Part 1

Doing Identity Analysis: Articulation, Challenge, Resistance in the Narration of the Public and of the Self
Identity, Development and Desire: Critical Questions

Jay L. Lemke

The concept of ‘identity’ is increasingly being asked to bear a heavy theoretical burden in discourses concerned with education, learning, development, and the relation of the individual and the social. I would like to raise a number of critical questions about the concept of identity in hopes of stimulating discussion in the research community about its uses and limitations and how it might be refigured, elaborated or superseded by alternative conceptualizations.

From the perspective of a socio-cultural and historical analysis, we need to understand the ways in which the concept of identity functions in contemporary discourses as a mediating term between social-structural approaches and views of lived, interactional experience (Lemke, 1995: chs 2, 5). In this role the notion of identity inherits many features of earlier discourses framed in terms of soul, psyche, persona, personality, selfhood, subject, agency, and so forth. We also need to understand in what sense postmodern notions of identity embrace multiplicity and hybridity of social identities across both diverse human relationships and social categories such as gender, sexuality, class, culture, race, ethnicity, and so on:

- What are the implications of specifically relational notions of identity (e.g., Gergen, 1991) for its multiplicity and hybridity? How can identities be unitary or integrative when they function as part of our relationships with diverse members of our communities (elders and juniors, same gender and non-same gender, same and non-same class, ethnicity, and so forth)?
- If identities are enacted or performed (Butler, 1993), how are they influenced by feelings of desire and fear? What is the role of the body and physical interaction, dependence and vulnerability in shaping identity (body to body; body to environment, tools, foods, threats)? Is a single notion of identity protean enough to apply across different timescales of human activity? If not, how is the identity we enact across a momentary interaction to be distinguished from the sort of identity that we perform over decades (Goffman, 1961; Harre, 1979)?
Do we construct identities only from fixed semiotic options provided by our culture and its constraints? If not, how can we innovate and perform new kinds of identities that potentially subvert the normative formations of our communities? What role do transgressive identities play in social and cultural change?

Finally, what is the politics of the notion of identity? How does the spread of discourses framed in terms of this concept advance the interests of some in society over those of others? How do they re-inscribe existing power relations and/or challenge them and offer alternatives?

My aim in this chapter will not be the impossible task of comprehensively reviewing social theories of identity, but the more specific one of raising challenging questions for those of us who use this currently fashionable concept in our research and analysis. In particular, I will suggest and open for discussion three principal theoretical proposals:

- The multiplicity and hybridity of postmodern identities is not new or exceptional, but is rather the contemporary realization of the more general principle (Lemke, 2002a) that in identity development, we learn how to perform diverse relational identities in interaction with diverse others across the significant social divisions within our community, particularly age and gender, but also class, ethnicity, race, religion, and so on.

- The notion of identity needs to be more scale-differentiated: that is, we need a range of differentiated concepts from that of identity-in-practice on the short timescales of situated small-group activity, to notions of identity appropriate to larger institutional scales and lifespan development. Identities across timescales are integrated by means of the material continuity of bodies and other socially meaningful material constructions across time (Lemke, 2000, 2002b).

- Identities on all scales shape and are shaped by desires and fears rooted in human embodiedness and its subsistence needs, affordances for pleasure, and vulnerabilities to pain. The phenomenological experience of unique selfhood overflows social semiotic categories, both structural and agentive, as we create feeling as well as meaning for ourselves and others across the multiple timescales of our lives.

### 1.1 Identity is multiplex: why, and how?

As part of its inheritance from earlier notions such as personality, subject and soul, we tend initially to imagine an identity as unitary. Throughout my discussion, however, I want to emphasize its multiplicity. We act differently with children and with peers, in formal situations and informal ones, in our professional settings and in our intimate settings. We cumulate over
our lifetimes elements of identity that may have had their origins in childhood, adolescence and the many later ‘periods’ of our lives. We may claim affiliation with different cultures and with different institutions and act differently, playing different roles, foregrounding different ‘sides’ of our personality in each. We are always ourselves, but who we are, who we portray ourselves as being, who we are construed as being changes with interactants and settings, with age of life. Identities develop and change, they are at least multi-faceted if not in fact plural. Their consistency and continuity are our constructions, mandated by our cultural notions of the kinds of selves that are normal and abnormal in our community.

How do we characterize an identity? Most often we do so by using simplistic social categories that stand in for complex, multi-dimensional degrees of performance or fit in a high-dimensional space of gradable, socially significant traits of being or behaviour. Our ‘gender’ identity is never so simple as being just ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’. We may be more stereotypically masculine on some traits (aggressiveness, impassiveness, physical courage) and less so on others (strength, tolerance for pain, group leadership). We may at the same time also be more stereotypically feminine in some respects (cooperativeness, nurturance, sexual passivity). We may dress in stereotypically feminine clothes, but have a highly developed and defined musculature (female bodybuilder). We may be good at boys’ sports and like playing with dolls. What cultural stereotypes insist are ‘packages’ of traits that must, ‘by nature’, go together, are in social fact and in principle relatively independent dimensions of behaviour and disposition that are correlated in a population only because of the social pressures to conform to the stereotypes. And there are always very many individuals, perhaps in some respect nearly all individuals, who do not conform in every respect to these stereotypes. (For further development of these themes see Lemke, 1998, and 1995: ch. 5.)

What is true of gender identity is also true of its near associates, such as sexuality, and indeed of every categorizable dimension of identity. What culture announces as one natural kind is in fact a distribution of dissociable traits which do actually combine in many different ways in real individuals. Are we a ‘religious man’ or a ‘good Catholic’? More so by some criteria and less so by others, always. Are we typically American or Chinese? Only in some ways and not in others. And so we may also be ‘hybrid’ in our identities: a bit ‘masculine’ and a bit ‘feminine’, a bit ‘American’ and a bit ‘Chinese’, more African-American with our mother’s family and more Puerto Rican with our father’s family. We may be able to code-shift our identity performances because we have substantial competence in more than one culture and its identity repertoire, or we may just inherit or have acquired portions of each total ‘package’.

In fact, hybridity is something of a misnomer. It presupposes the essentialization of the categories across which we ‘hybridize’ when there is no
good reason to take those categories as other than cultural ideals (and often the representatives of cultural ideologies). People are diverse. We populate a large volume in the space of possible ways of being human along all dimensions of similarity and difference. Many of us may clump near the ideal-types of our cultures in many respects, but never in all, and we are as often outliers on many other dimensions. We are all ‘queer’ in one way or another, and that, nor ‘normality’, is the ordinary condition of being human. Normality is always a mystification of normativity, a social lie that succeeds in part by introducing simplistic, low-dimensional category grids for pigeon-holing us, and in part by sanctioning any too public display of mismatched qualities. There is no reason why fierce warriors and outstanding athletes should not favour flamboyant clothing and frequent bouts of tears, and no doubt many do, but they are taught not to reveal in public realities which contradict the illusions of cultural norms. We are all forced to pretend that the world is far more like our culture imagines it than it really is, and that we too are far more normalized than we really are. From this arise the frequently noted contradictions between our subjective identities, who we are to ourselves, and our projected identities, who we wish to seem to be to others.

Projected identities, however, are not solely the product of normalizing forces. We also often really are different people to different others, and particularly as we shift in our lives from dealing with those who are much younger or much older, much weaker or much stronger, and those whose ways of life are very different from our own. Our identities are the product of life in a community, and we learn how to interact with many sorts of people very different from ourselves, in the process building up a cumulative repertoire of roles we can play, and with them of identities we can assume. We remember how to be playful, how to play the role of child in parent-child interactions, how to play at being a parent when we are still a child. A child is partly still an infant, partly a child of different kinds to different people and in different situations, and partly a person who has already begun to internalize and build a model of what it is like to be and play the part of those older than ourselves with whom we have learned to interact successfully. Every child can imitate the ways of grown-ups, often quite tellingly. Every student can stand in front of the class and play the role of teacher, often with surprising competence. Every customer has a well-developed model of the service agent or seller we deal with regularly. Every woman has a pretty good idea how to play the part of a man. Everyone of lower or weaker status must learn as part of survival how the minds of the powerful work. Asymmetrically, the powerful are often much less able to put themselves in the shoes of those whose ways of thinking they are privileged to ignore.

Each of us internalizes a great deal of the diversity of the communities in which we live. Our identities include components that understand and
model other roles and identities which we may not be licensed to perform. Children at play, and all of us in our playful moments, experiment with donning identities that we are not sure whether we wish to continue to perform or not, but which we are just trying on to feel their texture and fit. We are in a sense microcosms of the social ecology of which we are a part. (For further discussion, see Lemke, 2002a).

1.2 Some theoretical functions of the notion of identity

Why has the notion of identity become so ubiquitous and central in socio-cultural discourse in the last decade or two? What are its theoretical functions? I believe that the primary value of this notion for most socio-cultural discourses is its function of mediating between the micro-social events in which human agency is foregrounded and the macro-social structures in which aggregate relations and longer timescale processes are most significant. Identity mediates between:

- **Positionality in the social-structural system** of social category relations based on power, exchange, distribution of resources, distribution of access, expectations, beliefs, values, opportunities, participation frequencies in various activity types, and so on.

and

- **The habitus of embodied dispositions** to action of particular meaningful kinds of individuals who have lived over some extended period of time in the social-structural positions as above, and experienced differentially and acted/acted differently the repertory of options for meaning and action provided by the internally diverse culture/community (either on grounds of division of labour, classificatory subdivision, or embodied history of cross-group encounters, immigrations, conquests, and so on).

Identity gives us a way to link the phenomenological domain of lived, moment-by-moment experience and the semiotic domain of enduring cultural and social systems of beliefs, values and meaning-making practices.

What the specific notion of identity adds to a basic sociological or cultural framework is the sense of Agency, that we construct our own identities out of the options afforded to us by our general positionality and our particular trajectory of experiences, encounters, options for action, and so forth. (For the variety of meanings of identity in educational discourse, see Gee, 2001.)

Recent work by Dorothy Holland and her collaborators (1998) on identity-in-practice also wrestles with the contradictions between semiotic-analytic characterizations of identity and more phenomenological-experiential
ones and provides empirical grounding for further discussions. Her dominant concern is to show how the longer-term, larger-scale social institutions of a culture can provide resources, material and symbolic, interactional and situational which identity-in-practice can use to reconstruct both itself and, ultimately, these same social and cultural systems.

I propose below a number of ways in which this can happen, including the role of anomalous and transgressive identities, the contradictions between lived experience and cultural norms, and the options opened to us for creating new identities and social relations by conflicts among social institutions and by the incipient reorganization of societies into larger global systems in which the dependence of individuals on particular institutions and organizations is greatly diminished.

### 1.3 Politics of the concept of identity

Who benefits and who loses from the more widespread adoption of the concept of Identity and its associated discourses and discourse functions?

Superficially, within the academic discourse community, the concept of identity provides a way for scholars who use it to by-pass some of the persistent political conflict between more individualistic psychological paradigms and more socio-cultural ones. This largely benefits the socio-culturalists.

More broadly in the wider community, discourses of identity highlight the differential opportunities and the legitimate anger of those who are positioned in subordinate statuses according to an 'identity politics' which disguises itself as category-blind in order to perpetuate the status quo. Discourses of identity call attention to diversity of identities and so to the pressures to conform to socially approved identities, the benefits of doing so, the costs of not doing so, and who determines which identities are approved and who provides the benefits and exacts the costs and how.

Nevertheless it is also true that discourses of identity often tend to re-inscribe more fundamental cultural assumptions which in turn promote a longer-term status quo.

First, ‘identities’ legitimate the dominant ideology of autonomous individuals as morally responsible for their actions and the life-consequences of their cumulative choices. This favours those who benefit from the dominance of a modern euro-cultural bourgeois legitimation of a political-legal-moral economy in which powerful individuals are freed from communitarian responsibilities to pursue their self-interest at the expense of both the community as a whole and its less powerful members.

Second, identity-types (e.g., masculine vs. feminine, straight vs. gay, middle vs. working class, children vs. adults, white vs. black, etc.), as previously said, tend to reproduce low-dimensional and highly biased oversimplifications of the high-dimensional space of diversity-by-degree of
possible patterns of human self-presentation through action. This favours the power of those who benefit from illusory political alliances which group together different coalitions as members of the ‘mainstream’ or ‘majority’ or dominant category in each case, even though it is only this small powerful minority which is always included in all these coalitions. Every such reduction of the cultural model of human diversity results in the creation of one ‘superior’ group categorically contrasted with all other ‘naturally inferior’ groups, whatever the prevailing rhetoric of equality or democracy.

Third, traditional notions of Identity elide the significant role of fear, desire, anger and other powerful feelings in shaping forms of action and reduce identity-performance to a matter of rational conformity or non-conformity to a small set of fixed social identity options. This again benefits a small cultural minority which claims that it has a right to power and privilege because of its superior ‘rationality’, a claim which is undermined by every discourse that identifies the fundamental role of other modes of affect in shaping all human behaviour and self-presentation.

Finally, notions of identity tend to emphasize invariance over change, unity over multiplicity, and neglect to examine whether notions of identity apply in the same sense at different timescales of activity or to units of analysis at different extensional or organizational scales. This benefits those who prefer an ideology of the inevitability of the status quo (invariance), sharp contrasts between superior and inferior identities and their associated dispositions for action (i.e., one such identity per individual), and the neglect of perspectives in which all apparent unity and stability is merely the contingent result of process of change at very many different timescales, occurring in and producing meta-stable units of organization at many extensional scales, from those below that of the single organism to those above, thus dis-privileging the unit of the individual moral and economic agent.

1.4 Limitations and expansions of the notion of identity

Many of the defects in common uses of the notion of identity can be remedied, but we need to understand its limitations and to begin to develop a sense of what alternative notions and discourses might be useful successors to the discourses of identity we now use.

1.4.1 Identities across timescales

We cannot, I think, usefully maintain that identity-in-the-moment, or identity-in-practice is identical with identity-across-events or with identity-across-the-lifespan. The main theoretical motivations for this are two:

• first, that in general, developmental or dynamical models have to show how phenomena which occur on much shorter and on much longer
timescales come to be linked to one another, given that as material processes they cannot directly exchange energy or information with one another, that is, they do not naturally interact (Lemke, 2002b);

• second, that the element of agency is more predominant in the notion of identity conceived of or observed at short timescales (identity-in-practice) and the element of structural or positional determination more predominant as we look to longer timescales.

Judith Butler’s notion of identity performance (1993) incorporates the notion that the longer-term aspects of identity are maintained and reinscribed in us as we act in the moment in particular ways. They are also, therefore, subject to change for the future through our active agentive choice to perform in some ways and not in others. We perform a pre-existing identity, that is, we continue a previous pattern of response to certain types of situations, to the extent that the actual situation now presents us with both the affordances to do so and the ‘figured’ (Holland et al., 1998) opportunities and expectations to see ourselves as performing some such aspects of our continuing identity. Some situations can be construed as fitting typical cultural scenarios in which we can take on some culturally recognizable identity, both because the scenario seems relevant and because the material affordances to enact our identity are present. The situation may fit the scenario of ‘being a good father’ or ‘acting tough’ both situationally and materially. To play the role of a father it helps to have someone present who can be construed as a son or daughter, or someone present who can observe our action and interpret it as relevant to our status as a ‘good father’. We have an opportunity to renew our identity as a good father … but therefore also an opportunity not to do so. We may try to perform our part and ‘fail’ in our own eyes or those of others, or we may choose not to perform this part, with potential consequences for how we see ourselves and how others see us in the future.

But the longer term aspects of our identity are not determined by a single performance. They constitute patterns across time, across situations, even across clusters of situation types (e.g., all the types of situations in which acting the ‘good father’ makes sense).

We can perform longer-term identities through how we enact an identity-in-practice, and we can constitute and change longer-term identities in the same way. The longer-term identities inscribed in our habitus (Bourdieu, 1987, 1990) constitute dispositions for action in the moment, and are themselves constituted through many actions across many moments. If these dispositions are positional and structural, similar for persons of the same social-class background, gender, and so on, it is because of the similar life opportunities, access to situation types, expectations of others, and so forth that we encounter repeatedly in living the kind of lives typical of our caste, generation, and the like. We are more
likely to have certain choices in clothes, foods, discourses and not others presented to us or available to us, and to consistently choose within this range of choices, developing a habitus which distinguishes us in our later ‘spontaneous’ choices from those whose life trajectories led them to develop dispositions in a different range of opportunities.

What does it take for momentary actions to add up to a consistent longer-term identity? It takes both the recurrence of the opportunities to enact these identities, for example, access to situations, material affordances/resources, presence of particular others or types of others, and so on, and the will to enact that identity on each such occasion. Bourdieu (1987, 1990) emphasizes the automatism of our dispositions, especially when events demand responses on shorter timescales than those on which we can deliberate about how to respond. He emphasizes as well the typicality of our responses, over longer timescales in our lives, and despite the occasional exception. Most of all he emphasizes the similarity and difference of dispositions, not according to individuality, but according to similarity and difference in the typical opportunities and demands of lives lived in different positions in society.

Bourdieu (1987) also makes use of the notion of a life-trajectory in which we may change our social position, and shows that, even so, dispositions are associated with such typical trajectories. The dispositions of the *parvenu* are not those of ‘old money’. The end of the trajectory may be the same, but the pathway was different, and it is the pathway that shapes the habitus.

What links the long term to the short is precisely recurrence: of persons with whom we can continue to enact some relationship in which our role is significant to our identity; of objects, including diaries, favourite books and films, familiar furnishings and clothes, through which we can continue to express aspects of our identities; of situation types in which we can recognize familiar scenarios and roles we can perform. Take all these things away and there is still the recurrence of our own bodies across moments, in respect not just of memory and embodied habit and habitus, but also of our physical characteristics: perceptual acuities and saliences, motor skills, physiological needs and dependencies, body hexis and body image. Change all these, over sufficient time, and replace them with other opportunities, demands and characteristics, and identity itself will mutate. Keep us long enough outside all links to our native culture and engaged with another culture and we will in many respects ‘go native’ or at least diverge from who we were. Take away our children and our identity as fathers or mothers will eventually fade. Suspend us in a sensory deprivation tank and eventually even core aspects of identity with long histories from infancy may fail to maintain themselves for us.

Meaningful human action is always a site of heterochrony: the intersection of processes and practices which have radically different inherent
timescales. In each moment, we act in response to the events of the moment before, producing the conditions and affordances of actions by ourselves and others in the moment next-to-come. At the same time, how we act in response to momentary events depends on both relatively automated and relatively volitional processes of identity maintenance (habit, habitus and habitual conscious preferences) that have been ongoing over much longer periods of our lives and which therefore are also adapted to their typical and recurring conditions on longer timescales. Those recurrent situation types, in turn, depend (in regard to frequency, invariant features across events, etc.) on much larger-scale patterns in the social ecology which make them more likely to happen, and to happen to us, as a function of our (possibly changing) position within that ecology. Which kinds of other persons, with what dispositions, in which sorts of recurrent situations we are likely to experience depends on our place in systems and processes whose coherence is defined, and whose stability is determined on much longer timescales and much larger extensional scales in space and quantities of matter, energy and information involved than the momentary.

Finally, it is important to recognize that there are not simply momentary-agentive and long-term-positional components to the genesis, maintenance and change of identity. These are merely extremal zones along a continuum, or at least a spectrum of timescales (because relevant timescales may clump in a discrete spectrum rather than spread evenly across time; cf. Holling, Gunderson and Petersen, 2002). Some aspects of our identities may persist for days or weeks, but not longer, as we travel, as we create intense but transient personal relationships, as we ‘try on’ identities in play or game environments (cf. computer role-playing games, e.g., Gee, 2003; Internet communities, Turkle, 1995) and communities in which we participate only on these timescales. Other aspects may develop and be maintained over months and years, or decades and ‘periods’ of our lives, across which we may change occupations, spouses, countries, religions, political commitments, and so forth.

1.4.2 Fear and desire in the construction of identity

The maintenance and development of identity is always also a material process, however symbolically mediated it may be by the value systems and cultural meaning relations of a ‘figured world’. Its continuity inheres in the persistence of material bodies, both our own and those of the landscapes and artefacts of our world. But the materiality of the human body makes it dependent and vulnerable: to thirst, starvation, pain and death. We are dependent on ecosystems and social cooperation (whether directly voluntary or consequential on participation in a social system) for water, food, shelter, protection and defence. Our desires begin with the needs of the body, our fears begin with the vulnerability of our bodies. And our iden-
tities are built in response to these primordial desires and fears, as well as to those additional desires and fears which our cultural worlds elaborate on their foundation.

We are what we fear, we are what we desire. ‘Who are we?’ is the basic question of identity. Who by natural gifts and weaknesses; who by membership and affiliation; who by social positioning, by financial, social and cultural capital; who by what we have and what we lack, what we desire and what we fear? Values and ambitions, search and avoidance are clearly grounded in fear and desire. So, one can persuasively argue, I think, are our beliefs about ourselves, others and the ecological world we are a part of. Belief systems are more collective than individual, they are features of communities (which all have many, not necessarily consistent, beliefs and webs of beliefs; cf. Bakhtin’s 1935/1981 *heteroglossia*). Our own identities-by-belief are positional as well as individual. We find ourselves always somewhat unique in our resources and vulnerabilities relative to particular circumstances. We try to find among the beliefs available in our community some that will serve us in achieving our desires and avoiding the pains we fear. Across time and situations, we come to have persistent fears and recurrent desires, and these as much as anything define our longer-timescale identities.

The role of desire in the construction of identity has been developed by feminist theory (e.g., Butler, 1993), but the complementary role of fear is perhaps something less palatable to our own identities, beset as we are as vulnerable individuals by threats and assaults from an ungentle world and an anti-communitarian society. Underlying fear is the vulnerability of the physical body to pain. We fear pain more than we fear death, if only because death is unknowable and unexperienced, whereas pain is only too real in our lives. The primary socialization of children in much of American and Western European society (I do not speak for other societies in this matter) is based on pain and the threat of pain. In our efforts to control and shape the behaviour of children ‘for their own good’, but most often for our good, and indirectly for the good of the currently dominant social order, we hurt children’s bodies and we threaten to repeat the inflicting of pain. We may belittle the degree of pain involved, but the reactions of children indicate that, combining physical and emotional (which is bodily by other means) pain, for them it is substantial. We learn these lessons early in our identity construction: pain matters, fear matters. We begin both to conform and to dissemble. We construct identities of ‘good boy’ and ‘bad boy’, often embodying both in unstable tensions, and we project identities which we do not necessarily feel.

The pains of adolescence and adult life are manifold, and most are related to socialization, to pressures to conform to particular identities. The threats and beatings of the boy who seems to be a ‘sissy’ and who may or may not identify as gay. The emotional abuse of youthful early sexuality,
feared by adults and proscribed by the dominant social order, leading to frustrations, exaggerated desires, conformity to norms in promise of licence for sexual satisfaction by individuals and institutions loom large. Later in adulthood (though biologically we are adult from puberty, whatever our social norms may prefer us to believe), we may suffer the pains of poverty, of criminal abuse, of emotional abuse by those with institutional power over our livelihoods, and always the threats of the powerful and of institutions to withdraw their support of us and leave us to the pains of the powerless, the hungry, the homeless or the dependent. We live in a very unjust society, where our present social order is enforced by far more aggregate pain than is in principle necessary for the maintenance of some supportive social order. Even if we are immunized from these regimes of pain by our social position, we are still subject to the threat of it ‘in the last instance’ (what else enforces law? what else do police and prisons do?), and we know that most members of our society are not immune, they suffer.

What aspects of our identities are shaped by pain and fear? Over what timescales? I believe these are important issues that our research on identity has not at all adequately dealt with as yet.

1.4.3 The phenomenology of identity

Do we actually feel or directly experience our identities as such? My sense is that we do not. What we feel and experience is some positive or negative valence associated with actions that we sense as performing some aspect of who we are, of which we are distinctly proud or ashamed. Insofar as identity is an abstract and composite notion which sums over many aspects of who we are and what and how we behave or feel, it is an analytical tool rather than a phenomenological reality. Insofar as identity refers to a cumulative identity over longer timescales, rather than the identity-in-practice of action in the moment, it also cannot be phenomenological except insofar as we may feel an echo across time as we re-enact some part of us that we recognize as having been part of us before, and perhaps for a long time. There is certainly some phenomenological sense of self-recognition that is related to the continuity of identity, but it does not appear to be an experience of identity as such.

This issue is important for thinking about the description of identity. Identities are described in terms of abstract categories and types; they are not narrated as experiences are. Identities belong to the semiotic domain of the conceptual rather than to the phenomenological domain of the experiential. Nonetheless, we often try to use the concept of identity to link across these two modes of making meaning. I believe this is so because it has been very difficult for phenomenological accounts of self to gain legitimacy in academic discourse, where more semiotic accounts of nearly everything predominate.
What such phenomenological accounts add to anything we can say semiotically is a sense of how the experiential overflows categorizations, how it exceeds any typological account. The phenomenological gives an account of flow, the semiotic of structure or pattern. Flow, or process, takes into account how being and doing make us feel in time; they are dynamical perspectives, whereas semiotic accounts are aoristic: they take a stance which stands outside of time. Phenomenological accounts saliently include affect, which semiotic accounts rarely do. The uses of language which more effectively convey phenomenological experience are narrative and poetic, efforts to create blends and shades of meaning which may be unique rather than to instance typical and familiar meanings with well-known contrasts and associations. In visual media, the semiotic is represented best by the monological and definite abstract diagram or graph, the phenomenological by the emotive and polysemic work of visual art.

We know that rich and meaningful accounts of selves and lives, of lived experience in its qualities and nuances are not fully possible with the canonical tools of semiotic meaning-making. We need to extend our repertoire of semiotic resources to more fully develop their potential for gradation and nuance, for ambiguity and polysemy, or, to the extent that such resources do already exist, what is needed are better ways of combining the definitive and the evocative forms and genres available to us. Our dominant intellectual and cultural traditions have preferred to keep them separate, allocating social power to the categorically based representations and marginalizing those closer to the phenomenological realism of the experiential to mere amusements.

The insistence that identities are embodied, and that embodied experience is fundamental to our sense of self, has led us to want more phenomenologically authentic accounts of identity, or at least of the experiences associated with recognition and performance of aspects of identity. We are still a long way from knowing how to integrate the knowing of narrative, poetry, and art with that of analytical accounts of identity. Including this one.

Having tried to sketch out a somewhat broader prospective notion of identity, one that is coupled to complementary notions such as timescales, traversals, situation types, heterochrony, and the embodied bases of fear and desire, I want to return to three kinds of processes in which agency in the moment is given a greater scope to construct alternative identities and associated changes in socio-cultural systems.

1.5 Transgressive and anomalous identities: troublemakers

Social systems require the flexibility to respond to unpredictable new conditions that may appear at large scales (climate change, invasions, new technologies). This flexibility comes from the variability of social units at
smaller scales (types of organizations, persons, identities). The normal distribution of social types favours those which interact in predictable ways to produce the usual emergent and self-reproducing dynamics of the society. But it also includes a percentage of deviant outliers which are capable of introducing perturbations which the system as a whole normally ‘resists’, except when its ability to filter them out or buffer against their effects is disrupted, for example, during times of social upheaval or great challenges. In such circumstances the net diversity of the system increases and the effects of these outliers can cascade upwards to have larger social effects. These effects may or may not generate sufficient novelty to allow the system to adapt to the new situation, but at least they increase the chances that some path to survival will be found: a path that necessarily requires change.

It is theoretically interesting to compare, as in evolutionary biology, the conditions under which perturbations of a system favour the survival of the most ‘normal’ or typical members versus those that favour the survival of (some) outliers. My guess is that when perturbations are random and not statistically very different from those which have shaped the previous evolution/adaptation of the system – what we might call ‘predictable catastrophes’, then on average, such perturbations will favour the pre-adapted, more typical members. It is only when the perturbations are unprecedented (as with newly emergent internal developments or first-meetings with external systems), and when they shift the average environment systematically away from the prior normal conditions, that the outliers will be favoured.

So, for example, a cyclic economic downturn (a ‘normal’ and not unprecedented disaster) will favour conservative investors, and such a strategy will be optimal over many cycles up and down. But when a new technology appears, and makes large-scale and permanent shifts in the economy (electric power grids, inexpensive computing), then some outliers who have a non-conservative strategy may be favoured, but only over the long-term. Over the short-term there will still be normal fluctuations that will favour the old-line conservatives, whose strategies are ‘pre-adapted’ to such fluctuations.

There are two sorts of identity outliers: the anti-establishment ‘rebels’ and the more genuinely unprecedented ‘weirdos’. Directly anti-establishment behaviour simply re-inscribes the polarities of the existing system, even though at the same time it does work to prevent over-rigidity and excessive uniformity which would oppose the minimal flexibility needed for survival. It is the genuinely unprecedented outliers, however, which provide true novelty and variety to the system. They will tend to be viewed by others as simply not making sense, as mad or weird rather than as criminal or evil. They may be regarded as idiosyncratic, dysfunctional, disturbing, or even insane (but with no ready-made diagnostic category available), but
transgressive only as a side-effect. They are in fact not deliberately transgres-
sive, but only accidentally transgressive. Going their own way, they do
not necessarily notice or care that they are transgressing social norms. It
must be pointed out to them. Ordinarily the ‘cultural police’ – which
includes all of us at times – effectively limit the spread of transgressive
innovations or unprecedented novelties, whether in language, art or behav-
iour. Nevertheless, and perhaps especially when there are other social
upheavals or crises to keep our attention elsewhere, these outliers can
sometimes spread and have influence on a wider scale.

Among rebels, there are those who hate the system, the status quo, but
there are also those who enact a strategy of deliberate transgression
designed to test boundaries and expose implicit norms, or force social
examination of the grounds of those norms. Unfortunately it is only when
this happens on a sufficiently wide scale that the re-examination can be
forced, and once again this happens only when there is already some sort
of serious larger-scale disturbance or perturbation to the social system.

Both the transgressors and those whose identities are simply anomalous
are sources of identity-based ‘trouble’ for the society. Societies regulate
themselves in part, and maintain their stability over time, by offering us
only some and not other conceivable ‘identities’. Whether we think of
identities as radically individual, or as identifications with social groups,
making trouble for the legitimacy of social identities, or for the notion of
identity itself, or for the belief that identifying with a social group is a good
thing: all of these intellectual moves make trouble for society.

Conflicting institutional demands on identity

Identities are contested not just in the sense that there are struggles over
the kinds of identities we are allowed to claim for ourselves, but there are
also struggles over the kinds of identities we can conceive for ourselves, and
which identities in any system of heteroglossic practice we will strive to
establish in ourselves.

This thesis of struggle and contestation over identity recognizes that the
technologies of the Self, as described by Foucault, are both technologies by
which we can make identities for ourselves, and technologies by which
social institutions, through the practices they afford for us and the prac-
tices of control exercised by others playing roles within them, attempt to
shape and control our identities.

Governments try to make us docile and conforming citizens by manipu-
lating the mass media and the flow of information, and by creating images
of wise and courageous leaders, and loyal and patriotic citizens. They work
to define what the identity of ‘good citizen’ consists of, in general, that is,
for the long term and irrespective of specific events, but also in the short
term; for example, what being patriotic means when the government
decides to have a war, or what being a good citizen means when the government decides the ordinary citizen should use less energy to keep the costs down for owners of energy-intensive industries.

Corporations try to make us docile and predictable consumers through advertising media and marketing strategies, selling us not just products, but lifestyles which incline us to want products, trying to get us to identify with certain stereotypical pseudo-identities which slot our consumption preferences into more predictable market-segment categories.

Corporations and other institutions also try to make us ‘good employees’, who care about the interests of the institution, whose behaviours are relatively predictable, and who see ourselves through the role-identity lenses of the good worker, supervisor or manager, and often specified by professional role identities such as the good researcher, professor, attorney, physician, minister, or less professionalized as the good secretary, technician, and so forth.

Institutions offer us pseudo-identities, their practices and material settings afford us and constrain for us various opportunities for action and interaction, and their norms and practices as embodied in others, constantly monitor us, evaluate us, and work to control us and push us, by promise and threat, to conform to their stereotypes.

Schools work to make us over in their image of the good student or the good teacher. Families work to make us conform to their image of the good child, the good mother or father, the good brother or sister, the good boy and the good girl. In doing this, each institution is embedded in its cultural and political-economic (i.e., ecological) relations to other institutions. It is not just families which are selling an image of the good son or daughter, but also Hollywood, the television networks, their owners and sponsors, magazine advertisers, fiction writers, journalists, and the like. The degree of convergence among these views of a particular identity is not simply a function of some miraculous invisible hand of shared or common Culture. It is the product of interests and the domination of some interests over others. It is governed by ideology that serves interests, and as Bourdieu (1990) argues regarding the limited autonomy of various social fields, such as the academy or the arts, much of the convergence is a product of the interests of those who dominate the dominant field of money-and-power.

This view of identity asks us to imagine that identities are not purely matters of internal feeling states or personalized discourses. Identities are contested public terrain. As Foucault argues, modernism has found more and more ways to take the inner soul, which was private, if publicly accountable under older forms of Christianity, and make it into a more public terrain of identity, under surveillance and subject to control by outside interests.

We often celebrate hybridity as an opportunity for people to escape from the prescribed role identities of particular cultures or institutions and
fashion their own unique sense of self, along with more unique modes of behaviour. But we should also recognize that hybridity represents a compromise by the individual among the pressures and forces of multiple cultures and institutions which are seeking to control our identities. Increasingly in the modern, mobile world, people are under pressure to conform to the identity stereotypes of more than one traditional community, ethnic or national culture. Increasingly we participate in multiple institutions, each of which has its own ideas about who we should be. Yes, we can sometimes play these off against one another to gain some space of greater freedom, but just as often, or more often I think, we hybridize merely to reconcile the conflicting pressures.

When does hybridity enhance our freedom of action and construction of meaningful selves? If we shuttle among institutions all of which are more or less subservient to the same dominant interests, then the difference among the identities demanded by these institutions are not likely to be differences from which we can productively expand a greater space of freedom to conceive and pursue our own interests and agendas.

There is a Nepalese woman in Holland’s book who scales the wall of a house to participate in an interview despite the possible strictures of her Hindu caste status (thus avoiding entering the first floor and passing through a kitchen she might ‘treif’). We can see her as creatively enacting a potential identity outside her traditional culture, afforded by the presence and practices of a Western interviewer from a very different cultural world. But we can also see her as constrained by the conflicting pressures of two cultures, Hindu and Western, each making demands on her, and forcing her to improvise a very uncomfortable compromise. Is she taking the first steps toward liberation? Or is she just being more constrained by the additional demands of new cultural forces? Is the liberated, anomic Western female identity, dependent on clothes and cosmetics to find a prospective partner in a competitive consumerist culture of romance (as described for US college students in another chapter of Holland’s book), a better choice for a shy, conventionally unattractive, poor young woman than the relative security of a system of arranged marriages? When does the divergence between cultural systems genuinely offer us a space of greater freedom to create our own identities, and when does it only offer us either a choice of equally constraining alternatives, or perhaps worse, double the constraints and double the conflicts we labour under?

Bhabha (1994) recognizes the ambivalent affordances of post-colonial situations in which we can strive to create a cultural ‘third space’. The tensions between pre-colonial and colonial cultures can be very destructive, tearing people apart, at the same time that they can also be very productive of creative post-colonial hybridity. But how do we transform conflicting demands for conformity into resources for creative freedom?
I do not want to fetishize creativity and individual freedom in this discussion. They are themselves ideals of Western culture that fit only too well with the interests of those who want a mobile workforce untied to local communities and a consumer unbound to tradition and free to buy new products. What matters in regard to the stake that each of us has in the ‘identity wars’ are the resources our culture and institutions make available to us to work past the contradictions between who we feel we are and want to be and who society demands that we become. Each of us is more individually unique by temperament and biography than is allowed by any system of stereotypical identities-on-offer. No prêt-a-porter, ready-to-wear identity for sale by the institutions whose interests are served by conformity to such identities will comfortably fit a real and unique human person.

We may well wish to support the family or the community in some respects, but not in others. We may well find ourselves comfortable and comforted by the norms and practices of some institution or community, or we may not. We may want to take up some of its affordances but not others. There may be feelings we have for which there are no recognized institutional or cultural channels of expression, or none which are allowed as appropriate to our social position. There may be desires we have which are taboo because they run counter to institutional interests, or even because their suppression is part of some long-evolved strategy of social control that has nothing much to do with us personally (e.g., homophobia arguably has far more to do with strategies for controlling the identities of young, working-class heterosexual males than with actually suppressing anyone’s sexual activity).

Modernist social systems and institutions demand and probably require narrow conformity to a certain very limited range of stereotypical identities. Much of this is the product of the effort to create very large scale social systems and institutions. That effort was motivated by the enormous concentration of resources it affords for those in control of the systems and institutions. Its consequence is largely that modernist systems and institutions have grown increasingly rigid and intolerant of unpredictable or divergent behaviour. Mass production, mass culture, mass consumption, mass conformity. Only a very superficial level of trivial diversity is tolerated. No social institutions in modern society encourage uniqueness or non-conformity, least of all schools and universities.

1.7 Troubling ‘identity’ as a mode of social control

The only resources that modern society affords for innovation or individualization of identity are its internal conflicts and cleavages and its intersections with radically different cultures. In time past, we were most often the captives of a small number of institutions. One family, one
school, one company, one church, one local community. Today we are far more likely to live as part of multiple families through divorce, remarriage, foster care, and so forth, both in our youth and throughout our lives. Because of social mobility, we are much more likely to move around from school to school in our youth and community to community throughout our lives. We no longer expect to spend our lives working in one company or university, or even pursuing one career or line of work. We are even more likely to shop around from church to church, if not actually change religious affiliation more than once during our lives. We are exposed through mass media and communications, as well as travel, to a wide range of social institutions and their norms and cultures. While most of these institutions of all kinds show a certain convergence of culture because of their common domination by dominant interests, and their common historical heritage, there are inevitably also contradictions and conflicts among them. The more institutions we visit in our lives, the more likely we are to encounter and recognize these internal contradictions and conflicts, and thereby acquire at least some independent freedom of vision with regard to possible values and identities.

Of course we encounter institutions not just in themselves, but mainly through their constituents: people, artefacts, media, discourses, practices, settings, and so forth. Somewhere in these, especially in the least ‘designed’ of them, that is, the people, we encounter contradictory elements and potential models for being different. One can never make a person or an artefact or discourse that includes only the features we are seeking to build in. There will always also be ‘accidental’ features and side-effects not under our control, or even always visible to the surveillance of designers who are focused on particular other features. There are always things about unique individual people, artefacts, discourses and settings that do not quite ‘fit’ with their institutional roles and functions. This ‘slippage’ affords us opportunities to question, trouble and escape from identities that are being used to control us to suit someone else’s social interests.

In late modern society we are also increasingly globalized, at least in the immediate sense that people, discourses and media from other cultures with whom we share less common historical heritage and fewer values, practices, norms, and so on come more and more often into our lives and communities. We hear other languages spoken on the street and on television. We meet or at least see and hear people born and raised in distant cultures. Traditionally there have been ‘natural’ barriers to learning from such people or sharing with them resources for identity development: we don’t understand their languages, we find their practices strange and often distasteful, we feel uncomfortable and anxious around them, we worry about our inability to predict their behaviour, we fear the unknown and uncertain. At first meeting. But if we work together with them, if we live nearby, if our children play together, if our joint participation in social
institutions throws us together long enough, then some individuals will start to get used to each other, like each other, share with each other, learn from each other. This becomes easier when the differences are attenuated but not lost: when we encounter second-generation immigrants, or immigrants who have been living among us for a long time already. If we belong to a more affluent stratum of our society, we will also visit other cultures on their own terrain. I do not underestimate our ability to travel and still manage to remain within our own culture, but equally, and particularly for younger travellers, there is more and more opportunity for genuine encounters with other ways of looking at the world and acting in it, for other identity possibilities.

All this is little enough, but it is far more than existed for most people even in the recent past. The result is a gradual de-articulation of culture. What was once a seamless whole, each part reinforcing the others, has increasingly become for many people a loose collection of different elements: norms, values, discourses, institutions, identities, roles, artefacts, settings each of which does not have to be joined with all the others in a consistent and stereotypical pattern. We can see this as an irony of consumer capitalism, which has produced for us all a strategy of disarticulation, of ‘mix-and-match’, to increase its overall consumer appeal and profitability. You don’t have to make the large resource commitment as a consumer to buy the whole package, you can just buy the parts that you want. Once this strategy is turned back on the culture itself, its hold on us is enormously weakened: the various elements do not necessarily any more reinforce one another. Identities are packages. If we start to mix and match, then the social control functions of identity are in trouble.

Schools, parents, mass media, and youth culture all war with one another. Our society is becoming more and more factionalized and factionated. If, like me, you believe that our society has long since become a pathological one, creating far more pain and suffering for its members than is required for maintaining itself as a positive and supportive environment, sacrificing the interests of most to those of a very few, enlarging the scale of monolithic institutions far past the point where their main effects became dehumanizing and dangerous to ecological sustainability, then you may be happy to hear that social control is beginning to fall apart.

There is no immediate danger of a total collapse. We are tightly bound to one another by a complex economic system of mutual interdependence in which we all have a stake. We will continue to transact and participate in institutions that are necessary to keep us alive and/or comfortable. But at the same time we are less and less persuaded of the legitimacy or necessity of any of these institutions or the norms, values, conventions, discourses, identities and practices associated with them. We are more and more disposed to disengage our loyalty, to pick and choose, to mix and match.
There is a lot of talk of people’s ‘multiple identities’. We can mean this in various senses. At short timescales, we may enact somewhat different identities in different social settings, playing different roles with different partners. At longer timescales we may continue to develop for ourselves identities that are useful to us, or required of us, as we participate again and again in the same institutions, communities, social networks or communities of practice. None of these identities, however, is necessarily a creative or unique individual hybrid. In many cases all of them may be stereotypical identities which we mix and match like ready-to-wear ‘separates’ to our strategic advantage, or just to navigate the compromises demanded by conflicting social pressures. When and how does this multiplicity become a resource for genuinely creative construction of unique identities? The kind of identities that can move our society in new directions?

One useful perspective on this issue is represented by a view of personal identity development that looks at the internal diversity of all human communities. We learn to be the people we are largely by the ways we interact with various other members of our community. Communities are diverse in age, in genders and sexualities, in social classes and occupations, in ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and in what is unfortunately still too often called ‘racial’, subgroups. We learn to interact more or less effectively, if not always comfortably, across most of these differences from whatever our own location is in social space at the time. That means that we learn expectations about the behaviour and responses of these other members of our villages. We even learn to some extent to mimic or imitate them, and certainly to stereotype and parody them. We cannot do this except by learning to some degree to act like them, to be like them. We acquire some part of the identity kits that enable people to be people of particular kinds. We may not ‘identify’ with these other identity competencies, but we do acquire them. We may not have the competence in the full ‘active’ sense of being able to pass for a person of this kind, but we do acquire it very often in the ‘passive’ sense of being able to interpret the behaviours of others sufficiently well for the purposes of ordinary life and social interaction.

And so here too are resources for making identity trouble. For the most part there are emotional factors and pressures that lead us to ‘identify’ only with one or a few of the available social types in our communities. We are strongly shaped by family and significant others, by early friendships, and of course by the institutional forces of divide-and-conquer that work so hard to polarize identities into incompatible camps. We are not allowed to assume identities that are socially polarized as conflicting and incompatible, at least not in terms of public performance and often also not in terms of emotional identification. But we do know these identities in many ways, and we can and do sometimes play at them, or in private try them on for complex emotional reasons we may not even understand ourselves. I believe there is a great deal of covert identity transgression in people’s
private and fantasy lives which is itself part of the work of resolving the lack of fit between our unique feelings and dispositions and the ready-to-wear identities that are useful to social institutions with which we share only limited interests.

If you are asked, as we so often are, ‘what do you do?’, how do you feel about any particular reply that you give? How adequate as a representation of your identity do you feel any of the stereotypical, culturally named, institutionally sanctified options available to you as answers really are? In multi-ethnic New York, there is a common social question: ‘Lemke, so what kind of name is that?’ which is part of the effort to simplify social relationships by fitting each person to one of a small number of ethnic-religious groups, mainly those that have been or are of political consequence in the city’s alliances of interest. I can claim several such identities, but none of them are ones that I feel much identification with. It is taboo to ask people about their sexuality beyond some overt markers of gender, but I would feel equally unsatisfied with any of the possible conventional answers. We don’t usually ask people more simply, ‘Who are you?’ in any sense other than asking for their name, but if it was asked, and you were to try to name your identity or identities, could you do so in any way that was satisfying to you?

Imagine some answers of the sort: ‘I’m an educator’, ‘I’m a teacher’, ‘I’m an American’, ‘I’m a mother’, ‘I’m a lesbian’, ‘I’m a hacker’, ‘I’m a Goth kid’, ‘I’m a researcher’, ‘I’m a physicist’, ‘I’m a theoretician’, ‘I’m a Catholic’, ‘I’m a liberal’, ‘I’m Jewish’, ‘I’m a twin’, ‘I’m a woman’ … and think not so much about how each leaves out a lot that you also are, but about how good a fit you really feel with any of these generic identities? How much more would you want to say to qualify such an answer? How would you get closer to saying who you really feel you are, what you really feel your identity is in terms of nationality, occupation, sexuality, cultural disposition, religion, ethnicity, and so forth. How much of your identification with these categories is based on the need to find allies against prejudice or opponents? Or to gain acceptance in social circles or institutions? Or to increase your status? Or not to offend your family or colleagues? Or not to have to deal with unresolved ambivalences in your own feelings?

What language of identity do we have that lets us go beyond institutionally defined stereotypical identities? Or long lists of them? What can we say about who we really feel ourselves to be, socially and personally, that is not couched in the language of these institutional stereotypes? If those stereotypes are sold to us in the interests of the institutions that benefit from conformity to them, what kinds of identities are imaginable from what we regard to be our own interests, especially those of our own interests which are not supported by social institutions, and which may be in conflict with those of the social institutions around us?
Paulo Freire in some very wise passages in his classic *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (2000) asks us to try to speak an authentic word, to try to name ourselves outside the realm of names given to us by social institutions and the interests of power. To say something about our lives, our problems, our feelings, our social condition, our anger, our desires, our selves that was not put in our mouths to serve someone else’s interests. Can we do it?

Bakhtin (1935/1981), with regard to discourse, and others (e.g., de Certeau, 1984) for social practices more generally, give us some hope for strategies of appropriation and re-accentuation of existing discourses and practices. The conventional forms may well have originated with the interests of powerful institutions and social groups, but they can often be re-articulated in our own interests to speak and enact our more fully authentic selves. Doing so, however, requires that we act from some critical stance, whether based on our personal conflicts with the demands of these institutions, or from some alternative perspective afforded us by our encounters with other institutions or cultures, often as mediated through persons. This re-articulation, when it occurs in new communities of discourse and practice, can begin the process of production of the kind of ‘third space’ described by Bhabha (1994).

### 1.8 Post-institutional society and traversal identities

I have argued elsewhere (Lemke 2002c, 2003) for another important linkage between shorter-term identities and historical changes in the organization of society. As society becomes more tightly organized, more interdependent, at larger and larger scales (cf. globalization), the stability of many individual institutions (in the sense of persistent organizations) becomes less critical to the overall sustainability of the (transnational and global) social ecology, and the functional need for tight linkages between individual lives and such organizational institutions also becomes weaker. Organizations come and go on shorter timescales, more easily substitutable in the larger more stable global patterns. Individuals move among institutions and organizations, also on shorter timescales, and more of the meaning of our lives is made across institutions rather than within them.

This phenomenon shows itself in the greater number of careers and organizations we work in, the greater number of families and relationships we form and live in across a lifetime, compared to a generation ago, and also, at shorter timescales, in the ways in which our identities may depend less on being a student in a school, a manager in a company, or even a father in a family, and more on our particular style of juggling these institutional identities as we move among institutions in the course of a year or even a day. As we make meaning across (substitutable) institutions, repeatedly, along the course of our traversals across these institutions, we develop
ways of linking and combining them, or relating them to one another, of distributing our time and attention among them. These styles are to some extent personal, but they are also in part positional. There may even be emerging in our post-modern society new divisions based on similar ‘lifestyles’ that consist in our ways of living across the affordances of particular institutions. We gain in this process a greater power to create our own mixes and combinations of the situational affordances of traditional institutions, and so of our own identities.

The process of re-assortment of significance among levels of organization of a complex dynamical system, when a new level of organization emerges in between of other prior levels, is well known. The new level, here quasi-global networks of sustainable interdependence among more substitutable, less persistent organizations and institutions, weakens the coupling matrix among units at the next lower level (the elements which come together to make up an organization, leading to shorter lifetimes for organizations and more transience among their components, including people). At the same time, the greater combinatorial freedom of these components may lead to the emergence of other new levels of organization among them, such as perhaps the new lifestyle castes.

From the perspective of the individual, institutions become relatively less important to identity, and recurrent styles of traversals and linkages we make among and across institutions become more important. Similarly, the units of the organizations and institutions, both practices and persons (as well as artefacts), may develop more identity-relevant connections and recurrent joint activities unrelated to the institutional matrices in which they may have initially combined. In some cases they will continue to depend on those matrices for the affordances needed for their new relationships and activities, or they may find substitutes that enable them to continue independently of any particular organization or institution. In time, and with aggregation of mutual interdependence for the sake of sustainability (ecological relations) of these initially ad hoc, trans-institutional formations at the multi-individual scale, new organizations or institutions may emerge that look quite different from those of modernism (e.g., they may be more spatially distributed, they may involve more asynchronous interactions, their timescales of change of practices or substitution of persons may be shorter, etc.).

1.9 Coda

We are nowhere near any conclusion of this discourse on identity. I hope, however, that the preceding arguments have opened up further space for discussion and development of our ways of using this important concept, ways that make more explicit how agency and positionality play off one another, how the multiplicity of identity mirrors the diversity of communi-
ties, how changing opportunities for making identities are connected to changing institutional and social configurations, how identities are made across multiple timescales and in the spaces created by the conflicting demands of institutions, and how identities are grounded in embodied experience, fear, and desire.

References


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