodness. Like Dewey, we start out critically before moving to the constructive part of our project. We ultimately want to support both a non-reductionist philosophical methodology and an explicitly pluralist epistemological axiology, but supporting the latter requires additional steps beyond the criticism of reliabilist externalism, evidentialist internalism, and some ‘robust’ forms of virtue or character epistemology. We will first clarify Dewey’s anti-reductionistic methodology and the ways he applied it to the problems facing reflective morality (Section 2). This puts us into position in the subsequent sections 3-6 to develop our own an epistemic analogue to Dewey’s approach. These analogues are our own, and we do not claim that the three factors we explicate through attention to recent debate over epistemic value or goodness are necessarily one’s that Dewey would identify even were he privy to recent central debates in epistemology.

In our concluding Section 7 we summarize and then turn our attention to the more constructive aspects of our project, and more specifically to the philosophic support of a version of epistemic value pluralism that we term axiological pluralism. We call it such because it makes a claim about the plurality of sources of epistemic goodness or value, rather than about an irreducible plurality of specific cognitive aims (understanding, wisdom, justification, etc.) beyond true belief and/or knowledge that epistemic value monists take as a core aim of our intellectual lives. Our approach is consistent with epistemic value
pluralism in the latter and more usual sense (a form of pluralism which we have each argued for elsewhere); but it is intended to open discussion of this more challenging kind of pluralism and its implications for epistemology. In developing axiological pluralism, we are aided by attention to Dewey, Peirce, James, and a longer “agent” and “inquiry”-focused tradition of American pragmatism. This approach we think also helps articulate “value-driven” epistemology, or at least provides some new resources helpful to addressing problems related to what Wayne Riggs calls the “family of credit-related” epistemic concepts, including faculty virtues, reflective virtues, epistemic responsibility/credit, meta-cognitive control, and epistemic luck of certain kinds.

2. The ‘Three Factors’ Essay in the Development of Dewey’s Ethics

As mentioned earlier, Dewey criticized consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics as “one-sided” accounts that as such cannot provide the complete account of reflective morality that their proponents typically take themselves to provide. His own familiarity with Aristotelianism helped him to anticipate “virtue ethics” as a third system in addition to those of “rules” and of “ends,” decades before its “official” revival in Anglo-American philosophy in the early 1960’s; but while it informs his constructive accounts of habits of inquiry and of the relationship between moral and intellectual flourishing, he was also clear in wanting to undercut virtue theory in any narrow sense as just another “opposing system” in addition to the long-standing contrast of the morality of ends and the morality of laws. According to Dewey, “there are at least three independent variables in moral action” (LW 5, 280), none of which can be reduced to the others. The good, which has to do with objects that satisfy desires, is entwined with the concepts of reason and ends. Reason is the faculty by which we reflectively project desired ends and compare their relative values. The idea of the good emerges at the top—as the most desirable—through the organization and ranking of ends with respect to their relative values. Independently of the good, the right, too, is a source of moral value. The right, which arises as a result of the reciprocally recognized demands that we make upon one another’s conduct, requires “the emotional and intellectual assent of the community” (282) that recognizes the demand of the right. As such, the right transforms the more individualistic concepts of “good” and “end,” infusing them with the socially generated and socially sustained authority characteristic of being right. Finally, virtue and vice provide an independent source of moral value. The concepts of virtue and vice capture the generalized content of “widespread” approbation and disapprobation. Virtue and vice are initially spontaneous or pre-reflective reactions to others’ actions; they occur independently of the “immediate social pressure characteristic of the right” (286) but are later tested against and shaped by those pressures. The independence of these three factors (the good, the right, and habits of virtue and vice) does not imply that they don’t all constitute a part of any moral situation. In fact, Dewey claims that each is a part of “all actual moral situations” (287). This is important, for the presence of each of the three factors as weighing into a given moral agent’s situation means that “they can be at cross purposes and exercise divergent forces in the formation of judgments” (280). From Dewey’s perspective, “[t]he essence of the moral
situation is an internal and intrinsic conflict; the necessity for judgment and for choice comes from the fact that one has to manage forces with no common denominator” (ibid.) Dewey would applaud Rosalind Hursthouse’s insistence that we should not assume “that any adequate action-guiding theory must make the difficult business of knowing what to do if one is to act well easy, that it must provide clear guidance about what ought not to be done which any reasonably clever adolescent could follow if she chose” (Hursthouse 1991, 230-31). By contrast, Dewey argues that, “it is characteristic of any situation properly called moral that one is ignorant of the end and of good consequences, of the right and just approach, of the direction of virtuous conduct, and that one must search for them” (LW 5, 280). Indeed, it is precisely this search that gives reflective moral life the meaning, urgency, and flavor that it has for us. We see these themes developed some years later in the second edition of Dewey & Tufts’ *Ethics*. There, the shift from customary to reflective morality puts the burden on the individual, making it the first business of ethics to get an outline of the factors that constitute personal disposition. But “why,” Dewey asks, “must moral theorists decide if becoming a good character or doing the right actions is the end of our moral life?” (LW 7, 133 or 173[check this]). Against what he calls the ‘Doctrine of fixed means and ends’, Dewey argues that there are no fixed means and ends in moral life, and thus no good reason to take either character considerations (virtues, ideals, projects) or act considerations (rules, principles, consequences) as the defining paradigm of moral engagement. For even though the landscape of moral conceptions—including desires, social demands, and approbation and disapprobation—are “constant” and “fundamental” parts of our moral lives, the particular emphases that theories or even cultures take on, in response to particular concerns and circumstances, are transient. Dewey’s approach contains a metaphilosophical view about the strife between systems of ethics as often under-motivated, and debates over the conceptual primacy of one or another of the three factors in particular as based on selective emphasis. But there is a constancy and fundamentality of the moral framework Dewey provides through his unique, non-reductive stance. So long as one is willing to treat theories as tools, and alternative models as not incompatible resources for moral reflection and judgment, the alternative systems we have come to know as deontology, consequentialism, and areteic ethics have value for reflective agents due to the unique resources each model provides for reflection on difficult issues.

3. Three Independent Sources of Epistemic Value

If our approach provides the useful resources that we think it does, we should be able to fill in our epistemic analogue of Dewey’s approach by identifying multiple factors that independently or in conjunction contribute to epistemic value. Their “independence” as sources of epistemic value is something that will need to be argued for, but identifying these factors requires us only to look to the master intuitions driving debate about the nature and sources of epistemic value. We identify these as three, though some might argue there are even more:

First: Agent reliability. Reliability in the production and maintenance of epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding is an epistemic
good. Today, this good is typically associated with externalist or truth-linked accounts of knowledge and/or justification, including safety-based anti-luck epistemologies that focus on the reliable production of belief together with the exclusion of veritic externalist luck, the luck the comes ‘betwixt belief and the fact,’ as we witness in Gettier cases. Second: Synchronic epistemic rationality. To have toward a proposition a doxastic attitude that ‘fits’ the evidence evokes a kind of epistemic rationality that is a source of epistemic value. Evidentialist internalism “is a theory of synchronic epistemic rationality” according to its best-known proponents, E. Conee and R. Feldman. But personal epistemic justification of this sort is valuable even independently of the links that internalists claim it has to an agent’s having epistemic justification and propositional knowledge. We are in good epistemic circumstances and succeeding in a sense when we can offer internalist justifications of our beliefs. Third: Diachronic epistemic rationality. Personal justification in this sense concerns habits of inquiry across time, including motivational components in knowing and the agent’s selection and execution of strategies appropriate to their problem situation. This personal justification evokes a kind of epistemic rationality related to responsibility in inquiry and belief maintenance/change; it gets its value from the exemplification of virtue in the sense of responsible actions and motivations in an agent’s initial and continuing intellectual inquiries. We interpret virtue responsibilism of the inquiry-focused (hereafter inquiry pragmatist) variety as a theory of diachronic rationality. The reflective intellectual virtues are enduring, praiseworthy traits that manifest in responsible actions-at-inquiry; good habits of inquiry are productive of states of internal justification and dispositions to believe reliably; but as personal virtuosity one’s diachronic rationality also contributes to the character development or “growth” of the agent; the exemplification of intellectual virtues also has value because the exercise of virtue is partly constitutive of intellectual flourishing.

4. Agent Reliability and Externalist Luck
Since Gettier, discussion of the problem of epistemic luck has become considerably more sophisticated as epistemologists like Duncan Pritchard have identified distinct kinds of epistemic luck and attempted to clarify how each differently impacts our capacity for knowledge or for other epistemic goods. From 2003-2005 Pritchard’s anti-luck epistemology was strongly externalist and reductionist, and his “safety-based,” counter-factualist approach did not require a condition for the reliability of the belief-forming process at all, let alone a condition of believing truly from abilities or competencies as virtue epistemologists understand them: “[T]he appropriate moral to draw . . . does not seem to be that we need to keep supplementing the reliabilist thesis ad infinitum . . . but rather that we should simply accept that knowledge is, at root, just true belief that meets the safety principle” (Pritchard 2003, 119). “Anti-Luck” epistemology had reductionist ambitions, and exemplified one version of reductionism based upon the first factor. One of Pritchard’s aims in Epistemic
Luck (2005) was to show a redundancy and therefore an overall lack of motivation in virtue epistemologies. In more recent papers he appears to have found his own motivation for an *areteic* condition: alongside of his “Master Intuition” regarding “the incompatibility of knowledge and luck,” he now concedes a second Master Intuition, namely an intuition regarding “the centrality of cognitive abilities to knowledge.” His acknowledgement of this second intuition goes together with the value-driven concern that since the realization of most epistemic goods (understanding at least, but possibly knowledge as well) is a cognitive *achievement* on the part of the agent, the agent’s habits and abilities are the bearers of the “final value” found in achievements of all kinds (intellectual or otherwise). Achievements are made *possible through* abilities/competences, so that if we are concerned that our accounts of key epistemic goods like knowledge, justification, understanding etc. reflect a sound philosophy of epistemic value, then we will necessarily be concerned with an account of achievements and the habits and abilities through which they are realized. Considerations along these lines led Pritchard, if we interpret him correctly, to respond to criticisms of his austere safety-based or “anti-luck epistemology,” which he conceived as a competitor to virtue epistemologies, by giving it up in favor of the “anti-luck virtue epistemology” (2009a, 2009b) he defends today. This newer stance is nevertheless consistent with his continued criticism of “robust virtue epistemology” as a reductionistic option at the other end of the spectrum. Thus, Pritchard argues against the idea that the notion of the agent having a true belief ‘because of virtue’ can or should be strengthened in such a way that it *entails* truth and thereby precludes regettierization.

Our own responsibilist approach shares some of Pritchard’s scepticism about robust VE. Moreover, it helps to maintain and elaborate the *moderate* VE stance that Pritchard prefers—VE with an *independent* externalist anti-luck condition. In other words, the independence thesis works to move us away from anti-luck and virtue epistemologies taken as mutually-exclusive accounts of knowledge, to anti-luck and virtue epistemologies “in consonance” (Axtell 2007; compare Napier, 2008). By robust VE, Pritchard identifies a questionable shared assumption in the approach to knowledge analysis taken by Greco, Napier, Sosa, and Zagzebski: namely, that the areteic condition can ‘go it alone’ as an anti-Gettier condition, and needn’t be supplemented by any more straightforwardly modal anti-luck condition like a safety (or sensitivity) condition. Anti-luck virtue epistemology is “moderate” because it resists the reductionistic claim that the work of a safety condition and an *areteic* condition can be ‘reduced’ one way or the other; it acknowledges that what serves to exclude Gettier (veritic) luck or to render our beliefs modally safe (and/or sensitive) is epistemically valuable.

This is a considerable shift for Pritchard away from his earlier stance as an anti-luck reductionist who conceived knowledge as at bottom just safe true belief. But in addition to seeing a place for an independent *areteic* condition to address value-driven considerations and epistemic achievements, Pritchard also began distinguishing between “veritic luck,” as operating in true Gettier cases, and “environmental luck,” as operating in, for example, barn façade cases (2007).
Kelly Becker’s work may be briefly introduced to further develop the point, because like Pritchard he acknowledges that “externalist luck” has two distinct knowledge-precluding forms, which he calls “world luck” and “process luck.” Being thus distinct, each kind of luck requires different treatment: To deal with world or environmental luck, we need a modalized tracking principle, as “a belief-truth linking condition that applies to individual instances of belief formation” (Becker, 2008, 356). But process luck requires that we distinguish this narrowly-typed disposition from a principle that would utterly lack generality by applying only to individual belief tokens. So if there is more than one kind of externalist luck that an adequate account of knowledge (or understanding) must preclude, then this makes the reductionistic thesis of robust VE all the more doubtful; an areteic condition may arguably bear upon if not preclude the veritic luck operating in Gettier cases, yet it seems largely irrelevant to the preclusion of what Becker calls world luck and what Pritchard terms environmental luck.

Now some of the best-known proponents of VE like John Greco concede environmental luck to be knowledge-precluding. Our ‘argument from environmental luck’ thus reinforces our thesis that anti-luck concerns are one independent factor in epistemology. According to this argument, defenders of robust VE have done little to show that this anti-luck concern (environmental luck) can be well-handled by their areteic condition, even if, as they argue, this condition is all that one needs to address veritic luck (i.e., to preclude regettierization). We take the argument from environmental luck to show that the robust virtue epistemologies of Greco, Sosa, and Zagzebski, (compare what Michael Levin calls “motive reliabilism” (2004)), cannot use fulfillment of the areteic condition to preclude all the forms of externalist luck that an account of knowledge should be concerned to preclude. Our argument underlines the need for an independent anti-luck condition to address environmental luck even if the proponent of robust VE can demonstrate that knowledge “because of virtue” serves to adequately preclude re-gettierization. If this is correct we need our externalist luck condition to remain “independent” of the areteic principle—we need what Pritchard calls “anti-luck virtue epistemology.”

Our “independent factors” approach is therefore in Pritchard’s terms a “moderate” rather than a “robust” virtue epistemology, which fits our description of our approach as non-reductionist. But as we will next see, ours is a form of (anti-luck) virtue epistemology wherein the responsibilist focus on diachronic traits—what Dewey’s called habits and dispositions—plays a very significant role over and above the standard internalist pre-occupation with time-slice analysis and with what Conee and Feldman term synchronic epistemic rationality.

5. The Epistemic Value of Synchronic Rationality

To be in epistemic circumstances where internalist justification for some target proposition is possible for the agent, and where the agent is able to access the reflectively good reasons that ground her belief, is to be in an epistemically desirable circumstances. This is really enough to support the contribution that synchronic epistemic rationality makes to epistemic value, even without insisting that such rationality forms a general necessary condition on knowledge. It is enough that internalism is basically on track as an account of what conditions are
epistemically most desirable, and what factors determine subjective appropriateness (Greco 259). There is a kind of intrinsic value of being doxastically most appropriate, as well as the instrumental value in obtaining knowledge (or at least one kind of knowledge) (Dougherty, 2008).

Making sense of synchronic epistemic rationality’s “permanent contribution” to epistemic value is difficult, though, for this requires disengaging it from the internalist’s form of reductionism, and disentangling it from the voluntaristic and deontological associations it has in Conee and Feldman’s thought. Evidentialism as Conee and Feldman present it is a theory of synchronic epistemic rationality. As an account of what constitutes epistemic justification, we view this as misguided. While our previous section included a criticism of Greco’s robust VE, here Greco seems completely right: if we are to rightly understand epistemic responsibility and personal justification, then “etiology matters.” But since our problem is only with the reductionist claim that the kind of rationality that pre-occupies the evidentialist provides a complete account of epistemic rationality, we are still able to allow synchronic epistemic rationality to be a genuine contributor to epistemic value.

Fieldman and other internalist evidentialists tells us that if an agent S has any attitude towards a proposition, then S “epistemically ought to have the attitude towards p supported by S’s evidence at t” (thesis O2, in 2004, 178). According to the internalist evidentialist, abiding this norm—being synchronically rational—maximizes epistemic value and constitutes epistemic success for an agent (thesis V3, 185). The view that you are being a completely or ideally rational agent just in case at every moment you are believing just those things that are supported by your evidence, no matter how weak or poor was the effort at inquiry that resulted in your having just that conception of evidence bearing upon a particular ‘target’ belief, is far too narrow a sense of rationality to characterize what it means to maximize epistemic value.

This “too narrow” objection seems to us obviously true, and an important truth. That it is solely the relationship, at a given time, between one’s evidence and a proposition considered a candidate for belief (or disbelief) that is of epistemic importance is a non-starter. Richard Foley (1988) was essentially right that there are elliptical standards of rational belief proposed by philosophers of science and by traditional epistemologists, the two groups being concerned with different kinds of rational belief. The former adopt a social or intersubjective perspective that is attuned to diachronic rationality, while the methodological individualism of the latter focuses upon the synchronic rationality of the agent at a given time-slice. “[G]iven the elliptical nature of claims of rationality,” Foley points out, “there need be no genuine conflict here” (136). We think that wanting to do well over time is something that applies to both our intellectual and our prudential goals. But Conee and Feldman seek to justify the reductionist claim that only synchronic epistemic rationality matters in epistemic evaluation of the agent by insisting that responsibility or irresponsibility in inquiry raises “moral or prudential questions rather than epistemic questions” (2004, 178; emphasis added). For them what we provocatively term diachronic epistemic rationality, isn’t epistemic at all: “Whether I should be a better epistemic agent is always a
practical question. The narrower question about what I should believe now, the
question I want to focus on, is the central epistemological question” (Feldman
1988, 252). Their stance reflects what the inquiry pragmatist sees as an overtly
rationalistic view of agency, which would be persuasive only if an adequate
theory of evidence can justifiably bracket questions concerning the quality of the
agent’s inquiries. That “[e]videntialism provides no guidance about what to do,”
and that its account of cognitive success is indifferent to how diligent or slothful
were the agent’s inquiries and reflections, arguably tell us far more about the
inadequacies of internalist evidentialism than about the purported lack of
genuinely epistemic value in our zetetic or inquiry-focused activities.

Among the insights of reliabilist externalism, as it caught hold during the
post-Gettier era, is that the etiology of belief matters. For reliabilists, proper
appraisal of the epistemic status of particular beliefs requires that we be
confident in identifying a reliable process type as giving rise to a token belief. Furthermore, reliabilism’s recognition of the importance of etiology at least
implicitly acknowledges the need for a diachronic component in any account of
knowledge and epistemic justification. Both virtue reliabilists and virtue
responsibilists are concerned with diachronic goals. Theoretic understanding is
entirely caught up with it, even if there are thin subjective and objective senses of
being propositionally justified that are not. However, Richard Feldman and Earl
Conee contend that synchronic epistemic rationality is the only source of properly
epistemic value. This view denies that factors external to the cognitive agent’s
ken (i.e., bearers of reliability and factors relevant to the etiology of beliefs) can
be sources of epistemic value. This view also denies epistemic import to
considerations external to the present time-slice at which S evaluates the
available evidence for some proposition that stands as a candidate for belief (or
disbelief). As such, it also denies that diachronic epistemic rationality can be a
source of properly epistemic value.

Dewey taught us that to move beyond the divide issue in ethics requires
an approach where action and character are equally central objects of moral
evaluation, and neither one is to be taken as the exclusive or even more basic
concern of moral philosophy. Perhaps similarly, then, to move beyond the divide
issue between the belief-focused evaluations of internalists and the agent-
focused evaluations of virtue epistemologists requires an approach where both
kinds of evaluation are acknowledged to have central roles important to
epistemic success. This is what Conee-Feldman evidentialism denies. The claim
that synchronic epistemic rationality provides a complete account of epistemic
justification, and that this in turn is what constitutes epistemic rationality, is
sufficiently-well refuted by Catherine Elgin when she writes,

Our cognitive goal...is not to ace life’s true/false test. It involves forming
beliefs (and other attitudes) that we can use as a reasonable basis for
inference and action and can responsibly convey to others when interests
are cognitive....Truth value does not determine cognitive value. So to restrict
the focus of epistemology to factors that would maximize our prospects of
acing the test is unwise. It substitutes a thin conception of knowledge for
thicker conceptions of epistemic states that are more valuable (2008, 386 & 371).

6. Zetetic Responsibilism and the Epistemic Value of Diachronic Rationality

One motivation for the present paper is to state a case for diachronic rationality’s contributions to epistemic value. The further connections between diachronic rationality and intellectual virtues should be obvious since virtues like intellectual conscientiousness, honesty, open-mindedness, etc. do not apply straightforwardly to the appraisal of beliefs, especially if the justification for beliefs is taken apart from the epistemic situation of a particular agent. Instead, virtues of the sort mentioned make us good at inquiry (compare Baehr (2006, 2010); Elgin (2006, 2008). In the previous section we acknowledged that synchronic epistemic rationality, once properly reformulated, serves as a source of epistemic value with respect to some distinctively human and higher epistemic standings, including theoretical understanding. But this proper reformulation requires the rejection of several tenets espoused by Feldman and Conee’s evidentialist internalism: namely, their internalist account of epistemic justification, their deontology, their account of epistemic value-maximization, and their claim that the source of diachronic rationality’s value is practical and non-epistemic.

In the present section we defend our claim that diachronic epistemic rationality is a third, independent source of epistemic value. As we have already seen, Feldman and Conee contend that synchronic epistemic rationality is the only source of properly epistemic value. This view denies that factors external to the cognitive agent’s ken can be sources of epistemic value. It also denies that diachronic epistemic rationality can be a source of epistemic value. It is our view that diachronic epistemic rationality is an important source of epistemic value. What, then, is the value of diachronic epistemic rationality? And why is this value best considered an independent source of epistemic value?

Of central importance to the epistemic axiology that we are presently developing is that a “zetetic” or inquiry-based conception of virtue can recognize a wide variety of epistemic goods without reducing the value of those many goods to their contribution to the value of any one particular epistemic good (e.g., knowledge or epistemic justification). Among the goods recognized by our zetetic conception of virtue is the value of diachronic epistemic rationality. Our view is that responsible inquirers are epistemically better off than otherwise reliable and synchronically rational agents because the former possess virtues that the latter may lack. From our “zetetic” point of view, a virtue is a habit that can be relied upon as a means for successfully conducting responsible inquiry; and this is the primary source of virtue’s unique epistemic value. To say that a habit is reliable is really to say two things. First, it is to say that the habit has been reliable in environments similar to the ones we now inhabit. Second, it is to say that the habit is to be relied upon in prospective inquiries. This is not to say that the virtues must be fixed and inflexible. On the contrary, the habits that facilitate inquiry over time must be flexible enough to respond to new and novel problems. Indeed, the value of zetetic virtue across time does not imply the static identity of
the virtue across time. The habits possessed by a novice, twelve-year-old inquirer will not (and ought not) be identical to the habits possessed by an advanced and mature inquirer. In large part, the difference corresponds to changes in the sophistication and complexity of the subject matters of inquiry, as well as the sophistication and complexity of the resources (observational, evidentiary, technological, etc.) available to the mature inquirer. Nevertheless, there is continuity in zetetic advancement. Properly cultivated, the early habits serve as cruder resources for the development over time of more refined zetetic habits. Thus, unlike “routine” habits, which fix human thought and action into unreflective ruts, intelligent habits are flexible, adaptable habits. John Dewey puts the point well when he says, “the intellectual element in a habit fixes the relation of the habit to varied and elastic use, and hence to continued growth” (MW 9: 53).

The idea that virtues facilitate growth clearly reveals the sort of diachronic epistemic rationality that makes a unique contribution to our epistemic axiology. Inquiry, when conducted responsibly, is a self-correcting process, one that subjects the methods, evidences, and outcomes of past inquiries to scrutiny. Evidentialist epistemic normativity is recognized as valuable from the point of view of inquiry; but the reflective virtues that successfully facilitate responsible inquiry also serve us well in our critical evaluations of past inquiries, and in our improvements of future inquiries. These flexible, reflective virtues help inquirers to improve upon the methods and habits that have governed past inquiries. In so doing, the virtues tend toward their own improvement, and toward the improvement or growth of the inquirer. It is here, in virtue’s contribution to growth, that the relationship between virtue and human flourishing is most evident.

Underlying Feldman and Conee’s insistence that diachronic considerations are essentially non-epistemic is the assumption that theoretical and practical norms are distinct in kind. Our inquiry-based approach to epistemic rationality assumes no distinction between natural kinds of reasons or virtues. Contrary to the implicit suggestion of evidentialists, thinking is not something that simply happens between one’s ears. Thinking involves the performance of various operations—including motor, observational, and ideational operations. Inquiry, as a medium of thought, is a transaction with our environments; it is a response to our environment by which we in turn make the environment respond. Successful inquiry aims to establish and purposively control relationships among the objects and potencies available within the environment, rendering the environment more intelligible and more inhabitable. As such, the virtues that facilitate inquiry are not simply stable habits; they are also stabilizing habits. An orderly world is not simply a precondition for the cultivation and exercise of virtue but also an achievement of inquiry. Thus, the possession and exercise of virtue contributes to the conditions for its own continued possibility and value.

Dewey, in our view, contributed significantly to moral theory in the twentieth century by critiquing consequentialism, deontology, and “virtue ethics” (in its narrow construal) as one-sided systems, only one of which the agent needs in problematic situations of moral reflection and action. Our claim is that there are also at least three factors that should be acknowledged to be
independent sources of epistemic value. What each contributes of permanent value shows their independence, and therefore shows the need for a pluralist epistemological axiology, and an account of epistemic goodness where the synchronic and diachronic forms of rationality (and personal justification) are goods internal to inquiry, strongly related to the value of cognitive achievements (final value) as well as to intellectual growth and flourishing.

Finally, an inquiry-based conception of virtue expands the scope of our concern broadly enough to include more than just epistemic values. The habits involved in successful inquiry help us to secure and enjoy many kinds of valuable objects and activities in all areas of human experience. The problems that it is the business of inquiry to solve may be classified as moral, epistemic, political, or as problems of any other sort. But, such classification is itself a part of the process of inquiry. Consequently, any distinctions between kinds of reasons or kinds of virtues are themselves conclusions or outcomes of inquiry. It is for these reasons that we see our “zetetic” approach to virtue as part of a still broader theory of value. It underlines the lessons of externalism, but goes further than agent reliabilist VE by insisting that evaluations of epistemic rationality are tied to evaluations of the inquiry-involving or zetetic activities of the agent. The agent’s manifested intellectual virtue and the diachronic epistemic rationality they enable is the factor among these three that most clearly addresses concerns about achievements-through-inquiry. The reflective virtues, as diachronic traits of character that bear upon the quality of our efforts at inquiry, contribute greatly to epistemic goodness or value in the sense that relates it to final value, or the kind of value shared by genuine achievements of all kinds.

7. Pluralism in Focus
The foregoing sections describe Dewey’s approach to reflective morality, and what appear to us the most natural epistemic analogues of his “three independent factors in morals.” We provided reasons to affirm that each of the three factors—agent reliability, synchronic, and diachronic epistemic rationality—contributes something important to epistemic evaluations of agents and their beliefs, and that epistemology as a field of study would be impoverished if any one of these factors gets ignored. Moreover, we argued that the exclusivist claims that attend the systems built upon a privileging of any one of the three are all of them unconvincing. In this concluding section we reveal some important implications of this negative argument, but our primary objective is to provide a positive account of the kind of epistemic pluralism that we advocate. Our axiological epistemic value pluralism consists of two core claims. On the one hand, we conceive of our three factors as functionally independent from one another. But the functional independence of these factors does not imply their isolation from one another. On the contrary, we view the three factors as reciprocally augmentative of one another.

We have described our account of epistemic normativity as “pluralistic,” but this can mean various things. Some epistemologists who describe themselves as epistemic value pluralists may intend opposition to veritism and other forms of epistemic value monism that view true belief as the single “core” goal of intellectual life. While veritists commonly accept just enough of the
pragmatist critique to qualify this core goal as “interesting” true belief, virtue responsibilists (including Kvanvig, Elgin, Hookway, and Zagzebski) hold that this conception of epistemic ends is not comprehensive enough. Responsibilists often claim that epistemology should widen its scope to include theoretical understanding and wisdom among the several desirable goals of intellectual life. For some of these authors, a pluralistic account of epistemic goods is supported by a somewhat eudaimonistic account of the intellectually good life in which true belief plays a still vital but more limited role in our overall cognitive economy. Let’s call these versions of epistemic value pluralism “teleological pluralism,” since they identify a number of desirable epistemic goals.

Although our account of epistemic value pluralism is consistent with teleological pluralism, the philosophical upshot of our novel approach has not been the need to accept teleological pluralism but, more precisely, axiological pluralism. Our epistemic analogue of Dewey’s moral pluralism calls into question three leading theories of epistemic normativity: reliabilist externalism, evidentialist internalism, and motivation-based or “pure” virtue epistemologies. The one-sidedness of these competing systems does not rest upon the poverty of their accounts of epistemic aims, but rather on the poverty of their reductive accounts of the sources of epistemic normativity or goodness. Axiological pluralism corresponds most closely to our critique of reliabilists, internalists, and virtue epistemologists who might claim that their approach provides a full account of epistemic normativity. Our pluralism is best conceived as antithetical to value reductivism, but not necessarily to a certain kind of value monism, for inquiry functions as the unifying consideration in our study of a plurality of epistemic goods, even if the value of our three factors is not reducible to the contributions they make to inquiry. In other words, while responsible inquiry entails the goods of reliability and synchronic and diachronic rationality, responsible inquiry itself needn’t be understood as an additional, independent good.

The reciprocal relationship between agent reliability, synchronic epistemic rationality, and diachronic rationality reveals the non-reductive side of our epistemic value pluralism. Within the ongoing process of inquiry, each of the three factors we have identified supports the other two. Thus, no single factor carries the whole load of epistemic value, and no one factor serves as the supremely final value toward which the other two aim. In this way, the reciprocal relationship among the factors grounds our rejection of both foundational and teleological reductivism. Agent reliability, synchronic epistemic rationality, and diachronic epistemic rationality are parts of the process of every responsible inquiry. But it is a mistake to conceive of these three factors as wholly distinct and insulated processes themselves. Diachronic epistemic rationality may lead to the cultivation of habits that help us to manage luck better than we have in past inquiries. It is a source of “thick” epistemic values, including epistemic responsibility in inquiry, and evidence growth. If ongoing inquiry occasions increased awareness of the potential impact of veritic and/or environmental luck and makes the inquirer take this into account when forming beliefs in future inquiries, then the inquirer grows as a responsible epistemic agent by strengthening her agent reliability. In like fashion, awareness of past instances of
knowledge-precluding luck may be internalized and incorporated into evidentiary and justificatory considerations, thus contributing to synchronic or propositional justification. Similarly, diachronic epistemic rationality may contribute to synchronic epistemic rationality by making the inquirer more diligent in the search for evidence, more sensitive to the salience of discovered evidence, and more assiduous in the processing of that evidence. It is a mistake to view inquiry as a process that unilaterally builds upon or proceeds from a foundation or starting point in either agent reliability, synchronic epistemic rationality, or in diachronic epistemic rationality. The three factors that we have identified in this essay are not steps in a unilateral process, but rather reciprocally related features of the ongoing process of inquiry.

But if these factors are so intimately related and mutually supportive of one another, then in what sense are they “independent” factors? To understand each of the three independent factors, qua primary sources of epistemic goodness, we need to remove them from the setting of the reductionist theories that distort them even as they claim exclusive conceptual or explanatory primacy for them. Thus “synchronic rationality” is epistemically valuable, but its contribution to epistemic value is distorted by claim of internalists like Conee and Feldman that it constitutes a complete account of epistemic responsibility. Diachronic rationality is similarly distorted by those robust forms of virtue epistemology that strictly identify value and virtue; and a reliable causal etiology of belief is valuable, though its contribution to epistemic value, too, is distorted by those reliabilist theories that ignore value-driven concerns or that succumb to the naturalistic temptation of supposing that we can do away with the need to talk about good reasons, and talk only about causes of belief in the process sense.

The three factors that we have identified function as independent factors in the practice of epistemic evaluation. By claiming that our three independent factors are functionally distinct we aim to say something about the roles that these factors play in those epistemic inquiries that aim to turn out evaluative judgments about epistemic goods. We thereby ground the independence of our three factors in epistemic practice. As we have explained earlier in this paper, each of our three factors has proven useful for making evaluative judgments. Each factor offers a distinct focus around which to organize epistemic evaluations. To put it another way, each factor represents a different evaluative tool to help us make judgments about persons’ claims to a host of epistemic goods (including knowledge, justification, virtue, understanding, and so on). However, since each factor is a part of every inquiry, which factor we appeal to when adjudicating claims to epistemic goodness is to be determined by our aims or interests in particular cases. To borrow a term from Daniel Dennett, we can adopt an agent-reliability “stance,” a synchronic rationality “stance,” or a diachronic rationality “stance” toward the claim in question. It is possible that it is more appropriate to adopt one of these stances rather than either of the others in certain contexts. Indeed, it would be helpful to know whether there are types of cases in which it is more appropriate to appeal, for instance, to agent-reliability than it is to appeal to either synchronic or diachronic rationality. It is perhaps possible to describe these types of cases, but we are not prepared to offer the
requisite descriptions at this time. However, we suspect that the grounds for
distinguishing types of cases are most appropriately located in the aims and
interests of epistemological inquirers than in features of particular epistemic
situations, conceived independently of those aims and interests. Agent reliability,
synchronic epistemic rationality, and diachronic epistemic rationality are
independent factors in evaluative epistemic practice. Which factor best serves
our aims and interests in our epistemic agency and modes of inquiry should
function as the desideratum in a given evaluation.

The real contributions of our independent factors approach to epistemic
value or goodness remain unrecognized, because treatment of reliability and
synchronic and diachronic epistemic rationality have too often been held captive
to the reductive ambitions of the various competing accounts of epistemic
normativity. We see the situation in epistemology as one of staleness and
stalemate over debates that are sustained by these questionable efforts. The
tactic of “centralists,” for example, always involves the attempt to reduce thick
epistemic normativity to one or another thin form (consequentialist or
deontological). But even virtue theorists, who are non-centralist in orientation,
often make the judgments of a phronemos serve to identify or even define the
thin concepts of rightness or justification. Yet, as our reciprocally nuanced
pluralism suggests, it is not clear that reliability and synchronic and diachronic
rationality are related to thick and thin normative concepts in any simple and
straightforward ways. Furthermore, the internalist/externalist debate is in part
directly traceable to a failure to properly distinguish between the norms of
personal justification and doxastic justification (M. Engel 1992, 137), as well as
evaluative and deontic concepts.

One implication of our approach may be that there is more of philosophical
interest in the study of habits and strategies in the first-personal or zetetic
context of inquiry. As Todd Lekan puts it, we need to attend more directly “to the causes
and conditions of deliberation itself. That is, we need to foster those conditions
that equip people with habits that enable effective delib-
eration.” (2006, 270, n. 8; Compare Dewey LW 2, 94-95). For the inquiry pragmatist there should be
optimism about a “general theory of value” comparing moral, epistemic, and
other kinds of value (Axtell 2009, Olson 2007b). There is an interest in this topic,
and there is an interest in empirical studies of agent responsibility and the
evidence for or against robust and global intellectual virtues. But there is
decidedly less of interest in between these concerns, and in the projects of
conceptual analysis for knowledge and epistemic justification around which the
internalism/externalism debate is shaped.

Our view has some decidedly “deflationary” implications for debates based
around the presumed incompatibility of accounts that focus on the role of any of
the three factors. But the axiological pluralism we have endorsed need not be
thought to deny altogether the usefulness of mutually-exclusive internalist and
externalist conceptual analyses of propositional knowledge and justification.
While the reductionistic spirit is certainly present in these and other attempts to
define mutually-exclusive conceptual analyses, our approach does not preclude
them but largely by-passes them. It could be the case that reliability is the main
requirement for some epistemic aims, while other concepts are best analyzable in terms of certain internalist requirements. But we think these matters are only cleared up once the independence and more especially the reflexivity of the three factors is acknowledged, and so we are simply not interested here in claims on behalf, for instance, of a reliabilist account of knowledge or an evidentialist account of justification, or a virtue-based account of understanding and wisdom. Pragmatists see theorizing as an extension of our practices, and as characteristic of those practices rather than as a self-contained activity isolated from them (Lekan 2006, 253).

Works Cited


