THOUGHT-IMAGES AND THE NEW AS A RARITY:
A REEVALEUATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF DELEUZE’S CINEMA BOOKS

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There is only a slim chance, so great is the capacity […] for exhausted life to get control of the New from its birth […].
— Gilles Deleuze

Contrary to Deleuze, therefore, I think […] events are rare […].
— Alain Badiou

INTRODUCTION

This article reexamines and reevaluates two aspects of Deleuze’s cinema books: their hardly acknowledged exploration of the problem of the “new,” and their taxonomy of different thought-images. It charts how these two aspects intertwine and how they relate to changes within Deleuze’s philosophy as a whole. What changes in Deleuze’s thought do the cinema books give expression to? There may seem to be a clear shift, as influentially argued by Paula Marrati and partly by Raymond Bellour, between Deleuze’s 1960s call for a “thought without image” and the cinema books’ (and What is Philosophy?’s) affirmation of a plurality of images of thought. But this article will critically examine and argue against there being a shift in this sense. The explorations of thought-images in the cinema books will instead be revealed to reflect complications and an altered focus in Deleuze’s conception of the “new.” How does this altered conception of the new manifest itself in the cinema books’ examinations of thought-images? And how does it relate to varying notions of the new within Deleuze’s philosophy at large?

Cinema 2’s intricate treatment of the problem of the new (beyond classical or modernistic notions that “we no longer believe in”) has been largely neglected in the research (and certainly by antagonistic readers like Badiou). As anticipated in Capitalism and Schizophrenia
and his book on Francis Bacon, “the new” has ceased to be naturally associated with the outcome of an ontology of constant differentiation (which tended to be the focus of his work in the 1960s). The term has now more clearly come to concern creations that are rare and that are the object and possible outcome of aesthetic-political-philosophical struggle. This article charts the flowering of this problematic in the cinema books in relation to both its notions of thinking images and the varying conceptions of the new across Deleuze’s work as a whole.

The article begins with the ontological level of the relation image-thought in *Cinema*, and with how the creation of new thought can be understood from this basic perspective and in relation to film. This is followed by a critical examination of Marrati’s (and Bellour’s) ideas of a shift, which will reveal how there is instead continuity between early Deleuze and the cinema books regarding thought-images, and most importantly, regarding the notion of “new images of thought” and their relation to the “outside” that is one of the conditions for the new. The article then proceeds to chart the varying conceptions of the new across Deleuze’s *oeuvre* as well as different ways of understanding the meaning of the term, in order to define in what senses the new is a rarity in Deleuze. The different thought-images of the cinema books are thereafter returned to from this perspective, which eventually leads to the question of how the “outside” can be part of thinking film images, and before that to a close examination of crystal-images. Crystal-images will be revealed to sketch the temporal logic of the new seen as the rare outcome of experimental struggle in situations in which creative intersections between realms of reality are disturbed. This article, then, will examine how the treatment of thinking images in *Cinema* are bound up with a shifted focus in Deleuze’s conception of the new.

**IMAGES, THINKING IMAGES — THE BASIC LEVEL**

In *Cinema* 1 Deleuze famously rolls out an ontology of “movement-images”: Movement, image and matter are the same thing. The universe is an acentered aggregate of interacting images consisting of matter-movement-light.¹ This unorthodox idea — creatively borrowed from Bergson — is one (particularly radical) way to short-circuit the dichotomy that places images in consciousness (or in other representations) and movements in quantitative space. The “black screens” that constitute subjective consciousness, however, are an interruption and subtraction within and among the universal flow of matter-image-light, which curves the universe and

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¹ This unorthodox idea — creatively borrowed from Bergson — is one (particularly radical) way to short-circuit the dichotomy that places images in consciousness (or in other representations) and movements in quantitative space. The “black screens” that constitute subjective consciousness, however, are an interruption and subtraction within and among the universal flow of matter-image-light, which curves the universe and
gives it a center or point of view. From surrounding images reacting on each other, the center selects and interrupts a few that are dragged into a “frame.” This framing process, which is ongoing, is the material base level of subjectivity. It outlines an interval of time, a “living image,” a gap between acting and reacting images. It introduces another register of references between images, in which thinking is made possible. The narrative that spans the two cinema books, on this level, reads like a map of dwindling paths (that crosses any discrepancies between the two books) from chaotic states of matter-images that start to form simple subjective centers, whose consciousness hardly transcends action-reaction, all the way to advanced nonlinear thought.

The idea of matter as movement-images does not make reality less, but “image” more. Things are not merely images “for us,” they are primarily perceptions, images, in themselves and for themselves. This claim about images must therefore not be confused with the variety of familiar theories in which reality/being has become image for human subjects and societies, as a more authentic reality/being has receded. For Deleuze, from this perspective, the authentic real is itself “images” — there is immanence of images, nothing more real behind or beyond — and it has been that way since “the world before man.”

This image ontology should neither be taken for Deleuze’s philosophy of (differentiating) intensity-time-matter in its full complexity — although Cinema 2 in parts closes in on such complexity — nor for an abstraction that is necessarily translatable to every other problem in Deleuze (another problem may require, say, a conception of reality as flow). But it sets up a plane of thought for the working out of a main issue in the cinema books: (different regimes of) immanent relations between images, matter, and thought. Thinking and things, while often distinct, are ontologically of the same stuff, they are found on the same larger plane of immanence (although the latter contains an open array of different planes of thought). The plane of immanence, write Deleuze and Guattari, has “two facets as Thought and as Nature [...]”.

The point is ontological, not epistemological or phenomenological – “No doubt there can be more in matter than the image we have of it,” Deleuze writes in his 1966 book on Bergson, “but there cannot be anything else in it, of a different nature.” Human cognition and perception are of course limited, and there is certainly “more in matter.” Regarding the acentered universe of primary “movement-images,” Deleuze writes that it “is not surprising that we have to construct it since it is given only to the eye which we do not have.” However, there are other eyes (to connect with speculative philosophy), other framings of images, found within science, scientific technology and art, which exceed “natural” perception and
Film has inherent potentials to go beyond human limitations in its ways of dragging selected images into a frame (the material base of film-consciousness in which film thinking is made possible). While human cognitions and perceptions are limited, they are not static, and as films directly affect (however “active”) spectator’s brains, they may rewire our (socially and biologically habitualized) images of thought.

As images produced by, or through machines, film and especially filmic montage hold potentials to expand what it means to think, and even allow us to think the (seemingly) unthinkable. But like other framings of moving-image thought in the universe, filmic images can make up any kind of “thinking” in the widest sense of the term. It can be a reptile-brain, an unforeseen film-philosophy, or anything in-between. For Deleuze cinema is like an actual brain a “tracing and retracing of cerebral circuits,” but as he famously adds, this “can be the deficient idiot brain as well as a brain of creativity.”

A truly creative tracing of new cerebral circuits entails, as a first basic step, going beyond what Deleuze labels dogmatic or representational thought. But in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze seemingly equated such thought with the very term image (“the image of thought”) and called for a “thought without image.” How do the cinema books — with their thought-nature-image ontology and their positive conception of image-s of thought — relate to this previous call for a thought without image? Paola Marrati argues and Raymond Bellour partly implies that the cinema books manifest the following shift in Deleuze’s conception of the relation between images and thought: He used to have a categorically negative conception of “image-thought” but made a series of realizations about the full nature of images and developed a new more positive conception of multiple thought-images (and their relations). The next section critically examines this notion of a shift. It does so in order to reveal that the cinema books actually do not signal a shift in Deleuze’s view of images but rather, as will be gradually shown throughout the article, a set of complications in his views on thought-images in relation to the problem of the new.

**THOUGHT-IMAGE/S BEFORE AND AFTER THE CINEMA BOOKS**

While Bellour’s ideas of a shift are part of a nuanced sketch of somewhat varying concepts of images in Deleuze, he does contend that in the cinema books “the split between image-thought
and though without image posed in *Difference and Repetition* gets reframed purely in terms of differences between images.” Marrati, more strongly, argues that Deleuze’s “encounter with cinema” and a new Bergsonian inspiration led him to “reconsider the ontological status of images” and to the realization that images contain “all sorts of speeds and movements, all sorts of depths of time,” and finally to his formulations of different planes of immanence of thought in *What is Philosophy?*. In a footnote, Marrati indicates a complication of the notion of a shift as she states that already since his 1962 book on Nietzsche Deleuze had “hesitated” between “the call for a ‘thought without image […] and the hope of creating a ‘new image of thought’,” but she goes on to argue that what is “decisive in *What Is Philosophy?*” as following the cinema books, is that “images of thoughts are multiplied” and “endowed with [a new] mobility and depth.” What is claimed here, then, is that prior to the multiplication of images of thought in the cinema books and *What is Philosophy?* there was only either the dogmatic Image of thought, imageless thought, or a hesitating “hope” of a new image.

Three things together speak against that being the case (Bellour interestingly touches on some of these points while still basically maintaining the implication of a shift). First of all, thought-images where already considered to be multiple, even the dogmatic ones, as for instance implied by the concept of “Noology” in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980) as “precisely the study of images of thought, and their historicity.” Secondly, while “private thinkers” like Nietzsche are said to “destroy images,” the word “image” was used in a restricted sense: as dogmatic images, referred to as a “classical image” and as “*this image*,” not as thought-images *per se*. Of course, this was already the case in *Difference and Repetition* (1968), in which the notion of a thought without image was exclusively about a thought without Image with a capital “I” defined as a “dogmatic, orthodox or moral image” with many variants.

Thirdly, and most importantly, these latter specifications of such an Image point to how Deleuze already regarded there to be other kinds of images of thought — not only in art but also in philosophy: In 1962, Deleuze held up Nietzsche as having succeeded in “setting up a new image of thought” (in contrast to Schopenhauer who only dreamt of it). And half outside philosophy there is Proust, who — in a particularly “Platonist” manner — as Deleuze writes in *Proust and Signs* (1964) sets up “an image of thought under the sign of encounters and violences” that is “in opposition” to the “essential presuppositions of a classical philosophy of the rationalist type.” These larger categories, representational/dogmatic image vs.
new image, there in Deleuze at least since 1962, remain as a main frame in the cinema books, no matter how plural the images become.

Furthermore, the cinema books do not reflect a reconsidering of “the ontological status of images” where images gain “all sorts of speeds and movements, all sorts of depths of time” since Bergsonian and Nietzschean conceptions of images and thinking were present in Deleuze’s work in the 1960s and 70s. And the “encounter with cinema” that Marrati mentions, had occurred for Deleuze long before he published his cinema books. In an interview with Cahiers du Cinéma in 1976 Deleuze makes explicit how many of the constitutive parts of his reading of cinema through a Bergsonian framework, with its plural image ontology — in which the “brain’s just one image among others” — were already in place. And in an interview in 1968, right before the publication of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze makes clear that this also includes the “new” thought-images of cinema:

Godard transforms cinema by introducing thought into it. He didn’t have thoughts on cinema, he doesn’t put more or less valid thought into cinema; he starts cinema thinking, and for the first time, if I’m not mistaken. [...] Godard knew how to find both a new means and a new “image” [...]  

The claim that the cinema books represent a shift in Deleuze’s conception of thought-images can also be countered from the other direction: the notion of “a thought without image” that Deleuze calls for in DR is not left behind in the cinema books. Cinema 2 discusses films that visually express thought “without image.” At one point literally, through a reference to Jean-Louis Schefer’s analysis of the beginning of Kurosawa’s Throne of Blood (Kumonosu-jô, 1957) that concludes with describing a section as “thought, without body and without image,” a quote that Deleuze uses to extend to other examples. But more importantly, through a concept that becomes central in the latter half of Cinema 2: the “outside.”

In Deleuze, the outside relates to thinking as/through the “unthought in thought” and it is one of the conditions for the new. Cinematic images are not only imbued with “all sorts of speeds and movements, all sorts of depths of time,” they can also have a relationship — beyond the Bergsonian — with an outside. In Nietzsche and Philosophy the dogmatic Image is pitted against a new image of thought concerned with “the real forces that form thought,” which is to say, the forces of the outside. A Thousand Plateaus describes how the concern of a
certain tradition of “counter thought” (e.g. Nietzsche) was to “place thought in an immediate relation with the outside, with the forces of the outside.” In the final section of this article we will deal with how the outside can be part of (film) images and with the role of the outside for the troubled dynamic of the new in time-images.

FILMIC UNTHOUGHT

The extended plurality of images dealt with throughout the cinema books, however, no doubt adds further nuances and insights to the larger categories of classical vs. new image. And although filmic ways of thinking are specific to film — to have an idea in film is irreducible to having an idea in another art form or in philosophy or science — film nonetheless makes literally visible/audible moving thought-images. In the cinema books, thought-images appear in a potentially endless array of new types, variations, and mixes. Still, the two cinema books are divided to cover two moving-image categories that are based on two different images of thought, which loosely correspond to the classical/representational/dogmatic and (at least the approaching of) the new image respectively.

The category of the classical movement-image — from Eisenstein’s intellectual montage to the American action-image — rests on an image of thought that can be labeled organic representation (including organic emotions and organic conceptions of the subconscious). Classical movement-images and montage indirectly represents — however dynamically, sensorially or subconsciously — an organic totality, a “concept” in the sense of a rational whole. This can be done in different ways but it has three moments in the form of gripping pathetic/affective aspects, “image and the concept as two movements each of which goes towards the other” (the image-parts connected and measured in relation to the concept-whole that they express), and an “identity of concept and images” that Deleuze calls “action-thought.” Action-thought designates unity of thought and nature in the sense of a powerful “sensory-motor relationship between world and man, nature and thought.” This relationship entails a representational form of man — the individual, the mass, the people (the individuated collective that has become subject) and a coherent whole as a concept already given. We will come back to this aspect below.
But action-thought, and its power to think a whole, can also break down in ways that open possibilities to think otherwise. Describing a fundamental aspect of thought in time-images, Deleuze, with references to Artaud, Blanchot and Heidegger, writes about a fundamental powerlessness at the very heart of thinking, even an “impossibility of thinking that is thought,” which the cinema is particularly suited to express.29 But this regards only the inability to think a particular kind of thought: representations of an organic totality. The “inability” may therefore simultaneously be the starting point of different kinds of thought. The powerlessness is no “simple inferiority” but a clearer revelation of a fundamental part of thought itself, which we now “should make our way of thinking from […], without claiming to be restoring an all-powerful thought.”30 What is this “fundamental part of thought itself”?

Generally, the sense of powerlessness of thought arises in encounters with powerful signs, which we cannot in principle recognize, which more or less violently “force” us to think.31 Filmically, we are no longer dealing with classical/modernistic political movement-image cinema, which aimed to provide a shock that forced “thought to think the whole as intellectual totality.”32 There is no longer a whole to think, or not in that sense,33 and the force to thought and the particular sense of “powerlessness” it produces instead opens up the “reverse side of thought” its “core” or the “unthought within thought.”34 This is — if not confused with stages in representational thinking, i.e. the labor of gradual recognition of the already given – a realm of potential for the new in thought.

Before going into the treatment of the problem of the new across Cinema 2, we need to put that treatment in context in order to understand its specificity. We will do so by going through some of Deleuze’s different conceptions of novelty across his oeuvre.

THE DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF THE NEW IN DELEUZE

Deleuze considers the transcendental (and biological) conditions of thought to be open, not fixed a priori. Inherent within thought, on the most fundamental level, is generative difference. This is a sub-representational realm of potential within thought,35 a realm that can be more or less creatively connected — internally/externally — to forces of the outside. This is not to be understood as potential for some grand, obvious mutations of our cognitive capacities, but as potential for new thought, unknown kinds of thought, subtle new circuits in the brain. (And
since thought and nature are ontologically of the same stuff, as we saw above, creation in thought is creation within and through the material real itself.) If thought — indirectly even the most clichéd habitual thought – is fundamentally based on generative difference, is there not also an opening to think and create more systematically with this “unthought within thought”? Here we find the philosophical motives for Deleuze’s interest in non-philosophical material such as “minor” strands within mathematics and the natural sciences and, more pertinent for our concerns, art and cinema. “It seems to me we have the means to penetrate the sub-representational,” Deleuze says, “to reach all the way to the roots of spatio-temporal dynamisms, and all the way to the Ideas actualized in them [...]”36 But if we have the means to reach these (differential, non-static) “Ideas,” these virtual potentials, we can also ask: how often are they actualized in senses that can be called new? How common is the new in Deleuze’s view? In what senses is the new ongoing everywhere and in what senses is it rare?

Statements by James Williams and Brian Massumi respectively perhaps best represent two interpretative limits regarding this matter. In his impressively detailed book on Deleuze’s philosophy of time, James Williams draws the following conclusion: “Every pace taken by every animal is new. Every roll of every stone is a break with the past”; all in all, “every event is new” even “any habitual gesture and the passing of that gesture.”37 William’s main point is likely that even the lived present (the “first synthesis of time”) of a contracted “habit,” for instance an organism, is the outcome of ongoing passive syntheses (as effected by the second and the third synthesis of time). In the most basic ontological sense of becoming=more-fundamental-than-being-effects, these passive syntheses entail constant differentiation from the self-identical (in this sense only differences return in time). But of course, I argue, this does not mean that the organism is in a constant state of extraordinary becoming (which would render meaningless more specific concepts of becoming-x). While everything in reality is in some kind of open movement, this does not mean that all movements are “new” in any other sense than not static or statically predetermined. Very few paces “taken by every animal” can be evaluated as interesting, remarkable or extraordinary (which are all key markers of evaluation for Deleuze). The interpretation that everything is “new” can therefore only refer to a fundamental ontological level: the world, and everything in it, regarded as open (groundless) in its very core — even that which may seem to develop in the most predetermined way or individuated things that appear the most like static identities are the outcome of process that are ongoing and open. But if one has already established
precisely that — i.e. that time is creative, and that change and novelty are irreducible to any telos or to (potentially pre-calculable) reorganizations into new patterns of elements implicitly already there, etc. — then other registers of the problem of the new can come into focus.

In Brian Massumi’s preface for *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze is described to have come to perceive “the world [as rarely leaving] room for uncommon intensity, being in large measure an entropic trashbin of outworn modes that refuse to die.” As this statement finds itself at the other (extreme) end of a spectrum, have we encountered an unresolved contradiction in Deleuze’s thought? Or is there an explanation such as Williams’ conclusion regards time and Massumi’s space? The answer to both questions is no. Deleuze’s thought rather encompasses both Williams’ and Massumi’s respective statements as limit points. Focusing too exclusively on one of the limit points, however, risks dragging out of context two different, but always intertwined, aspects of Deleuze’s conception of the real. While Deleuze’s full conception of reality spans a complex set of differential processes — importantly including a third aspect of intensity, or the outside — his conception can be generalized through the virtual-actual pair — and this is not, as in Bergson, a division between time and space. While Miguel de Beistegui for instance describes one of the generalized sides as a hidden “‘law’ of nature [...] according to which differences only return” he does so in relation to the other side which is described as a “surface of the world” with “empirical laws” in “which things recur identically.” Williams can draw his conclusions about omnipresent novelty in his *Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time* only by here focusing too exclusively on the determining power of one of the sides in which more clearly “only differences return” in time. The sense of Massumi’s assertion stems from a (too narrow) focus on the other aspect: the realm — spanning a continuum of nature and culture — of the actualized, including “insignificant facts” and “everyday banality,” or processes of stratification that Deleuze and Guattari describe as an “inevitable phenomenon that is beneficial in many respects and unfortunate in many others” and that “consist of giving form to matters, of imprisoning intensities or locking singularities into systems of resonance and redundancy, or producing upon the body of the earth molecules large and small and organizing them into molar aggregates.” While intertwined — and, as Williams has importantly emphasized in another book, reciprocally determined — the two realms are distinct and irreducible to one another. One aspect organizes and gives consistency to virtual potentials, the other concerns the actualized realm in which more solid forms or identities are played out. Depending on how one gives emphasis to only one of
these aspects — and their involvement with intensity, their outside — one can read out of Deleuze the proposition that everything is new or that almost nothing is new, without there being any real contradiction.

But there are also changes in Deleuze’s thinking over the years that effect how he himself conceives of, or at least focuses on the new. John Rajchman has shown that there is an extent to which Deleuze’s work can be divided into three periods. Rajchman is careful to point out that the changes he finds do not make up a linear development or “maturity” curve, but he nonetheless finds Deleuze’s thought to become “more complex and multiple in its implications and its reach, as well as its internal relations.”

1. The 1960s. The books leading up to and including the “two great works of logic” *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*.


3. The 1980s and 90s. A time of a burgeoning neoliberal “new world order.” Deleuze turns to the problem of “belief” in the world that “reaches its fullest development” in *Cinema 2.*

This periodization, I find, can be used as a reference in charting changes also in Deleuze’s conception of the new. Generally, the shift from the first to the second period is more widely acknowledged. It is also sometimes exaggerated — although many of the terms will change and Deleuze’s philosophical system will continue to be in constant movement, many of its basic coordinates will remain intact. Kept is certainly the notion of differentiating potential that “subsists” in actualized things and phenomena (although no longer thought of as a “depth”). But the fact that this register of reality is far from always dominant becomes increasingly emphasized. As now more clearly relating to other forces that “imprison” their own, this register finds itself immersed in various struggles. Also in thought: thinking and the formation of concepts becomes “guerilla fighting.” Deleuze will increasingly focus on how philosophy and art must more radically co-create *with* the forces of potential — instead of merely (by going in the opposite direction from actualization) revealing them. In his 1981 book on Francis Bacon, Deleuze reiterates his notion of art as making invisible “forces visible” and “capturing forces” that are “nongiven,” but he also carefully emphasizes that this is
not enough and that something must also take shape, “emerge” from the “diagram” of such forces. Art, if you will, as conception.

The shift between the second and the third period is less recognized. If the second period dealt with “overcoding,” “apparatuses of capture,” “anti-production,” and various other names for repressive forms of reterritorialization, it was also an exuberant and “joyful” explosion of theory brimming with belief in the creative powers of life, art and philosophy. The third period is marked by a certain wavering in Deleuze’s own “belief” in the contemporary world and the possibility of “creating new forms of life.” Other kinds of forces, not least a burgeoning new logic of capitalist repression, became increasingly overwhelming. Belief in the world more clearly comes to concern struggle. And what the struggle is up against is not merely representational forms, but rather a new kind of modulating, flexible logic of “control.”

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If at one of the extreme limits of Deleuze’s system everything can be said to be new, such a contention certainly has very little to do with Deleuze’s diagnoses of social, aesthetic, and political areas. And for Deleuze of any period, very few thoughts are new. Perhaps thinking in the world in general is for Deleuze not a total “entropic trashbin of outworn modes.” But the new in thought is clearly regarded to be exceptional. In a talk given in 1987 on what it means to have an idea in film and in philosophy (respectively) Deleuze said: “having an idea is an event that happens rarely, it is a kind of festivity, it is uncommon.” And in his book on Foucault, he writes about the occasions when thinking “free[s] itself from what it thinks (present) and is able to ‘think otherwise’ (the future)” by making “the past active and present to the outside so that something new will finally come about.”

THE SUBTLETY OF THE EXTRAORDINARY

But if the new is such a rarity, what qualifies as “new”? While the new entails an extraordinary event, “extraordinary event” is in Deleuze irreducible to an obvious break or a Grand happening (the revolution, the battle, etc. — and certainly to debased pastiches of them: the ta-dah of the new exciting product). While generative processes primarily occur on subtle and virtual
levels of “Ideas,” the actualizations of the latter into something new does not for Deleuze entail a clear-cut “rupture” with the Past, since what Deleuze conceives of as the “past” is precisely the virtual realm of Ideas found “underneath the large noisy events”\(^50\) — the new entails a differentiation not a break. The virtual past — whose nature we will return to below — upholds a kind of continuity while serving as one of the conditions for the new (a reserve of varying potentials that subsists in things). Although the potentials/Ideas within the virtual past are themselves modified by actualizations and actual events (see note 43), clear-cut breaks only appear, when they appear, on the level of the actual or on the level of linear history.

But although Deleuze, following Nietzsche, aimed to move focus from Grand Events to the subtle significance of every event, the latter concerns the multiplicity of sense of every event, and their layered internal genealogies, rather than a claim that every event is new.\(^51\) At the other end of the spectrum from Grand Events, there is another risk found in the interpretation of the concept of the new in Deleuze: implicitly subsuming banalities and clichés under the heading everything is new. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze writes about “banalities mistaken for profundities, ordinary ‘points’ confused with singular points.”\(^52\) In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze writes about an event “too quickly covered over by everyday banality […].”\(^53\) Looking back at May ‘68 from 1984, Deleuze writes that “[e]verything that was new has been marginalized or turned into caricature.”\(^54\)

A main antagonist in *Cinema 2* is the “permanent state of daily banality” of post-war capitalist societies. Remnants of the classical movement image and its transcendent values and organic conceptions of history, society, and subjectivity remain as free-floating clichés (they no longer link up as parts of an organic whole). This is a state of modern nihilism that certain time-images, through the “specific power” of the unthought, try to find “a subtle way out” from.\(^55\)

**TWO REGIMES OF THOUGHT-IMAGES, TWO NOTIONS OF THE NEW**

The classical movement-image famously gives — through movement and montage – an indirect representation of a whole that changes. But although this whole is “open,” it is simultaneously given on the levels of thought or signification. The whole is given in the sense of a totality of pre-conceived meaning — such as a Mythic past/Universal History/Progress/etc.,
and/or a grand Idea of organic Unity such as Spirit, the Subject, the People, etc. — that the whole of the film (implicitly or explicitly) presupposes, points towards, or gives expression to through organic associations and rational links. Although action in the movement-image regards change and often a sense of being enthusiastically orientated towards the future this is tied to an already given concept projected forwards.

It should be stated that the classical movement-image entails the “new” in two more non-given senses, but only within the confines of a sensory-motor logic that is itself basically fitted within a representational whole. The three most central sub-categories of movement-images are perception-images, affection-images, and action-images, which form around the structure of a center in the interval between perception and extended action (i.e. reaction). The center curves the universe not only as conscious perception but “already from the point of view of action.” Since the new action is not given but the outcome of a subjective analysis of received perceptions, the center is a “center of indetermination” and the action it selects therefore “present[s] something unpredictable or new.” But this is “new” only in the sensory-motor sense of a certain freedom of choice in how to react, and Deleuze therefore writes that this particular sense of the “new will be called ‘action’ strictly speaking.” There is also an affective or experiential form of sensory-motor novelty: The relation perception-center-reaction may also give rise to an affection-image that temporarily linger within the center and expresses a pure quality or affect — “pure” in the sense of a sign that refers only to itself and that, as Deleuze writes, “concerns what is new in experience.” Within the regime of the movement-image, such qualities or affects are measured in relation to a sensory-motor schema (e.g. a character temporarily shocked by a perception before taking action) and an organic thought-whole (or a “spiritual” whole).

But both the action-image and the affection-image (as well as the perception-image itself) can drag the logic of the movement-image far towards different limits, and, famously, Hitchcock brings the logic of the movement-image as far as it can go, through a “mental image” that introduces “a new, direct, relationship with thought.” Hitchcock does this by externalizing and making abstractions of the sensory-motor relations, and by shifting from character-subjects as the locus of reasoning to a camera that becomes more explicitly “conscious.” Importantly, Hitchcock’s cinema here indicates openings for other kinds of thought-images that go beyond, and not merely stretch, the logic of the classical movement-image —
openings that are partly passed through in some of Hitchcock’s later films such as *Vertigo* that belong more to the time-image.\(^60\)

Time-images primarily dwell directly within — or show the actual/virtual relation from the perspective of — the non-linear depths of the virtual past. They inhabit a crystalline time, that is, time that “detaches itself from its actualizations [and] starts to be valid for itself.”\(^61\) Time for itself — in contrast to how it appears as indirectly represented by sensory-motor movement — is shown to have a non-chronological nature, a time of “Cronos and not Chronos”\(^62\) that, reversely, subordinates movement. This complication and deepening of the logic of time in the film image unlocks thought from being necessarily tied to representation and concepts already given — thought, as we saw in the first section above, first arose within an interval of time, and as time complicates thought tends to be forced towards the searching, singular, and non-linear. Corresponding to how time is shown directly, thought becomes increasingly immanent to the unfolding of moving images, in contrast to images that only illustrates preexisting thought or creates associations. This opens the possibility of a “new image of thought” (in which, perhaps, the very idea of “concept” itself must alter accordingly).

As the organic logic of the classical regime (for a complex set of reasons) lost its ability to convince, the open question arose of how to establish new kinds of links to (and life-perpetuating, immanent forms of beliefs in) the world. Exhausted with classical cinema (although it extends in ever new forms in contemporary mainstream cinema) was substantial belief in individual or collective action as capable of modifying a situation, and in organic unity as organized around pre-established, transcendent ideals projected onto the past and/or the future. Evident in the first Neorealist films is that such organic links between humans and the world have been lost or seriously damaged. The world has become “unthinkable” or even “intolerable” not least because of a new permanent state of daily banality.\(^63\) This intolerable state, however, forces creative film thought towards new kinds of explorations — towards new ways to think the new beyond classical or modernistic notions.

How does one set up a new image of film thought? It is not enough to merely break with representation, or to wallow in its ruins. It is also not enough with a “pure time-image.” On a more technical level, there is a sort of passage from the mere break with the sensory-motor to a new image, consisting of three — or as we shall see, rather four — steps/levels. The break itself provides only what Deleuze calls the “preliminary condition.”\(^64\) Although the famous characteristics that followed from the break, as Deleuze writes, “did not yet constitute […]
the new image,” they released an important set of new coordinates which first of all made possible the second step/level that “takes the place of the [merely] faltering sensory-motor connections”: pure optical and sound images/signs that make perceptible bits of “time in its pure state.” But also the latter “was not enough: the image had to enter into relations with yet other forces, so that it could itself escape from a world of clichés.” It had to open up to what Deleuze calls “the readable image and the thinking image,” where more clearly cuts, camera-movements and “reframings [are] functions of thought” and movements in time, more than descriptions of space. But there is a fourth step, or rather a fourth aspect implied in the new image: the capacity to “put thought into contact with an unthought,” that is, with an outside, with forces of the new. Below we will return to the question of how the outside can remain outside while part of a film image.

Different time-images relate to all this in different ways, and they differ in how close they come to a new image of thought capable of handling the forces of the outside. Italian Neorealism introduces the “preceeding characteristics” and had “an intuitive consciousness of the new image in the course of being born,” but they simultaneously retained much of the organic logic. The New American Cinema as well as parts of the French and German new waves tended to stay “content to parody the cliché instead of giving birth to a new image.” Other parts of French New Wave (e.g. Godard) — as well as the “nouo-sphere” cinema of for instance Resnais and Kubrick — more fully managed set up such an image of thought from the new coordinates. Basically all modern time-images, however, concern the struggle for the possibility of creation within states that appear as the outcome of entropic cancellation of potential. Virtual potential subsists even in such states, and time-images deal with these states precisely from the perspective of virtual potential, but whose lines of actualization are more or less blocked. The crystal-images chart the parameters of this latter aspect.

CRYSTAL CONCEPTION

The chapter on crystal images in Cinema 2 introduces the theme of the new as delicate and rare, a theme that continues in more directly social and political forms in other kinds of time-images described subsequently in the book (for instance the struggle to tear from the dominant and the preestablished a “pure speech-act” in Huillet/Straub, or the endeavor to extract
“just an image” from the clichés in Godard). The description of different crystal-images appear like a map of struggles for the new as seen from the perspective of a virtual past.

Crystalline struggles primarily take place at the intersections of virtual potentials and seemingly exhausted actual worlds — as they both relate to an elusive outside. What does “struggle” mean here? In general, to struggle means to try do advance with violent effort or to compete with an opposing force. The aim of crystalline struggle, however, is not for the virtual “win” over the actual (or the other way around). The aim is to revive or create channels of actualization between virtual potentials and the actual states that they subsist within. This entails, to repeat the above quote from Deleuze’s Foucault, making “the past active and present to the outside so that something new will finally come about.” Before we go into the details of how this is played out in the films, we need to make a path through some of the temporal basics of the crystal-image.

The virtual past shown in the crystal-image differs from the (represented) virtual past of the movement-image. In the movement-image, there is an internal tendency to expand towards grander and grander “sets” and “worlds,” not only spatially, but also including vast circuits of fantasy, dreams or recollection. Movement-image films may thereby contain various more direct “virtual” images, but only — despite the limit-cases and complications — as fitted within an overall logic of representation: for instance, a dream-image anchored in a dreamer that dreams or a recollection-image centered on a character that remembers something in an actual present. Such “virtualities” are measured in relation to an actual, present perspective in which they appear as representations.

The crystal-image, instead, contracts the actual/virtual relation, to the point that they co-exist within the same image. The two sides are objectively distinct, but can no longer be discerned as distinct (they chase after each other in continual, reciprocal exchange). At this most contracted point, the present is revealed as no longer a point (in a succession of points) but a double flow: the present as a constant split between the actual present (which flows to the future) and its co-existing past (which it flows back to). The present, as this double movement, is merely the most contracted (pseudo-)point of the whole of the virtual past that coexists with itself in all its levels of contraction and relaxation (as illustrated by Bergson’s cone). The crystal thereby shows a present no longer rooted in the actual but as seen from the perspective of the virtual past itself, which reversely draws in the actual present as one of its dimensions. The crystalized image reveals the virtuality that subsists as a reality
within any actual as its “own” virtual side, a virtual side that — through the crystalized limit point (the contracted tip of the cone) — also opens up to the whole of the virtual “pure” Past. The manner in which this past in “pure” is key for understanding how this relates to the problem of the new.

The virtual past is pure, first of all, since it is irreducible to what was (a line of former presents). It is a preexisting Past “in general” that fundamentally consists of that which, counter-intuitively, “has not yet received a date” (a past that is primarily datable, conversely, corresponds with the logic of the movement-image: linear time and representational thought that can re-collect and re-cognize what resides in the past as givens). But while the crystalline past is pure from (being reducible to) representable remnants of the old, it is filled with potentials for the new. The virtual past is made up of — co-excising and intercommunicating but non-organic and all-in-all incommensurable — “sheets,” “strata,” and “regions” that a time-image film may traverse in an open variety of ways (and with varying depth). These sheets and regions consist of variable constellations of pre-individual singularities, which is to say, problematic Ideas or potentials not yet actualized (these Ideas/potentials are real but made up of differential relations that are non-localizable and that have “not yet received a date”). How do these potentials relate to the “blocked” lines of actualization mentioned above and the notion of the new as a rarity?

This question first leads to another question: What do crystal-images primarily show and what do they rarely show? What the basic contraction of virtual/actual in the crystal-image “reveals or makes visible,” Deleuze writes, “is the hidden ground of time, that is, its differentiation into two flows, that of presents which pass and that of pasts which are preserved.” This notion of a past as the “ground” of time and its process of differentiation within its most contracted point, corresponds closely to the “founding” operation within the “ground” that is the second synthesis of time, in which the present and the future are dimensions of the past, as described in *Difference and Repetition*. However, there is in *Difference and Repetition* also a third synthesis of time: intensity or the force of the future. The third synthesis, in which the past and the present are instead dimensions of the future, is the other condition for the new (the virtual past is the other). What is provided by this condition? In one sense, the future does not bring anything. The new itself does not come “from the future” – nothing does. For Deleuze the future, or the third synthesis, is in itself “pure and empty.” It is empty in every sense except consisting of the intensity that spawns actu-
alizations (and that in certain ways also drives the virtual: at the deepest level the virtual past “topologically” connects with a generating outside, future, intensity). If the virtual past contains variable constellations of pure differences that form potentials (differentiation) it is the force of the future that draws novelty (differentiation) from the realm of potentials. And reversely, as an “empty” force, the third synthesis therefore depends on the second synthesis, the pure past. As Williams notes, the pure past is a “reserve of difference,” which avoids “the need for creation out of nothing.”75 The creation of the new in the actual, then, concerns a complex mix of processes (differentiation) that span intensive force (future) and virtual potential (past).76 But these processes far from always relate in an ongoing flow of creativity. Their relations can include many forms of blockages. This is what Cinema 2 investigates.

Deleuze does not explicitly refer to the three syntheses of time after his detailed descriptions in Difference and Repetition (he seldom references any of his previous work in a direct sense), but I argue that he implicitly returns to them in Cinema 2 while complicating some of their internal dynamic. Cinema 2 does not merely illustrate the syntheses through film examples or apply them as if they were a static system unchanged by the specific problems at hand. But it still refers to the basic principles of the syntheses in its own complicating ways. In some of his other works, Deleuze shorthands or simplifies his conception of time, such as in the division between Chronos and Aiôn in The Logic of Sense and A Thousand Plateaus, in which Aiôn largely refers to non-chronological time in general and thereby may be said to work as a sort of cover-all indication of what would correspond with the second and third syntheses.77 Cinema 2, in contrast, does not perform a simplification so much as a complication that regards disturbances between the two conditions for the new — the second (pure past) and the third synthesis (pure future, the outside) — as concerning the possibility of creation within the actual. This book deals with a variety of struggles and creative blockages between the two syntheses, in which the pure crystalline past may appear closed in on itself, and the actual present as a state of entropic cancellation of potential. Let us now finally look at how all this plays out across the different crystal-image films.
A “perfect crystal” is a prison. Nothing can escape when the actual/virtual circuit forms a closed circle. In the films of Ophüls, characters are according to Deleuze “imprisoned” and “[c]rystalline perfection lets no outside subsist: there is no outside.” Does the enclosure mean that the crystal is sterile? Generally, the virtual aspect of the crystal indicates the opposite: as we have seen, the virtual past consists of variable constellations of pure differences, potentials. A perfect crystal, however, imprisons such potentials. They are clearly blocked from being drawn out by the “third” force so as to create something new, but also, as it seems, from flowing to the future in the sense of the forward direction of presents caused by the founding operation of the second synthesis. Still, the pure past even of the most enclosed crystal-images tend to display a theatrical uncertainty, where new things are tried out, before the right role is found which could pass on to new life. While “we are born in a crystal,” a closed crystal that remains closed — like an egg that never hatches — “retains only death, and life must come out of it, after trying itself out.” In order for that to happen in any significant manner, however, there must be an escape from the crystal, which is to say, not only from the enclosed past but from the whole crystalline time circuit itself (consisting of flows of presents passing forwards and back to the past). This is possible if the crystal contains a flaw that can function as a “point of flight [point de fuite].”

Renoir’s crystals are not perfect. They contain aspects of what Deleuze here calls “the third side, or the third dimension”: small cracks in which something can escape. While Renoir’s films deal with levels of theatricality “absorbing the real” into a crystal circuit, the crystal always has a “failing” and most often something “is going to slip away in the background” in the sense that “a new Real will come out beyond the actual and the virtual.” The something that has gradually been formed from experimentation within the crystal is finally directed towards a future, but not merely in the sense of presents continuously made to flow forwards, but in the sense of the “future as a bursting forth of life” that produces “a new distinction [...] like a new reality which was not pre-existent” — all “on condition that it leaves the crystal.”

But such novelty, such productive intrusion of an elusive third force, does not come about easily in any crystal-image. The new is rare. And this goes for all time-images described in *Cinema 2*. While crystal-images are more firmly at home in the virtual past/second synthesis, the new is equally rare also in other time-images in which the past and the outside are in more dynamic and direct contact. In Huillet/Straub the past come in the form of texts,
documents, monuments, and the archeological layers of the earth that buries events, which poses a resistance to the pure, “nomadic” speech-act that in turn struggles to “tear” itself from them. The emphasis is on the struggle — whether the tearing will fully succeed is left as an open question. The new is rare also when its production is as explicit as it can get, as in Kubrick’s 2001. Deleuze conceives of Kubrick’s cinema (like Resnais’) as expressing identity between world and brain, as having as mise-en-scène a world-brain, which is not a “whole” but a topological membrane connecting “two forces”: an “inside” deeper than any interiority that is the depths of the past, and an “outside” beyond any exteriority that is the violent force of creativity, evolution, future. The two forces, the two conditions for the new, which at the limit “become ultimately indiscernible,” are themselves here “deadly.” There is in 2001 only the “chance of entering into a new, incommensurable, unknown relation, which would convert death into a new life.” Even in the more optimistic and future-oriented of Renoir’s films, to return to the chapter on crystal-images, the “new Real” is what towards the end may take flight or sneak out in the background through a crack. The new Real also tends to have a subtle and downplayed position, and in some of his more “pessimistic” films it may never come about. But what is this new Real? What actual content does it have? The new Real that is born through the crack is an event in which the forces of the future actualize — and thereby further differentiate — singled out aspects of the virtual past. But although directly implied or hinted at by a camera, the new real is seldom if ever shown as a present actuality, and if it is, very briefly or poetically (like the camera panning out into the water at the end of The River, 1951). Rather, the new Real appears in these crystal-images more like the hint of an actualized new future as seen from the perspective of the pure past. And given that time is fundamentally open, and the future therefore unforeseeable, how could the actualized new itself ever be more than a hint (in general and in Deleuze’s philosophy in particular)? If it were it would instantly become not-future, an actual, present content (or the future as envisioned by the actual, i.e. mainstream science-fiction). Conversely, the outside, the empty force of the future, can hardly appear as a matter of fact image without becoming not-outside. But still, it must be rendered visible somehow in the “new image.” The new image must have means to integrate the outside, as outside.

How can the outside be part of an image in any sense? No matter how far beyond the representational a time-image finds itself — expressing non-localizable and non-chronological relations that give filmic shape to virtual Ideas — an image is fairly concrete. Any one image
frames an inside with a content. But of course, there is the specificity of moving images with sound and all the possibilities that lie in composing them (shots, framings, postproductions) and creating linkages (montage) between images as well as between the visual and the audio: instead of linkages that commensurably measures them in relation to a concept-whole, there can be non-commensurable linkages between “independent” images and sounds in which the link itself, the cut, becomes more autonomous and primary. Throughout the latter half of Cinema 2, Deleuze discusses incorporations of the outside mainly in terms of the interstice that appear in various “differential” connections between images and between images and sounds — the audio can importantly form its own autonomous image frame (no longer a mere aiding component of the visual image) that relates non-linearly to the visual image, forming new kinds of complexes of audio-visuality. Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier, referencing the formally advanced thought-images conceptualized towards the end of Cinema 2, asserts that while the outside cannot be a direct localized image it will (in these films) nonetheless find itself incorporated “into the image’s inside, thus proposing a sort of visibility of the invisible itself.”

Is the implication here the more outside the better for creative thought? Not at all. The outside must be carefully harnessed. The new thought-image aims to creatively connect the outside (3) with (virtual) Ideas/potentials (2) formed in relation to specific actual situations (1). But the lines that lead to the outside are “deadly, too violent and fast,” Deleuze says in a 1986 interview, and adds that “we have to manage to fold the line and establish an endurable zone in which to install ourselves, confront things, take hold, breathe — in short, think.”

Compared to the pure intensive force of the (unfolded) outside, the virtual past, which is the main perspective of the crystal-image, is a more stable zone. There are several types of crystal-images, that all relate a bit differently to the problem of the new. Some produce potentials for and others even hint at the actualization of the new. But not even the crystals that finally only retain “death” are sterile — there has still been experimentation within the crystal, although, of course, the experimentation is more productive when the crystal is not closed (Ophüls compared to Renoir). In reference to Renoir, Deleuze writes: “Everything happens as if the circuit served to try out roles, as if roles were being tried in it until the right one were found, the one with which we escape […] In short, the circuit, the round, are not closed because they are selective […]”. This experimentation with roles in Renoir is no empty role-playing. Rather, as Deleuze writes, “something takes shape inside the crystal which will [perhaps] succeed in leaving through the crack.”
In the crystal-images of (later) Fellini the something that “takes shape” is instead more like the whole film or the whole crystal in the process of growing. Instead of escaping from a crystal past that equals death if not creatively opened to the future, it is now the march towards death in the actual, linear time of successive presents — a “formidable entropy” — that must be escaped. Life therefore seeks entryways into the crystal, entryways that themselves form “seeds” (some abort while others succeed) and that make up a crystal “in the process of being made.”91 Here it is more clearly in the crystal that we see the creativity of life (differentiation), instead of in the bursting out from it (differenciation). The crystal as a realm that, as Deleuze writes, “holds in its depths or in its sides the surge of the new reality” — the crystal world, if you will, as a growing egg.92 It is an open question, however, whether the crystal-egg will remain closed in the direction of actualization or somehow become “present to the outside so that something new will finally come about.”

CONCLUSION

Contrary to what is often argued or implied — whether by famously tendentious interpreters like Badiou93 or by the most important Deleuze scholars — events that lead to the creation of the new are in many regards a rarity in Deleuze. The rarity of the new is increasingly emphasized from his 1970s and forward, culminating with Cinema 2, which in large parts deals with the new as an intricate difficulty. While creative experimentation with structures of potential continues to have a certain consistency within the virtual (differentiation) — which time-images tend to delve deep into — truly creative actualizations of potentials (differenciation) are now considered to be uncommon. Although the generalizations virtual-actual co-exist as always intertwined and (mutually) interacting registers of reality, the relationship between the two can be more or less creative depending on their relation to the actualizing forces of the “outside.” Time-images, as I have shown above, deal with troubled relations between forces and registers.

The crystal-images introduce the basic parameters for a theme that runs throughout Cinema 2: the new as the rare outcome of struggle. The aim of the struggle is creative connections between (3) the outside (actualizing intensity) and (2) virtual potentials within (1) actual states that appear as the effect of entropic exhaustion of generative difference (societies
of cliché, in which the new itself only appears as cliché). Since generative differences are not really exhausted but subsist as virtual potentials even in such states, the concern is to link the potentials with the outside — and to thereby connect the two conditions for the new — so that there can be creative actualizations. The rest of Cinema 2 complicates and develops these parameters — most importantly in the direction of a more fully realized new image of (film) thought that is capable of a more direct (but careful, harnessing) handling of the forces of the outside. This new image, however, does not makes the creation of the new go from rarity to a constant; it only sets up a partly new plane of immanence of thought on which the struggle can be conducted with stronger (noological) weapons.

“There is only a slim chance,” Deleuze says in the epigraph above. As our capitalist societies of cliché develop further into societies of control — with their modulating, flexible logic — the struggle confronts new kinds of forms of “exhausted [and exhausting] life” with expanded capabilities of getting “control of the New from its birth.” It is now even clearer that it is not enough (it never was) to merely break with representation or the transcendent form of the true — the opponent has itself to a large extent done precisely that (a problem Deleuze and Guattari investigate from Anti-Oedipus and onwards). Beyond mere wallowing in the wreckage of representation, we need un-preconceived types of new creative thought. And that doesn’t come about very often.

2. Deleuze, C1, fr 89-95/eng 60-64.
3. Deleuze, C1, fr 117f/eng 81f.
6. Deleuze, C1 fr 117/eng 81.
7. Deleuze on cinema as exceeding, or even contradicting natural perception, Cinéma 2. L’image-temps (Paris: Les Éditions de minuit, 1985), 262; Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Roberta Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 201, hereafter referenced as C2 followed by fr/eng pagination; see also C1 fr 11/eng 2f
8. Deleuze: “[W]e can say of the shot that it acts like a consciousness. But the sole cinematographic consciousness is not us, the spectator, nor the hero; it is the camera — sometimes human, sometimes inhuman or superhuman.” C1 fr 34/eng 20.
9. As implied in the preceding note, Deleuze is far from most contemporary film studies in his views on spectatorship: “Nothing happens in the spectator’s head that does not derive from the character of the image.”  


12. Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy [2003], trans. Alisa Hartz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 4, 93. Worth mentioning, although it falls outside of the present discussion, is that Marrati’s preface for the English translation of her book contains seminal suggestions for how to understand the cinema books as among Deleuze’s most important contributions to political philosophy.

13. Marrati, Gilles Deleuze, 124f, note 32.


15. Deleuze and Guattari, ATP fr 469/eng 379.

16. Deleuze, Différence et répétition (Paris: PUF, 1968/2008), 172f; Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London/New York: Continuum, 2004), 167f, hereafter referenced as DR followed by fr/eng pagination. One may object by pointing to how Deleuze adds that “[i]t is not a question of opposing to the dogmatic image of thought to another image borrowed, for example, from schizophrenia […]” DR fr 192/eng 185. But this addition comes across clearly as an effort to underline that the principles of the new thought are not to be perceived as an alternative representational or stereotyped Image.


21. Deleuze: “This was also the case with […]” C2 fr 220/eng 169.

22. On the unthought in thought as the “outside,” see Deleuze, Foucault (Paris: Les Éditions de minuit, 1986/2004), 127; Foucault, trans. by Seán Hand (Minnesota/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 96f, see also Deleuze, C2 fr 233/eng 178. More precisely, the deepest level of thought is topologically connected to the outside, from which it is fundamentally born. C2 fr 363/eng 278.


25. The two images types, as D. N. Rodowick puts it, “differ with respect to the image of thought they presuppose,” Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 175.


27. Ibid., fr 212/eng 163.

28. Ibid., fr 209-210/eng 161f.

29. Ibid., fr 217/eng 166.

30. Ibid., fr 221/eng 170.


32. Deleuze, C2, fr 205/eng 157.

33. More precisely, the whole that thought confronts “undergoes a mutation,” in which it “ceases to be the One-Being” and merges with the force of the outside. Deleuze, C2, fr 235, 233/eng 180, 179.

34. Deleuze, C2, fr 217, 218/eng 167. This may be compared with the romantics’ concern with elaborating “a material of thought in order to capture forces that are not thinkable in themselves,” but in Deleuze and Guattari’s conception, the latter is about forces that “constitute a great expressive Form” more relatable to the logic of the movement-image. See ATP, fr 42/eng 342f. For a comment on the Romantics’ organic notions of Spirit, Nature and a Whole, see also Deleuze, C1, fr 80/eng 54.
35. As is well-known, Deleuze contrast virtual potential from the “possible” in the following manner: A possibility preexists the real as a given identity that only awaits realization; a virtual potential is instead already real but in the form of a “problematic” virtual Idea that if “actualized” will entail the production of a new difference that does not resemble the potential.


37. James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 106. Daniel W. Smith draws, in his seminal readings of the new in Deleuze, similar but more nuanced conclusions about what I here call the frequency of the new. Although he contends that every event is new, and that novelty is a ubiquitous part of everyday processes (that occur between the side of a thing that is a virtual multiplicity and its actual side), not everything that happens is an event. Not even within the virtual. This is because a virtual multiplicity is a mixture of both “singular” and “ordinary” points, and it is only the former that constitutes “precisely those points where something ‘happens’ within the multiplicity” — an event — or something that occurs “in relation to another multiplicity, causing it to change nature and produce something new.” See Smith “The Conditions of the New,” Deleuze Studies 1 (2007): 17, 11. In a footnote, Williams corrects Smith on this issue and argues — despite Deleuze’s frequent usage of the term — that there are no ordinary points, only singular points. Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time, 187, note 10.


39. On Deleuze’s critique of Bergson’s dualism between space and duration, and how the relation between the actual and the virtual is structured differently in Deleuze, see Miguel de Beistegui, Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 313-317.

40. de Beistegui, Truth and Genesis, 322.

41. Deleuze, DR, fr 176/eng 171.

42. Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, fr 54/eng 40.

43. In Deleuze, the relation between virtual/actual is not simply one-directional. The virtual is indeed a generative condition but as such, it is an immanent part of reality and not a semi-trascendent sphere that merely “gives.” Both sides are altered by interactions between them. First of all, actualizations of virtual potentials/Ideas (differenciation) determine not only actual things and phenomena, they also re-determine the virtual potentials/Ideas themselves — the virtual structure will have been, as Daniel Smith writes, “modified by the actualisation that has just taken place,” which is to say that the virtual “conditions and the conditioned are determined at one and the same time,” Smith, “The Conditions of the New,” 17. Furthermore, through their mutual implication, concrete actual events, relations, and problems affect virtual potentials — although not in a straight casual fashion. Although Williams goes too far in crediting actualization for determining virtual potentials/Ideas (the latter, rather, are equally determined virtually by experimental processes within, through, and between themselves) he aptly describes the “reciprocal quasi-causal determination” between virtual and actual as “perhaps Deleuze’s greatest metaphysical innovation and the key to understanding the power of his philosophy.” Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 176ff; see also 11, 14f, 21, 186f. The well-acknowledged fact that Deleuze in DR utilizes the term “reciprocal determination” more explicitly for how differences that form Ideas are determined within the virtual does not itself, as John Roffe claims, speak against virtual and actual as reciprocally determined in the senses described above. Roffe, Badou’s Deleuze (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), 149ff.


45. Ibid., 25.

46. Deleuze, Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1981/2002), on capturing invisible forces, see 37, 58, 61, on something having to emerge form the diagram, see 103, 146; Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. by Daniel W. Smith (New York: Continuum, 2004), 56, 57, 61, 110, 138, 156.

47. Deleuze, DR fr 174, 192/eng 168, 185.


49. Deleuze, Foucault, fr 127/eng 119.

50. Deleuze: “Underneath the large noisy events lie the small events of silence, just as underneath the natural light there are the little glimmers of the Idea.” DR, fr 212/eng 202f.

51. Deleuze, NP, fr 4/eng 4; C2, fr 332/eng 255.

52. Deleuze, DR, fr 198f/eng 191.


55. Deleuze, C2, fr 221/eng 170.

56. Deleuze, C1, fr 91/eng 62.
57. Ibid.
58. Deleuze, C1, fr 139f/eng 98f; C2 fr 45f/eng 30f.
59. Deleuze describes this “mental image” in C1, fr 266-277/eng 196-205.
60. As is well known, no actual film ever belongs 100% to either of the categories. But in all films one is more or less dominant, although sometimes this can even vary within the same film.
61. Deleuze, C2, fr 166/eng 127.
62. Ibid., fr 109/eng 81.
63. Ibid., fr 29, 221/eng 18, 170.
64. Ibid., fr 10/eng 3.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., fr 35, 33/eng 23, 21f.
68. Ibid., fr 279/eng 214.
69. Deleuze, C1, fr 284f/eng 211-212.
70. Ibid., fr 283f/eng 210f.
71. Time-images can thereby also be rooted in presents, such as in the films of Robbe-Grillet, but in contrast to how movement-images are rooted in actual, chronological presents, this regards presents that are “de-actualized.” See Deleuze, C2, fr 131-132, 137/eng 100f, 104.
72. Ibid., fr 129/eng 98.
73. For a very different account of the three syntheses of time and how they are at play in Cinema 2, in which the third synthesis is discussed in terms of actual content that comes “from the future,” see Patricia Pisters, The Neuro-Image: A Deleuzian Film-Philosophy of Digital Screen Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 136-155.
74. Deleuze, DR, fr 354, 112, 160, note 1/eng 346, 114, 149. It is worth stating that “empty” must not be confused with dismissible. Jay Lampert goes so far as to label Deleuze “anti-future” while arguing that in Deleuze, since “the new is not the future,” the New is the Past,” Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History (New York: Continuum, 2006), 140. But these formulations obscure what finally drives the production: the future/third synthesis/intensity creatively draws select constellations of differences within the past outside of the past.
75. Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time, 136.
76. Deleuze describes the details of difference/tiation in the forth and part of the fifth chapters of Difference and Repetition, rather than the second chapter in which the three syntheses of time are described.
77. Deleuze, LS fr 190-197/eng 186-193; ATP fr 320ff/eng 262ff.
78. Deleuze, C2, fr 111/eng 83.
79. Ibid., fr 115/eng 86.
80. Ibid., fr 117/eng 87.
82. Deleuze, C2, fr, 113, 114/eng 85, 86.
83. Ibid., fr 116, 117/eng 87, 88, emphasis mine. Translation modified.
84. Ibid., fr 331ff/eng 254ff.
85. Ibid., fr 267f/eng 205f.
86. Ibid., fr 235f/eng 180f. Jean-Clet Martin describe Rembrandt’s Philosopher in Meditation as wearing the mask of the old image of thought in order to smuggle in the subtle expression of a new image of thought and even the outside, in “The Image of Thought,” Deleuze Studies 3 (2009): 1-25. But it seems to me that painting, however expressive in other respects, will in contrast to moving images with sound always be comparably more like indications or even representations of a new image of thought and the outside than itself directly expressive of them.
87. Ropars-Wuilleumier, “Image or Time? The Thought of the Outside in The Time-Image (Deleuze and Blanchot),” in Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze’s Film Philosophy, ed. D. N. Rodowick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 17.
89. An exception of sorts is the “decomposing” aristocratic crystal worlds of Visconti’s later films that are separated “from life and creation” and that have not yet vanished completely because the crystal is “artificial,” and in which the only actualizing, clarifying aspect possible is the realization that it is “too late” for these (aesthetically “grandiose”) crystal worlds to escape their own decomposition. Deleuze, C2, fr 124-128/eng 94-96.
90. Ibid., fr 115/eng 86, emphasis mine.
91. Ibid., fr 117, 119, 121, 123/eng 88, 90, 92. 93. Translation modified.