ARTAUD VERSUS KANT: 
ANNIHILATION OF THE IMAGINATION 
IN DELEUZE’S PHILOSOPHY OF CINEMA

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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Antonin Artaud (1896-1948) present two different poles of the possibility of thought: 1) that of critical sharpness and 2) a possible inability to concentrate on thinking at all. The first author is known as a famous critic of all forms of reason, whereas the second stands out as the author of the theatre of cruelty, a poet, playwright, essayist, novelist, theatre and film actor, producer, theoretician of the theatre, and artist who spent about nine years in various asylums, diagnosed with schizophrenical delirium. How it is possible for them to have some relation at all? Philosophy is a paradox, writes Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*. These two, at the first sight incommensurable thinkers, as Michel Foucault would have said — meet at the realm of discourse — in the philosophy of Deleuze. In 1963, Deleuze published the book *Kant’s Critical Philosophy* (*La philosophie critique de Kant*). He never wrote a book or any special text on Artaud as, for instance, Jacques Derrida did in “La Parole soufflée,” “Le Théâtre de la cruauté et la clôture de la représentation,”" and “Farcener le subjecile.” Adrian Morfee nevertheless made a hasty conclusion when he reproached Deleuze for “grandiloquent championing  of Artaud in his article “Le Schizophrène et le mot,” where he declares he would not sacrifice one page of Artaud for all of Carroll, in fact only half a page out of fifteen are given over to discussing Artaud. This is a disappointing failed encounter.” Artaud’s name appears in Deleuze’s pre-cinema books *Difference and Repetition* (*Différence et répétition, 1968*), *The Logic of Sense* (*Logique du sens, 1969*), as well as in the books written in collaboration with Félix Guattari: *Anti-Oedipus* (*Capitalisme et Schizophrénie 1. L’Anti-Cédie, 1972*) and *A Thousand Plateaus* (*Capitalisme et Schizophrénie 2. Mille Plateaux, 1980*). Artaud’s name also appears in the *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (*Cinéma II: L’Image-temps, 1985*) in the seventh chapter “Thought and cinema,” in which Deleuze is discussing thought’s place in the cinematic image and relies not on transcendental idealism of Kant, but on transcendental empiricism of Artaud. How do Artaud’s ideas become concep-
tual presuppositions for Deleuze when discussing the premises of modern cinema? Further, how is it possible for Deleuze to see Artaud in opposition to Kant?

ANTONIN ARTAUD OR LEWIS CARROLL?

In the book *The Logic of Sense*, Artaud seems to be mentioned as an exemplar only incidentally in chapter thirteen, entitled “Schizophrenic and the Little Girl.” Whereas Kant is referred to by Deleuze in chapter fourteen, entitled “Double Causality.” Addressing the question of how we are to reconcile the logical principle according to which false propositions would also make sense as true statements, Deleuze returns to Husserl and Kant. Deleuze opposes the position of a transcendental subject, which retains the forms of the person, personal consciousness and subjective identity, and which is satisfied with creating the transcendental out of characteristics of the empirical. That, according to Deleuze, is evident in Kant when he directly deduces the three transcendental synthses from the corresponding psychological synthses and no less evident in Husserl, when he deduces an original and transcendentall “seeing” from the perceptual “vision.” On the other hand, Deleuze criticizes Kant and Husserl’s philosophy for its powerlessness to break free from the forms of common sense. The same critique will be repeated by Deleuze in the *Difference and Repetition*. Deleuze is in search of what is impersonal, pre-individual, what constitutes the genesis of thought. Artaud seems much closer to Deleuze’s intentions. Kant and Artaud appear as two accidental thinkers, who are of no particular importance to the main narrative of the book, which is based on event. Under the circumstances, Kant even appears more challenging, if only for the reason that Deleuze is developing a new transcendental philosophy (as prefigured in his *Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, 1963, developed in *Difference and Repetition* and still a concern in his last essay “Immanence: a life...”). But, contrary to Kant, Deleuze “seeks to avoid the mapping of the condition on what it conditions, thereby allowing both an openness through the asymmetry of their relations and a form of reciprocal determination.” James Williams, writing a critical introduction to Deleuze’s *Logic of Sense*, mentions Artaud only once and only as an example among other writers Deleuze was interested in. It seems Artaud did not have much to say about the event in question.
Deleuze’s focus on analysing Artaud’s language of schizophrenia is based on Artaud’s inability to translate the verse of *Jabberwocky*, created by Lewis Carroll in the book *Through the Looking Glass: And What Alice Found There*, from English into French. Deleuze regards Carroll as the master and the surveyor of surfaces, on which the entire logic of sense is located. Nevertheless, he paradoxically remarks, “We would not give a page of Artaud for all the Carroll.” What does he mean?

Deleuze is intrigued by Artaud’s disappointment in translating Carroll’s book. In 1942, Artaud was moved to the asylum in Rodez, where his doctor Toulouse, considering that the most effective therapy was through art, encouraged Artaud to maintain correspondence with his friends and persuaded him to translate the poems by Lewis Carroll, a chapter from the book *Through the Looking-Glass*, and Robert Southwell’s *The Burning Babe*. Artaud also translated some poems by Edgar Allan Poe. After spending seven months at Rodez, Artaud wrote to his mother that the atmosphere of affection and human helpfulness had shaken him up and finally brought him back to himself and restored the sanity of his vision.

However, Deleuze draws our attention to another letter by Artaud, within which he writes about how bored he was while translating Carroll’s poem *Jabberwocky*. He explains, “I never liked this poem which always struck me as an affected infantilism. I do not like poems and languages of the surface. […] There is no soul in *Jabberwocky*. It seems that Deleuze borrowed the concept of surface from this specific letter, which he further develops in *The Logic of Sense*, as opposed to the concept of depth. Deleuze carefully reads Artaud’s translation of *Jabberwocky* and notices in it the gradual slide from Carroll’s intended meaning towards the language of schizophrenia. Deleuze notices the gap between the logic of sense played on the surface of the language used by Carroll and Artaud’s schizophrenic language of suffering, death, and life. While he is intellectually intrigued by Carroll’s language games, personally he takes Artaud’s side, seemingly expressing solidarity with Artaud’s schizophrenic abyss. What new insights can this schizophrenic language suggest for philosophy?

Deleuze’s answer can be found in the chapter “The Image of Thought” in the *Difference and Repetition*:

Artaud does not simply talk about his own “case,” but already in his youthful letters shows an awareness that his case brings him into contact with a generalised thought
process, which can no longer be covered by the reassuring dogmatic image but which, on the contrary, amounts to the complete destruction of that image. The difficulties he describes himself as experiencing must therefore be understood as not merely in fact but as difficulties in principle, concerning and affecting the essence of what it means to think.\(^\text{13}\)

For Deleuze, the case of Artaud was not a question of opposing the dogmatic image of thought with another borrowed image, for example, from schizophrenia. Rather it was a question of remembering that schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also a possibility for thought — one, moreover, which can only be revealed as such through the abolition of that image.

The genesis of thought was the main interest for Deleuze in his philosophical conception of the cinema. In the second volume of \textit{Cinema}, Deleuze is seeking to trace the faculties of the mind, which organize cinematic art as a specific art in comparison with the others. Deleuze is exploring the possibility of the cinema to achieve a truly mathematical rigour, “a rigour which no longer simply concerns the image (as in the old cinema which already subjected this to metrical and harmonic relations), but the thought of the image, the thought in the image?”\(^\text{14}\) He develops his idea by relying on Artaud’s “Cinema of cruelty,” on Artaud’s idea that it “does not tell a story but develops a sequence of spiritual states which are deduced from one another as thought is deduced from thought.”\(^\text{15}\)

What happens to imagination when thought plays the main creative role or becomes a faculty responsible for creative process in cinema? What is the relation between thinking and imagination?

KANT:
HARMONY, DISCORD AND GOING BEYOND THE IMAGINATION

The relationship between reason and imagination is reflected by Deleuze in his investigations of Kant’s philosophy. In his book \textit{Kant’s Critical Philosophy}, Deleuze reflects upon the nature of common sense as a relationship between three faculties: imagination, understanding, and reason. Deleuze considers the idea of the difference in nature between these three
faculties to be one of the most original points of Kantianism. In this text, Deleuze discerns accord between imagination as free and understanding as indeterminate; there is a free and indeterminate accord between the faculties in question. Such an agreement defines a properly aesthetic common sense (taste). Following Kant, Deleuze claims that this free play of imagination and understanding cannot be cognized intellectually, but only felt. Aesthetic common sense does not represent an objective accord of the faculties, but a pure subjective harmony where imagination and understanding are exercised spontaneously, each on its own account.¹⁶ Aesthetic common sense does not complete the other two. Rather, it provides them with a basis and makes them possible.¹⁷ In the essay “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics” (from 1963), Deleuze returns to this conclusion, stating that it would be a mistake to think of the Critique of Judgement as completing the other two Critiques. In aesthetic judgment, imagination cannot attain a role comparable to that played by the understanding in speculative judgment, or that played by reason in practical judgment. The imagination is liberated from the supervision of the understanding and reason. It does not, however, become legislator in turn: on a deeper level, the signal it gives to the other faculties is that each must become capable of free play on its own.¹⁸ For Deleuze, these Kantian insights seem very important, especially for his own conception, the one he elaborated further. His conception of a contingent agreement of sensible objects with all our faculties together, instead of a necessary submission to one of the faculties — and a free indeterminate harmony of the faculties among themselves, instead of a determinant harmony presided over by one of the faculties, is one of the main presuppositions of Deleuze’s experimental thinking. It seems that he invented these ideas himself just together with Kant.

In 1978, Deleuze gave a number of seminars on Kant, some of which were published in the text “On Four Poetic Formulas Which Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy.”¹⁹ Here, again, the problem of the imagination enters into play. In this text, Deleuze formulated the first answer to the question he raised in the previous philosophical writings, namely, what is the deepest secret of imagination? The Sublime goes even further in this direction: it brings the various faculties into play in such a way that they struggle against one another. The struggle consists of the one pushing the other towards its maximum or limit, the other reacting by pushing the first towards an inspiration, which it would not have had alone, without such an interaction. Each pushes the other to the limit, but each makes the one go beyond the limit of the other. It is a terrible struggle between imagination and reason, and also between
understanding and the inner sense, a struggle whose episodes are the two forms of the Sublime, and then Genius. It is a tempest in the depths of a chasm opened up in the subject. The faculties confront one another, each stretched to its own limit, and find their accord in a fundamental discord: a discordant accord is, according to Deleuze, the great discovery of the *Critique of Judgement*.

This discord between imagination-understanding and reason is once more emphasized in the book *Difference and Repetition*. There, Deleuze radically opposes the Kantian common sense idea as the harmony between these three faculties as a hindrance to philosophy, naming it ideal orthodoxy, which implements a dogmatic image of thought and substitutes the transcendental model of recognition and representation. As a consequence, the harmony between the faculties can appear only in the form of a discordant harmony, since each only communicates the violence to the other, which confronts it with its own difference and its divergence from the others. Deleuze highlights that, “Kant was the first to provide the example of such a discordant harmony, the imagination and thought which occurs in the case of sublime.”

What happens with this Kantian-based investigation of the relation between reason and imagination when Deleuze enters into the realm of film philosophy? Deleuze argues that the clash between reason and imaginations turns towards the annihilation of imagination.

In the first volume *Cinéma*, when discussing the aesthetics of German expressionism, Deleuze again returns to the Kantian idea of the Sublime, discerning two possible versions — mathematical and dynamic (the immense and the powerful, the measureless and the formless). Both had the property of decomposing organic composition — the first by going beyond it, the second by breaking it. In the mathematical sublime, the extensive unit of measurement changes so much that the imagination is no longer able to comprehend it, runs up against its own limit, and is annihilated. But the most important effect of this annihilation, according to Deleuze, is that annihilated imagination gives way to a thinking faculty which forces us to conceive the immense or the measureless as whole.

In the dynamic sublime, it is intensity which is raised to such a power that it dazzles or annihilates our organic being, strikes terror into it, but arouses a thinking faculty by which we feel superior to that which annihilates us, to discover in us supra-organic spirit which dominates the whole inorganic life of things: then we lose our fear, knowing
that our spiritual “destination” is truly invincible. German expressionism tells us, from the aspect of dynamic sublime, that the non-organic life of things culminates in a fire, which burns us and which burns all of Nature, acting as the spirit of evil and darkness.22

Could it be then, that the deepest secret of imagination is the death of imagination, which gives birth to the new sort of thought?

In the second volume of Cinema, Deleuze is seeking to trace the faculties of the mind, which organize the cinema art as the specific art in comparison with the others. To do so, Deleuze relies not on imagination, but on thought. In the chapter entitled “Thought and Cinema” Deleuze, following the Kantian idea of the Sublime though not mentioning his name, suggests a sublime conception of cinema: “In fact, what constitutes the Sublime is that the imagination suffers a shock which pushes it to the limit and forces thought to think the whole as intellectual totality which goes beyond the imagination.”23

When the imagination was annihilated, the thought came into play. But Kant has nothing to do with it any more. From now onwards, Deleuze relies on the thought genesis reflected by Antonin Artaud.

ARTAUD AND MODERN CINEMA

According to Deleuze,

modern cinema develops new relations with thought from three points of view: the obliteration of a whole or of a totalization of images, in favour of an outside which is inserted between them; the erasure of the internal monologue as whole of the film, in favor of a free indirect discourse and vision; the erasure of the unity of man and the world, in favor of a break which now leaves us with only a belief in this world.24

How does it happen that, according to Deleuze, Artaud is a forerunner of modern cinema?

The idea of a shock as an effect of the spirit, which forces it to think and to think the Whole is not a Deleuzian invention, but seems to be suggested by the Russian film director Sergei Eisenstein (1898-1948). Deleuze carefully reads texts by Eisenstein: Film Form, Film
Sense, Mémoires, Au-delà des étoiles, La non-indifférente Nature. He refers to Eisenstein not only in the first chapter, when discussing the topic of dialectical montage, but also in the second volume in the chapter “Thought and Image.” Deleuze seems to refer to this notion of Eisenstein, in which he considered that internal monologue in the cinema goes beyond dreaming, which is too individual, and constitutes segments or links of a truly collective thought. Artaud also wrote about shock as a very important power in his theatre of cruelty: “To make metaphysics out of a spoken language is to make the language express what it does not ordinarily express: to make use of it in a new, exceptional, and unaccustomed fashion; to reveal its possibilities for producing physical shock.” Deleuze compares the Eisensteinian insight of the shock, which annihilates the imagination and gives birth to new thought, with a different version of the shock, namely the one expressed by Artaud. The “theater of cruelty” is supposed to produce shock in order to revitalize the world we live in. Artaud wrote: “Everything that acts is a cruelty. It is upon this idea of extreme action, pushed beyond all limits, that theater must be rebuilt [...] The theater must give us everything that is in crime, love, war, or madness, if it wants to recover its necessity.” Artaud suggested for the new theatre to concentrate around famous personages, atrocious crimes, superhuman devotions — to return to the images and struggling forces of the old Myths. But this return to old Myths has nothing to do with the return towards imagination. Artaud proposed to renounce “our empiricism of imagery, in which the unconscious furnishes images at random, and which the poet arranges at random too, calling them poetic and hence hermetic images.” He also proposed “to return through the theater to an idea of the physical knowledge of images and the means of inducing trances.”

But these trances have nothing to do with a dream. Artaud wrote that a dream as it appears in the European cinema inspired by surrealism is too easy a solution to the “problem” of thought. Artaud believes more in the appropriateness between cinema and automatic writing, considering that automatic writing is not the absence of composition, but a higher control which brings together critical and conscious thought and the unconscious in thought. It is the structure of spiritual automaton. Deleuze, following Artaud noticed that mainly in cinema, thought is brought face-to-face with its own impossibility, but drawn from this a higher power of birth. In this conception, thought no longer confronts repression, the unconscious, dream, sexuality or death, “as in expressionism (and also in surrealism), it is all these
determinations which confront thought as a higher “problem,” or which enter into relation with the indeterminable, the unreferable.”

“It is true,” — concludes Deleuze, “that a bad cinema (and sometimes good) limits itself to a dream state induced in the viewer, or — as has been the subject of frequent analysis — to an imaginary participation. But the essence of the cinema — which is not the majority of films — has thought as its higher purpose, nothing but thought and its functioning.”

The paradox is that Artaud himself has difficulties with thought, but Deleuze relies mainly on these difficulties. He discusses them in *Difference and Repetition*. Deleuze noticed that for Artaud the problem was not to orientate his thought, or to perfect the expression of what he thought, or to acquire application and method or to perfect his poems, but simply to manage to think something. Deleuze studies the discussion in correspondence between Artaud and his friend Jacques Rivière concerning the difficulties of thought and concludes that Rivière did not understand the main idea of Artaud, who identified the only difficulties in thinking as related to lack of method, technique or application, and even lack of health. According to Deleuze, these, however, are fortunate difficulties. Fortunate not only because they prevent the nature of thought from devouring our own nature, and not only because they bring thought into relation with obstacles which are so many “facts” (without which it would not manage to orientate itself), but also because our efforts to overcome these obstacles allow us to maintain an ideal of the self as it exists in pure thought. We can maintain this ideal like a “superior degree of identity with ourselves,” which persists through the factual variations, differences and inequalities which constantly affect us. But Artaud, from Deleuze’s point of view, had different things in mind. For him, according to Deleuze, this was the only conceivable “work”: it presupposes an impulse, a compulsion to think which passes through all sorts of bifurcations, spreading from the nerves and being communicated to the soul (*et se communiqué à l’âme*) in order to arrive at thought. Henceforth, thought is also forced to think its central collapse, its fracture, its own natural “powerlessness” (*impouvoir naturel*), which is indistinguishable from the greatest power — in other words, from those unformulated forces, the *cogitanda*, as though from so many thefts or trespasses in thought. Deleuze concludes, that contrary to Kant’s dogmatic image of thought, Artaud pursues in all this the terrible revelation of a thought without image (*d’une pensée sans image*), and the conquest of a new principle which does not allow itself to
be represented. Artaud knows “that difficulty as such, along with its cortège of problems and questions, is not a de facto state of affairs but a de jure structure of thought; that there is an acephalism in thought (acéphale dans la pensée) just as there is an amnesia in memory (un amnésique dans la mémoire), an aphasia in language (un aphasique dans le langage) and an agnosia in sensibility (un agnosique dans le sensibilité).”32 Relying upon Artaud’s insight on the powerlessness of thought Deleuze concludes that thinking is not innate, as Kant supposed, but must be engendered in thought. This genesis of thought, overlooked from the Kantian perspective but tackled from Artaud’s experience, reveals for Deleuze that the problem is not to direct or methodically apply a thought which pre-exists in principle and in nature, but to bring into being that which does not yet exist. “To think is to create — there is no other creation — but to create is first of all to engender ‘thinking’ in thought,”33 says Deleuze, following Artaud. This conception constitutes one of the important principles of Deleuzian aesthetics of cinema.

A different understanding of the genesis of thought creates, according to Deleuze, an absolute opposition between Artaud’s project and a conception such as Eisenstein’s. Deleuze concludes that for Artaud, contrary to Eisenstein’s concept, what cinema advances is not the power of thought but its impower.

Artaud was involved in cinema art as an actor and screenwriter. Having appeared in more than twenty films between 1924 and 1935, Artaud as film actor was performing in Abel Gance’s Napoléon (1926), Carl Th. Dreyer’s The Passion of Joan of Arc (La Passion de Jeanne d’Arc, 1927), and Fritz Lang’s Liliom (1933). Artaud is the author of fifteen scenarios, but only one of them was to ever be produced. When Germaine Dulac directed The Seashell and the Clergyman in 1927, Artaud insisted on his participation in the filming and editing of his own text, but Dulac, taking into account Artaud’s notoriously difficult personality, did her best to exclude Artaud from any possible collaboration. Afterwards, Artaud openly disagreed with the interpretation of his scenario. When asked in 1924, “What sort of films would you like to make?,” he replied: “So I demand phantasmagorical films […] The cinema is an amazing stimulant. It acts directly on the grey matter of the brain. When the savour of art has been sufficiently combined with the psychic ingredient which it contains it will go way beyond the theatre which we will relegate to a shelf of memories.”34 When Artaud believed in cinema he suggested some its achievement as an example for theatre. In The Theater and Its Double he wrote:
In a Marx Brothers’ film a man thinks he is going to take a woman in his arms but instead gets a cow, which moos. And through a conjunction of circumstances which it would take too long to analyze here, that moo, at just that moment, assumes an intellectual dignity equal to any woman’s cry. Such a situation, possible in the cinema, is no less possible in the theater as it exists: it would take very little—for instance, replace the cow with an animated manikin, a kind of monster endowed with speech, or a man disguised as an animal to rediscover the secret of an objective poetry at the root of humor, which the theater has renounced and abandoned to the Music Hall, and which the Cinema later adopted.\(^{35}\)

When Deleuze pronounces that “the Brain is the screen,”\(^ {36} \) he does so as if following Artaud’s insight. But, as Jamieson notices, tragically, Artaud’s film theory was never fully realized and remains historically lost. Despite pursuing a number of avenues to raise funds, Artaud’s polemic remained purely theoretical.\(^ {37} \) Nevertheless, Deleuze discerns in Artaud’s ideas the turn towards modern cinema. Deleuze notices that as long as Artaud believes in the cinema he credits it not with the power of returning to images and linking them according to the demands of an internal monologue and the rhythm of metaphors, but of “un-linking” them, according to multiple-voices, internal-dialogues, always a voice in another voice. “In short,” writes Deleuze, “it is the totality of cinema-thought relations that Artaud overturns: on the one hand there is no longer a whole thinkable through montage, on the other hand, there is no longer an internal monologue utterable through image.”\(^ {38} \) Deleuze studies unrealised film scripts written by Artaud (32, *La révolte du boucher, Dix-huit secondes*) and identifies the powerlessness of thought as the main topic in them. Deleuze concludes that Artaud believes in the cinema as long as he considers that the cinema is essentially suited to reveal this powerlessness to think at the heart of thought. He ceases to believe in the film when he begins to believe that the movie may create only an abstract, figurative and dreams. Deleuze warns that we are in danger of misconstruing Artaud’s originality: “it is no longer thought which confronts repression, the unconscious, dream, sexuality or death, as in expressionism (and also in surrealism), it is all these determinations which confront thought as higher “problem,” or which enter into relation with the undeterminable, the unreferable.”\(^ {39} \)

Deleuze was not interested in Artaud’s experience as an actor — he did not usually analyse the actor’s input into the film creation. Deleuze was more interested in Artaud’s disap-
pointment in cinema as an art. He refers to Artaud’s reflections in the text *La vieillesse précoce du cinéma* (*Old age of the cinema*): “The imbecile world of images caught as if by glue in millions of retinas will never perfect the image that has been made of it. The poetry which can emerge from it all is only a possible poetry, the poetry of what might be, and it is not from cinema that we should expect.”40 Artaud’s disappointment is the basic argument Deleuze uses to discuss the problem of the unity of man and the world in modern cinema. To a certain extent, Deleuze shares the disappointment in modern cinema with Artaud when writes, “Cinema is dying, then, from its quantitative mediocrity.”41 Artaud warned that cinema must avoid two pitfalls: abstract experimental cinema, which was developing at the time, and commercial figurative cinema, which Hollywood was imposing. Deleuze thinks that in some sense Artaud’s predictions become realized: “What becomes of Hitchcock’s suspense, Eisenstein’s shock and Gance’s sublimity when they are taken up by mediocre authors?” 42 On the other hand, Deleuze considers that cinema as the mass-art has degenerated “into state propaganda and manipulation, into a kind of fascism which brought together Hitler and Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler. The spiritual automaton became fascist man.”43 This type of a cinema is not the one Artaud was dreaming about. It is also not the type of a cinema Deleuze is interested in. Deleuze is concentrating on the other type of cinema, according to his words “when it stops being bad”44 (*quand il cesse d’être mauvais*).45 This type of movie does not constitute the majority of film production, but is enough for Deleuze: he mentions more than one hundred film directors in the first volume *Cinema I, The Movement-Image* and adds additional forty in the second volume *Cinema II. The Time-Image*. He further cites about four hundred movies in the both volumes of *Cinema*.

On the other hand, as has already been discussed in this article, Deleuze relies on Artaud’s texts which are not related to the cinema — he discerns from Artaud’s reflections on the inability of thought, the attempt to break the causally related patterns of the movement-image, the so-called “sensory-motor schemata,” along with a turn towards pure visual situations in modern cinema. Among the main film directors who made this sensory-motor break towards the modern cinema of the seer in pure visual situations Deleuze mentions the Danish film director Carl T. Dreyer (1889-1968) (*Vampyr, Gertrud, Ordet*), the Italian film director Roberto Rossellini (1906-1977) (*Stromboli, Europe 51*), and the French-Swiss film director Jean-Luc Godard (1930) (*Pierrot le fou, Une femme est une femme, Bande à part, Le Mépris, Weekend, Lettre à Freddy Buache, Les Carabiniers, La Chinoise, Deux ou trois choses que je sais d’elle*).
Deleuze even noticed the spiritual crisis Dreyer experienced and posed the rhetorical question: “Was Dreyer an Artaud to whom reason would have been “restored,” once again by virtue of the absurd?” In Dreyer’s movies Deleuze points out the new relation between cinema and thought, the grasping of the intolerable even in the everyday and insignificant. In 1983, during a conversation with Pascal Bonitzer and Jean Narboni, Deleuze, when asked about the crisis of the movement-image, mentions these two Rossellini’s movies once more, indicating that in them, the situations are too powerful or too painful or too beautiful and because of that the old sensory-motor links are broken. The main personages in Stromboli and Europe 51 found themselves in situations which are too intense, so they do not know how to react. Instead of reacting by action, they have gained an ability to see and to hear. In this visionary cinema, new types of signs, such as chronosigns, lectosigns, and noosigns, are created. Artaud’s “cinema of cruelty,” as Deleuze renames it: “does not tell a story but develops a sequence of spiritual states which are deduced from one another as thought is deduced from thought.” This has, according to him, something in common with Paolo Pasolini’s movies (Theorem, Salo). In them, the image is carried to the point where it becomes deductive and automatic and creates the thought of the image and the thought in the image (pensée de l’image, la pensée dans l’image). Carmelo Bene (1937-2002) – an Italian actor, poet, film director and screenwriter, wrote the essay Superpositions in 1979 in collaboration with Deleuze. In the chapter “Cinema, Body and Brain, Thought” (Cinema II. The Time-Image) Deleuze concludes, that “Carmelo Bene must be the director closest to Artaud.” Deleuze explains: Bene has the same experience as Artaud: he “believes” in cinema, he believes that cinema can bring about a more profound theatricalization than theatre itself, but he only believes this for a short time. The most important aspect which unites Artaud’s conception with Bene’s is their common belief in the capacity that cinema would have to give a body, to bring about its birth and disappearance in a ceremony, in a liturgy. In Bene movies (Capricci, 1969, Don Giovanni, 1971, Salomè, 1972, One Hamlet Less, 1973) one can discern a metaphysics Artaud wrote about. According to Artaud:

to make metaphysics out of language, gestures, attitudes, sets, and music from a theatrical point of view is, it seems to me, to consider them in relation to all the ways they can have of making contact with time and with movement.
Derrida argues that this “impouvoir” indicated by Artaud is not lack of inspiration, the sterility of having nothing to say, but, on the contrary, is the inspiration itself in so far as it is antecedent and another voice coming from “nowhere.” Adrian Morfee in his book *Antonin Artaud’s Writing Bodies* opposes Derrida by arguing that Artaud is quite simply not as meditative, reflective, and philosophical as Derrida’s brilliance makes him appear. Nor do his texts carry the penetrating insights he lends them. Artaud’s way of thinking is not unidirectional and incisive, but fragmented, messy, and repetitive. For this reason, Morfee suggests that the greater danger with this approach is that it assumes Artaud may be treated synthetically. But Artaud is not that sort of writer. His ideas evolve and mutate over time, and, to make matters more complicated, he proceeds by developing pairs of conflicting accounts. In his final poetry two mythic narrative systems are created, the one to trace the genealogy of his alienation, the other to trace out a future genealogy that would end it.\(^{51}\) The same critique could be addressed to Deleuze as well — that is, one can say that he treats Artaud synthetically.

On the other hand, Morfee claims that Artaud does not build theories but theorizes — his work is directed not towards creating objects, either esthetic or theoretical, but towards the activities of thinking and writing. The annihilation of imagination in Deleuzian aesthetics of the cinema is based mainly on the activities of thinking.

Thought does not become visible in cinema, but it turns towards what is impossible to think in thought and towards what it is impossible to see in the image. Thought in the cinema clashes with its own impossibility, but exactly from this clash its power and new rebirth becomes possible. Discussing the problem of thought’s own impossibility as the source of cinema art, Deleuze returns to other, different theoretical sources. He mentions Martin Heidegger who discovered the thought’s universal form and Maurice Blanchot, who expressed an idea similar to Artaud’s in literature. What Blanchot diagnoses everywhere in literature, Deleuze considers as particularly clear in cinema: “on the one hand the presence of an unthinkable in thought, which would be both its source and barrier; on the other hand the presence to infinity of another thinker in the thinker, who shatters every monologue of a thinking self.”\(^{52}\) On a similar note, Deleuze also cites Jean-Louis Schefer’s book *L’homme ordinaire du cinéma*,\(^{53}\) noticing Schefer’s attempt to reply to the question: in what respect and how is cinema concerned with a thought whose essential character is not yet to be? Deleuze concludes that Schefer is close to Artaud.\(^{54}\)
Mainly, cinema art reveals that thought, when it approaches the world, meets with something unbearable and something unthinkable. These contradictions stop its functioning. Because this world is intolerable it can no longer think a world or think itself. The intolerable (*l’intolérable*), supposes Deleuze, is not some injustice, but the permanent state of a daily banality. Man is not himself a world other than the one in which he experiences the intolerable and feels himself trapped. The aim of cinema, says Deleuze, as if trying to restore Artaud’s faith in the cinema, is to create a new link between man and the world and this link is possible if only a new belief were created. For Artaud this belief in reality is closely linked with the belief in body. In this place Deleuze unexpectedly expresses his own personal attitude towards cinema. He considers the aim of cinema to function as an artificial link between man and world, an art form that paradoxically allows us to believe into our world (and us relating in meaningful way to it). According to Deleuze, it is possible to believe in this only as in the impossible, the unthinkable, which nonetheless cannot but be thought.

Artaud’s film theory was not implemented. However, Deleuze revived Artaud’s lost film theory and re-created it in his experimental cinematic thinking, making it the one of the most influential sources in his cinematic investigations.

CONCLUSION

Deleuze concludes, that contrary to Kant’s dogmatic image of thought, Artaud pursues in all this the terrible revelation of a thought without image (*d’une pensée sans image*) and the conquest of a new principle which does not allow itself to be represented. Whereas Kant discusses the displeasure this free play can cause, under the terms of “the sublime,” Artaud’s displeasure is by no means linked to a new belief in body and flesh. On the contrary: the “healing” — yet gruesome — pedagogy of Artaud’s cinema (for Deleuze) lies entirely in the experience of a severe disappointment, namely, Artaud’s (and probably everybody’s) inability to link brain and screen instantly/directly together, which Artaud longed so urgently for in his early writings of the 20th Century. Artaud’s later praise of the theatre of cruelty (1935) are reminiscent of his cinematic days, as it relies on a number of techniques that are interestingly typical for cinema, but not for theatre. One can argue that Artaud’s disappointment in cinema (as medium) is transformed/perverted/elevated into its hidden praise in disguise of
a theatrical theory. There — just as in cinema — he recommends to scatter the text (script book). As is done every day while shooting, he aims to distort the body with obscene gestures, to use the human voice as an organ of common beasts. He deliberately separates human voice and human movement/gestures as it is possible through a non-synchronic use of sight & sound in cinema (through machines, not by virtue of the actor). The use of one’s body, one’s one voice, one’s text etc., that Artaud projects here, is not only schizophrenic, it brings the daily, banal, yet artificial (and yes: controlled) use of all our faculties into the process of film shooting on stage and lets the audience suffer, as no current of music, no flickering lights, no narrative, bring all these fragments back to life. Artaud’s theatrical fragmentations of the human body and the scattering of any possible narrative display and re-enact cinematic techniques at best. The free play of the human faculties (in Kant) here (in Artaud) becomes a free play of all the inabilities and hindrances a gifted actor (who Artaud was) can think of. The inability of thought might not be its cause, but the effect of this impressive display of Artaud’s — theoretical — anti-method-acting avant-la-lettre:

The Theatre of Cruelty has been created in order to restore to the theatre a passionate and convulsive conception of life, and it is in this sense of violent rigour and extreme condensation of scenic elements that the cruelty on which it is based must be understood. This cruelty, which will be bloody when necessary but not systematically so, can thus be identified with a kind of severe moral purity which is not afraid to pay life the price it must be paid.⁵⁶

1. The article is based on the investigation included into the project “Gilles Deleuze: Philosophy and Arts” financed by the Lithuanian Academy of Science (No. MIP-067/2014).
12. Ibid., 84.
15. Ibid., 174.
17. Ibid., 50.
21. Ibid., 146.
23. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 152.
24. Ibid., 187-188.
25. For Deleuze relation towards Eisenstein see Gregg Lambert, *The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze* (New York: Continuum, 2002).
27. Ibid., 85.
28. Ibid., 80.
30. Ibid., 163.
33. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 147. Deleuze, *Différence et répétition*, 192: “Penser, c’est créer, il n’y a pas d’autre création, mais créer, c’est d’abord engendrer “penser” dans le pensée.”
39. Ibid., 161.
41. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 164.
42. Ibid., 164.
43. Ibid., 159.
44. Ibid., 166.
46. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 165.
47. Ibid., 174.
49. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 184.
52. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 162.
54. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 163.
55. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 164. Deleuze, *Cinéma II*, 221: “Croire, non pas à un autre monde, mais au lien de l’homme et du monde, à l’amour ou à la vie, y croire comme à l’impossible, à l’impensable, qui pourtant ne peut être que pensé.”