

[manuscript which became Chapter 3 of *Textual Politics*;
for Figures and References, see the book]

DISCOURSES IN CONFLICT: HETEROGLOSSIA AND TEXT SEMANTICS

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Basic to the textual politics of any text are the discourse patterns that, from somebody's point of view, stand opposed to it.

There are very few matters in a complex and diverse society about which there is only one discourse. Each different social or political point of view, each school of thought constructs its own discourse formation: it speaks of the matter in its own way. Although many discourse formations try to seem autonomous and self-sufficient, attempting to create the ideologically functional impression that they are simply presenting their viewpoint in the most natural way possible, it is always possible to detect in them what Bakhtin called their implicit dialogue with other points of view, other discourses on the same subject.

It can in fact sometimes be difficult to tell whether two different discourse formations are indeed talking about "the same thing" or not. Since each of them constructs the subject matter by what they have to say about it and how they say it, there is always a sense in which they are not speaking of exactly "the same thing." If one discourse says that the freedom fighters are being kept in a concentration camp, while the other says that the terrorists are being held in a prison (cf. Mansfield 1987), the reader has to do some substantial work to construct a unity between these discourses. It is not enough simply to substitute some words in one for apparently corresponding words in the other: the semantic relationships between prisons and terrorists are not the same as those between freedom fighters and concentration camps.

Even more importantly, we interpret the meaning of what each of the two discourses says in relation to two different sets of intertexts. Using one set, we may conclude that the terrorists are prisoners, and also criminals, and suppose therefore that they have had a trial and been found guilty of specific violations of civilized law (though in fact in the discourses in question these suppositions are often unwarranted). Using the other set, we may conclude that someone's freedom is being threatened by people who act with no regard for civilized jurisprudence but intern people without trial. Reading one discourse we are led to side with the authorities; reading the other, to side with those defending themselves from oppression. Are these discourses really talking about "the same thing?"

Is abortion the "murder of an unborn child" or the "termination of an unwanted pregnancy"? Is there a neutral discourse here? Or would any pretense of neutrality, as in a scientific or medical discourse about abortion, still be seen by some discourse communities as an abdication of moral responsibility? If children were being murdered, who would accept a dispassionately clinical discourse as morally appropriate (cf. the pseudo-scientific accounts of "experiments" performed on Nazi concentration-camp inmates). In highly polarized discourse communities, where even a "neutral" position may represent a special interest (that of the medical community's assertion of its special prerogatives, or similarly, say, those of the journalistic community), that we most clearly see textual politics, and heteroglossia, in action.

In these extreme circumstances, every speaker or writer is forced to choose sides, or is taken by one side or another as having done so. Every utterance, every text, represents a political act because it cannot ignore the polarization of the community. Admittedly, these are extreme cases, but they illustrate a universal phenomenon: we cannot make meaning outside the system of discourses of our community, not as speakers and writers nor as listeners and readers. Every text requires that we bring to it a knowledge of other texts (its intertexts) to create or interpret it, and members of different social groups (whether defined by gender, age, social class, religion, political affiliation, occupation, etc.) will in general bring different intertexts to bear, will speak with different discourse voices and listen with different discourse dispositions.

Heteroglossia in Bakhtin's original sense meant simply the diversity of social languages, socially defined discourse types in a community. But in a more fully developed social theory of the role of language and discourse in society (as in Chapters 1 and 2), we need to understand that these different discourse voices are not simply different: they are also

systematically related to one another, and related in ways that depend on the wider social relations between the subcommunities that use them.

Discourses, in the sense of recurring discourse types or formations, are not simply the product of our dispositions and our deployment of lexis and grammar. They are also themselves a resource to be deployed (a symbolic capital in Bourdieu's terms). As writers and as readers, whether we explicitly refer to discourses other than our own or not, we make use of the existence and widespread currency of other discourses because we must always take them into account, must always be at least implicitly in dialogue with them.

How do we deploy these resources? How do we write and read meanings differently against the background of intertexts from different and competing discourses?

Ultimately we do it by the lexical, grammatical, and semantic means at our disposal (in speech we have also the resources of sound, e.g. of a sneering or a mocking accent; and in general we also have the resources of other, especially visual, semiotic systems: caricatures, "scare quotes", etc.). What are those means and how do we use them? We need to have good answers to this question in order to go beyond generalities and specifically link what is said and how it is said in one discourse to the different semantic patterns constructed in another discourse. Then we can ask how it happens that these discourses have come to be as they are, and come to be used by some people rather than others, people who have particular social relations to one another as members of particular social groups.

If we are to have a social model of discourse as part of a general theory of social processes, then at some point we have to get very specific about what is actually said and done in a particular social event or text. Since so much of our viewpoint toward the world and social issues are constructed in language, and since we know more today about how language works than we do about any other system of semiotic resources, linking the phenomenon of social heteroglossia to the actual semantic patterns constructed in particular texts is an important task. That is what I will try to do in this chapter.

Heteroglossia and Text Semantics

Before we actually begin analyzing the two texts I want to present, we need first to head off some potential, and common, misunderstandings. First, the heteroglossic relations between two texts cannot be deduced solely on the basis of what is said in the texts. Heteroglossic relations are, above all, social and political relations. They must be construed, or constructed, by someone, from some point of view. This is of course done with reference to what is said in the texts, but it is perfectly possible for two texts to be counted as instances of compatible discourse formations from one point of view in the community and as instances of totally opposed and incompatible discourses from another viewpoint.

So what we have to examine here are two interdependent uses of language: (1) the discourse's construction of "the way the world is" (its ideational, representational, or presentational thematic) meaning and its viewpoint toward this state of affairs (its orientational or attitudinal meaning), and (2) the discourse's (and our own) construction of the heteroglossic relations between it and other possible discourses. The latter is a meta-discursive use of language (i.e. discourse about discourses). This can get complicated!

All these constructions employ the same basic resources: the semantic resources of language. What are those resources? In one sense we can say that they are the resources of lexis (words) and grammar (wording). In another sense we can say that they are all the possible kinds of meanings that can be made with language, i.e. that can be made through words and wordings. If we allow this to include texts of any length, then we pretty much have all the meanings made in the community. (In practice of course, we need to take into account the total context of use of language, including associated actions and visual representations.) If we initially restrict ourselves to the meanings that can be made with a single grammatical clause, it is possible, as Halliday has done (e.g. 1978, 1985a), to sort out the semantic resources available to us into three major kinds.

The first of these, Halliday's ideational (or experiential) resources, deal mainly with specifying what kind of process or relationship we are talking about (material action, sensory perception, identity, location, etc.), what the participants in the process or relationship are (agents, beneficiaries, targets, sensors, phenomena, locations, etc.), and various relevant circumstances (time, place, manner, etc.).

The second kind Halliday calls interpersonal resources. They enable us to specify the kind of speech-act relation between speaker and addressee (statement, question, command), and the attitude or stance of speakers both toward addressees (friendly, formal, hostile) and toward the ideational content of their own discourse (certain or doubtful, pleased or displeased).

The third kind are textual resources. They enable us to shift the starting point and relative prominence of information within the clause, and to connect the meaning of what is said in one part of the clause to what is said in another (or even in a different clause).

But we do not make meaning just with single clauses. We make meanings by combining clauses into long spoken chains of clauses, or the sentences and paragraphs of conventional writing. And of course language gives us the means to do this as well: the means to create, or at least suggest to the reader, a continuity of ideational, interpersonal, and textual meaning. Any resource that enables us to project continuity obviously also allows us to construct changing patterns of ideational meanings, interpersonal stances, and textual organization and informational prominence. And some of these larger, complex patterns become socially institutionalized in the sense that they come to be repeated, with variations, in recognizable ways from one text to another, one occasion of discourse to another. They come to be discourse formations, genres, text types.

What I call text semantics (Lemke 1988a, 1989c, 1994b) deals specifically with such patterns of continuity and change in clause-level meaning across texts. In addition to my own work, there is a substantial literature making use of Halliday's analysis of clause-level semantic resources (e.g. Halliday 1977, 1982; Halliday & Martin 1993; Hasan 1984a, 1988; Martin 1989, 1992; Gregory & Malcolm 1981; Thibault 1986, 1991; Ventola 1991). It is possible, with some caution (Lemke 1983a, 1989c, 1992a), to separately trace out the patterns of ideational meaning that run through a text, and then to see in relation to them how interpersonal-attitudinal and textual-organizational meanings are also brought to bear. The caution is because these three kinds of resources are intimately interdependent on one another in real text; all three kinds of resources contribute to all three kinds of meaning-making. It is only in a very specialized sense (Halliday 1978, Hasan 1994, Martin 1992) that each kind of resource has as its primary, original, or most direct semantic function the making of a particular kind of meaning.

I prefer to define the kinds of meaning as primary, and then to look at how all the different resources contribute to their construction, continuity, modulation, and change across a text (Lemke 1989c; 1990a: chapter 8; 1992a). I also somewhat generalize Halliday's original typology in order to describe what I see happening most typically in text semantics. We construct with the semantic resources of language (and in more general contexts with the resources of other semiotic systems as well) three simultaneous kinds of meaning:

Presentational: the construction of how things are in the natural and social worlds by their explicit description as participants, processes, relations, and circumstances standing in particular semantic relations to one another across meaningful stretches of text, and from text to text

Oriental: the construction of our orientational stance toward present and potential addressees and audiences, and toward the presentational content of our discourse, in respect of social relations and evaluations from a particular viewpoint, across meaningful stretches of text and from text to text

Organizational: the construction of relations between elements of the discourse itself, so that it is interpretable as having structure (constituent, whole-part relations), texture (continuities and similarities, with differences within these), and informational organization and relative prominence across meaningful stretches of text and from text to text.

You will probably have noticed that these definitions (they are really only descriptions) present these meanings as made not only within a text but also "from text to text", and this is very important.

All meaning is intertextual. No text is complete or autonomous in itself; it needs to be read, and it is read, in relation to other texts. Which other texts? Each community, each discourse tradition, has its own canons of intertextuality, its own principles and customs regarding which texts are most relevant to the interpretation of any one text (cf. Lemke 1985). In our own community, texts are more relevant for one another's interpretation the more they share the same patterns of presentational meaning. Among such texts, those that also share the same orientational stances, or are considered instances of the same discourse formation or heteroglossic social discourse, are considered more relevant or appropriate intertexts, other things being equal. Purely organizational dimensions of meaning-making in texts are least considered,

but since genres tend to combine particular organizational conventions with some rather than other presentational meanings and orientational stances, they are never entirely irrelevant either.

This viewpoint has some far-reaching implications. For one thing it no longer considers words as such to have meanings. Words have meaning potential, a range of possible meanings that we abstract from all their actual uses, but their relevant meaning potential in a given text is always severely restricted by the pattern of presentational or orientational meanings they help to express. And their actual, specific meaning for us in a given text depends critically on that pattern. These patterns, which in the case of presentational meanings I call thematic patterns or thematic formations (Lemke 1983a, 1990a) are fundamentally intertextual. The same patterns recur from text to text in slightly different wordings, but recognizably the same, and each wording can be mapped onto a generic semantic pattern that is the same for all. I take these thematic patterns, appropriately modified or subclassified where necessary to take into account the dependence of presentational meaning on the orientational stance of the discourse (in which case I will call them heteroglossic discourse formations or voices) as the irreducible units of text-meaning.

Text meaning is not reducible to or recoverable from word meaning potential alone. Text meaning is made by using thematic patterns as the direct meaning-making resource. Thematic patterns include the semantic relations which words (or more abstractly the thematic items which the words express) consistently have from one text to another, or from one part of a text to another. Just as a word has only a general meaning potential which is narrowed by its context of use, and especially by the words it is grammatically linked to, so even the semantic relations between two words still represent only a potential range of meaning relations. It is only when we have a full pattern, usually consisting of many thematic items with relatively constant semantic relations (which are now their thematic relations) that we can reasonably identify the kinds of definite meaning that we ordinarily associate with words.

Another way to say this is that texts and thematic patterns are elements of the system of meanings, they are units of meaning, they have meaning. Words as such are not units of meaning and do not "have" meaning. They are, rather, elements of the system of grammatical resources which we use to construct meanings. Lexis and grammar, wordings, are the tools, the resources; we use those tools to create meanings. An utterance, a social act of meaning-making, is a text. It has meaning, or has meaning construed for it, on the basis of the thematic patterns we take it as instancing on that occasion.

A clause is also a unit of grammar, but, like a word, it can realize an utterance, can be the whole of a text. It is as utterance, as text, that we make single words or clauses mean, and not as isolated lexical or grammatical units.

Of course thematic patterns are not the whole story. They are just the most linguistically and culturally salient contextualizations of a wording in terms of which it has meaning for us. Even more culturally (but not linguistically) salient is the context of situation, what is happening socially and materially in terms of events and actions, of which the utterance or text is an integral part. Wordings have specific meanings for us in relation to this sort of context as well. For example, "G'day!" or "Fuck you!" are utterances for which the presentational thematics is largely irrelevant and only the orientational-attitudinal meaning of the social situation really counts. In a more specialized sense, as I have already said, it is not the thematic pattern alone, but the whole discourse formation, including the attitudinal stance of its heteroglossic voice, that provides the critical linguistic context for the meaning of an utterance or text, constructed from words and wordings.

Text semantics is also not in principle reducible to the formal analysis of propositions or their truth values. Meaning is a more fundamental category of analysis than truth. "Truth" is just one of the meanings we can make about a proposition, and it is not a meaning we can make about questions, commands, requests, offers, etc. unless we turn them into statements or propositions. Propositions do not even exhaust the meanings that can be made with a single clause, much less text meanings. Propositional formal semantics is based on a particular linguistic trick. Any statement, say "John is coming", can be embedded in another clause, say: "It is ... that John is coming." Halliday refers to this kind of embedded statement as a fact and contrasts it with similar constructions (Halliday 1985: 227-251). In the framing clause I have chosen, what can fill the blank are Attributes of embedded clauses, or, loosely, of propositions. Truth-value theories of propositional semantics are based on privileging just one of these Attributes, truth.

But in the semantics of English, abstracted from all the discourses in which such constructions appear, we discover that there are many such Attributes which propositions can have, and that they are all evaluations. We can meaningfully say, for example, that it is good, useful, unfortunate, unusual, important, appropriate, or likely that John is coming, but we do not meaningfully say that it is red, large, abstract, or grammatical that John is coming. Systematic analysis of the

kinds of orientational meaning we can make specifies pretty much what sorts of predicates are evaluative and in what ways. There are a small number of different kinds of evaluations (Desirability, Probability or Warrantability, Necessity or Obligation, Usuality, Significance, etc.) that turn up not just in the evaluations of embedded statements, but all over the grammar and lexicon of English (e.g. modal auxiliary verbs, modal adverbs, verbs of mental process, etc.; see Halliday 1985:332-341; Martin 1992:412-415, 533-536; Lemke 1989c, 1992a, and in preparation).

Among the many evaluative attributes (or predicates) that an embedded statement (or proposition) can have are those in the class we could call Warrantability, Probability, or relative Certitude. It is one of several classes of attitudinal stance a speaker can take toward the content of his or her own discourse. And within it there falls in a particular option (whose existence follows a general pattern also found in the other classes), a particular kind and degree of evaluation of this sort, expressed most commonly by the attribute true. Truth is just a common foot soldier in a much larger semantic army, just one among many attributes of propositions deriving from the system of orientational and attitudinal stances our culture and language allows speakers to take toward the presentational content of their own discourse. It can hardly be a candidate for the ground or basis of all meaning. The fact that historically it has been, and for many philosophers today still is, should make us look critically at the wider discourses in which it is embedded, and inquire into their ideological functioning. But that is not our task at the moment.

Discourses in Conflict

I want to use two texts to illustrate how to construct heteroglossic relations between discourses from an analysis of their different text-semantic patterns. These texts belong to two different social communities, each of which sees itself as opposed in social interests and viewpoints to the other: Christian fundamentalists who regard homosexuality as sinful and oppose full civil rights for gay citizens, and secular gay activists who oppose both the views of Christian fundamentalist groups and their right to write these views into law.

There are clearly differences of values between these groups, and there are also differences, as we shall see, in how they present the-way-things-are-in-the-world.

Each of these texts shows its author to be aware of the divergence between his discourse and the discourse of the other community. Our analysis will show more specifically how that divergence arises from differences in thematic patterns and value orientations toward them, and how each discourse internally constructs its heteroglossic relations to the other. (This viewpoint, by the way, makes talk about "authorial" belief or intention merely a customary metaphor; authors may make meaning in the context of the production of a text, but readers do this work in the context of interpreting it. Similarities in the meanings made on these two occasions are characteristics of the community's meaning-making practices, and not characteristics of authors, readers, or texts as such. Cf. Lemke 1989b on the semiotics of object-texts vs. meaning-texts.)

To more fully appreciate the larger system of heteroglossia in which these texts are interpreted in the community at large, we should also be aware that these are only two of many social discourse voices on the subject of homosexuality and gay rights. Fundamentalist Christian discourse, while relatively monolithic, still shows considerable diversity on these matters, including outright support of positive gay relationships (e.g. Johnston 1983). The larger community of mainstream Christian denominations has a very wide range of views, in relation to which those of the fundamentalist text we will read are fairly extreme. On the side of the gay community, the second text represents a fairly mainstream, majority view, but there are also some gay Christians who regard their homosexual orientations or actions as sinful, and some gay activists who would take a more radically critical view of the basic values of mainstream Christian discourse. Each of these communities has its own Discourses, and reads any text in relation to its own system of intertextuality, which in turn embodies its own beliefs and evaluative attitudes.

We will see that these texts explicitly invoke still other discourse formations about homosexuality and gay civil rights, ones that originate in still other communities: medical, psychiatric, psychological, sociological, and legal discourses. We will see that in most cases it is not necessary to know a particular intertext in order to interpret the text we are reading: any (co-thematic) intertext of the relevant discourse formation will probably do just as well. It is the relevant thematic patterns we need to be familiar with, and the value stances associated with them by particular social discourse voices.

Text 1: The Discourse of the "Moral Majority"

To suggest		1Aa
that	homosexuality is a sickness	1B
or that	it is a physical condition	1Ca
	caused by biological facts	1Cb
rather than	an emotional and mental condition	1D
	is highly blasphemous.	1Ab
The Bible tell us		2A
that	the cause of homosexuality is sin.	2B
	A person is not born a homosexual;	3A
	he becomes one according to his sinful will.	3B
	A person lets sin and the devil take control of his life.	4

Our first text is the fifth paragraph of what its source (Liberty Home Bible Institute, n.d.) calls a "commentary," presumably on the Christian Bible, though possibly on its topic, homosexuality.

I want to begin with a dynamic reading, taking the text phrase by phrase and attempting to see how we might make sense of it as we go, i.e. as we unfold the text in linear time. Normal visual reading is not generally quite so strictly linear, since we can and sometimes do see and process "ahead" in the text when it is laid out visibly before us. The dynamic mode of interpretation is more usual for spoken language, but it is useful as a general analytical technique. It should always be complemented by synoptic reading, in which, as literary criticism does, we interpret each part of the text in relation to the whole, frozen outside of the stream of time and the action of reading or hearing. Both modes of reading are extremes and somewhat artificial, and each produces rather different insights into text semantics and textual politics. We will read the second text in this chapter more synoptically.

I am also somewhat artificially extracting this text fragment from its surrounding text. For a dynamic reading, only the preceding text is relevant; for synoptic, both preceding and following text is. Our purpose here is to examine the process of meaning-making, rather than to achieve the fullest explication of the meanings that can be made with this particular text. As we get into the fragment, we will look back at the role of whatever precedes the phrase currently in focus.

"To suggest that ..." is a beginning [1Aa] which projects (Halliday 1985: 227-251) some discourse to follow (i.e. [1B], [C], and [D]), whether we take this to have been actually uttered or merely "thought" (i.e. constructed in language without public utterance). It embeds the projected clause(s) in an infinitive phrase which stands here as a potential subject for some predicate. The suggestion we are about to hear is a suggestion about which something further, the predicate, will then be said (i.e. [1Ab]), completing a grammatical, and semantic, structural unit, the 1A clause. As is customary with beginnings, we are being set up for what is coming. The specific semantic content of this setting up comes from the semantic class of the verb "suggest." It is a verb, as we have seen, of mental or verbal process (cf. Halliday 1985: 106-112, 129-131) which contrasts with others such as assert in a way which in fact constructs orientational meaning as well as presentational. That is, not only are we told that someone may be doing something (suggesting), but the writer has chosen to characterize this action for us in a way that makes the implied Sayer (Suggester) seem somewhat tentative about whatever he or she is about to say.

When we find out later [1Ab] that the writer considers such a suggestion a terrible thing to have made, we realize, retrospectively, that to have asserted it would have been even worse, that the negative evaluation of it is actually strengthened by choosing the word suggest (as if "even to suggest, much less to assert ..." is terrible), and that using the infinitive here allows this terrible deed to remain at least in the realm of the hypothetical (irrealis). As it stands, there is no actual Sayer identified; the infinitive requires no grammatical subject in this role. We will be left to wonder just who might suggest such a terrible thing.

But at [1Aa] we do not yet know that this suggestion will be terrible, only that a supposition is being made that such a suggestion is possible. With [1B] we begin to hear the suggestion, "that homosexuality is a sickness." Suggestions are not normally a thematic topic (except possibly for linguists and philosophers), but homosexuality certainly is. There are in the community, and available to actual and potential readers of this text, quite a range of possible discourses about

homosexuality, each of which constructs a particular set of thematic formations (statements about who is doing what, how one matter is related to another, etc.) and also constructs a set of orientational stances toward these thematic states-of-affairs (i.e. that they are possible or real, desirable or terrible, normal or surprising, etc.). Each of these discourses creates its own defined "ideological-axiological" world in Bakhtin's terms (see Chapter 2, and recall that his "ideological" would be better translated as "ideational," i.e. thematic or presentational in my terms).

The bare proposition, a presentational or thematic semantic clause, [1B], does not yet tell us the stance of the writer towards it. We can well imagine at this point that he agrees with it, since it certainly seems, as expressed, to be a variant of the thematic-evaluative pattern: /HOMOSEXUALITY IS SICK/, which is mainly orientational-attitudinal (i.e. we don't like homosexuality, we think it is bad) in its usage, but which still has to express some presentational meaning (viz., that it is a characteristic or attribute of Homosexuality that it is "sick"). [1B] foregrounds the thematics a bit more, saying that it is "a sickness." It constructs an Identification relation (cf. Halliday 1985: 112-128) between two thematic items, /HOMOSEXUALITY/ and /SICKNESS/ and at the same time (Halliday shows how usual this is, pp. 115-118) a relation of Token to Type, that the one is a specific instance of the more general other.

It will turn out, however, that in this writer's discourse, while homosexuality is certainly considered bad, it is for reasons that are to be strongly distinguished from anything having to do with sickness, and the view that homosexuality is a kind of sickness is something to be rejected in the strongest terms. This text shows very well the importance of analytically distinguishing the presentational or thematic content of a discourse from the attitudes it constructs toward that content. Both of these basic discourse functions are performed in every semantic unit of the text, often by the same words, but it is still useful to distinguish them as distinct aspects of the meaning we make with the text.

The next clause constructs a thematic proposition that we can represent as:

/HOMOSEXUALITY -- Tok/Val -- [PHYSICAL CONDITION]/,

where I am using a notation (Lemke 1983a, 1990a) based on Halliday's analysis of identifying clauses which relate a Token (the instance) to its Value (the type, class, or general case). Dynamically, in the text up to this point, we are still in the dark about the attitude to this possible state-of-affairs, and might well read it in isolation as a plausible and neutral element of a scientific discourse on the topic. We also need to take into account, however, the organizational dimension of meaning in this text. Clause [1Ca] is not isolated, but is grammatically and cohesively (cf. Halliday & Hasan 1976) linked to [1B] and to [1A].

The parallelism in wording between [1B] and [1Ca] is matched by the semantic parallelism in the thematic content of the two clauses, further strengthening their cohesion (cf. Hasan 1984a on cohesive harmony). The organizational relations here are signalled most explicitly by the conjunctions "that ... or that ..." interpretable as being logically linked by alternative-or rather than disjunctive-or. That is, [1B] and [1Ca] are to be read as two different ways of saying more or less the same thing, rather than as mutually exclusive of one another. This makes sense in a thematic universe (i.e. in terms of intertexts) in which:

/SICKNESS --Tok/Val-- [PHYSICAL CONDITION]/.

The relevance of this thematic formation (i.e. thematic pattern shared by many such intertexts) is reinforced by [1Cb], which specifies this as a physical condition "caused by biological facts," which would certainly be a commonplace of such a physicalist or medical discourse. So, in this possible discourse world, it is clear that if we consider homosexuality to be a sickness, we could clearly also consider it to be a physical condition caused by biological facts, since that is more or less what a sickness is in commonsense discourse. So [1B] and [1Ca-b] are to be taken as two suggestions of more or less the same thing for the purposes of this text.

If we wish to interpret a little further, we might in fact wonder what further specific discourses are relevant to the implied thematic connection that "homosexuality ... is caused by biological facts." Many readers might immediately read this against the background of many familiar intertexts, i.e. through the thematic pattern or formation of texts in which it is specifically genetic biological facts that might be said to cause homosexuality. But we have as yet no warrant in this text for doing so.

[1D] is introduced by the clearly disjunctive (more precisely replacive, Halliday 1985: 207-210) conjunction "rather than," which sets up a thematic contrast between mutually exclusive alternatives. The specific alternative here is "an

emotional and mental condition." Again the grammatical and lexical parallelism of the alternatives is very strong, "homosexuality is a ... condition" in which what is contrasted are the specifiers or classifiers of "condition,"
/PHYSICAL-BIOLOGICAL/ vs. /EMOTIONAL-MENTAL/.

The text has now set up for us a contrast which we recognize as a common one in many possible intertexts. What the text has grammatically and lexically constructed for us is the salience or importance of this possible contrast for this text, for its discourse world.

When clause [1A] finally concludes with [1Ab], "is highly blasphemous," the orientational meaning, the evaluative attitude toward the thematics which precedes it, is finally (and from the dynamic reading point-of-view, retroactively) established. I will not go through the complex process by which this happens grammatically (see Lemke 1988c for more detailed analysis of both these texts), but only point out that while what is "blasphemous" grammatically is "to suggest ...," that semantically, it is the thematic proposition(s):

/HOMOSEXUALITY --Tok/Val-- [PHYSICAL-BIOLOGICAL CONDITION]/ (1)

on which the strongly negative evaluative attitude of /BLASPHEMOUS/ falls, transmitted to it, as it were, by the grammatical and cohesive links in the text, which at the same time reverse the effect on the other embedded proposition:

/HOMOSEXUALITY --Tok/Val-- [MENTAL-EMOTIONAL CONDITION]/ (2)

which is to be evaluated positively according to the discourse of this text (i.e. it is good to /SAY/ so, not necessarily good that it /IS/ so).

Even more importantly, what has been accomplished here in a single complex sentence, is to set up, and to OPPOSE to one another (cf. Lemke 1988c) two different intertextual thematic formations (ITFs): that of texts which assert or assume (1), and that of texts which assert or assume (2). It should be clear that these two ITFs do not have to be set up as being OPPOSED to one another; they could in some other text or set of texts be treated as CONSISTENT or compatible with one another, even as being simply VARIANTS of one another. But that is obviously not the case in Text 1.

The word "blasphemous" is striking. It occurs in a highly focal place in the sentence, in the most prominent New Information site and role (Halliday 1995: 274-281). It belongs, like most evaluative attributes (see Lemke, in preparation), to a semantic cline that is gradable by degrees, and it is of very high negative degree in Desirability just as a lexical item, and further strengthened by "highly." This extreme evaluation has the effect of even further contrasting the ITFs of (1) and (2) as OPPOSED.

But of course it also has a thematic force of its own, a presentational meaning. That meaning has to be construed in relation to some set of intertexts, to some ITF in which we are likely to meet /BLASPHEMOUS/ in the company of the other thematic items in this text. This word has a fairly restricted distribution among ITFs; it belongs most often to texts we notionally classify as speaking a religious or theological discourse. We will see that this text goes on to construct such a discourse, so that we can at some later point be more certain that this is not merely metaphorical hyperbole. In fact the very next phrase of the text takes us into this THEOLOGICAL ITF.

[2A], "the Bible tells us," has, as do all clauses, its thematic meaning, which here is parallel to and also subtly in contrast with [1Aa]. Tells, contrasting with the parallel suggests, is another projective verb of Saying; orientationally, it is much higher on the scale of Warrantability. This is reinforced by the Sayer here being "the Bible," which in this construction, in this ITF, is an authoritative Sayer. The Saying "tells" is also realis, contrasting with the more irrealis to suggest. [2A] also does more attitudinal work in relation to [1Ab]: to blaspheme is to speak against or in contradiction to God; what the Bible says is, in this discourse, the very contrary, God's own word. So just as [1Ab] cast its negative evaluative attitude over [1B-C], so we expect that [2A] will introduce thematic propositions which are not only authoritative (high on Warrantability or certainty) but also present beliefs that it is Desirable to hold. We can thus further expect them to develop a discourse about /HOMOSEXUALITY/ (the THEOLOGICAL ITF) which will contrast with that of [1B-C] (which from now on I will label as the BIOMEDICAL ITF).

The grammatical organization which links [2A] and [2B] establishes [2B] as part of the approved thematics of the THEOLOGICAL ITF. (Note that it might be more fully glossed as U.S. Fundamentalist Christian Anti-Homosexual Theological ITF; as we are analyzing it here, it is specific to this text, but this text was produced in and is mainly consumed by a subcommunity for whom many similar intertexts are available, and for whom it would be read in relation to this common intertextual pattern.) Presumably [3A] and [4A-B] are also part of this ITF, but notice that [3A] is in fact a negation of /Persons are born homosexual/, which can easily be read as an instance of the BIOMEDICAL ITF, in which it would be linked to [1C] by the common thematics of genetic biological determinism.

The cohesive parallelism of [3A] and [3B] again sets up a contrast between the denied BIOMEDICAL thematics of [3A] and the approved THEOLOGICAL (i.e. "Biblical") thematics of [3B]. In fact [3B] for the first time gives us a thematic proposition about homosexuality from the viewpoint of this THEOLOGICAL ITF which is recognizably framed in religious terms ("sinful"). [4] augments this, elaborating it with further signs of theological discourse ("sin," "the devil"). In terms of orientational meaning, we have not only the heteroglossic opposition of the BIOMEDICAL and THEOLOGICAL ITFs being carried further here, and the construction of approval for the THEOLOGICAL and condemnation of the BIOMEDICAL, but we also have, within the THEOLOGICAL thematics of [3B] and [4], further evaluative attitudes toward the state-of-affairs they present.

Becoming a homosexual, according to [3B], is the result (contrast with the causal explanation in [1Cb]) of "sinful will," and in this discourse clearly the negative evaluative attitude toward the cause is extended to the effect. In [4] this is even stronger as far as the negatively valued cause is concerned ("the devil"), though one perhaps needs the semantic linkage between "will" in [3B] and "lets" in [4] to see why [4] does not in fact exonerate the homosexual of sin as the victim of a superior power, "the devil."

I can well imagine that some readers even at this point are a bit confused about the text's theological logic. Full understanding does require familiarity with the ITF through other intertexts (discussed in Lemke 1988c), in which it becomes clear that what is at stake here is whether the homosexual has willfully chosen this path (the claim of this THEOLOGICAL ITF) or whether such persons have indeed no control over the matter (which is the conclusion the text would draw from the opposing BIOMEDICAL discourse formation).

[INSERT FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]

In Figure 3.1 I have tried to indicate some of the complexity of the heteroglossia in this text. There is one authorial speaking voice which ventriloquates (a Bakhtinian term) two discourse formations about /HOMOSEXUALITY/. It does this by using two meta-discourse moves (in [1A] and [2A]), which are contrasted with one another. By this means, and others, it constructs two thematic formations about the topic, approving one and disapproving the other, sets these two ventriloquated voices (the one it identifies with and the one it rejects) in heteroglossic OPPOSITION to one another, and constructs within each a causal explanation for homosexuality, one of which does not morally condemn it, the other of which does. Figure 3.1 shows the meta-discursive component and the heteroglossic OPPOSITION of the two ITFs, as well as their internal thematics and how these contrast semantically. It does not show the other attitudinal meaning constructions, and it deliberately abstracts away from the particular textual organization of the ITF thematics (see Lemke 1983a for why this is useful).

I want to turn now more briefly to Text 2 to see how the heteroglossic relations among ITFs reflect, and help to constitute, the social relations among subcommunities. The texts of a community's dominant discourse formations construct relations of ALLIANCE, OPPOSITION, etc. (see Lemke 1988c) among various thematic views of the world, including the views of other communities and their discourses. So, from each text's or community's point-of-view, there are systematic relations among discourses, which we can see as essentially sociological and ultimately political relations. It is an essential feature of how these relations are constructed in discourse (first emphasized by Bakhtin) that they always involve value judgments about the discourse of others, and by extension, about other communities. So deep is the connection between the presentational and the orientational dimensions of meaning-making, between what we say the state-of-affairs is and how we judge it, that even saying that something is, is always already a judgment (of Warrantability). It may well be that in making meaning from a viewpoint, it is impossible for discourse not to imply judgments on all the Orientational dimensions, including Desirability.

Text 2: The Discourse of Gay Rights

Text 2 (see Figure 3.2) is drawn from the fourth to seventh paragraphs of an article published in the leading national Gay magazine, *The Advocate* (Johnson, 1984). Under the title, "Gay as Religion: Free Thought in a Free Society," Johnson argues that restrictions on the civil rights of gays that are based on the religious objections of some Christian denominations to homosexuality contradict the constitutional separation of church and state in the U.S.

It is perhaps so obvious that we no longer take note of it, but the ideological basis of the right these denominations claim to write their particular beliefs into the common law is simply the presumption of their universal validity. Modernism, in order to supplant an older, religious worldview, found it necessary to adopt the principle that its truths too were inherently universal. Its truths, grounded in a scientific-rationalist worldview, were to take precedence over those of religion wherever the two were in conflict, but modernism could not challenge the principle that whatever was true was ipso facto universal. That step is only possible in the post-modernist view appropriate to a world in which no one cultural group has the power to enforce a claim to universality (though each may privately believe it). Moral relativism and moral tolerance are uneasy modernist allies, potentially corrosive of the fundamental modernist claim that real truths (i.e. those grounded in modernist science) are universal. Only the thin shield of the fact/value dichotomy prevents moral relativism from subverting scientific absolutism, the ground of modernist legitimacy. As we will see in later chapters, postmodernism gives up the defense of this ultimately untenable disjunction.

But meanwhile modernism continues its ancient war with religion, and particularly with absolutist, today "fundamentalist," Christianity. As a result, there exists at present, in our own community, a readily invoked heteroglossic OPPOSITION between modernist, scientific discourse formations and surviving, pre-modern religious discourse traditions. (Of course "mainstream" Christian discourse long ago made its accommodations with modernism, which is why it is the "mainstream," and why it marginalizes and disparages Fundamentalism.) In Text 1 we have seen this opposition at work between the BIOMEDICAL and THEOLOGICAL ITFs. In Text 2 the viewpoint is reversed, but a similar heteroglossic opposition is still constructed.

[INSERT FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]

In lines [4A] and [4Ba] two consecutive words of the text, the informationally focal final word of [4A], "religious," and the thematized first element of [4Ba], "scientific," are not immediately or directly contrasted with one another. It is only against the background of the widespread cultural construction of their opposition as worldviews that we initially sense an incipient contrasting of thematic formations here. To actually see how this text constructs two ITFs and a heteroglossic opposition between them, we need to identify recurring thematic-semantic patterns in the text, and to listen as well for the evaluative stances the text's own voice takes toward them (see Lemke 1988c).

Without pursuing the analysis in detail, we can still readily see that this text constructs two discourses about /HOMOSEXUALITY/: one it labels that of SCIENCE, the other that of FUNDAMENTALISM. In the first, homosexuality is "a normal variation"; in the second, it is a matter for "serious objection." In the first, claims are based on "scientific observation"; in the second, on "revealed" texts or "superstitions." Textual organizing and structuring devices such as the uses of "remaining/modern" [4A, 4Ba], "changed/modern" [4C], "look/no longer look" [4D-F], "shift" [5Aa], and "today" [6Aa], set up the contrast between the two thematic formations. There is also textual parallelism, foregrounding specific thematic contrasts (e.g. "texts/world" in [4E-F]).

Just as Text 1 used such expressions as "blasphemous" and "the Bible tells" to mark what was Warrantable and what was Desirable, what the text voice affiliated with or rejected, so Text 2 uses "scientific" and "superstitions" in the same ways. Note once again that simple clause- or sentence-level grammatical analysis is not sufficient to analyze the range of thematic propositions to which these attitudinal markers apply. A complex text-semantic analysis is necessary, operating at the level of the thematic formations themselves (details in Lemke 1988c). A diagram of the main ITFs and their relations is given in Figure 3.3.

[INSERT FIGURE 3.3 ABOUT HERE]

Just as in Text 1 it was not possible, in isolation, to interpret the meaning-contribution of clauses [1B-D] to the text, so in Text 2, for example, line [6Aa]:

Today homosexuality is understood to be a psychological condition

seems, in isolation, to belong to the same thematic pattern as, say, [1D] from Text 1:

... [homosexuality is] an emotional and mental condition

But in the context of the discourse formations which are being constructed and contrasted in these texts (and which define large sets of intertexts with similar thematics and viewpoints), these lines in fact instance completely different discourses about homosexuality. Line [1D] is interpretable in Text 1 only as an instance of its THEOLOGICAL ITF, and as meaning /NOT-BIOLOGICALLY-DETERMINED/ but /WILLFULLY-CHOSEN/. Whereas [6Aa] in context means roughly that homosexuality is a "simple" "personality" trait, rather than something "demonic" "criminal" or "mentally disordered." [6Aa] belongs to the SCIENTIFIC ITF of Text 2.

Note also that the FUNDAMENTALISM discourse of Text 2 is not identical to the THEOLOGICAL discourse of Text 1, nor is BIOMEDICAL identical to SCIENTIFIC. If we really want to read these two texts in relation to one another, to make them intertexts of one another, then we need to look to still wider cultural discourse formations to do so. That is, we need to be able to use the larger social system of heteroglossia, the thematic, attitudinal, and sociological relations among many texts in our community, as a resource. We need, for example, to acquaint ourselves with the specific discourse of "Facultative Psychology" that fundamentalists use as an alternative to mainstream "liberal humanist" psychology in interpreting [1D]. We need to examine the possible relations between the discourse of biological determinism of homosexuality (which Text 1 opposes) to the "Kinsey Report" science that seems to more closely represent the scientific worldview of Text 2. We need to understand the similarities and differences between how Fundamentalist views of homosexuality are set forth in their own texts and how they are described by text voices opposed to their discourse.

We are now deeply involved in textual politics. The interpretation of these texts, from the meanings of particular phrases to the force of their overall arguments, depends critically on where we situate ourselves among the discourse viewpoints of our community. Which intertexts do we use to interpret these texts? What kinds of relations do we make between them? What discourse patterns do we construct that seem to us validly invariant from one text to another? Textual meaning is not separable in principle from the rhetorical contexts of production and use of a text. If the meaning of any fragment of a text, from a word to a sentence, is defined to be the contribution of that fragment to the meaning of some larger unit, then we can see the pointlessness of trying to circumscribe "the meaning" of such fragments in isolation. Even when we resort to some notion of their most probable, frequent, or "unmarked" meanings, we are simply privileging some common contexts of use over others. The probabilities of co-occurrence of wordings and their larger textual, situational, and intertextual contexts is itself an essential resource for meaning-making. The very notion of meaning is vastly diminished if we neglect to model just how the meanings we make with wordings depend on these wider contexts.

Much the same holds true at a higher level: the social meanings of texts and discourses cannot be usefully isolated from their social contexts of production and use. Who speaks these ITFs? When? to whom? for what purposes? in whose interests? with what effects? Not uniquely, but typically. Ultimately we may concern ourselves with individual speakers, addressees, and sequences of social events, but we can usefully do so only in relation to the typical patterns of such things in our communities. What kinds of persons speak these discourses? what subcommunities do they belong to? what are the interests of these communities? how do their interests and agendas conflict with those of other communities? what discourses do these other communities speak? on what occasions? with what typical effects? How are larger-scale sociological relations between these communities, including relations of power and domination, enacted, maintained, strengthened, challenged, resisted, and changed through these kinds of social events, these kinds of discourses? This is the very heart of textual politics.

□