The present issue of Cinema: Journal of Philosophy and the Moving Image was born in praise of the thirty years passed since Gilles Deleuze’s Cinema 1: The Movement-Image was published in 1983. With Cinema 2: The Time-Image (1985), they remain seminal works in the philosophy of cinema, film-philosophy, and in film studies in general. His thought on moving images occupies the centre of contemporary debates on cinema, video art, and visual culture, and informs central debates in metaphilosophy as well.

In 1997, David N. Rodowick devoted the spring issue of Iris to Gilles Deleuze as “a philosopher of the image”. With the assembly of essays he edited, Rodowick’s aim was to unify two very different approaches to Deleuze’s Cinema books. He noted that there was an inconsistency between his commentators: those from film theory had insufficient knowledge of Deleuze’s unique conceptual and philosophical work, and at the same time, those from the philosophical field who were familiar with his larger conceptual and philosophical thought, had insufficient knowledge of film theory itself. Bringing both approaches together into a consistent and “sustained dialogue” seemed to be a crucial and mandatory step for Deleuzian studies as Deleuze’s own cinephilia was always closely connected with his philosophical method. Both fields should keep neighbouring territories, not only because of the extrinsic and intrinsic interferences between them, but also to guarantee those types of interferences that are not localized. Indeed, in the 80’s, Deleuze’s own philosophical project included an elaboration of a philosophy-cinema. However, we realise that while much of the current research within film studies is interdisciplinarily informed, cinema’s relevance for philosophy itself has been generally ignored. In what sense is Deleuze’s Cinema work important to philosophy? Our aim with the present volume is to find alternatives to this circumscribed debate by opening it up into the specific philosophical field, namely through dialoguing with Difference and Repetition (1968), The Logic of Sense (1969), or with his work with Félix Guattari. Other important thinkers with whom we may dialogue within a systematic hermeneutics of Deleuze’s texts and references include Plato, Kant, Bergson, Artaud, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger, amongst others — even, we might say, to contradict them.
For this issue, we intend to bring together original essays that, from a philosophical point of view, specifically explore the moving image(s) and time, and its many connections with metaphilosophy and metacinema (and consequently with self-reflexive films). We seek, in particular, to analyse the link between moving images and other kinds of images (from its materiality to its technological origins and viewer’s perception) and the way that an image may be a version or a variation of another image in an intermedial network. Our aim is to encourage the metaphilosophical debate on these themes with a scrutiny on the direct and indirect interferences between both philosophy and film, and philosophy and non-philosophy (as a logic of sensation: of percepts and affects).

I was a student of philosophy, and although I wasn’t stupid enough to want to create a philosophy of cinema, one conjunction made an impression on me. I liked those authors who demanded that we introduce movement to thought, “real” movement (they denounced the Hegelian dialectic as abstract movement). How could I not discover the cinema, which introduces “real” movement into the image. I wasn’t trying to apply philosophy to cinema, but I went straight from philosophy to cinema, the reverse was also true, one went right from cinema to philosophy.4

How should we understand the surprisingly unattainable character of what could be a philosophy of cinema considering the importance that cinema had in his philosophical work? Deleuze declares that he never wanted to create a philosophy of cinema taken in one sense: as thinking about cinema, by applying a pre-established philosophy to this artistic field material. “What we should in fact do, is stop allowing philosophers to reflect “on” things. The philosopher creates, he doesn’t reflect.”5 Thus, Deleuze’s own intention was to go directly from one field to the other through what both philosophy and cinema share in common — through their common problems. He did want to create a philosophy of cinema, but one that would be based on conceptual (philosophical) practice or conceptual (philosophical) creation. At the beginning of The Movement-Image, he says that he wanted to create a philosophy able to reveal that it was cinema itself requiring and imposing a new way to think images. To think with moving images, not to think on them.

The oft commented upon final words of The Time-Image echo the consequences of this philosophical and methodological delimitation of the differences between a film theory (as a
reflection on cinema) and a philosophy of film (as a conceptual practice). We may say that surreptitiously it also permeates the affinities that we are looking for within Deleuzian philosophy itself: “there is always a time, midday-midnight, when we must no longer ask ourselves, ‘What is cinema?’ but ‘What is philosophy?’” We are far, however, from a chronologic point of view of time as a measurable dimension controlled by the 12-hour clock. The measure for the temporal transition from morning to evening and from one day to another, raises questions regarding the frame of reversible elements. The abbreviations “12 a.m.” and “12 p.m.”, before midday (ante meridiem) and after midday (post meridiem), are not but conventions. It lacks precision concerning its beginning and ending. Nevertheless, this indiscernible element also seems to characterize the relationship between cinema and philosophy — we can easily go from one to another and the reverse, without losing any sensations or any conceptual work. Their boundaries are slippery. As an event, precarious, contingent, ephemeral, we feel obligated to think it — in-between.

Even so, philosophers do not see cinema just as a mechanical reproduction or a modern version of Zenon’s paradoxes resumed in “two irreducible formulas”? a) Real Movement → Concrete Duration, and b) Immobile Sections + Abstract Time. For decades, cinema was a useful ideological tool used with optimism towards the possibility of social and political change through the shock activated by montage: the positive effect of thought-images was reflected on the “spiritual automaton,” a version of the Spinozian deduction of one thought from another. But, cinema is also its images and its content, not just a thought-machine. Who was in control of that mechanism? The spiritual automatism means autonomy and the affirmation of the power to think, but also means its privation, the lack of a spirit, the impower of thinking. Thus, diverse types of dangers haunt cinema — the massification of an art form such as cinema can have a utilitarian use by serving a politicization of art, but also can be used by totalitarian states that aestheticize politics. To sum up: “The great directors of the cinema may be compared, in our view, not merely with painters, architects and musicians, but also with thinkers. They think with movement-images and time-images instead of concepts.” The future of the two-way street that goes from a philosophy of film towards a film-philosophy is written with this conscientiousness.

The problematic of time, its (re)presentations and perception, the quest for the connection between 20th Century history, politics and ethics, and the role of film and images within a philosophy of time are common problems shared by the eight essays published in this issue.
on Gilles Deleuze and Moving Images. Between the interchanging movement from cinema to philosophy and back, all share the effort to think this complex relationship and to clarify thought-images, the conceptual thinking of images, as well as thinking with the moving images. Although there have been numerous exegeses on Deleuze’s books on cinema and also on his pre and post-Cinema period, we think that the following essays will be of interest to both beginners and experts of Deleuzian studies. Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 are still philosophical milestones to (re)discover and time a central topic of his philosophy. Think, for instance, of David N. Rodowick’s clarification of the two philosophical approaches to both time and thought in the pre and postwar period that will result in the tension between the two imagery regimes with different notions on time, movement, and whole. If the movement-image has a strong influence on the Hegelian will to truth, the time-image follows Nietzsche’s idea of fabulation and falsified narrations. The two regimes present different images of thought. Or in David Martin-Jones’ idea to expand the taxonomic conceptual work of Cinema for processes of re/construction of new national identity in cinema, thus overcoming the well-known concept of minor cinema. Or even in Patricia Pisters’ concept of the “neuro-image,” a questioning of the supposed strong and clear connection between Deleuze’s previous philosophy of time (from Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense) and his philosophy of cinema. These are but a few examples that reveal the vitality of the Deleuzian work and of his systematic methodology towards a creative practice.

In this line of thought, we are delighted to begin with a translated version of Mirjam Schaub’s essay on Deleuze, time and images, “Cinema: the ‘Counter-Realization’ of Philosophical Problems.” In this work, the author analyses how Deleuze’s interest in time was conceived during his philosophical work by explaining his pre-Cinema silence on that issue as well as his rupture with an infinite, one-directional successiveness concept of time. By analyzing the asymmetrical relationship between the visible and the utterable, she defines the Deleuzian conception of “image” as a process, and by that, it becomes clear that Deleuze’s interest remained on the virtual presence of images: if we perceive sound successively and if we see simultaneously, in a paradoxical way images may waive any form of temporality. Thus, Mirjam Schaub develops the Deleuzian concept of the interval, the in-between two images, in its immeasurable and imageless features.

“Visual Effects and Phenomenology of Perceptual Control” by Jay Lampert, questions the effects compositor as a true artist that “paints with time.” In what could be considered a
contemporary version of Dziga Vertov’s own idea of separating the camera eye from the flesh eye, the author defends the notion that synthetic perception does not intend to replace consciousness but to give it a kind of perceptual experience it could not have in any other way than expanding the spectator’s experience from a phenomenological point of view. Thus, avoiding the more common discussions on the aesthetics of digital images, the author is driven by a phenomenology of the act of compositing through its technological origin, which was ignored by Deleuze. Therefore, Lampert explains how digital editing manipulates natural images as they are registered, but can also create original perceptions.

Bernd Herzogenrath’s essay “Double-Deleuze: ‘Intelligent Materialism’ Goes to the Movies” is an essay on Morrison’s film Decasia (2002), a film made exclusively of both found footage and archive material in different states of deterioration. As a ruinous film, Decasia is beyond Deleuze’s movement-images and time-images as for the author it creates a matter-image. It poetically shows the historicity of film itself, that it is a fragile temporary material, by nature subject to deterioration and mortality. Herzogenrath writes an essay of time, decay, and materiality: in Decasia, the complexity of representing time in film is explained by its own filmic material and not by the projected film, nor by narration time, neither by narrated time. By focusing mainly on time, film, and its materiality the author ends by concluding that the representation of time in film is weaker when compared to the effects of time on film.

In “Bringing the Past into the Present: West of the Tracks as a Deleuzian Time-Image,” William Brown enlarges the Deleuzian concept of the time-image outside the cinematic field claiming that this film’s own episodic structure (“Rust,” “Remnants,” and “Rails”) is a direct presentation of time that breaks with the official history of China constructed by conventional narrative films. As a Deleuzian analysis on Wang Bing’s documentary of spaces of ruin and decay, it questions history and temporality. The author problematizes Deleuze’s general vagueness on documentary films by questioning the specific connection between space and the time-image. Thus, the passage of time is not only visible by its ruinous documented spaces, neither by its nine-hour duration, but also by the spectator’s own experience of the passage of time.

Jakob Nilsson’s essay “Thought-Images and the New as a Rarity: A Reevaluation of the Philosophical Implications of Deleuze’s Cinema Books” aims at reversing the common idea that Deleuze’s Cinema 2 marked a shift from the earlier concept on “thought without image” to a multiplicity of “images of thought.” Through the genealogy of the concept of “new,” a necessary methodology that does not imprison the author in a supposed linear narrative line.
of thought, Jakob Nilsson philosophically argues for the rarity of the new by questioning the different forms of crystal-images as lines of flight that open to the unthought in thought.

We continue on questioning the creative production of the new (in philosophy, in visual arts) with Joseph Barker’s “Visions of the Intolerable: Deleuze on Ethical Images.” The author posits the priority of ethics and questions the general idea that Deleuze privileges the process of creation. By questioning it from an ethical point of view, Joseph Barker analyses Gilles Deleuze’s own images of the intolerable and reverses the argument: these type of intolerable images are the real aim of creativity itself.

“Artaud versus Kant: Annihilation of the Imagination in Deleuze’s Philosophy of Cinema” by Jurate Baranova, is an essay that compares the influence of such different aesthetical thinkers as Kant and Artaud in Deleuze’s thought. Jurate Baranova starts by revealing how the two thinkers had a strong impact on Deleuze’s thought in order to compare the dogmatic image of thought and thought without image. The author questions the role of imagination and the doctrine of faculties in Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema by developing his cinematic conception of the “sublime” in Kant and the “impower to think” in Artaud.

Nuno Carvalho’s “Para além da Imagem-Cristal: Contributos para a identificação de uma terceira síntese do tempo nos Cinemas de Gilles Deleuze” (“Beyond the Crystal-Image: Contributions towards the Identification of a Third Synthesis of Time in Gilles Deleuze’s Cinema”), evaluates the function of the third synthesis of time in Cinema 2. According to the author, the crystal-image is key to understanding the genetic element of the time-image. However, Orson Welles’ dissolution of the pure past that seems to inscribe the third synthesis of time in the filmic images is not openly assumed by Deleuze.


I do hope that readers, beginners or not, enjoy this issue and find some practical value for their own personal work.
9. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 159: “The spiritual automaton became fascist man.”
11. Deleuze, Cinema 1, xix.