

CHAPTER 30

EMOTIONS, ART AND IMMORALITY

MATTHEW KIERAN

30.1 INTRODUCTION

At one level it is easy to see why art works deal with morally bad characters and situations from Shakespeare's *Richard III* to Irvine Welsh's *Trainspotting*. We are naturally interested in why people are bad, come to be so or come to do bad things. What looks more puzzling is how and why works get us to empathize, sympathize, and even admire bad people or react to morally problematic situations as we would or ought not to ordinarily. Consider how you might likely react to the following newspaper headlines:

Wife-killing paedophile kidnaps young step-daughter
Suburban homeowner is psychopathic mafia boss
Trendy Shoreditch moron sleeps with 13-year-old model
Beethoven lover rapes wife of respected author
Adulteress arranges husband's murder and betrays lover
Bully Manager made staff's lives hell

In real life if we read about the events as encapsulated in such headlines or witnessed them our moral shock and horror would likely preclude sympathy for or empathy with the perpetrators involved. Yet given that the mock headlines above refer to Humbert Humbert from *Lolita*, Tony in *The Sopranos*, Nathan Barley in *Nathan Barley*, Alex in *A Clockwork Orange*, Cora in *The Postman Always Rings Twice*, and David Brent (UK) or Michael Scott (US) from *The Office* respectively, we know that this is not the case with

respect to many art works. Indeed it is a mark of the success of such works as art that they do get us to sympathize with Humbert Humbert, empathize with Alex's thrill of violence, laugh at Nathan's apparently exploitative underage sex, or be indignant with Tony Soprano at someone grassing the family up to the Feds.

In contrast with newspaper headlines, art works are complex artefacts intentionally designed to prescribe and promote sophisticated imaginings that draw on our emotional responses and the ways in which they interact at various levels. In *Lolita* Nabokov purposefully cultivates empathy with Humbert at his wife's crass vulgarity to underwrite the reader's sympathy for Humbert and contempt for Charlotte. The novel's capacity to do this rests in part on the fact that Humbert's retrospective telling of the story is constrained by his refusal or inability (except right at the very end) to take up the viewpoint of anyone else. All we have is Humbert's attempt to persuade the reader of what he retrospectively takes himself to have been convinced of at the time. If Nabokov had used an omniscient narrator allowing for a perspective detached from Humbert's own, then not only would our imaginings be rather different (we might then know what Lolita thought and was actually like) but so too would our emotional responses. We might then have been repulsed by rather than sympathetic for Humbert in the first half of the novel. The language and literary techniques used shape and structure our emotional responses in ways that facilitate our ability to feel and respond emotionally as we ordinarily would or perhaps ought not to.

30.1.1 Emotional Asymmetries

Nonetheless, even if we strip away the complex interactions between a work's features and the emotional journey we undergo in responding to them it is worth noting that the asymmetries involved can occur at two distinct levels.

Symmetric Emotions, Asymmetric Valences

We may feel the same type of emotion in response to the same kind of events both ordinarily and as represented in art works and yet enjoy the emotion in one case and not in the other. The feelings of fear, moral repugnance, or horror found to be distinctly unpleasant in ordinary situations may be found to be exhilarating when solicited in response to similar types of events in art works. If we witnessed an unprovoked attack in a bar the feelings of fear, horror, and anticipation may be experienced as deeply unpleasant and traumatic. Yet when watching *The Sopranos* we may nonetheless enjoy being horrified at Tony Soprano's deliberately explosive and unprovoked attack on his driver. This is a common phenomenon. We often enjoy feeling emotions in responding to art that we would ordinarily be distressed to feel due to the morally relevant features of the situation or characters.

Asymmetric Emotions

In engaging with art works we often allow ourselves to have emotions to the same kind of events that stand in contrast to the types of emotions we would ordinarily have. The very things we might ordinarily respond to as fearful, horrific, or repugnant in real life may be ones we respond to with amusement, hope, or joy when engaging with art works. In watching *Arsenic and Old Lace* we are amused by rather than straightforwardly appalled at the spinster aunts who have the 'bad habit' of poisoning lonely old men. When reading David Foster Wallace's *Brief Interviews with Hideous Men* we may find hilarious the dispassionate dissection of the ludicrous narcissism of the clinically depressed. Yet ordinarily we might not or would not be able to allow ourselves to respond thus to the events represented. The serial murders of old men or clinical depression are after all, at least ordinarily, no laughing matter.

We're normally motivated to avoid empathizing with evil or bad people and tend to judge them morally in real life. How is it that we respond emotionally or enjoy certain emotions when engaging with art works in ways we ordinarily would or should not due to morally relevant features? What is valuable about doing so?

In what follows it will be argued that the asymmetries involved cannot all straightforwardly be attributed to a neat distinction between fact and fiction. Furthermore the narrative artistry that is often concerned with soliciting empathy and sympathy can facilitate the suspension of moral judgement, norms, and values. Works often solicit the suspension of particular moral assumptions in order to imaginatively explore different ways of seeing, feeling, responding to, and valuing the world. We do so for the values realized in and through such imaginings. Finally, it is suggested that the complex inter-relations between the evaluation of our emotional responses to what we imagine, our own character, and the moral character of works of art is more complex than is commonly assumed, and future directions for research are suggested.

30.2 FICTION, NON-FICTION, AND NARRATIVE ART

30.2.1 Fiction vs. Reality

One obvious thought is that what makes the difference falls neatly out of the distinction between fiction and reality. Insofar as we take something to be fictional we are thereby free to indulge emotions in ways we would not if we took them to be true (no-one gets hurt and no real person is the formal object of our responses). If we see a student deliberately knock down her professor in a hit-and-run then we are both motivated to respond and act in various ways (assuming moral decency).

We may be horrified, angry, worried for the victim, rush to help them, and so on. Yet if we are reading or watching a fiction then we are not only freed from the constraints of action but we are free to respond in ways we ordinarily would not depending upon the literary or artistic treatment of the events as represented. A serious work might characterize the event from the student's point of view and empathizing with her motives of revenge we may allow ourselves to feel glad at the success of her malicious intent. Apprehending the work as a fiction enables us to enter into the glee which the student feels as she pulls away as we would not for moral reasons were we to read about the event as, say, a newspaper report. Alternatively a comic treatment might render the whole thing farcical. The ludicrous indignity of the way the cyclist is represented as being knocked down, the juxtaposition of garish safety clobber encasing the large frame of the victim on a spindly bike, may solicit amusement and hilarity at the absurdity of it all. If we were to take the events as represented to be fact rather than fiction we might be repulsed rather than delighted by the comic treatment and refuse to laugh. According to this view apprehending a work as a fiction allows us to feel and explore emotional responses it would be callous to indulge were we to apprehend the events as reported matters of fact.

It might be held that the difference stems from differences in the nature of our emotional responses to fiction and non-fiction. We respond to real life events with genuine emotions but only with quasi-emotions to fictional events (Walton 1978; 1990). On this view quasi-emotions have the same affect and phenomenology as genuine emotions; it is just that they involve the imagination as opposed to belief. Perhaps the asymmetries can be explained in virtue of quasi-emotions not being subject to the same constraints as genuine emotions since belief is constrained in ways in which the imagination is not. Alternatively it might be held that apprehending something as fictional brings with it an aesthetic or psychic distance that enables viewers to attend to the artistic and aesthetic features (Bullough 1995). Such distance is often held to be crucial when we are engaging with unpleasant subject matter.

As appealing as such views initially seem, they cannot be quite right. First, many great art works that deal with morally problematic characters and situations are works of non-fiction. Milton's sonnet *On the Late Massacre in Piedmont* concerns an act of genocide against the Vaudois, considered by some to be the original Protestants due to their excommunication in 1215. In 1655 the Catholic Duke of Savoy sent his troops in to expel them and the end result was the massacre of nearly 2000 people. The appropriation of historical events for artistic purposes (including wider political aims such as Milton's) is hardly rare in the world of painting, literature, or cinema. Consider Géricault's *The Raft of Medusa*, Goya's *Disasters of War* series, or Georg Buchner's non fiction tragedy *Woyzeck* (the basis for Berg's opera *Wozzeck*). There are even great non-fiction documentary tragedies (Friend 2007). All of these works and so many more involve the representation of

real life events and partly depend on the knowledge that this is so in shaping and prescribing our emotional responses to them. In at least some such cases the narrative artistry involved is devoted to cultivating empathy with and sympathy for real people we would normally be morally repulsed by and thus unwilling or unable to have such responses for. The publication of Truman Capote's non-fiction novel *In Cold Blood* was greeted with immediate controversy due to its sympathy for and empathy with the killers of the Clutter family, and David's great painting *The Death of Marat* successfully solicits admiration for a bloody secular saint of the French Revolution. How we respond to someone as represented in a novel or painting need not dovetail with how we would respond to such a person in real life.

Second, it cannot be the case that just in virtue of something's being a fiction we are thereby free to indulge emotional responses unconstrained by real world considerations. Many works of fiction rely upon characters as fictional instances of recognizable real-world types (Gaut 1998a). In doing so they invite emotional responses and inferences that are not just tied up with the apparent fictional object but also with respect to real world counter parts. Indeed, it would otherwise be deeply puzzling what the appeal of much satire or nineteenth-century realist psychological fiction is supposed to be. It is sometimes taken to follow from this that even in fiction our emotional responses are subject to criteria of appropriateness which depend upon what the relevant justified cognitive-affective world-directed attitudes are, for example that cruelty is wrong or killing for self-gain is bad (Gaut 1998b). This is, as we shall see below, a difficult matter. Furthermore, fictions often cultivate our empathy for characters in order to deepen our imaginative understanding. This can in turn direct us to apply the relevant cognitive-affective attitudes to the world (Kieran 1996). Harper Lee's *To Kill A Mocking Bird* not only shows us why racism is morally pernicious but gets us to care about it through shaping our emotional responses in the contemplation of its near-disastrous consequences – consequences narrowly averted in the fiction through heroic action but by implication all too easily realizable in the actual world.

30.2.2 Narrative Artistry

A work's fictional status is not always what is crucial to explaining the asymmetry of cognitive-affective attitudes we might have to events as represented in a work in contrast with events as represented in newspaper reports or witnessed. What is always crucial are two things that are non-contingently closely associated with fictionality: (i) the states of affairs as represented are at a distance from us, i.e. we cannot intervene and (ii) the use of artistic devices mediating the representation of events portrayed ranging from pictorial techniques, poetic form, imagery and metaphor to interior monologues. These two features enable us to appreciate

represented events in a distinctive way, such that we are freed from practical reasons to intervene and thus respond emotionally to aspects of what is represented in ways we might or could not were we to be present at the actual scene. The recognition that we cannot intervene in events as represented is as true of past events or modal facts as it is of fictional ones. A significant difference between imagining entertained scenarios, many asserted scenarios, and witnessing events inheres in the fact that it is often only in the last type of case that we can intervene or something might happen to us. When reading *A Clockwork Orange* or *In Cold Blood*, for example, it neither makes sense to be afraid for ourselves or to think that we can intervene in the events represented. Thus as readers we are free to respond in ways that we otherwise would or could not. We are free to empathize with Perry and sympathize with Alex in ways we might be unable to were we to meet them. Furthermore, it is not as if the shock or horror always precludes sympathy or empathy.

At least where a story or report is not too close to home we can be amused at or take a prurient interest in reports and stories very much as we would do if a narrative were fictional. A headline such as 'Police help dog bite victim' might be funny in a way that precludes empathy or sympathy for the victim unless say you saw the event or recently were the victim of a dog bite (and understandably fail to see the funny side of it). Hence the appositeness of Charlie Chaplin's famous dictum that 'Life is a tragedy when seen in close-up but a comedy in long shot'.

It should be emphasized that, whilst a distinction between engaging with a representation and witnessing some state of affairs helps to explain some asymmetries of emotional response, much of the work is done by the manipulation of artistic techniques, imagery, thematic exploration, and structuring. It is the imposition of structure and form on events as represented for artistic purposes that sustains and builds from the differences that arise from watching a film or reading about as opposed to witnessing an event. Hence the huge difference between mere news reports of the slaughter of Herbert Clutter, his wife, and two of his children and Capote's *In Cold Blood*. One of the purposes to which such artistry can be put to, in contrast with mere reports, is the facilitation of empathy with and sympathy for those we might not normally want or be able to have an emotional feeling for (e.g. disturbed or immoral characters). The techniques for doing so are many and varied, ranging from point of view shifts, narrational suspense, and authorial treatment to the use of free indirect style. Consider Maisie's thoughts as she wonders about her governess whose daughter had died in Henry James's *What Maisie Knew*: 'Clara Matilda . . . was in heaven and yet, embarrassingly, also in Kendal Green, where they had been together to see her little huddled grave.' We see things from Maisie's point of view and thus feel her confusion whilst nonetheless grasping the complexity of the situation from an adult perspective. Indirect free style enables the narrative to 'take on the properties of the character, who now seems to "own" the words . . . Thanks to free indirect style, we see things

through the character's eyes and language but also through the author's eyes and language. We inhabit omniscience and partiality at once" (Wood, 2008). Techniques that achieve such an imaginative characterization of a situation enables artists to explore themes that are central to human drives, desires, and moral action. *Lolita* or *The Sopranos* get us to empathize with the central characters (what they feel, think, are disposed to do) in ways that facilitate the dramatic exploration of interesting and profound themes such as the nature of self-deception, psychopathy, and the conflation of morality with power.

30.3 EMOTIONS, MORAL CRITERIA, AND ARTISTIC VALUE

The above explanation seems to fit neatly with the idea that, once we allow for differences between witnessing an event and engaging with an artistically designed narrative, we should respond emotionally to art works as we ought to in real life. In other words the overall cognitive-affective attitudes manifest in the work that solicit emotional responses from us are subject to the same criteria of appropriateness that our real life attitudes are. One motivation for the view derives from the recognition that we often draw on our standard moral norms and presumptions to fill in and respond emotionally to narratives in order for them to succeed. How we do so automatically often depends upon shared moral assumptions. The suspense in thrillers, for example, often arises concerning whether or not the perpetrator will be caught or the innocent man be let off. In such cases it is not as if the narratives need to explain or prescribe us to imagine valuing innocence or assuming that criminals are bad. This happens all the time with narratives. If a reader fails to empathize with and feel sorrow for Dorothea on her honeymoon then this betokens a failure to get *Middlemarch*. It is not just that a reader must recognize how the narrative characterizes events but she must respond appropriately in order to understand it (Carroll 1996; 1998). Furthermore, emotional responses solicited by art works are subject to evaluation in terms of whether they are merited or not. A horror movie may aim to scare us but if the monsters or aliens as represented are ridiculous, hapless, or unthreatening then we ought not to be scared. This would make for a failure in a work as a horror movie. We should respond with hilarity rather than horror (as is infamously true in the case of Ed Wood Jr.'s *Plan 9 from Outer Space*). In general, works can fail as art in virtue of soliciting emotional responses that are not merited. Where solicited responses come apart from what is merited then this is a failure in the work as art. On this basis it has been argued that where emotional responses involve moral considerations then whether or not the

emotions solicited are merited or not will depend upon moral considerations. Thus, according to this line of thought, wherever the moral character of a work is defective and related to the emotional responses a work prescribes its audience to take up, a moral defect is always an artistic one and a moral virtue an artistic one (Gaut 1998*b*; 2007). Indeed, insofar as works draw us into identifying with characters and call upon emotional responses which in turn enable us to gain imaginative insight into attitudes or human psychology it looks as if 'truth to life' is an important art evaluative criterion (Kieran 1996).

Whilst the considerations of narrative comprehension, merited response, and cognitive gain differ, we can see how they can all be used to ground roughly the same conclusion. Namely, that the evaluation of our emotional responses to art works should be evaluated in moral terms as we would and should evaluate them in real life. Narrative suspense requires us to know who the innocent or good guys are and the happy ending may only be truly happy if it is in some sense deserved. It is often crucial that we are being asked to admire that which truly is admirable and that the putative insights shown to us through our emotional engagement with a work are indeed genuine. Artistic failings in works are very often to be explained in terms of failures along these very lines. Furthermore, such grounds make sense of why we resent or are repulsed by works that prescribe emotional responses or attitudes we judge to be morally inappropriate. Hence literary and cinematic criticism sometimes involves diagnosing whether, where, and why some work may be morally defective, offensive, or cruel. Critical controversies over works ranging from D. H. Lawrence's oeuvre to Shakespeare's *Taming of the Shrew* revolve around whether or not they rest upon morally problematic views of sex and gender that get in the way of our engagement with and responses to the texts. D. W. Griffiths' *Birth of a Nation* and Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will* solicit emotional attitudes ranging from hope to admiration towards that which we should only feel dread and disgust. This is not to deny the artistic virtues of such works but it is to hold that, insofar as the glorification of the Ku Klux Klan and the Third Reich respectively underwrites emotional responses sought from us, they fail as art. Where the emotions solicited from us involve taking up attitudes that are racist or misanthropic, say, then even if we could we should not allow ourselves to respond accordingly. Conversely the various grounds make sense of why we enjoy feeling certain emotional responses and praise some works as morally profound. Jane Austen's oeuvre, for example, is much more than the comedy of romantic misunderstanding set amongst late eighteenth-century genteel society. If Austen's novels amounted to no more than this then they would be pleasurable but inconsequential. Rather each novel takes as its central theme certain human failings and through the narrative explores how they give rise to misunderstandings that fundamentally threaten the prospect of the central protagonists' happiness. The central protagonist in *Emma* is a snob given to meddling with the private lives of others due to her own romantic flights of fancy. Austen cultivates empathy with

and sympathy for a character that in ordinary life many of us would neither want to be around nor like very much. This is part of Austen's achievement. We see Emma's faults and yet feel for her. Sympathy for Emma is required in order for the novel to work as it does. Devoid of sympathy we would neither hope for the eventual romantic resolution nor fear for the all too close possibility that it might not happen. Furthermore, the way our emotional responses are prescribed through the novel guides our apprehension of the ways in which good intentions can be bound up with snobbery in ways that may blind us to the value of others and lead us into acting badly. In following Emma's recognition and emotional trajectory, the lessons Emma learns thereby become the readers. Emma's self-condemnation is arrived at in a way that both provides the dramatic basis from which she can go on to rectify the misunderstandings she has caused and allows the reader to hope that she is successful in doing so. The fear that Emma might not be able to and the hope that she can is merited because the self-knowledge arrived at and what she is prepared to do to set matters right show that she comes to deserve to find happiness. Devoid of any such self-revelation in the narrative the solicited emotions on the part of the reader would seem far from merited. It is common in narrative art for there to be a complex interplay between the moral development and understanding conveyed through the work and the emotional responses sought from the audience. From works such as Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*, pictures such as Hogarth's *Rake's Progress* to films such as *The Lives of Others*, the profundity of narrative art works often rests upon the extent to which the emotional responses sought from us in engaging with them are appropriate. Conversely, where works ranging from D. W. Griffith's *Birth of A Nation (The Clansman)* to Lars von Trier's *The Idiots* solicit emotional responses from us that endorse or depend on morally problematic or incoherent attitudes, we may be unable to (Walton 1994) or might refuse to (Gendler 2000) indulge the emotions as prescribed. Indeed, even where we can and do respond emotionally as solicited it might be thought that we should not (Moran 1994; Gaut 2008) where such responses depend on views that are at odds with how things are morally speaking.

Despite general arguments against such a view (Jacobson 1997; Kieran 2003*b*; Patridge 2008) it does seem most plausible when we think about straightforward nineteenth-century realist novels or genres that depend upon importing to our engagement with narratives the moral norms we take to be justified. Nonetheless, at the very least it cannot do justice to the complex ways in which our emotions operate when engaging with other kinds of art works. The assumption of transitivity from what merits the appropriateness of emotional attitudes in ordinary life to what merits emotions in responses to narratives as artistically represented is too literal-minded. What seems out of synch here is the underlying presumption that what matters in terms of the appropriateness of our emotional responses is how they would line up with respect to the real world. Our primary interest in engaging with a narrative work as art is playing games of make-believe and responding to

them as prescribed (Walton 1990). We are cued by the work to take certain presumptions as given in exploring the make-believe world as represented. Whether or not the emotions that the work solicits from us are merited or not depends upon the presumptions we are to take as given in playing the game and what the work does through the dramatic unfolding and characterization of events. While moral criteria are often relevant to the emotional responses solicited from us it does not thereby follow, however, that whether the relevant emotional responses are merited or not in responding to the work depends upon whether they would be (or we would judge them to be) such in real life.

30.4 IMAGINED WORLDS AND MORAL COMMITMENTS

Consider the Norse legends. Out of the regions of fire and ice come the evil giants and the righteous Gods who are at constant war with one another. It is in part a fantastical world according to which Odin created man and woman, the treacherous Loki's children issued from congress with an ogress, and the Berserkers fail to discriminate between allies and enemies in the heat of battle. The emotions solicited from the reader depend upon a code that prizes valour, honour, and truth highly but in many ways is at odds with the moral norms we would take to be (and let us assume for the sake of argument are) justified. Furthermore the Icelandic sagas (from which much of our account of Norse legends derives) are in various parts principally historical texts. Written primarily in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries along with some supernatural mythology and no little humour they relay the previously oral history of particular individuals and communities. A striking moral divergence between the presumptions embodied in the Icelandic sagas, upon which various emotional responses depend, and those one might expect in much contemporary literature is the way in which honour or vengeance killings are treated. Vengeance is represented as a legal and honourable way of resolving conflict whilst even more strikingly amicable resolution outside the law is judged much more harshly than blood vengeance. Moreover, vengeance need not take the form of killing the original perpetrator of some sleight or crime but is represented as justifiably consisting in the killing of one of the original perpetrator's family or group. Considerations ranging from status to consequences are often carefully calibrated in the sagas and mistakes in calibration often lead to negative cognitive-affective attributions of foolishness or shame at dishonour.

In reading the sagas and appreciating them we can allow for different moral presumptions and allow our emotions to respond accordingly. We can recognize that, given the moral code underlying the sagas, reluctance to kill ought to lead to worries about manhood and a character's honour. It is not that we think that as such these attitudes and emotional responses are merited. It is just that in the world as represented through the sagas these are appropriate and merited cognitive-affective responses and attitudes to have. This is far from rare. Engaging with many narratives ranging from Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, stories from the Bible, *A Thousand and One Arabian Nights*, the *Mahabharata*, revenge tragedies such as *The Spanish Tragedy*, *Titus Andronicus*, *Hamlet*, *The Revenger's Tragedy* to comedies such as *The Taming of the Shrew* and *The Man of Mode* involves (a least for many of us) the imaginative taking on of moral commitments and values other than our own.

It might be tempting to think that the complex ways in which we can suspend and play with our underlying moral presumptions arises only in the case of works that are associated with psychologically distant worlds that imaginatively explore only nominally available possibilities or ways of viewing the world. Perhaps, it might be thought, we can allow ourselves to respond in a game of make-believe in ways we would otherwise deem not to be merited precisely because the values implicit in the make-believe narrative worlds issuing from Ancient Greece, India, or the Iceland of the middle ages are psychologically distant and thus unthreatening. Imagine a narrative according to which the central protagonist sets about an honour killing depending upon presumptions akin to those we find in the Icelandic sagas. He must do so in order to avenge himself and his family, uphold honour and doing so is a matter of duty. In doing so various emotional responses of admiration, hope, and sympathy are called upon. The only significant difference is that this narrative is set in contemporary London. It seems plausible that the very same narrative set within an Icelandic saga would be less troublesome in terms of successfully soliciting the emotional responses called upon than the one set in contemporary London. Why should this be so? One possibility is that we engage with an Icelandic saga as laying out some far-off make-believe world that bears fairly indirect and complicated relations to our own. We do not take or respond to the narrative as endorsing or implying that honour killing within the world we inhabit is praiseworthy. Yet we may be repulsed in the extreme by a contemporary novel that prescribes a pro attitude towards honour killing. What we imagine in engaging with the Icelandic sagas may be engaged with as the exploration of something that is merely a nominal possibility whilst the contemporary novel's endorsement is seen as an all-too-real possibility. Thus our emotional reactions to the moral praiseworthiness of revenge killing as represented in the two cases may diverge markedly.

Even if the distinction between nominal and real confrontations of value explains some differences it cannot be the whole story since we can suspend and play

with our moral presumptions in imaginatively engaging with respect to more contemporary works. We grasp works as belonging to particular genres in a way that makes a significant difference to the emotional reactions that are appropriate and the inferences we make between the relevant fictional worlds and the real one (Nichols 2006; Weinberg 2008).

Contemporary noir fiction, action movies, espionage thrillers, westerns, farce, satire, and black comedies all often involve responding with emotions that draw on moral presumptions at odds with those that are or would be judged to be merited in real life. Indeed, it is difficult to see how audiences could be drawn into the excitement or humour of certain works if this were not so. Consider works in the thriller or hard-boiled detective genre. *Donnie Brasco* draws the audience in as Brasco himself is drawn into the excitement and style of the 'bad' life. The shift of moral outlook only comes home when Brasco manages to meet with his wife and realizes how far his outlook has changed. If we pick up novels by Dashiell Hammett, James Cain, or James Ellroy we know that we are entering a moral universe where men tend to be predatory by nature, cynicism rules, and yet there remains a perpetual conflict between honour and corruption. In James Ellroy's *L. A. Quartet*, consisting of *The Black Dahlia*, *The Big Nowhere*, *L. A. Confidential*, and *White Jazz*, the central characters we empathize with are recognizably vile. The racism, misogyny, and psychopathic tendencies in the central protagonists are deeply ingrained whilst nonetheless we can go along with them and respond emotionally as solicited. The explanation for this lies in the moral universe Ellroy's work operates within. It is a Hobbesian world shot through with a heavy dose of Freud. Everyone acts from self-interest, even those who appear to be conventionally good. Consider *L. A. Confidential*. The dark, psychological secrets of the protagonists explain why they act in the way they do. Those that are driven towards the right actions are motivated by idiosyncratic reasons going back much earlier in life. Bud White's mania for protecting women issues from his father's systematic brutality towards his mother. The clean-cut Ed Exley's ambitiousness is driven by the desire to outdo his father and fulfil his late brother's role. The characters are designed to reveal not just their own peculiar individuality but also to reflect something about the baseness of the city itself. The nostalgia for an innocent 1950s Americana is rendered as a fantastical projection from a world where rank hypocrisy, murderous exploitation, and corruption are the order of the day. In dramatic terms the noir style and fragmentary narrative heightens suspense as the most disparate elements turn out to be intimately related. In *L. A. Confidential* the bloody shoot-out at an all-night café turns out to be tied to a pornography ring and beneath it all lies police corruption of the deepest order – in Exley and White's own department. Underlying the dramatic plot is the driving force of the postwar construction of L. A. Rapacious greed is the generator that constructs the city and explains why the individuals involved face the choices they do. Importantly the difference between the 'good' guys and

the 'bad' guys sometimes only turns on differences of consciousness. In *White Jazz* the central protagonist Klein is a right-wing, racist, psychopathic cop implicated in 'killings, beatings, bribes, payoffs, kickbacks, shakedown. Rent coercion, music jobs, strikebreaker work. Lies, intimidation, vows trashed, oaths broken, duties scorned. Thievery, duplicity, greed, lies, killings, beatings, bribes, payoffs" (Ellroy 1993: 331). What distinguishes Klein from the novel's villains is the recognition of what he has done and his attempts to grasp not just the how but the why of the crime central to the novel. In such a universe all the characters are morally implicated and besmirched. Nonetheless, we respond emotionally in ways we would not judge to be merited or appropriate in the real world. This is because the artistry involved makes use of and builds from two significant factors. First, our ability to take as given in what we imagine something like the presumptions of Hobbes and Freud (independently of whether or not we think they hold true in the world). We can entertain hypothesis and assumptions distinct from the ones we actually do hold. This is just as true in games of make-believe as it is in moral argument. Second, in cultivating our capacity to empathize with and have sympathy for the central characters. This is not merely a product of representing matters from the relevant characters' points of view (though that is a part of it). It also usually depends upon the central characters embodying redeeming traits in contrast with the utter amorality, lack of feeling, or failure to try and understand of the villains.

Our capacity to play such imaginative games of make-believe and respond emotionally to works as we ordinarily would not depends upon our capacity to suspend moral judgement, norms, or values in order to explore different ways of seeing, feeling, responding to, and valuing the world. Engaging with works in moral terms is not an all-or-nothing matter. Emotional responses to works traffic in and call on moral concepts and norms but it does not thereby follow that we should respond to art works as we should respond ordinarily. Works may solicit emotional responses we find intelligible in the light of certain background moral assumptions, ones we may entertain rather than share (Kieran 2001, 2006). There might be all sorts of ways in which we find the application of moral terms or the evaluative component central to them intelligibly variable. Hence we are often prepared to entertain actions as, for example, honourable, sentimental, or callous in engaging with make-believe works in ways we would not were we to be confronted by them in actuality. We can and often do isolate off or suspend moral norms and commitments in order to imaginatively explore the make-believe worlds played out before us in the narrative. Indeed, if this were not so it would be deeply puzzling as to how people could engage fully with works from other cultures, epochs or, at least for some, genres outside of nineteenth-century psychological realism. The reason we do so is the payoffs such imaginings will bring, which ties in to the basic motivations for and values realized in so doing.

30.5 MOTIVATIONS AND VALUES

30.5.1 Aesthetic

Entertaining fictional states of affairs frees us from immediate practical motivations and worries, thus facilitating the realization of aesthetic value. The artifice of narrative artistry in fictional works is free to invent characters, scenes, and events that facilitate the exploration of a work's underlying themes. Even in non-fiction work the artistry involved is often free in terms of how exactly events are framed or pre-criterially focused, which scenes to concentrate on, and how to bring out the putative exploration of motivations and themes. This allows artistic narratives, at least typically, to be epistemically transparent to a degree that ordinary works often cannot be. This is not to deny that fictionality as such can make a difference. Schrader and Scorsese's *Taxi Driver* was loosely based on Arthur Bremer's infamous shooting of George Corley Wallace, the 1972 Democratic presidential candidate. As a fiction a work is free to determine the nature of its central protagonists and why they do what they do in ways in which a work of non-fiction is not. It follows that *Taxi Driver* is open to a range of critical and emotional responses that a biographical film would not be. In a crucial scene in the movie Travis Bickle (Robert De Niro) takes Betsy (Cybill Shepherd) on a date to a Swedish sex movie. This is supposed to manifest Travis's cluelessness regarding how to treat women in particular and inability to understand people more generally. Betsy is deeply offended and storms off. This event precipitates Travis's decline into obsessively violent thoughts, seeking out the moral decay he is so repulsed by. Given that the film is a fiction the artistic choice in inventing such a scene as well as choices made concerning how it is played out are subject to critical evaluation. We respond with sympathy for Bickle in a way we might not in real life because it is clear what he is trying to do and why. By contrast, in real life perhaps it never was or became clear why Bremer was motivated to do what he did. It is also important to note that the scene and the relevant solicited emotions are subject to appraisal in terms of the themes explored through the work. It is open to question whether the scene amplifies or undermines the thematic working out of the narrative. Travis is drawn towards Betsy because her clean, waspish beauty allows him to project his romantic fantasies of angelic innocence on to her. Travis does have some sense of and aspires towards some kind of fantastical purity and beauty. Thus it would be a criticism of the movie to say that even given Travis's lack of understanding it would be psychologically incredible to think that he would take her to see a Swedish sex movie rather than something more in line with his fantastical projection of her. If that is right then perhaps our sympathy for Travis is or should be undercut (and to the extent this is so, it constitutes a flaw in the work). The fictional status of a work also more easily allows for the aestheticization of things like violence to enhance the sense of spectacle or

humour. Focusing in on the movement of bodies, wounds inflicted, and so on can enhance the aesthetic properties of a work as can be seen from the choreography of violence in Tarantino's *Kill Bill* to various John Woo films. Alternatively farcical treatment enables us to find violence humorous, as can be seen from Mazzini's comic journey to a baronetcy by knocking off his aristocratic relatives in the satirical *Kind Hearts and Coronets*. If a non-fiction film delighted in showing us scenes of violence in the manner of a John Woo film or treated it farcically along the lines of an Ealing Comedy we should judge it cruel or callous. However, given that we know such films are fiction we are free to delight in the aesthetic aspects of the violence portrayed or find them humorous as we otherwise would not be.

Nonetheless, as argued above, works of non-fiction can similarly aspire to the realization of aesthetic value. It is just that as non-fiction they are subject to additional constraints. Works of non-fiction as such are at the very least not free to invent central scenes or protagonists. They are nonetheless open to artistic choice in terms of the way in which events are framed through context, emotional tone and tenor, use of imagery, and thematic exploration. Compare the two recent biographical films of Truman Capote, both of which represent many of the same scenes. *Infamous* introduces us to Capote in his element as the gay society figure. The initial setting provides a sharp relief to Capote's subsequent visit to Holcomb, Kansas, where he becomes caught up with the town's response to the murders and then the killers themselves, especially Perry Smith. The initial delight Capote took in his own munificence as a society figure is represented as being of a piece with and foreshadowing his subsequent betrayals of all who came to trust and confide in him. The underlying thematic explanation is the narcissistic pursuit of self-glory. *Capote*, by contrast, starts with him on the way down to Kansas with Harper Lee. It delves straight into Capote's investigations into what happened and why. Hence *Capote* cultivates a much greater degree of empathy with his internal struggles as a writer, in contrast with the external perspectives more often afforded in *Infamous*. The strong identification with Perry Smith in *Capote* is elaborated in terms of common childhood experiences (as opposed to lust) and this is represented as feeding into his egoistic but sincere qualms about whether Capote could have done more for Smith. The egoistic way Capote uses the people around him is made clear but the greater degree of empathy cultivated by *Capote* enables the viewer to feel greater sympathy for him. *Capote* leaves us feeling sorry for a talented but ultimately selfish man whereas *Infamous* leaves us feeling appalled at and repulsed by utter treachery.

30.5.2 Emotional Intensity

People enjoy experiencing intense emotional states, though the degree to which this is so and, moreover, which ones people enjoy feeling intensely are agent-relative

matters. After all, this is what explains why some people like, for example, roller coasters, rock climbing, car racing, or certain types of dance music (Morreall 1985; Gaut 1993). Narrative artistry can facilitate and promote enjoying vicarious thrills and spills gained from engaging with works without any moral cost. This is most obvious when we are dealing with fictional works and helps to explain a range of immersive phenomena from the popularity of CGI in violent movies to the role empathy plays in allowing us to feel the emotions of the central protagonist. At least some of the pleasures in such cases arise from the heightened sense of emotional arousal that comes with greater immersion. It makes just as much sense to complain of a game that it is not violent enough or the central protagonists in a novel are not bad enough as it does to complain of a horror movie that it is not scary enough. Indeed with art more generally one of the things that appeals (at least to some) are the ways in which works successfully solicit emotional responses from us that are often stronger and more intense than those we ordinarily feel. No doubt part of the joy taken in Anthony Burgess's *A Clockwork Orange* lies in the play with language along with its concomitant aestheticization of violence. Yet given that the story is narrated from Alex's point of view, the aestheticization plays a crucial role in enabling us to delight in the primal vitality expressed through his violent acts. Indeed, part of the point of the novel is to show the reader through arousing such joy and excitement in Alex's actions that the appeal of violence lies in its passionate intensity. Indeed many artistic techniques are often designed to heighten the audience's emotional intensity. Thus, for example, in Hubert Selby Junior's *Last Exit to Brooklyn* where a couple is rowing the text suddenly cuts to whole pages written in capitals ratcheting up both the emotional ante and the reader's affective response.

30.5.3 Cognitive Gains

Another reason we are drawn to engaging with and appreciating works that take immoral characters as their central protagonists or play with morally problematic situations concerns cognitive value. In watching *Rome* or *The Sopranos* we may be reminded of how easy it is to conflate power and morality when issues of loyalty and admiration arise. The viewer may root for Tony and admire him whilst nonetheless apprehending his good family man routine as a self-serving deceit that facilitates his manipulateness. Furthermore, what we attend to and the ways in which we attend often vary depending upon which emotional state we are in the grip of. Artists can use this not only to convey how the world seems to a character, and thus what state he is in, but to draw audiences more deeply in to 'seeing' the fictional world as the character does. To take one example, in *The Sopranos* season six, episode seventy, Tony is out of hospital and worried about

the erosion of his authority. His physical weakening has eroded the fear he is held in by his captains, the fear that is essential to the exercise of power as head of the family. The episode builds up our sense of Tony's situation through several strategies including Tony's worrying about it with his psychiatrist and his crew's incessant joking about weakness. As the captains sit around laughing we suddenly see them from Tony's point of view and in slow which enhances the apprehension of them exhibiting primate-like basic group behaviour. Tony then unleashes an unprovoked but furious assault on the most physically impressive guy in the room, the new driver Perry Annunziata. The arbitrary nature of the attack combined with Tony's victory re-establishes his dominance. This serves not just to remind us of the importance of fear in maintaining the family's hierarchy and what Tony is prepared to do to maintain it but orientates the ways in which we apprehend apparent shows of friendship and loyalty in the show. Indeed more generally it is a powerful reminder of the ways in which apparent professions of collegiality or friendship (on one's own part or that of others) can sometimes be much more self-serving than perhaps we tend to admit. Works prime our emotional responses and shape them in the journey through a narrative. Often they do so in order to remind us of the things we may already tacitly know or in ways that extend or deepen our understanding (Carroll 1998). Park Chan-Wook's *Vengeance* trilogy, for example, explores different ways in which the lust for revenge can seem natural and its various consequences. In *Lady Vengeance*, the last of the trilogy, we see the families of murdered children brought together. They exact revenge on the killer of their children by turning aggressors themselves, each participating in the taking of the murderer's life. Afterwards the initial feeling of cohesion brought about by the group action dissipates as the feelings of guilt start. Gradually everyone leaves citing trivial excuses and the viewer is left with a sense of their not wanting to see each other again. The arc of our emotional responses shows us how feelings of vengeance can give way to guilt and isolation. As can be seen from works ranging from *American Psycho* to *Dangerous Liaisons* the ways in which works engage our emotions through the exploration of violence, sexuality, betrayal whilst taking a host of morally problematic actions as their subject matter can be used to promote knowledge and understanding (Kieran 2003*b*; 2006).

A little observed but important way we can also learn concerns not so much the insights we may glean from emotional engagement with a work but the enhancement of our cognitive-affective skills and capacities (Kieran 2005: 138–47). *Series 7: The Contenders* is a film set in a near-contemporary or future world where we see, for the most part, scenes from a reality television show in its seventh run. The show's conceit involves matching up ordinary people to fight to the death, bringing with it all the normal clichéd interviews and faux emotional trajectories we would expect of the genre. The exploration of reality television involves a by turns amusing and horrifying parody of the exact look and feel of its

conventions. Prior to *Series 7*, Chris Morris's *Brass Eye* had similarly parodied television news media conventions and the ways in which public figures could easily be persuaded into talking nonsense or making claims about subjects they knew nothing about. *Brass Eye* caused a storm of controversy not just because of the highly emotional nature of the subject matter (from paedophilia to drugs) but also due to the ways in which public figures had been duped. Independently of the particular message of these shows, the astute parodies of television news and reality show conventions facilitate the viewers' capacity to see how and why the relevant conventions are there. Thus such works enhance our ability to see where, why, and how such shows are constructed for emotionally manipulative reasons. More generally, engaging with artistically constructed narratives may enhance readers' capacity for empathizing with people in real life since they tend to expose us in imagining to a wider range of how people can behave and cultivate the abilities involved in inferring intentions and underlying patterns of action.

30.5.4 Drives and Desires

Art works can and often do call on emotions that are related to motivating drives or desires that we may have. Representations of adultery, betrayal or violence abound where our responses are not straightforwardly solicited in terms of what is permissible, right or good but rather in terms of empathy with or sympathy for central characters (understandably perhaps) transgressing moral boundaries. To the extent that such representations are successful, part of what is involved may call upon emotions of excitement, arousal or desire that normally we would consider to be prohibited (Kieran 2002). In real life scenarios where we are subject to such emotions we would normally work to suppress them or distance ourselves from them, whereas, depending upon the work in question, in the artistic case we may allow ourselves to indulge them. The underlying drives or desires might normally be taken to be intrinsically problematic, for example emotions such as envy, malice, or *schadenfreude*. Alternatively works may cultivate emotions that would not themselves be considered to be morally problematic except that the way in which they are directed or the extent to which they are indulged may normally considered to be so. This may also include a range of complex meta-responses as well. After all works sometimes self-consciously set out to prompt in the reader second order responses of pleasure (as well as disgust) at the first order emotional responses successfully solicited. These may range from pleasure taken in the moral rectitude of one's abhorrence felt at a character's adultery to pleasure arising from the delights of moral transgression. Hence the appeal of works by Céline, de Sade, the Earl of Rochester, and John Waters.

30.5.5 Artistic Values

We have isolated central explanations as to how and why we enjoy empathizing and sympathizing with immoral characters but this is not to deny that works tend to draw on them in complex ways. Indeed, great works tend to make symbiotic use of the different motivations in ways that enhance the value of their works. The appeal of an emotional roller-coaster movie such as *Saw* when contrasted say with *A Clockwork Orange* tends to diminish given the realization that *Saw* is merely an effective emotional intensifier rather than a work which puts emotional impact in the service of exploring a rich theme about human existence. Where a work attempts to get us to isolate off aspects of our normal moral commitments and respond emotionally to what we imagine in ways we ordinarily would not then we expect there to be a payoff for so doing. There will be individual variance since what values an agent is able or prepared to allow herself to take on or isolate with respect to what is imagined may well be an agent-relative matter (Stokes 2006). Indeed, even individuals who share the same evaluative commitments may give them different priorities. Furthermore, it not only depends on an agent's values and commitments but also on the agent's capacities, for example the ability to empathize may vary. Variance may also arise depending on how the appreciator understands the relations between the responses solicited in engaging with the artistic object and real-world attitudes. In the same way that there is permissible variance amongst individuals with respect to horror movies, so too there is permissible variance over individuals as to the degree to which norms can be suspended in underwriting empathy with and sympathy for characters who would normally be judged to be deeply immoral. If there is no payoff in terms of the motivations outlined above then the work will have failed to justify itself. Furthermore, in certain cases we may judge that whatever the payoff is, it is insufficient to redeem what the work has put us through as readers or viewers.

Consider Haneke's *Funny Games*, which charts the psychopathic descent of two characters trespassing on a conventionally nice middle-class family holiday. The film self-consciously plays with cinematic conventions and foregrounds the ways in which the film is being played out for the viewer's sake. We see no violence directly, but are prompted to imagine what happens in ways that trigger a range of intensely uncomfortable emotional reactions. The charge of the movie rests on the self-conscious condemnation of its audience. The payoff here is minimal and the film's character is disingenuous. A work that prompts an audience to be voyeuristic at misery and degradation through its manipulation of artistic conventions and then morally condemns the audience for being voyeuristic constitutes a kind of artistic hypocrisy. This goes hand in hand with Haneke's failure to provide the trespassers with any real motivation. Indeed, the film flaunts its failure to do so as if this constitutes an act of artistic daring required for the thematic conceit and ultimate accusation. Yet the conceit is flawed since the audience is always entitled to ask for

what purpose a writer or director is doing something. Is it intelligible? Is what we are being put through artistically justified? Characters depend on reasons for action. Devoid of such, the psychopathic descent in *Funny Games* leaves the viewer numb and blank since there is nothing there to empathize or sympathize with. Haneke's film prompts the viewer to imagine increasingly unspeakable acts and then accuses the viewer of a systematic disposition towards cruelty or schadenfreude. All it reveals, however, is that viewers expect the dramatic development of the film to have some payoff despite the apparent lack of explanation or emotional engagement. If the analysis is right, then this is artistic cowardice presenting itself as artistic courage or daring. The flaw lies with the character of the film and what the director is attempting to do rather than with the audience.

30.6 EMOTIONS, IMAGININGS, AND CHARACTER

Underlying much of the debate is the presumption that our emotional responses to what we imagine can be morally problematic because of what they express or reveal about our character. The thought is familiar enough both from the extant literature and contemporary cultural discourse (Gaut 2007: 48). Nonetheless, little has been done to justify and work out the presumption in any great detail. It faces two distinct challenges. The first is epistemic. Narrative art works are often shaped as they are to get us to respond emotionally in certain ways. The same kind of event may be represented from a victim's, perpetrator's, observer's, or third person point of view. The very choice as to which viewpoint(s) a scenario is represented from and the order in which this is done can make a significant difference to the reader's emotional responses. The point of view(s) the reader is prescribed to attend to and how they are guided through the event as represented influences the nature and tone of the audience's emotional reactions (Goldie 2003; Kieran 2003a). Where a work is good as art then presumably it will elicit the sought-for emotional responses across a wide range of readers. After all, it is taken as a mark of artistic value that a work speaks to people across different times, places, and cultures. Yet if this is the case then surely someone's responding with empathy, disgust, or indignation to what they are prescribed to imagine doesn't necessarily tell us anything interesting about their character. It only tells us that in common with a whole host of other people they can be successfully made to feel certain emotions in response to having their imaginings prescribed in certain ways. We may laugh at the attempt to knock off the old lady in *The Lady Killers* or flinch with repulsion at the horrific details of psychopathic killings in *American Psycho* but as yet all that is revealed is how human emotions generally can be shaped in particular ways

through artistic narratives. It reveals little or nothing significant about someone's character in particular. Furthermore, given that we can and do isolate aspects of our moral norms and codes in engaging with works, it is not clear what exactly is revealed in terms of dispositions towards feeling and acting morally with respect to actual events. How we respond to works in what we imagine need not systematically reflect how we would be disposed to respond when actually confronted with putatively morally problematic people and events. The mere fact that someone empathizes with Tony's outrage at being grassed up to the Feds or enjoys the range of emotional responses bound up with the illicit activities portrayed does not yet tell us anything about that person's actual dispositions to act and feel when confronted by such people and scenarios in the real world. Consider an analogy to sexual fantasies. It is well documented that there seems to be little general causal relation between people's sexual fantasies and how they would respond if confronted with the real-life equivalent (Williams 1979; Bauserman 1996). Thus even if it is the case that certain imaginings are revealing about basic traits or tendencies what is revealed may be fairly indirect and have little or no implications for actual scenarios putatively closely related to the imagined ones.

The second challenge is moral. We should distinguish between something being revealing about character in imagining morally problematic scenarios and something manifesting character in ways that are morally problematic. Emotional responses to art works that involve imagining morally problematic characters and states of affairs may under certain circumstances reveal character but it does not thereby automatically follow that the imaginings and emotional responses to them are as such morally problematic or condemnable. Consider the analogy to sexual fantasies further. Imagine that someone indulges in fantasies involving illicit activities, partners, or sex without consent. The erotic interest taken in and aroused by imagining activities that would be morally problematic were they indulged in actual activities may be revealing about someone's character. Exactly what might be revealed is a difficult matter but let us assume that the particular fantasies involved can be said to reveal that someone is submissive or dominant, a sexual thrill seeker, and so on. Thus such imaginings may reveal basic traits of someone's sexual character. Nonetheless, given that the person is aware of what is being imagined as a fantasy it is far from clear that the imaginings are or could be morally problematic as such. After all, the internalized moral prohibitions of the person could be such that they never would act as they imagine in the fantasy. This holds for imaginings more generally. In reading the Icelandic sagas or watching *The Lady Killers* we apprehend and emotionally respond to the works as artistically constructed narratives. If someone responds with indignation or hilarity at certain junctures in the respective films it may reveal that they are more hostile or less serious-minded than others. It might also manifest a capacity to dissociate aspects of standard moral systems or norms more easily when compared to others who do not have the same emotional reactions to the relevant scenes. What is not clear is

that such emotional responses to what is imagined issues from someone's character in a way that connects up straightforwardly with a disposition in real life to be callously amused at murder, admire honour killings, or act in associated ways issuing from such a disposition.

The two challenges presented are not tantamount to a denial that our emotional responses in what we imagine may sometimes be revealing of character or indeed morally problematic. However, they highlight the ways in which the contemporary debate needs to take much greater account of the complex inter-relations between what we may be prescribed to imagine, what we can or are prepared to imagine, how we do so, the artistic payoff of so doing, our attitude towards such, and the ways in which character may be implicated through doing so. What is required is a more complex story about the reasons to hold when, where, and why our empathy for and sympathy with morally problematic characters in artistically-shaped narratives issues from or cultivates more general dispositions to do ill (or good): work which requires a greater philosophical and psychological understanding of the complexities involved. Psychological work is required since much will depend on how and the extent to which emotional responses interact with belief and imagination systems and in what ways so doing may reflect or cultivate more general dispositions of character to feel and act. Put more plainly we not only need to know more about the underlying mechanisms that enable us to empathize and sympathize with morally problematic characters in narrative art but how, if at all, so doing may corrupt our more general patterns of emotional response and character. Philosophical work is required since, even if we arrive at such a psychological understanding, we need a better conceptual grasp of the ways in which emotionally responding to imagined states of affairs might manifest virtue and vice.

REFERENCES

- BAUSERMAN, R. (1996). 'Sexual Aggression and Pornography: A Review of Correlational Research'. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 18: 405–27.
- BULLOUGH, E. (1995). 'Psychical Distance', in A. Neill and A. Ridely (eds.), *The Philosophy of Art: Classic Readings*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- CARROLL, N. (1996). 'Moderate Moralism'. *British Journal of Aesthetics* 36: 223–37.
- (1998). 'The Ethical Criticism of Art', in J. Levinson (ed.), *Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 126–60.
- ELLROY, J. (1993). *White Jazz*. London: Arrow.
- FRIEND, S. (2007). 'The Pleasures of Documentary Tragedy'. *British Journal of Aesthetics*. 47: 184–98.
- GAUT, B. (1993). 'The Paradox of Horror'. *British Journal of Aesthetics* 33: 333–45.
- (1998a). 'Just Joking: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Humour'. *Philosophy and Literature* 22: 51–68.

- (1998*b*). 'The Ethical Criticism of Art', in J. Levinson (ed.), *Aesthetics and Ethics: Essay at the Intersection*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 182–203.
- (2007). *Art, Emotion and Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- GENDLER, T. S. (2000). 'The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance'. *Journal of Philosophy* 97: 55–81.
- GOLDIE, P. (2003). 'Narrative, Emotion, and Perspective', in M. Kieran and D. Lopes (eds.), *Imagination, Philosophy, and the Arts*. London: Routledge, pp. 54–68.
- JACOBSON, D. (1997). 'In Praise of Immoral Art'. *Philosophical Topics*. 25: 155–99.
- KIERAN, M. (1996). 'Art, Imagination and the Cultivation of Morals'. *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 54: 337–51.
- (2001). 'In Defense of the Ethical Evaluation of Narrative Art'. *British Journal of Aesthetics* 41: 26–38.
- (2002). 'On Obscenity: The Thrill and Repulsion of the Morally Prohibited'. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 64: 31–55.
- (2003*a*). 'In Search of a Narrative', in M. Kieran and D. Lopes (eds.), *Imagination, Philosophy, and the Arts*. London: Routledge, pp. 69–88.
- (2003*b*). 'Forbidden Knowledge: The Challenge of Cognitive Immoralism', in S. Gardner and J. L. Bermúdez (eds.), *Art and Morality*. London: Routledge, pp. 56–73.
- (2005). *Revealing Art*. London: Routledge.
- (2006). 'Art, Morality and Ethics: On the (Im)Moral Character of Art Works and Inter-Relations to Artistic Value'. *Philosophy Compass*. 1: 129–43.
- MORAN, R. (1994). 'The Expression of Feeling in Imagination'. *Philosophical Review* 103: 75–106.
- MORREALL, J. (1985). 'Enjoying Negative Emotions in Fiction'. *Philosophy and Literature* 9: 95–102.
- NICHOLS, S. (2006). 'Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like'. *Mind & Language* 21: 459–74.
- PATRIDGE, S. (2008). 'Moral Vices as Artistic Virtues: Eugene Onegin and Alice'. *Philosophia* 36: 181–93.
- STOKES, D. (2006). 'The Evaluative Character of Imaginative Resistance'. *British Journal of Aesthetics* 46: 387–405.
- WALTON, K. (1978). 'Fearing Fictions'. *Journal of Philosophy* 75: 5–27.
- (1990). *Mimesis as Make-Believe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1994). 'Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality, I'. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, suppl., 68: 51–66.
- WEINBERG, J. M. (2008). 'Configuring the Cognitive Imagination', in K. Stock and K. Thomson-Jones (eds.), *New Waves in Aesthetics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 203–23.
- WILLIAMS, B. (1979). *The Williams Report: Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship*. London: HMSO, Cmnd. 7772.
- WOOD, J. (2008). *How Fiction Works*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.