Understand to Prevent

The military contribution to the prevention of violent conflict

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The military contribution to the prevention of violent conflict

A Multinational Capability Development Campaign project

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GBR, AUT, CAN, FIN, NLD, NOR, USA

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Distribution statement

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Military thinking on the utility of force is at a crossroads. Thirteen years of continuous warfare — in Iraq, Afghanistan and the brief intervention in Libya — have delivered only limited and uncertain political gains. Trials of strength have been won, but not the clash of wills. The most recent intervention — Iraq, again — is asking the same questions, with the answers no clearer than before.

Member Nations of the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) are also facing the consequences of pulling back from overseas engagement — how to retain talented personnel, how to manage budget cuts and, above all, how best to prepare for an uncertain future?

Opinions are divided about how the role of the military will evolve in the coming years. Will it continue fighting ‘wars amongst the people’, or are the biggest risks still posed by powerful nation states? Should the military be preparing to mix the two strategies, or will the pervasiveness of cyberspace, and its use by friends, allies, whole populations — and our adversaries — force us to significantly change the way that we configure and use our armed forces? Will the gathering effects of climate change drive more conflict or stimulate more cooperation, calling on the military to contribute in ways that are, as yet, unclear, and certainly outside its traditional roles?

Against this uncertain background, Understand to Prevent (U2P) argues for a new focus — a shift of military effort from crisis response (waiting for the future to happen) to ‘upstream’1 engagement to positively manage conflict, prevent violence and build peace. In practical terms, while warfighting will always remain the foundation of military capability, we need to supplement the current spectrum of effects practised by most Western nations (shape-persuade-deter-coerce-intervene) with a new human-centred model. With this new model, the military will offer persistent modulated engagement — a continuous presence through the deployment of scaleable, bespoke tailored joint forces to respond intelligently and appropriately to each circumstance and engagement proactively. Specifically, supporting locally-led prevention initiatives through an altered spectrum with a different emphasis — ‘understand-engage-early-act-endure-assess’.2

This new model will provoke challenge, not least from areas of the world where the military are seen as part of the problem rather than possible contributors to the solution. It is also likely that some of those working in development and peacebuilding fields will regard with scepticism, or even hostility, to the prospect of military boots marching into ‘their’ space.

For the military to be effective in this new approach, they must be accepted as a trusted contributor. Trust will therefore have to be built with the many other actors in the field, some of whom will not be our usual partners. Additionally, understanding of the human domain has to broaden and deepen in order for us to engage with other actors effectively. We must also develop a better understanding of conflict itself, and embrace the distinction between conflict, violence and violent conflict — related but different concepts that call for different approaches, and which render the term ‘conflict prevention’ too blunt to be useful.

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1 ‘Upstream’ is used in this document to refer to the period before conflict turns violent. ‘Downstream’ refers to restoring peace after a violent crisis.

2 See Chapter 6 for more detail.
Based on these human-centred insights, an understanding emerges of the wider contribution the military can make; namely, as ‘conflict specialists’. Their legitimate range of activity runs from personal mediation at one end of the spectrum, through conflict resolution and transformation, to deterrence and — if necessary — warfighting.

We welcome feedback on the ideas put forward in this publication and hope that it will prompt a wider discussion about how the military can play a proactive and strategic role in helping to create a less violent world.
Introduction

This publication is a think piece, primarily intended to introduce military readers to various ideas about conflict, violence and prevention that we believe will prove useful in starting to focus military thinking on upstream engagement. It is, therefore, designed to challenge preconceptions and create debate, enabling military officers and their civilian counterparts to think more broadly about the subject. It is neither definitive or authoritative, but it does provide the foundation for further exploratory work by the MCDC community.

Our selection includes a range of concepts and models drawn from the rapidly growing world of peace studies that will be familiar to some readers but unknown to others, and which we readily acknowledge is far from complete. We see it as a first step in an ongoing and reflective process of learning and exchange that we hope will become embedded in military study.

Central to U2P are the ideas of the Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung and the US academic-practitioner John Paul Lederach. You should note, however, that peace and conflict studies is a relatively young field and much of it is still contested. For example, while Galtung’s pioneering ideas on the nature of conflict and violence have been extremely influential, his more recent work has proved controversial. Similarly, although Lederach’s ideas have been widely accepted he too has his critics. Nevertheless, both men are significant figures in the field and we believe their insights have much to offer.

U2P also touches on a number of practical advances in conflict management that have occurred in recent years and may be unknown to military readers. The field has developed rapidly and substantially, so that alongside conceptual and academic growth there has been growth in:

- think-tanks, commentary and lobbying;
- civil society as a source of innovation and social mediation;
- local peacebuilding work around the globe;
- international civil society programmes and networking; and
- governmental, and intergovernmental, awareness and action.

Acknowledging all this, U2P is presented in two parts. Part 1 is broadly theoretical, while Part 2 starts to look at how those concepts could be applied by the military.

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3 For a good introduction to the field of peace and conflict studies see Contemporary Conflict Resolution (3rd Edition), Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011.
4 Professor of International Peacebuilding at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana.
5 See, for example, the continually updated Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation: www.berghof-foundation.org/publications/handbook/berghof-handbook-for-conflict-transformation
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Part 1

Foundation studies
Key terms

Since Understand to Prevent (U2P) presents a new focus, it is important at the outset to understand how the terms ‘conflict’, ‘prevention’ and ‘violence’ will be used in this publication. Their full meaning will be amplified in the main body of the text. ‘Understanding’, as used in the military sense, is also explained.6

What is conflict?

U2P takes conflict to be a natural and inevitable feature of human relationships that arises when people actively pursue incompatible goals or perceive, correctly or not, that something they care about is being threatened or denied. This ‘something’ is invariably related to one or more of their fundamental human needs, which range from the basic and physical to the (often subtle) emotional and psychological.

Fundamental human needs are frequently in competition with one another. However, even within individuals, conflict can be seen as a dynamic process of seeking to meet or prioritise apparently incompatible needs.

This process can lead to negative consequences, including violence, if the needs of certain groups or individuals are pursued at the expense of other groups or individuals’ needs; but it can also produce healthy and productive development if the process is both nonviolent and seen as generally fair. As John Paul Lederach notes, ‘conflict is normal in human relationships, and conflict is a motor of change’.7

Conflict prevention?

The goal is, therefore, not to prevent conflict per se but to engage with it in ways that seek to bring about positive change. Indeed, in the field of peace studies the term ‘conflict prevention’ is often challenged precisely because it implies a wholly negative view of conflict, in which conflict is assumed to mean violent conflict or simply violence.

There are some who object to the term, believing conflict prevention is neither possible nor necessarily useful, since the conflict at issue might actually benefit from being escalated, not prevented, in order to bring about positive change.8

In short, conflict and the violent means that can be used to resolve it (‘might is right’) should be understood and dealt with separately; that is, conflict should be managed, resolved or transformed, and violence should be prevented.

What is violence?

Violence is defined as: behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage or kill someone or something.9 In law it may also include the threat of such force against another. Johan Galtung, however, proposes a greatly extended concept of violence:

“I see violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life; lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible. Threats of violence are also violence.”10

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6 A glossary of terms often used in peacebuilding and conflict management can be found at Annex U.
8 See Conflict resolution and conflict transformation, Chapter 2.
Galtung describes three types of violence in his ‘direct — structural — cultural’ or ‘DSC’ triangle (which is depicted in Figure 1).\textsuperscript{11} Direct violence coincides with the Oxford English Dictionary definition, in which he includes verbal, emotional and psychological violence. In addition to direct violence, Galtung identifies two forms of indirect violence — structural and cultural. Though harder to identify — being part of the generally accepted fabric of societies they are often unseen — structural and cultural violence nevertheless produce harmful effects on others.

This concept (discussed further in Chapter 3) implies that while the immediate concern might be to address a conflict’s direct violence, threatened or actual, it is vital also to deal with its underlying structural and cultural causes. If these are neglected, the likelihood is that at some point the direct violence will re-emerge.

Effective decision-making relies on thorough understanding of the environment, circumstances and situations within which we may find ourselves operating or interacting. Understanding also usefully exposes our mental limitations and informs the potential implications and consequences of our activities.

**Definition of understanding.** Understanding is defined as: the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making.\textsuperscript{13} It is about making better decisions based on the most accurate depiction possible.

**Establishing context.** The term understanding has a number of similar, but subtly different, meanings dependent upon the context in which it is used and the user communities or institutions who develop it. For example, military understanding traditionally relates to what military forces need to understand to identify, monitor and defeat adversaries; economic understanding is a framework of competition, supply, demand, regulation and risk. Each context provides a different interpretation or frame of reference.

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\textsuperscript{11} Violence, War, and their Impact, Johan Galtung, http://them.polylog.org/5/fgj-en.htm

\textsuperscript{12} This is a DCDC rendering of a quotation from List of Universal Truths by Peter Kay as at 2010: ‘Intelligence is knowing a tomato is a fruit; wisdom is not putting it in a fruit salad.’

\textsuperscript{13} COED, 11th Edition: the ability to understand something, comprehension; the power of abstract thought (intellect); an individual’s perception or judgement of a situation; sympathetic awareness or tolerance; an informal or unspoken agreement or arrangement; having insight or good judgement.
Insight and foresight. Whatever the context, understanding involves the acquisition and development of knowledge to such a level that it enables insight (knowing why something has happened or is happening) and foresight (being able to identify and anticipate what may happen). Developing understanding relies first on having the situational awareness to identify the problem. Analysis of this situational awareness provides greater comprehension (insight) of the problem; applying judgement to this comprehension provides understanding of the problem (foresight). Foresight will never be perfect, but improving the quality of our information sources and the analysis of them will make it more certain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understanding</th>
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<tr>
<td>Situational awareness and analysis = Comprehension (insight)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comprehension and judgement = Understanding (foresight)</td>
</tr>
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Objectives of understanding. In the military context, the most likely objectives for understanding will be:

a. Providing the context for making better decisions.
b. Supporting the development of policy, strategy and plans.
c. Helping develop alliances or agreements.
d. Achieving influence.
e. Focusing on a particular operating environment.
f. Developing an appreciation of the actors within an environment.
g. Developing empathy with another individual, group or community.

In this document, ‘conflict’ is used in its widest sense to refer to disputes between people at all levels, from the individual and domestic to the collective and international. These conflicts might involve violence, in which case the term will be used as defined by Galtung and qualified where necessary by the words ‘direct’, ‘structural’ or ‘cultural’. ‘Prevention’ refers to the prevention of violence or violent conflict, according to the context. ‘Conflict prevention’ will be used only as it appears in quoted text. ‘Understanding’ is used in the sense outlined above.

14 Insight is the capacity to gain an accurate and deep understanding of something, and foresight is the ability to anticipate future events or requirements (COED).
15 It should be noted that situational awareness is the appreciation of what is happening, but not necessarily why it is happening.
16 In the context of understanding, analysis is the process of evaluating information about the current and past behaviour of an individual, organisation, system or country. It consists of four stages: collation, evaluation, integration and interpretation/assessment.
Chapter 1 — Understanding the human domain

‘I am a man. Nothing that is human is alien to me.’

Terence

1.1 To manage conflict successfully and prevent it from escalating into violence, it is vital to understand its fundamental causes, both generically and in specific cases. These causes are invariably rooted in the human domain. Decisions are more likely to help mitigate, rather than exacerbate, conflict if the military adopts a human-centred approach to understanding. This approach is one that focuses on the actors involved, their relationships to each other as well as their cultural and physical environments. Above all, it focuses on what they care about.

Why the ‘human domain’?

1.2 Why, despite overwhelming military strength, was the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) unable to defeat the Taliban insurgency? Why, in Iraq, did a swift military victory lead not to peace, a stable democracy and a thriving economy but to years of violent (and continuing) insecurity? Why, in short, has Western military dominance failed to deliver the desired political goods?

1.3 Current thinking has concluded that military doctrine has been too focused on hard power, hardware and technology — what Clausewitz called ‘the trial of strength’ — and has tended to ignore, downplay or simply misunderstand the vital role of what he termed ‘the clash of wills’. In the words of Professor Colin Gray, the human dimension of war and strategy has a way of triumphing over technology and cunning plans.

1.4 Developing the concept of the human domain is a response to this perceived gap in military thinking. In military parlance, a domain is a sphere of military activity — the main domains being land, sea, air and space, and cyberspace. Frank Hoffman and Michael C Davies neatly summarise current thinking about the need to add the human domain.

“...If war is a clash of wills, we need to ensure our efforts are focused on creating the capabilities needed to shape that clash towards our objectives. Thus, our understanding of the complexities of contemporary conflict should examine the human environment and devote resources to researching its conceptual utility and its components.”

What is the human domain?

1.5 There has been difficulty for different forces to agree on a definition for this new (or neglected) domain. Based on discussion...
between a number of the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) members, we hope, in time, to offer one definition that embraces the three related perspectives below:

a. The human domain is characterised by external factors or attributes shared within, or between, collective humans. Commonly, they are social structures, cultures, religions, languages, institutions, customs, informal and formal networks.

b. The human dimension is characterised by internal, psychological factors or attributes that shape individual understanding, perceptions and actions. They can include motivations, attitudes, perceptions, decision-making, cognition, values, morals and ethics.

c. Human factors are those that categorise individual human performance and man/machine interfaces. They may include speed, weight, size, body mass index and cardio-vascular performance.

1.6 We also offer a model that attempts to reflect the interconnected nature of the domains which make up the military operating environment. In this ‘globe’ model, the number of domains has been reduced to three – physical, information and human – where the human element is both at the core of all three and existing in its own sphere of activity. Figure 1.1 shows this.

1.7 At the ‘core’ is the individual actor (or group/collective), who embodies both the physical aspects (the who, where and when) and the human aspects (the attitudes, behaviour and perceptions we would be seeking to influence).

1.8 The ‘inner mantle’ is made up of those aspects of the physical, human and information domains that are most important or personal to any attitude, perception or behaviour. For example, within the physical domain it could be food, water or security.

Figure 1.1 — The human domain
1.9 The ‘outer mantle’ makes up the bulk of the external factors affecting an actor or group, while the ‘crust’ (made up of all three domains) represents the operating environment together with the physical challenges presented by a complex terrain. The maritime and air and space environments are still included but deliberately placed above the crust, representing an increasingly hostile environment for human activity. However, they are still capable of hosting the means to influence actors in the physical, human and information domains.

1.10 By placing the human being at the centre and suggesting the complex interconnection of factors anticipated in the future operating environment, we believe this model represents a logical step in developing human-centred military thinking. While retaining the ability to exercise hard power if necessary, it suggests that the military needs to develop the skills essential to strengthening the ‘soft’ power attributes of attraction and influence. This involves knowing how to attract and convince actors to a particular way of thinking, rather than simply trying to coerce them.

1.11 While developing the additional skills suggested by this model, military actors will increasingly act as conflict specialists, who are able to draw on a wide range of tools to address particular conflicts. Specifically, employing this type of early military engagement upstream can help to shape the attitudes, perceptions and behaviour of the actors away from violence and towards conflict resolution or transformation.

Exploring the human domain

1.12 The globe model identifies three interrelated aspects of the human domain. At the core is the actor (as an individual or a group/collective), who has both an internal psychological life (the human dimension) and an external life divided into cultural and institutional dimensions.

11.13 Discussion is continuing across MCDC members on how best to integrate these three aspects. A number of frameworks are being used and no dominant model has yet emerged — if, indeed, one is desirable. As Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) notes, ‘The use of multiple frameworks helps analysts and planners to identify differences between how we (as outsiders) and the target (as insider) sees and interprets the operating environment’. In that light, it is possible to view each of the three aspects of the human domain by using elements of existing frameworks.

Actors

1.14 The UK’s view of the human domain recognises four actor categories — state, non-state, global and local — but also stresses the need to avoid fixed identities or roles. Individually and as groups, the actor changes continually. The extract on the following page has been taken from the UK’s Joint Doctrine Publication 04, *Understanding*.

1.15 Observations of group dynamics and the caution against classifying actors as irreconcilable, belligerents, neutrals, friendly or spoilers points to a fundamental tenet of conflict management. Just as identity is not fixed, every individual (and by extension every collection of individuals) embodies the inherent potential for change. This might not come about in a way that other actors welcome or within a time frame that they deem acceptable. Even so, the inherent capacity of individuals to transform, and, in so doing, transform their social environments, is an important factor to remember in any conflict’s analysis.

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Categories of actors. The human domain framework considers four actor categories.

a. **State actors** are individual or group actors aligned with or representing their state. State actors include: governments and government agencies (political, military and economic); state-controlled industries (e.g. the defence industry in some states); populations; and individuals who officially represent their state in global organisations or alliances such as the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

b. **Non-state actors** are individuals and groups that are independent of a state. Non-state actors include: state aspirants (e.g. Palestinians and Kurds); independent groups (such as non-governmental organisations); and individuals (such as lobbyists, philanthropists, pirates, criminals, refugees and displaced persons).

c. **Global actors** operate and have influence at the global level. They include: groups of states working together through a formal and legal body (UN, NATO, Association of Southeast Asian Nations or the African Union); transnational companies and multinational corporations; global organisations (e.g. the nuclear protest movement, the anti-whaling movement, Greenpeace); and individual actors who transcend their own state affiliations, such as Nelson Mandela or Osama Bin Laden.

d. **Local actors** are those actors with the ability to hold a common or collective perspective at the lowest level within or without the formal state structure. Local actors include communities based on regional, provincial, town, village, family, ethnic or tribal lineage. They also include communities based on criminal activity and those supporting warlords.

Membership of multiple groups. Actors within the human domain should be examined as part of the groups of which they are members. It is human nature to interact with other people, and forming social groups originates in our need to band together for survival. However, individuals are never members of just one social group. For example, a non-state actor can also be a global actor. We are all members of multiple groups, whether we are born into them (as for families or ethnic groups), assimilate into them (as sports supporters, members of political parties, or jihad supporters) or achieve status (with higher education or membership of the armed services).

Attitudes and behaviour. Being part of a group means to act according to the rules or norms of that group, whether these rules are explicit or unconscious practices. Each of the groups of which we are a member therefore influences what we believe and how we behave. How individuals behave will depend on the context in which they find themselves...

Group allegiance. A person does not remain a member of the same groups throughout their life, joining or leaving groups either by choice or circumstance. In all societies people change group allegiance when they move jobs or home, marry, vote for different political parties or make new friends. Even seemingly fixed groups (such as families or tribes) can change within a lifetime, through marriage or other formal arrangements with new groups. It is therefore inaccurate (and potentially dangerous) to view personal group memberships as fixed.
Irreconcilable actors. The term ‘irreconcilable’ is used generally to describe a category of actors who will never change their mindset or view. In the case of extremists or fanatics this often leads to tragic fatal consequences when two opposing viewpoints clash. Irreconcilability is therefore a function of mutual incompatibility between groups or actors who are generally hostile. However, labelling groups as irreconcilable from the outset can lead to our own viewpoint becoming just as irreconcilable and may perpetuate the problem. Although some actors and groups are irreconcilable for long periods of time, reconciliation is often time dependent. All individuals can change their attitudes and behaviours, and the groups of which they are a member, when the conditions are right for them to do so. Defining particular groups as irreconcilable is generally counter-productive as it limits our ability to think creatively about how best to engage with them.

Similarly, classifying actors as belligerents, neutrals, friendly or spoilers tends to relate their actions only towards our own forces or interests. In reality, actors can move allegiances rapidly across all of the categories we use to classify them, becoming adversary, friend or neutral depending on the circumstances at the time. Our ability to understand any part of a population from their own perspective depends on examining the human domain using groupings that local people consider important, rather than our own classification which tends to be based primarily in terms of their relationship to us.

Analysing the actor’s internal/psychological aspect

1.16 Psychology has developed a number of approaches to explain the internal drives for human behaviour. These fall into several schools.

- **Psychodynamic perspective** — originating with the work of Sigmund Freud and emphasising the unconscious mind’s role, early childhood experiences and interpersonal relationships.
- **Behavioural perspective** — rather than emphasising internal states, this focuses on observable and learned behaviour.
- **Cognitive perspective** — focuses on mental processes such as memory, thinking, problem solving, language and decision-making.
- **Biological perspective** — emphasises the physical and biological bases of behaviour, including genetics and brain function.
- **Cross-cultural perspective** — focuses on how attitudes and behaviour are shaped by cultural influences.
- **Evolutionary perspective** — argues that mental processes serve an evolutionary function in aiding survival and reproduction.
- **Humanistic perspective** — emphasises the role of motivation on thought and behaviour, arising from the innate drive to develop personal potential.

These perspectives can overlap — the biological and evolutionary perspectives, for example, and the cross-cultural and the humanistic. Psychologists tend to meld different approaches in the course of their work.
Fundamental human needs

1.17 Human needs theory is part of the humanistic perspective and is favoured by Johan Galtung, albeit with an important caveat.

“From the very beginning let it be stated unambiguously: a basic needs approach (BNA) is not the approach to social science in general or development studies in particular, but one approach. There are others...

What is needed are very rich, many-dimensional and many-faceted views of human beings, ranging from the most material to the most non-material aspects. As far as we know, the basic needs approaches are the only ones that bring that entire range of aspects under one umbrella.”

1.18 Abraham Maslow postulated the best-known model of human needs in 1943. Although his ‘hierarchy of needs’ has been supplanted by models more closely based on empirical evidence, the underlying theory remains unchanged. The theory states that:

• human beings are driven by the urge to satisfy a range of fundamental needs;
• they adopt various (often ineffective) strategies to do so; and
• they experience positive emotions when these needs are satisfied and negative emotions when they are not.

1.19 However, the relationship between our needs and the emotions that arise from them is often not obvious, even to ourselves. The founder of Nonviolent Communication, the American psychologist Marshall Rosenberg, observes the following.

Judgements, criticisms, diagnoses and interpretations of others are all alienated expressions of our needs. If someone says ‘You never understand me,’ they are really telling us that their need to be understood is not being fulfilled. If a wife says ‘You’ve been working late every night this week; you love your work more than you love me,’ she is saying that her need for intimacy is not being met.

1.20 Needs theory argues that, consciously or unconsciously, people move towards relationships, situations and environments that meet their needs and away from those that do not. A threat to, or denial of, any of these needs will cause conflict in varying degrees for the actors involved. This conflict might be manifested between actors externally or suppressed and internalised. For example, they might fight others — literally or metaphorically — to express their identity; or they might hide it — for fear of persecution, say — but then struggle internally with feelings of cowardice and lack of integrity. The Chilean economist Manfred Max-Neef argues that:

Human needs must be understood as a system: that is, all human needs are interrelated and interactive. With the sole exception of the need of subsistence, that is, to remain alive, no hierarchies exist within the system. On the contrary, simultaneities, complementarities and trade-offs are characteristics of the process of needs satisfaction.

1.21 According to Max-Neef, ‘Fundamental human needs are finite, few and classifiable’ and are the same in all cultures and in all historical periods — ‘What changes, both over time and through cultures, is the way or the

means by which the needs are satisfied.\textsuperscript{25} He identifies nine categories of fundamental needs — subsistence, protection, affection, understanding, participation, leisure, creation, identity, freedom — which, as noted, can clash within the individual. Classically, for example, the needs for freedom/autonomy and participation/relatedness are in continual tension.

\textquote{Much of the rich fabric of the human psyche is founded upon the interplay of the deep adaptive tendencies toward autonomy (individual integration) and relatedness (integration of the individual into a larger social whole) that are part of our archaic heritage and will, under optimal circumstances, be complementary but can, under less optimal circumstances, become antagonistic.}\textsuperscript{26}

1.22 Similarly, needs can clash between individuals and groups. For example, a road scheme through a forest that one group sees as meeting their need for economic development, might be viewed by others as violating their need for subsistence if they think it threatens their livelihood.

1.23 Max-Neef’s model of needs is one of several. Rosenberg, for example, employs seven categories — autonomy, celebration, integrity, interdependence, play, spiritual communion and physical nurturance. What qualifies as a need can also be debated. But, whatever the classification, human needs theory has had a strong influence on developing approaches to conflict management.

\textbf{Positions, interests and needs}

1.24 The theory of ‘positions, interests and needs’ is founded on human needs theory. It is based on human beings pursuing certain interests and creating positions that they believe will satisfy their needs.

1.25 In a conflict, the positions that the actors adopt or demand are, therefore, seen as the tip of a larger iceberg of usually hidden interests and needs, shown here in Figure 1.2.

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{The conflict iceberg}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{25} ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behaviour; Deci and Ryan, Psychological Inquiry, Volume 11, Number 4, 2000.
1.26 A common approach of mediators and others working in conflict management is to encourage the actors to analyse their underlying interests and needs, and explore the possibility that there could be other ways to meet them. What is wholly incompatible on the surface — the positions — might, subsequently, be reconciled at the level of interests or needs.

Core beliefs

1.27 Closely related to the concept of human needs, though sometimes overlooked in conflict analysis, is the actor’s sense of the ‘sacred’ — in the broad sense, what is prized above all other things. The vignette on page 23 explores this idea through the concept of the honzon.

Emotional intelligence

1.28 Discussing fundamental human needs and core beliefs indicates that human beings are feeling, as well as thinking, animals, whose thoughts are, to a large degree, influenced by their emotions. Indeed, the Enlightenment philosopher David Hume famously argued that the rational mind was subservient to emotion. He said, ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them’.  

1.29 To operate effectively in the human domain, especially when engaged in prevention, military forces must develop a greater degree of ‘emotional intelligence’ — emotional quotient (EQ) to support their intelligence quotient (IQ).  

1.30 The concept is not without controversy — some commentators question whether EQ is a form of intelligence at all, while others argue about specific aspects of different frameworks. Nevertheless, the idea of EQ is useful in drawing attention to the often under-emphasised role of emotion in human behaviour. This includes the fact that there are benefits in having a high degree of emotional intelligence — the ability to relate to others (and vice versa) being the most obvious — and the fact that aspects of emotional intelligence can be consciously developed. Two leading proponents of emotional intelligence, Professors Peter Salovey and John Mayer, suggest a four-branch model that describes EQ as including the abilities to:

- accurately perceive emotions in ourselves and others;
- use emotions to facilitate thinking;
- understand emotional meaning; and
- manage emotions.

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27 David Hume (1711-1776).
29 EQ — emotional quotient, IQ — intelligence quotient.
Honzon is a Japanese word that expresses the idea of core beliefs in its two composite characters.

- hon — fundamental.
- zon — object of respect, veneration or devotion.

The concept derives from Eastern religious thought and can be broadly interpreted as referring to what a person bases their life on, consciously or unconsciously, to give it meaning. It is similar to the concept of psychological centrality, and what author and organisational expert Steven Covey calls ‘centers’.

‘Each of us has a center, though we usually don’t recognize it as such. Neither do we recognize the all-encompassing effects of that center on every aspect of our lives.’

A honzon can be defined as: a person’s most essential needs attached to a specific goal, activity or object, real or abstract. A person’s self-identity is closely bound to his or her honzon. All individuals and groups have a honzon, which is also the basis of individual and group morality. For example, a person might never be violent — except to protect his or her honzon. Examples of honzones include the following.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Work/career</th>
<th>Belief system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key relationship</td>
<td>Fame</td>
<td>Talent/activity</td>
<td>Abstract principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer group</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Pleasure/fun</td>
<td>Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation/team</td>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>A substance</td>
<td>Culture/land/nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal/pet</td>
<td>Possession(s)</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>The enemy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For as long as our honzon is perceived to be intact, within reach or recoverable, we will draw strength and inspiration from it. The picture of our family or loved one in time of stress, the nation’s flag raised on the battlefield, the thought that the many hours of training or study will eventually bring fame or wealth are all day-to-day examples of the motivational power of a honzon.

On the other hand, the loss of our honzon leads to confusion, suffering, decline and even death. A threat to (or denial of) our honzon is the most serious of all challenges and can prompt the earliest and strongest reaction.

Differing honzons can, therefore, be at the heart of the most intense and protracted conflicts, because the honzon is the one thing that the actors can never compromise or negotiate away — they would rather die than betray it. If the honzon is lost, they will do everything possible to win it back, or even pass the task on to future generations.

It is, thus, important for us to establish whether a honzon is involved in any conflict, as it can play a significant role in determining how the conflict — especially the ‘clash of wills’ — might be resolved or transformed. For example, promising to respect the honzon of our opponent can reduce the sense of threat that they feel.
1.31 Table 1.1 develops these points further.

1.32 Emotional intelligence also has a cultural dimension. How people express emotion can clearly vary between different societies and can, therefore, be easily misinterpreted by outsiders. Successfully managing conflict, often depends on us correctly reading the emotions of the various actors involved, while simultaneously controlling our own reactions, so that the response is both appropriate and most likely to generate a positive outcome. In summary, developing emotional intelligence is a key element in deepening understanding of the human domain.

**Table 1.1 — Four aspects of emotional intelligence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perception, appraisal and expression of emotion</th>
<th>Emotional facilitation of thinking</th>
<th>Understanding and analysing emotions: employing emotional knowledge</th>
<th>Reflective regulation of emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability to identify emotion in our physical states, feelings and thoughts.</td>
<td>Ability to identify emotion in other people, designs, artwork, and so on, through language, sound, appearance and behaviour.</td>
<td>Ability to express emotions accurately and to express our needs related to those feelings.</td>
<td>Ability to stay open to feelings, both pleasant and unpleasant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to identify emotion in other people, designs, artwork, and so on, through language, sound, appearance and behaviour.</td>
<td>Ability to express emotions accurately and to express our needs related to those feelings.</td>
<td>Ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate (or honest versus dishonest) expressions of feeling.</td>
<td>Ability to reflectively engage or detach from an emotion depending upon its judged usefulness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to express emotions accurately and to express our needs related to those feelings.</td>
<td>Ability to express emotions accurately and to express our needs related to those feelings.</td>
<td>Emotions prioritise thinking by directing attention to important information.</td>
<td>Ability to reflectively engage or detach from an emotion depending upon its judged usefulness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate (or honest versus dishonest) expressions of feeling.</td>
<td>Emotions are sufficiently vivid and available that they can be generated as aids to judgement and memory concerning feelings.</td>
<td>Emotions are sufficiently vivid and available that they can be generated as aids to judgement and memory concerning feelings.</td>
<td>Ability to effectively monitor emotions in relation to ourselves and others, such as recognising how clear, typical, influential or reasonable they are.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotions are sufficiently vivid and available that they can be generated as aids to judgement and memory concerning feelings.</td>
<td>Emotional mood swings change the individual’s perspective from optimistic to pessimistic, encouraging us to consider multiple points of view.</td>
<td>Emotional mood swings change the individual’s perspective from optimistic to pessimistic, encouraging us to consider multiple points of view.</td>
<td>Ability to effectively monitor emotions in relation to ourselves and others, such as recognising how clear, typical, influential or reasonable they are.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional mood swings change the individual’s perspective from optimistic to pessimistic, encouraging us to consider multiple points of view.</td>
<td>Emotional states differentially encourage specific problem approaches, such as when happiness facilitates inductive reasoning and creativity.</td>
<td>Emotional states differentially encourage specific problem approaches, such as when happiness facilitates inductive reasoning and creativity.</td>
<td>Ability to manage emotion in ourselves and others by moderating negative and enhancing pleasant emotions, without repressing or exaggerating information they may convey.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.1 — Four aspects of emotional intelligence**
Analysing the actor’s external environment — culture and institutions

1.33 The globe model divides the actor’s external social environment into two dimensions, the cultural and the institutional. MCDC members use a number of (at times overlapping) frameworks to analyse these dimensions. The extract below from the UK’s Joint Doctrine Publication 04, *Understanding*, describes them as follows.

**Cultural environment**

The cultural environment includes the general and pervasive ideas of a society such as: language; historically-rooted concepts of collective identity; and fundamental existential and moral beliefs such as those provided by religion. The cultural environment is sub-divided into two categories.

- **Ideological.** The ideological environment concerns common ideas, language, rituals and theories providing a common bond for communities such as tribes, religious groups and ethnic groups. It may also therefore represent a line of division between groups and be the source of conflict.

- **Psychological.** The psychological environment concerns the mental and emotional state, and behaviour of individuals or groups and their interrelation. It concerns what motivates them, their fears, attitudes and perceptions, and how these factors affect the courses of action available to them. It relates to the notion of competing narratives of individuals and groups with different interests and needs. This may result in conflict or conversely a common cause.

**Institutional environment**

The institutional environment embodies ideas, such as practices and conventions, that form the landscape of social life. It covers political institutions, law and judicial machinery and bounded communities such as families, clans and tribes. It also includes criminal associations and dissident groups operating outside of institutional conventions. The institutional environment is divided into four categories.

- **Political.** The political environment is the political belief system within which a population operates. The political environment consists of global, regional, national and provincial systems.

- **Military.** The military environment consists of the system, beliefs and allegiances within which military personnel operate, their reputation at home and abroad, their relationship to the political environment and the capabilities, structures and equipment they can bring to bear in support of the state.

- **Economic.** The economic environment consists of the economic factors (resources, employment, income, inflation, interest rates, productivity) that influence the material prosperity of an environment. It also covers the ability to produce and distribute goods, their consumption, the provision of financial services and the gross domestic product. Economic environments can be local, national or international and are linked to the political environment.

- **Legal.** The legal environment is characterised by the international and national laws applicable to a State, community or organisation.

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33 You should note that the globe model considers the psychological dimension to be internal to the actor.

34 Provincial is used here generically; this includes the US equivalent of states, districts and counties.
1.34 Establishing strong institutions frequently removes conflict in subordinate groups or societies.\textsuperscript{35} Developed systems of governance and law and order provide means of addressing contest and competition within nations.\textsuperscript{36}

1.35 Other analytical frameworks used by MCDC members include:

- PEST — political, economic, social and technological perspectives;
- PESTLEI — political, economic, social, technological, legal, environmental and information perspectives;
- PMESII — political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information perspectives (a widely used and effective US model);
- PMESII\textsuperscript{+}PT — as above plus physical environment and time perspectives;
- STEEPLEM — social, technological, economic, environmental, political, legal, ethical and military perspectives; and
- ASCOPE — area, structure, capabilities, organisation, people and events perspectives (used by the US and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan).

1.36 While the above frameworks are useful, they tend to view the actor’s social environment from the outsider’s viewpoint. To complement these frameworks DRDC offers the emic\textsuperscript{37} analytical framework. This attempts to explore the world through the insider’s eyes, as expressed by the actor’s social reality and worldview. It reports:

> Social reality is comprised of the ideational, social and physical structures that people construct, experience and share with others. Each of these structures is comprised of multiple factors.

A worldview is one subjective reality; that is, an internalized, comprehensive mental framework (held by an individual or collective) that represents the totality of a person’s knowledge about social reality, and helps people interpret and act appropriately in their social reality.

Worldviews and social reality influence each other. This implies that worldviews can evolve over time and be influenced or shaped by external agents when engaged in an effective and appropriate manner.\textsuperscript{38}

1.37 The emic analytical framework follows a three-step process. First, using a series of detailed questions, all relevant aspects of the actor/target and the operating environment are identified. Some of these questions are detailed in Table 1.2 on page 27.

1.38 The factors and questions shown here are far from exhaustive. For example, questions might be added about how the actor (individual or collective) receives information about the world, along with questions about their attitudes towards gender, family, government, outsiders and so on; even questions about preferred forms of entertainment and play can be relevant.

\textsuperscript{35} Strong institutions can also provoke conflict if they are perceived as lacking in legitimacy.
\textsuperscript{36} Op. cit.
\textsuperscript{37} In anthropology, emic research is conducted from within a social group and/or the subject’s perspective; etic research is done from the observer’s perspective, outside the target group.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Key questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norms</td>
<td>What are the key social norms or societal codes? Who is responsible for social norms? Are social rules flexible? Who do they apply to? Are they applied evenly throughout society or group? What are the consequences of transgression? How is honour defined? What is the significance of norms in daily life?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Describe key societal values and guiding ideologies. What is the significance of values in daily life? How do they shape behaviour?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>What are the morals guiding social participation? Who is responsible for moral codes? What are the consequences of transgression?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Describe what languages are used in the group or the target. What dialects are used? Are dialects tied to ethnicity, social status or other forms of social identity? When are certain languages used? Are there different languages for different social settings? Is speech direct or indirect, passive or aggressive? Is slang used? If so, how and by whom?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>What are the dominant religious and political ideologies? How is ideology defined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbols</td>
<td>What are the dominant symbols used in or by the target? Are symbols owned? Does anyone have the right to use the symbols? Are symbols sacred or secular?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myths</td>
<td>What are the predominant myths and stories of the target?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs</td>
<td>What beliefs are prevalent? What are the practices associated with the beliefs? Are beliefs secular or sacred? How tolerant is the target of other belief systems? How important are beliefs in the daily life of the target? Is the target superstitious?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion and spirituality</td>
<td>What are the dominant views on religion and spirituality? What religions do people adhere to or practise? What is the relationship between the individual and the sacred (divine)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterns of behaviour</td>
<td>Is there a general pattern of life? What are the predominant patterns of behaviour of the target? Are there punishments for transgressions of normative behaviour?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ritual</td>
<td>What are the predominant rituals in society or the group? Are they secular or sacred? What is the role of ritual in society or the group?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power, leadership and authority</td>
<td>What are the sources of power in society? How are leaders defined? How are leadership roles assumed? Are there different forms of authority?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social networks and affiliation</td>
<td>How are people connected? How do people connect (in person, by phone, social media and so on)? How is friendship defined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutions (religious, educational and so on)</td>
<td>What institutions exist in society? How are they led? What roles do institutions play in society? What local or national systems of education exist? Are there informal systems of education or religion? How is education valued?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups and organisations</td>
<td>What are the primary social groups? How are groups defined? What are the boundaries? How do people belong to a group? What are the group’s dominant beliefs? How do they differ from other groups? Are group boundaries loose or fixed?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.2 — Sample emic analytical framework questionnaire
1.39 The second step in the emic analytical framework process is to rate, on a ten-point scale, the importance to daily life that the actor places on each factor. The third step then identifies and rates the relationship between the factors on a second ten-point scale.

1.40 In essence, the emic analytical framework seeks to explore what the actors care about. It also looks at how these are reflected in their social environment — what might be called the ‘emotional fabric’ of their society or group.

1.41 This analysis can be useful from a preventive standpoint. It both offers a range of (often unexpected) points for connection with the actor, through which in upstream engagement the process of building trust can begin. It can also flag up possible areas of friction, to be negotiated with care or avoided altogether.

**Human networks**

1.42 Common to all the analytical frameworks mentioned above is the acceptance of Aristotle’s observation that ‘Man is by nature a social animal’. This aspect of the human domain has been discussed from many different perspectives, one of the more recent of which is ‘network theory’, more specifically ‘social network analysis’. This studies how relationships, rather than the innate characteristics of people, affect behaviour on an individual and group level.

1.43 Each individual actor is a ‘node’ at the centre of his or her own unique network of human relationships, which together make up an intricate and complex web of connections. These relationships are formed and sustained by family ties, friendship, affection, obligation, mutual interest, payment, loyalty, gratitude and so forth, and vary in strength along a spectrum running from positive, through neutral, to negative/hostile. Human networks are inherently dynamic, since the relationships they comprise are always changing.

1.44 The tendency of human beings to create networks has been hugely helped by the growth of the Internet. Facebook, started in 2004 by a group of students at Stanford University, currently claims some 1.28 billion active users — approaching one in five of all the people on the planet. Each of those users is at the centre of their own network of ‘friends’ and also often part of various Facebook groups; that is, networks of networks. Many other online networks exist, not least Twitter and Weibo, the Chinese Facebook-Twitter hybrid, which each claim over 500 million registered users.

1.45 Understanding the essentials of human networks offers possible insights into how conflict in the human domain might be managed. This is especially true in light of the protean, ‘shape-shifting’ nature of currently active networks of violent non-state actors.

1.46 For example, systems scientist and psychiatrist Gottlieb Guntern argues that the capacity for ‘auto-organisation’ is inherent in human systems at all levels — ‘person, couple, family, group, organization, community, society, [and] supranational’. As he explains in his paper, *Auto-Organization in Human*
According to Guntern, the ‘health’ or effectiveness of human systems depends on the efficient integration of the six sub-processes he identifies. One implication of this is to ask whether violent networks might be more effectively disrupted by undermining their capacity for auto-organisation at one or more of the points of the hexagon, rather than by confronting them with force.

Another implication is that the latent capacity for the auto-organisation of alternative local approaches to violent conflict can be actualised by the appropriate ‘hetero-organisation’ (also known as ‘outside help’). This is indeed the approach of various international agencies and non-governmental organisations.

In summary, systems thinking and social network analysis could help develop strategies that weaken undesirable networks and strengthen desirable ones. Both of these can support prevention.

Leadership

Implicit in Guntern’s analysis of human systems is the role of leadership at each point of the auto-organisation hexagon:

- evaluating the status quo;
- defining purposes and goals;
- defining problems;
- choosing strategies and tactics;
- implementing; and
- controlling.

This leadership might be exercised formally or informally, with a variety of styles, and can take many forms.

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45 Ibid.
46 The NGO Peace Direct, for example, states: ‘We believe that local people have the power to find their own solutions to conflict. Our mission is to help them to make this happen.’ www.peacedirect.org/uk
47 See Annex A: Some forms of leadership.
1.51 Lederach suggests that complex societies have many leaders, grouped at three levels in the form of a pyramid. These are the elite, middle-range and grassroots. Figure 1.4 gives more information.

1.52 The elite leadership represents the fewest people, in some cases a handful of key actors. By contrast, the grassroots level involves the largest number of people, who best represent the population at large.

1.53 Conflict can arise within and between levels, with leaders playing a key role to organise and escalate the conflict or, if acting as peacemakers, to contain and de-escalate it. The most powerful leaders (who might appear at any level but are usually found in elite positions) are those who are able to operate across all three levels and convince most networks in society to follow a particular course of action. However, Gene Sharp\textsuperscript{48} notes, as a scholar of nonviolent action, that the power of any leader ultimately derives from the willingness of others to follow him or her, especially the leaders of sub-networks at each level of the pyramid who have more direct influence on their own constituents.

1.54 To determine the appropriate approach to upstream engagement, we must therefore not only understand the nature of the conflict, but also who acts and what actions are best taken at each level.

1.55 A common challenge is designing truly inclusive conflict management processes, especially in the wake of violence. Peace agreements are typically made by elite groups but often fail to include middle-range or grassroots actors. Conversely, grassroots peacebuilding can often fail to impact on policies made by elites. Trusted individuals who can facilitate communication within, and between, networks at all three levels are, therefore, especially valuable in upstream engagement.

\textbf{Types of actors}

\textbf{Level 1: Top leadership}
- Military/political/religious leaders with high visibility

\textbf{Level 2: Middle-range leadership}
- Leaders respected in sectors
  - Ethnic/religious leaders
  - Academics/intellectuals
  - Humanitarian leaders (NGOs)

\textbf{Level 3: Grassroots leadership}
- Local leaders
- Leaders of indigenous NGOs
- Community developers
- Local health officials
- Refugee camp leaders

\textbf{Approaches to building peace}

- Focus on high-level negotiations
- Emphasizes cease-fire
- Led by highly visible, single mediator

- Problem-solving workshops
- Training in conflict resolution
- Peace commissions
- Insider-partial teams

- Local peace commissions
- Grassroots training
- Prejudice reduction
- Psychosocial work in postwar trauma

\textbf{Figure 1.4} — Lederach’s ‘peace pyramid’

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48 See Nonviolence, Chapter 3.
1.56 The most important of the ‘glues’ that hold human networks together is trust. This is clear where cooperation can be given or withheld more or less voluntarily, but even networks sustained by fear and coercion rely on trust to some degree, if only between those in positions of power — the leader and his senior supporters, for example.

1.57 Recognising trust as a key element in the human domain, the military has been studying it in recent years in some detail, from a variety of perspectives. The extracts below are from a paper commissioned by DRDC in 2014.49

1.58 Key to the success of upstream engagement in any conflict, therefore, is establishing — and maintaining — trust with the actors. If trust is not secured, or is broken for any reason, progress towards resolving or transforming the conflict will be slowed, halted or even reversed.

**Intercultural trust**

You trust another entity (person, groups or organisation) when you are willing to rely on them in situations that have risk, expecting that they will be there to provide you with something that you need if and when required. Trust has been determined “the single most important element of” and is critical to the success of all relationships. High trust has been associated with various positive personal and group performance outcomes, including increased timeliness, productivity, communication, and information sharing, and less focus on monitoring the actions and intentions of others, while a lack of trust is associated with greater conflict, less cooperation, and a focus on controls that ensure self-protection rather than integrative problem solving. Trust is considered to be particularly important under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty or crisis...

As depicted [below], the decision to trust involves assessments of another entity and is based on up to four dimensions: (i) perceptions of the other’s ability level (i.e. competence); (ii) perceptions of genuine, unselfish care and concern i.e. benevolence; (iii) perceived adherence to a commonly-held and valued set of principles i.e. integrity; (iv) perceptions that the other will react in a consistent manner i.e. predictability.

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49 Letter Report LR ST1405AL00, DRDC, Toronto Research Centre, 2013.
Four dimensions of trust

Although related, the dimensions are considered to be distinct. Thus, the extent to which each of the dimensions is deemed to be important is assumed to vary, for instance, according to the demands of the situation: in some cases skill and ability may be more important than benevolence (or vice versa). Although often based on another party’s past history with us, trust is always considered to be a prediction — i.e. a ‘leap of faith’ concerning future intentions and behaviour.

Judgements of trust are made based on a combination of emotional and cognitive processes or analytical lenses. For instance, the decision to trust — or not to trust — another can be achieved via:

1. a simple viewing of the rewards against the risks of trusting (i.e. calculative process)
2. a determination that another’s past behaviour is a good indication of their future reliability (i.e. prediction process)
3. a determination of the party’s positive underlying motivations (i.e. intentionality process) and/or
4. conferring trust on a stranger based on a trusted third party’s recommendation, or because they are a member of a trusted social network or agency (i.e. transference process)

In their excellent analysis of research addressing trust differences across national cultures, Ferrin and Gillespie\(^\text{50}\) concluded that trust has both universal and culture-specific elements. First, the overall concept of trust was found to exist across cultures, as were the underlying dimensions of integrity, benevolence, predictability and competence. However, there was also clear evidence that culture affected a variety of aspects of trust. For instance, one of the most robust findings was that generalised trust — defined as the level of trust conferred on strangers and acquaintances relative to trust in close friends and kin — differed by culture. There were similar cultural differences in the extent to which affect (i.e. trust based on personal relationships, mutual help, frequency of contact, kin ties) and cognition (trust based on perceptions of professionalism, competence, performance) were implicated in trust judgements, as well as in the specific indicators of trustworthiness such as the role of risk taking opportunities on trust building...

For example, all groups display in-group bias (termed ethnocentrism, and an issue to which we will return later) and trust tends to increase with level of familiarity, with members of all cultures tending to trust kin more than strangers. However, cultures that value individualism (e.g. typically Western industrial nations) and value lower power distance\(^\text{51}\) tended to have higher levels of generalised trust of strangers and acquaintances than did cultures that embraced a more collective orientation (often Eastern and/or less industrialised countries). Cultures that value a collective orientation and/or a higher power distance were more likely to evidence higher levels of trust in family and kin and in-group members.


\(^{51}\) Power distance is a term coined by the Dutch social psychologist Geert Hofstede to describe the extent to which a society values hierarchical relationships and respect for authority. Low power distance indicates a preference for less hierarchy; high power distance indicates the opposite.
Perhaps particularly relevant to the issue of foreign militaries working with local militaries and civilian populations, research has also demonstrated that cultural differences have a range of effects on inter- (i.e. different) versus intra- (i.e. same) cultural teams. These include more cooperative behaviour with people of the same culture and more competitive responses when interacting with individuals from a different culture. Furthermore, these cultural differences were observed beyond differences in the individual personality traits among the participants.

Perhaps not surprisingly, given the sometimes complex nature of trust, the research reviewed suggested that the basis for the differences in cultural norms was also multidimensional, being at least associated with, if not actually determined by, macro-level institutional, economic, social and/or environmental factors. For instance, trust has been shown to be stronger in nations that have higher and more equal incomes, with more formalised institutions that restrain the predatory and arbitrary actions of organisations and governments and among populations that had better education and moderate levels of ethnic homogeneity (relative to populations with high or low ethnic homogeneity)...

In summary then, although developed from the perspective of organisational psychology, the conclusions of Ferrin and Gillespie have clear applicability to the issue of the role of intercultural trust in international military missions:

1. Do not ignore trust. It is crucial for … [task] success and individual well-being.
2. Ignore cultural differences at your peril. Understanding cultural norms, values, assumptions, and beliefs and how they are manifested in … behaviours and attitudes, is critical for … success and individual well-being...
3. Recognise that there are cultural variations in the enactment of trust. Appreciate what it takes to be perceived as trustworthy in one country may differ (however subtly) in another country. When in a foreign culture, adapting one’s own behaviour [where possible] to be in line with important local cultural norms typically helps engender trust.
Summary

1.59 This overview of the human domain is necessarily brief and we welcome further input. We believe, however, that the globe model (Figure 1.5) is an important tool for organising our understanding of the domain, as it implies that the actor’s internal and external environments are not simply connected but an intimate reflection of each other. The external is an expression of the internal, past and present; while the internal constantly absorbs and is influenced by the external.

1.60 The entry point for understanding of the human domain can, therefore, be either the actor or the actor’s environment, but true understanding is not possible without close study of both in relation to the other. For this, continued human-centred engagement is key. In every conflict, understanding the dynamics of the human domain — and especially what the actors care about — will help policy-makers and military planners reach better decisions.
Chapter 2 — Understanding conflict

‘Man is born unto trouble, as the sparks fly upward.’

Book of Job52

2.1 Conflict is everywhere in the human domain. It exists within individuals and between individuals, within groups and between groups, within and between organisations and communities, towns, cities and nations. It even exists between human beings and their physical environments.

2.2 Violence doesn’t exist everywhere — at least, direct violence as defined by Galtung. In fact, people can live their entire lives without ever encountering an act of direct violence, except perhaps on the news or in entertainment.

2.3 Conflict and violence are different. Understanding that difference is key to developing effective approaches to prevention. This chapter (and the next) explore conflict and violence, and the relationship between them.

The ABC triangle

2.4 Despite the fact that conflict can be found in many places and almost everyone has experienced it on some level, it is surprisingly difficult to define in a way that embraces all cases — from the inner conflict of an individual, through a minor dispute between two individuals, to nation-states threatening all-out war. Popular definitions tend to list synonyms for conflict such as:

- argument
- battle
- clash
- combat
- contest
- contradiction
- difference
- disagreement
- disharmony
- dispute
- fight
- opposition
- struggle
- war

2.5 While such definitions describe various features of conflict, the model proposed by Galtung seeks to reduce conflict to its basics. His ‘attitude — behaviour — contradiction’ (ABC) or ‘conflict triangle’ is now widely accepted and used. This can be seen below in Figure 2.1.

2.6 Galtung argues that all conflict arises from the interplay of three essential elements. These are the:

- contradiction — the issue or resource over which there is disagreement or what he calls ‘incompatibility’;

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52 Book of Job, 5:7.
Understanding conflict

- attitude of the conflict actors — their perceptions, emotions, judgments and desires — towards the contradiction and each other; and
- behaviour that arises from this.

For example, two or more actors strongly desiring (attitude) the same resource (contradiction) can provoke feelings of mutual hostility (attitude) that give rise to violent action (behaviour).

2.7 Attitude and behaviour can be both the cause and effect of conflict, and so tend to reinforce each other. For example, if one actor perceives (attitude) that another actor might desire (attitude) the same resource (contradiction), it could prompt them to have a hostile attitude and behaviour towards the second actor and so provoke hostility in return.

2.8 From this, it can be inferred that conflict needs more than simple difference, disagreement or incompatibility between the actors. After all, many people live peacefully alongside others with whom they have nothing in common or will never agree; indeed, often ‘opposites attract’ and couples can live peacefully together despite having incompatible religious or political views.

2.9 What we need to activate a conflict is the perception of threat to, or denial of, whatever is at the heart of the contradiction. If any of the actors fears that they will suffer loss or harm in some way, or will be denied something they care about, conflict is likely to be triggered.

2.10 Expressing this ABC dynamic in a single sentence, one can say that — Conflict arises when people perceive that something they care about is being threatened or denied. This can be depicted visually as shown below in Figure 2.2.

2.11 If the actor perceives no threat to, or denial of, the ‘something’ they care about, there is no conflict. Similarly, there is no conflict if the actor does not care about the ‘something’ being threatened or denied. Simply put — no threat or denial, or ‘don’t care’, means no conflict. On the other hand, the more that the actors care about the ‘something’ being denied, or the greater the perceived threat to it, the more intense the conflict will be. This is especially so if the core beliefs of one or more of the actors is involved.

2.12 Importantly, whether the perception of threat or denial is accurate or not is immaterial; neither is the merit of the ‘something’. What matters is how the actor sees things, what he or she cares about and how much. The same goes for all the other actors involved.

2.13 This analysis of conflict does hold for all cases. For example, two individuals in conflict invariably care about a ‘something’, which can often include the other actor’s attitude and behaviour. Sometimes, the manner in which the actors try to deal with the contradiction can be more problematic to each of them than the core issue in dispute. There is a strong need in individuals — regardless of age, gender, nationality or culture — for acceptance, acknowledgment (to be heard), appreciation, consideration, fairness, respect and understanding. If either actor perceives that one or more of these needs is being denied
by the other, the conflict tends to intensify or escalate, as this grievance becomes another ‘something’ added to the mix.

2.14 Nation-states threatening total war also clearly demonstrate the validity of the ABC triangle. The behaviour of one actor (diplomatic and/or military posturing, for example) might be perceived as threatening the ‘something’ the other actors care about. For one actor this might be a resource (for example, territory), for a second actor a value (such as; international law, democracy or human safety), and for a third actor it could be something as intangible, but nevertheless important for them as their status on the world stage. Attitude, behaviour and contradiction are locked in a tight knot for all of the actors, individually and in relationship to each other.

2.15 Even an individual with an inner conflict (a dilemma) adheres to the ABC triangle. In this case, in effect they simultaneously play the role of two or more actors, each of whom is a version of themselves choosing a different course of action. In each role they perceive the choice as posing a threat to, or denial of, something that they care about. For example, choice A might risk, or even guarantee, some form of loss or suffering, while choice B might deny something else they strongly desire. For every option that they face, all three points of the ABC triangle are active.

**Enemy or ‘conflict partner’?**

2.16 The usefulness of the ABC triangle lies in more than just analysis. It can be combined with other models and concepts to explore conflict from a variety of perspectives, which can suggest previously unseen solutions. For example, one can use the ABC triangle as the basis for developing two fundamental stances one can take towards conflict — duality and oneness — which tend to lead to different outcomes, one violent and the other less or nonviolent. Figure 2.3 illustrates it further.

2.17 The dualistic attitude sees conflict in binary terms — either-or, us or them, right and wrong and friend or foe. The underlying attitude towards ‘the other’ with whom one is in conflict is hostility. The behaviour that arises from this dualistic stance is to attack-defend-
counter-attack. This can be done physically, verbally, emotionally and psychologically (in any combination), directly or indirectly, and is based on the exercise of (often violent) power. Any action that strengthens ‘us’ and weakens ‘them’ is legitimate; ‘all is fair in love and war’, which can mean, ultimately, using violence.

2.18 The effect is that the substance of the conflict — the contradiction — becomes a win-or-lose, zero-sum struggle. Any gain for ‘us’ is seen as a loss for ‘them’ and vice versa. This can mean that neither side is willing to make any concessions, however minor, as they will be interpreted as victories for the other, both by ‘them’ and by our own supporters. This is especially the case if a core belief is at stake for any of the actors. As a consequence, if neither side has enough power to prevail — including violent power — the dualistic conflict often results in protracted stalemate.

2.19 The attitude of ‘oneness’ sees conflict in relational terms — it exists because of various causes and conditions that are, in essence, malleable. As those causes and conditions change — the attitudes of the actors towards each other, the context in which they operate, and so on — the conflict will alter to reflect that change. Therefore, the actors are connected by the conflict, which can be viewed as a shared problem that they could work to solve, separately, and in various combinations. To do this, though, they each have to overcome their hostility towards ‘the other’ through the conscious development of empathy — the ability to see the shared problem accurately from the other’s perspective, even while disagreeing with that perspective.

2.20 The behaviour that helps us to develop empathy is dialogue. This is not to be confused with debate or negotiation. Dialogue is a process of exploring ‘the other view’, based on non-judgmental listening and an openness to change through mutual influence.

2.21 The overall effect of this stance is to stimulate the creativity of the conflict actors towards the contradiction. Possible solutions are generated, evaluated, modified, accepted or rejected. The enemy (‘them’) becomes a partner in trying to solve the contradiction at the heart of the conflict. Some of the apparently most intractable conflicts have been transformed through applying this stance.

The conflict cycle

2.22 Galtung’s ABC triangle and the fundamental stances of duality and oneness can also help deepen understanding of ‘the conflict cycle’, a concept central to mainstream thinking on prevention. This describes the key stages through which a conflict escalates into a violent phase and then de-escalates out of it. A simple model that is used is presented in Figure 2.4, showing the transition in Northern Ireland as an example.

Figure 2.4 – The conflict cycle — escalation and de-escalation
2.23 Differences exist quite normally between actors but can become the basis of a contradiction (in Galtung’s terms) that, if unresolved, can harden to the point that the actors polarise and turn to violence, even total war. After a time, the actors might decide to stop fighting and call a ceasefire, which can lead to talks and an agreement. As the situation normalises, opportunities arise for the actors to explore the possibility of reconciliation. Essentially, the conflict cycle sees escalation (1 — 4) as an increasing constriction of negotiating space, reducing options and increasing the level of threat and then use of violence. De-escalation (6 — 9) is the process in reverse.

2.24 According to this model, preventive measures must be appropriate to the relevant point in the conflict cycle. Thus, at steps 1 — 3, the aim is to prevent the conflict turning violent through:

- (at 1) activities to deepen mutual understanding;
- (at 2) preventive diplomacy, both formal and informal; and
- (at 3) crisis management.

At steps 4 — 6, the aim is to prevent the violent conflict intensifying, becoming prolonged and spreading. The aim at steps 7 — 9 is to prevent the relapse into violence and war.

2.25 The goal, however, is to take action as early as possible — ‘upstream’ at difference and contradiction (1 — 2) — to avoid prevention being enacted predominantly in terms of crisis management/response. Similarly, if little or no action is taken towards normalisation and reconciliation (8 — 9), the chances will increase that the cycle will return to contradiction and polarisation (2 — 3), with the continuing danger of escalation once again into violence and war (4 — 5).

2.26 By applying the ABC triangle to the conflict cycle, we can see that during the process of escalation the attitudes and behaviour of the actors move steadily towards a dualistic stance — polarisation — while during de-escalation they move away from dualism and towards oneness. This is also true for conflicts that never manifest into physical violence. The violence at (4) might be verbal, emotional or psychological, for example, and the war at (5) could be the total, but physically nonviolent, breakdown of the relationship between the actors. A consideration of typically dualistic attitudes and behaviours can help to demonstrate this pattern.

## Dualistic attitudes and behaviour

2.27 During escalation (1 — 4) of a conflict (even between two individuals), these polarising attitudes (and variations of them) will tend to be increasingly expressed by the actors and their supporters.

- It’s us against them.
- Are you with us or against us, friend or foe, ally or enemy?
- It’s win or lose, all or nothing.
- It’s their fault, not ours.
- We’re right and they’re wrong.
- We’re good and they’re evil.
- God is with us. They are (supported by) the Devil.
- We’re the victims; they’re the perpetrators.
- We’re the heroes; they’re the villains.
- Our intentions are benign; theirs are malign.
- We are honest and tell the truth; they are devious and tell lies.
- We can do no wrong, they can do no right.
- Our cause is just, theirs is unjust.
- We act in defence; they act in aggression.
- Our violence is justified; their violence is despicable.
- There is no alternative.
- Talking doesn’t work.
2.28 Dualistic attitudes tend to stress supposedly fundamental differences between the actors (‘othering’); to express antagonism towards the opponent; allied with distrust, suspicion and fear; to frame the conflict in terms of ‘either/or’ simplicity; and to downplay nuance and complexity.

2.29 The dualistic behaviour towards ‘the other’ that accompanies these attitudes during escalation can include:

- attacking/defending/counter-attacking;
- trying to wound;
- seeking revenge for (perceived) wrongs;
- accusing/blaming/criticising;
- personalising the conflict — states become ‘people’ (‘China is angry that…’) and/or focusing on leaders (‘What is Putin up to?’);
- dehumanising/demonising them (‘These monsters…’);
- misrepresenting their position and views;
- falsely/partially reporting their actions, especially any that might seem positive;
- ridiculing/vilifying/disparaging/insulting the opponent or their collective group (race, ethnicity, nationality, gender etc.);
- seeking allies;
- rejecting neutral assistance;
- attacking via proxies/allies;
- raising the stakes;
- hitting back harder;
- seeking dramatic, decisive action (to cut the ‘Gordian knot’);
- manipulating behind the scenes;
- spying;
- secrecy;
- spreading false rumours;
- seeking (to) control;
- restricting contact with the opponent by self and others;
- making (unreasonable) demands;
- making threats;
- scaremongering;
- giving ultimatums;
- not listening/ignoring/refusing to respond;
- rejecting/excluding;
- seeking to divide;
- withdrawing contact;
- bearing a grudge/hating; and/or
- increasing direct violence.

2.30 As the conflict polarises, language tends to become increasingly aggressive, condemnatory and threatening, and the war of words can tip into physical violence. Thereafter, violent action takes centre stage and becomes the dominant issue in the contradiction — until the violence stops and, ideally, a peace agreement is reached. During the period of violence, verbal communication between the actors tends to become minimal and what little there is will usually be conducted through trusted third parties or the media (‘megaphone diplomacy’).

2.31 It is worth noting that these attitudes and behaviours tend to be displayed to a greater or lesser extent by all actors in all conflicts. They also make no reference to the contradiction that lies at the heart of the conflict, since dualistic attitudes and behaviour tend to ignore or obscure substantive issues and focus on the attitudes and behaviour of ‘the other’.

2.32 We should also note that escalation can form part of a conscious and thought-out strategy to deter one’s opponent from pursuing a particular course of action. The challenge lies in keeping the process under control, as the other actor (or actors) might be pursuing a different logic or driven by other factors — emotion, for example — in which case the escalation strategy can backfire.
Attitudes and behaviour of ‘oneness’

2.33 If escalation is not desired or de-escalation is sought, dualistic attitudes and behaviour have to be minimised or avoided altogether. A further step is to adopt attitudes and behaviour that emphasise the commonalities that connect the actors. The following list shows examples.

- It’s all of us against the negative effects of this shared problem. (‘It’s us against them.’)
- Can you, as a friend or neutral third party, help us solve this problem? (Are you with us or against us, friend or foe, ally or enemy?)
- Win-win is better than win-lose or, more likely, lose-lose. (It’s win or lose, all or nothing.)
- How did this problem arise? Did/do ‘we’ have a part in it? (It’s their fault, not ours.)
- Let’s try hard to understand everyone’s views. (We’re right and they’re wrong.)
- All of us are responsible for both positive and negative actions. (We’re good and they’re evil.)
- If there is a God, wouldn’t he want us to resolve our differences without violence? (God is with us. They are (supported by) the Devil.)
- We’ve all suffered — how can we end it? (We’re the victims; they’re the perpetrators.)
- The heroes will be the ones who can stop the violence and bring lasting peace. (We’re the heroes; they’re the villains.)
- What can we do to start rebuilding trust between us? (Our intentions are benign; theirs are malign.)
- What is your truth? This is ours. (We are honest and tell the truth; they are devious and tell lies.)
- How can we find a just settlement that meets everyone’s needs? (Our cause is just; theirs is unjust.)
- How do you feel threatened by our attitudes and behaviour? This is how we feel threatened by yours. (We can do no wrong; they can do no right.)
- We’re deeply sorry for the violence from all sides and pledge to pursue nonviolent means of settling our conflicts from now on. (We act in defence; they act in aggression. Our violence is justified; their violence is despicable.)
- Let us wrack our brains to find an alternative. (There is no alternative.)
- Let’s keep talking until we do... (Talking doesn’t work...)
- Let’s focus on the shared problem, not individuals. (Personalising the conflict.)
- Let’s always seek the humanity in ‘them’. (Dehumanising or demonising.)
- Let’s challenge ourselves to confront and transform any feelings of animosity and bitterness towards ‘them’. (Bearing a grudge/hating.)

2.34 By contrast to the dualistic stance, the focus of this approach tends to be on the contradiction — that is, the ‘something’ about which the actors care — using inclusive, forward-looking language. Complexity and nuance are uncovered and explored, which — paradoxically — tends to reveal unseen connections and relationships that can lead to unexpected solutions. Where the negativity of the actors — including ‘us’ — has to be confronted the emphasis is on trying to understand, rather than condemning or blaming. Overall, the aim is to start a process of trust-building and reconciliation so that negative attitudes and behaviour will not be repeated in the future.
2.35 Many actors in conflict find this approach challenging, if not impossible, especially if they have experienced suffering and violence. When emotions are raw, the last thing they want to think about is engaging with those they hold responsible. This is why genuinely neutral mediators can be vital in helping to de-escalate, then resolve or transform conflicts. It is also why the military, as conflict specialists, will find it useful to add emotional intelligence and mediation skills to their toolkit if they are to engage effectively upstream.

2.36 A variety of other models can be used in conjunction with the ABC triangle to add depth and nuance to understanding of different aspects of conflict. Examples of other models follow.

### Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Modes

2.37 One model that throws more light on the attitudes and behaviour of the actors in a conflict is the widely-used conflict style ‘inventory’ developed by Kenneth Thomas and Ralph Kilmann, academic experts in business management. They argue that actors in conflict tend to focus on their own needs and desires (assertiveness) or those of others (cooperativeness) — approaches that dovetail with the duality and oneness discussed above. This leads to five basic ‘conflict styles’ explained in the extract below taken from An Overview of the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument.

**Competing**
- Zero-sum orientation
- Win/lose power struggle

**Collaborating**
- Expand range of possible options
- Achieve win/win outcomes

**Compromising**
- Minimally acceptable to all
- Relationships undamaged

**Avoiding**
- Withdraw from the situation
- Maintain neutrality

**Accommodating**
- Accede to the other party
- Maintain harmony

**Assertiveness**
Focus on my needs, desired outcomes and agenda

**Cooperativeness**
Focus on others’ needs and mutual relationships

Thomas-Kilmann conflict modes

Competing is assertive and uncooperative — an individual pursues his own concerns at the other person’s expense. This is a power-oriented mode in which you use whatever power seems appropriate to win your own position — your ability to argue, your rank, or economic sanctions. Competing means ‘standing up for your rights’, defending a position which you believe is correct, or simply trying to win.

Accommodating is unassertive and cooperative — the complete opposite of competing. When accommodating, the individual neglects his own concerns to satisfy the concerns of the other person; there is an element of self-sacrifice in this mode. Accommodating might take the form of selfless generosity or charity, obeying another person’s order when you would prefer not to, or yielding to their point of view.

53 See ‘Preventing direct violence — mediation and alternative dispute resolution’, Chapter 4.
54 Kenneth Thomas is Professor Emeritus at the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey. Ralph Kilmann was formerly George H Love Professor of Organization and Management at the Katz School of Business, University of Pittsburgh.
Avoiding is unassertive and uncooperative — the person neither pursues his own concerns nor those of the other individual. Thus he does not deal with the conflict. Avoiding might take the form of diplomatically side-stepping an issue, postponing an issue until a better time, or simply withdrawing from a threatening situation.

Collaborating is both assertive and cooperative — the complete opposite of avoiding. Collaborating involves an attempt to work with others to find some solution that fully satisfies their concerns. It means digging into an issue to pinpoint the underlying needs and wants of the two individuals. Collaborating between two persons might take the form of exploring a disagreement to learn from each other’s insights or trying to find a creative solution to an interpersonal problem.

Compromising is moderate in both assertiveness and cooperativeness. The objective is to find some expedient, mutually acceptable solution that partially satisfies both actors. It falls intermediate between competing and accommodating. Compromising gives up more than competing but less than accommodating. Likewise, it addresses an issue more directly than avoiding, but does not explore it in as much depth as collaborating. In some situations, compromising might mean splitting the difference between the two positions, exchanging concessions, or seeking a quick middle-ground solution.

2.38 Thomas and Kilmann stress that none of these approaches is inherently superior and that the challenge lies in choosing whichever combination is best for each situation. However, many people tend to be more comfortable with only one or two approaches and can overuse them, often inappropriately.

**Conflict resolution and conflict transformation**

2.39 Whereas the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Modes tend to focus on the attitudes and behaviours of Galtung’s triangle, Lederach focuses more on the challenges of resolving the contradiction. Lederach draws a distinction between conflict resolution, which is limited and specific in time and scale, and conflict transformation, which is more relationship-orientated and ongoing. Lederach states that:

There are many conflicts or disputes where a simple resolution approach such as problem-solving or negotiation makes the most sense. Disputes that involve the need for a quick and final solution to a problem, where the disputants have little or no relationship before, during, or after, are clearly situations in which the exploration of relational and structural patterns are of limited value. For example, a one-time business dispute over a payment between two people who hardly know each other and will never have contact again is not a setting for exploring a transformational application. At best, if it were applied, the primary focus might be on the patterns of why these people as individuals have this episode, and whether the episode repeats itself time and again with other people.

On the other hand, where there are significant past relationships and history, where there are likely to be significant future relationships, where the episodes arise in an organisational, community or broader social context — here the narrowness of resolution approaches may solve problems but miss the greater potential for constructive change. This is especially important in contexts where there are repeated and deep-rooted cycles of conflict episodes that have created destructive and violent patterns. From the perspective of conflict transformation, these are always situations where the potential for change can be raised.

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In the latter case, it could be said the attitudes, behaviour and contradiction that produce the conflict have been so interwoven, over such a long time, that steady effort is necessary for a prolonged period at all three points of the ABC triangle to bring about lasting and positive change.

Lederach summarises the main characteristics of the two approaches in Table 2.1.57

Note (at bottom-right) that the conflict transformation perspective embraces the possibility of conflict escalation as a route to constructive change. This might seem counter-intuitive, until we consider how a frozen or unacknowledged conflict might have to be escalated into view before the unmet needs sustaining it are addressed. The struggle for human rights in many parts of the world, especially by minority groups, comes to mind.

Relating these ideas to Galtung’s definition of violence, one could say that conflict resolution tends to be applicable to the immediate challenge of direct violence. Conflict transformation, however, is more relevant to the sustained efforts needed to reform structural and cultural violence, which are more deeply embedded. We will explore this further in the following Chapter.

### Healing and reconciliation

A third model that can be used alongside the ABC triangle, and which resonates strongly with Lederach’s ideas on conflict transformation, is the Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience (STAR) model for trauma healing and reconciliation. Building on the experience of psychological therapies developed in the wake of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, practitioners at the Eastern Mennonite University devised the STAR programme to address the challenge of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The key question</th>
<th>Conflict resolution perspective</th>
<th>Conflict transformation perspective</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How do we end something not desired?</td>
<td>How to end something destructive and build something desired?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The focus</td>
<td>It is content-focused</td>
<td>It is relationship-focused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The purpose</td>
<td>To achieve an agreement and solution to the present problems creating the crisis</td>
<td>To promote constructive change processes, inclusive of — but not limited to — immediate solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The development of the process</td>
<td>It is embedded and built around the immediacy of the relationship where the present problems appear</td>
<td>It is concerned with responding to symptoms and engaging the systems within which relationships are embedded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time frame</td>
<td>The horizon is short-term</td>
<td>The horizon is mid-to-long-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of conflict</td>
<td>It sees the need to de-escalate conflict processes</td>
<td>It sees conflict as a dynamic of ebb (conflict de-escalation to pursue constructive change) and flow (conflict escalation to pursue constructive change)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 — Conflict resolution and transformation: a brief comparison of perspective

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breaking the dynamics that drive the cycle of violent conflict. This point in the conflict cycle — 8 (normalisation) and 9 (reconciliation) — is often misleadingly called ‘post-conflict’, but for many (if not most) people the conflict might be continuing in another form and could escalate again into a violent phase if the underlying causes are not resolved or transformed. ‘Upstream’ engagement, therefore, might also be ‘downstream’ of a violent conflict whose effects are still being felt.

2.44 Psychologists working in this field see the desire for revenge or justice-through-violence as stemming from a sense of victimhood and humiliation following an act of aggression. When there is little or no self-reflection on either an individual or group level, and when grief and fears are not expressed and worked through but suppressed, thought and action tends to focus on punishing the perpetrator/enemy (or even simply ‘the other’, who can become the scapegoat/proxy for anger). At the same time, those who have suffered the trauma can cast themselves, perhaps unconsciously, as perpetual victims.

2.45 In Galtung’s terms, at this point in the conflict cycle the ‘something’ cared about, the contradiction (C), is the present suffering caused by the past trauma, and those whom the victims blame for causing it. The attitudes (A) include the desire for revenge/justice-through-violence, the sense of victimhood and feelings of humiliation. The behaviour (B) is whatever actions both sustain these attitudes and actually punish the perceived enemy.

2.46 The STAR Team’s ‘snail model’, shown below in Figure 2.5, is a three-step process of:
- seeing and beginning to break free from the habitual cycles of victim and aggressor;
- confronting and coming to terms with the past (acknowledgement); and
- while integrating a transformed view of the past, consciously choosing to shape a new reality (reconnection).

Figure 2.5 — The ‘snail’ model for trauma healing and reconciliation

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58 http://www.emu.edu/cjp/star/toolkit/
2.47 Work which attempts to understand both our own role in the traumatic event and its place in a wider context can lead to reconciliation and healing. Justice is not abandoned but is more restorative than punitive — for example, punishment is generally sought only for leaders. At other levels of society, mutual recognition of hurt and responsibility, and even forgiveness, might be stressed. The ultimate aim is both to relieve suffering in the present and to ensure that it does not become the cause for future violence.

Summary

2.48 The ABC triangle can be a helpful model for analysing conflict and suggesting possible solutions, both as a stand-alone tool and in conjunction with other models, such as Lederach’s. It shows that conflict does not come out of nowhere but always arises as the result of particular causes and conditions, specifically the attitudes and behaviour of the actors involved, centred on something that they care about. If those causes and conditions change, so will the conflict. If they change sufficiently for the better, the conflict will dissolve. This implies that no conflict, however apparently intractable, is fated to last forever; and, in fact, no conflict has.

2.49 It is important to note that some conflicts can be chronic. They can go through active and frozen phases (sometimes over many decades) if the underlying contradiction is not resolved but regarded by different actors as more or less serious at different times. However, things become more difficult when violence is manifested. This is the subject of the next chapter.

59 It is important, however, not to become too schematic. A human-centred approach to conflict means dealing always with the human beings in front of one, and trying to build a relationship of trust with them.
Chapter 3 — Understanding violence

‘Rambo isn’t violent. I see Rambo as a philanthropist.’  
Sylvester Stallone

3.1 What is violence? The answer might seem straightforward — until we encounter a quotation such as the one above. In fact, there is a wide range of views and definitions of violence and some examples are listed below.

a. [Violence is] the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation. (World Health Organisation)

b. All violence consists in some people forcing others, under threat of suffering or death, to do what they do not want to do. (Leo Tolstoy, 1828-1910)

c. The state calls its own violence ‘law’, but that of the individual ‘crime’. (Max Stirner, 1806-56)

d. Violence is not only impractical but immoral. (Martin Luther King, 1929-68)

e. Violence, naked force, has settled more issues in history than has any other factor. (Robert Heinlein, 1907-88)

f. Violence, even well intentioned, always rebounds upon oneself. (Lao Tzu, 5th century BC)

g. People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf. (George Orwell, 1903-50)

h. Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent. (Isaac Asimov, 1920-92)


j. All violence is the result of people tricking themselves into believing that their pain derives from other people and that consequently those people deserve to be punished. (Marshall Rosenberg, 1934-2015)

k. If German boys had learned to be contemptuous of violence, Hitler would have had to take up knitting to keep his ego warm. (JD Salinger, 1919-2010)

l. Violence is both unavoidable and unjustifiable. (Albert Camus, 1913-60)

m. Poverty is the worst form of violence. (Mahatma Gandhi, 1869-1948)

Such a spectrum might raise the question of whether these quotations even refer to the same phenomenon. Looking at these it would seem very difficult to agree on a comprehensive definition.
The DSC triangle

3.2 In his ‘violence’ or ‘DSC’ triangle, Johan Galtung describes three types of violence — direct, structural and cultural — all of which cause harm. Figure 3.1 shows that, like an iceberg, direct violence is the part that is visible, while the much larger structural and cultural violence that supports it is less visible, ‘hidden’ below the surface.

![Figure 3.1 — The ‘iceberg’ of violence](image)

3.3 Direct violence is the commonly understood definition of violence, as expressed by the World Health Organisation (paragraph 3.1, a) — behaviour intended to hurt, damage or kill someone or something. Direct violence might be perpetrated physically, through words, and through emotional or psychological pressure. This understanding of violence can be seen in most of the definitions above in paragraph 3.1.

3.4 Structural violence refers to the inequality, exploitation and oppression of people that is formally or informally embedded within societies in their structures and systems — racism, sexism and class discrimination, for example. For Galtung, poverty is also a form of structural violence, as are the policies and systems that perpetuate it, including corruption. Gandhi also makes this point (paragraph 3.1, m). Some commentators consider military forces to be forms of structural violence, especially where they support unjust, exploitative or oppressive policies and systems.

3.5 Cultural violence describes those aspects of society that seek to legitimise, justify or normalise structural and direct violence through reference to religion and ideology, art and language, and empirical and formal science. Some examples include culture that depicts men as inherently superior to women, certain races as inferior to others, or certain religions, ethnic groups or nationalities as a ‘historic’ threat or enemy. Stirner’s observation (paragraph 3.1, c) can be interpreted as the language of the state disguising the true nature of its (violent) power. Salinger’s comment (paragraph 3.1, k) points to the role of culture in shaping attitudes towards violence and war.

3.6 Galtung’s conflict (ABC — introduced in Chapter 2) and violence (DSC) triangles are related — the attitudes expressed in cultural violence drive or justify the behaviour of direct violence, both of which arise from and are directed towards the contradictions of structural violence. Figure 3.2 illustrates the relationship.

![Figure 3.2 — ABC and DSC triangles](image)

3.7 Related to this, Galtung also describes the concept of negative and positive peace. Negative peace exists when there is the absence of direct violence. Positive peace is the condition, founded on equality and mutual respect, which seeks to manifest the full potential of all individuals and where structural and cultural violence have been removed.
3.8 For Galtung, it is vital to address all three aspects of the violence triangle to achieve a real and enduring peace. In any violent conflict, force (direct violence or its threat) can be applied to prevent or bring about the end of direct violence — negative peace — but if the structural and cultural violence have not been transformed the direct violence is likely to recur when the ‘stabilising’ force is removed; the three aspects are intimately linked. As Galtung notes:

“Violence can start at any corner in the direct-structural-cultural violence triangle and is easily transmitted to the other corners. With the violent structure institutionalized and the violent culture internalized, direct violence also tends to become institutionalized, repetitive, ritualistic, like a vendetta.”

The central aspects of Galtung’s analysis are now generally accepted in the UN and beyond, though by no means universally, and provide a useful model for examining direct, structural and cultural violence in more depth.

Direct violence

3.9 The nature of the direct violence enacted by human beings has been debated for centuries. Currently, that debate tends to be framed in psychological terms, and human aggression and violence are explained according to the various schools described earlier. Thus:

- from the psychodynamic perspective, aggression and violence are driven by unconscious impulses that result from repressed or distorted experience;
- from the behavioural perspective they are not innate but learned;
- from the cognitive perspective they are the solution to a problem;
- from the biological perspective they are innate and instinctual (human nature);
- from the cross-cultural perspective they are manifested in line with societal norms;
- from the evolutionary perspective they are strategies to ensure survival of the fittest;
- and from the humanistic perspective they are (conscious or unconscious) strategies adopted to meet or defend various needs.

3.10 If a consensus on the nature of human aggression and violence is emerging, it is around the view summarised by the Harvard psychologist Professor Steven Pinker. ‘Human nature is complex,’ he says. ‘Even if we do have inclinations toward violence, we also have inclination to empathy, to cooperation, to self-control.’ Pinker argues in his controversial study of the historical decline in human violence, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*, that inherent tendencies in human beings towards aggression and violence are encouraged or discouraged by external factors. Galtung makes essentially the same point in many of his writings. For example:

“Some nations and some epochs are much more belligerent than others. If, like the drives for food and sex, belligerence were instinctive, we should expect it to be much more uniformly distributed in time and space. With some minor variations, human beings everywhere and in all times eat and drink and engage in sexual activity. The same universality does not apply to war.”

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62 For an analysis of a recent violent conflict using the Galtung models see Annex B: The Sons of Iraq.
3.11 Recent statistics would seem to support these views, although they are strongly contested in some quarters. Figure 3.3 above illustrates these statistics.

3.12 It has been argued, for example, that one reason for the decline in battle deaths is improvements in the evacuation and medical treatment of wounded personnel. It is also argued that if the two massive ‘spikes’ of battle deaths in the last century (the First and Second World Wars) were discounted as historical anomalies, the overall downward trend would be much less marked. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the trend might not start rising again at some point in the future.

3.13 Pinker’s response is that criticism of his argument about the decline in violence is misplaced.

“I am sometimes asked, How do you know there won’t be a war tomorrow (or a genocide, or an act of terrorism) that will refute your whole thesis? The question misses the point of this book. The point is not that we have entered an Age of Aquarius in which every last earthling has been pacified forever. It is that substantial reductions in violence have taken place, and it is important to understand them. Declines in violence are caused by political, economic and ideological conditions that take hold in particular cultures at particular times. If the conditions reverse, violence could go right back up.”

3.14 Pinker’s conclusion appears to be confirmed by a recent report into urban violence published by the International Committee of the Red Cross. It observes that ‘in contrast to a decline in the number of people who die each year as a result of armed conflict, nine times as many people died in 2012 as a result of non-conflict violence — 450,000 versus 50,000. In various cities across the world, a lethal cocktail of organised crime, gang and drug-related violence, as well as potential ethnic and sectarian violence, have resulted in a situation of chronic non-conflict armed violence.’

66 Pinker, op. cit.
A public health approach to violence

3.15 The basic understanding that a combination of external conditions encourage or discourage the individual's innate capacity for violence is supported by the World Health Organisation. It explains in its World Report on Violence and Health (2002):

“Violence can be prevented and its impact reduced, in the same way that public health efforts have prevented and reduced pregnancy-related complications, workplace injuries, infectious diseases, and illness resulting from contaminated food and water in many parts of the world. The factors that contribute to violent responses — whether they are factors of attitude and behaviour or related to larger social, economic, political and cultural conditions — can be changed.

Violence can be prevented. This is not an article of faith, but a statement based on evidence. Examples of success can be found around the world, from small-scale individual and community efforts to national policy and legislative initiatives.”

3.16 International treaties, forums and networks for dispute resolution are examples of violence prevention initiatives at the global level. FOMICRES, a community-based organisation in Mozambique, is an example of a nationwide violence prevention initiative; while the Community Initiative to Reduce Violence is a city level project that has been running since 2008 in Glasgow.

FOMICRES – Mozambique

FOMICRES build secure and engaged communities through activities that prevent crime and violence, and promote community economic and social development.

Following the end of the 1977-92 civil war (in which an estimated one million people died and millions more were internally displaced or fled the country) an expensive UN-led programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration collected about 155,000 of the more than six million weapons in circulation in the country, but ended in 1994.

In early 1995, fourteen young people (some of whom had been child soldiers or regulars in the army), decided to tackle this threat to public security and the fragile peace. Using an innovative bartering system — exchanging weapons not for money but for the goods needed to start small businesses — the organisation they founded (Community Intelligence Force – FIC) had managed to collect or destroy more than 800,000 pieces of ordnance by 2005. Some of the weapons were transformed into pieces of art, which are now world-famous.

In May 2005, FIC transformed into FOMICRES, a Portuguese acronym for ‘Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social Reintegration’. This reflects the organisation’s expanded vision to address the wider human security needs of the people of Mozambique and the fact that, as in many post-conflict countries, the deep social disruption of the war has left a legacy of increased (and often violent) crime.

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70 In January 2014, for example, the 33 countries of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) declared Latin America and the Caribbean to be a ‘Zone of Peace based on respect for the principles and rules of International Law’ and stated a ‘permanent commitment to solve disputes through peaceful means with the aim of uprooting forever threat or use of force in our region’.
3.17 The World Health Organisation distinguishes four modes in which violence may be inflicted:
• physical;
• sexual;
• psychological attack; and
• deprivation.
It further divides the general definition of violence into three sub-types, according to the victim-perpetrator relationship.
• Self-directed violence refers to violence in which the perpetrator and the victim are the same individual and is subdivided into self-abuse and suicide.
• Interpersonal violence refers to violence between individuals, and is subdivided into family and intimate partner violence and community violence. The former category includes: child maltreatment; intimate partner violence; and elder abuse. The latter is broken down into acquaintance and stranger violence and includes youth violence; assault by strangers; violence related to property crimes; and violence in workplaces and other institutions.

3.18 The violence prevention strategy proposed by the World Health Organisation is based on a four-step public health approach.
1. To define the problem through the systematic collection of information about the magnitude, scope, characteristics and consequences of violence.

2. To establish why violence occurs using research to determine the causes and correlates of violence, the factors that increase or decrease the risk for violence, and the factors that could be modified through interventions.

3. To find out what works to prevent violence by designing, implementing and evaluating interventions.

4. To implement effective and promising interventions in a wide range of settings. The effects of these interventions on risk factors and the target outcome should be monitored, and their impact and cost-effectiveness should be evaluated.

By definition, public health aims to provide the maximum benefit for the largest number of people. Programmes for the primary prevention of violence based on the public health approach are designed to expose a broad segment of a population to prevention measures and to reduce and prevent violence at a population-level.72

3.19 The Global Status Report on Violence Prevention,73 which focused on interpersonal violence, describes the extent to which countries have been implementing the recommendations of the 2002 World Report. The factors strongly associated with interpersonal violence have been identified and ‘many countries have begun to implement prevention programmes and victim services, and to develop the national action plans, policies and laws required to support violence prevention and response efforts… Yet, this survey shows that serious gaps remain and that much work is still required to realize the full potential of the growing violence prevention field’.  

3.20 One key element to take from the Global Status Report on Violence Prevention report — if the analysis of Pinker, the World Health Organisation and others is correct — is that violence arises from a combination of internal and external causes and conditions. Change one more of those causes and conditions and direct violence will be ended, lessened or prevented. Conflict is one such cause and condition. Early (upstream) engagement to manage, resolve or transform conflict can lead to a reduction in direct violence at all levels.

3.21 Structural violence refers to inequalities, discrimination and abuses built into the fabric of a society and/or state, which fail to meet the basic human needs and rights of people. Those at the receiving end of structural violence are usually a distinct group or class and are often a minority — but they can be a majority. Members of the minority Sunni sect dominated Iraqi public life under Saddam Hussein, for example, while members of the Shia majority sect were largely excluded. When Saddam was ousted in 2003, the positions were reversed.74

3.22 The example of Iraq demonstrates that structural and direct violence are closely related. Direct violence is often used to enforce structural violence, while structural violence can provoke direct violence. As John F Kennedy noted, ‘Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable’.

3.23 The World Bank’s World Development Report 2011 (WDR 2011) — Conflict, Security & Development — is the most ambitious study to date of the complex relationship between structural violence (in the form of poverty and

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74 See Annex B: The Sons of Iraq.
what it calls ‘weak state governance’) and the repeated cycles of direct violence that continue to blight the lives of some 1.5 billion people throughout the world. The central message of WDR 2011 is that to break these cycles of violence it is crucial to strengthen legitimate institutions and governance in order to provide citizen security, justice and jobs.

3.24 The WDR 2011 marshals a wealth of data that to support this message. Some examples are below.

- No low-income fragile or conflict-affected country has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal.75
- Countries with weak government effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption have a 30-45% higher risk of civil war, and significantly higher risk of extreme criminal violence, than other developing countries.
- Countries lose an estimated 0.7% of their annual GDP for each neighbour involved in civil war.
- In surveys conducted in six countries and territories affected by violence, the main reasons cited for why young people become rebels or gang members are very similar — unemployment predominates for both, as can be seen in Figure 3.4. (This is not necessarily the case for militant ideological recruitment.)

3.25 Since structural violence tends to be deeply embedded, transforming it is not a quick or simple process. As the WDR 2011 notes, ‘it took the 20 fastest reforming countries in the 20th century between 15 and 30 years — a generation — to raise their institutional performance from ‘very fragile’ to more resilient levels. Specifically, it took 17 years on average to reduce military interference in politics and 27 years to establish rules-based controls against corruption’.

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75 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), set by the UN in 2000, were eight development targets to be reached by 2015: (1) To halve the number of undernourished people; (2) To achieve universal primary education; (3) To promote gender equality and empower women; (4) To reduce child mortality; (5) To improve maternal health; (6) To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) To help children and make sure that they go to school; (8) To develop a global partnership for development.

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Figure 3.4 — Unemployment and rebel/gang participation
3.26 When one form of structural violence is overturned, or when the direct violence of an armed conflict ends, problems often remain. According to the WDR 2011:76

“Homicides have increased in every country in Central America since 1999, including those that had made great progress in addressing political conflict — and this is not unique; countries such as South Africa face similar second generation challenges. In Guatemala, for example, criminal violence today kills more people every year than the civil war in the 1980s did. In fact, intentional homicides are nearly double the average battle deaths directly from the civil war in the 1980s.”

This is one reason why the WDR 2011 states that ‘Few countries are truly ‘post-conflict’. The rate of violence onset in countries with a previous conflict has been increasing since the 1960s: 90% of civil wars in the 21st century occurred in countries that already had a civil war in the previous 30 years; every civil war since 2003 was in a country with previous civil war.’

3.27 There are two main reasons why the use of direct violence alone to ‘solve’ the problem of structural violence in a society tends to produce only a short-term fix, or even to be counter-productive. First, it legitimises direct violence as a way of ‘resolving conflict’; and second, it often puts into circulation a large number of weapons.

3.28 Current thinking, as expressed in the WDR 2011 (and reflecting Galtung’s DSC triangle), is that to bring about sustained peace and development in any society, all aspects of direct, structural and cultural violence must be addressed in a comprehensive and inclusive strategy.77

Cultural violence

3.29 Cultural violence can be the most difficult element of the DSC triangle to identify since, according to Galtung’s definition, it makes direct and structural violence seem normal and legitimate. For example, marriage between same-sex couples is currently legal in fourteen countries in the world. In most countries, however, same-sex couples are denied the same legal rights as heterosexual couples, if not actively discriminated against or even persecuted. In many countries, violence by others against individuals in same-sex relationships is tolerated.

3.30 The different treatment of same-sex couples has been — and in most countries still is — legitimised by cultural violence in the form of biological arguments (‘It’s not natural’), religious edicts (‘God says…’) and social norms (‘No son of mine is going to be a…’). In a number of countries, the discrimination expressed in these mainstream attitudes is supported by legal sanction. In 78 countries, same-sex relationships are illegal and in five of them, they are punishable by death.

3.31 Until very recently, though, even in countries where same-sex marriage is now legal the very idea would have seemed to many people outrageous, bizarre or comic. Such is the power of cultural violence. When it is seamlessly blended with the systems and institutions (official and unofficial) of society and the state (namely, structural violence) that power is magnified, not least because individuals often internalise the norms expressed by cultural violence. As the anthropologist Maurice Godelier observes:

77 Specific proposals from the comprehensive strategy suggested in the WDR 2011 can be found in Annex C.
The strongest and most effective force in guaranteeing the long-term maintenance of power is not violence in all the forms deployed by the dominant to control the dominated, but consent in all the forms in which the dominated acquiesce in their own domination.  

3.32 According to Galtung, cultural violence is often seen in how and what a society chooses to teach of its past and what it chooses to leave out. Creating an accurate narrative of one’s history, warts and all, is a sign of maturity and confidence but is undoubtedly challenging, since the acknowledgment of past errors – or worse – is often uncomfortable. Failure to do so, however, can play a major role in exacerbating and perpetuating conflict. As Samuel P Huntington notes, for example:

The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.  

3.33 Uncovering and attempting to transform cultural violence is often a source of conflict in itself, especially if it is perceived as a threat to one’s core beliefs. For example, those who prize the family above all, or certain religious teachings, can feel profoundly threatened by same-sex marriage; similarly, challenging the foundation story of one’s nation-state, often a mix of fact and myth, can cause deep upset to those who have this as their core belief. Such reactions are understandable since what is being challenged is often viewed as not only normal but, if it is a core belief, the very basis of individual or group identity.

3.34 As a result, transforming the mutually supportive relationship of cultural and structural violence usually meets strong resistance; the process of change can, therefore, take a long time. For example, the first same-sex wedding in the USA was performed (but not legally recognised) in 1969; 54 years later, in June 2013, the US Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional for the US federal government to deny federal benefits of marriage to married same-sex couples, if it is recognised or performed in a state that allows same-sex marriage. Currently, 20 US states still do not allow it. It is important to bear this point in mind when considering upstream preventive engagement in states and societies that follow different social norms.

Violence and the state

3.35 One of the central features of any state is its claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence. In return for keeping its citizens safe from external and internal attack, the state demands obedience to the laws of the state and punishes citizens if they transgress.

3.36 The ‘modern’ nation-state that embodies this principle — complete with flag, anthem and a seat at the United Nations (UN) — has its origins in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. This established the notion of the sovereign state that today is defined in international law as having a:

- permanent population;
- defined territory;
- government; and
- capacity to enter into relations with other States.

3.37 The Peace of Westphalia also established the prohibition against the interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state by other states. This has,

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80 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933, Article 1.
however, been challenged in recent years by, amongst other things, the development of the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).\footnote{See Annex D: The Responsibility to Protect.}

3.38 Since 1945 crises and conflicts between states have been addressed through an international system that is based on the centrality of this concept of the state, set and codified through global and regional intergovernmental organisations (for example, UN, World Trade Organisation, European Union, African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)). With the end of the Cold War, however, these organisational constructs have struggled to adapt to the complexity of violence and instability within states. This is particularly true where a state has been unwilling or unable to manage internal conflict and violence, or is actually one of its main drivers (hence developing Responsibility to Protect). Sudden shocks — such as rapid fuel or food price increases, an economic collapse, a disputed election result, a natural disaster or a religious or ethnically motivated attack — can all trigger violence within states. Longer term external pressures, such as the spillover from a conflict in a neighbouring country, transnational terrorism and tensions over resources or regional dominance can also trigger violence. These may also lead to conflict between states. ‘Fragile’ and ‘failed’ states\footnote{Fragility and fragile situations: Periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to violence. WDR 2011.} also tend to produce protracted and often violent internal conflicts, and vice versa.

**The importance of a political settlement**

3.39 The structures of a state are commonly determined and legitimised by a stable political settlement. This will usually be forged by a common understanding, principally among elites, that a society’s interests and beliefs are best served by a particular way of organising political power, especially with regard to security, governance, and how the economy and basic infrastructure are run. The elite in any society are those who have the most control over its material, cultural and spiritual resources, through which they exercise power and influence. Elites, therefore, comprise political, business, religious, military and intellectual leaders, and in democratic societies can include civil society leaders such as trade unionists and heads of various pressure groups and lobbies.

3.40 The common understanding the elite must forge to sustain a political settlement is based on a shared religion or basic philosophy, and supported by a variety of formal and informal institutional structures and practices. Together, these normally prevent disputes escalating to violence and, ideally, facilitate non-violent positive change. For example, elections determine the outcome of political argument, courts settle legal disputes and social norms restrain disagreements between neighbours. These elements of a stable state are shown in Figure 3.5.
Conversely, significant political disputes can be an indication that the basic political settlement of a society is fractured, incomplete or vulnerable. If this is the case, the formal and informal structures and practices of the state will increasingly be perceived as illegitimate or inherently dysfunctional, rendering the state itself weak or ‘fragile’ as shown in Figure 3.6.

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**Figure 3.5 — Elements of a stable state**

**Figure 3.6 — The political settlement fragments**

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83 Taken from UK Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*

84 Ibid.
Conflict resolution through violence

3.42 Within these environments, violence — both organised and systematic, or individual and chaotic — can become the primary mechanism to resolve disputes. For example, rival factions tend to form militias rather than political parties. This undermines already fragile state and societal institutions and damages the relationships on which peace and stability depend. In fragile states, individuals tend to transfer their loyalty to any group that promises safety and protection, including irregular actors, especially those of the same ethnicity, nationality or religion.

3.43 Violent conflicts that arise from the breakdown of the political settlement that underpins and gives stability to the state can ultimately be resolved in two ways, through:

- greater direct violence — the annihilation, expulsion or subjugation of opposing actors; or
- negotiating a new political settlement, which might also be accompanied by longer term structural and cultural changes.

Actors in protracted intrastate conflicts can alternate between these two modes, often over many years.

‘Ungoverned spaces’

3.44 Fragile states can also incubate so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’ — zones outside the control of state forces, often seen as safe havens for terrorist and criminal activity. However, many aspects of the ungoverned spaces notion are contested, including the term itself. As the final report of the Pentagon’s Ungoverned Areas Project notes:

> Few places in the world are truly ‘ungoverned’; where formal governance breaks down, localized or informal governance structures tend to emerge. Therefore, the concept of ungoverned areas ... (is) not about threats that emerge from the absence of governance, but about certain potential threats that emerge from the way a place is governed. For example, weakly governed societies have governance gaps (by definition), which can give freedom of action to illicit actors; but some highly governed societies have legal protections that give freedom of action to everybody (including illicit actors), while other highly governed societies provide freedom of action to certain illicit actors as a matter of policy. In short, the degree of governance matters, but the particular way a place is governed matters more.  


3.45 At present, policy-makers largely tend to view the ungoverned spaces of fragile states in security terms. This can fail to address the structural and cultural factors that have created the ungoverned space and so prolong chronic direct violence.

> Strategies focusing on military victory, law enforcement, and intelligence capacity, at the expense of the soft-power tools that win over or placate sceptical populations, often tend to exacerbate existing grievances or generate new ones that some illicit actors can exploit to facilitate their own freedom of action and impede efforts at intelligence collection.  

86 Ibid.

The need for legitimacy

3.46 While there is a growing appreciation that stable governance is essential for the nonviolent management of conflicts within society, efforts by non-locals to establish what might be perceived locally as ‘alien’
forms and structures of governance can in themselves provoke conflict and direct violence. The WDR 2011 notes that ‘legitimacy is acquired by building trust and confidence among various parties’ and identifies two key elements as underpinning acceptance of institutional structures.

- **Political legitimacy (accountability)** and inclusion, or using credible political processes to make decisions that reflect shared values and preferences, provide the voice for all citizens equally and account for these decisions. This includes providing information to citizens and mechanisms for legal recourse to resolve disputes and complaints, including complaints against the state. This can also be considered to include international legitimacy: the state’s exercise of responsible sovereignty as laid out under international law.

- **Performance legitimacy (capacity)**, earned by the effective discharge by the state of its agreed duties — particularly providing security, economic oversight and services, and justice.

3.47 The forms and structures that build trust and confidence among local actors, while earning both political and performance legitimacy, tend to be ones that go with the grain of local practices and culture. This is why locally-led and designed conflict management processes, albeit with external support, are more likely to succeed than those simply imposed from outside (and ‘above’).  

### National and human security

3.48 Another important consideration when establishing state legitimacy is the need to address both national and human security. Historically, security has been understood as national security, which concerns itself with territorial integrity and protecting the institutions and interests of the state from both internal and external threats. According to *UK Defence Doctrine*:

> External threats may lead to invasion, attack or blockade. Internal threats may include terrorism, subversion, civil disorder, criminality, insurgency, sabotage and espionage. Other threats include instability caused by financial crisis, climatic events, cyber or other forms of attack on critical national infrastructure and the possibility of pandemic disease. We cannot maintain our own security in isolation.

3.49 Increasingly, the understanding of security has been broadened to include the notion of human security, which emphasises protecting individuals in their daily lives. Human security encompasses freedom from fear of persecution, intimidation, reprisals, terrorism and other forms of systematic violence; as well as freedom from want of immediate basic needs such as food, water, sanitation and shelter. In its ultimate form, it embraces the notion of human development and protecting cultural values; that is, individuals being able to manifest their full potential through equal access to education, economic opportunity, health care and equal enjoyment of political and human rights. The distinction between national and human security might, therefore, be said to echo Galtung’s concept of negative and positive peace. *UK Defence Doctrine* identifies human security as being potentially threatened by:

- political/ideological tensions;
- environmental events;
- racial, ethnic or religious tensions;

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87 See Chapter 4 — ‘Local first’.  
89 www.gov.uk/mod/dcdc
• poverty, inequality, criminality and injustice;
• competition for, and/or access to, natural resources; and
• corrupt and inept governance.  

3.50 Clearly, national and human security overlap. For example, the presence and activities of violent groups both challenges the stability of the state and undermines the safety and security of its people. A stable state must protect the most basic survival needs of both itself and its people. This includes providing human security for the population, in addition to controlling territory, borders, key assets and sources of revenue. Establishing stable and legitimate state structures can be a long and complex process.

Nonviolence

3.51 Fundamental to many of the ideas being explored and developed in the field of peace and conflict studies is a belief in the need for nonviolence, whenever and as far as possible, at all three points of the DSC triangle. This includes the concept of using nonviolent action as a strategic approach to conflict. The best known examples of this are the nonviolent campaigns waged by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King for, respectively, the freedom of India from British control (1920-47) and equal rights for African-Americans in the USA (1955-68).

3.52 Drawing on these and other examples, Professor Gene Sharp has written extensively on the theory and practice of nonviolent political struggle. Dubbed the ‘Machiavelli of nonviolence’ and the ‘Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare’, Sharp has produced a series of texts that are said to have influenced a number of nonviolent campaigns, including in the former Soviet bloc, Serbia, Georgia, the Ukraine and Egypt. A selection of extracts from a recent book, Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential, is offered below.

Waging nonviolent struggle

War and other forms of violence have not been universal in the waging of acute conflicts. In a great variety of situations, across centuries and cultural barriers, another technique of struggle has at times been applied. This other technique has been based on the ability to be stubborn, to refuse to cooperate, to disobey and to resist powerful opponents powerfully.

Throughout human history, and in a multitude of conflicts, one side has instead fought by psychological, social, economic, or political methods, or a combination of them. Many times this alternative technique of struggle has been applied when fundamental issues have been at stake, and when ruthless opponents have been willing and able to apply extreme repression. This repression has included beatings, arrests, imprisonments, executions and mass slaughters. Despite such repression, when the resisters have persisted in fighting with only their chosen ‘nonviolent weapons’ they have sometimes triumphed.

This alternative technique is called nonviolent action and nonviolent struggle. This is ‘the other ultimate sanction’. In some acute conflicts it has served as an alternative to violent struggle.

90 Ibid.
91 Some elements that might appear if the ‘violence triangle’ were transformed into a ‘peace triangle’ are discussed in Chapter 4.
92 Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth.
In the minds of many people, nonviolent struggle is closely connected with the persons of Mohandas K Gandhi and Dr Martin Luther King Jr. The work and actions of both men and the movements that they led or in which they played crucial roles are highly important. However, those movements are by no means representative of all nonviolent action. In fact, the work of these men is in significant ways atypical of the general practice of nonviolent struggle during recent decades and certainly throughout the centuries. Nonviolent struggles are not new historically. They have occurred for many centuries, although historical accounts frequently give them little recognition.

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A multitude of specific methods of nonviolent action, or nonviolent weapons, exist. Nearly two hundred have been identified to date and without doubt, scores more already exist and others will emerge in future conflicts.

...These methods may be used to protest symbolically, to put an end to cooperation, or to disrupt the operation of the established system. As such, three broad classes of nonviolent methods exist: nonviolent protest and persuasion, non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention.

Symbolic protests, though in most situations quite mild, can make it clear that some of the population is opposed to the present regime and can help to undermine its legitimacy. Social, economic, and political non-cooperation, when practised strongly and long enough, can weaken the opponents’ control, wealth, domination and power, and potentially produce paralysis. The methods of nonviolent intervention, which disrupt the established order by psychological, social, economic, physical or political methods, can dramatically threaten the opponents’ control.

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Inaccuracies and misunderstanding [about nonviolent action] are still widespread. Here are corrections for some of them:

1. Nonviolent action has nothing to do with passivity, submissiveness or cowardice. Just as in violent action, these must first be rejected and overcome before the struggle can proceed.

2. Nonviolent action is a means of conducting conflicts and can be very powerful, but it is an extremely different phenomenon from violence of all types.

3. Nonviolent action is not to be equated with verbal persuasion or purely psychological influences, although this technique may sometimes include action to apply psychological pressures for attitude change. Nonviolent action is a technique of struggle involving the use of psychological, social, economic, and political power in the matching of forces in conflict.

4. Nonviolent action does not depend on the assumption that people are inherently ‘good’. The potentialities of people for ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are recognised, including the extremes of cruelty and inhumanity.

5. In order to use nonviolent action effectively, people do not have to be pacifists or saints. Nonviolent action has been predominantly and successfully practised by ‘ordinary’ people.

94 See Annex E 198 Methods of Nonviolent Action.
6. Success with nonviolent action does not require (though it may be helped by) shared standards and principles, or a high degree of shared interests or feelings of psychological closeness between the contending sides. If the opponents are emotionally unmoved by nonviolent resistance in the face of violent repression, and therefore unwilling to agree to the objectives of the nonviolent struggle group, the resisters may apply coercive nonviolent measures. Difficult enforcement problems, economic losses, and political paralysis do not require the opponents’ agreement to be felt.

7. Nonviolent action is at least as much of a Western phenomenon as an Eastern one. Indeed, it is probably more Western, if one takes into account the widespread use of strikes and economic boycotts in the labour movements, the non-cooperation struggles of subordinated European nationalities, and the struggles against dictatorships.

8. In nonviolent action, there is no assumption that the opponents will refrain from using violence against nonviolent resisters. In fact, the technique is capable of operating against violence.

9. There is nothing in nonviolent action to prevent it from being used for both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ causes. However, the social consequences of its use for a ‘bad’ cause differ considerably from the consequences of violence used for the same ‘bad’ cause.

10. Nonviolent action is not limited to domestic conflicts within a democratic system. In order to have a chance of success, it is not necessary that the struggle be waged against relatively gentle and restrained opponents. Nonviolent struggle has been widely used against powerful governments, empires, ruthless dictatorships and totalitarian systems. These difficult nonviolent struggles against violent opponents have sometimes been successful.

11. One of the many widely believed myths about conflict is that violence works quickly, and nonviolent struggle takes a long time to bring results. This is not true. Some wars and other violent struggles have been fought for many years, even decades. Some nonviolent struggles have brought victories very quickly, even within days or weeks. The time taken to achieve victory with this technique depends on diverse factors – including the strength of the nonviolent resisters and the wisdom of their actions.

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The extremely widespread practice of nonviolent struggle is possible because the operation of this technique is compatible with the nature of political power and the vulnerabilities of all hierarchical systems. These systems and all governments depend on the subordinated populations, groups and institutions to supply them with their needed sources of power.

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The persons who are at any point the rulers do not personally possess the power of control, administration and repression that they wield. How much power they possess depends on how much power society will grant them. Six of these sources of political power are:

1. Authority: This may also be called legitimacy. It is the quality that leads people to accept the right of persons or groups to lead, command, direct and be heard or obeyed by others. Authority is voluntarily accepted by the people and therefore is present without the imposition of sanctions (or punishments). The authority figures need not necessarily be actually superior. It is enough that the person or group be perceived and accepted as superior. While not identical with power, authority is clearly a main source of power.
2. **Human resources:** The power of rulers is affected by the number of persons who obey them, cooperate with them or provide them with special assistance, as well as by the proportion of such assisting persons in the general population and the extent and forms of their organisations.

3. **Skills and knowledge:** The rulers’ power is affected by the skills, knowledge and abilities of such cooperating persons, groups and institutions, and the relation of their skills, knowledge, and abilities to the rulers’ needs.

4. **Intangible factors:** Psychological and ideological factors such as habits and attitudes toward obedience and submission, and the presence or absence of a common faith, ideology or sense of mission, contribute to the rulers’ power.

5. **Material resources:** The degree to which the rulers control property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, communication and transportation, and the like, helps to determine the extent or limits of the rulers’ power.

6. **Sanctions:** These have been described as ‘an enforcement of obedience’. The type and extent of sanctions, or punishments, at the rulers’ disposal, both for use against their own subjects and in conflicts with other rulers, are a major source of power.

...These six sources of political power are necessary to establish or retain power and control. Their availability, however, is subject to constant variation and is not necessarily secure.

The more extensive and detailed the rulers’ control over the population and society, the more such assistance they will require from individuals, groups, organisations and branches of the government. If these needed ‘assistants’ reject the rulers’ authority, they may then carry out the rulers’ wishes and orders inefficiently, or may even flatly refuse to continue their usual assistance. When this happens, the total effective power of the rulers is reduced...

No complex organisation or institution, including the State, can carry out orders if the individual and unit organisations that compose such an institution do not enable it to do so.
3.53 As with Gottlieb Guntern’s observations on the dynamics of networks (explored in Chapter 1), Gene Sharp’s insights into the nature of political power are relational; that is, political power does not exist independently of the relationships that sustain it, even in violent and authoritarian societies. This attitude is in direct contrast to Mao Zedong’s famous maxim that ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun’.

3.54 A detailed comparison of nonviolent and violent action to overthrow authoritarian regimes during the past century\(^5\) reveals a number of surprising results. The first is that a nonviolent campaign is actually more likely to succeed than a violent one, as can be seen in Figure 3.7.

Figure 3.7 — Success rates of non-violent and violent campaigns, 1900-2006

3.55 The second surprise is that nonviolent action is more likely to lead to a peaceful, just and sustainable outcome. Violent campaigns, even if they succeed in the short-term, tend to lose popular support en route and have a greater likelihood of leading to violent challenge or even civil war.

3.56 A third surprise is that nonviolent campaigns are becoming more successful; at least to 2006, when the study ended. This phenomenon is shown in Figure 3.8.

Figure 3.8 — Success rates by decade, 1940-2006

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As the Arab Spring shows, however, the picture is complex. Nonviolent campaigns can lead to positive change but can also fail or be reversed. But according to the study, violent campaigns can rarely be justified on strategic grounds.

**A change of heart — and mind**

3.57 One implication of Guntern and Sharp’s work is that to alter the power of any political movement — including those that readily use violence to attain their goals — one must seek to identify, then strengthen or weaken, key human relationships. Personal testimony of political change, such as this from Maajid Nawaz, tends to support this conclusion. A former recruiter for the Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), below he describes how he became disenchanted with Hizb ut-Tahrir during the five years he spent imprisoned in Egypt for Islamist activity.

3.58 Nawaz’s progressive disillusionment starts with the perception that the leaders of Hizb ut-Tahrir do not care about him as an individual; he’s expendable. His view of them changes — they are insincere and inconsistent — and as his trust in them declines, so does their authority over him. As Sharp says, “The authority figures need not necessarily be...

‘The starting point of my leaving HT had probably occurred back in Pakistan. My treatment out there had given me pause for thought about HT: not the ideas themselves, but about the people who were in charge of the organisation. A similar moment occurred at the trial, with Jalaluddin’s ‘supreme command’ that we should be more ‘defiant’. I had plenty of time to think about those events, lying awake in my cell. Each time, it had been me who had gone forward, sacrificed everything for the cause, in Pakistan my degree and educational future, and in Egypt my body, yet each time there were idle hawks hounding me due to their own personal insecurities. This didn’t challenge my faith in Islam, or initially my belief in the Islamist ideology, but it did make me question the capability, tactics and strategy of these figures. This, I believe, is the beginning of the process of leaving an ideological movement, for those brave enough to see their thinking through to its logical conclusion. Like an onion, you have to continue to peel back each layer and expose the next one, no matter how painful that process may be. My disillusionment with HT leaders and their tactics meant that, by the time I was sentenced, I was ready for some more serious thinking about my ideology.

The behaviour of HT members though was not the only factor that started me on this route. I believe that, where the heart leads, the mind can follow. After our conviction, Amnesty International adopted us as ‘Prisoners of Conscience’, and began campaigning openly and vigorously for our release...

Support for my plight from Amnesty was something that took me aback. It was its unconditional nature that humbled me: you’re a human being, and so you deserve our support. There was something very powerful, and very pure about that premise. Like many ideologies, Islamism derived part of its power from its ‘dehumanisation’ of ‘the other’. It is easier to dismiss and do things to ‘the other’ if you consider them unworthy: the Nazis and the Jews; the jihadists and the infidels. Throughout my teens and young adult life I had been dehumanised and desensitised to violence. As I got sucked into the Islamist ideology, I in turn began to dehumanise others.

Amnesty’s support challenged all that: instead of dehumanising people, it re-humanised them.’

96 Radical, 2013
Actually superior. It is enough that the person or group be perceived and accepted as superior.' Once the authority of the leaders is diminished so, by extension, is the authority of the organisation, along with the validity of the ideas that it promotes.

3.59 Crucially, with his sense of mission (his core belief) undermined, a positive alternative is presented to Nawaz in the form of Amnesty International, which embodies precisely the caring, sincerity and consistency that he has found lacking in Hizb ut-Tahrir. In short, as he says, ‘where the heart leads, the mind can follow.’ He now campaigns against the very ideology he once advocated.

3.60 Transactional relationships — those founded on mutual benefit — are always vulnerable to changing perceptions of advantage. One of the most valuable aspects of upstream engagement is that it offers many opportunities to build resilient networks based on trust and genuine human interaction.

Summary

3.61 Violence and conflict in the human domain are different but related. Direct violence can arise from conflict, while conflict can arise from challenges to often unseen structural and cultural violence. Understanding the difference between violence and conflict, and how they relate, is key to developing appropriate nonviolent preventive strategies that not only ‘do no harm’ but actually do some good.
4.1 The benefits of preventing violent conflict have long been recognised. The attempt to prevent war through diplomatic means — negotiation, treaties and alliances — reaches back into ancient history: the earliest recorded peace treaty was concluded in c. 1283 BC between the Egyptians and the Hittites. What was new in the twentieth century was the attempt to prevent war by creating a formal diplomatic institution — the League of Nations — that was designed to be both permanent and global. The League was to be the international body that ensured the First World War really was ‘the war to end all wars’.

4.2 Although the League failed — in absolute terms the Second World War was the most destructive in history — the concept of a global institution dedicated to preventing interstate war survived. The United Nations (UN) was the League reborn, but with a crucial addition — the authority to police peace agreements, by military force if necessary. Its aims are spelled out in its Charter shown below.98

UN Charter 1945 — Chapter 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

97 Benjamin Franklin (1706-90).
4.3 The UN’s record in preventing violent conflict has been decidedly mixed. Since its establishment in 1945, the UN has mandated 69 peacekeeping missions, ranging from unarmed observer missions to deploying forces authorised to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect themselves or the mandate given them by the UN Security Council (UNSC). These operations have been mandated either under Chapter VI of the UN Charter — ‘The Pacific Settlement Of Disputes’ — or Chapter VII — ‘Action with Respect to Threat to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression’.

4.4 Surprisingly perhaps, only one of these missions has ever been deployed in a specifically preventive capacity, that is before the outbreak of hostilities — UNPREDEP in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Its mandate, which ran from March 1995 to February 1999, is widely held to have prevented violence and instability spreading from the conflict in Kosovo.

4.5 As the uniqueness of UNPREDEP suggests, the deployment of UN missions has been almost wholly reactive — in the build-up to, or during, a crisis, or after it to police a peace agreement. Understand to Prevent argues that this approach needs to change and that military forces can play a valuable expanded role in ‘upstream’ prevention.

Section 1 — The current model — theory

4.6 Drawing on the idea of the conflict cycle (1-9 on the bottom arrow), the current concept of how the prevention of violent conflict should work can be represented in Figure 4.1 below.

4.7 A crisis builds between two or more parties. External diplomatic, economic and military pressure — possibly even military intervention — is brought to bear in an effort to deter violent conflict or to stop it escalating. If the pressure succeeds, the crisis will abate and

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Figure 4.1 — Violent conflict and its prevention

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103 1 — difference; 2 — contradiction; 3 — polarisation; 4 — violence; 5 — war; 6 — ceasefire (often a process rather than a single event); 7 — agreement; 8 — normalisation; 9 — reconciliation.
a degree of stability will return. If it fails and the ‘crisis line’ is breached, there will be full scale violent conflict. When the fighting stops — often with a truce leading to a more permanent peace agreement — external military forces will intervene (if they have not already) first to enforce and then to keep the peace. The level of coercion from the external force declines as the situation stabilises until, eventually, the peacekeepers withdraw and ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding can get underway in earnest.

4.8 The focus of prevention in the current model is on developing potent diplomatic, economic and military actions to keep the situation below the crisis line. The military role in this, which follows an agreed pattern of escalation and de-escalation, can be summarised as shown in Figure 4.2. In following the sequence of ‘shape, deter, coerce and intervene’, military force becomes more explicit as the situation worsens, and *vice versa*.

- ‘Shape’ means to influence the environment in which the actors operate.
- ‘Deter’ means to offer an implied threat of action should the conflict escalate.
- ‘Coerce’ means to make that threat explicit.
- ‘Intervene’ means to take military action (this might be before the crisis line has been breached — that is, preventive action — or after it has been breached in order to stop the parties fighting).

4.9 This (admittedly simplified) model of prevention has had mixed success. It is most effective, perhaps, when the conflict is limited in time and space and involves clearly defined actors. Recent positive examples include the UK intervention in Sierra Leone (2000) and the UN-French action in Côte d’Ivoire (2011). It also helps if the parties are operating in states that are small and weak, with no powerful allies. However, in recent years the model has been increasingly challenged on a number of fronts, which we explore below.

104 Economic and financial sanctions, for example, are becoming increasingly sophisticated – witness the ‘smart sanctions’ imposed on the Syrian government and its supporters. http://reut.rs/PK79TB. The effectiveness of sanctions in preventing or ending violent conflict is, however, a matter of historical (and ongoing) debate. See ‘Sanctions: Diplomatic tool or warfare by other means?’: http://bit.ly/QOF7rk
The United Nations

4.10 The locus of the diplomatic action is usually the UN, specifically the UN Security Council (UNSC). Any UN member may bring a complaint to the UNSC regarding a threat to international peace, as can the Secretary-General. The UNSC might then pass a resolution authorising a range of actions.

4.11 The responsibility for carrying out the mandate falls on the Secretariat, led by the Secretary-General. If military action has been mandated, they must compile the mission from resources offered by member states, as the UN has no military forces of its own. These resources fall into three broad categories — financial support, logistical support and military/police support. It is not uncommon for a UN mission to comprise a patchwork of different elements, sourced from member states around the world. While displaying a positive image of multinational cooperation, this also poses significant challenges for coordination, a topic explored below.

Security Council Mandates

United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. The tasks that a United Nations peacekeeping operation will be required to perform are set out in the Security Council mandate. Security Council mandates differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents. Since United Nations peacekeeping operations are normally deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or a more comprehensive peace agreement, Security Council mandates are influenced by the nature and content of the agreement reached by the parties to the conflict.

Security Council mandates also reflect the broader normative debates shaping the international environment. In this regard, there are a number of cross-cutting, thematic tasks that are regularly assigned to United Nations peacekeeping operations on the basis of the following landmark Security Council resolutions.


The range of tasks assigned to United Nations peacekeeping operations has expanded significantly in response to shifting patterns of conflict and to best address emerging threats to international peace and security. Although each United Nations peacekeeping operation is different, there is a considerable degree of consistency in the types of mandated tasks assigned by the Security Council.

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guideline

105 See Annex G: The United Nations
106 See Annex H: The UN Security Council (UNSC)
Other preventive actions

4.12 The UN is far from being the only body currently involved in preventive action. Increasingly, regional organisations, international non-governmental organisations, national governments and local civil society actors can be engaged in ‘preventive diplomacy’.

4.13 Preventive diplomacy is a term with both broad and narrow interpretations. In broad terms, it refers to any nonviolent action taken to prevent a conflict from escalating into violence, or to limit its spread if it does turn violent. More narrowly, it refers to the work, both public and private, of high level diplomatic envoys used by the conflict actors, their allies or impartial third parties to encourage dialogue, compromise and the nonviolent resolution of tensions. Preventive diplomacy can take many forms.

Official (Track 1) diplomacy
- Mediation
- Conciliation
- Fact-finding
- Good offices
- Peace conferences
- Envos
- Hotlines
- ‘Talks about talks’
- Confidence building measures

Non-official (Track 2) diplomacy
- Private mediation
- Message-carrying
- Creation of back-channels
- Peace commissions
- Problem-solving workshops
- Conflict resolution training
- Round tables

Grassroots (Track 3) diplomacy
- Interfaith/intercommunity dialogue
- Cultural events and exchanges
- Personal and local initiatives

Multi-track diplomacy
- Any combination of Tracks 1 - 3 that occur simultaneously

Preventive diplomacy can also involve direct ‘sticks and carrots’ (coercion and inducements) negotiation between the conflict actors, especially at state level.

The peace triangle

4.14 The concept of preventive diplomacy has also been influenced by the ideas of Johan Galtung, in particular his ‘peace triangle’, which relates to his conflict (ABC) and violence (DSC) triangles. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Once again, Galtung argues that all three points of the peace triangle have to be addressed for lasting and sustainable peace.

- Peacekeeping engages with the behaviour of direct violence.
- Peacemaking seeks to transform the attitudes and cultural violence that drive the violent behaviour.
- Peacebuilding seeks to reform structural contradictions and injustices.
Combining this understanding with the conflict cycle offers a fuller ‘menu’ of possible actions at each point of a conflict’s escalation and de-escalation, as outlined in Table 4.1.\textsuperscript{107}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of conflict</th>
<th>Strategic response</th>
<th>Examples of responses and capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Difference      | Cultural peacebuilding | • Problem-solving  
• Support for indigenous dispute resolution institutions and conflict resolution training  
• Fact-finding missions and peace commissions  
• Culture of toleration and respect  
• Multiple and inclusive identities |
| 2. Contradiction   | Structural peacebuilding | • Development assistance  
• Civil society development  
• Governance training and institution building  
• Human rights training  
• Track 2 mediation and problem-solving  
• Institutional capacity  
• Constitutional and legal provision  
• Legitimacy and social justice |
| 3. Polarisation    | Elite peacemaking  | • Special envoys and official mediation  
• Negotiation  
• Coercive diplomacy  
• Preventive peacekeeping |
| 4. Violence        | Peacekeeping       | • Interposition  
• Crisis management and containment |
| 5. War             | War limitation     | • Peace enforcement  
• Peace support and stabilisation |
| 6. Ceasefire       | Peacekeeping       | • Preventive peacekeeping  
• Disarmament and security sector reform  
• Confidence building and security enhancing measures  
• Security in the community through police training |

\textsuperscript{107} From Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011.
4.16 In the broadest sense, any appropriate attempt at de-escalation at any point of the conflict cycle can be considered an effort towards prevention. However, it should be noted that the UN and others have begun to question the conflict cycle as a useful model on which to base preventive action, and to stress the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach.

Conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement rarely occur in a linear or sequential way. Indeed, experience has shown that they should be seen as mutually reinforcing. Used piecemeal or in isolation, they fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict that, thereby, reduces the risk of conflict recurring. However, the international community's ability to combine these activities effectively remains limited and this has, in some cases, resulted in critical gaps in the international response to crises that have threatened international peace and security.

It is to those gaps that we now turn.

Table 4.1 — The conflict cycle and possible responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of conflict</th>
<th>Strategic response</th>
<th>Examples of responses and capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. Agreement</td>
<td>Elite peacemaking</td>
<td>• Electoral and constitutional reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Power-sharing and decentralisation of power</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Problem-solving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Normalisation</td>
<td>Structural peacebuilding</td>
<td>• Collective security and cooperation arrangements</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic resource cooperation and development</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Alternative defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Reconciliation</td>
<td>Cultural peacebuilding</td>
<td>• Commissions of enquiry/ truth and justice commissions</td>
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<td>• Peace media development</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Peace and conflict awareness education and training</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Cultural exchanges and initiatives, sport as reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Problem-solving as future imaging</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Understanding prevention

Section 2 — The current model — practice

Early warning

4.17 Central to the current model is the importance of conflict early warning, which must not only be timely but well-informed. Proper understanding of developing crises can only be formed on the basis of collecting, collating and correctly analysing accurate and recent information.

4.18 Although there is no formal conflict early warning system for the UN as a whole, several UN agencies have developed or are developing such systems, including:
- UN Department of Safety and Security;
- Department of Political Affairs;
- UN Development Programme;
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations;
- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs;
- World Food Programme;
- Office for the High Commissioner for Refugees;
- Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide; and
- UN Global Pulse.

4.19 As well as the UN agencies listed above, a number of international and regional organisations, national governments and non-governmental organisations have, or are developing conflict early warning functions. Initiatives based on up-to-the-minute reporting by mobile phone or the Internet are also being developed — the Ushahidi platform, for example.

4.20 While there is increasing access to information about potential conflicts and developing crises, the challenge lies in:
- how to interpret that information;
- how and when to react to it; and
- exactly who should react.

Interpretation — conflict indicators

4.21 To help with interpretation, several models of ‘conflict indicators’ have been developed that could suggest an increased likelihood of violent conflict. These indicators fall into four interrelated categories.

- Quantitative — data correlated to the incidence of violent conflict. The annual Global Peace Index, for example, uses 22 different indicators — ranging from a nation’s level of military expenditure to the size of its prison population — to rank 162 of the world’s countries according to their peacefulness or violence.
- Qualitative — information on the situation that cannot be rendered in statistical form, such as first-hand reports and media coverage of events, assessment of the actors’ personalities and goals, reports on public attitudes and so on.
- Immediate causes — what is happening now and how it might affect the conflict; for example, political and economic developments or events in neighbouring countries.
- Long-term causes — these correspond (in Galtung’s terms) to structural and cultural violence.

Conflict indicators limitations

4.22 As the UN has acknowledged, violent conflicts rarely conform smoothly to the model of escalation and de-escalation suggested by the conflict cycle, as the factors that drive them are so varied and unstable. This means that:
- violence can erupt without obvious warning — no one predicted, for example, that the self-immolation of a fruit-seller in a small town in the middle of Tunisia would spark the events now known as the Arab Spring;
4.23 According to conflict early warning expert David Nyheim, while significant advances have been made in developing analytical tools, they ‘oversimplify complex and fluid violent conflicts and situations of state fragility. They provide simple snapshots that are quickly outdated, and the quality of the analysis suffers from data deficits that characterise many countries affected by conflict and state fragility.’\textsuperscript{109} Predicting exactly how and when violent conflicts will develop therefore remains a tricky task.

**Early warning, slow — or no — response?**

4.24 For all the efforts being made to develop accurate and efficient conflict early warning systems, a more fundamental problem remains to be solved – the response. For example, The Rwandan genocide did not occur for lack of warning.\textsuperscript{110} In 1992-93 there were at least four reports from respected and credible sources that a genocide was being planned, including from the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary and Extrajudicial Executions. The UN Force Commander in Rwanda even sent a cable to UN headquarters in January 1994 reporting signs that killings could be imminent. Despite there being a historical precedent (there were Hutu massacres of Tutsis in 1959, 1962 and 1972), all the warnings were either ignored or prompted a wholly inadequate response. The genocide started in April 1994. To understand why something like this could happen we need to examine some of the factors that complicate the current model of prevention.

**Prevention — understanding the complicating factors**

4.25 Preventing violent conflict involves many actors operating in many different areas and at many different levels. As a consequence, decision-makers often find it difficult to formulate consistent policy, make coherent choices and carry them out effectively. Awareness of these complicating factors is an essential element in understanding. They include:

- the warning-response gap;
- international law;
- politics;
- complications arising from the UN mandate; and
- ‘new’ wars and violent conflicts.

We shall examine each of these in turn.

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The warning-response gap

4.26 The warning-response gap refers to the failure to act, or to act quickly or effectively enough, in the face of a growing crisis. The problems are summarised below by one of the authors of a 2010 study\footnote{Recasting the Warning-Response Problem: Persuasion and Preventive Policy, International Studies Review, Meyer and others, Volume 12, Issue 4, December 2010.} of the issue.

1. **The knowledge basis for warning about violent conflict or phenomena such as mass atrocities and genocide is contested.** Decision-makers are doubtful about the knowledge claims made and remake them. They tend to trust senior individuals they know, rather than methods and evidence — this means that knowledge regarding conflict is being under-used, open to chance and problematic criteria are applied for judging source credibility.

2. **Foreign affairs bureaucracies discourage or impede early and high impact warning, especially when warnings are particularly surprising and politically inconvenient.** With few exceptions, warning is considered to be risky by officials in terms of career-prospects and reputation. In the dominant organisational culture of foreign affairs ministries, out-of-the field ideas are generally discouraged, informal fast-tracking of warnings beyond proper channels is penalised, and exposing errors of analysis and policy is seen as ‘politicisation’ or, alternatively, incompetence in dealing with problems. As a result, experts tend not to communicate warnings, communicate them late, or in ways that are so hedged that they evade immediate attention, but could be used to deflect blame afterwards.

3. **Government mechanisms to prioritise warnings and act upon warnings are under-resourced, underpowered and cumbersome, thus delaying response well into crisis management.** Legal and budgetary obstacles exist to putting preventive policy across different ministries into practice, and bodies that are being charged with coordinating prioritisation, contingency planning and response lack sufficient resources and political clout. The results are that different sectoral lenses are just added on top of each other, thus narrowing the focus to the usual suspects, ministries feel that coordination is just too cumbersome and withdraw informally, and/or responses take so long that early warning does not lead to early action.

4. **Disincentives to act early due to political invisibility of preventive success and media credit for crisis management.** While foreign policy is typically not a vote winner for politicians, foreign ministers often relish their visible role in managing crises and disregard early preventive action. Many responses to emerging conflict are largely invisible to domestic publics because of their nature and/or making them visible may be counter-productive for the effectiveness of ‘silent diplomacy’. Within bureaucracies plenty of lip-service is paid to the ‘prevention is better than cure’ proposition but no serious attempt is made to evaluate by how much. As a result, success of prevention remains largely invisible and thus ‘unloved’ by decision-makers.
International law

4.28 The legality of international actions regarding the use of force, armed and unarmed (for example, economic sanctions), is framed by the UN Charter, to which 193 nations have acceded. This states in Article 2(4) that:

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

4.29 The Charter allows only two situations in which states can use military force. The first is with UNSC approval, under powers granted in Articles 24, 25 and Chapter VII; and the second is in self-defence, under Article 51. This also allows for collective self-defence; in other words, states can come to the aid of an ally if it is attacked. NATO's legitimacy is based explicitly on Article 51.

4.30 Under Chapter VIII of the Charter (Article 53), regional organisations can employ their 'good offices' without resort to a UN mandate, but can use force only if authorised by a resolution of the UNSC. To avoid any ambiguity, Article 103 further states that:

“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”

4.31 Despite this apparent clarity, at various points during the Cold War many members of the UN — including all of the five Permanent Members (P5) of the UNSC — ignored the Charter’s injunctions forbidding the use of force unless in self-defence or with a UNSC mandate.

Post-Cold War ‘breaches’

4.32 Since the end of the Cold War there have also been a number of instances when members of the P5 have taken (preventive) military action without an explicit UNSC mandate. Examples include:

- enforcing ‘no-fly zones’ in Iraq — USA, UK and France, 1991;
- Kosovo — USA and UK/NATO, 1999;\(^{112}\)
- Sierra Leone — UK, 2000;\(^{113}\)
- invading Iraq — USA and UK, 2003;
- the South Ossetia War — Russia, 2008; and
- the annexation of the Crimea — Russia, 2014.

4.33 In each instance, the P5 members involved argued for the legality of the action by reference to other treaties, precedents or existing UNSC resolutions. The Russians cited Responsibility to Protect as justification for their action in South Ossetia, for example, while NATO cited the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s breach of Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203 to justify its intervention in Kosovo. International jurists have generally rejected these arguments on the grounds that:

- they nullify the veto of the P5;
- they allow any state or coalition of states to act as it pleases, without reference to the UNSC, by citing these actions as a precedent; and
- even where the wording might be open to interpretation, the clear intention of the UN Charter is that the UNSC alone should decide on matters of war and peace, except in cases of individual or collective self-defence.

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Appeal to the International Court of Justice

4.34 To uphold the Charter, any country can take another country or group of countries to the International Court of Justice over an alleged breach. However, all parties have the right not to recognise the jurisdiction of the court. For example, in 1986 Nicaragua successfully sued the USA in the International Court of Justice for its role in supporting ‘military and paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua’. However, the USA did not to recognise the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, refused to accept its judgment and later vetoed its enforcement by the UNSC, thus preventing Nicaragua from obtaining compensation.

International Criminal Court

4.35 The International Court of Justice is not to be confused with the International Criminal Court, which is the first permanent, treaty based, international criminal court set up to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. It sits in The Hague in the Netherlands and is an independent organisation that operates outside the UN system to prosecute individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Subject to agreement on definition by participating states, it might also one day be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression; that is, the aggressive use of armed force by states.

4.36 Although the Court’s expenses are funded primarily by states, it also receives voluntary contributions from governments, international organisations, individuals, corporations and other entities. The International Criminal Court is based on the precedent of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials (which addressed war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which were both set up in the 1990s. However, because all of these were established to try crimes committed within a specific time-frame and during a specific conflict, there was general agreement that an independent, permanent international criminal court was needed. The International Criminal Court was established in 1998 when 120 states adopted the Rome Statute.

Non-state actors

4.37 A question of increasing urgency is the status and consequent treatment of non-state actors under international law. Since non-state actors tend not to observe international humanitarian law (see the box on page 81), should they be protected by it? Are captured non-state actors ‘prisoners of war’, who merit treatment according to the Geneva Conventions, or ‘enemy combatants’ – such as those in detention in Guantanamo Bay, who can be held under a different set of rules? 114 Can non-state actors be legally targeted if they are not at that time active on the battlefield – for example, by an unmanned aerial vehicle strike when they are travelling in a civilian area? There are differing legal views held by states and lawyers, which makes it difficult to answer these questions.

114 To address this the UK has produced Joint Doctrine Publication 1-10, Captured Persons which concerns all captured persons.
Politics

4.38 The distinction between legality and legitimacy is important for understanding the broader context in which preventive action is taken (or not). Whereas the legality of a certain action can be argued against agreed and written laws, its legitimacy is judged against prevailing moral, social and political norms. This is more problematic, as these norms vary according to different contexts. The legitimacy of preventive action in any particular case is therefore in the eye of the beholder, which means that ultimately it is a political question. Legitimacy helps shape political will, while political will ‘decides’ legitimacy. In short, understanding the politics at the heart of any preventive action is key to its success, not least because preventive action is so often undertaken in alliance with one or more partners.

4.39 The military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously said that ‘War is the continuation of politics with the admixture of other means.’ For Clausewitz, politics is interstate conflict without violence; war is interstate conflict with violence. State-organised violence is a tool, like any other, to be employed to further the state’s interests when it is judged advantageous to do so.

4.40 The UN Charter is a fundamental challenge to this philosophy, framing ‘the scourge of war’ as a basic failure of politics. Its preamble talks of ensuring ‘by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’; which will be determined by the UN, specifically the UNSC.

4.41 In essence, the UN Charter first establishes the principle that using violence to settle interstate conflict is illegitimate — except in self-defence or with UNSC authorisation — and then establishes formal provisions to render it illegal in international law. A political-moral position is stated, then strengthened by institutional means. The UN’s adoption of Responsibility to Protect effectively extends the same principle to intrastate conflict.
4.42 Against this background, ‘real world’ political considerations include the following.

a. **National interest.** It is a common argument that involvement in the conflict of another state can be justified only if it is also in the intervening actor’s national (or organisational) interest. Hard choices have to be made about where best to spend political capital; and harder choices still about how to spend national blood and treasure. If there is no obvious return, other than upholding abstract ideas of the common good (freedom, democracy, human rights), or worse, if there is a clear disadvantage to getting involved (the loss of an ally or trading partner, say, or reprisals from an opponent) the argument is that such ‘expenditure’ should go elsewhere.

b. **Impartiality.** The counter-argument is that any suggestion that external actors are biased or have hidden or self-interested motives in preventing a conflict (or not) undermines their moral authority and trustworthiness. In turn, this limits their effectiveness or even renders their engagement counter-productive. The identity and history of the external actors is, therefore, an important factor.

c. **Other interests.** Often unacknowledged openly is the wide variety of personal and group interests that might be at play in any conflict, ranging from career ambition to financial and commercial considerations. The involvement of core beliefs can be especially influential in shaping outcomes, as can the desire to keep the support of friends and allies and avoid the negative reactions of opponents.

d. **Who else is involved?** From a national perspective, a common view is that action should preferably be taken in concert with others, on the basis of ‘from each according to their ability’ and ‘(moral) strength in numbers’. US involvement is often considered essential.

e. **The CNN effect.** This is the effect that the 24-hour rolling news cycle can have on the exercise of foreign policy. The visceral immediacy of television images can lead to the demand that ‘something must be done’, resulting in a short-term but ultimately ineffective ‘fix’. When media attention switches elsewhere, the political attention follows. Alternatively, the absence of media attention can mean nothing is done when action is desirable. In short, the CNN effect can set the policy agenda, impede the achievement of desired policy goals and lead to hasty decision-making.

f. **Social media.** A new phenomenon that can amplify the CNN effect and *vice versa* is social media. A social media storm can be picked up by the mainstream media and create an amplifying loop. Social media has led to the rise of ‘citizen journalism’ that bypasses traditional media controls and makes publicly available a wider range of information, especially photo images and raw video footage. In this way social media can also be used to exacerbate conflict and violence on the ground, or to mitigate them.

g. **Emotion.** Closely related to the CNN effect and social media is the emotional reaction of different actors to the plight of those involved in a conflict or under threat in some way. The more that influential actors care about the conflict, or about how it might affect something else that they care about (for example, a core belief), the more likely they are to engage.

h. **History.** The perceived outcomes of past actions, especially in the recent past, have a large influence on decision-making. The US ‘Black Hawk Down’ experience in Somalia in 1993[^15] was a dominant factor in limiting UNSC action towards Rwanda in

[^15]: See Annex L: Blood diamonds, Sierra Leone.
1994. The UK Parliament’s unwillingness in 2013 to authorise UK military involvement in Syria is evidence of a growing reluctance in Western democracies to risk entanglement in foreign conflicts, born of the perceived failures of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. The UK decision also acted as a brake on US policy-makers, themselves acutely aware of the lack of popular support for more military involvement overseas. However, past history did not stop both countries deciding in 2014 to engage in air-strikes against the forces of the Islamic State in Iraq and, for the US, in Syria.

Social change. Broader changes in social attitudes, especially in democracies, also influence decision-making: opposition to gender-based violence is rising up the political agenda, for example. It is also possible that the armed forces of NATO and its allies will be increasingly constrained by evolving public attitudes against violence in general. Tolerance of death and injury to one’s own forces appears to have declined. Similarly, what is deemed unacceptable within national borders could be extended beyond those borders, both to fighters but especially to civilians in hostile environments.

The election cycle. In democracies, decisions about engaging in preventive actions — whether contemplated or ongoing — can be heavily influenced by their closeness to impending elections.

All such political considerations are interdependent and debateable — and are indeed debated in the political sphere. For example, if lives are saved — do the intentions of the external actor matter? What are the limits of impartiality in the face of ‘evil’? To what extent should decision-making be influenced by popular feeling? And, if legitimacy and legality clash, which prevails?

**Legality vs legitimacy**

4.44 Drawing on the political considerations discussed above, it is possible to group questions of legality-legitimacy into four pairings. Actions can be as follows.

a. **Illegal and illegitimate.** For example, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 1990.

The Iraqi government claimed the annexation was legitimate as Kuwait used to be part of the Ottoman province of Basra — its borders were redrawn illegitimately by France and Britain following the defeat of the Ottomans in the First World War. The UNSC and the bulk of international opinion disagreed and Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait by the UNSC-mandated Operation Desert Storm in February 1991.

b. **Illegal but legitimate?** For example, the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, 1999. The bombing was not mandated by the UNSC, was the first time that NATO had used military force without UN approval, and was against a sovereign nation that did not pose a threat to any NATO member. However, the NATO action was supported in many parts of the international community and global media because it was seen as, and argued to be, a ‘humanitarian intervention’ to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and which would have been vetoed by Russia had it been put to the UNSC. By contrast, when Russia cited Kosovo as a precedent for its annexation of the Crimea — preventive action to protect a threatened ethnic minority in a larger and hostile state — the move was widely condemned as illegal.

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117 See Annex F.
118 See Annex J.
but also illegitimate because land was annexed and there was no clear threat to the safety of the Russians in the peninsula.

c. **Legal and illegitimate?** For example, the Rwanda genocide, 1994.\(^{118}\)

Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, adopted by the UN in December 1948, states that ‘the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish’. Armed intervention in Rwanda in 1993 or early 1994, in the face of mounting evidence of planning for genocide, would therefore have been legal if authorised by the UN under international law.

The **legitimacy** of a Chapter VII mandate was nevertheless denied by many actors — some because there was no national interest at stake, others because they were concerned to protect UN impartiality, or others because they judged that prevention could be achieved at a lower level of commitment. For several actors, this led to a studious avoidance of ‘the g-word’, acceptance of which would have triggered their obligations under the Genocide Convention.

d. **Legal and legitimate.** For example, the protection of Benghazi, 2011.\(^{119}\)

In March 2011, citing for the first time the principle of Responsibility to Protect, the UNSC passed a Chapter VII resolution to protect Libyan citizens from threatened attack by the forces of the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi. The mandate had widespread support in the international community, the global media and national parliaments.

Even so, despite general agreement on both the legality and legitimacy of the military action, deep divisions soon emerged in the P5 over the interpretation of the mandate — divisions that continue to limit the effectiveness of the UNSC.

4.45 In summary, the lack of consistency over when, why and how external actors become involved with (other people’s) conflicts continues to complicate the crucial question of legitimacy. With it comes the challenge of effective preventive action.

**Complications arising from the UN mandate**

4.46 Preventive action mandated by the UN that involves military intervention can face formidable practical challenges. These have included the following.

a. **Problems with the mandate.**
   - The mandate has to be agreed by the UNSC and (usually) with the host government(s) and will therefore be limited by international and local political realities (for example, the status of forces agreement), rather than reflecting what might be best for the conflict.
   - The mandate is too vague, especially regarding the use of force (rules of engagement) or the distinction between peace-making, peace enforcement and peacekeeping — or it is over-precise and therefore limits tactical initiative.
   - The mandate authorises a peacekeeping deployment where there is no peace to keep.
   - The mandate keeps changing — or it doesn’t change fast enough to meet changing realities on the ground — as a result of a disconnect between the mission and UN headquarters.

\(^{118}\) See Annex M: The Fall of Gaddafi — Libya, 2011.

• The mandate is too short — the mission is withdrawn before the conflict is resolved or even sufficiently stabilised.

• The mandate is too long — the presence of the mission helps to ‘freeze’ the conflict or to act against its resolution; for example, UNFICYP has been in Cyprus since 1974.

• The mandate blurs military and humanitarian action.

• The mandate includes national caveats that hinder local action — UN troops are at all times legally under the control of their national governments.

b. Problems with assembling the mission.

• The difficulty of finding good personnel quickly.

• Delays in recruiting and deploying troops, leading to staggered deployment — the Secretary-General has to assemble a mission with troops, equipment and money from willing countries, all of which can take time.

• Troops of poor quality — the UN pays troop-contributing countries, so troops often come from poorer countries that need the revenue; these troops can be inadequately trained and equipped.

• Force commander quality — levels of competence and personal integrity vary; in some cases there have been allegations of bribery and corruption.

• Limited joint UN pre-deployment training.

• Troop-equipment mismatch — troops can come from one country and the mission equipment from another; the training necessary can further delay the mission operation.

• Standard operating procedures are thorough and available but poorly consulted.

c. Problems with sustaining the mission.

• Insufficient mission strength — there are simply not enough troops for the mission as mandated, either because the force level has been misjudged or because one or more of the troop contributing countries don’t deliver all (sometimes any) of their promised contingent.

• Troops can be withdrawn at short notice by their national governments; for example, if they have suffered what are seen as unacceptable casualties.

• Inadequate mission logistics — there is insufficient or unsuitable materiel for the demands of the mission.

• Poor interoperability between different contingents — troops often come from a number of different countries; even if they speak the same language they usually operate within different military cultures; there can also be tensions between different contingents.

• Poor coordination with civilian actors, for example, non-governmental organisations or government officials.

• Command issues — better trained and equipped contingents from richer nations and regional organisations refuse to be commanded by ‘junior’ partners; for example, UN force commanders from a poorer country.

• UN troops and their commanders lack specific training in peacekeeping or ‘policing’ in civilian areas.

• Troop indiscipline — there have been several cases of serious criminal behaviour by UN troops, including sexual assault and murder; additionally, a cholera outbreak in Haiti was traced to the practices of UN troops.

• General difficulty of achieving unity of effort, both within the mission and more broadly with other actors in theatre and internationally.
d. Problems with local actors.
   • They ‘play’ the UN mission according to the limits of its mandate.
   • They make then break agreements.
   • Their response to the UN presence creates its own problems; for example, civilians seek sanctuary in UN compounds, which can draw the hostile attention of other actors; UN missions can distort local economies and cultures.

Responding to complications arising from the UN mandate

4.47 These complications are among those being addressed by the UN’s New Horizon process, led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support of the UN Secretariat. This reform process consists of four main areas.

• Policy. Clarifying the critical roles and responsibilities of peacekeepers and developing practical guidance in specific areas, for example, protecting civilians, peacebuilding roles of peacekeepers, and effective response to threats.

• Capability. Filling critical capability gaps in peacekeeping missions in a forward-looking and sustainable manner and ensuring peacekeepers are prepared, equipped, and enabled to deliver against reasonable performance expectations.

• Global field support. Transforming service delivery in the field.

• Planning and oversight. Ensuring more effective and inclusive arrangements for the planning, management and oversight of missions.

The UN hopes that the New Horizon process will lead to a renewal of the peacekeeping partnership between the different stakeholders, especially the UNSC, the troop contributing counties, contributors of financial resources and the UN Secretariat.

4.48 There is concern, however, about the extent to which UN peacekeeping is moving away from its traditional three pillars of impartiality (not taking sides in a violent conflict), consent (deploying with the agreement of the conflict actors) and nonviolence. The desire of the UNSC to protect civilians — a task not undertaken in the early days of peacekeeping — coupled with more deployments to contested areas, has meant that increasingly UN missions are finding themselves having to ignore one or more of these pillars. As Dr David Curran of Bradford University notes:

“UN Security Council actions towards protection of civilians often give an impression of recklessness. For instance, two of the most critical humanitarian emergencies on the council’s agenda at present — CAR [Central African Republic] and South Sudan — have come off the back of considerable warning of impending tragedy from humanitarian organisations, advocacy organisations and UN agencies. That members of the UN Security Council failed to act until violence had escalated to unmanageable scales is a cause for concern. That believing that the answer is to send in peacekeepers to deal with the consequences is even more troubling.”

4.49 Other commentators question the extent to which the UN, as it is currently structured, will ever be able to overcome the challenges inherent in peacekeeping. They point out that for force to be used effectively — including preventive force — there must be clarity and consistency in political, strategic, operational and tactical goals. These are often lacking in UN missions, they say, simply because the UN is so often not united.

Understanding prevention

On flexible peacekeeping arrangements

The international community learned the hard way in the mid-1990s the human and political costs of failing to equip peacekeepers with the necessary resources to fulfil their mandates. In some cases, this is a question of scale; in others, of quality or flexibility. Far from the Cold War days of static peacekeeping in buffer zones or alongside contested borders, contemporary operations are dynamic, operate in politically complex environments, and often cover enormous areas... [U]ncertainty and weak institutions that enable violence can endure in a society for several decades, long after the traditional period of intensive peacekeeping. In too many cases, peacekeepers had to be recalled when a brief period of recovery was followed by a relapse into a new cycle of violence.

The dilemma here is that national authorities and international mandating bodies are often reluctant to contemplate longer term peacekeeping engagements. More creative solutions must be found. These could include combinations of long term programmes for security sector development and reform, light monitoring and over-the-horizon reinforcements... If security and development indeed march hand in hand, so too should peacekeeping and economic support to the process of transforming national institutions — including through joint programmes, for example, on security sector reform and the management of natural resources:’

Ramatane Lamara, Commissioner for Peace and Security, African Union
Alain Le Roy, UN Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations

World Development Report 2011

‘New’ wars and violent conflicts

4.50 A major challenge to thinking on preventive action based on the conflict cycle is that the character of warfare has changed: indeed, ‘War no longer exists’ according to General Sir Rupert Smith, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe 1998-2001. By this, he means the war of state against state, with air, sea and land forces fighting each other in large-scale battles to seek decisive advantage. These days, Smith argues, even if an opponent is swiftly beaten on the battlefield (as in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003), the victor is likely to become embroiled in a protracted, unwinnable insurgency, a ‘war among the people’. In this ‘war’ the control of territory or resources can be secured only by winning the consent of the people among whom one is fighting. As Jonathan Schell notes:

“Even Clausewitz, let us recall... understood that military victories were useless unless the population of the vanquished army then obeyed the will of the victor. The resolute society that dislikes its ruler can find another ruler; but where would a ruler who had lost the obedience of his society find another society?”

Additionally, as in any overseas action, ‘war among the people’ can be fought by external actors for only as long as it enjoys consent at home.

121 The Unconquerable World, Schell, 2003.
The Utility of Force

The *Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* is a book by General Sir Rupert Smith. During Smith’s 40 year career in the British Army he commanded the 1st Armoured Division during the 1991 Gulf War, led UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1995 and was General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland 1996-8. His final command was as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

*The Utility of Force*, written in 2005, is Smith’s analysis of why the best military forces in the world win their battles but not their wars. He argues that there has been a paradigm shift from ‘industrial warfare’ to ‘war amongst the people’, in which intertwined political and military goals cannot be resolved by military force alone. According to Smith the strategies for war amongst the people should be based on ‘confrontation analysis’\textsuperscript{122} rather than established military doctrine.

Some extracts are below.

In the world of industrial war the premise is of the sequence peace-crisis-war-resolution, which will result in peace again, with the war, the military action, being the deciding factor. In contrast, the new paradigm of war among the people is of a continuous criss-crossing between [hostile but non-violent] confrontation and [violent] conflict, regardless of whether a state is facing another state or a non-state actor. Rather than war and peace, there is no predefined sequence, nor is peace necessarily either the starting or the end point; conflicts are resolved but not necessarily confrontations.

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War among the people is characterised by six major trends:

- **The ends for which we fight are changing** from the hard absolute objectives of interstate industrial war to more malleable objectives to do with the individual and societies that are not states.

- **We fight amongst the people**, a fact amplified literally and figuratively by the central role of the media: we fight in every living room in the world as well as on the streets and fields of a conflict zone.

- **Our conflicts tend to be timeless**, since we are seeking a condition, which then must be maintained until an agreement on a definitive outcome, which may take years or decades.

- **We fight so as not to lose the force**, rather than fighting by using the force at any cost to achieve the aim.

- **On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons**: those constructed specifically for use in a battlefield, against soldiers and heavy armaments, now being adapted for our current conflicts since the tools of industrial war are often irrelevant to war among the people.

\textsuperscript{122} See Annex N: Confrontation Analysis.
• The sides are mostly non-state since we tend to conduct our conflicts and confrontations in some form of multinational grouping, whether it is an alliance or a coalition, and against some party or parties that are not states.

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Since the end of the Cold War force had been used time and again, yet failed to achieve the result expected: it has been misapplied, whilst in other cases leaders have shrunk from applying it because they could not see its utility. All the while they have intended to achieve a decisive victory which would resolve the problem they faced, usually political.

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[War is] the product of both a ‘trial of strength’ and a ‘clash of wills’... In our current circumstances it is actually the will of the people that is often the objective being sought — yet there is still a tendency to use overwhelming military force in the belief that winning the trial of strength will deliver the will of the opponent.

***

War is an imitative and reciprocal activity. In order to defeat an opponent in a long war one becomes more and more like him, and both sides end up feeding off the other.

***

Our institutions, civilian and military, have yet to adapt to this new reality [of war amongst the people] — each within itself and the intertwined world that leads to any decision on military action. Much the same is true of the international organisations that feed off the member states. They are all still embedded in the world of industrial war, seeking information and intelligence towards making decisions — on using force as much as the way it is used — without properly considering the enemy against which they seek to operate, or the consequences of the actions. Even if force is used to stop violence, it will not deliver the strategic decision sought by those who decide to apply it. For unlike industrial war, in war amongst the people no act of force will ever be decisive; winning the trial of strength will not deliver the will of the people, and at base that is the only true aim of any use of force in our modern conflicts.
Blurred distinctions

Rupert Smith is not alone in noting that as violent conflict between states has declined, it has morphed into something much more complex. According to Mary Kaldor, it now also involves:

A blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organised political groups for political motives), organised crime (violence undertaken by privately organised groups for private purposes, usually financial gain), and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organised groups against individuals).

In most of the literature, the new wars are described as internal or civil wars or else as ‘low-intensity conflict’. Yet although most of these wars are localised, they involve a myriad of transnational connections so that the distinction between internal and external, between aggression (attacks from abroad) and repression (attacks from within the country), or even between local and global, are difficult to sustain.

Features of ‘new’ wars

These ‘new’ wars and violent conflicts do not conform neatly to the model of the conflict cycle. They are dispersed (often over a large area) and change constantly, with localised crises of violence that can pass before conventional forces have time to react. For example, they often target civilians in terror campaigns, in which atrocities are used as weapons of war.

New wars can involve several groups of non-state actors, which coalesce in shifting alliances and can include regular forces that literally change in and out of uniform as the situation demands. This ‘shape-shifting’ renders them not only difficult to beat militarily but also difficult to negotiate with — a peace deal made with one group can be rejected by another or broken for a perceived advantage. Additionally, the groups might themselves be loose coalitions of individuals who have come together for a variety of different reasons — ideology, grievance or personal gain. According to Rupert Smith:

They might be the parties to a civil war or an insurgency, whether operating as formed armies or guerrillas or terrorist groups or the band of some warlord. In contrast to the formality of the [opposing] multinational organisation, and its dependency on the formulas and procedures that states impose on it so as to manage their affairs at least risk to themselves, the non-state actors appear formless. They often use political and military titles borrowed from the terminology of states, and use the nomenclatures of formed industrial armies to describe the organisation of their forces, but they are not states in either law or fact. Moreover, even if one or more sides appears to have a just or moral cause, one must not be fooled into assuming it is a formulated side, representing a position that is coherent with the majority of the population and with the structures and procedures to provide accountability. Such an unfounded assumption was the case with, for example, the US support for the KLA in 1999.

New wars and violent conflicts involving non-state actors can also persist for a long time — the ongoing violence between the Colombian government (supported by the US) and various paramilitary groups, drugs syndicates and leftist rebels started in the mid-1960s. A complex violent conflict has waxed and waned in Congo/Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo for even longer and continues in the east of the country, despite the presence of a UN force since 2000.

125 Smith, *Op cit*.
126 Despite progress in peace talks, the Colombian government reserves the right to continue military action against the rebels.
Drivers of new wars and violent conflicts

4.55 The late Professor Edward Azar identified four preconditions — drivers — for these new wars, which he called ‘protracted social conflicts’ (see Table 4.1).

4.56 Descriptions of the preconditions are below.

- **Communal content**: when the conflict tends to be between one or more identity groups and the state, which might itself be dominated by an identity group that it favours over the others. In such situations, even democratic elections can become highly charged — and often violent — ‘winner-take-all’ contests for control of state resources by competing identity groups.

- **Unmet needs**: conflict arises when ‘victim’ identity groups perceive that some combination of their security, development, political and cultural needs are being denied.

- **Governance problems**: the state is unable or unwilling to meet the legitimate needs of all its citizens equally; or worse, actively discriminates against or persecutes other identity groups. These problems lead to and are amplified in fragile and failing states.

- **International linkages**: the various identity groups — both dominant and victim — are supported by external actors (often of the same or sympathetic identity). This external support — with money, arms, personnel, expertise, sanctuary — can sustain the conflict long beyond the capacity of the local actors, leading to protracted stalemates and/or see-sawing fortunes.

Complicating factors — summary

4.57 In conclusion, a decision on whether, when and how to intervene to prevent a conflict escalating into violence is rarely straightforward. It involves developing understanding of the following.

- **The warning-response gap**: Systems need to be established not just to ensure that accurate information can quickly reach (all) the right people, but that an appropriate response can be formulated and acted upon.

- **International law**: To be legal in international law intervention in the conflicts of another state can only be (a) at the invitation of the state; (b) with a UNSC mandate; or (c) acting in self-defence of one’s self or another state. If the former, the impartiality of the intervener(s) might be challenged by other actors and probably compromised, especially if force is involved. International law is nevertheless difficult to uphold in the face of non-cooperation by states, especially the P5.

- **Politics**: If action is to be taken with a UN mandate, the realities of UN politics, especially UNSC politics, come into play. If action is to be taken without a UN mandate, the action becomes far more

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<th>Preconditions</th>
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<td>Communal content</td>
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<td>International linkages</td>
<td>Volume of arms imports, etc; cross-border fomentation</td>
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Table 4.1 — Features of ‘protracted social conflicts’

127 Professor of government and politics, and Head of the Centre for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, College Park, 1981-90.
serious, carries risk and would need widespread support – which may damage the international system in the round. In other words, actions have consequences, which might come in the form of opposition at home; or internationally as retaliation by other actors, and/or lack of cooperation now or in the future.

- **Operational challenges.** Where military intervention is concerned, operational challenges are formidable, whether the operation is badged by the UN or a regional organisation. A recent study concluded that ‘the UN has in fact proven to be no more or no less effective than international coalitions, operating under the legitimacy of a UN resolution, in leading military interventions to success in the post-Cold War era. Only two factors greatly influence the outcome of any such interventions: the political will of the international community and the regional adversaries’ interest in achieving a sustainable peace. Of these two factors, the latter is the dominant variable and must be the focus of international efforts when setting the conditions for mission success.’

- **‘New’ wars and violent conflicts.** The changing character of warfare has brought into question ‘the utility of force’; namely, to what extent can military intervention in such conflicts prove decisive in helping to deliver a desired political outcome? The challenges of these ‘new’ wars include both weak and failing states and non-state actors.

- **Weak and failing states.** The international system is structured to deal with, and through, national governments. When these national governments are of weak or failing states, the entry and exit points for preventive action (and all points in between) become difficult. Without a stable political settlement, violent conflict is likely to continue or recur.

- **Non-state actors.** The international system, including its military force, finds it difficult to deal with the challenges posed by armed non-state actors, especially when they are protean in nature and operate across jurisdictions, often ‘among the people’.

It is largely in light of these complications that a new paradigm is being sought.

### Section 3 – ‘Upstream’ prevention and peacebuilding

4.58 The most significant recent development in the field of armed conflict prevention is recognising the need to move away from crisis response and towards ‘upstream’ prevention and peacebuilding. That includes taking action to address the structural and cultural roots of violent conflict.

The term peacebuilding first emerged through the work of Johan Galtung over thirty years ago. In his essay *Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding*, Galtung called for the creation of peacebuilding structures to promote sustainable peace by addressing the ‘root causes’ of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution. The concept gained currency in peace studies and among practitioners of conflict transformation in the following decades, but its widespread acceptance had to await the end of the Cold War.

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4.59 This recognition has led to the inclusion of a growing number of non-military and non-government actors in prevention initiatives — academics, specialist non-governmental organisations and many other civil society actors. If we do now have ‘war among the people’, it is perhaps no surprise that ‘the people’ are becoming more involved in ending them. Increasing, too, is an understanding that to be effective and sustainable, upstream prevention has to be:

- **multilevel** — analysis and action has to address all levels of the conflict and the complex interplay between them — the personal (inner conflict), interpersonal and inter-group (families, neighbourhoods, associations), national, international, regional and global levels;

- **multidisciplinary** — analysis and action is best when it draws on a wide range of disciplines including politics, the law (domestic, international and regional), economics, international relations, military studies, development studies, individual and personal psychology, religion and cultural studies — in short, whatever offers potentially helpful insights into the conflict and its drivers; and

- **multicultural** — human conflict is present in all societies around the world and non-violent approaches to conflict have been developed everywhere; while many of these are culture-specific, others can be adapted to different contexts.

**Local first**

4.60 Evidence is also pointing to the conclusion that upstream prevention must be **locally-led.** Writing in 2011, Chetan Kumar of the UN Development Programme’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery observed that ‘eighty-seven countries in all of the world’s regions can currently be identified as facing the prospects of potential violence, prolonged deadlock, or a relapse into violent conflict over the next 2-3 year period’. The beginnings of this seem to be appearing — the 2014 Global Peace Index notes that ‘the world has become less peaceful; since 2008 111 countries have deteriorated in levels of peace, while only 52 have improved’.

4.61 One consequence of these trends is that local civilian initiatives to prevent, transform, resolve and heal after violent conflict are increasing. In 2001 the Oxford Research Group was able to identify 400 such initiatives worldwide, of which it reported on 50 of the most effective. Currently, the total identifiable initiatives are estimated to be at least five times that number.

4.62 Adopting a prevention strategy that is locally-led has a number of benefits that bypass several of the complications associated with the current model of preventive action. Local actors tend to have most knowledge about local conflicts and, therefore,

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129 Locally-led: local organisations design and implement the strategy, international non-governmental organisations fund-raise for it and may provide other forms of support, and donors fund. This contrasts with ‘locally implemented’ — donors design, international non-governmental organisations contract, local non-governmental organisations deliver; and ‘locally owned’ — international non-governmental organisations devise programmes, donors fund, and locals are consulted on the detailed design and implementation of the programme.


131 Global Peace Index 2014, Institute For Economics and Peace.


133 The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict lists 1030 organisations (some of which are governmental and inter-governmental organisations) [www.conflict-prevention.net](http://www.conflict-prevention.net). Search for Common Ground works with organisations in 22 countries, Peace Direct lists more than 500 organisations on [www.insightonconflict.org](http://www.insightonconflict.org). The UN Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery has established a Portal listing 577 organisations under ‘peacebuilding/conflict management’. [http://www.peacebuildingportal.org](http://www.peacebuildingportal.org) taking into account some overlap, the total is now in excess of 2,000.
• they are best-placed to develop local early-warning systems of growing crises, and to respond swiftly;
• they care most about the outcome and have most to gain in seeing disputes settled; they are also less likely to leave than external actors;
• the legitimacy and legalities of external intervention are usually irrelevant;
• local capacity for conflict management is developed, which helps sustain lasting change; and
• they are considerably cheaper than external interventions.

4.63 Locally-led initiatives typically suffer major challenges; for example, lack of money and other resources, poor organisation and infrastructure, and lack of trained personnel. Even so, a locally-led response to the violence that erupted in Kenya at the turn of 2007-08 shows what is possible when these obstacles are overcome.

How to stop a civil war? Locally-led 'bottom-up-top-down' responses - Kenya, 2008

The value of a ‘local first’ approach can be seen in the response of a small group of civil society actors to the violence that erupted in Kenya at the announcement of the presidential election results on 30 December 2007.

The violence quickly evolved from apparent spontaneity to well-orchestrated attacks and counter-attacks involving massacres, arson, looting, rape, evictions and dispossession. Ethnic tensions surfaced, camouflaged by a façade of political affiliation. The police response added to the violence and deaths. In less than two months, more than 1,300 people were killed - almost half within the first two weeks - while more than 500,000 people were displaced from their homes. Kenya seemed to be on the brink of disintegration.

The situation was turned around by the swift ‘bottom-up’ intervention of a citizen diplomacy group, the Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP), which paved the way for the official ‘top-down’ mediation by the African Union’s Panel of Eminent Personalities, led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

This locally-led ‘bottom-up-top-down’ combination culminated in the National Peace and Reconciliation Accord of 28 February 2008, which established a power-sharing Grand Coalition Government.

The National Peace and Reconciliation Accord – Kofi Annan, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga
Swift action

Less than 24 hours after the announcement of the contested results, five Kenyan citizens came together to analyse the situation. They were:

- Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat — renowned mediator and former Special Envoy to Somalia;
- General Daniel Opande (Rtd) — former UN peacekeeper in Namibia, Liberia and Sierra Leone;
- General Lazaro Sumbeiywo (Rtd) — served as Special Envoy to the Sudanese peace process (1997-98) and then as mediator (2001-05);
- Dekha Ibrahim Abdi — global peacemaker, winner of the 2007 Right Livelihood Award (the ‘alternative Nobel Peace Prize’); the only female in the core group, she was invited by the other four to be the Chairperson; and
- George Wachira — policy advisor with Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa.

These five, all highly experienced in conflict management and peacebuilding, became the core of a movement known as the Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP). Seeing the void in national leadership, they realised that violence was likely to erupt and that decisive action was needed. Working publicly and behind the scenes, they mobilised peace-minded volunteers and professionals from a wide spectrum of Kenyan society into a web of preventive action that stands out on several counts.

- Speed — the core team mobilised only hours after the onset of violence. This early engagement, in the form of televised appeals for peace and dialogue, was critical at a time when the country appeared to be on the edge of complete collapse. The peace-builders’ initial focus was to plead publicly and privately with the political leadership for dialogue, while calling on Kenyans to stop the violence and wanton destruction of property.
- The CCP mobilised a web of actors committed to non-violent negotiation as a means of resolving the crisis. They included: media and business professionals; political analysts and writers; university vice-chancellors and student leaders; government officials, the police and the military; religious leaders and politicians.
- CCP quickly established an open and inclusive public posture, inviting any willing Kenyan to participate in its activities while at the same time engaging in quiet and confidential diplomacy. Their daily Open Forum quickly generated a wide range of ideas for action, which were matched with the available funds and volunteer time. Working Committees were formed, while ‘Concern’ became a brand name used by other affiliates of CCP — Concerned Writers of Kenya, Concerned Women and Concerned Youth for Peace to name a few. In the first month of the crisis, the Open Forum became the place where Kenyans from all walks of life came together for several hours every day to reflect, analyse, strategise — and act.
- CCP set the pace for the international mediation process by initiating the visit of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, by briefing the Eminent Persons, and by interacting with the process led by Kofi Annan — the CCP’s base, the Serena Hotel, was also the venue for the formal mediation process, creating an ideal link for CCP.
Key initiatives

The connections generated in the Open Forum enabled CCP to take several initiatives, they:

- urged the public to stop the violence while also pressing politicians at all levels to resolve the crisis through dialogue;
- engaged with the formal mediation process from the very beginning;
- worked strategically with the media — television, print, radio, electronic, blogs, and texting; Kenyans topping up their pay-as-you-go mobiles would receive an automatic message urging them not to take violent action;
- worked with public institutions to prevent the spread of the violence;
- worked with the private business sector;
- worked across lines of tribe, ethnicity and religion, at all levels of society;
- offered practical support for mourning, confidence-building and healing; and
- supported local-level actions by key individuals and groups to avert and respond to the violence.

This last point is key and warrants more detail:

"One of the methods they used [to stop the killing] was to ask the sixty thousand members of a women’s organisation, who had cell phones, to look out of their windows and report what they saw. The information started pouring in. They began to plot not only the hot spots of the violence but also the cold spots, since it was important to know where people were running to, so they could be protected. They then began to develop strategies for each spot, with the help of trusted local leaders, to work out together how they could stop the killing without using force. Almost miraculously, in less than three weeks, with the help of community, youth and church leaders; sports personalities; the police; and the media, these strategies brought the violence under control."

134 Scilla Elworthy, Dekha Ibrahim Abdi Obituary, Guardian, 9 August 2011 (Dekha Ibrahim died on 14 July 2011 from injuries sustained in a car accident).

Additionally, Generals Sumbeiywo and Opande were able to assure the CCP — and through it the wider populace — that the Kenyan army would not become involved in the conflict on either side, an impartiality possible thanks to earlier reforms that had professionalised the military and ensured an ethnic balance.

Without CCP’s intervention, Kenya could have collapsed into civil war. Deep-seated problems could have been exacerbated by the violent dynamics of the moment. CCP’s actions can be seen as an example of the crucial need, at a time of crisis, to create an ‘enabling environment’ that helps to prevent self-destruction and encourages everyone to focus on identifying and resolving the conflict’s underlying causes. Specifically, the CCP’s strategy was:

- to stop the violence, not to solve the conflicts (plural, because many past and present grievances were folded into the violence); and
- to approach leaders at all levels of society simultaneously with this aim.  

135 See Lederach’s ‘peace pyramid’, Chapter 1.
Its success was built on:

- the legitimacy of the core CCP actors — their authority, impartiality and experience;
- a speedy, well-informed response, driven by use of the Ushahidi text/web platform, which gave prompt situation reports; and the Open Forum, whose openness and inclusion generated effective ideas for action;
- dialogue and non-violence; and
- an appeal to a higher goal/prize — ‘Kenya’.

The total cost of CCP’s actions was roughly USD 200,000, donated at short notice following urgent requests to international non-governmental organisations. The violence in Kenya lost its economy an estimated USD 3.6 billion in the short-term and depressed GDP going forward. How much higher this would have been — not just for Kenya but the entire region — had the CPP not been formed and intervened as it did is impossible to say. A UN Development Programme paper on the national and regional effects of the instability in the Cote D’Ivoire in 2011 offers some indication.136

Once the conflict had entered a much less violent phase, peacebuilding activities started to transform the conflicts’ structural and cultural roots with the aim of gradually eradicating the indirect violence. One such initiative was introducing a new constitution, which was endorsed by 67% of Kenyan voters in an overwhelmingly peaceful referendum in 2010. In addition, the lessons identified in 2007-08 were applied successfully to the parliamentary and presidential elections in March 2013, which were once again largely non-violent.

However, contentious structural issues remain in Kenyan society and work continues to transform the conflicts arising from them.

Transforming the ‘iceberg’ of violence

4.64 Bearing in mind the injunction of ‘local first’, this section looks at upstream prevention and broader civil society engagement in peacebuilding, using as a framing model a transformation of Galtung’s violence (DSC) triangle (see Figure 4.4 overleaf).

4.65 If direct violence is sustained by, and the manifestation of, structural and cultural violence, it follows that transforming each point of the violence triangle is necessary to bring lasting peace. Direct peace is sustained by, and the manifestation of, structural and cultural peace, and the more a society develops the aspects suggested here, the more it will be able to manage its inevitable conflicts creatively and without violence.

4.66 The aspects featured here are by no means exhaustive137 and all warrant discussion. For now, though, we will examine one or two aspects from each point of the triangle — civilian peacekeeping and mediation (direct peace); infrastructures for peace and arms control (structural peace); and attitudes to women (cultural peace).

137 For a wider range of components and subcomponents of the field of peacebuilding and their relationship to each other see Annex P: Peacebuilding Pathways
Preventing direct violence — civilian (and unarmed military) peacekeeping

4.67 For some, the notion of confronting direct violence with nonviolence can seem idealistic, ineffective or even dangerous folly. The idea of extending the use of unarmed civilian peacekeepers might therefore seem especially challenging.

4.68 Civilian peacekeeping has been defined as: the prevention or control of direct violence through influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators by unarmed civilians who are deployed on the ground.\textsuperscript{138} It can be carried out by local groups, external actors or a mix of the two and, despite the term ‘civilian’, military personnel might also be involved. The key element is that no one carries a weapon. Civilian peacekeeping embraces a number of activities.

- Civilian missions with protection mandates deployed by governments or intergovernmental organisations (for example, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Verification Mission; the Truce/Peace Monitoring Mission in Bougainville; EU observers in Georgia).
- Non-partisan protective accompaniment of human rights activists in many countries (for example, Guatemala, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Colombia) so that they can do their work without fear of being kidnapped or murdered.
- Humanitarian protection by aid, development and human rights organisations.
- Larger-scale unarmed civilian peacekeeping by non-governmental organisations (for example, Nonviolent Peaceforce in Mindanao, Myanmar, South Caucasus).
- Preventing violence during particularly volatile situations, for example, when elections or referenda are upcoming.
- Protecting vulnerable groups and communities (for examples, protection of internally displaced persons or ethnic minorities)

• Human and civil rights monitoring can also be seen as part of civilian peacekeeping since it usually has an element of direct protection of victims.
• Protection of activist communities, such as those in Colombia that declared themselves peace zones.

4.69 As the paper cited on the subject explains, ‘civilian peacekeeping is based on the presence of people, be it people calling themselves civilian peacekeepers, accompaniers or humanitarian workers. But it is much more than presence, monitoring, accompaniment and inter-positioning, the activities of civilian peacekeepers most often listed. Civilian Peacekeeping is usually multi-dimensional — it is at least as much about bringing parties in conflict together and building capacity of local communities — and that goes for most governmental missions as well as for peace teams.’

4.70 There are five main types of unarmed peacekeeping:
• unarmed military;
• international police (for example, deployed under UN mandate);
• unarmed civilians with an international mandate (for example, UN and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe observers);
• unarmed civilians from civil society (for example, humanitarian and human rights non-governmental organisations or journalists); and
• unarmed civilians with special skills and mandate for peacekeeping (such as Nonviolent Peaceforce).

Each type acts differently, according to its composition and mandate.

4.71 Advocates of civilian peacekeeping claim that unarmed international peacekeepers have subtle and often highly effective sources of power.
• They can be protected from violence because they are respected per se or because the countries or organisations they come from enjoy respect.
• The fact that internationals are protected can be transmitted to individuals, groups and communities they are accompanying — a potential perpetrator risks hurting or killing these internationals if they attack.
• The potential perpetrator risks internationals reporting misdeeds to a wider audience, which may lead to direct or indirect repercussions for them. ‘The world is watching’ has often proved a powerful deterrent.
• Internationals and locals may be protected because of the standing they have within the local community (for example, village elders) and again transmit this standing to the community as a whole.

4.72 None of these protection sources is guaranteed, however. Perpetrators may be aware of these factors and disregard them, or there may be countries and areas where internationals are hated for, rather than protected by, their status as outsiders. In short, as with armed peacekeeping, civilian peacekeeping brings its own challenges.

4.73 Nevertheless, one of the roles of the military deployed in upstream engagement could be to see how the use of unarmed peacekeepers — civilian, military or a mix of the two — could be extended to help de-escalate local conflicts. As the title of the paper quoted says, this is a ‘barely tapped resource’.
Understanding prevention

4.74 Creating a culture and structures, nationally and internationally, where early expert mediation is available to conflict actors has obvious implications for upstream prevention. The term ‘mediation’ refers broadly to any process where a (usually neutral) third party helps two or more actors to resolve a dispute. It has been used in various forms for centuries but came to the fore in recent years in the commercial arena. Here it is used as an alternative to seeking resolution through a formal legal process, hence the term ‘alternative dispute resolution’.

4.75 Alternative dispute resolution is now common in a range of different contexts — family, neighbour and community disputes, public policy disputes and increasingly in restorative justice processes between victims and offenders in criminal cases. It is also standard as part of the civil legal process in a number of jurisdictions.

4.76 There are several different forms of alternative dispute resolution and mediation.

- **Arbitration.** The parties agree on an impartial party — the arbitrator — to hear and decide the dispute. The parties either agree in advance to be bound by the arbitrator’s decision and award, or agree that any decision can be appealed to court.

- **Conciliation.** This involves efforts by a third party to improve the relationship between two or more disputants by correcting misunderstandings, reducing fear and distrust, and generally improving communication between them. This can result in dispute settlement or pave the way for a mediation process.

- **Mediation.** The parties agree on an impartial third party — the mediator — who conveys information between the parties and assists them in trying to reach a

Two reports from the Truce/Peace Monitoring Mission in Bougainville

‘While on the topic of security it is probably worth commenting on the concept of being unarmed. This is an interesting concept for military personnel but one that is apparently becoming more common in peace operations. There is no doubt in my mind that being unarmed in Bougainville is the correct posture. Relying on the Bougainville people to ensure the safety of peace monitors reinforces the message that peace for Bougainville is the responsibility of the people of Bougainville. They are only too aware that should the safety of the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) be placed at risk, there is a very real danger that the peace process will falter. This was emphasised on a number of occasions when Bougainvillians assisted patrols in difficult circumstance. The PMG provides the environment for the peace process, and many fear the consequences should they depart.’


‘The decision to go to Bougainville unarmed created some angst in the Australian Defence Force at the time, but it was the right one. At least two occasions I encountered may have gone differently if we had been armed. Perhaps more fundamentally, the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) experience reaffirmed for me that the role of peacekeepers is to not only stand between the warring sides to prevent more suffering but also to encourage the coming together of divided people.’

Andrew Rice, Australian Department of Defence, 1999

Quoted in *Civilian Peacekeeping: A Barely Tapped Resource.*
settlement of the dispute. There are four different types of mediation:

- **facilitative mediation** — the parties are encouraged to negotiate based upon their needs and interests instead of their strict legal rights;
- **settlement mediation** — the parties are encouraged to compromise in order to settle the disputes between them;
- **transformative mediation** — the parties are encouraged to deal with underlying causes of their problems with a view to repairing their relationship as the basis for settlement; and
- **evaluative mediation** — the parties are encouraged to reach settlement according to their rights and entitlements within the anticipated range of court remedies.

4.77 The benefits of mediation are recognised as:

- **speed** — it is not uncommon for even long-running and complex disputes to be settled in a fraction of the time that a court case would take;
- **cost** — as mediated cases can usually be settled more quickly than in court, and usually with fewer people involved, the costs are correspondingly lower;
- **control** — the mediation process remains wholly in the hands of the actors; the mediator facilitates the discussions and can offer various suggestions but is never able to impose anything;
- **flexibility** — although the process is structured it can adapt quite easily to the needs of the actors; the outcome is also shaped by the actors; and
- **compliance** — as the outcome is reached by the mutual consent of the actors, who have been directly involved throughout the process, compliance with mediated agreements is normally high; mediation anyway tends to encourage compromise and win-win agreements.

**Migration into the political sphere**

4.78 The benefits of professional mediation are prompting its steady move into the political arena, albeit with some confusion. In politics, the words ‘mediation’, ‘diplomacy’, ‘dialogue’, ‘discussion’, ‘talks’ and ‘negotiation’ are often used interchangeably, even though they have specific and distinct meanings. Dialogue is not negotiation, for example, and diplomacy is not mediation. Neither is what often passes for mediation in international politics a process that many professionals in the field would recognise. Even high level ‘mediators’ have little (if any) training in the necessary skills and methods and have to rely on their experience as (usually retired) politicians and diplomats.

**The Mediation Support Unit**

4.79 Leading the strengthening of mediation at the international level is the UN’s Mediation Support Unit (MSU). Established in 2006, the MSU provides professional support to ‘good offices’ activities, including preventive diplomacy and the mediation of disputes. The MSU serves a wide range of clients — including the UN system and member states, regional organisations and various peacemaking entities — by offering support in the:

- technical and operational aspects of peace processes;
- strengthening of mediation capacity of the UN, its partners and parties to a conflict; and
- development and dissemination of mediation guidance, lessons learned and best practices.

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140 See Annex U for a glossary of terms commonly used in peace studies and conflict management.
This support is provided by full-time staff and a ‘mediation roster’ of senior mediators, operational-level mediators and technical-level experts, managed by the MSU on behalf of the Department of Political Affairs. Additionally, the MSU organises a ‘standby team’ of mediation experts who can be deployed within 72 hours.

### Do no harm and conflict sensitivity

The concept of ‘do no harm’ articulates the issues that external actors need to consider when planning any kind of intervention in a local conflict. The extract below has been adapted from *What is Peacebuilding?* by K Van Brabant of Interpeace.

For any action or intervention in conflict, a minimum obligation is that it respects the principle of ‘do no harm’. It should consciously look for, and seek to avoid or mitigate negative impacts. Examples of negative impacts, even of peacebuilding interventions, would be:

- worsening divisions between conflicting groups;
- increasing danger for participants in peace activities;
- reinforcing structural or overt violence;
- diverting human and material resources from productive peace activities;
- increasing cynicism; or
- disempowering local people.

Conflict sensitive actions and programming seek to consciously avoid or minimise negative impacts (do no harm) and equally consciously try to create positive impacts on the conflict dynamics. Conflict-sensitivity has been promoted out of concerns about the inadvertent negative effects of interventions, projects and other efforts that have been ‘conflict blind’.

It is not possible to work with conflict sensitivity without solid conflict analysis. Genuine attempts to work conflict-sensitively also draw attention beyond the approach of our own agencies to that of others in the same operating environment.

Understanding a context from a conflict-sensitive perspective helps agencies to understand that their own positive contributions to mitigating violence can easily be frustrated by carelessness from a conflict-blind or conflict-insensitive organisation operating in the same area. This realisation encourages organisations that wish to be conflict-sensitive to strategically engage with organisations they might otherwise choose not to engage with.

### Mediation and the prevention of violent conflict

Experienced mediators have identified a number of key areas where embedding professional mediation skills, or using professionals, within national governments or regional organisations can support preventive action. These key areas are below.

- Planning, implementing and evaluating dialogue — impartial mediators are skilled in helping conflict actors shape the what, how, who, when and where of the talks process, keeping it on track; and evaluating fairly the extent to which any agreement is being implemented.
- Crisis provides opportunity — actors will often seek an immediate solution to a conflict and avoid the more difficult long-term issues. While this conflict resolution approach has its merits, an expertly run mediation also offers the chance to establish an ongoing conflict
transformation process to address underlying problems. In this way the likelihood of conflict recurring in the future is reduced.

• Talking with the enemy — skilful mediation also offers the opposing actors the chance to learn how to talk constructively with each other, which can help them develop a capacity to deal jointly with future problems.

**Countering structural violence — Infrastructures for Peace (I4P)**

4.82 Whereas a mediation process typically addresses the immediate challenges of direct peace, ‘infrastructures for peace’ address the need for enduring and robust pillars of structural peace. These locally-embedded systems rely on, and help to further develop, a society’s inherent capacity to resolve conflict upstream, before it turns violent.

**Limits of mediation**

4.83 External mediation is not always possible or appropriate in situations of threatened or actual violence — the conflict might be too extensive throughout different levels in society, for example, or the host government hostile to ‘interference’. In such cases:

• external mediation may need to be complemented or substituted, where entry points do not exist, with the development and application of national and local capacities for conflict prevention and for internal mediation;

• such capacities can be described as *infrastructures for peace*, or the ‘dynamic network of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in a society’.

4.84 Infrastructures for peace can take various forms, which can be combined together.

• National, District and Local Peace Councils comprised of trusted and highly respected persons of integrity, competence and experience in transforming conflicts, who can bridge political divides.

• National peace platforms/forums for consultation, collaboration and coordination of peace issues by relevant actors and stakeholders.

• A government bureau, department or Ministry of Peace (building).

4.85 Additionally, new forms might be introduced, based on successful initiatives elsewhere. For example, civil society groups like Kenya’s Concerned Citizens for Peace might be established in other fragile and conflict-affected countries (adapted to local conditions), to devise and rehearse contingency plans to prevent or mitigate violence at times of tension.

**Benefits of infrastructures for peace**

4.86 Infrastructures for peace can strengthen existing approaches in four main ways.

a. Managing recurrent conflicts over land, natural resources, apportioning mineral wealth, and contested elections, especially where development itself has exacerbated these conflicts.

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b. Finding internal solutions, through a mediated consensus or a multi-stakeholder dialogue, to specific conflicts and tensions, especially in circumstances where concerns over sovereignty are paramount.

c. Complementing external mediation targeted at the primary parties with internal negotiations that bring together actors at different levels of the society and polity, often inaccessible to itinerant external mediation, or a wider group of stakeholders, including civil society, thus broadening the base for peace.

d. Negotiating and implementing new governing arrangements in an inclusive and consensual manner, especially after periods of turbulent political or socioeconomic transition.

Closing the warning-response gap

4.87 Infrastructures for peace can also significantly close the warning-response gap discussed earlier, since local crowd-sourced information (made possible by collating information from SMS texts, emails and social media sites like Facebook and Twitter) can prompt a local, much faster and more directed upstream response.

Countries implementing infrastructures for peace

4.88 The concept is currently being implemented in several countries around the world, supported by the UN Development Programme and the Department of Political Affairs, and is being explored by several more. They include:

- Afghanistan
- Costa Rica
- Ghana
- Kenya
- Kyrgyzstan
- Nepal
- Peru
- Sierra Leone
- Solomon Islands
- South Sudan
- The Philippines
- Timor-Leste
- Togo
- Uganda

Infrastructure for peace in Ghana

Twenty-three violent conflicts were recorded in the three northern regions of Ghana between 1980 and 2002. Many community-based and inter-ethnic conflicts were viewed as intractable because of a failing justice system: many court cases were not resolved. When violence erupted, official Commissions of Inquiry were established. However, their recommendations were not implemented, leaving a number of unresolved conflicts.

After the slaying of the King of Dagbon and many of his elders in 2002, the regional government established the Northern Region Peace Advocacy Council. Its role, as a mediation and conflict resolution mechanism, was to deal with the issues of trust among the factions, as restoring confidence and relationships was crucial.

With the success of the Northern Region Peace Advocacy Council, the government decided to explore the idea of extending peace councils nationwide. Consultations were held with many different stakeholders at local, regional and national level. These led to the ‘National Architecture for Peace’ being developed, which consists of representatives of relevant stakeholders as well as individuals who enjoy high levels of trust and respect in society. Councils are served by a body of professional Peace Promotion Officers, connected to ten Regional Peace Advisory Councils.
The National Architecture for Peace in Ghana was unveiled by the Ministry of Interior in May 2006. The National Peace Council (NPC) played a major role in ensuring peaceful elections in 2008 and a smooth transfer of power, through discreet meetings with stakeholders that defused considerable tension.

In November 2010, the National Peace Council Bill was presented to Parliament with the aim of enhancing the peace infrastructure of Ghana, and was unanimously passed in March 2011. The enhanced functions of the National Peace Council are to:

- harmonise and coordinate conflict prevention, management and resolution and build sustainable peace through networking and coordination;
- strengthen capacities in relation to its objectives;
- facilitate the amicable resolution of conflicts through mediation and other connected processes;
- monitor, report and offer indigenous perspectives and solutions to conflicts in the country; and
- promote understanding about the values of reconciliation, tolerance, confidence building, mediation and dialogue as responses to conflict.

The National Peace Council is independent, with a Board of 13 eminent persons appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State; eight members are representatives from religious bodies.

The National Peace Council also has Regional and District Peace Councils, which consist of 13 persons whose responsibilities include public education, sensitisation and awareness of conflict indicators within the region.

Peace education has been given to selected youths from all the regions in the country to become Peace Advocates within their communities.

Capacity building programmes were established with the three main political parties to strengthen their capacities to manage diversity and conflicting interests.

**Challenges.** Regional Peace Advisory Councils have been established in most regions, but not all. In some regions, they were merged with regional security structures. Some District Peace Advisory Councils have been established and Peace Promotion Officers have been appointed in most regions.

**‘Local first’ is more (cost) effective**

4.89 Chetan Kumar of the UN Development Programme, who has worked on developing infrastructures for peace in several countries, notes that “Traditionally, national and local actors did development — the vaccination of children and the building of roads — and international diplomats and NGOs did conflict prevention or resolution, or the mediation of conflicts in primarily developing countries.”

4.90 Kumar’s experience has convinced him that the infrastructure for peace approach towards conflict management actually works and it is possible to equip national and local actors to resolve conflicts, prevent violence and build consensus over contentious issues in an inclusive and credible manner. ‘And this approach is cost-effective,’ he says, noting that:

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World military expenditure totalled $1.75 trillion in 2013, a fall of 1.9 per cent in real terms since 2012. The fall in the global total comes from decreases in Western countries, led by the United States, and despite increases in all other regions. In fact, military spending in the rest of the world excluding the USA increased by 1.8 per cent.

The next three highest spenders — China, Russia and Saudi Arabia — all made substantial increases, with Saudi Arabia leapfrogging the United Kingdom, Japan and France to become the world’s fourth largest military spender. China, Russia and Saudi Arabia are among the 23 countries around the world that have more than doubled their military expenditure since 2004.

The fall in US spending in 2013, by 7.8 per cent, is the result of the end of the war in Iraq, the beginning of the drawdown from Afghanistan, and the effects of automatic budget cuts passed by the US Congress in 2011. Meanwhile, austerity policies continued to determine trends in Western and Central Europe and in other Western countries.\(^{146}\)

4.91 Infrastructures for peace’s development seems to be gathering pace.\(^{144}\) For example, in 2013, regional consultations were held in Ghana and Lesotho to discuss establishing national infrastructures for peace more widely. The one in Ghana was organised by the national government, in cooperation with Economic Community of West African States, the African Union and UNDP. The meeting in Lesotho was organised by the government of Lesotho, Southern African Development Community, the African Union and UNDP. Both meetings resulted in declarations being signed aimed at commitments by member states of the two regional organisations to establish national infrastructures for peace. The Accra Declaration explicitly stated that stakeholders in member states shall establish national infrastructures for peace within three years, with national plans of action to be developed that seek to transform structural dynamics, based on conflict risk assessments, and taking advantage of the existing capacities and opportunities available within civil society, government, security services, the private sector, etc.\(^{145}\)

### Countering structural violence — arms control

4.92 Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation are contentious issues for many working in development and the field of peace and conflict studies. They argue that conventional arms transfers, which are currently increasing to emerging and developing countries, not only fuel violent conflict — or the capacity for it — but also divert resources away from activities that support human security, such as economic development, education and health.

4.93 For example, in 2013 world military expenditure totalled USD 1.75 trillion. At the same time, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization reported that only USD 3 billion was being delivered of the USD 16 billion needed annually from foreign donors to achieve good quality basic education for all in low income countries by 2015. As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute notes:

> Results in Guyana, Bolivia, Ghana, Kenya, and Timor Leste were achieved, for instance, for approximately only USD 15 million. This is slightly less than the average cost of a DDR program in a post-conflict country.\(^{143}\)

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146 [http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2014/Milex_April_2014](http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2014/Milex_April_2014)
4.94 Those who defend arms transfers argue that all states have a right to self-defence. Defence industries provide many jobs worldwide, and the global arms market is regulated by a growing regime of treaties and agreements, not least the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty.

4.95 Despite these arguments, the upstream prevention of violent conflict includes the need for further controls on the development, manufacture and trade in conventional weapons. As the non-governmental organisation Saferworld explains:

“Existing national, regional, and international controls on the transfer of arms leave gaps and loopholes that undermine their effective regulation. Work is required at every level in order to strengthen the application of these controls so as to curb, more effectively, the proliferation and misuse of conventional arms. Effective controls are those which prevent transfers of arms that increase the risk of violent conflict, or undermine human rights, development, or good governance. In addition, if the international community is to tackle the problem effectively, it also needs to confront the availability and misuse of arms, and in particular small arms, that are already in circulation.”

4.96 On 31 October 2000, the UNSC unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace and security. This was the first time the UNSC had addressed the disproportionate and particular impact of armed conflict on women, and recognised the undervalued and poorly used contributions they make to all aspects of conflict management and peacebuilding. It also stressed the importance of women’s equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security.

4.97 Transforming limiting cultural attitudes and behaviour towards women, and the structures which support such limits, takes more than just passing a UNSC resolution, of course, and efforts continue in many societies around the world to implement the principles articulated in UNSCR 1325. The text below (taken from the UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security: 2014 – 2017) highlights the challenges as currently seen by the UK government, with some suggested solutions.

Peace processes in conflict-affected states have historically failed to include women or represent women’s and girls’ interests meaningfully. Rather, women and girls can sometimes be seen as passive victims with little regard for how they can promote peace and foster security, ignoring the fact that they are often active peacebuilders at local, national and international levels and have a right to participate in these processes. When decisions are made and agendas set, women’s and girls’ voices are often not heard and their skills, experience, needs and knowledge are not taken into account. Women then have little or no opportunity to influence and implement the decisions that are made about rebuilding their country and shaping their lives and those of their communities. Without their rightful participation in the negotiation and policy-making process, an unbalanced and unsustainable peace is secured, which ignores the needs of half the population.

147 See Annex Q: Major Arms Control Treaties and Agreements.
Post-conflict, strong peace agreements and constitutional reform processes can ensure women’s rights are strengthened and built into legal frameworks. Donor funding to grassroots women’s and girls’ organisations during and post-conflict can provide women with new resources, training and networking opportunities that enable women to participate meaningfully. Increased availability of micro-credit can expand market opportunities for female petty traders, improving the self-sufficiency and living standards of women and increasing their bargaining position within their family. We need to build on these opportunities and ensure that the voices of women and girls are heard before, during and after a peace agreement, and their contribution welcomed.

However, women’s formal participation is not enough. This doesn’t guarantee women’s influence in decision-making, nor attach priority to gender equality. Too often, women’s participation is tokenistic, included as an afterthought. So, inclusion must be meaningful. Work must be done at the grassroots to build women’s and girl’s leadership skills, education, networks and political know-how. Women must be involved in setting the terms of their participation and inclusion to enable them to broaden the scope of peace agreements and ensure consideration and agreement on a society’s full set of priorities, laying the foundations for an equitable, just and lasting peace.

Women’s participation should not only be political. Social, civil and economic participation should count equally. Discrimination against women and girls can mean that it is difficult for them to move about, speak out in public or take on public roles. In times of conflict, this can mean many women struggle to get jobs outside of low paid sectors. Ensuring the social and economic needs of women and girls are considered, along with those of men and boys, is therefore critical to meeting the needs of the whole population.

In October 2013, the UK led the UN Security Council in adopting Resolution 2122, which aimed to move forward women’s participation, focusing on making women’s leadership of peace a reality. It also moves the debate away from a clichéd image of women as merely victims of violence, only being consulted on the subset of issues considered relevant to them.

Representative and legitimate political systems make for societies which meet people’s basic needs, respect their human rights and make opportunities for social and economic development open to all. Systems that marginalise women and girls are neither representative nor legitimate. With women involved, the chances of sustainable peace are far greater. At national and local levels, ways to communicate early warning of conflict can help prevent violence. At all stages of designing and implementing early warning systems women, men, boys and girls must be involved, as certain factors may be more evident to women than men, such as gender-based violence, and risk being missed or ignored if women and girls are not included.

To make for real change, the international community needs to address the underlying root causes of the barriers that limit women’s participation at all levels of peace processes, including pushing for access to education and changing attitudes towards women’s participation. Only then will there be an enabling environment in which women can fully and freely participate in building peace at the local, regional and national levels.
4.98 We need to ask what role military forces are playing, if any, in supporting the principles of UNSCR 1325 — internally, within their own structures and attitudes; during the prevention of violent conflict; and more broadly in the societies which they serve. Additionally, how might military forces have to evolve further to fulfil that role, especially during upstream engagement in the prevention of violent conflict?

A comprehensive approach

4.99 As noted earlier, the World Development Report 2011 (WDR 2011) examined in depth the close relationship between violent conflict, poor governance and poverty in fragile and conflict-affected states around the world. The recommendations that came out of the WDR 2011 reflect the realisation that since the problems are closely interrelated, the solutions have to be conceived and implemented so as to support one another (here again the influence of Galtung’s DSC triangle can be seen).

4.100 The recommendations have contributed to the formulation of proposals for the Sustainable Development Goals, which should be agreed by the international community the end of 2015. Goal 16 focuses on promoting ‘peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, [that] provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.’ It seeks to remedy the failure of the Millennium Development Goals to make any reference to peace, citizen security or justice, let alone set targets for them, despite these being key expectations of people in fragile and conflict-affected states. In detail, Goal 16 seeks to:

- significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere;
- end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children;
- promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all;
- by 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organized crime;
- substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms;
- develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels;
- ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels;
- broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance;
- by 2030 provide legal identity for all including birth registration;
- ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements;
- strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacities at all levels, in particular in developing countries, for preventing violence and combating terrorism and crime; and
- promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development.

150 See Annex C.

151 See http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html. Sustainable Development Goals refer to an agreement of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012 (Rio+20), to develop a set of future international development goals as successors to the Millennium Development Goals.
In early 2014, an open letter suggesting a range of specific targets for this Sustainable Development Goal was sent to the UN by 33 civil society organisations that are directly or indirectly engaged in the prevention of violent conflict, violence reduction and peacebuilding in a range of countries. In many ways the thinking behind the choice of targets returns us to the beginning of this paper and the discussion on the human domain. The letter states, for instance, ‘that if the framework is to drive meaningful change, targets need to look beyond institutions and processes and instead focus on outcomes for people; outcomes that need to be set and assessed against both objective measurements and the perceptions of the people involved.

In other words, these organisations place the individual human being at the centre of the picture, both objectively and subjectively, and suggest targets that seek to reduce all the factors – not just the obvious and immediate ones – that drive conflict and violence in his or her social and physical environment. External drivers, such as trade and financial flows, are therefore included. This is key to civil society thinking on conflict management and violence prevention and is perhaps the greatest challenge – to build and sustain a peaceful society, as far as possible everyone and everything has to be considered.

The military contribution

Since upstream prevention and peacebuilding activities post-2015 will be set increasingly within the emerging framework of the new Sustainable Development Goals, how might military thinking make a contribution in this area? Conversely, how might developments in this area make a contribution to military thinking? In short, how might the differing military and peace studies perspectives explored so far be better and more effectively integrated? This is the question to which we will now turn.

If upstream conflict prevention is to be taken seriously, it is not enough for international donor governments and NGOs to set up programmes to prevent conflict and carry on business as usual in everything else they do. Trade, aid, diplomatic relations and defence engagements can all have both positive and negative impacts on conflict dynamics, so all overseas engagements must be based on a thorough analysis of their potential impact on peace and security, and contribute to building peace in the long term. This presents a significant challenge, particularly given the number and diversity of different actors involved.

In the past, development, diplomatic and defence interventions have been designed based on the perspectives of those within policy communities in donor countries; however, there is increasing recognition that this approach has not been effective. An upstream conflict prevention approach needs to prioritise the needs and concerns of local communities in conflict-affected countries. Involving affected communities in designing and delivering responses can not only improve understanding of conflict dynamics, but also ensure the local ownership of conflict prevention activities.

Upstream Conflict Prevention — Saferworld, 13 September 2012

152 See http://www.c-r.org/letter-targets-sustainable-peace
153 For the list see Annex R: Endorsing Organisations.
154 See Annex S: How were these targets selected?
Understand to Prevent — Suggested principles

Based on our work so far, we suggest that a number of principles be borne in mind by military actors engaging in upstream preventive action.

1. **Human-centric**: all efforts must focus on the individuals who will be affected by any action, from a range of perspectives that include (but are not limited to):
   - respect;
   - transformation;
   - trust;
   - empathy;
   - relationships; and
   - emotion.

2. **Local first**: prime consideration will be given to local individuals and their knowledge, expertise, and leadership; any engagement will seek to support and facilitate local initiatives, not to dominate.

3. **Do no harm**: any engagement must be planned with the awareness that it should not make things worse, even inadvertently.

4. **Seek to understand**: all aspects of the target conflict — as seen from within and without — must be understood before any significant action is taken.

5. **Impartial**: external actors must not take sides in the conflict except to prevent direct violence.

6. **Inclusive**: any preventive initiative must seek to include all the relevant actors.

7. **Comprehensive**: any preventive initiative must consider its likely effects from a wide range of different perspectives.

8. **Seek unity in diversity**: preventive initiatives stand the best chance of succeeding when they identify and stress commonalities between different actors.

9. **Consistency**: external actors must model the attitudes and behaviours they wish to engender, especially if they are working in a multi-agency and/or multinational alliance. External decisions and actions must also be consistent with preventive decisions and actions.

10. **Iterative evaluation**: all decisions and actions must be regularly evaluated, and adapted where necessary.

These are suggested principles and we welcome discussion on how they might be improved and refined.155

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155 Compare, for example, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee’s *Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations* (2007): http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf/38368714.pdf
Part 2

The U2P Concept
Chapter 5 — Identifying the military task

‘To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence.’

Sun Tzu

5.1 Part 2 of Understand to Prevent (U2P) develops the roles that military forces might or should perform within the wider prevention effort. Such military activity can only ever form part of the overall effort and, thus, we seek to identify the contributions that we:

• can make;
• might be relied upon to make; and
• should not be involved in.

A comprehensive approach

5.2 The concept that military involvement should only ever be in support of wider efforts to counter violent conflict is fundamental to the U2P concept. We have embraced the comprehensive approach throughout but have identified that, in the upstream prevention period, the overriding challenge is effective coordination between the comprehensive players — political, diplomatic, economic, military, non-governmental organisations, civil society and business.

5.3 The U2P concept therefore proposes establishing forums to bring together legitimate stakeholders to help a host nation with a ‘prevent’ task. We call this a Comprehensive Contact Team.

5.4 A Comprehensive Contact Team is a facilitating and supporting forum, open to agencies and actors seeking to support the prevention of violent conflict in a specific host nation. They will be able to exchange information and, therefore, increase their understanding of the conflict. Their approach will be multi-layered and multi-dimensional, hence the need for coordination. Their aim will be to engage local actors to find local solutions to transform the conflict.

5.5 The development of this contact team model — its composition, its methodologies and its leadership (if any) — is proposed as the central theme of a subsequent project. Through exchange and developing ideas, a flexible and adaptable model can be developed and then tested in an exercise environment. Operators in the ‘prevention space’ can then understand each other’s contribution, identify overlaps and gaps, and optimise sharing of tasks.

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156 The Art of War, Sun Tzu.

157 The UK’s Stabilisation Unit, which seeks to coordinate the prevention activities of three ministries — the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development — is developing strongly to fill this gap and offers extensive and integrated guidance relevant to many of the issues discussed in this document. See http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk.
Military tasks

5.6 We are already involved in many activities that can play a bigger role in prevention. Having identified those Defence engagement activities, we should focus on exploiting opportunities for the prevention agenda.

5.7 Furthermore, in order to be able to contribute effectively in the prevention field, we need to develop new skills. We must develop our understanding. A combination of individual education and corporate systems for analysis and engagement will be required. Military officers will need to develop their own skill sets to be able to be credible and contribute. They will need to understand concepts and theories of conflict, peace and prevention. They will need to develop skills of negotiation, mediation and dialogue.

5.8 Thus, we consider tasks under the following four headings (expanded in Figure 5.1):

- **standard** — those tasks which might fall to the military but might be done by others were it not for other prevailing circumstances;
- **enhanced** — those areas where we need to develop our capability to be able to contribute effectively in the prevention field;
- **focused** — those areas where we might already be involved in a relevant activity but where the main effort is not prevention; a prevent focus is now required; and
- **new** — there are new tasks for military forces in the upstream period; we identify our contribution within the comprehensive team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Enhance</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Develop understanding:</td>
<td>A prevent focus for defence engagement — early, enduring understanding and influence</td>
<td>Upstream engagement:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readiness</td>
<td>• human-centric</td>
<td></td>
<td>• join the comprehensive team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range</td>
<td>• study conflict</td>
<td>Coalitions — unity of action</td>
<td>• agree roles: security sector reform/armed groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>• structured early warning</td>
<td>‘Patrol with a mission’</td>
<td>• engage early — local first</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niche</td>
<td>• study the conflict</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• adapt</td>
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</table>
Standard tasks

5.9 Military forces provide governments with capabilities that extend beyond the basic defence of the nation. As the conflict curve grows steeper and a problem gets closer to being a crisis, the military will always have a role to play. While not necessarily being the ideal candidate to take on a specific task, our capabilities could be called upon at short notice. Reasons to use military forces include the following.

- **Risk** — where the security situation presents a challenge to those without the ability to protect themselves, military deployments might be required to provide protection to people or property or to accomplish a task directly.
- **Readiness** — when only the military are able to deploy to meet a need in the time required.
- **Range** — when only the military have the ability to deploy at distance with appropriate logistics.
- **Numbers** — when only the military have the numbers immediately available.
- **Niche** — when the military have specialist capabilities that might be required. By virtue of the very broad skill-set in the military, and the advantages of deployability described above, it is very possible that specialists in niche capabilities can be provided to solve a particular problem or support host nation capacity building, for example, legal expertise, cyber skills, negotiation, planning and strategic communications training. Databases of such skills across coalition nations should be maintained.\(^{158}\)

5.10 The military could be used when one or more of these demands (risk, readiness, range, numbers or niche — RRRNN) is made. Once the need has abated, ideally a cheaper, more bespoke response would be provided by other agencies or the business sector.

5.11 RRRNN assists in identifying the tasks with which the military can help but are not necessarily the optimal choice in the longer term. Annex R is a draft guide to activities in which we think the military must be, can be and must not be used.

Enhanced tasks

5.12 Understanding. As stated above, there is a fundamental need for military officers to broaden their understanding of conflict. A polarised war-fighter’s view of conflict will be a disadvantage in future operations ‘amongst the people’. By studying conflict from wider angles than traditional war studies perspectives and deepening our understanding of conflict mechanics, we will become better war-fighters, as well as able to take a credible place in the Comprehensive Contact Team.

5.13 Additionally, military operators need to develop specific skills to become ‘conflict specialists’ in their own right — listening, dialogue, mediation, negotiation and arbitration. Operating with a human-centric focus in ‘wars amongst the people’ will demand enhanced skills.

5.14 Early warning. The military has also traditionally played its part in early warning. Reporting from intelligence agencies and attachés worldwide provides information on military capacity and intent. This intelligence is usually analysed in respect of whether that nation or group poses a direct threat to the home nation, its allies or interests, rather than the potential for violence manifesting.

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\(^{158}\) Some nations already have such a database.
5.15 Spotting the capability and intent for violence wherever it appears is the needed task and a key contribution to the wider conflict early warning. Developing ‘understanding of conflict’ indicators would give additional value to the analysis. Broader joint analysis of indicators within the comprehensive community – for example, incorporating business actors – is required.

5.16 There are plenty of effective early warning models already available. Interconnectivity is a challenge but most important is the connection to the decision-makers who determine the response to the warning. This political challenge is very subjective and usually based on a kind of cost-benefit analysis, rather than altruism. This is a topic that needs to be explored further in U2P2.159

5.17 Analysis and planning. Military operations are defined by analysis and planning; indeed, we are structured and trained to analyse complex situations and plan a route to a desired end-state through a sequence of activities. The upstream prevention of conflict should not present a fundamentally different challenge but there are factors that will demand adaptation.

- Broader human-centric understanding. While we would traditionally seek to get into an enemy’s mind in order to identify the best way to break their will to fight, in prevention operations there will be many more actors and many more perspectives and beliefs that will need consideration. This collection and analysis will demand new systems to be developed. Without a deeper understanding of the problem and the actors involved, it will be impossible to facilitate appropriate local solutions.

- Wider engagement. Military planners are used to operating in isolation. The broadest engagement is required with the Comprehensive Contact Team, which will demand planning in more open organisations.

- Plug-and-play planning. Any military involvement in a prevention task will come with its own planning capability, whether it is one specialist or a whole headquarters. This might be better resourced than any other contributor within the Comprehensive Contact Team. The military component might therefore be able to support others in the coordination of analysis and planning.

5.18 This role of corporate facilitation and support does not fit the traditional military model of operational planning. Even where we have operational experience of comprehensive approach planning, it has tended to be through attaching or liaising within a military headquarters. We must identify more appropriate ways of ‘plug-and-play’ with other agencies and their planning teams. We might have the most resources but we should not be in the lead.

5.19 Assessment. We should always attempt to assess the effectiveness of any prevention activity. We intend to use early warning systems to alert us to conflicts where certain indicators warn of violence escalation. In order to judge the success of prevention activity we should use the same indicators. Ongoing assessment will not only facilitate controls on activity to reinforce success and prevent failure, but will provide systematic analysis of the value of preventive deployments. Therefore, these indicators should be identified early and captured throughout the engagement.

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159 The second phase of the U2P project.
5.20 Defence engagement. There are numerous opportunities for Defence engagement. The term covers many activities, from generic ‘soft power’ activities to specifically targeted engagements, for example, Defence sales.

5.21 However, much of this activity lacks a prevention focus and certainly lacks coordination with coalition partners. U2P provides the opportunity to ‘patrol with a mission’. Every engagement, whether a ship’s visit or a foreign student on a sponsored course, should be provided with an ‘understand’ and a ‘prevention’ influence task. We must engage early and endure. Investing in relationships across the international security sector, and beyond, will provide the human-centric networks in which future comprehensive prevention operations may be conducted. Examples of opportunities for prevention influence activity include:

- treaties and alliances;
- senior visits;
- Defence attaché networks;
- loan service personnel;
- civilian Defence advisors;
- overseas exchange and liaison officers;
- overseas training teams;
- security sector reform;
- international Defence training and education opportunities — including staff course attendance;
- conventional deterrence — general and immediate;
- overseas joint exercises;
- ship, unit and aircraft visits;
- Defence industry cooperation;
- arms control and counter-proliferation;
- maritime security;
- counter-terrorism; and
- counter-organised crime, trafficking and supply.

5.22 Defence engagement activity should be coordinated between government departments as part of a long-term prevention influence plan. It should then be reinforced by coordination with other MCDC nations, and beyond.

New tasks

5.23 The real evolution opportunity in prevention is in the area of upstream engagement. The challenge we have set ourselves is to identify the contribution we can make in the critical upstream zone, before direct violence rears its head. This moves us out of the zone where the military uses force (or the threat of force) to change attitudes and behaviours, and into an area where — through our own example and demonstration — we can inculcate nonviolent and preventive attitudes and behaviours in other groups.

5.24 Many of the skills developed and practised in the last 15 years under the ‘stabilisation’ heading have utility in the upstream phase. Support to fragile or failing states to find local solutions to conflict challenges is the essence of this concept. There are plenty of agencies — from those countries, in those countries and outside those countries — already working with that aim. The military has yet to get involved — and pick up its responsibilities — in that field.

5.25 While external military involvement carries significant sensitivity, few would argue that the military should not be part of a comprehensive team — and might indeed have specific roles to play. These would tend to focus on military-to-military (or armed group) influence connections, but other military-to-civilian tasks could appear upstream, again often related to the RRRNN factors.

5.26 Additionally — because of coalition networks, logistic capacity and a planning infrastructure — the military might play a
facilitation role in bringing together the comprehensive team. This does not imply a lead role for the military. Indeed, the need to ensure host nation military forces are subordinate to civilian government would demand we are not in the lead. Instead, we should follow the principle of perform, demonstrate, inculcate; that is, embody these practices in our own forces and then demonstrate them to, and seek to inculcate them in, other military forces.

Military-to-military — a brotherhood of arms?

5.27 The privilege of wearing a uniform and being part of a respected military organisation facilitates privileged access to, and potential influence in, other uniformed organisations. There is a relationship between military folk of any creed, just because of their shared life experiences. It might not immediately expose itself in familial terms but there is an underlying respect and willingness to communicate that is not available to civilian interlocutors. Likewise, although not necessarily in uniform, armed groups — and particularly their leaders — might be more amenable to engaging with a military interlocutor. The ‘brothers in arms’ link might provide opportunities that can be developed.

5.28 We must identify and exploit these opportunities for engagement and influence. It is recommended that preventive activities involving military forces or armed groups should initially be explored by the military component of the Comprehensive Contact Team. Specific tasks could include:

- discipline, training;
- rules of engagement;
- monitoring and reporting of sexual violence;
- disarmament, treaties; and
- analysis and understanding — to facilitate comprehensive understanding and shared approach to human-centric skill-sets; for example, understanding, dialogue, negotiation and mediation.

The ‘must not’ consideration

Involving armed forces to prevent violent conflict is an apparent contradiction and carries huge sensitivity in some areas. U2P has deliberately set aside traditional military roles of force-based intervention to explore nonviolent prevention opportunities. It is essential to understand, therefore, that while no one should deny self-defence or the defence of a UN-mandated mission, using or threatening force plays no part in the U2P concept.

There are further sensitivities that need to be addressed. These are easily understood through the use of principles and human-centric consideration. The first two UN peacekeeping principles — consent of the parties and impartiality — are very relevant but may not be in place at the start of the engagement. Impartiality could appear impossible if one side in a conflict has invited external actors in. Evidence of impartiality should be one of the very first things offered during early engagements with the actors. Only then can the parties’ consent be achieved, trust built and a local solution developed. Thus, the posture, presence and profile of military external actors is particularly important in this process and will need careful consideration.

160 The third being non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.
5.29 The list at Annex T indicates those prevention activities that we believe are less than ideal or inappropriate for military forces. But, military forces can certainly play a positive — even transformative — role, as seen in recent years in the Philippines. The extract below is from an article written by Commander Thomas Boehlke of the German Navy.161

Conflict transformation by military involvement

A practical example of an intractable and protracted social conflict ... is the internal conflict in Mindanao (Southern Philippines). It has already lasted for more than four decades and is one of the longest lasting violent internal conflicts. Its recurring hostilities have caused the loss of life of about 120,000 people and the displacement of more than two million people. The violent encounters mostly take place between rebel groups and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Formal peace talks and negotiations (Track 1) are taking place or are about to be resumed between the government and rebel groups, but they are supplemented by complementary activities at various levels of society (Tracks 2 and 3)...

The Muslim Filipinos form a minority (5 per cent) amongst a Christian majority (85 per cent) of the population. The ‘Moros’, as the Muslim Filipinos call themselves, are a multi-ethnic group with differing cultural and linguistic backgrounds. They have in common their adherence to Islam. The conflict is ethnic in nature with socio-cultural, economic and political roots that eventually led to the marginalisation and impoverishment of the Muslim Filipinos in Mindanao. In the course of government politics to re-settle landless people from a densely populated North to the less populated Mindanao, a demographic shift in Mindanao occurred. Muslims became a minority in their ancestral domains:

Minoritised over decades in their homeland, the last five provinces where Muslims remain as the majority are not only the poorest provinces but also those where the quality of life is worst. These five provinces... have the least access to education, health, electricity, and transport, water, and sanitation services — the basic infrastructure to sustain any growth or development. Moreover, life expectancy and adult literacy are the lowest in these provinces.162

...In Mindanao the long and fierce fighting has installed fear and distrust and alienated the armed forces from the population. The military is seen as an occupier rather than a protector, a situation a local field commander intends to change.

Contemporary (internal) conflicts require a new set of skills for the military ‘war-fighter’. It is an understanding of conflict dynamics that will need to be complemented by conflict management skills, to break away from old and failed patterns of dealing with present-day conditions and to regain people’s trust and thus avoid renewed escalation.

161 Conflict transformation by military involvement. New Routes Volume 14, 2009. This article, written by Commander Thomas Boehlke of the German Navy, was published during the long negotiations that eventually culminated in the signing on 27 March 2014 of the ‘Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro’ (the name given to the new Muslim autonomous entity in the Philippines) by the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
In Mindanao, the local military commander, Major-General R Ferrer,\(^{163}\) chose a different approach to the challenges of achieving peace. He introduced conflict management training for his field officers and non-commissioned officers in order to effectively contribute to conflict transformation. It is, [he says] the ‘transformation of mindsets that is challenging the military to go the distance, going deeper into unknown territory, such as understanding culture and history, analysing human behaviour, using sound judgement when it comes to tribal wars (or *rido*), learning to practise empathy and communication, and erasing biases.’

An encouraging fact is also that this training takes place in cooperation with local NGOs. The five-day training courses cover the following learning objectives:

- cite concepts and theories on conflict, peace and peacebuilding;
- outline the different concepts, principles and approaches of peacebuilding work;
- demonstrate basic skills of mediation, negotiation and dialogue;
- identify how peacebuilding can be integrated in their own work context; and
- analyse/assess conflict in their respective Areas of Responsibility using [conflict management] tools.

Additionally another programme called SAALAM (Special Advocacy on Literacy/Livelihood and Advancement for Muslims) focuses on enlisted personnel. This programme aims at soldiers employed in remote geographic areas where they stay with local communities and are supposed to teach basic reading and writing, and instruct on aspects of livelihood. These are areas where military personnel are often the only government representation.

In support of the peace process an International Monitoring Team was employed to Mindanao, encompassing (unarmed) military personnel from Malaysia, Brunei, Libya and Japan. Their mission was to monitor the ceasefire between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippine Government. Their main ‘weapon’ is patience, empathy and communicative skills in order to diffuse any tense situation arising, by mediating between armed groups involved.

Their strength rests in the fact that they are professional soldiers and a kind of respected peer for their counterparts, as they speak the ‘language’ and understand potential concerns.

**Conclusion**

The military plays a critical role in the way to sustained dialogue as the way to conflict transformation. However, it has a supportive role in the process of conflict resolution and has its main emphasis on conflict containment. The military side comes on stage at a time when a conflict has escalated and the use of force, or the threat thereof, is unavoidable to counter violence.

The way the military is employed needs to keep the end, a sustainable peace, in mind. At a time when contemporary (internal) conflicts are characterised by ‘war amongst people’, a new set of skills needs to be acquired by military personnel, if they are going to be part of effective peacebuilding.

Although military intervention is primarily an element of Track 1, its involvement will necessarily permeate all levels down to the grassroots and require proper cooperation and coordination with all other players actively involved in the peace process.

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\(^{163}\) The then Commander of the Philippine Army’s 6th Infantry Division (Cotabato City).
5.30 More recently, the initiatives mentioned above have led to the formation in Mindanao of the ‘Good Wednesday Group’, an informal mechanism composed of leaders from the military, civil society organisations, the media and other interested individuals. According to a recent (unpublished) evaluation of the group:

Through regular contact and dialogue, the GWG has been able to prevent threats of election-related violence and harassments from politicians in the Maguindanao province. Instructions by military officials to base commanders to refrain from launching offensives in places considered ‘hot spots’ offered a reprieve for people continually living under the climate of fear. Debriefing sessions and consultations organized by BMFI\(^\text{164}\) also helped to break the barriers between those who think that ‘soldiers treat us [Moro people] as their enemies’, a comment made by Bobby Taguntong, provincial coordinator of the Citizens’s Coalition for ARMM Electoral Reform and GWG members and soldiers. The group employs a ‘no-holds barred’ approach where parties engaged in meetings can be honest in sharing their feelings and points of view, rebuild trust and strengthen ‘mutual responsiveness’ to identified issues and conditions.

5.31 The Good Wednesday Group merits further study as it could offer a useful model for the Comprehensive Contact Team explored in the following chapter.\(^\text{165}\)

\(^{164}\) Balay Mindanaw Foundation Inc

Chapter 6 — The way ahead: the Comprehensive Contact Team

‘Teamwork is the fuel that allows common people to attain uncommon results.’

Andrew Carnegie

Introduction

6.1 Pre-emption of a future violent conflict might often take place after an outbreak of violence is brought to a close, in anticipation and recognition of the potential for future outbreak. Applying an understanding of the dynamics of direct, structural and cultural violence, and of the human dimensions of conflict in general, will assist our efforts to shape the conflict environment, prevent the escalation of violence, and prevail over the root causes of violent conflict. This task is difficult and can benefit from a comprehensive approach with non-traditional partners.

6.2 In the past few decades, militaries have demonstrated some utility for peacekeeping in post-war settings. Many of the approaches taken by militaries in these situations (for example, monitoring, security operations, security force capacity building and so on) have applicability in prevention activities. Thus, it would be helpful to have a military contribution to the upstream prevention of further collective political or deep-rooted identity-based violence. Extending the use of militaries in a preventive role is an evolution of their usual function in peacekeeping, peace support or peace enforcement after the fact.

6.3 The military has the potential to be a useful partner in the area of prevention as part of a comprehensive approach or the Comprehensive Contact Team (to identify those actors supporting prevention activities). Military personnel do tend to apply linear forms of thinking in their planning approaches and this sometimes causes friction with partners if their approaches differ significantly. Also, militaries are generally able to deploy considerable planning capacity into an area of operations, which can overwhelm the other government departments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations that inevitably deploy with a much lighter footprint. Military actors, therefore, need to be sensitive to the impact they have on all aspects of the operating environment.

The stages and principles of military contribution to prevention

6.4 The framework that provides guidance to planners involved in a military contribution to prevention consists of five stages, with each stage having a number of supporting principles. Though the stages are logically sequential, each stage and the range of supporting principles must be re-evaluated frequently in order to achieve the full potential of the prevention effort.

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166 Andrew Carnegie, industrialist (1835-1919).
6.5 Every engagement must be based upon legitimate involvement and an overall strategy to support a local solution. Maintaining the aim of that strategy is crucial to success; it should be considered the master principle and foundation upon which the framework depends. The intent to ‘do no harm’ is the most important component of the strategy and yet is often the most difficult issue to reconcile with the immediate interests of nations contributing to prevention involvement. The five stages of the prevention framework (illustrated in Figure 6.1) are: understand; engage; act; endure; and assess.

a. The first stage, developing an understanding of the situation, is a fundamental part of designing a coherent and helpful strategy and goes well beyond mere ‘situational awareness’.

b. Early engagement (or re-engagement, as violent conflict is often cyclical) is the next logical stage and should be focused on increasing understanding and building trust with all actors.

c. To act means to effectively address the causes of direct and indirect violence.

d. To endure means to see through the transformation of violent conflict by sustaining the necessary level of commitment.

e. Assessment of the effects of our actions needs to be iterative, with the results fed back into the understanding of the situation and our impact on it.

The prevention framework

1. **Understand**
   - Create understanding of the conflict and its dynamics
   - Adopt a “do no harm” approach
   - Build relationships — build networks, adapt
   - Be aware of opportunities for conflict transformation
   - Engage in a substantial and iterative evaluation of the situation
   - Develop a narrative that describes what is going on

2. **Engage early**
   - Get key individuals involved through a respectful, human-centric approach
   - Seek comprehensive inclusivity (local first/tactical, mid-level actors/operational, whole-of-government/strategic)
   - Build credibility and trustworthiness by acting impartially
   - Respect needs, but tap beliefs, emotions and motivation in order to influence behaviour (i.e. create a positive effect)

3. **Act**
   - Address causes of direct, structural and cultural violence

4. **Endure**
   - See through the transformation of violent conflict to peace with real, lasting commitment

5. **Assess** — continuous assessment — positive and negative feedback to adapt

Figure 6.1 — Five principles of upstream prevention
Understand

6.6 The understand stage of prevention is supported by important principles and considerations that shall guide and support the actual understanding of the underlying dynamics of the particular conflict. The principles embrace inclusivity and an interrelated emphasis on ‘local first’ actions.

6.7 ‘Local first’ means that the conflict situation needs, ideally, to be led by local actors, with external actors providing different kinds and levels of support. Where this is not possible, ‘local first’ means to understand the conflict from the local perspective by truly listening to, and hearing, local actors. This depends on building relationships of trust — and then networks of such relationships — within the operating environment.

6.8 This, in turn, results in working through the inclusivity principle. The relationships and networks must include the range of intervening actors — nations (using the so-called ‘whole-of-government’ approach), international organisations and non-governmental organisations — and, more importantly, the range of local actors at all levels of the society. The local actor network must include national level influencers, other actors who have an impact only within their own neighbourhoods, and mid-level actors who have the ability to span across, and interact within, the other levels. The inclusivity principle drives an increased comprehensiveness of approach.

6.9 Building trust is a key consideration in gaining the necessary level of understanding for transforming a state of violence into a stable peace. Building trust involves an assessment that demands a demonstration of four distinct components.

   a. Benevolence. The unselfish, genuine care and concern for others.
   b. Integrity. The adherence to a commonly held and valued set of norms are fundamental to the ‘do no harm’ aspect of the strategy.
   c. Competence. The skills, professional knowledge and ability to do the job well.
   d. Predictability. Demonstrated consistency of attitudes and behaviours are also necessary throughout all stages of prevention and when put into practice early will help to speedily develop trust. This, in turn, will enhance the ability to understand the conflict, first through the opportunities presented to better understand the culture in general, and second by learning about historical specifics and the dynamics of the conflict as local actors share their insights.

6.10 Having a better understanding of the culture in general, and the conflict specifically, leads to possibilities opening up to creatively transform the (potentially) violent conflict into a more stable state of nonviolence. It is not likely that transformation will be achieved in one quick leap but, rather, that it will emerge over time in a series of iterative evolutions. This demands a substantial and ongoing evaluation of the situation. The collaborative (namely, inclusive and ‘local first’) creation of a narrative that supports the strategy of transforming violence into nonviolence is a necessary outcome of the understanding stage. Without this foundation, it is unlikely that intervention will be as helpful as it could be.
Engage

6.11 Early and serious engagement increases understanding. Initial engagement with the conflict actors will allow a picture to be built of the conflict dynamics – a ‘recognised conflict picture’. This can lead to a deeper understanding of the problem and generate a prevention narrative, around which further interaction can be built.

6.12 Engagement is about generating a human-centric approach that includes respect, impartiality and attention to people’s needs. It openly and honestly acknowledges the emotions at work in the situation, along with the motivations of individuals and groups, in order to influence behaviour away from violence. It strives to enhance the credibility of all parties involved so they can achieve a positive effect together. Creating small successes early is critical to building the partners’ credibility and belief in the entire peacebuilding endeavour.

Act

6.13 It is only through a deep and inclusive understanding of the conflict that a ‘do no harm’ strategy can be brought to bear in an effective plan of action. The actions of all engagement partners and the conflict population must be focused on addressing the root causes of direct and indirect violence. The effort spent on better understanding leads to a learning culture among the actors that, in turn, facilitates adaptation to the evolving situation.

6.14 This adaptation does not generally come easily to many of the actors involved in violent (or potentially violent) conflicts. However, it is only through a deep understanding of the situation – coupled with a willingness among all partners to commit to transforming the conflict through exploiting new approaches and attitudes – that the direct, structural and cultural violence will be addressed effectively. Such adaptation, in line with the prevention narrative, aims to engender holistic change, operational change and individual change in support of prevention activities and conflict transformation.

Endure

6.15 It is important not to squander hard-won trust and credibility as an (external) actor by losing focus and not following through on the implicit promise of assistance. Shaping a society’s values, towards nonviolence and transformation of violent conflict through to a stable and lasting peace, demands a high level of commitment from all involved, something that must be understood from the outset. There will be an ongoing (though presumably reduced) level of help required for some time in most situations, once they are transformed to a manageable level. The aim, however, is to help build enduring local capacity for nonviolent conflict management.

Assess

6.16 At all stages of the engagement, assessment of progress is required. This applies at the interpersonal level, all the way up to the strategic. Various methodologies are available but they should be linked to the same indicators used in the early warning process to ensure coherence.

6.17 The requirement for continuous assessment and a continuing effort to gain more understanding never ends. Through a long-term (albeit reduced) engagement, this understanding can be maintained and any weak signals that might suggest renewed violence can help in future decisions about larger scale re-engagement, if necessary.

6.18 Lessons learned in these situations are also hard-won and the deductions and insight gained must be retained and reinvested back into the society that is being helped to overcome the cycle of violence. This can only be achieved through persistent engagement at some level.
Potential military roles in prevention

6.19  As mentioned above, extending the use of militaries in a preventive role is an evolution of their traditional use in peacekeeping, peace support or peace enforcement. Professional militaries have capability and capacity to conduct a wide variety of activities and engage in the broad range of campaign themes. They are prepared to act at any point on the spectrum of operations, from the most benign peacetime military engagement with foreign militaries, to high-end war-fighting as a means of national survival.

6.20 Modern Western militaries already conduct upstream activities such as Defence engagement, exchanges, military training assistance and Defence diplomacy, but these activities are not specifically aimed at prevention. There is scope within these areas to be more proactive in seeking out opportunities for prevention.

Security sector reform

6.21 Historical precedent has shown that militaries have a unique skill-set and considerable capacity to engage in what is known as ‘security sector reform’; more specifically, ‘security force capacity building’. This capability has been employed on a considerable scale in post-war settings and its potential as a likely upstream prevention activity-set for militaries is being recognised.

Conflicts are likely to continue arising in fragile and failing states. There is consensus that Western nations will continue to conduct military capacity building missions but with a move to upstream conflict prevention in an attempt to avoid hard-end intervention, and that such efforts will generally be conducted as part of an alliance or ad hoc coalition. Military capacity building... has indeed become a central element of defence policies of several [NATO] Alliance nations. Moreover, despite the ‘intervention fatigue’ prevalent throughout the Alliance, smaller scale stabilisation interventions may still be unavoidable.  

6.22 Assistance of this latter sort generally falls into one of three categories:

• hard security operations without a capacity building element;
• hard security operations with a capacity building element; or
• capacity building element only.  

So, whereas stabilisation operations are generally thought of as part of a campaign that comes with establishing peace following the conduct of war, and prevention or ‘phase zero’ operations seek to stave off the outbreak of violence — stability activities are pertinent to both kinds of operations.

The way ahead: the Comprehensive Contact Team

6.23 Stability activities can include:
• security and control;
• support to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration;
• enhancing the rule of law;
• support to security sector reform;
• support to initial restoration of services;
• support to initial governance; and
• assistance to other agencies.

All of these activities could be carried out by the military in a pre-violence, prevention setting. Clearly though, some of these activities are best carried out by partners other than the military (for example, support to service provision or governance) and should be if the security situation permits it. The military has considerable doctrine and experience in these activities and is more or less capable of conducting them effectively, depending on the level of professionalism.

6.24 The proposed development of the military skill-set is key in this area. Developing human-centric skills — dialogue, listening, mediation, negotiation and so forth — will provide new ways that military-to-military influence can be brought to bear. It will also open up new tasks where the military can better contribute to the comprehensive effort. The focus should be on providing ideas and resources for local exploitation, as well as providing an appropriate military model for local emulation: perform — demonstrate — inculcate.

6.25 Security force capacity building is one aspect of support to security sector reform that is an obvious and natural fit for bringing the military into the work of prevention. Security force capacity building is activity undertaken to develop the institutional and operational capabilities of foreign security forces, in order to create appropriate, effective and legitimate security institutions and forces.170

“Building the capacity of foreign security forces has always been a key element of creating the conditions that lead to a safe and secure environment... but... the goal of a security force capacity building programme will generally be to build a more capable, accountable, self-sustaining, and credible force, able to meet the security challenges faced by the foreign [nation] and looked upon as legitimate by the population.”171

6.26 Though the military may be the primary agency conducting security force capacity building activity, it will be necessary to work closely with other partners in a coordinated and complementary manner. The specific activities generally fall within the following categories:
• building — structuring, recruiting and selection, equipping, infrastructure;
• mentoring — one-on-one training by a senior officer;
• advising — providing advice, guidance or assistance;
• training — formal individual and collective training, and creating training institutions; or
• enabling — attaching elements into the host nation security force in order to augment capability or provide specialisation with a view to sustainably developing these over time.

The security force capacity building elements may work independently alongside the host nation force, or they may be embedded or even integrated within it.

6.27 The resources applied to this kind of assistance may be tailored to the specific need of the security force or institution being

supported. Some models that have sometimes worked well in the past are the Provincial Reconstruction Team construct; and the Mentoring, Liaison and Advisory Teams, which tend to be smaller and more focused on specific tasks such as police training or low-level tactical training. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams generally worked on a larger scale, with a whole-of-government or coalition approach, to provide a broader range of support to a larger area or higher level of institution, and did not restrict themselves to security force capacity building activities.

6.28 While seeking to inculcate ‘softer’ human-centric preventive skills, the force must nevertheless have a deterrent capacity — itself part of its overall preventive function — and, thus, must be developed to the balanced model of fighting power. This model can be seen in Figure 6.2 below.

Some final considerations and a way forward

6.30 The idea of pre-emption or prevention of future violent conflict as an upstream intervention activity in which the military might be involved is starting to be taken more seriously, especially by military leaders. There are many non-military partners, though, who have been doing this kind of work for a long time, often very effectively. Militaries and the governments that send them to engage as part of a broad partnership must think strategically about how to leverage the understanding that already resides in the individuals and institutions around the globe that are already committed to the challenge of transforming violent conflict into durable peace.

6.31 While this project has identified some of the academic underpinning and best practice of engaged agencies — and suggested the areas in which the military can contribute — the full Comprehensive Contact Team concept has yet to be developed. Additionally, the military must address a number of key questions. These include the following.

- What are the legal and political issues that need to be resolved before committing to prevention missions?
- How is coordination with other non-military partners to be managed in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort or working at cross-purposes?
- What has worked well and what has not worked so well in prevention?
- What kinds of military capabilities ought to be committed to prevention?
- What are the ‘mechanics’ of gaining understanding and how do militaries train for it?
- How do we integrate early warning indicators and how can we precipitate involvement?
What are the measures of effectiveness that will tell military partners if the correct first, second and third-order effects are being created by prevention activities? Who measures?

What kind of leadership model is most appropriate for prevention missions? What are the selection criteria for mission leaders? How are they trained?

Are there models for committing effort to prevent violent conflict that do not have to rely on vested interests of contributing governments?

6.32 This document has suggested a conceptual foundation from which an operational model could be developed amongst the multinational and comprehensive community. Work is continuing within the MCDC community to take that task further and we welcome your thoughts and ideas.

The Multinational Capability Development Campaign focuses on projects to enhance the operational effectiveness of its 23 member nations and organisations in joint, interagency, multinational and coalition operations.
The costs of violent conflict are enormous, counted not only in the obvious and immediate toll on lives and property, but in the devastating effects on wider development, investment and security. U2P argues that the military can contribute to initiatives that help to prevent this. Peace, like war, can be planned — indeed, in many places, to be sustainable it must be — and military capabilities, both established, and those yet to be developed, can play a significant role in this process if the right steps are taken.

We believe that one of those steps must be to bring together the experts in national security and human security to discuss the way ahead. Military minds, academics working in peace and conflict studies, peacebuilding practitioners, politicians, business and spiritual leaders, and civil society actors of all kinds need to meet on a regular basis to start to forge a consensus on preventive action. With new threats to peace appearing on the horizon — for example, climate change, disease and radicalisation — it is a consensus the world is going to need more and more. As the Buddha said:

“If you want to understand the causes you have made in the past, look at the effects as they appear in the present. And if you want to know what results will appear in the future, look at the causes you are making now.”

172 Contemplation on the Mind-Ground Sutra.
# Annex A — Some forms of leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Leadership</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aristocracy</td>
<td>rule by the nobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autarchy</td>
<td>rule by an absolute ruler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autocracy</td>
<td>rule by one individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bureaucracy</td>
<td>rule by civil servants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy</td>
<td>rule by the people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>despotism</td>
<td>rule by despots or tyrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnocracy</td>
<td>rule by an ethnic group or race</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gerontocracy</td>
<td>rule by the aged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hierarchy</td>
<td>rule by a ranked body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hoplarchy</td>
<td>rule by the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idiocracy</td>
<td>personal rule; self-rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>isocracy</td>
<td>equal political power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kleptocracy</td>
<td>rule by thieves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>matriarchy</td>
<td>rule by women or mothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meritocracy</td>
<td>rule by the meritorious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mobocracy</td>
<td>rule by mobs or crowds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monarchy</td>
<td>rule by one individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oligarchy</td>
<td>rule by the few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patriarchy</td>
<td>rule by men or fathers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phallocracy</td>
<td>rule by men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plutocracy</td>
<td>rule by the wealthy; plutarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technocracy</td>
<td>rule by technical experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theocracy</td>
<td>rule by priests or by religious law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>timocracy</td>
<td>rule by the propertied class; timarchy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex B — The Sons of Iraq, 2005-12

During the height of the US-led war in Iraq, the Coalition found itself fighting a determined insurgency. One element of this insurgency was Sunni fighters, largely from what is now known as the Sunni Triangle.

Over time, this Sunni element — the ‘Sons of Iraq’ (SOI) — were enticed to change sides and support the Coalition and the fledgling Iraqi government it was attempting to build and solidify. The SOI went from posing a major challenge to the Coalition to being a critical element in bringing calm to the area. Where it once waged battle with Coalition forces, it now patrolled streets, helped keep explosives off the roads and generally maintained security in the area.

As the Coalition planned its withdrawal from Iraq, it was decided that the SOI would change from being, essentially, employees of the Coalition (who paid their salaries) and become members of the Iraqi security and civil service. However, as the Coalition withdrew and the Shia-led Iraqi government consolidated power, the SOI were gradually marginalised. They were not incorporated into the military or the civil service in anything approaching the numbers promised, and those who were employed tended to be given menial jobs with no real responsibility.

The Sons of Iraq and the Galtung ABC/conflict triangle

The Iraqi government’s treatment of the SOI is a good example of Galtung’s concept of conflict as comprising contradiction, attitude and behaviour.

Contradiction. The contradiction between the Iraqi government and the SOI was about power distribution. The Iraqi government, new to power, had little to no interest in sharing power with the SOI, while the latter obviously saw things differently. As one prominent figure in the movement noted, ‘The government of Iraq must represent the interests of the people, and the Sunni must be better represented as the heart of the government.’ Ultimately, the SOI had major political ambitions but effectively no stake in the government. The Iraqi government had a major stake in the government and the overall power of the state but had little interest in sharing that power. Clearly, contradictory interests.

Attitude. The negative attitudes of conflict actors towards their opponents manifest themselves in various ways, including a sense of superiority of the in-group over the out-group, mutual insults, self/group-righteousness and an unwillingness to put oneself (or one’s group) in the shoes of the other. Many such

attitudes have been reported in the conflict between the Iraqi government and the SOI, buoyed by considerable mutual antipathy.

Table B.1 below summarises some of the attitudes reported by global news services between the two groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iraqi government towards SOI</th>
<th>SOI towards Iraqi government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fear of</td>
<td>Fear of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mistrust</td>
<td>Mistrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antipathy</td>
<td>Antipathy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrupt</td>
<td>Corrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists</td>
<td>Dogs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolves in sheep’s clothing</td>
<td>Conspirators</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B.1 — SOI and Iraqi government reported attitudes

**Behaviour.** The behaviour of both groups drove the conflict towards outright violence. While the antagonism was mutual, the Iraqi government held more power and the ability to solve the conflict if it had so chosen. Instead, it worked systematically to marginalise the SOI as an active security force.

As noted above, the Iraqi government promised to integrate a large number of SOI security personnel into the Iraqi armed forces, police and broader civil service. Instead, it delayed integration and ultimately set out to destroy the SOI.  

For example, it is reported that the Iraqi government commonly removed competent SOI commanders from leadership positions in favour of Iraqi government loyalists. In instances where the commanders refused to resign, the Iraqi government would often force them out using threats of bogus criminal charges, prosecution and imprisonment. These tactics did not stop with SOI commanders but extended down to the rank and file of SOI forces.

Figure B.1 below illustrates some of the elements of Galtung’s ABC/conflict triangle that are present in this conflict.

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176 Who’s to Blame for Iraq Crisis?, Harvey, Derek, CNN, 12 June 2014.
177 Ibid.
The Galtung DSC/violence triangle and the Sons of Iraq

Galtung’s direct, structural, cultural (DSC) model offers insights into how the unseen ‘indirect violence’ of this conflict eventually led to extreme direct violence, perpetuated by both sides.

Cultural Violence. At the heart of the conflict between the Iraqi government and the Sons of Iraq is the Sunni-Shia divide. In 632, following the death of the Prophet Muhammad, his followers split over who should succeed him and formed into the two sects. Some research indicates that today, even beyond the Iraqi context, sizable portions of both groups do not feel that the members of the other sect are true Muslims. Viewing an out-group in this way can clearly contribute to justifying structural and direct violence, and is undoubtedly part of what drives the current violence in Iraq.

Also present in the Iraqi government SOI conflict is politically-based cultural violence. While Saddam Hussein was in power in Iraq, the minority Sunnis held power over the majority Shia and justified this structural violence in various ways — for example, by appealing to a unifying Iraqi nationalism. When Saddam was overthrown and the Shia came to power, the previous treatment of the Shia by the Sunnis served as a justification for the new Iraqi government to take political revenge.

Beyond their religious and political differences, both the Iraqi government and the SOI commonly make use of military parades, flags and ubiquitous photos of leaders, all examples of cultural violence as described by Galtung.

Structural violence. While there are many examples of structural violence within the context of the Iraqi government SOI conflict, one that stands out as a major driver of direct violence is the Anti-Terror Law (ATL), passed by the Iraqi government in 2005. Ostensibly designed to help combat the terrorism that was roiling the nation, the Anti-Terror Law defines terror as ‘any criminal act carried out by one or more persons against the security and stability of the state and/or against persons or groups of persons deliberately or blindly’. This includes acts that have the effect of ‘damaging public or private assets or of causing terror, fear or panic among the populace’. Such a broadly written law has allowed the Shia Iraqi government to systematically target its enemies (real or imagined) within the SOI and the Sunni population as a whole. Numerous reports describe how Sunnis, and in particular SOI personnel, have been targeted in sweeps by Iraqi government forces, often initiated by ‘tips’ based on false or exaggerated information — informants are rewarded with USD 100 for every arrest their tip produces. One report cited informants who indicated that ‘security forces don’t ask [us] to make up stories, but [we] know informants who do because they want more money’. The same report went on to say, ‘Another informant … said he often informs on people he believes only sympathise with extremists. He said that “many innocent people” have been convicted based on his intelligence, and that sometimes government officials have encouraged him to provide false information to secure arrests’.

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178 http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-19#sthash.6oFCGlfl.dpuf
181 For example, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/world/middleeast/sunnis-in-iraq-protest-antiterror-tactics-that-hurt-innocents.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
182 Ibid.
Such activities by the Iraqi government have led to tit-for-tat structural violence on the part of the SOI and other Sunnis — several reports indicate that they speak of not participating in elections in order to delegitimise the Iraqi government. In addition, some SOI have organised protests that have harmed the overall economic productivity of the nation.\textsuperscript{183} Of most concern is the willingness of the SOI to openly support groups who advocate and carry out direct violence against the Iraqi government.

Direct violence. The conflict and structural/cultural violence just described eventually gave rise to extreme expressions of direct violence on both sides. For example, one report (of many) noted that:

\begin{quote}
Iraq’s leadership used draconian measures against opposition politicians, detainees, demonstrators and journalists, effectively squeezing the space for independent civil society and political freedoms in Iraq... Thousands of civilians and police were killed in spates of violence, including targeted assassinations, amid a political crisis that has dragged on since December 2011. Alongside the uptick in violence, Iraqi security forces arbitrarily conducted mass arrests and tortured detainees to extract confessions with little or no evidence of wrongdoing...
\end{quote}

As insurgent groups targeted innocent Iraqis in a multitude of coordinated attacks throughout the year, Iraq’s security forces targeted innocent civilians in mass campaigns of arbitrary arrests and abusive interrogations... [including] several instances of torture of female detainees. Their families reported that security officers and judges collaborated to keep women detained on spurious ‘suspicion of terrorism’ charges, then demanded bribes to secure their release. The sources said the police beat the women and tortured them with electric shocks and plastic bags placed over their heads until they began to suffocate. \textsuperscript{184}

While the Iraqi government was brutal with its application of direct violence against its SOI opponents, their actions eventually drove the SOI back into the arms of the Sunni insurgency that they had initially been recruited to combat.

The Sunni insurgency, which eventually came to be known as ‘Islamic State’ (IS), engaged in its own form of draconian direct violence against the Shia-led Iraqi government, as well as anyone else the group branded an enemy. Even when they did not join in the fighting, the SOI commonly supported IS or at minimum did not resist them.

Over time IS has become increasingly extreme in their use of direct violence. In one instance, they massacred 1,700 Iraqi government soldiers after taking over a military base. They have also beheaded Western hostages and posted the videos on social media, ostensibly to intimidate their opponents and to increase their prestige with — and potential recruitment from — the like-minded.

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}

The *World Development Report 2011* (WDR 2011) recommends a mix of internal country actions and external international support to meet the challenge of providing citizen security, justice and jobs.

**At the national level**

In fragile transitions or situations of rising risk, context is always crucial, but the report describes five practical approaches that have been used in very different country circumstances to link rapid confidence-building measures to longer-term institutional transformation:

- Support for bottom-up state-society relations in insecure areas, such as combined community-based programs for policing [see ‘Civilian peacekeeping’, pages 88 – 89], employment and service delivery, and access to local justice and dispute resolution systems [see ‘Infrastructures for peace’, pages 102 – 105].
- Security and justice reform programs that start with the basics and recognise the linkages between policing and civilian justice rather than treating them separately.
- Basic job creation schemes, including large-scale public works, addressing infrastructure bottlenecks, and expanding access to skills, finance, work experience and assets.
- Involving women in the design and implementation of security, justice and economic empowerment programs.
- Focused anti-corruption actions to demonstrate that new initiatives and revenues can be well governed, drawing on external and community monitoring capacity.

**At the international level**

The current system of diplomatic, security and development institutions — designed to address the problems of interstate and civil war — has helped many countries recovering from conflict. But it is not well-adapted to today’s reality of repeated cycles of instability and risks of criminal and political violence. This means:

- refocusing assistance on confidence building, citizen security, justice and jobs
- reforming the procedures of international agencies to respond more swiftly
- responding at the regional level
- renewing cooperative efforts between lower, middle, and higher income countries.
Track 1: Investing in prevention through confidence-building, citizen security, justice and jobs

- Improving international capacity on policing and justice, with the UN taking the lead in providing a range of assistance, from deployment of international police through advisory and technical support, and establishing clear links between policing and building capacity in the justice system.
- Investing in job creation in insecure areas, including: electricity and transit infrastructure; access to finance and skills; public support for community-based employment; and public-private partnerships for local business development.
- Providing specialised risk reduction assistance in countries seeking to prevent violence as well as in post-conflict environments.
- Moving from ‘coordination’ of international organisations to ‘combined programmes’ in risk assessment, security and justice reforms support for mediation efforts, and humanitarian transitions.

Track 2: Reforming internal agency procedures to manage risks and results

- Redesign of current budget, staffing and fiduciary systems. These were developed for more stable environments and need to be adapted to meet the needs of countries struggling to prevent violence before it breaks out, as well as those recovering from conflict.
- New risk management tools to support national institutions over the long-term in places where governance is volatile. This requires more reliable aid flows, longer-term mediation support, and flexible peace-keeping arrangements, including ‘over the horizon’ guarantees.
- Short and longer-term indicators of progress to demonstrate returns on investment in violence prevention. This means measuring people’s sense of security and trust in institutions.

Track 3: Acting regionally and globally on external stresses

- Increased support for cross-border development programming, including through combining the capacity of regional and global institutions.
- Strengthened capacity to ‘follow the money’ of illicit trafficking and enable developed and developing countries to conduct joint investigations and prosecutions.
- Agreed standards on land resource purchases and natural resource revenues.

Track 4: Marshalling the combined experience and resources of low, middle and high income countries in tackling violence

- A renewed dialogue on international norms and expectations of responsible leadership, building on historical evidence of governance transformations.
- Alignment with regional processes on violence prevention, where these exist.
- South-South and South-North exchanges on violence prevention.

Adapted from WDR 2011 Synopsis
Annex D — The Responsibility to Protect

As the UN was established primarily as a body to prevent violent conflict between states, the protection of civilians is not explicitly articulated in the UN Charter. However, in light of the genocide in Rwanda (1994) and the Srebenica massacre (1995), the prevention of violent conflict has become increasingly linked to the challenge of preventing atrocities enacted by states on their own citizens. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a concept developed in response to this challenge, especially in relation to the question of outside intervention. The defining document of R2P\(^\text{185}\) states:

- a. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.

- b. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.

The document explains that R2P embraces three specific responsibilities.

- a. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.

- b. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.

- c. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

Of these three, ‘Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it’.

The document further argues that, to be justified, any military intervention must be guided by the following criteria.

1. Just cause — is the threat a ‘serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings’?

2. Right intention — is the main intention of the military action to prevent human suffering or are there other motives?

3. Final resort — has every other measure besides military invention been taken into account? In other words, will only military action work in this situation?

4. Legitimate authority.

5. Proportional means — are the minimum necessary military means being applied to secure human protection?

6. Reasonable prospect — is it likely that military action will protect human life, and are the consequences of this action sure not to be worse than no action at all?

R2P and the UN

The principles of R2P are being steadily developed by the UN and incorporated into its decision-making. The 2005 UN World Summit unanimously agreed to apply R2P to the four ‘mass atrocity’ acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing, and to give the UN Security Council the sole authority for authorising intervention. In 2006, the UN Security Council formally recognised R2P in Resolution 1674 and has cited it in a number of subsequent resolutions. However, despite the events of 9/11 and the idea of ‘right of humanitarian intervention’, R2P has been seen as one of the most controversial and difficult of all international relations questions. There continues to be disagreement as to whether there is a right of intervention, how and when it should be exercised, and under whose authority.

Specifically, the UN recognises three ‘pillars’ of R2P.

1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;

2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility;

3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The UN has two Special Advisers working in this area. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide seeks to raise awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, to alert relevant actors where there is a risk of genocide, and to advocate and mobilise for appropriate action. The Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect leads the conceptual, political, institutional and operational development of R2P.

R2P in action

Libya in 2011 was the first instance where the UN Security Council authorised (but not without abstentions) a military intervention based on R2P, a decision that soon sparked fierce controversy, as critics accused the intervening powers of using R2P as a cover for regime change as they went beyond the mandate. This has caused long term issues within the UNSC.

Additionally, the influence of R2P can be seen in the African Union’s decision to accord its African Standby Force the right ‘to intervene in a Member State in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.
Annex E — 198 Methods of Nonviolent Action (Gene Sharp)

The methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion

**Formal statements**
1. Public speeches
2. Letters of opposition or support
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions
4. Signed public declarations
5. Declarations of indictment and intention
6. Group or mass petitions

**Communications with a wider audience**
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols
8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books
10. Newspapers and journals
11. Records, radio, and television
12. Skywriting and earthwriting

**Group representations**
13. Deputations
14. Mock awards
15. Group lobbying
16. Picketing
17. Mock elections

**Symbolic public acts**
18. Displays of flags and symbolic colours
19. Wearing of symbols
20. Prayer and worship
21. Delivering symbolic objects
22. Protest disrobing
23. Destruction of own property
24. Symbolic lights
25. Displays of portraits
26. Paint as protest
27. New signs and names
28. Symbolic sounds
29. Symbolic reclamations
30. Rude gestures

**Pressures on individuals**
31. ‘Haunting’ officials
32. Taunting officials
33. Fraternization
34. Vigils

**Drama and music**
35. Humorous skits and pranks
36. Performances of plays and music
37. Singing

**Processions**
38. Marches
39. Parades
40. Religious processions
41. Pilgrimages
42. Motorcades

**Honouring the dead**
43. Political mourning
44. Mock funerals
45. Demonstrative funerals
46. Homage at burial places

**Public assemblies**
47. Assemblies of protest or support
48. Protest meetings
49. Camouflaged meetings of protest
50. Teach-ins
Withdrawal and renunciation
51. Walk-outs
52. Silence
53. Renouncing honours
54. Turning one’s back

The methods of social non-cooperation

Ostracism of persons
55. Social boycott
56. Selective social boycott
57. Lysistratic non-action
58. Excommunication
59. Interdict

Non-cooperation with social events, customs and institutions
60. Suspension of social and sports activities
61. Boycott of social affairs
62. Student strike
63. Social disobedience
64. Withdrawal from social institutions

Withdrawal from the social system
65. Stay-at-home
66. Total personal non-cooperation
67. ‘Flight’ of workers
68. Sanctuary
69. Collective disappearance
70. Protest emigration (hijrat)

The methods of economic non-cooperation: economic boycotts

Action by consumers
71. Consumers’ boycott
72. Non-consumption of boycotted goods
73. Policy of austerity
74. Rent withholding
75. Refusal to rent
76. National consumers’ boycott
77. International consumers’ boycott

Action by workers and producers
78. Workers’ boycott
79. Producers’ boycott

Action by middlemen
80. Suppliers’ and handlers’ boycott

Action by owners and management
81. Traders’ boycott
82. Refusal to let or sell property
83. Lockout
84. Refusal of industrial assistance
85. Merchants’ ‘general strike’

Action by holders of financial resources
86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
89. Severance of funds and credit
90. Revenue refusal
91. Refusal of a government’s money

Action by governments
92. Domestic embargo
93. Blacklisting of traders
94. International sellers’ embargo
95. International buyers’ embargo
96. International trade embargo

The methods of economic non-cooperation: the strike

Symbolic strikes
97. Protest strike
98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)
Agricultural strikes
99. Peasant strike
100. Farm workers’ strike

Strikes by special groups
101. Refusal of impressed labour
102. Prisoners’ strike
103. Craft strike
104. Professional strike

Ordinary industrial strikes
105. Establishment strike
106. Industry strike
107. Sympathy strike

Restricted strikes
108. Detailed strike
109. Bumper strike
110. Slowdown strike
111. Working-to-rule strike
112. Reporting ‘sick’ (sick-in)
113. Strike by resignation
114. Limited strike
115. Selective strike

Multi-industry strikes
116. Generalised strike
117. General strike

Combination of strikes and economic closures
118. Hartal
119. Economic shutdown

The methods of political non-cooperation

Rejection of authority
120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
121. Refusal of public support
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance

Citizens’ non-cooperation with government
123. Boycott of legislative bodies
124. Boycott of elections
125. Boycott of government employment and positions
126. Boycott of government departments, agencies, and other bodies
127. Withdrawal from governmental educational institutions
128. Boycott of government-supported institutions
129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents
130. Removal of own signs and placemarks
131. Refusal to accept appointed officials
132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions

Citizens’ alternatives to obedience
133. Reluctant and slow compliance
134. Non-obedience in absence of direct supervision
135. Popular non-obedience
136. Disguised disobedience
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse
138. Sit-down
139. Non-cooperation with conscription and deportation
140. Hiding, escape, and false identities
141. Civil disobedience of ‘illegitimate’ laws

Action by government personnel
142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
143. Blocking of lines of command and information
144. Stalling and obstruction
145. General administrative non-cooperation
146. Judicial non-cooperation
147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective non-cooperation by enforcement agents
148. Mutiny
Domestic governmental action
149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays
150. Non-cooperation by constituent governmental units

International governmental action
151. Changes in diplomatic and other representation
152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events
153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition
154. Severance of diplomatic relations
155. Withdrawal from international organisations
156. Refusal of membership in international bodies
157. Expulsion from international organisations

The methods of non-violent intervention

Psychological intervention
158. Self-exposure to the elements
159. The fast
   a. Fast of moral pressure
   b. Hunger strike
   c. Satyagrahic fast
160. Reverse trial
161. Nonviolent harassment

Physical intervention
162. Sit-in
163. Stand-in
164. Ride-in
165. Wade-in
166. Mill-in
167. Pray-in
168. Nonviolent raids
169. Nonviolent air raids
170. Nonviolent invasion

171. Nonviolent interjection
172. Nonviolent obstruction
173. Nonviolent occupation

Social intervention
174. Establishing new social patterns
175. Overloading of facilities
176. Stall-in
177. Speak-in
178. Guerrilla theatre
179. Alternative social institutions
180. Alternative communication system

Economic intervention
181. Reverse strike
182. Stay-in strike
183. Nonviolent land seizure
184. Defiance of blockades
185. Politically motivated counterfeiting
186. Preclusive purchasing
187. Seizure of assets
188. Dumping
189. Selective patronage
190. Alternative markets
191. Alternative transportation systems
192. Alternative economic institutions

Political intervention
193. Overloading of administrative systems
194. Disclosing identities of secret agents
195. Seeking imprisonment
196. Civil disobedience of ‘neutral’ laws
197. Work-on without collaboration
198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government
Annex F — The Kosovo Crisis, 1998-99

The state of Yugoslavia came into existence in 1918 through the merger of a number of territories that had been part of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. It was invaded in 1941 by the Axis powers — Germany, Italy and Hungary — which established a Nazi puppet regime in Croatia and occupied the rest of the country, prompting a fierce partisan resistance led by the communist Josip Broz Tito.

After the Second World War, with Tito as president, Yugoslavia became a non-aligned communist federal state, made up of six ‘socialist republics’:

- Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Croatia;
- Macedonia;
- Montenegro;
- Serbia; and
- Slovenia.

There were also two ‘socialist autonomous provinces’ — Vojvodina and Kosovo — which after 1974 were effectively republics but without the legal right to leave the federation.

Three main ethnic groups were spread unevenly throughout the country — Orthodox Christians, Catholics and Muslims — reflecting the region’s long history of migration and conquest. The degree of mixing and intermarriage between the groups varied from area to area. Many areas dominated by one group would also contain a patchwork of minority enclaves of the other groups.

In Kosovo, for example, Serb (Orthodox) minority enclaves were embedded in a majority Albanian (Muslim) population. The situation there was complicated by the Serb claim to the province as the birthplace of Serb freedom from Ottoman rule, symbolised by the 1389 Battle of Kosovo.
The Kosovo Crisis, 1998-99

The break-up of Yugoslavia

Post-war nationalist and ethnic tensions within Yugoslavia were kept ‘in check’ by Tito, but escalated after his death in 1980. With the end of the Cold War these tensions fragmented the country. In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia seceded from the Federal Republic, provoking a military response from the Serb-dominated government, led by Slobodan Milosevic. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia seceded three months later, with no violence.

The deteriorating situation led to the deployment of a UN force — UNPROFOR — first in Croatia, in February 1992, and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most ethnically-mixed of the republics, which attempted to secede in March 1992. This triggered a war that was characterised, as in Croatia, by brutal attacks on civilian minorities to drive them from areas dominated by the majority group — ‘ethnic cleansing’.

The most notorious of these was at Srebenica where, in March 1993, thousands of Bosniak (Muslim) civilians were besieged by Serb regular and irregular forces. Despite the UN Security Council designating Srebenica a ‘safe haven’, at the crucial moment UNPROFOR was unable to defend it. After more than two years of siege, in July 1995, the town fell to the Serbs and some 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were massacred — the largest atrocity in Europe since the Second World War. There was also systematic rape and murder of Bosniak women and girls.

Following sustained international pressure, including airstrikes by NATO on Serb forces in Bosnia, the warring parties signed the Dayton Agreement in December 1995, bringing the armed conflict in Bosnia to an end. The violent conflict in Croatia had ended the month before with the signing of the Erdut Agreement.

The struggle for Kosovo

The Dayton Agreement left the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reduced to the republics of Serbia and Montenegro, and the two ‘autonomous provinces’ of Vojvodina and Kosovo. However, many Kosovo Albanians were disappointed that Dayton made no reference to their desire for independence, which had been intensified by severe restrictions on the province’s autonomy imposed by Milosevic in 1989.

Kosovo had managed to avoid the wars of 1991-95 but post-Dayton the newly-formed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) embarked on a strategy of violence against Serb security forces in the province, claiming them as revenge for the killing of Albanians. With the UN and the United States both calling the KLA a terrorist group, and Interpol accusing it of heroin smuggling, the Serb-dominated government responded with violent ‘counter-terrorist’ operations, which hardened Albanian support for the KLA and provoked more attacks.

The tipping-point came in February/March 1998, when the KLA killed two Serb policemen. An anti-terrorist unit called to the scene killed 25 villagers, prompting a wave of demonstrations, violence and tit-for-tat killings across the province.

The situation deteriorated throughout the rest of 1998. Increasing numbers of Serb security forces were deployed to conduct violent operations against the KLA and its supporters. As the death toll mounted, refugees started to flow out of Kosovo, many with stories of Serb atrocities.

International involvement

Fearing a return to the excesses of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, and suspecting the Serbs of mounting a new campaign of ethnic cleansing to drive the Albanians out of Kosovo, NATO governments warned Milosevic that...
Serb forces would once again be targeted by airstrikes if they did not withdraw. This prompted the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to remind NATO that it must seek a UN Security Council mandate for any military intervention in Kosovo. Confident that his Russian ally would veto such a move, Milosevic pressed ahead with his ‘counter-terrorist’ campaign in the province.

By October, following intense diplomatic efforts at the UN and by the United States special envoy Richard Holbrooke, Milosevic’s confidence that NATO would not act without a UN mandate had waned. He agreed to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Serb forces, to be verified by international monitors from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

But within a few weeks the ceasefire broke down and violence resumed, culminating in the massacre of 45 Kosovo Albanian farmers at Račak on 15 January 1999 — a reprisal for the killing of four Serb policemen. Convinced that, as in 1995, only military action — or the threat of it — would force the Serbs into a lasting agreement, on 30 January NATO issued a statement that ‘the NATO Secretary General may authorise air strikes against targets on [FRY] territory’ to ‘[compel] compliance with the demands of the international community and [to achieve] a political settlement’.

The Rambouillet Accords

A peace conference was convened at Rambouillet in France a few days later, involving the Serbs, Russia, the Kosovo Albanians and NATO. The talks lasted six weeks and led to the Rambouillet Accords, which called for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous province within Yugoslavia; a force of 30,000 NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory, including Kosovo; and immunity for NATO and its agents from Yugoslav law.

But, there was actually no accord — the Serbs and the Russians refused to sign, saying they could accept a large degree of autonomy for Kosovo and a UN peacekeeping mission, but not the presence of NATO forces. Scarred by UN failures in Bosnia, however, the NATO governments were unwilling to involve it in Kosovo and so the talks failed.

The NATO air campaign

NATO airstrikes against targets in Serbia began on 24 March — the first time in the alliance’s history that it had attacked a sovereign nation that posed no military threat to any of its members. The air campaign, whose aims were summed up in six words — ‘Serbs out, peacekeepers in, refugees back’ — split international opinion.

Some called the entire action a war crime as it was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council, but a Russian motion condemning the bombing was defeated in the UN Security Council by 12 votes to three. Others pointed out that the air campaign was simply provoking further Serb action against civilians and exacerbating refugee flows. Additionally, various civilian targets in Serbia were hit, including the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the headquarters of Radio Television Serbia, killing 16 employees. The campaign also failed in its aim of bringing the Serbs quickly to heel, lasting 78 days.

However, on 9 June NATO signed a Russian/Finnish-brokered agreement with Milosevic that was, in essence, the Rambouillet Accords policed by NATO under UN control. The air campaign was suspended the next day. At the same time the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, authorising a NATO-led military force in Kosovo, KFOR, and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
KFOR troops began their deployment in Kosovo on 12 June and Serb forces withdrew completely by 20 June.

**Aftermath**

Kosovo Albanian refugees started to return soon after KFOR deployed. As they did revenge attacks on Kosovo Serbs began, prompting a flow of Serb refugees in the opposite direction. By December 1999, over 810,000 Kosovo Albanians had returned to the province and some 250,000 Kosovo Serbs had fled.

Kosovo declared full independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 17 February 2008, prompting a massive, largely peaceful protest in Belgrade. The declaration was challenged as illegal by Serbia in August 2008 in the International Court of Justice. In 2010, the International Court of Justice found by a vote of 10-4 (with China not participating) that the declaration of independence did not violate international law.

Very few Serb refugees have returned to Kosovo and those who remain live in a number of small enclaves scattered throughout the country.
The United Nations (UN) Charter established six principal organs of the UN, the:

- General Assembly;
- Security Council;
- Economic and Social Council;
- Trusteeship Council;
- International Court of Justice; and
- Secretariat.

The UN also encompasses 15 agencies and several programmes and bodies.

The General Assembly is the main deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the UN. Comprising all 193 Members of the UN, it provides a forum to discuss all the international issues covered by the Charter.

The Security Council — see Annex H.

The Economic and Social Council oversees the UN’s initiatives towards global economic, social and environmental challenges.

The Trusteeship Council was established to supervise the administration of UN Trust Territories. Its operation was suspended on 1 November 1994 following the independence of Palau, the last remaining such territory.

The International Court of Justice is the UN’s principal judicial organ and sits in The Hague. Its role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by UN bodies and agencies. The Court is composed of 15 judges, who are elected for terms of nine years by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The Secretariat — an international staff led by the Secretary-General — carries out the day-to-day work of the UN. Working in duty stations around the world, it services the other principal organs of the UN and administers the programmes and policies laid down by them.

The Secretary-General is the ‘Chief Administrative Officer’ of the UN, who acts in that capacity and performs ‘such other functions as are entrusted’ to him or her by the Security Council, General Assembly and other UN bodies. The Charter also empowers the Secretary-General to ‘bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in their opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security’. Through the use of their ‘good offices’ they may also undertake various public and private initiatives but have no power, other than the authority of their office and their personal qualities of impartiality and integrity, to bring about any particular outcome.

The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council, for a five-year renewable term. Their selection is, therefore, subject to the veto of any of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
Annex H — The UN Security Council

The UN Security Council (UNSC) has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and may meet whenever peace is threatened. It comprises 15 members:

- five permanent members — China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States — each of whom has the right to veto any Council decision; and
- ten non-permanent members, elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly (five each year).

Members take turns at holding the presidency of the Security Council for one month, and meetings may be called at any time when the need arises.

The Security Council recommends to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and the admission of new Members to the UN. Additionally, together with the General Assembly, it elects the judges of the International Court of Justice.

All members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the UN make recommendations to member states, only the Security Council has the power to make decisions that member states are then obliged to implement under the Charter.

How the Council operates

All members of the UN have the right to bring a complaint to the Security Council concerning a threat to peace. When this happens the Council’s first action is usually to recommend that the actors try to reach agreement by peaceful means. It may:

- set forth principles for such an agreement;
- undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;
- dispatch a mission;
- appoint special envoys; and
- request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council’s primary concern is to bring them to an end — as soon as possible. In that case, the Council may:

- issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict; or
- dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate opposing forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.

Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including:

- economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans;
- severance of diplomatic relations;
- blockade; and/or
- collective military action.

A chief concern is ‘to focus action on those responsible for the policies or practices condemned by the international community, while minimizing the impact of the measures taken on other parts of the population and economy’.

The responsibility for implementing the decisions of the Security Council lies with the Secretariat, led by the Secretary-General.
Non-Council member states

More than 60 United Nations member states have never been members of the Security Council. A State which is a member of the United Nations but not of the Security Council may participate, without a vote, in its discussions when the Council considers that that country’s interests are affected. Both members and non-members of the United Nations, if they are parties to a dispute being considered by the Council, may be invited to take part, without a vote, in the Council’s discussions; the Council sets the conditions for participation by a non-member State.
Annex J — The Rwanda Genocide, 1994

The Rwanda genocide has its roots in the long and often troubled relationship between the country’s two dominant groups — the Hutu and the Tutsi. For much of that history the minority Tutsi were in charge, although rich Hutus could be accepted as part of the elite. Tutsi status was strengthened when Rwanda became first a German and then a Belgian colony — the Europeans considered the Tutsi to be the superior race and exercised control through them.

When Rwanda became an independent country in 1962, the roles reversed. After decades of, at times violent, resentment, the majority Hutu purged the Tutsi from public life, killing many and prompting thousands more to flee to neighbouring countries. Tutsi exile groups gradually coalesced into the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which began a civil war with the Hutu government of President Juvenal Habyarimana in 1990.

The Arusha Accords, signed in August 1993 brought an end to three years of fighting and formed a power-sharing government. The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was set up two months later to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords.

However, a number of prominent Hutus were unhappy that the Tutsi RPF had been brought into the government. In January 1994 the UNAMIR Force Commander, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, alerted the UN Secretariat that he had received credible information of preparations for a possible genocide of Tutsis by government-backed Hutu militia. The warning was not shared with the UN Security Council, however, and Dallaire was not allowed to take pre-emptive action — UNAMIR had been mandated under Chapter VI and could only use force if attacked. Instead, Dallaire was instructed to confront President Habyarimana with the information and insist he take steps to disrupt any activity that would jeopardise the peace process. Dallaire received assurances from Habyarimana that he would investigate the alleged plot but heard no more about it.

On 6 April 1994, the plane carrying Habyarimana and the Hutu president of Burundi back to Rwanda from a regional conference was shot down on its approach to Kigali airport, killing all on board. The perpetrators were never conclusively identified but the murder of Tutsis and moderate Hutus started within hours of the crash.

One of the first victims was the prime minister, who on the death of the president had become the head of government. An escort of five Ghanaian and ten Belgian peacekeepers, sent to protect her, was captured and disarmed. The Ghanaians were released but the Belgians were driven away, tortured and brutally killed, an act that prompted the Belgian government to withdraw the rest of its large contingent.

With UNAMIR gravely weakened and the genocide gathering pace, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali offered the UNSC three options — strengthen UNAMIR with more men and a Chapter VII mandate, withdraw it completely, or leave a small group of 270 men to try to broker a ceasefire between the Tutsi RPF, who had taken up arms again, and the Hutu government.
The UN Security Council chose the third option. There was no desire to become actively involved in what was being described as an African civil war, especially within the US administration, which had just completed withdrawing US troops from Somalia following the ‘Black Hawk Down’ debacle six months earlier.186 A few days after the killing began, Belgian, French, Italian and US forces intervened briefly to evacuate foreign nationals, but during most of the genocide Dallaire, and what was left of UNAMIR, struggled alone to save as many people as they could.

In late June, the UN Security Council controversially authorised a French-led Chapter VII mission, Operation Turquoise, to establish a safe zone in the southwest of the country. Critics argued that:

- it undermined UNAMIR, which should have been strengthened;
- it did nothing to stop the killing of Tutsis, even within the safe zone;
- the zone encouraged refugee flows and allowed Hutu killers to escape; and
- the operation’s real purpose was to blunt the RPF’s advance, since France backed the Hutu government.

The Operation Turquoise mandate expired in late August and the force left.

The genocide continued for approximately 100 days, until 18 July, when the RPF finally prevailed over the Hutu government forces. The number of dead has been estimated at between 500,000 and 1.1 million — no one kept a count of the victims.

The victory of the RPF prompted a mass exodus of Hutus, many of whom had been actively involved in murdering their Tutsi neighbours. The flow of some two million refugees into the surrounding countries, especially Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), has destabilised the entire Great Lakes region, where fighting continues. The First and Second Congo Wars (1996-97 and 1998-2003) are estimated to have claimed some five million lives.

There are also well-documented reports of systematic Tutsi reprisal killings of Hutus, both within Rwanda and during attacks on refugee camps outside the country.

An independent inquiry commissioned by the UN in 1999 was blunt in its criticism:

“The overriding failure in the response of the United Nations before and during the genocide in Rwanda can be summarized as a lack of resources and a lack of will to take on the commitment which would have been necessary to prevent or to stop the genocide. UNAMIR, the main component of the United Nations presence in Rwanda, was not planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed in a way which provided for a proactive and assertive role in dealing with a peace process in serious trouble. The mission was smaller than the original recommendations from the field suggested. It was slow in being set up, and was beset by debilitating administrative difficulties. It lacked well-trained troops and functioning materiel. The mission’s mandate was based on an analysis of the peace process which proved erroneous, and which was never corrected despite the significant warning signs that the original mandate had become inadequate. By the time the genocide started the mission was not functioning as a cohesive whole; in the real hours and days of deepest crisis, consistent testimony points to a lack of political leadership, lack of military capacity, severe problems of command and control and lack of coordination and discipline.”

186 See Annex L.
The inquiry concluded that responsibility for the UN’s failure to prevent the genocide lay ‘with a number of actors, in particular the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, the Security Council, UNAMIR and the broader membership of the United Nations’. The failure warranted ‘a clear apology by the Organization and the Member States concerned to the Rwandan people’.

Inspired by the overthrow of the government of neighbouring Liberia by the forces of Charles Taylor, and supported by them, in March 1991, Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started a war to topple the government of Sierra Leone. The former British colony had achieved independence in 1961 but the country’s elite had been responsible for years of corruption, economic mismanagement, poverty and oppression. It soon became clear, however, that the rag-tag RUF were a ‘cure’ far worse than the disease.

Their brutality towards enemies and civilians alike – mass rape, hacking off limbs and enslaveing child soldiers were common practices – coupled with the incompetence of the government forces, saw the RUF by the end 1991 in control of two-thirds of the country, including its diamond fields. While the RUF traded these ‘blood diamonds’ for more arms through Taylor in Liberia, the loss of revenue to the government and the dire situation facing the country prompted the army, in April 1992, to mount a coup.

For the next three years chaos ruled. Fighting continued, with both the RUF and government forces increasingly preying on the civilian population – ordinary Sierra Leoneans dubbed the government forces sobels, ‘soldiers by day, rebels by night’.

Gradually, the RUF gained the upper hand and advanced on the capital, Freetown. The government appealed to the international community for help but none came. In desperation, in April 1995 it hired a company of South African mercenaries, Executive Outcomes, to defeat the RUF and regain control of the diamond fields. The results were dramatic. Thanks to Executive Outcomes’s superior weaponry and tactics, eight months later the diamonds were back in government hands and Sankoh was suing for peace.

Bowing to international pressure, the government was forced to hold the election it had promised after the 1992 coup, and in March 1996, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah became Sierra Leone’s first directly elected head of state. He immediately engaged in the ongoing peace talks with Sankoh, which led to the Abidjan Peace Accord being signed in November 1996.

Six months later Kabbah was in exile. With Executive Outcomes now out of the country — a condition of the Accord — a small group of disaffected soldiers calling itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) had staged another coup. However, the AFRC had very little support so invited the RUF into government — though without Sankoh, who was under house arrest in Nigeria for illegally trying to buy arms.

There followed a reign of terror as AFRC/RUF forces literally raped and pillaged the country. These developments were too much for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Its military force, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), had intervened briefly on the government’s side back in 1991 and were still using parts of the country as a base to fight Charles Taylor’s regime in Liberia. Supported by the international community, ECOWAS demanded the return of Kabbah’s government and threatened economic sanctions and renewed military action if the AFRC/RUF did not comply.
Forced to the negotiation table, in October 1997 the AFRC/RUF signed the Conakry Peace Plan and promised to reinstate Kabbah by the following April. But, almost at once the AFRC/RUF sought a delay and ECOWAS decided that only military action would settle the issue.

On 2 February 1998 a Nigerian-led ECOMOG force launched an offensive against the AFRC/RUF (who were supported by Ukrainian mercenaries) in Freetown and, after ten days of fighting, took the city. President Kabbah and his government were formally reinstated on 10 March.

ECOMOG’s success was marred by atrocities committed against fleeing AFRC/RUF fighters and anyone suspected of supporting them, including women and children. In addition, the ECOMOG advance out of Freetown was soon bogged down by logistical difficulties and stiff AFRC/RUF resistance. The desire of the AFRC/RUF to fight on was strengthened by the Kabbah government’s execution of 24 AFRC leaders. Sankoh, the RUF leader, was also repatriated from Nigeria, tried and sentenced to death.

In July 1998, the UN Security Council finally intervened. The United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), comprised of 70 unarmed military observers and 15 medical personnel, was charged with monitoring the general security situation in the country, and overseeing the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of the former combatants ‘in secure areas of the country’. They were also to keep an eye on ECOMOG, who were nevertheless in charge of UNOMSIL’s own security.

In January 1999, the AFRC/RUF hit back. They infiltrated Freetown and in a surprise attack caught ECOMOG off guard. (There are allegations that some ECOMOG commanders were bribed by the AFRC/RUF) UNOMSIL quickly withdrew and, in disarray, ECOMOG was sucked into an orgy of violence. Discipline was restored when reinforcements arrived and after three weeks of street fighting the AFRC/RUF retreated, leaving 10,000 people dead, 150,000 homeless and large parts of Freetown razed to the ground. They also abducted some 3,000 women and children.

ECOMOG’s mandate did not extend beyond securing the Kabbah government in Freetown, however, and the Nigerian government wanted to bring its troops home. With the AFRC/RUF a continuing threat outside Freetown and no military option at hand, the UN and its partners decided that they had no choice but to broker another peace deal.

The Lomé Peace Agreement of July 1999 freed Foday Sankoh from death row, made him vice-president and put him in charge of the body overseeing Sierra Leone’s diamond mines. It also pardoned the remaining AFRC leaders and granted an amnesty to AFRC and RUF fighters. In return, the AFRC/RUF agreed to disarm and disband all their forces. To oversee this process the UN Security Council mandated the United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which unlike UNOMSIL had a substantial military component — 6,000 troops initially, rising eventually to 17,500.

The Lomé Peace Agreement was highly controversial, both within Sierra Leone and internationally, and it soon began to break down.

Although UNAMSIL had been mandated under Chapter VII, its commander limited the use of force to self-defence and the protection of civilians only if ‘under imminent threat of physical violence’. Disarmament of the AFRC/RUF was slow, patchy or non-existent and there were frequent clashes with UNAMSIL. These culminated, on 4 May 2000, in the AFRC/RUF ‘detaining’ more than 500 UNAMSIL soldiers and seizing their weapons and armoured personnel carriers, which they started to drive towards Freetown. Terror gripped the capital.
Fearing the collapse of UNAMSIL and a return to anarchy, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appealed to the UK, as the former colonial power, to intervene. Operation Palliser saw UK elite forces deploying to Freetown within days, under a Commonwealth (not UN) mandate to rescue international non-combatants. Once that was completed, and acting on his own initiative, the UK force commander Brigadier David Richards (who ultimately became the UK’s Chief of Defence Staff) expanded the UK role to that of supporting Kabbah and leading the defence of Freetown against the AFRC/RUF advance. The AFRC/RUF were routed when they met UK forces on 17 May.

This engagement and the capture the same day of Foday Sankoh — in hiding after his bodyguards had killed a number of protestors outside his Freetown villa — proved to be the beginning of the end for the RUF. It began to fracture and when it lost its funding source, thanks to the 2001 UN-led international embargo on ‘conflict diamonds’, more and more RUF fighters joined the DDR process. Breaking the RUF was helped by the UK’s strengthening of UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Army through improvements to leadership, command structures and training.

On 18 January 2002, Kabbah declared the war officially over. Sankoh died in July 2002 after a stroke, while awaiting trial by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). Charles Taylor was convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in April 2012 of eleven charges of aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes against humanity, and sentenced to 50 years in prison.

The civil war saw nearly half the country’s 4.5 million population internally displaced, with a further 500,000 people believed displaced in neighbouring countries. At least 50,000 people died in the fighting, and there were an estimated 100,000 victims of mutilation. The economy and the country’s infrastructure both collapsed.
Annex L — Black Hawk Down: Somalia, 1993

In January 1991, after a four-week battle in the Somali capital Mogadishu, rebels ended the 21-year dictatorship of Mohamed Siad Barre. His fall saw the effective dissolution of the Somali state. The army and the country’s security forces were disbanded, and a complex fight for power ensued between various rival clans. The breakdown in law and order also led to widespread criminality and banditry.

The civil war, combined with a drought, severely reduced food production, leading to some 300,000 deaths by early 1992. More than two million people — half the population — were judged to be at serious risk of starvation, malnutrition or related diseases, with a further one and a half million judged to be at moderate risk and one million refugees in neighbouring countries. Food had become a prized commodity and international food aid was regularly looted by rival clans and criminal gangs to be sold or traded for arms.

In March 1992, the main parties to the conflict — General Mohamed Farrah Aidid and ‘President’ Ali Mahdi Muhammad (his status was disputed) — agreed to a UN-brokered ceasefire. The UN Security Council then mandated the small UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) to monitor the agreement and oversee humanitarian relief activities.

UNOSOM’s 50 monitors arrived in July 1992 and confirmed ongoing reports that the ceasefire was not being observed. Fighting had escalated, food aid was still being stolen and starvation was increasing. The UN Security Council responded by mandating a larger UNOSOM force, but most of the troops were never actually sent.

In Somalia, the situation continued to worsen, including attacks on UNOSOM itself. The relationship with Aidid grew especially strained over UN control of Mogadishu airport when his militia openly fought the Pakistani UNOSOM battalion there.

In December, the UN Security Council accepted a United States (US) offer to lead a substantially strengthened force to stabilise the situation. This United Task Force (UNITAF — dubbed by the Americans ‘Operation Restore Hope’) was given a Chapter VII mandate to use ‘all necessary means’ to ensure the protection of the relief efforts. UNOSOM would meanwhile continue its responsibility for humanitarian assistance and the political aspects of the mission.

The 37,000 strong UNITAF began its deployment on 9 December and was largely successful. The delivery of food and other aid was protected, the overall level of violence decreased and the UN started to broker a new ceasefire between the rival factions. On 27 March 1993, in the Addis Ababa Agreement, the clans pledged to end the armed conflict, to reconcile their differences through peaceful means and to hand over all of their weapons to UNITAF and then UNOSOM II. This was the beefed-up Chapter VII UN mission that would oversee implementation of the Agreement once UNITAF withdrew, secure continued relief efforts and work with the parties to restore peace and rebuild the Somali state and economy.

However, following the transition to UNOSOM II in early May 1993 the Agreement started to unravel. Aidid’s forces would not surrender their weapons and on 5 June carried out a series of attacks on UN troops. In the worst incident, 25 Pakistani peacekeepers were
Black Hawk Down: Somalia, 1993

killed. Outraged, the UN Security Council passed an emergency resolution calling for the detention and trial of those responsible, while UNOSOM II began to take aggressive military action against Aidid’s forces. An arrest order was made for Aidid himself, but he eluded capture.

The situation deteriorated further as the actions of UN and US forces led to growing numbers of Somalis being killed and wounded, including women and children, whom the UN Security Council accused the rival militia of using as human shields.

The efforts to apprehend Aidid culminated on 3 October 1993, when an elite force of US Rangers sought to capture two of his key aides during a special operation in Mogadishu. The raid should have been completed in half an hour but two US Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and the Rangers were besieged in a bloody fight for 17 hours. When they were finally evacuated — along with their captives — they had lost 18 men, with 84 wounded. The mutilated bodies of some of the dead US personnel were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by a jubilant mob, an event shown by news media around the world. It is thought that hundreds of Somalis also died in this ‘Battle of Mogadishu’, although the actual number is not known.

Responding to public anger and revulsion in the US, four days later President Clinton announced that all US forces would be withdrawn from Somalia in six months. Aidid’s forces soon declared a unilateral ceasefire and UN attempts to broker a lasting peace between the rival factions restarted.

In the following months, a number of agreements were reached, only to be broken, and after the US withdrawal the prospects of UNOSOM II achieving its goal of rebuilding the Somali state became increasingly remote. In November 1994, the UN Security Council decided that UNOSOM II would end by the following March.

Although a transitional government was established in Somalia in 2004, and was succeeded by a permanent federal government in 2012, civil war continues in the country, now between the government and the militant Islamist group Al-Shabaab.
Annex M — The Fall of Gaddafi: Libya, 2011

Protests in Benghazi in February 2011 sparked a rebellion that soon became nationwide. By mid-March, however, the rebellion looked to be on the point of defeat — government forces had turned the tide and were at the gates of Benghazi, the rebel stronghold. Fearing a civilian massacre — Gaddafi had promised to show ‘no mercy or compassion’ to those who resisted his forces — and for the first time citing Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the UN Security Council passed a Chapter VII resolution on Libya (UNSCR 1973), voting ten in favour, with five abstentions (including Russia, China and Germany). Among other things, this established a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace and authorised relevant member states ‘to take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’.

Almost at once, this passage became the subject of intense debate.

Some — notably those leading and supporting the military response — argued that it made all Libyan government forces legitimate targets, whether they were active or not, since their very existence posed a threat to ‘civilians and civilian populated areas’. Others argued that this interpretation stretched the remit of UNSCR 1973 far beyond what was intended and was, in fact, cover for the real aim of the military responders and their allies — regime change, since this interpretation would lead to the destruction of all Libyan government forces and the victory of the rebels. Effectively, the UN would be bringing down the legal government of a member state.

Whatever the motives of the nations that enforced UNSCR 1973, the fall of Gaddafi seems to have confirmed the suspicions of the Russians and Chinese that their permanent five (P5) partners on the UN Security Council could not be trusted when it came to other people’s conflicts. The result has been, among other things, P5 stalemates over Syria and Ukraine and continued instability and violence in Libya.
Annex N – Confrontation analysis

Based on game theory and drama theory, confrontation analysis was originally developed as a structured means of understanding complex disputes (‘confrontations’), identifying the interrelated dilemmas they contain and then formulating effective strategies for dealing with them. Confrontation analysis starts with three questions:

- participants — who is involved?
- positions — what are they saying they want to happen?; and
- threatened future — what are they saying they will do if nobody moves and do others believe them?

The answers generate a series of problems for each of the participants, which are classified as dilemmas of persuasion, trust, cooperation, threat and rejection. Possible strategies are then offered to eliminate each of the dilemmas.

These include:

- presenting your opponent with rewards and threats to change their position;
- convincing them of your position;
- changing things so that their position becomes irrelevant;
- undermining or blocking their position; and
- changing your position.

The consequences of following each possible strategy are then analysed to judge whether it eliminates the dilemma or produces further dilemmas. If the latter, these are then used to generate further strategies.

In this way, confrontation analysis can be used to game-play the probable and possible responses of each participant to a developing series of different scenarios. Advocates of confrontation analysis believe that it tends to encourage ‘win-win’ decision-making and reduces the likelihood of violent outcomes.
Annex P — Peacebuilding pathways

This graphic — developed by John Paul Lederach and Katie Mansfield — illustrates the main components and subcomponents of the field of peacebuilding and their relationship to each other.

The inner circle highlights the three major areas of strategic peacebuilding:

- efforts to prevent, respond to, and transform violent conflict;
- efforts to promote justice and healing; and
- efforts to promote structural and institutional change.

The outer circle highlights sub-areas of focus within those three areas. A variety of pathways emerge each of these sub-areas.

Restorative justice

- Addressing historical and ongoing harms against indigenous people
- Community-based restorative justice
- National restoration processes (addressing historical structural harm)
- Prison system reform

Transitional justice

- International Criminal Court or tribunals
- Justice to address mass atrocity and human rights
- National and local justice processes
Peacebuilding pathways

**Trauma healing**
- Child soldier reintegration
- Collective community healing
- Refugee resettlement and services
- Trauma therapy and counselling/social support
- Victim support and reparations

**Humanitarian action**
- Crisis health care and social services
- Human rights protection and monitoring
- Humanitarian advocacy and law
- Humanitarian emergency response
- Information management for relief operations
- Public health work related to structural and physical violence

**Government and multilateral efforts**
- Civil-military relations
- Demobilisation and disarmament
- Diplomacy
- Intergovernmental organisations
- Peace processes
- Policy analysis and implementation
- Post-conflict reconstruction

**Nonviolent social change**
- Active nonviolence
- Community organising, mobilisation or social action/movements
- Issue-based educational campaign
- Media/journalism/writing
- Minority and marginalized empowerment and civil rights advocacy

**Dialogue/conflict resolution strategies**
- Arts-based approaches to social transformation
- Conflict monitoring and early warning
- Cross-cultural contact programs
- Inter-faith, inter-ethnic and intercultural dialogue
- Language interpreting or teaching
- Local peacebuilding institutes and training
- Mediation or dispute settlement
- Reconciliation
- Violence prevention or resolution

**Education**
- Adult and civic education
- Applying gender lenses to peace and conflict
- Building peaceable schools
- Educational reform initiatives
- Investigating cultural and structural violence
- Leadership development and training among disadvantaged groups
- Service learning
- University-based peace studies/peace education/peace research
- Vocational schools

**Development**
- Economic development
- Gender equality work
- Housing and urban development/redevelopment
- Human and social development
- Local and international development
• Microfinance and small business development
• Strengthening democratic institutions and participation
• Sustainable development, sustainable agriculture

Dealing with transnational and global threats
• Corruption and organised crime
• Cultural and structural violence
• Economic and social injustice
• Environmental degradation and climate change
• Gender exclusion and gender-based violence
• Genocide and mass violence
• Human rights violations
• Human trafficking
• Imperial domination
• Nuclear and small arms proliferation
• Poverty, hunger and homelessness
• Terrorism
• War

Law: advocacy and solidarity
• Family law and domestic violence protection
• Human rights law
• Immigration law, immigrant services and education
• Indigenous cultural preservation, solidarity and rights
• International law and policy work
• Labour and employment law/protection
• Land issues
• Migrant justice, migration and human trafficking
• Work with youth: Child protection, rights, services
Annex Q — Major arms control treaties and agreements

- Arms Trade Treaty — Establishes common international standards for regulating the international trade in conventional arms, and seeks to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion, March 2013.
- Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) — Treaty by which states agree to ban all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes, September 1996.
- International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), November 2002.
- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) — an informal and voluntary association of countries that share the goals of non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; originally established in April 1987.
- New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) — Treaty between the USA and the Russian Federation, with the formal name ‘Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms’, April 2010.
• Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – Treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, July 1968.

• Open Skies Treaty – Treaty to establish a program of unarmed aerial surveillance flights over the entire territory of its participants, designed to give all participants a direct role in gathering information about military forces and activities of concern to them, March 1992.


• Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) – Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, April 1976.


• South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), August 1985.

• Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) – Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 1972.

• Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II) – June 1979.

• Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) – Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 1991.

• Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) – Treaty Between the USA and the Russian Federation on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, January 1993.

• Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) – Treaty Between the USA and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, June 2003.

Annex R — Endorsing organisations

ACTION for Conflict Transformation
Action for Sustainable Change
Action on Armed Violence
Afghan Health and Development Services
Alliance for Peacebuilding
CDA Collaborative Learning Projects
Centre for Sustainable Development and Education in Africa
Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
Community Policing Partners for Justice, Security and Democratic
Conciliation Resources
Cordaid
Every Casualty Campaign
FemLINKPACIFIC
GADET-Pentagon
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
Global Alliance on Armed Violence
Global Witness
Human Rights First Rwanda Association
Igarapé Institute
International Alert
Integrity Action
Interpeace
Life and Peace Institute
Oxford Research Group
PAX
Peace Training and Research Organisation
Quakers United Nations Office
Saferworld
Southern African Liaison Office
War Child
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
Women Peacemakers Program
World Vision
Annex S — How were the Sustainable Development Goal targets selected?

The Sustainable Development Goal targets were agreed upon by a group of civil society organisations that are directly or indirectly engaged in the fields of conflict prevention, violence reduction and peacebuilding in a range of countries. The group agreed on several criteria to inform their selection of targets.

1. Are the targets outcome focused?

The group agreed that if the framework is to drive meaningful change, targets need to look beyond institutions and processes and instead focus on outcomes for people.

2. Do the targets address the drivers of conflict?

The group agreed that if the new framework is to promote peace that is sustainable, targets need to focus beyond the symptoms of violent conflict and insecurity and address their underlying drivers. As peacebuilding is a multidimensional endeavour, it was agreed that peace cannot only be achieved through four or five specific targets, but rather should be integrated across the framework.

3. Are the targets measurable?

The group agreed that targets must be measurable. Therefore, all targets have been included on the basis that relevant indicators either exist or could be developed. Where appropriate, they have been worded in quantifiable terms. However, data to indicate the baseline for each target should be established before an ambitious, but achievable, level of progress can be established in quantitative terms at national level. Non-quantified targets have provisionally been worded as 100% targets, unless it is unrealistic to do so.

In order to prevent horizontal inequalities between social groups and regions — shown to be a key driver of conflict — all indicators in the framework should be disaggregated to the greatest extent possible, for example between gender, class, income, age, ethnicity, caste, region and religious groups.

4. Are the targets broad enough?

In relation to the above, it may be necessary to avoid overly simple peace-related targets. ‘Single-indicator’ targets that appear clear and easily measurable may in some cases contradict most available guidance on formulating peace-related targets and indicators. Often, the most appropriate way to measure peace-related targets is to use a basket of at least three indicators that together measure three key aspects of a target:

- capacity to address the issue at stake;
- the ‘objective’ situation in society; and
- most importantly, the perceptions of all social groups on security, justice and other key peace-related issues.
5. Are the targets appropriately contextual and nationally relevant/applicable?

Targets need to encourage positive progress across all contexts if they are to be conflict sensitive. With this in mind, it is envisioned that context-specific baselines and benchmarks for progress should be established and agreed at the national level. This will provide the flexibility required to make sure that targets are relevant to all contexts and conflict sensitive.

6. Are the targets ambitious but achievable?

The group decided to prioritise ambitious targets that go beyond business-as-usual to drive change. Targets should clearly set the direction of travel — but nationally-owned baselines and benchmarks will allow states to retain autonomy to plan and sequence their own development progress.

7. Is the target based on widely-accepted evidence?

The group agreed that its targets must be based on evidence and widespread consensus that they are of universal importance to preventing conflict, reducing violence and fostering sustainable peace around the world.

8. Do the targets have a powerful message that is easy to understand?

It was agreed that targets should be accessibly and sensitively worded, in order to communicate effectively to all people and social groups and inspire action.
## Annex T – Analysis of prevention tasks

This grid, based on the main components and subcomponents of the field of peacebuilding (as identified in Annex P), illustrates how military actors might contribute to upstream prevention. It is by no means inclusive and is offered as a basis for further discussion.

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<th>Activity</th>
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<th>Military &gt; Civilian</th>
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<td>Must do</td>
<td>Can do</td>
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<tr>
<td>Restorative justice</td>
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<td>• Addressing historical and ongoing harms against indigenous people</td>
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## Analysis of prevention tasks

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## Analysis of prevention tasks

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<td>• Work with youth: Child protection, rights, services</td>
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Annex U — Glossary

Some terms commonly used in peacebuilding and conflict management

alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
A collective term for various means of settling disputes without litigation, for example, arbitration and mediation. A neutral third party is often involved in alternative dispute resolution.

arbitration
A method of resolving a dispute in which the actors present their case to an impartial party, which then makes a (usually binding) decision that resolves the conflict.

civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)
The coordination and cooperation, in support of a specific mission, between military and civil actors, who can include the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.

civil society
Refers to ‘the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations [e.g.] community groups, non-governmental organisations, labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations and foundations.’ 188

Comprehensive Contact Team
Refers to a coordinated multi-agency group of actors — internal and/or external — using the comprehensive approach to facilitate and support a local prevention solution.

compromise
A solution to a mutual problem that meets some, but not all, of each of the actors’ interests.

conciliation
Conciliation involves efforts by a third party to improve the relationship between two or more disputants. It may be done as a part of mediation or independently. Generally, the third party will work with the disputants to correct misunderstandings, reduce fear and distrust, and generally improve communication between them. Sometimes this alone will result in dispute settlement; at other times, it paves the way for a later mediation process.

conflict management
A generic term for all aspects of engagement with conflict as a process. Also used to refer to the long-term containment of conflict to keep it from escalating.

conflict resolution
Usually refers to the process of resolving a conflict permanently i.e. to the satisfaction of all the actors involved.

conflict transformation
Refers to a change (usually an improvement) in the nature of a conflict, for example, a de-escalation or a reconciliation between

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188 World Bank definition.
people or groups. Whereas conflict resolution tends to focus on issues, conflict transformation includes a focus on the relationships between the people involved.

consensus
A process that demands the actors develop an agreement that is good enough (though not necessarily perfect) for all of them to agree to it.

context-driven
The principle of matching solutions to problems as the problems change. This means that the value of any practice depends on its context; there are good practices in context, but there are no ‘best practices’.

contradiction
Term used by Johan Galtung for an underlying conflict situation that includes the actors’ actual or perceived incompatible goals.

cultural violence
A term used by Johan Galtung to describe those aspects of societies that seek to legitimise, justify or normalise structural and direct violence through reference to religion and ideology, art and language, and empirical and formal science. See also ‘direct violence’ and ‘structural violence’.

de-escalation
Developments that reduce the intensity of a conflict. They can be conscious (for example, concessions or other placatory moves by one or more of the actors) or can come about because of the reduced capacity of the actors.

dehumanisation
The psychological process of making opposing actors seem less than human and therefore not worthy of humane treatment.

dialogue
The process of sharing and learning about another’s beliefs, feelings, interests and needs in a non-adversarial, open way, sometimes with the help of a third party. Unlike mediation, in which the goal is usually to resolve a conflict, the goal of dialogue is often simply improving understanding and trust between the actors.

diplomacy
Generally refers to the interaction between two or more nation-states, traditionally carried out by government officials, who act as advocates for their governments, and negotiate treaties, trade policies and other international agreements. The term has been extended to include unofficial exchanges of private citizens (such as cultural, scientific, and religious exchanges) as well as unofficial (sometimes called ‘citizen’ or ‘Track 2’) diplomacy in which private citizens try to help develop solutions to conflicts.

direct violence
A term used by Johan Galtung to describe behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage or kill someone or something. Direct violence might be perpetrated physically, through words, and through emotional or psychological pressure. See also ‘cultural violence’ and ‘structural violence’.

embedded actors
Actors indigenous to the conflict who seek to work towards its resolution or transformation.

empathy
The ability to understand and share the feelings of others. Empathy is generally thought to take two forms. ‘Affective empathy’ refers to sensations and feelings that arise in response to others’ emotions, for example, mirroring those emotions oneself. ‘Cognitive empathy’ — also known as ‘perspective taking’
— is the ability to identify and understand the emotions of others.

**empowerment**
The process by which a person or group gains more power, for example, through education, coalition building, community organising, resource development or advocacy assistance.

**escalation**
An increase in the intensity of a conflict. As a conflict escalates, the actors will adopt an increasingly polarised and confrontational stance. The number of actors tends to increase and the issues involved tend to broaden. Actors can change from simply wanting to win to wanting also to hurt the opponent.

**face-saving**
An approach that prevents the opposing actors (or oneself) appearing in a negative light. By allowing actors to save face, a negotiated settlement becomes more likely.

**facilitation**
Actions of a third party to help actors clarify their positions and to communicate with one another.

**force**
Pressure applied to actors to make them do something against their will. Force need not be violent. It can simply be the threat of a negative consequence if the actor does not comply with a demand.

**framing**
The process of defining an issue. Just as a frame can be placed around a photograph, including some parts of the picture but cropping others, framing tends to draw attention to some aspects of a conflict while ignoring others (see 'reframing' below).

**hard power**
The use of military, economic or political strength to persuade or force others to a particular course of action.

**human security**
The protection of individuals in their daily lives, encompassing freedom from fear of persecution, intimidation, reprisals, terrorism and other forms of systematic violence, as well as freedom from want of immediate basic needs such as food, water, sanitation and shelter.

**intervention**
Often used to mean the introduction of third party armed forces into a conflict but more widely can refer to any third party involvement in a dispute; for example, unarmed civilian peacekeeping is a form of intervention.

**lose-lose situations**
Game theory makes a distinction between positive-sum 'games' (situations) which everyone can win (also referred to as 'win-win'), negative sum games in which all sides lose (also referred to as ‘lose-lose’) and zero-sum games in which one side wins only if another side loses.

**mapping**
The process of determining who the actors are in a conflict, how they relate to each other and what their positions, interests and needs are. It also involves the determination of external constraints and any other factors that define the conflict. Also called ‘scoping’.

**mediation**
A method of conflict resolution carried out by a neutral third party who works with the disputing actors to help them improve their communication and analysis of the conflict, so that they can design a solution themselves.
multi-track diplomacy
The idea that international exchange can take many forms beyond those between official diplomats. Examples of multi-track diplomacy include official (Track 1) and unofficial (Track 2) conflict resolution efforts, which can sometimes be combined (Track 1½); and grassroots citizen and scientific exchanges, business negotiations, cultural and athletic activities and other international contacts and cooperative efforts (Track 3).

narrative (strategic)
The idea that effectively telling a story that explains unfolding events can also influence the events themselves. The ‘strategic’ element of the narrative lies in understanding how to develop, and enact, a story whose internal logic induces its various audiences to behave in ways that will lead to a desired outcome.

nation-building
A term widely used during the period of decolonisation to describe the process of forging national identity, often from a highly diverse population, to transcend subordinate loyalties. See also ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘state-building’.

national security
The protection of a state’s territorial integrity and its institutions and interests from both internal and external threats.

negative peace
The condition that exists when there is the absence of direct violence. See also ‘positive peace’.

negotiation
The process of bargaining between two or more actors to find a solution to a conflict. Seeking a solution that is mutually beneficial is called ‘win-win’ or cooperative bargaining.

Seeking to prevail over opponents is called ‘win-lose’ or adversarial bargaining.

non-violence
The principle that conflict should be managed, resolved or transformed without recourse violence in any of its forms. See also ‘cultural violence’, ‘direct violence’ and ‘structural violence’.

peacebuilding
Actions taken to reduce the risk of actors lapsing or relapsing into violent conflict. It works by (i) strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and (ii) laying the foundation for sustainable peace and development by addressing in a comprehensive manner the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict. See also ‘nation-building’ and ‘state-building’.

peace enforcement
The application, under the authority of the UNSC, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force, to restore peace and security in situations where the UNSC has judged there to be a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.

peacekeeping
Efforts to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Contemporary peacekeeping incorporates many elements — military, police and civilian — working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

peacemaking
Actions taken to address conflicts in progress and bring hostile actors to a negotiated agreement. Peacemaking efforts may be undertaken by a wide range of actors including various agencies of the UN, governments, groups of states, regional
organisations, unofficial and non-governmental groups, community leaders and prominent personalities working independently.

**polarisation**
The movement of actors in a conflict towards increasingly irreconcilable positions; it is both a cause and an effect of escalation.

**positive peace**
The condition, founded on equality and mutual respect, which seeks to manifest the inherent potential of all individuals and where direct, structural and cultural violence have been removed.

**principled negotiation**
An approach to negotiation that calls for ‘separating the people from the problem’, negotiating on the basis of interests rather than positions, identifying options for mutual gain, and using objective criteria to judge the fairness of any proposed settlement.

**problem-solving approach**
The process of working cooperatively with other actors to solve a common problem based on identifying and seeking to meet the underlying human needs. It can be contrasted with the adversarial approach which views the other disputants as opponents or enemies to be defeated.

**reconciliation**
The normalisation of relationships between people or groups. According to John Paul Lederach, it involves four simultaneous processes — the search for truth, justice, peace and mercy/forgiveness. When all four of these factors are brought together, he says, reconciliation is achieved.

**reframing**
The process of redefining a situation to see a conflict in a new way, usually based on input from others with a different perspective. Also see ‘framing’.

**restitution**
Payment in cash or kind to a person or group for harm that was done to them. Although lost lives can never be replaced, making a symbolic payment of money, giving social or economic assistance, or otherwise trying to alleviate damage or harm that was done can help resolve a conflict and move the actors towards reconciliation.

**soft power**
The ability to attract and co-opt others to a particular course of action, rather than induce their cooperation with rewards or simply by coercing them.

**stabilisation**
The efforts made — often by intervening actors — during or after a period of violent conflict to reduce violence and return the affected society to normal life, repair damaged infrastructure and political institutions, and begin the process of reconciliation. Stabilisation efforts can be contested if conflict actors perceive them as favouring opponents.

**stakeholders**
Those who are involved in a conflict, who are or will be affected by it, or by how it might be resolved.

**stalemate**
A situation in a conflict in which no actors are able to dominate or where negotiation has stalled. Often actors must reach a stalemate before they are willing to negotiate a resolution to their conflict and/or invite in external mediators.
state-building
Efforts to (re)build self-sustaining institutions of governance capable of delivering the essential public goods required to underpin legitimacy as perceived by citizens. See also 'nation-building' and 'peacebuilding'.

structural violence
A term used by Johan Galtung to describe the inequality, exploitation and oppression of people that is formally or informally embedded within societies in their structures and systems. See also ‘cultural violence’ and ‘direct violence’.

sustainable peace
A term that can mean to establish national security or both national and human security.

tactical escalation
A deliberate move by one or more actors to intensify a conflict in an attempt to gain some perceived advantage.

theory of change
In general, a theory of change defines all the elements required to bring about a given long-term goal. In conflict management and peacebuilding, it defines what practitioners identify as the key elements that need to change — and how — for conflict to be resolved or transformed.

third party
An impartial person or body who tries to help the actors find a solution or at least communicate better. Examples of third parties are mediators, arbitrators, conciliators and facilitators.

triggering event
An event that initiates a conflict or that brings a hidden or frozen conflict into view.

win-lose (adversarial) approach
An approach that assumes that the conflict is a contest in which the other actors are adversaries who must be defeated.

win-win (cooperative or problem-solving) approach
An approach that assumes conflict is a joint problem that can be solved by the disputing actors cooperating to find a 'win-win' solution i.e. one that satisfies all the disputants.

zero-sum games or situations
Situations in which one side benefits only if the other side loses; for example, when there is a finite amount of a resource to be distributed. This often triggers a win-lose approach.
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Finland
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Royal United Services Institution
Understand to Prevent

The military contribution to the prevention of violent conflict

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